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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

S.C. Supreme Court

Certiorari to Marion County
William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2014-UP-366 (S.C. Ct. App. filed 10/29/2014)
2009-GS-33-0106

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

DARRELL LEE BIRCH,

PETITIONER

APPENDIX

LAURA R. BAER
Appellate Defender

ALAN WILSON
Attorney General

South Carolina Commission on Indigent
Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
PO Box 11589
Columbia, SC 29211-1589

JOHN W. MCINTOSH
Chief Deputy Attorney General

SALLEY W. ELLIOTT
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

WILLIAM M. BLITCH, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

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**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals**

The State, Respondent,

v.

Darrell Lee Birch, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-213215

Appeal From Marion County
William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-366
Heard October 14, 2014 – Filed October 29, 2014

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Carmen V. Ganjehsani, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blicht, Jr., all of Columbia,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Darrell Lee Birch appeals his convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and for possession of ecstasy, arguing the trial court erred in (1) refusing to suppress the drug evidence because his mere presence at a home lawfully searched did not create probable cause to search him, the officer

lacked reasonable suspicion for a *Terry*¹ stop and frisk, and the search exceeded the scope of a lawful pat-down when the officer forcibly removed Birch's hand from his pocket; (2) denying Birch's motion for a continuance; and (3) refusing to grant a mistrial because an officer's testimony constituted improper prior bad acts evidence. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. Regarding the trial court's denial of Birch's motion to suppress the drug evidence: *Michigan v. Summers*, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (holding officers executing search warrants are permitted to detain occupants until search is completed); *Muehler v. Mena*, 544 U.S. 93, 98-99 (2005) (permitting use of reasonable force to effectuate detention of occupants during execution of search warrant); *State v. Freiburger*, 366 S.C. 125, 132, 620 S.E.2d 737, 740 (2005) (holding full warrantless search of person is permitted if he has been lawfully arrested, and search is conducted in immediate vicinity of, and substantially contemporaneously to, arrest).
2. Regarding the trial court's denial of Birch's motion for a continuance: *State v. Yarborough*, 363 S.C. 260, 266, 609 S.E.2d 592, 595 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The granting of a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion."); Rule 7(b), SCRCrimP (stating no motion for continuance for absence of witness will be granted without sworn statement that witness' testimony is material, and due diligence has been used to procure witness); Rule 7(b)(2), SCRCrimP (requiring sworn statement concerning facts defendant believes absent witness would testify to and the grounds for such belief); *State v. Colden*, 372 S.C. 428, 438, 641 S.E.2d 912, 918 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding all aspects of Rule 7(b), SCRCrimP, are strictly required); *State v. McKennedy*, 348 S.C. 270, 280-81, 559 S.E.2d 850, 855-56 (2002) (finding defendant was not entitled to continuance when he failed to name any witnesses he wished to call, how they would be beneficial to his case, or identify any evidence that could be introduced if he had more time to prepare); *Skeen v. State*, 325 S.C. 210, 214-15, 481 S.E.2d 129, 131-32 (1997) (finding no reversible error for failure to request continuance because no evidence was presented that additional time to prepare would have made any possible impact on result).

¹ *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

3. Regarding the trial court's denial of Birch's motion for a mistrial: *State v. Stanley*, 365 S.C. 24, 33, 615 S.E.2d 455, 460 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge."); *State v. Thompson*, 352 S.C. 552, 561, 575 S.E.2d 77, 82 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding officer's single reference to warrants for the defendant "did not constitute sufficient prejudice to justify a mistrial"; holding vague reference to prior criminal record does not warrant mistrial when State does not attempt to introduce evidence accused has been convicted of other crimes); *State v. Wiley*, 387 S.C. 490, 496, 692 S.E.2d 560, 563 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding reference during opening statements to outstanding warrants did not justify mistrial); *State v. George*, 323 S.C. 496, 511, 476 S.E.2d 903, 912 (1996) (concluding judge's instruction to disregard statements suggesting defendant's possible involvement with drugs cured any alleged error; finding issue of whether denial of mistrial was proper to be unpreserved but noting appellant's "possible drug dealing was merely suggested and no testimony was presented concerning such behavior").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, SHORT, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Marion County
William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2014-UP-366 (S.C. Court of Appeals filed October 29, 2014)

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

DARRELL LEE BIRCH,

APPELLANT.

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2012-213215

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Appellant, Darrell Lee Birch, respectfully petitions the Court for a rehearing of its Opinion No. 2014-UP-366 pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR based upon the following points overlooked or misapprehended by the Court:

On October 29, 2014, this Court filed its unpublished opinion affirming Appellant’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession of ecstasy. In his appeal, Appellant argued that the officer’s search of Appellant’s person violated the Fourth Amendment and the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful search should be suppressed where:

1. Appellant’s mere presence at a private residence being searched pursuant to the consent of the homeowner did not provide probable cause for the officer to search Appellant;

2. the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity to justify an investigatory detention and frisk where Appellant was merely standing in the home being searched with his hand in his pocket and made no movements toward the officer; and
3. the officer exceeded the scope of a pat-down search of the outer clothing of Appellant where the officer forcibly removed Appellant's hand from his pocket.

In affirming the Trial Court's denial of Birch's motion to suppress the drug evidence, this Court cited to Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) for its holding that officers executing search warrants are permitted to detain occupants until the search is completed and Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) for its holding that use of reasonable force to effectuate detention of occupants during the execution of a search warrant is permissible.

Summers, however, does not authorize searches of individuals on premises being searched pursuant to a search warrant. Summers only authorizes requiring occupants to remain on the premises. Footnote 4 of the Summers opinion makes it clear that the United States Supreme Court was only addressing the detention and not the search of occupants. In Summers, the police did not search the defendant until after they had probable cause to arrest the defendant and had actually arrested him. 452 U.S. at 695 n.4. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) that a search warrant authorizing the search of a certain location does not give rise to probable cause to search that person.

It is also significant that in the Summers and Muehler cases, officers had obtained a search warrant for the search of the premises before entering and detaining the occupants. The Court in Summers observed that “[o]f prime importance” in accessing the detention was “the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent’s house for contraband.

A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there.” 452 U.S. at 701. A search warrant therefore provides objection justification for the detention because a judicial officer has already determined there is probable cause to believe that someone in the home has committed a crime and there is minimal intrusion to require a person to remain in his home while the search warrant is being executed.

In Appellant’s case, there was no search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. The search of the home was being conducted only on the consent of the homeowner. Furthermore, the officers in Appellant’s case did not just try to simply detain him and require him to remain on the premises. There is no evidence in the record that Officer Grice asked Appellant to identify himself or informed Appellant that a search of the premises was being conducted. Instead, Officer Grice immediately proceeded with a search of Appellant. This was not just a detention. Officer Grice yanked Appellant’s hand out of his pocket which led to the medicine bottle containing contraband to fall out of Appellant’s pocket and then pulled off Appellant’s ball cap which then led Officer Grice to recognize Appellant. There is no exception to the Fourth Amendment permitting this warrantless search. Appellant’s presence at the premises, even if he were an occupant, was not sufficient to establish probable cause to search Appellant’s person.

Officer Grice also lacked reasonable suspicion to search Appellant’s person. A police officer may elevate a police-citizen encounter into an investigatory detention only if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Burton,

228 F.3d 524, 527-28 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). “Reasonable suspicion is something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, and it is the government’s burden to articulate facts sufficient to support reasonable suspicion.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

“Once an officer had a basis to make a lawful investigatory stop, he may protect himself during that stop by conducting a search for weapons if he has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous. . . . But an officer may not conduct this protective search for purposes of safety until he has a reasonable suspicion that supports the investigatory stop.” Id. at 528 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, before an officer can conduct a protective search, the officer “must first have reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id.

When officers entered Horne’s home to search Horne’s residence, they did not have any reason to suspect that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity merely because he was present in Horne’s residence. See State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 101 (Wash. 1982) (“Merely associating with a person suspected of criminal activity does not strip away the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). Appellant was simply just “standing in the front room” of Horne’s residence with his hand in his pocket. R. 29, ll. 5-7. Such conduct does not justify an officer’s reasonable suspicion that criminal activity must be afoot.

Appellant’s refusal to remove his hand from his pocket also did not establish that reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot to justify a protective search of Appellant. “An individual’s refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for detention or seizure.” Burton, 228

F.3d at 529 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)); see also United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that a defendant has “the right to refuse to speak with . . . officers, who in turn possess no right to detain citizens who decline to talk or otherwise identify themselves).

In Burton, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the refusal of the defendant to remove his hand from his pocket at the insistence of the police officer was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The court further held that in the absence of reasonable suspicion, the officer in Burton could not frisk the defendant “merely because he felt uneasy about his safety.” The court concluded that the officer’s reaching inside the defendant’s coat was an unlawful search and the handgun discovered as a result of the unlawful search should have been suppressed at trial. Burton, 228 F.2d at 528-59.

Similarly, Appellant’s refusal to remove his hand from his pocket was also not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The record is devoid of any evidence that Appellant made any furtive movements as Officer Grice approached. As in Burton, Officer Grice only forcibly removed Appellant’s hand from his pocket because Officer Grice felt uneasy about his safety. But just as the court in Burton concluded that this was an insufficient basis to frisk the defendant in that case, Appellant’s refusal to remove his hand from his pocket was insufficient to justify Officer Grice forcibly removing Appellant’s hand from his pocket. Any evidence seized as a result of Officer Grice unlawfully searching Appellant and then subsequently arresting Appellant after Officer Grice removed Appellant’s ball cap and discovered Appellant’s

identity should have been suppressed and trial and accordingly, Appellant's convictions reversed.

Even assuming *arguendo* that the search of Appellant was justified, the scope of the search was impermissible. In conducting a constitutionally acceptable pat-down search, a law enforcement officer is confined to "patting the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used as instruments of assault." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968). In Sibron, the United States Supreme Court found that a search was not reasonably limited in scope where the officer "with no attempt at an initial limited exploration for arms, . . . thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and took from him envelopes of heroin." , the United States Supreme Court found that a search was not reasonably limited in scope where the officer "with no attempt at an initial limited exploration for arms, . . . thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and took from him envelopes of heroin." Id. Officer Grice's forcible removal of Appellant's hand from his pocket and the pulling off of Appellant's ball cap to reveal Appellant's identity likewise exceeded the scope of a lawful pat-down.

On this issue, this Court cited to State v. Freiburger, 366 S.C. 125, 620 S.E.2d 737 (2005) for its holding that a full warrantless search of a person is permitted if he has been lawfully arrested and the search is conducted in the immediate vicinity of, and substantially contemporaneously, to the arrest. In Freiburger, the search of the defendant's person preceded the lawful arrest. Id. at 130, 620 S.E.2d at 739. The Supreme Court observed that a search may precede a formal arrest if the officer has probable cause to arrest at the time of the search. Id. at 132, 620 S.E.2d at 740. In Freiburger, the officer who searched the defendant testified that although the defendant

had not been arrested at the time of the pat down search, he was going to be arrested for hitchhiking. Id. at 133, 620 S.E.2d at 741.

Freiburger is inapplicable to Appellant's case. When Officer Grice forcibly removed Appellant's hand from his pocket and pulled his ball cap off his head, Officer Grice did not at that time have probable cause to arrest Appellant. Officer Grice only discovered Appellant's identity and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest after the illegal search and seizure. Officer Grice testified that when he entered Home's residence, there was an individual in the front room wearing a ball cap, coat, and jeans. At this point, Officer Grice did not know the identity of this individual and had no probable cause to arrest this individual. Officer Grice claimed that the individual had his left hand in his pants pocket and that Officer Grice told the individual several times to remove his hand. Officer Grice said that when the individual refused to remove his hand from his pocket, Officer Grice "forcibly removed his hand and when [he] did an object fell out on the floor." R. 86, l. 11 – 87, l. 8.

After this container, which later was discovered to contain crack cocaine, fell on the floor, Officer Grice then removed the individual's ball cap and said he recognized the individual as Appellant and knew that the Marion County Combined Drug Unit for looking for Appellant. R. 88, ll. 1-8.

But for this illegal search and seizure, Officer Grice would not have known that the person standing in Home's house and minding his own business had outstanding warrants on him. But for this illegal search and seizure, Officer Grice would not have known that this individual was the person for whom the Drug Unit was looking. But for this illegal search and seizure, Officer Grice would not have had an independent and lawful reason for


searching Appellant's person. The only reason Officer Grice learned that the person in Horne's house was Appellant was because Officer Grice illegally yanked Appellant's left hand out of his pocket and then illegally pulled Appellant's ball cap off his head to reveal his identity after a container fell to the floor from Appellant's pocket.

When the search of Appellant occurred, Officer Grice did not yet have probable cause to arrest Appellant. Therefore, Officer Grice was not entitled to conduct a full warrantless search of Appellant. Officer Grice's forcible removal of Appellant's hand from his pocket and the pulling off of Appellant's ball cap to reveal Appellant's identity accordingly exceeded the scope of a permissible pat-down of Appellant's outer clothing.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant Darrell Lee Birch respectfully requests that the Opinion of the Court of Appeals be withdrawn, the evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment be suppressed, and his convictions reversed

Respectfully submitted,



Carmen V. Ganjehsani
Appellate Defender

This 13th day of November, 2014.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Marion County
William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2014-UP-366 (S.C. Court of Appeals filed October 29, 2014)

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.


DARRELL LEE BIRCH,

APPELLANT.


APPELLATE CASE NO. 2012-213215

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a true copy of the Petition for Rehearing in the above-entitled case has been served upon William M. Blich, Jr., Esquire, at Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201, this 13th day of November, 2014.


Carmen V. Ganjehsani
Appellate Defender
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 13th day
of November, 2014.

 (L.S.)
Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: October 24, 2021.

The South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,


v.

Darrell Lee Birch, Appellant.


Appellate Case No. 2012-213215

ORDER


After careful consideration of the petition for rehearing, the Court is unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting a rehearing. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.



J.



J.



J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:

Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire
Carmen Vaughn Ganjehsani, Esquire
William M. Blich, Jr., Esquire
The Honorable William H. Seals, Jr.

FILED

December 17, 2014



The South Carolina Court of Appeals

JENNY ABBOTT KITCHINGS
CLERK

V. CLAIRE ALLEN
DEPUTY CLERK

POST OFFICE BOX 11629
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211
1015 SUMTER STREET
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29201
TELEPHONE: (803) 734-1890
FAX: (803) 734-1839
www.sccourts.org

February 17, 2015

The Honorable Sherry R. Rhodes
PO Box 295
Marion SC 29571-0295

REMITTITUR

Re: The State v. Darrell L. Birch
Lower Court Case No. 2009GS3300106
Appellate Case No. 2012-213215

Dear Clerk of Court:

The above referenced matter is hereby remitted to the lower court or tribunal. A copy of the judgment of this Court is enclosed.


Very truly yours,

V. Claire Allen, Deputy

CLERK

Enclosure

cc: Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire
William M. Blitch, Jr., Esquire
Laura Ruth Baer, Esquire



STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Marion County

William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

DARRELL BIRCH,

APPELLANT

Appellate Case No. 2012-213215

Motion to Recall Remittitur

Counsel for Darrell Birch respectfully moves this Court to recall the Remittitur issued in this case on February 17, 2015, and received by the Office of Appellate Defense on February 17, 2015.

- 1.) On October 29, 2014 this Court, after hearing oral argument on October 14, 2014, affirmed the conviction and sentence in a per curiam unpublished Opinion, No. 2014-UP-366. A timely petition for rehearing was filed on November 13, 2014. The State did not file a Return to the Petition for Rehearing.
- 2.) The petition for Rehearing was denied on December 17, 2014. Counsel, however, did not receive a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing. As a result, counsel

did not timely file a petition for writ of certiorari with the South Carolina Supreme Court.

- 3.) As seen below, the Attorney General's office did not receive a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing either.
- 4.) On February 17, 2015, the Office of Appellate Defense received a copy of the Remittitur.
- 5.) Counsel received a letter from Petitioner prompting her to look at the status of his case on February 25, 2015 and found that the Office had recently received the Remittitur but realized that she had not received a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing. Our office policy when a Remittitur is received is to attach to the Remittitur the most recent order preceding the remittitur and the closing letter sent to the client informing him of the court's decision and next step in the appellate process. This packet is then initialed and signed by the assigned attorney and attorney's assistant. The absence of both the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing and any closing letter to the client was an immediate indication that something was wrong.
- 6.) Counsel fully intended to file a petition for writ of certiorari.
- 7.) Attached and made a part of this motion is an affidavit from counsel stating that she did not receive a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing.
- 8.) Counsel conferred with Assistant Attorney General William M. Blich, Jr. who confirmed that, based on the mail log at the South Carolina Attorney General's Office, his office also did not receive a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing. Assistant Attorney General William M. Blich, Jr. does not oppose the motion to recall the Remittitur and leaves the decision in the Court's discretion.

Based on the above factors counsel respectfully asks this Court to recall the Remittitur to allow counsel to move to file a petition for writ of certiorari, out of time, with the South Carolina Supreme Court. Counsel submits that good cause has been shown to recall the Remittitur and the failure to file a timely petition for writ of certiorari was not the fault of petitioner but rather the result of appellate counsel not receiving a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing.

Respectfully submitted,



Laura R. Baer
Appellate Defender
1330 Lady Street, Suite 401
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
(803) 734-1679

The 26th day of February, 2015.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Marion County

William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

DARRELL BIRCH,

APPELLANT

Appellate Case No. 2012-213215

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECALL REMITTITUR


PERSONALLY appeared before me, Laura R. Baer, who being duly sworn, deposes and says that:

- (1) I am an Appellate Defender with the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, and I represent Darrell Birch.
- (2) On October 29, 2014, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Birch, Op. No. 2014-UP-366 (S.C.Ct.App. Filed October 29, 2014).
- (3) On November 13, 2014, Carmen Ganjehsani, former appellate counsel, filed a timely Petition for Rehearing in Mr. Birch's case. The State did not file a Return to the Petition for Rehearing.

- (4) The Court of Appeals denied the petition for Rehearing on December 17, 2014. My office did not receive a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing. As a result, I did not timely file a petition for writ of certiorari with the South Carolina Supreme Court.
- (5) I fully intended to file a petition for writ of certiorari.
- (6) On February 17, 2015, the Office of Appellate Defense received a copy of the Remittitur.
- (7) I received a letter from Mr. Birch prompting me to look at the status of his case on February 25, 2015 and found that the Office had recently received the Remittitur but realized that I had not received a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing. Our office policy when a Remittitur is received is to attach to the Remittitur the most recent order preceding the remittitur and the closing letter sent to the client informing him of the court's decision and next step in the appellate process. This packet is then initialed and signed by the assigned attorney and attorney's assistant. The absence of both the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing and any closing letter to the client was an immediate indication that something was wrong.
- (8) My assistant, Bailey Reed, her supervisor, Kimberly McCall, and I have checked our files thoroughly and found no copy of the Order denying the Petition for Rehearing. When the Office of Appellate Defense receives mail, the mail is stamped received with the date and then routed to the appropriate person. After a diligent review of the procedures in place at Appellate Defense and a thorough review of the file, I can only conclude that my office did not receive a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing.
- (9) On February 25, 2015, I conferred with Assistant Attorney General William M. Blich, Jr. who confirmed that, based on the mail log at the South Carolina Attorney General's


Office, his office also did not receive a copy of the Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing either.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.



Laura R. Baer
Appellate Defender
1330 Lady Street, Suite 401
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
(803) 734-1679

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before
me this 26th day of February, 2015



(L.S.)
Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: October 24, 2021.

The South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Darrell Lee Birch, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-213215

ORDER

This Court's Remittitur was sent to the Clerk of Court for Marion County on February 17, 2015. Counsel for the Appellant filed a motion to recall remittitur. This motion is granted. The Clerk of Court for Marion County is, therefore, directed to return the remittitur to the Clerk of the South Carolina Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from the date of this order.

FOR THE COURT

BY V. Claire Allen, Deputy
CLERK

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:

Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire

William M. Blich, Jr., Esquire

Laura Ruth Baer, Esquire

FILED
4/2/15
Mmmmm

