

January 14, 2015

Aaron Donaldson, #355077
Allendale C.I.
P.O.Box 1151
Fairfax, SC 29827

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court
P.O.Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211

RECEIVED

JAN 20 2015

RE: Donaldson v. State of South Carolina
Appellate Case No. 2014-0012108

S.C. SUPREME COURT

002108


Dear Mr. Shearouse:

Enclosed please find the original of the Supplemental Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the above-captioned matter. We would appreciate it if you would file the original and return the clocked copy to me.

By copy of this letter to opposing counsel, we are hereby serving the Counsel with a copy of this document.

Thank you for your assistance.

Very truly yours,



Aaron Donaldson, #355077

cc: J.Croom Hunter, Esq. Attorney for Respondent
Robert M. Pachak, Attorney for Petitioner

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

CERTIORARI TO LANCATER COUNTY
WILLIAM JEFFREY YOUNG, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Arron J. Donaldson,

Petitioner,

vs.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2014-~~0012108~~

002108

SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OTHER COUNSEL OF RECORD:

J. Croom Hunter, Esq.
S.C. Attorney General Office
1000 Assembly Street, Room 519
Columbia, SC 29201

Robert M. Pachak, Appellate Defender
S.C. Commission on Indigent Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
P.O. Box 11589
Columbia, SC 29211-1589

Arron J. Donaldson, #355077
Allendale C.I.
P.O. Box 1151
Fairfax, SC 29827

Pro Se Petitioner

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

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ISSUE PRESENTED

- GROUND A. The Solicitor committed a "Procedural Error" by Unlawfully Impaneling its Grand Jury outside the Statute [14-5-700 Sec.3].
- GROUND B. The State have failed to produce one single grain of physical evidence that place's [SIC] the Petitioner in Williams Financial Service on October 18, 2012, which is even another "element" required to prove [Armed Robbery]?
- GROUND C. Trial Counsel failed to adequately investigate the petitioner's charges, failed to investigate and interview potential witnesses and failed to give his client adequate legal advice prior proceeding.
- GROUND D. Did the Trial Judge err by the pronouncement of sentence from the bench and Trial Court failed to personally signed their own Order?

STATEMENT

In January 2013, Lancaster grand jurors indicted petitioner for Armed Robbery. Petitioner was tried during the April 2013 term of the Lancaster County Court of General Sessions before the Honorable J.Ernest Kinard, Jr., in Lancaster County and pled guilty to armed robbery. A ten (10) year sentence was imposed. William P. Frick, Esquire, was plea counsel. William Nowiki, was the Assistant Solicitor. (App.p.1-p.11).

Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief on September 6, 2013 Respondent filed a Return dated March 19, 2014. (App.p.12-p.27). An Evidentiary Hearing was held on July 29, 2014, before the Honorable W.Jeffrey Young. Petitioner was present and was represented by W.Michael Hemlepp, Jr. Esquire. Respondent was represented by Croom Hunter, Assistant Attorney General. Both Petitioner and Plea Counsel testified at the hearing (App.p.28-p.54). On September 16, 2014, Judge Young issued an Order denying and dismissing Petitioner's application for post-conviction relief. (App.p.55-p.63).

This petition follows.

ARGUMENT

**GROUND A. The Solicitor committed a "Procedural Error" by Unlawfully
Impaneling its Grand Jury outside the Statute [14-5-700
Sec.3].**

SUPPORTING FACTS AND ARGUMENT

The Petitioner humbly contends that the Solicitor did commit a [Procedural Error] and [Contempt of the Proceedings] by unlawfully impaneling its Grand Jury outside of the Jurisdiction of the Court of General Sessions. Here, the General Assembly did not make a provision in [14-5-700 Sec.3], for a [Term of Court for January in the Court of General Sessions.

On the one hand, the Solicitor failed to comply with the Statute [14-5-700 Sec.3]. Which is a [Contempt] of the Proceedings. This is the Petitioner most basic and fundamental right by Federal and State Laws pertaining to Due Process and the United States Constitution. The indictment of South Carolina against the Petitioner is a violation of Federal and State Laws related to Due Process because it possesses a [Constitutional Structural Error in that the language and/or charge contained therein is constructed to produce conclusion presumption(s) that immediately shift the burden of persuasion upon the Petitioner in regard to the crucial elements of the offense(s) and take away the Petitioner's preemption of innocence.

In the case at hand the indictment reads as follows:

- **At a Court of General Sessions, convened on January 10, 2013 the Grand Jurors of Lanchester County present upon their oath:**

Nevertheless, there is a significant practical difference between the indictment and the Statute [14-5-700 Sec.3], this Statute is without a provision for January [Term of Court]; the Solicitor committed a "Procedural Error" by violating the contractual obligations contained within the Statute [14-5-700 Sec.3] because South Carolina Statutory Law provides "only" for the follows Term of Court:

- S.C.Code Ann.§ 14-5-700 Sec.3 Lancaster County.- The Court of General Sessions for Lancaster County shall be held at Lancaster on the first Monday in February for a two-week term, the fourth Monday in April the third Monday in September and the Second Monday in November for a two-week term.

On the other hand, nowhere in the S.C.Code Ann.§ 14-5-700 Sec.3 does legislature provide for the Month of January within the Statute. As a result, the Solicitor committed a Constitutional Structural Error by unlawfully impaneling its Grand Jury on January 10, 2013, the statutory construction of 14-5-700 Sec.3 and Legislature history is very clear and ambitious. Landmark cases Ex Parte Lilly, 7 S.C. 372, 1876 WL 5977. See also, State v. Henderson, 134 S.E.364, 136 S.C. 363, (S.C.Aug.16,1926), the S.C. Supreme Court corroborate the "Term of Court" that set forth in Legislature Statute [14-5-700 Sec.3].

In the present case, it is obvious that the Solicitor impaneled its Grand Jury in the Court of Common Pleas. The Term of Court for January is in the Court of Common Pleas. Pursuant to S.C.Code Ann.§ 14-5-700 Sec.(3):

- The Court of Common Pleas shall be held in Lancaster beginning on the third Monday in January, the third Monday in March the first Monday in April, the Second Monday in May, the Second Monday in September, the fourth Monday in October and the Second Monday in December.

Thus, under those requirements, NO rules can be made or established for process and return of indictments, unless it comports with Section 14-5-700 Sec. (3) and Section 14-9-210. Otherwise, it would be Unconstitutional and Null, being without binding legal effect.

Additionally, it should be noted that the Court of Common Pleas is vested with NO authority to take any action on matters pertaining to return of true-bill criminal indictments. "The Court is made up of the Court of Common Pleas which hears Civil Actions and the Court of General Sessions which hears Civil Actions-

and the Court of General Sessions which hears criminal cases..." See Dove v. Gold Kist Inc., 314 S.C. 235,442 S.E.2d 598 (SC 1994); see also SC Constitution Article V § I.

Thus, there is no grant of concurrent jurisdiction, and therefore NO true bill criminal indictments can be lawfully issued through grand jury proceedings held before a Court of Common Pleas.

Lastly, it should also be noted that a Circuit Court Judge retains NO authority on his own standing to conduct and oversee grand jury proceedings outside the bounds of a lawfully convened Court of General Sessions.

One additional piece of evidence very clearly settles the matter of State's FALSE condition. The information contained in the indictment, also establishes that no special term of the Court of General Sessions was convened on January 10, 2013 under the provisions of either section 14-5-400, Section 14-5-910 or Section 14-5-920. Citing, State v. Gosset, 117 S.C. 76, 108 S.E. 290 (S.C. 1921), the Power to call a special term of the Court of Common Pleas and General Sessions, conferred on the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Presiding Associate Justice.

Therefore, recognizing the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Section 14-9-210, mandating the only process allowed for impaneling a lawful grand jury, and often consideration of the facts and evidence presented above, it became apparent that the Petitioner was indicted outside the jurisdiction of the Court of General Sessions and by a mode of procedure that State had no lawful authority to adopt.

When a legislative enactment limits the manner in which something may be done, the enactment also evinces the intent that it shall not be done another way. Thus, since the Court utilized an unlawful mode of procedure not allowed under Section 14-5-210, State lacked the requisite jurisdiction to complete return of its true-billed indictment.

As established above, Section 14-9-210 is clearly a jurisdictional Statute, and sets forth mandatory procedure to be utilized by State for lawful return of a true-billed indictment. A substantial body of South Carolina law holds that a failure to-

comply with Statutory law jurisdictional in nature deprives the Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, State v. Lee, 564 S.E.2d 372 (SC App. 2002).

In the present case, it should be noted that the code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 2 (A), states, "A judge shall respect and comply with the law, and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes Public, confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."

ARGUMENT

GROUND B. The State have failed to produce one single grain of physical evidence that place's [SIC] the Petitioner in Williams Financial Services on October 18,2012, which is even another "element" required to prove [Armed Robbery]?

SUPPORTING FACTS AND ARGUMENT

The Petitioner humbly contends subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of general class to which the proceedings in questions in question belong Bells v. Monanto Corp, 579 S.E.2d 325 (SC 2003); Inasmuch the Court's Power to hear and determine a case. Subject Matter Jurisdiction does not only cover and or involve whether or not the matter resides in a proper Court of Jurisdiction to hear and determine it, but also involves any issue that may affect that Power and or ability to act in accordance to law, these issue above can be raised at any time, can not be, waived by the Defendant and the Court shall not fail to take notice Brown v. State, 342 S.C. 342,540 S.E.2d 846 (2001). Here, the Solicitor offered no evidence. As a result, the Solicitor withholding of material evidence, even "without guile," was a denial of due process and that there were valid theories on which the confession might have been admissible in Brady's defense. The holding that suppression of exculpatory evidence violated Brady's right to due process. App. 10. Line 4-6:

- The Court Mr.Frick, have you explained to him if he went to trial he could move to suppress the confession and all of that stuff?

The Petitioner into an unlawfreely, unknowingly, involuntary and unintelligently given guilty plea that has the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion, violates Due Process and is ground for an acquittal even if its embodied within an indictment.

App. 65. Clearly there is nothing cited by law that mandates that these strict rules of Court and requirements of law be solely limited to a Judge's Charge. They apply to any charge place before the Court or the Petitioner in order to manipulate, mentally and/or psychologically coerce and/or force him into a plea. Such a heavy weight of shifting the burden of persuasion and the takes away of one's presumption of innocence by the indictment(s) of South Carolina have been unjust and unconstitutionally used against the Petitioner in the State of South Carolina to mentally and/or psychologically coerce and/or force them into plea bargains and at their Trials, for far too long.

To further elaborate the Petitioner was never place in a lineup to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person in the "video" was the Petitioner. Here, the victim (Judy Bake) never identify the Petitioner to be the perpetrator of this allege crime. As a result, there was no photo identifications conduct by the Police, to establish probable cause to arrest the Petitioner. See Neil v. Biggers Supra.

App. 34. Line 13-25:

Q. Okay. Tell me what you told Mr.Frick about the defense.

A. I was telling him there was a witness that was— that wrote a statemen saying that I didn't match description— match the description. And there was a camera, and seen the individual going to the store and put his hands on — on the door. And the prints came back. They weren't my prints.

I was not caught with a weapon and— and I didn't have nothing to do with it. And the victim, I believe she also said that I did not match the description. And there was no photo lineup; there was no voice lineup; and there was nothing. And I was trying to aware him of this, but all he would say is that in Court I could probably be found guilty. And I felt like I had a strong belief that I would not have been found guilty.

This information exonerating the Petitioner was not available at the trial or the first post-conviction relief hearing on Sept. 16, 2014. The Petitioner's right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and South Carolina Law was denied as a result of the evidence and misconduct of the Police and Solicitor with regard to the evidence. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Solicitor has an affirmative Duty to make available to the defense any-

ARGUMENT

GROUND C. — Trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the petitioner's charges, failed to investigate and interview potential witnesses and failed to give his client adequate legal advice prior proceeding.

SUPPORTING FACTS AND ARGUMENT

The Petitioner contends it is well established by the United States Constitution, the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Trial Counsel failed to conducted an investigation into the Petitioner case. The Petition asserts that Mr.Frick "failed to investigate the circumstances regarding Mr.Frick's statement to the Police Officers to determine whether or not it could be challenged." Here, Mr.Frick did not file a Motions, upon the Petitioner's behalf.

Moreover, the fact that Mr.Frick was appointed to represent the Petitioner, and the Petitioner's plea of guilty to Armed Robbery was entered on April 15, 2013, caste a degree of doubt upon the adequacy of Mr.Frick's investigation, especially where, as here, Mr.Frick's conclusion that no grounds existed to exclude the statement. Citing State Ex Rel. Strogen v. Trent, 469 S.E.2d 7 (W.VA. 1996), in Strogen, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that decisions of Petitioner's Counsel were not based on adequate or reasonable investigation, and therefore Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Certainly, an investigation of the case must precede the making of decisions with regard to the representation of a defendant in a criminal case. In particular, the Court recently observed in State ex rel.Daniel v.Legursky, 195 W.VA. 314, 320, 465 S.E.2d 416,422 (1995), that in applying the Strickland test, Courts have had "no difficulty finding ineffective assistance of counsel where an attorney neither conducted a reasonable investigation nor demonstrated a strategic reason for failing to do so." Syllabus point 3 of Daniel states:

- ° The fulcrum for any ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the adequacy of counsel's investigation. Although there is a strong presumption that counsel's

° conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, counsel must at a minimum conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him or her best to represent criminal clients. Thus, the presumption is simply inappropriate if counsel's strategic decision are made after an inadequate investigation.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

LAW

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Lamar v. State,— S.E.2d— 2008 WL 2874456, S.C. 2008 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 [citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)]. In Strickland, the Supreme Court outlined counsel's responsibility to provide effective assistance and established a two-part test for determining whether counsel was ineffective. Counsel is ineffective if his effort were objectively unreasonable as measured against prevailing professional norms and counsel's errors were prejudicial. *Id.* at 688-94. Prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the proceeding would have had a different result. *Id.* at 694. A "reasonable probability" is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." *Id.*

"There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgement in making all significant decision in the case." Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331, 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007).

In a PCR proceeding, the Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he or she is entitled to relief. Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103, 109, 525 S.E.2d 514 (2000). "In the context of a challenge to a guilty plea, a PCR applicant must establish both that his plea counsel's representation was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient representation, the petitioner would not have pled guilty." James v. State, 377 S.C. 81, 83-84, 659 S.E.2d 148, 149 (2008). When alleging that his guilty plea was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel, an petitioner must prove that counsel's advice was not "within the competence demanded of attorneys criminal cases." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed. 2d 203 [1985]. "In determining guilty plea issues, it is proper to consider the guilty plea transcript as well as evidence at the PCR hearing." Suber v. State, 371 S.C. 554, 558, 640 S.E.2d 884, 886 [2007].

WHETHER COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFEICIENT

Trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below minimum professional norms in a number of ways:

1. There is no substantial doubt that trial counsel failed to even consider offering alibi witnesses for the time perior during which the Armed Robbery was to have taken place.
2. Trial counsel failed to fully advise the Petitioner of all the consequence of this plea and further failed to investigate potential defenses against the charges against the Petitioner.
3. Counsel failed to properly investigate the case, prepare the case and gave inadequate advise to Petitioner.
4. Ineffective Assistance of trial court supporting facts: Counsel Failed to Adequately put up a meaningful defense by conducting an investigation on the case, in order for the Petitioner to make an informed decision to plead guilty. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct.130^o (U.S. 2012)
5. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Ensures the Fairness of all Critical Stages of a Criminal Prosecution, Including Plea Negotiations, Not Just the Fairness of Trial.
6. Counsel failed to file pre-trial and post trial motions such: pre-trial motion accordingly to S.C. Code Ann.§ 17-19-20, and 30, for the purposes of having the indictments quashed, dismissed, and or charges induced in the situated effect accordingly to the mandates as: S.C.Const Art. I § 11,, State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494.; U.S. v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,122 S.Ct. 1781,152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), challenges to its sufficiency must be made in accord. With § 17-19-90 (2003).

Simply put, the Solicitor has failed to present any competent evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that there was a "total failure and omission to provide a investigation by the Trial Counsel" or that "the ineffective assistance of counsel rendered was so inadequate as to surpass mere ineffective assistance of counsel and to shock the conscience." Missour v. Frye Supra.

ARGUMENT

GROUND D. Did the Trial judge err by the pronouncement of sentence from the bench and Trial Court failed to personally signed their own Order?

SUPPORTING FACTS AND ARGUMENT

The Petitioner humbly contends that the [Trial Judge] committed a [Constitutional structural error] in the pronouncement of sentence from the bench. App.10.Line 21-24. In cases where there is a direct conflict between an unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment and commitment, this Court has uniformly held that the oral pronouncement, as correctly reported, must control. The only sentence that is legally cognizable is the actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant. United States v. Jarratt, 471 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hicks, 455 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.1972). In the present case, the trial judge made no oral pronouncement of sentence from the bench. The rule that the oral pronouncement controls in a pronouncement of sentence.

Simply put, it appear that the trial judge did not personally signed his own Court Order. The S.C. Supreme Court held In R.E. Smith, 559 S.E.2d 584. In this case the Court ruled that the judges must personally sign their own Court Orders. Exhibit [A] will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Honorable Ernest Kinard did not personally signed his own Court Order on April 15,2013.

This legal framework and foundation being firmly in place, the Court is compelled to look at the facts in regard to this case sub-justice because the law arises from facts (Ex Facto Oritur Jus). The trial judge must personally sign their own court orders.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated herein above, it is respectfully requested that this Honorable Court grant the Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Certiorari for a new trial.

This the 14 day of January, 2015



Arron J. Donaldson, #355077

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

Certiorari to Lancaster County
William Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge

Aaron J. Donaldson,

Petitioner,

vs.


State of South Carolina,

Respondent

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2014-002108

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy a true copy of the Supplemental Petition for Writ of Certiorari and a copy of the Exhibit in this case have been served on J. Croom Hunter, at Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201; and Robert M. Pachak, Appellate Defender S.C. Commission on Indigent Defense Division of Appellate Defense, P.O. Box 11589, Columbia, SC 29211-1589 this 14th day of January 14, 2015.



Aaron J. Donaldson, #355077

SWORN TO BEFORE ME

This 14 day of January, 2015


(L.S.)
Notary Public for South Carolina

My Commission Expires: 2/17/2021

COUNTY OF horry
STATE

VS.

INDICTMENT/CASE#: 2013 -GS- 29 - 35

AKA: Aaron Jami Donaldson

AW#: 2012A2910100639

Race: B Sex: M Age:

Date of Offense: 10-18-12

DOB: 3-11-93 SS#:

S.C. Code §: 16-11-330(A)

Address: Hagins St.

CDR Code #: 0139

City, State, Zip: Rock Hill, SC 29730

DL# * SID#

SENTENCE SHEET

*CDL Yes No CMV Yes No Hazmat Yes No

In disposition of the said indictment comes now the Defendant who was TO: Armed Robbery

CONVICTED OF or PLEADS

In violation of § 16-11-0330(A) of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 0139

NON-VIOLENT VIOLENT SERIOUS MOST SERIOUS Mandatory GPS (CSC w/minor 1st or Lewd Act) §17-25-45

The charge is: As indicted, Lesser Included Offense, Defendant Waives Presentment to Grand Jury. (def.'s initials)
The plea is: Without Negotiations or Recommendation, Negotiated Sentence, Recommendation by the State.

ATTEST:

[Signature] 70432 X [Signature] [Signature] 69775
Solicitor SC Bar # Defendant Attorney for Defendant SC Bar #

WHEREFORE, the Defendant is committed to the State Department of Corrections County Detention Center, for a determinate term of 10 days/months/years or under the Youthful Offender Act not to exceed _____ years and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided that upon the service of _____ days/months/years and or payment of \$ _____; plus costs and assessments as applicable*; the balance is suspended with probation for _____ months/years and subject to South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services standard conditions of probation, which are incorporated by reference.

CONCURRENT or CONSECUTIVE to sentence on:

The Defendant is to be given credit for time served pursuant to S.C. Code §24-13-40 to be calculated and applied by the State Department of Corrections.

The Defendant is to be placed on Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect pursuant to S.C. Code §17-25-135.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 922, it is unlawful for a person convicted of a violation of Section 16-25-20 or 16-25-65 (Criminal Domestic Violence) to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm or ammunition.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS:
 RESTITUTION: Deferred Def. Waives Hearing Ordered

PTUP

Total: \$ _____ plus 20% fee: \$ _____

_____ days/hours Public Service Employment

Payment Terms: _____

Obtain GED

Set by SCDPPPS _____

Attend Voc. Rehab. Or Job Corp. _____

Recipient:

*Fine:		\$	_____
§14-1-206 (Assessments 107.5%)		\$	_____
§14-1-211 (A)(1)(Conv. Surcharge)	\$100	\$	_____
§14-1-211 (A)(2)(DUI Surcharge)	\$100	\$	_____
§56-5-2995 (DUI Assessment)	\$12	\$	_____
§56-1-286 (DUI Breath Test)	\$25	\$	_____
Proviso 47.9 (Public Def/Prob)	\$500	\$	_____
§14-1-212 (Law Enforce. Funding)	\$25	\$	_____
§14-1-213 (Drug Court Surcharge)	\$150	\$	_____
§50-21-114 (BUI Breath Test Fee)	\$50	\$	_____
§56-5-2942(J) (Vehicle Assessment)	\$40/ea	\$	_____
Proviso 90.5 (SCCJA Surcharge)	\$5	\$	_____
3% to County (if paid in installments)	\$	\$	_____
TOTAL		\$	_____

May serve W/E beginning _____
Substance Abuse Counseling
Random Drug/Alcohol Testing
Fine may be pd. in equal consecutive weekly/monthly pmts. of \$ _____ Beginning _____
\$ _____ Paid to Public Defender Fund


Other: _____

Appointed PD or appointed other counsel, §47.12 requires \$500 be paid to Clerk during probation.

Clerk of Court/Deputy Clerk [Signature]
Court Reporter: [Signature]
SCCA/217 (03/2011)

Presiding Judge [Signature]
Judge Code: 2017
Sentence Date 4-15-13

Aaron Donaldson # 355077
Attendale Correctional Institution
P. O. Box, ~~MSI~~ MSI Hwy 47
Fairfax, Sc 29827



UNITED STATES POSTAGE
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Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court
Post office Box 11336
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

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JAN 15 2015

MAILROOM
ACI