

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF BEAUFORT
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

CASE NO. 2013 CP-07-03048

2014 NOV 17 PM 3:50

PHILLIP C. SHAW

RECEIVED

JEFFREY C. MOSS, Ed.D.

PLAINTIFF(S)

FEB 25 2015

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by: MASTER IN EQUITY

SC Court of Appeals

Attorney for : Plaintiff, Defendant
or
 Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. See Page 2 for additional information.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit); Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j), SCRPC; Bankruptcy; Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk :

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)
		\$
		\$
		\$

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

Circuit Court Judge

Judge Code

Date

11/17/14

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF BEAUFORT

PHILLIP C. SHAW,

Appellant.

v.

JEFFREY C. MOSS, ED. D.

Respondent.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 13-CP-07-03048

ORDER

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FEB 25 2015

SC Court of Appeals

2014 NOV 17 PM 3:55

Date of Hearing:	October 7, 2014
Presiding Judge:	Honorable Marvin H. Dukes, III
Attorney for Appellant:	Fatima Alexis Zeidan, Esquire
Attorney for Respondent:	Vernie L. Williams, Esquire
Court Reporter:	Deborah Thomas

This matter came to be heard before me on October 7, 2014 in the Beaufort County Court of Common Pleas for the purpose of hearing an Appeal filed by Appellant, Phillip Shaw, in which he appealed the Beaufort County School District Board of Trustees's ("Board") decision rendered on November 4, 2013 to terminate his employment with the school district. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter pursuant to §59-25-480 S.C. Code Ann. (2007). Appellant was represented by Fatima Alexis Zeidan, Esquire. Respondent was represented by Vernie L. Williams, Esquire. During the hearing, oral arguments and evidence were presented from both attorneys.

Phillip Shaw ("Shaw/Appellant"), a twenty-year veteran educator, began his employment with the Beaufort County School District as the principal of H.E. McCracken Middle School ("McCracken") in 2006. On November 8, 2012, he was placed on

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administrative leave. Superintendent Jeffery Moss (“Moss/Respondent”) recommended Shaw’s termination under S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-430 for reasons outlined in a letter to Shaw dated July 18, 2014. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-470, Shaw requested an evidentiary hearing in front of the Beaufort County School District Board of Trustees (“Board”). The hearing commenced on November 1, 2013 and concluded on November 4, 2013. On November 4, 2013, the Board voted to terminate Shaw in accordance with the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. §§59-19-90(2) and 59-25-430. A written order of the Board was executed on November 20, 2013. Shaw appealed the Board’s decision by the filing of this action on December 4, 2013 pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-480.

After hearing testimony and reviewing the evidence, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

- a. This action is governed by the South Carolina Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act (“Act”), S.C. Code Ann. §§59-25-410 to 530.
- b. This action was initiated pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 59-25-480 (1976).
- c. Appellant was employed by the Beaufort County School District from 2006 until his termination by the Board on November 4, 2013.
- d. Appellant was most recently employed by the district as the Principal of H.E. McCracken Middle School in Bluffton, South Carolina. (Although the Act references “teachers” it is agreed that it applies in this instance)

- e. Respondent is the superintendent of Beaufort County School District. Respondent became the superintendent on July 1, 2013.
- f. On November 8, 2012, Appellant was placed on administrative leave.
- g. On July 18, 2013, Respondent recommended Appellant's termination under S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-430.
- h. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 59-25-470, Appellant requested an evidentiary hearing with the Beaufort County School District Board of Trustees ("Board").
- i. The evidentiary hearing commenced on November 1, 2013 and concluded on November 4, 2013.
- j. On November 4, 2013, the Board voted to terminate Shaw in accordance with the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. §59-19-90(2) and §59-25-430.
- k. A written order of the Board was executed on November 20, 2013.
- l. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-480, Appellant appealed the Board's decision by filing this action on December 4, 2013.
- m. Appellant's appeals the judgment of the Board on the following grounds 1) The appellant was improperly terminated under S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-430; 2) The Board improperly found good and sufficient reasons existed to discharge Appellant as provided under S.C. Code Ann. §59-19-90(2); 3) The Board improperly found that Appellant manifested an evident unfitness for teaching under S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-430; 4) The Board improperly upheld objections to limit the testimony of a witness called by the Appellant; 5) The Board improperly allowed evidence of a lockbox to be

admitted; and 6) the Board improperly considered the fact that the appellant did not testify on his own behalf during the evidentiary hearing.

- n. The hearing regarding the appeal in this matter was held on October 7, 2014 at 10:00 a.m.

ANALYSIS

Review of a school board decision terminating a teacher's employment is normally limited to determining whether it is supported by substantial evidence. *Felder v. Charleston County School Dist.*, 327 SC 21, 25 (1997). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would accept to support an administrative agency's action. Substantial evidence exists when, if the case were presented to a jury, the court would refuse to direct a verdict because the evidence raised questions of fact for the jury. *Hamm v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n*, 315 SC 119, 122 (1993). "Substantial evidence" is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the Board reached or must have reached in order to justify its action. *Laws v. Richland County School Dist. No. 1*, 270 SC 492 (1978). The Administrative Practices Act gives the circuit court the authority to reverse an agency decision 'made upon unlawful procedure' or in excess of 'statutory authority.' *Adamson v. Richland County School District One*, 332 S.C. 121, 128 (1998).

I. §59-25-430, S.C. Code of Laws, 1976

Local school boards have the power to employ and discharge teachers. S.C. Code Ann. §59-19-90(2) (1990). This authority is codified in the South Carolina Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act (“Act”) , S.C. Code Ann. §§59-25-410 to 530. The Act governs the employment and dismissal of all continuing contract teachers in the South Carolina public school system. Among other things it empowers school boards to employ teachers and to discharge them “when good and sufficient reasons for doing so present themselves.” S.C. Code Ann. § 59-19-90(2)(1976). Our General Assembly permits the termination of a teacher’s employment—without affording a reasonable time for the teacher to rectify the offending behavior—only under certain narrow circumstances. *Hall v. The Board of Trustees of Sumter County School District No. 2*, 330 S.C. 402, 405 (1998).

§59-25-430 of the Act provides, “Any teacher may be dismissed at any time who shall fail, or who may be incompetent, to give instruction in accordance with the directions of the superintendent or who shall otherwise *manifest any evident unfitness for teaching...*” S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-430 (1990) (emphasis added). Other deficiencies or shortcomings, however, must be addressed by giving the teacher notice and a reasonable time for improvement. S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-440 (1978); *Adams v. Clarendon County Sch. Dist. No. 2*, 270 S.C. 266, 273 (1978). Failure to improve within this time constitutes a “good and sufficient” reason warranting the termination of employment. S.C. Code Ann. §59-19-90(2); *Adams*, 270 S.C. at 272-73. South Carolina appellate courts have upheld immediate termination only where evidence of unfitness for teaching was “undeniably and abundantly present.” *Kizer v. Dorchester County Vocational Educ. Bd. Of Trustees*, 287 SC 545 (1986).

Section 59-25-430 sets forth a non-exclusive list of examples of unfitness for teaching. Examples including “persistent neglect of duty, willful violation of rules and regulations of [the] district board of trustees, drunkenness, conviction of a violation of the law of this State or the United States, gross immorality, dishonesty, illegal use, sale or possession of drugs or narcotics.” S.C. Code Ann. §59-25-430.

Immediate termination under §59-25-430 has been used in rare circumstances. As stated in the *Hall* opinion, although the Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act contemplates “evident unfitness for teaching” to encompass a broad variety of deficiencies, the Act was also intended to prevent the abuse of a school board’s power of termination. *Adams* 270 S.C. at 272. Consistent with this requirement, South Carolina appellate courts have upheld immediate termination only where evidence of unfitness for teaching was “undeniably and abundantly present.” *Kizer v. Dorchester County Vocational Educ. Bd. Of Trustees*, 287 SC 545 (1986).

In *Kizer*, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a school board’s immediate termination where the teacher, among other things, referred to fellow teachers and students as “stupid,” obstructed the provision of emergency medical services for a pregnant student suffering a miscarriage, used profanity, and otherwise created a school environment filled with “turmoil, tension, conflict, fear and an absence of trust and respect. . . at war with the interests of society. *Id.* At 550-51.

The Supreme Court upheld immediate termination and extended unfitness for teaching regarding a teacher’s participation in an unauthorized student protest, contrary to

the specific directive of the principal that the students return to class. *Felder v. Charleston County School Dist.*, 327 S.C. 21 (1997). In *Hendrickson v. Spartanburg County School District Number 5*, 307 SC 108 (Ct. App. 1992), the Court of Appeals affirmed a teacher's immediate termination where the teacher slapped a student and could not maintain control of her temper or classroom.

The *Hall* Court went on to find, by contrast, when a teacher's conduct does not demonstrate unfitness for teaching of the type contemplated by the previously cited decisions, procedural safeguards must be followed to allow the teacher reasonable time to correct the problem. This delineation is an important one. As noted in *Johnson v. Spartanburg County School District Number 7*, "there must be a distinction between the cases or it renders the legislatures's intent to create procedural safeguards for educations a nullity." 314 S.C. 340, 343 (1994) (assistant principal demoted without an opportunity to modify offensive behavior and without being given notice that he risked demotion.)

Hall, a media specialist was immediately terminated under §59-25-430 of the Act, arising from her actions while supervising a senior class trip to Disney World. Hall checked in a different hotel than the students and failed to abide by an administrative directive not to discuss the matter with any other employees pending the closure of the investigation. The Court of Appeals held that "regardless of what common sense would appear to dictate, the immediate termination of a teacher with fifteen years experience for reasons unrelated to the discharge of her teaching responsibilities cannot be upheld under these circumstances." 330 S.C. 402, 408. When discussing Hall failing to abide by the administrative directive, the Court

held, “We find, however, that the Board produced insufficient evidence to show that Hall’s alleged insubordination demonstrated unfitness for teaching.” 330 S.C. 402, 409.

More recently, the Supreme Court in *Shell v. Richland County School District One*, ordered Shell reinstated after he was immediately terminated under §59-25-430 of the Act for being arrested for possession of crack cocaine. The Board found this arrest constituted an unfitness to teach; however, the Court overturned that ruling, holding that it was “insufficient to support a finding of unfitness to teach, especially when the school district does not contend Shell ever used, possessed, or sold illegal drugs.” 362 S.C. 408 (2005).

In the instant action, Moss recommended Shaw’s termination to the Board for reasons delineated in a letter dated July 18, 2013. The letter detailed ten (10) various district financial protocol violations that were determined to have been committed by two teachers and a secretary at McCracken. In the letter, Moss opined “if these transactions were occurring without your knowledge, you were not effectively managing the day-to-day operations of your school.” Moss also held that Shaw did not comply with the administration’s directive not to communicate with faculty and staff members of McCracken during his leave, as Shaw had received communications from a secretary at McCracken. Shaw previously informed Moss that the secretary had spoken with his wife while he was on leave, and Moss considered this “violating the spirit of the directive” Shaw given to Shaw. Additionally, Moss decided “after reviewing the information that was reported in the newspaper and comparing it with the concerns you expressed in our meeting, the information shared substantially similar to the statements attributed to you by a local

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newspaper regarding your issues with Ms. Ballard. You did not offer a satisfactory explanation of how the newspaper would be aware of your concerns if you did not share the information with the newspaper.” Moss also determined that Shaw was “purposely insubordinate” as he did not provide a physician’s statement “until it was requested a second time.” The letter went on to criticize Shaw regarding the “apparent delegation of authority that you gave to your secretary.” The Board, in their written order dated November 20, 2013, “agreed with the Superintendent’s judgment and recommendation in this matter.” The Board upheld Moss’s determination and held Shaw’s failure to supervise and his insubordination demonstrate his evident unfitness for teaching, thereby justifying his dismissal without providing him with a reasonable time for improvement .

The Board’s findings were insufficient to support a finding of unfitness for several reasons. First, the Board upheld Moss’s determination that there were ten separate violations of policies and procedures related to the handling of finances at McCracken. These violations stemmed from an agreement between Student Counsel sponsors and the Parent Teacher Organization. Counsel for Respondent admitted that the PTO is an independent organization not subject to governance by school administrators.

Included in the violations was the use of an unauthorized checking account for student activity purposes in the name of McCracken in which the school bookkeeper nor Shaw was familiar with. None of the ten financial allegations described in the termination letter contend that Shaw ever used any money, possessed any money, arranged or was involved in any of the financial violations.

The Board upheld Moss's determination that Shaw failed to comply with the administration's directive not to communicate with faculty and staff during the investigation. During the evidentiary hearing, no evidence was presented that Shaw spoke with any faculty or staff member. Instead, Moss assumed Shaw failed to comply based on his answers to questions and "violated the spirit of the directive" when Shaw's wife spoke with a secretary of McCracken. I defer to the Court's ruling in *Hall* regarding this matter, and contend there is no evidence that, even if true, Shaw's alleged subordination manifested an unfitness for teaching.

Next, the Board upheld Moss's determination that Shaw revealed to a local newspaper confidential, employment-related information concerning another employee. Moss concluded the sentiments attributed to Shaw were "substantially similar" to those expressed by Shaw within their meeting, therefore concluding Shaw must have given the newspaper the information. This conclusion is troublesome. First, even if the assumption is correct, there is no cited district policy in which Shaw was found to violate and there is no evidence that such violation would rise to a level of evident unfitness as a principal. Second, since this was merely an assumption reached by Moss and ultimately the Board, it does not rise to the "undeniably present and abundant" substantial evidence as required by *Kizer*.

The Order of the Board cited general concerns about how Shaw handled his administrative and medical leave; however, no district policy violations were cited and no conclusions were made by the Board that would indicate an evident unfitness for teaching. Likewise, in the Order the Board repeated Moss's concerns involving "questionable honesty

in discussing several of the Superintendent's concerns," which included knowledge about a lockbox allegedly found under Shaw's desk allegedly containing \$600 cash and personal items belonging to Shaw. Throughout the investigation, Shaw contended he had no knowledge of the contents of the lockbox. In his letter, Moss concluded that it was "reasonable" for him to find that the cash contained in the lock box confirmed cash transactions were being done on a routine basis and cash was being kept inside the school. No entity including the school or student council ever reported missing any funds. The financial handbook developed and distributed to all faculty and staff by the bookkeeper at McCracken and introduced into evidence at the hearing as complainant's exhibit 37 contained no mention of any school or district policies which prohibited leaving any amount of cash in a school overnight. Even if the Board "questioned" Shaw's honesty regarding these matters, there was an internal investigation done and the results did not yield any conduct by Shaw which would rise to the level of unfitness as teacher.

None of the teachers involved in the apparent violations of financial district policies were reprimanded in any way for their conduct. Likewise, neither was the school bookkeeper who admitted during the hearing receiving packages in which she did not order, signing for the receipt of those packages, and delivering those packages to the two teachers in charge of student council. The school bookkeeper also admitted to knowing the teachers were not in compliance with district and school financial policies, however, there was no evidence presented that she reported such violations to Shaw. There was also no evidence presented during the hearing that Shaw had knowledge of or had been formally trained in district finance procedure. Instead, a local high school principal testified on behalf of Shaw that

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given the workload and duties of an administrator, principals rely on the in-house school bookkeeper to keep them abreast of such policies. Absent direct evidence regarding the “questionable honesty” of Shaw in handling such matters, the scant evidence is insufficient to show Shaw’s unfitness for teaching within the meaning of §59-25-430.

The Board’s Order lastly sided with Moss regarding the “general overall poor administrative judgment in handling of matters at the school, including Shaw’s excessive delegation of authority to his secretary in the management of school affairs.” The generality of that assertion lends itself to no direct understanding of what the Board was referring to. During the hearing, there was testimony that Shaw worked closely with the designated principal’s secretary of McCracken; however, there was no evidence provided by the district that this working relationship was out of the norm or uncharacteristic. Further, there was no evidence by the District that Shaw had been advised of any concerns regarding the role and tasks assigned to the secretary. Testimony was provided by a staff member that a concern had been expressed to Shaw that the secretary needed to work from her own desk and that he had been instructed to move her office to another location. Testimony from witnesses at the hearing indicated Shaw complied with that demand.

The generality of the later three assertions by the Board in upholding Shaw’s termination is of concern, especially when attempting to convert them to show to an unfitness for teaching as §59-25-430 requires. Applying the substantial evidence test, there is no substantial evidence in the record to support that, even in the light most favorable to the district, Shaw manifested an evident unfitness for teaching. In fact, evidence presented at the

hearing demonstrated that Shaw had received a favorable evaluation from a superintendent just three months prior to him being placed on administrative leave. Moreover, after the investigation into the financial policy violations at McCracken concluded then-acting Superintendent Jacqueline Rosswurm decided not to terminate Shaw, but rather re-assign him to another school. This demonstrates that the district did not find that his actions manifested an evident unfitness for teaching.

The Board adopted all of Moss's findings in the Order. These findings are inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Act and the judicial precedent of the South Carolina Court System as it fails to demonstrate an unfitness for teaching. Shaw was improperly terminated under §59-25-430. The district provided no substantial evidence to show that any of the allegations against Shaw undeniably and abundantly manifested an evident unfitness for teaching as required by law. As such, the Board could not have found there was substantial evidence warranting Shaw's immediate termination. The more appropriate remedy under the Act, would to have been for the district to comply with the requirements of §59-25-440 in which when any superior finds it necessary to admonish a teacher for a reason they believe may lead to or be cited as a reason for dismissal, they must first bring the matters in writing to the attention of the teacher, make a reasonable effort to assist the teacher in correcting such issues, and allow reasonable time for improvement.

II. §59-19-90(2), S.C. Code of Laws, 1976

Local school boards have the power to employ and discharge teachers from authority codified in the South Carolina Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act , S.C. Code Ann.

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§§59-25-410 to 530. The Act governs the employment and dismissal of all continuing contract teachers in the South Carolina public school system. Among other things it empowers school boards to employ teachers and to discharge them "when good and sufficient reasons for doing so present themselves." S.C. Code Ann. § 59-19-90(2) (1976). As discussed herein, teachers may be dismissed immediately under §59-25-430 or after a reasonable period of correction under §59-25-440.

During the termination hearing, the district provided no substantial evidence to show that any of the allegations against Shaw undeniably and abundantly manifested an evident unfitness for teaching as intended by the General Assembly and interpreted by the case law of this State. As such, the Board could not have reasonably found that good and sufficient reasons existed to warrant his immediate termination.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

NOW THEREFORE, based on the evidence presented I find the following:

1. Appellant brought this action pursuant to Section 59-25-480, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, as amended.
2. Appellant was dismissed pursuant to §59-25-430, S.C. Code Ann., which reads in part, "Any teacher may be dismissed at any time who shall fail, or who may be incompetent, to give instruction in accordance with the directions of the superintendent, or who shall otherwise manifest an evident unfitness for teaching; provided, however, that notice and an opportunity shall be afforded for a hearing prior to any dismissal. Evident unfitness for teaching is manifested by conduct such


as, but not limited to, the following: persistent neglect of duty, willful violations of rules and regulations of district board of trustees, drunkenness, conviction of a violation of the law of this State or the United States, gross immorality, dishonesty, illegal use, sale or possession of drugs or narcotics.”

3. Based on the evidence presented, the statutory authority and relevant case law, the Board erred in finding the Appellant manifested an unfitness for teaching.
4. As the Board erred in finding Appellant manifested an unfitness for teaching, the Board further erred in finding that good and sufficient reason existed to terminate employment of Appellant.
5. As I reverse on the grounds stated hereinabove, it is not necessary to rule on the remaining grounds for appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUGED AND DECREED:

That the decision of the Board be REVERSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED



Marvin H. Dukes, III

Beaufort, South Carolina

Monday, November 17, 2014

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FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
 COUNTY OF BEAUFORT
 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

CASE NO. 2013 CP-07-03048

PHILLIP C. SHAW

JEFFREY C. MOSS

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by: BEAUFORT COUNTY MASTER IN EQUITY	Attorney for : <input type="checkbox"/> Plaintiff <input type="checkbox"/> Defendant
	or <input type="checkbox"/> Self-Represented Litigant

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 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other

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 FEB 25 2015
 SC Court of Appeals

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court:

THIS CAME BEFORE ME ON A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. AFTER HEARING FROM BOTH PARTIES I HEREBY DENY THE MOTION.

2015 FEB 10 PM 4:18
 BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C.
 CLERK OF COURT

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.
 Additional Information for the Clerk : *[Signature]*

INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC INDEX		
Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.		
Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)
		\$
		\$
		\$
If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:		

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest

or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

Circuit Court Judge

3069
Judge Code

2/12/15
Date

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on the 10th day of FEB, 2015 and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on this 17th day of FEB 2015 to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

FATIMA A. ZEIDAN

VERNIE L. WILLIAMS

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Dawn Allen - STAFF
CLERK OF COURT

Court Reporter: N/A

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FEB 25 2015

SC Court of Appeals