



The Supreme Court of South Carolina

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June 17, 2015

The Honorable Amy Bracy
P.O. Box 1715
Columbia SC 29202-1715

REMITTITUR

Re: Gregory Collins v. Seko Charlotte
Lower Court Case No. 2007WC1900222
Appellate Case No. 2012-213425

Dear Clerk of Court:

The above referenced matter is hereby remitted to the lower court or tribunal. A copy of the judgment of this Court along with the earlier decision of the South Carolina Court of Appeals is enclosed.



Very truly yours,

CLERK

cc: Linda Byars McKenzie, Esquire
Weston Adams, III, Esquire
Helen Faith Hiser, Esquire
Timothy Blair Killen, Esquire

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court**

Gregory A. Collins (Deceased), Employee, Claimant,
Respondent,

v.

Seko Charlotte and Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,
Petitioners,

v.

West Expedited & Delivery Service, Inc., Defendant,

v.

Seko Worldwide and Federal Ins. Co., Defendants,

v.

Uninsured Employers Fund, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2012-213425

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal From the South Carolina Workers' Compensation
Commission Appellate Panel

Opinion No. 27519
Heard March 5, 2015 – Filed April 29, 2015

AFFIRMED

Weston Adams, III, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Columbia, and Helen Faith Hiser, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, both for Petitioner.

Linda Byars McKenzie, of Bowen McKenzie & Bowen, LLP, of Greenville, and Timothy Blair Killen, of Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, P.A., of Columbia, for Respondents.

JUSTICE BEATTY: This matter is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review the decision in *Collins v. Charlotte*, 400 S.C. 50, 732 S.E.2d 630 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals reversed the Workers' Compensation Commission's (Commission) decision which found that Gregory Collins was not a statutory employee of Seko Charlotte at the time of his death. We affirm.

I. Facts

Collins worked for West Expedited & Delivery Service, Incorporated (West Expedited) and was killed in an automobile collision while returning to South Carolina after making a delivery in Wisconsin for Seko Charlotte. West Expedited, as a subcontractor, contracted with Seko Charlotte to make an interstate delivery of parts. Seko Charlotte, like West Expedited, is in the cargo delivery business.

Collins made deliveries to Wauwatosa and Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin. Although there is no written contract, Seko Charlotte engaged in business with West Expedited roughly two to three times per month. In this case, as was customary, Seko Charlotte paid West Expedited for mileage one way, however, West Expedited included the cost of the return trip in the mileage rate charged Seko Charlotte.

As a result of Collins' work-related death, Collins' dependents filed a workers' compensation claim against West Expedited¹, Seko Worldwide, Federal Insurance Company, Seko Charlotte², and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide).³ The case was heard by a single commissioner of the Workers' Compensation Commission. The single commissioner applied the three tests from *Voss v. Ramco, Inc.*, 325 S.C. 560, 482 S.E.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1997)⁴ and determined that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee at the time of his fatal accident pursuant to section 42-1-410 of the South Carolina Code.⁵

¹ The Uninsured Employers Fund was brought into the case because West Expedited did not carry workers' compensation insurance at the time of Collins' fatal accident.

² Seko Charlotte and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company were brought into the case after Seko Worldwide, LLC filed a motion to add them as parties.

³ Nationwide is Seko Charlotte's workers' compensation insurance carrier.

⁴ *Voss* states:

To determine whether the work performed by a subcontractor is a part of the owner's business, this Court *must* consider whether (1) the activity of the subcontractor is an *important* part of the owner's trade or business; (2) the activity performed by the subcontractor is a *necessary, essential, and integral* part of the owner's business; or (3) the *identical activity* performed by the subcontractor has been performed by employees of the owner.

Voss, 325 S.C. at 568, 482 S.E.2d at 586 (emphasis added).

⁵ Section 42-1-410 reads:

When any person . . . referred to as "contractor," contracts . . . with any other person . . . for the execution or performance by or under the subcontractor of the whole or any of the work undertaken by such contractor, the contractor shall be Liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under this Title which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately employed by him.

S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-410 (1985).

Additionally, Collins was determined to be a traveling employee.⁶ Therefore, Seko Charlotte, and its insurance company, Nationwide, were liable.

Seko Charlotte and Nationwide timely appealed the single commissioner's order. The appeal was heard by the Appellate Panel of the Commission. Applying the four factors of the employee/independent contractor test, the Appellate Panel of the Commission concluded Collins was not an employee of Seko Charlotte on the return trip because West Expedited had "the exclusive right of control over [Collins]" after the deliveries were made in Wisconsin. The Appellate Panel of the Commission reversed the single commissioner.

The Uninsured Employers Fund (Fund) appealed to the Court of Appeals. *Collins*, 400 S.C. at 50, 732 S.E.2d at 630. The court found that the Commission committed an error of law when it applied the employee/independent contractor test instead of the statutory employee test. *Id.* at 57, 732 S.E.2d at 634. Applying the statutory employee test, the Court of Appeals concluded that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee, reversed the Commission's decision, and reinstated the single commissioner's order. *Id.* at 58, 732 S.E.2d at 634. This Court granted Seko Charlotte and Nationwide's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

II. Standard of Review

"[Appellate] review is limited to deciding whether the Commission's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled by some error of law." *Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co.*, 360 S.C. 276, 289, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004). "The determination of whether a worker is a statutory employee is jurisdictional and, therefore, the question on appeal is one of law." *Fortner v. Thomas M. Evans Constr. & Dev., L.L.C.*, 402 S.C. 421, 429, 741 S.E.2d 538, 543 (Ct. App. 2013). "As a result, this court has the power and duty to review the entire record and decide the jurisdictional facts in accord with its view of the preponderance of the evidence." *Id.* "It is South Carolina's policy to resolve

⁶ "It is well settled that 'traveling employees are generally within the course of their employment from the time they leave home on a business trip until they return, for the self-evident reason that traveling itself is a large part of the job.'" *Hall v. Desert Aire, Inc.*, 376 S.C. 338, 357, 656 S.E.2d 753, 762 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Arthur Larson, *Larson's Workers' Compensation Law*, § 14.01 (Lexis-Nexis 2004)).

jurisdictional doubts in favor of the inclusion of employers and employees under the [Workers' Compensation Act]." *Id.* at 429-30, 741 S.E.2d at 543.

III. Discussion

The issue on appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Collins was a statutory employee of Seko Charlotte at the time of his fatal accident? The statutory employment section of the Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA") provides:

When any person, in this section . . . referred to as "owner," undertakes to perform or execute any work which is part of his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other person (in this section . . . referred to as "subcontractor") for the execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under this title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had been immediately employed by him.

S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-400 (1985). "The terms owner and contractor can be used interchangeably." *Fortner*, 402 S.C. at 431, 741 S.E.2d at 544. "Thus, depending on the **nature of the work** performed by the subcontractor, an employee of a subcontractor may be considered a statutory employee of the owner or upstream employer." *Voss*, 325 S.C. at 565, 482 S.E.2d at 585 (emphasis added). There are three tests to determine whether a statutory employment relationship exists:

To determine whether the work performed by a subcontractor is a part of the owner's business, this Court *must* consider whether (1) the activity of the subcontractor is an *important* part of the owner's trade or business; (2) the activity performed by the subcontractor is a *necessary, essential, and integral* part of the owner's business; or (3) the *identical activity* performed by the subcontractor has been performed by employees of the owner.

Id. at 568, 482 S.E.2d at 586 (emphasis added). "If any of these tests is satisfied, the injured worker is considered the statutory employee of the owner." *Id.*

"The concept of statutory employment provides an exception to the general rule that coverage under the WCA requires the existence of an employer-employee relationship." *Fortner*, 402 S.C. at 432, 741 S.E.2d at 544 (citing S.C. Code Ann.

§ 42-1-410). "The statutory employee doctrine converts conceded non-employees into employees for purposes of the [WCA]." *Id.* at 432, 741 S.E.2d at 544.

Seko Charlotte and Nationwide, (collectively Petitioners) argue the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee at the time of this fatal accident because the contractual relationship between West Expedited and Seko Charlotte had terminated. Petitioners argue their contract terminated once the deliveries were made and Collins began his return trip to South Carolina. Petitioners, therefore, submit that without a contractual relationship, no statutory employment relationship may be found to exist between Collins and Seko Charlotte.

Conversely, the Fund argues that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee because the return trip was "necessarily incidental to [Collins'] statutory employment with Seko." The Fund represents that each of the three tests for creating a statutory employment relationship were met here. Further, the Fund submits that Collins' injuries arose out of his employment relationship as he was a "traveling employee" and Collins does not meet the exception to the rule because he "did not deviate from the most direct route to return him to South Carolina."

This case is fact-driven and under these facts, Collins qualifies as a statutory employee. The circumstances here involve a delivery of goods on a round-trip to Wisconsin and back to South Carolina. Seko Charlotte concedes that Collins was a statutory employee on the trip to Wisconsin. At issue is whether Collins' status ever changed.

The Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that the Commission erred in applying the employee/independent contractor test when it should have applied the statutory employee test. The statutory employee status is an exception to the normal employee/employer relationship. In the statutory employment analysis, active control of the worker is not the focal point. It is evident that Seko Charlotte understands this because Seko Charlotte had no more control over Collins on the trip to Wisconsin than it did on the return trip to South Carolina, yet it concedes that Collins was its statutory employee on the trip to Wisconsin.

Seko Charlotte contends that it was the parties' understanding that the delivery of the cargo to Wisconsin terminated their contract. Assuming this to be so, Seko Charlotte's and West Expedited's understanding of when their obligation to each other terminated is not dispositive of our inquiry. This is so because the contract only provides the necessary foundation for the creation of the statutory employee relationship. Once the statutory employee status attaches, the extent of

the status is determined by the nature of the work contracted to be performed. We must view this issue from the perspective of when was the employee's contracted work for the statutory employer completed. Our focus thus becomes the nature of the work itself.

Collins was engaged in an "express hot delivery" from South Carolina to Wisconsin for Seko Charlotte. In this instance, an "express hot delivery" is understood in the trade to mean an immediate and direct trip to Wisconsin. It is also understood that it is unlikely that the driver will have cargo on the return trip. Moreover, Morris West, owner of West Expedited, testified that it was unusual to carry cargo on a return trip of an "express hot delivery," and when West Expedited did have a load it was for the same primary contractor.

Seko Charlotte frequently used West Expedited's services and knew that the trip was being made especially for them and that, more than likely, the return trip would be without cargo for another West Expedited customer. Indeed, Collins did not pick up any cargo for the return trip to South Carolina. Therefore, the nature of the work required immediate travel to Wisconsin and an expected return trip to South Carolina. As the Court of Appeals stated in *Hall*, the traveling itself is a large part of the job. *Hall v. Desert Aire, Inc.*, 376 S.C. 338, 357, 656 S.E.2d 753, 762 (Ct. App. 2007). Viewed from this perspective, it is reasonable to conclude that, under the facts of this case, the work for Seko Charlotte ended when Collins returned to South Carolina.

This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Seko Charlotte concedes that: (1) it is in the cargo delivery business; (2) interstate deliveries are a necessary and integral part of its business; and (3) its drivers make similar deliveries as Collins did if it is within 100 miles of Charlotte. The nature of the work for Seko Charlotte's direct employees is the same as the work performed by Collins. This fits squarely within the requirements of *Voss*.

Further, the language of section 42-1-400 states, "the owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under this title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had been immediately employed by him." As such, this section does not allow for partial or conditional statutory employees. Seko Charlotte concedes that its drivers are covered on their return trips. Collins was entitled to the same coverage as Seko Charlotte's direct employees.

IV. Conclusion

The Court of Appeals properly reversed the Commission's decision and reinstated the single commissioner's order. We, therefore, affirm the Court of Appeals.

AFFIRMED.

PLEICONES, Acting Chief Justice, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Gregory A. Collins (Deceased), Employee, Claimant,
Respondent,

v.

Seko Charlotte and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
Respondents,

v.

West Expedited & Delivery Service, Inc., Defendant,

v.

Seko Worldwide and Federal Insurance Co., Defendants,

v.

South Carolina Workers' Compensation Uninsured
Employers' Fund, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-184326

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Opinion No. 5022
Heard May 8, 2012 – Filed August 15, 2012

REVERSED

Timothy B. Killen, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Weston Adams, III, and Helen F. Hiser, both of
McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Columbia, for
Respondents Seko Charlotte and Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co.

Linda Byars McKenzie, of Bowen McKenzie & Bowen,
LLP, of Greenville, for Respondent Gregory Collins.

SHORT, J.: The dependents of Gregory Collins (deceased) filed this workers' compensation claim against West Expedited & Delivery Service, Inc. (West), Seko Worldwide, Federal Insurance Co., Seko Charlotte (Seko), Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., and the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Uninsured Employers' Fund (the Fund). The Fund appeals the order of the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission), arguing it erred in: (1) finding Collins was not Seko's statutory employee; (2) finding the "going and coming rule" barred Collins' recovery as to West, but not as to Seko; (3) finding Collins was a "traveling employee" as to West, but not as to Seko; (4) finding the method of payment was dispositive in determining the statutory employment relationship; (5) applying Georgia law; and (6) finding Collins would have been a gratuitous worker if considered a statutory employee of Seko at the time of his accident. We reverse.

FACTS

Collins, a South Carolina resident, was hired by West, a South Carolina expedited delivery company, to drive a delivery van. Seko Charlotte (Seko) contracted with West for a delivery of parts from Ina Bearing Company in Spartanburg, South Carolina, to Wauwatosa and Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin. On September 7, 2007, Collins picked up the parts and delivered them to Seko's customers in Wisconsin. While driving back to South Carolina on September 8, Collins was killed in an automobile accident. This claim was filed. At the time of the accident, West's workers' compensation coverage had lapsed, and the Fund participated in the case.

Ronald Burks, Seko's general manager, testified that Seko is a transportation logistics company providing regional, national, and international transportation services. Seko employed three drivers among its sixteen employees. These drivers made deliveries within a hundred miles of Charlotte. Seko subcontracted longer trips to companies such as West.

Burks testified West provided "express hot deliver[y]" services, which are required when a customer needs immediate delivery and cannot wait for a full truck load to deliver in their area. As he explained, West provided services for cargo that "needs to get . . . somewhere faster than an LTL [less than a truck load] truck would" be able to deliver.

Burks testified Seko did not have a written contract with West. Seko paid West \$1.20 per loaded mile, one way. Seko utilized West's services approximately two to three times per month and contracted with four or five companies comparable to West, similarly paying them per mile, one way. Seko's contention was that once a delivery was made, its agreement with West ceased. In this case, Collins had no cargo in the van during the return trip to South Carolina, and Seko accordingly maintained he was no longer its statutory employee.

Burks admitted that if Collins had been Seko's employee at the time of the injury, he would have a valid workers' compensation claim against Seko. He conceded that the Seko drivers were covered by Seko's workers' compensation insurance on their entire trips, rather than just on the way to the delivery site. Burks admitted he knew West's drivers would return to South Carolina because they were based here, but insisted Seko's relationship with Collins ceased after he made his deliveries in Wisconsin. Burks conceded such deliveries were an important and necessary part of Seko's business.

West's president, Morris West, testified the drivers generally do not have cargo on their return trips to South Carolina, and in Collins' case, he did not have cargo on his return trip. Morris also testified West was free to contract with another company for return loads, and Seko had no relationship with his drivers once a delivery was made.

The single commissioner found Seko was Collins' statutory employer. Seko appealed to the Commission. At the hearing before the Commission, Seko conceded it was Collins' statutory employer for the trip from South Carolina to Wisconsin. It maintained Collins was West's employee during the return trip.

Seko argued it no longer had control over Collins after his delivery in Wisconsin, and its status as a statutory employer thus ceased upon delivery. The Fund argued the issue of control was not relevant to a determination of statutory employment.

The Commission found Collins was Seko's statutory employee during his trip to Wisconsin, but Seko did not maintain the degree of control over Collins during the return trip to continue the employment relationship. Furthermore, the Commission found Collins was no longer Seko's employee within the "going and coming rule." Finding this a case of first impression in South Carolina, the Commission relied on Georgia and North Carolina law to conclude Collins was no longer Seko's statutory employee at the time of the accident. Therefore, the Commission found the Fund was liable for the claim. The Fund appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) depends on the existence of an employment relationship. *Posey v. Proper Mold & Eng'g, Inc.*, 378 S.C. 210, 216, 661 S.E.2d 395, 398 (Ct. App. 2008). "Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists is a jurisdictional question." *Id.* Where the issue involves jurisdiction, the appellate court can take its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. *Id.* at 216-17, 661 S.E.2d at 399. "It is the policy of South Carolina courts to resolve jurisdictional doubts in favor of the inclusion of employers and employees under the Workers' Compensation Act." *Id.* at 217, 661 S.E.2d at 399; see *Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Palmetto State Transp. Co.*, 382 S.C. 295, 300, 676 S.E.2d 700, 702 (2009) (rejecting the analytical framework of distinguishing between an employee and an independent contractor that "most assuredly skews the analysis to a finding of employment" while "remain[ing]" sensitive to the general principle sanctioned by the Legislature that workers' compensation laws are to be construed liberally in favor of coverage").

LAW/ANALYSIS

The Fund argues the Commission erred in finding Collins was no longer Seko's statutory employee at the time of his accident. We agree.

Statutory employment is an exception to the general rule that coverage under the Act requires the existence of an employer-employee relationship. *Posey v. Proper Mold & Eng'g, Inc.*, 378 S.C. 210, 217, 661 S.E.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App. 2008). "The statutory employee doctrine converts conceded non-employees into employees for

purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. The rationale is to prevent owners and contractors from subcontracting out their work to avoid liability for injuries incurred in the course of employment." *Glass v. Dow Chem. Co.*, 325 S.C. 198, 201 n.1, 482 S.E.2d 49, 50 n.1 (1997). "The effect of these [statutory employment] provisions when brought into operation is to impose the absolute liability of an immediate employer upon the owner and/or general contractor although it was not in law the immediate employer of the injured workman." *Parker v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc.*, 275 S.C. 65, 72, 267 S.E.2d 524, 527-28 (1980).

The statutory employment section of the Act provides:

When any person, in this section . . . referred to as "owner," undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other person (in this section . . . referred to as "subcontractor") for the execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under this Title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had been immediately employed by him.

S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-400 (1985).

The Commission found Collins was not Seko's statutory employee based primarily on Seko's lack of control over Collins at the time of his accident. *See Wilkinson*, 382 S.C. at 299, 676 S.E.2d at 702 (recognizing the four-factor test to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor: (1) right to, or exercise of, control; (2) furnishing of equipment; (3) method of payment; and (4) right to fire).¹ The Commission also relied on case law from Georgia and North

¹ In discussing the going and coming, gratuitous worker, and traveling employee doctrines, the Commission likewise focused on Seko's method of payment or control over Collins at the time of the accident. *See Whitworth v. Window World, Inc.*, 377 S.C. 637, 641, 661 S.E.2d 333, 336 (2008) ("Under the going and coming rule, an employee going to or coming from the place where his work is to be performed is not engaged in performing any service growing out of and incidental to his employment. Therefore, an injury sustained by accident at such time is not

Carolina to find no statutory employment relationship. In *Farmer v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.*, 266 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 1980), the Georgia Supreme Court began its analysis of control stating the statutory employment statute was inapplicable in that case. *Farmer*, 266 S.E.2d at 924. In *Lewis v. Barnhill*, 148 S.E.2d 536 (N.C. 1966), the North Carolina Supreme Court employed the borrowed servant doctrine² without mentioning a statutory employment statute in Lewis' tort action. *Lewis*, 148 S.E.2d at 543.

We find the Commission erroneously utilized the "employee/independent contractor" test to determine whether Collins was Seko's statutory employee. We also find neither the Georgia nor North Carolina case relied on by the Commission is dispositive.

In *Voss v. Ramco, Inc.*, 325 S.C. 560, 566, 482 S.E.2d 582, 585 (Ct. App. 1997), this court found that whether the employee was an independent contractor of the alleged statutory employer was irrelevant. The court concluded that "section 42-1-400 imposes liability on an upstream employer if the injured worker is an employee of the *subcontractor*, but not if the worker is an independent contractor of the *subcontractor*." 325 S.C. at 566-67, 482 S.E.2d at 585. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals likewise stated that whether the statutory employer exercised control over the employee is not the issue in South Carolina:

compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act because it does not arise out of and in the course of his employment."); *Kirksey v. Assurance Tire Co.*, 314 S.C. 43, 45, 443 S.E.2d 803, 804 (1994) (holding gratuitous workers are not employees); *Hall v. Desert Aire, Inc.*, 376 S.C. 338, 357, 656 S.E.2d 753, 762 (Ct. App. 2007) ("It is well settled that 'traveling employees are generally within the course of their employment from the time they leave home on a business trip until they return, for the self-evident reason that the traveling itself is a large part of the job.'") (quoting Arthur Larson, *Larson's Worker[s]' Compensation Law*, § 14.01 (Lexis-Nexis 2004)).

² Under South Carolina's borrowed servant doctrine, "when a general employer lends an employee to a special employer, that special employer is liable for workers' compensation if: (1) there is a contract of hire between the employee and the special employer; (2) the work being done by the employee is essentially that of the special employer; and (3) the special employer has the right to control the details of the employee's work." *Cooke v. Palmetto Health Alliance*, 367 S.C. 167, 175, 624 S.E.2d 439, 443 (Ct. App. 2005).

Suffice it to say that no South Carolina case has been found involving this statute in which an owner's liability either for payment of compensation or tort damages has been made to rest upon the degree of control retained by the owner over the injured employee of a subcontractor. On the contrary, once it is established that the work being done by the subcontractor is a part of the owner's general business, the employees of the subcontractor become statutory employees of the owner even though their immediate employer is an independent contractor.

Corollo v. S. S. Kresge Co., 456 F.2d 306, 311 (4th Cir. 1972).

Once the Commission determined Collins was an employee of Seko's subcontractor, West, which the parties in this case did not dispute, the Commission should have looked to whether Collins' activities were part of Seko's trade, business, or occupation. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-400 (1985) (providing statutory employment requires the claimant to be engaged in an activity that "is a part of [Seko's] trade, business[,] or occupation"). South Carolina has applied three tests and concludes the statutory requirement is met if the activity (1) is an important part of the owner's business or trade; (2) is a necessary, essential, and integral part of the owner's business; or (3) has previously been performed by the owner's employees. *Olmstead v. Shakespeare*, 354 S.C. 421, 424, 581 S.E.2d 483, 485 (2003). If the activity meets any of these three criteria, the injured employee qualifies as a statutory employee. *Id.* In this case, Burks admitted deliveries like the one Collins made were an important and necessary part of Seko's business. We agree that Seko's utilization of West's services two to three times per month for "express hot deliveries" is an important part of Seko's delivery business. Accordingly, we find Collins was Seko's statutory employee during the entire trip. See *Voss*, 325 S.C. at 568, 482 S.E.2d at 586 (finding a manufacturer of small equipment was the statutory employer of field salespeople because selling the equipment was an essential part of the manufacturer's business); *Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co.*, 190 S.C. 336, 351, 2 S.E.2d 825, 837-38 (1939) (affirming the trial court's finding that maintenance of Duke Power's transmission lines and utility poles was an important and essential part of its trade or business and, therefore, finding Duke Power the statutory employer of the employee of a subcontractor hired to paint utility poles).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we find the Commission employed improper analyses in reversing the single commissioner. Under our own view of the preponderance of the evidence, we find Collins was Seko's statutory employee. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission and reinstate the single commissioner's order.

REVERSED.

HUFF, J., concurs.

FEW, C.J., concurring: I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to further explain why it was error for the commission to use the independent contractor test to determine whether Collins was Seko's statutory employee. There is no reason to consider whether a claimant is a statutory employee unless the claimant or his direct employer has an independent contractor relationship with the defendant. Therefore, it is nonsensical to determine Collins was not the statutory employee of Seko because of the independent contractor relationship between Seko and West. Rather, Collins can be a statutory employee of Seko only if there is an independent contractor relationship between Seko and West.