

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

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SC Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM GREENVILLE COUNTY  
D. Garrison Hill, Circuit Court Judge  
Appellate Case No. 2014-001853

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The State, ..... Respondent,

vs.

Donna Boyd, ..... Appellant.

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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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J. Falkner Wilkes, 12893  
114 Whitsett Street  
Greenville, SC 29601  
(864) 282-1292

Counsel for Appellant

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## STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

- 1). Did the circuit court err in dismissing the appeal based on the ground of failure to prosecute?

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Appellant, Donna Boyd, was charged by warrant in Greenville County on November 16, 2012, for the offense of filing a false police report. On June 25, 2014, Boyd appeared *pro se* for a jury trial in the Greenville Magistrate Court, the Hon. Dean E. Ford presiding. At the conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty and a sentence was imposed. Boyd filed a timely notice of appeal to the circuit court. (R. p. 2).

The circuit court held a hearing regarding the appeal on August 12, 2014, the Hon. D. Garrison Hill presiding. (R. p. 7 ). [Tran 1-4]. On August 14, 2014, an Order was entered dismissing the Appellant's appeal. (R. p. 1). Appellant timely served and filed notice of appeal from the circuit court's order of dismissal. (R. p. 2). This brief follows.

## ARGUMENT

### *Standard of Review*

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b), SCRCP, an appellate court may reverse the trial court's decision upon an abuse of discretion. *In Re Miller*, 393 S.C. 248 (2011); *McComas v. Ross*, 368 S.C. 59, 62, 626 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ct.App. 2006). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court are either controlled by an error of law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions.” *Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County*, 382 S.C. 8, 20, 675 S.E.2d 439, 445 (2009). Dismissal constitutes an abuse of discretion when the sanction is too harsh when compared to the conduct at issue. *See McComas v. Ross*, 368 S.C. 59 (Ct.App. 2006).

### **I. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING BOYD’S APPEAL UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.**

The facts and circumstances of this case fail to support the circuit court’s dismissal of Boyd’s appeal. Boyd’s case involves a criminal appeal from the magistrate court. The record shows that Boyd fully briefed her case through filings with the circuit court. (R. p. 2). A hearing on the appeal was scheduled only forty eight days after the trial, and twenty two days after the return of the magistrate.

The case had therefore been pending in the circuit court for only a very short period of time.<sup>1</sup> Prior to the hearing the Appellant requested permission of the court to have the matter addressed without her appearance and indicating that she had to attend to some undisclosed personal matters. (Email). In a responsive email, the judge's law clerk instructed the Appellant to resend the email copying the solicitor but did not otherwise indicate or instruct Boyd that she was required to appear unless otherwise instructed. (R. 13, 15, Supp. R. 1). The record therefore shows an attempt of the Appellant to prosecute the matter without her personal appearance at the hearing. There is no evidence that Boyd abandoned her case, or neglected in moving it along. Nothing she did would have injured the rights of the state in the appeal. Boyd clearly sought to have her case decided.

The sanction of dismissal is far too harsh under the circumstances of this case. Dismissal constitutes an abuse of discretion when the sanction is too harsh when compared to the conduct at issue. *See* McComas v. Ross, 368 S.C. 59, 626 S.E.2d 902 (Ct.App. 2006). The only conduct which appears to have triggered the dismissal was the Appellant's failure to appear for the hearing. There is no evidence that Boyd intended to cause undue delay of the process, or that she had

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<sup>1</sup>The charge remained pending in the magistrate's court for approximately one and a half years before a trial was held.

delayed the process in the past, or that there was a pattern of not appearing for court on prior occasions. Absent a pattern of egregious behavior, dismissal that terminates the action is far too harsh an action in light of Boyd's conduct. In granting a dismissal for failure to prosecute, there must be some showing of indifference to the rights of the defendant. *See Bond v. Corbin*, 68 S.C. 294, 294-95, 47 S.E. 374, 374 (1904); *See also McComas, supra*.

In McComas this Court held that without evidence of an established pattern of behavior, such as a history of requesting continuances, or abusing court rules, or evidence a clear record of delay and contemptuous conduct, dismissal of a case with prejudice constitutes an abuse of discretion. In McComas the court found the requirements to support dismissal under state law to be the same as required by the federal cases involving dismissal. In McComas the court equated the analysis for unreasonable neglect, as required by the South Carolina case law, to the federal analysis for dismissals for lack of prosecution. Under McComas, a dismissal with prejudice, absent a pattern of egregious conduct, is sufficient to establish a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. McComas, *citing Small v. Mungo*, 254 S.C. 438, 442, 175 S.E.2d 802, 804 (1970).

McComas specifically held: "Though Rule 41(b) does not require the defendant prove unreasonable neglect by the plaintiff to be granted a motion to

dismiss for failure to prosecute, we find a reasonableness standard should apply in cases of this kind, *as illustrated by the federal cases on point*. See McComas, *supra*, FN 3, *emphasis added*.

In applying the reasonableness standard McComas recognized that federal cases are clear in consistently holding that dismissal is only appropriate under the most extreme circumstances:

Our Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has also addressed this issue. The court in McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 396 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1976) held that dismissal is a harsh sanction, which "should be resorted to only in extreme cases." Dismissal is generally permitted only in the face of a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff. *Id.* The discretion should be exercised discreetly and only after due consideration of the availability of sanctions less severe than dismissal. *Id.*; Bush v. U.S. Postal Serv., 496 F.2d 42, 44 (4th Cir. 1974). The Fourth Circuit has said the trial court must consider four factors before dismissing a case for failure to prosecute: (1) the plaintiff's degree of personal responsibility; (2) the amount of prejudice caused the defendant; (3) the presence of a drawn out history of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion; and (4) the effectiveness of sanctions less drastic than dismissal. Hillig v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 916 F.2d 171, 174 (4th Cir. 1990). See also Herbert v. Saffell, 877 F.2d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 1989); McCargo, 545 F.2d at 396; Chandler Leasing Corp. v. Lopez, 669 F.2d 919, 920 (4th Cir. 1982).

McComas v. Ross, 368 S.C. 59, at 63, 626 S.E.2d 902 (Ct.App. 2006)

The federal circuits have consistently held that a district court may dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, either upon motion by a defendant pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) or on its own motion. Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1974). But because dismissal is such a harsh sanction, however, it “should be resorted to only in extreme cases.” McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976) *citing* Dyotherm Corp. v. Turbo Machine Co., 392 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1968). In this case, the record fails to show how the facts in Boyd’s case present the rare and extreme circumstances that would justify the dismissal of the action.

Under McComas, dismissal is only appropriate where the record shows that the party had a “history of requesting continuances or abusing court rules to evidence a clear record of delay and contemptuous conduct, as required by the federal cases involving dismissal, or unreasonable neglect, as required by the South Carolina case law.” McComas v. Ross, 368 S.C. 59, 626 S.E.2d 902 (Ct.App. 2006). None of those conditions were found to be present in Boyd’s case. There was therefore, no factual basis supporting the circuit’s dismissal of the case.

Under the required analysis in McComas the circuit court was required to consider conflicting policies: “[a]gainst the power to prevent delays must be weighed the sound public policy of deciding cases on their merits.” McComas *quoting* Reizakis, 490 F.2d at 1135. Here, the circuit court failed to apply the proper legal analysis in its decision to dismiss Boyd’s case.

Cases interpreting the court's ability to dismiss for want of prosecution have uniformly hold that it cannot be automatically or mechanically applied. Against the power to prevent delays must be weighed the sound public policy of deciding cases on their merits. *See generally, Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil* §§ 2369, 2370 (1971). Bush v. United States Postal Service, 496 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1974) Consequently, dismissal "must be tempered by a careful exercise of judicial discretion." Durgin v. Graham, 372 F.2d 130, 131 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1967).

While noting that dismissal is a discretionary matter, federal courts applying the same rule have generally upheld dismissal only in the face of a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff. Durham v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1967). Such a record simply does not exist in this case. Additionally, appellate courts frequently have found abuse of discretion when trial courts, as in Boyd's case, failed to apply sanctions less severe than dismissal. *See, e. g., Richman v. General Motors Corp.*, 437 F.2d 196, 199 (1st Cir. 1971); Flaksa v. Little River Marine Construction Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1968); Dyotherm Corp. v. Turbo Machine Co., 392 F.2d 146,148 (3d Cir. 1968). Here, despite a lack of any exceptional circumstances, the circuit court has applied the severe sanction possible.

Unlike cases that have upheld dismissals, Boyd's record shows no prejudice to the opposing party by Boyd's actions. Although generally the lack of prejudice alone to the defendant is not a bar to dismissal, it is a factor that must be considered in determining whether the trial court exercised sound discretion.

Pearson v. Dennison, 353 F.2d 24, 28 (9th Cir. 1965). Reizakas v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1974).

Under McComas, the circuit court should have taken at least four factors into account in deciding whether dismissal was appropriate as a sanction in Boyd's case:

- (1) the degree of personal responsibility of the plaintiff,
- (2) the amount of prejudice caused the defendant,
- (3) the existence of a 'drawn out history of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion', and
- (4) the existence of sanctions less drastic than dismissal.

Herbert v. Saffell, 877 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1989).

Applying the appropriate considerations, the record fails to establish a basis for the extreme sanction of dismissal in Boyd's case. (1) The record shows that Boyd never intended to abandon or neglect her case. She fully briefed her issues through the filings with the circuit court. Her intent was not to merely delay the case. On the contrary, even in her email indicating that she could not attend the hearing, she nevertheless clearly sought to have the case ruled upon. (2) There is

no showing of prejudice to the state from Boyd's not appearing at the hearing. As it was not an evidentiary hearing, there was no lost testimony, no evidentiary problems, or other prejudice to the state's position on the appeal. At worst, it was merely a matter of rescheduling a hearing. (3) There is no record of any prior behavior that would constitute a drawn out history of deliberately being dilatory. (4) The court could have admonished Boyd or taken numerous other actions short of ending the case without reaching the merits. The facts and circumstances fail to support the harsh sanction of dismissal in Boyd's case.

Although our supreme court has affirmed cases involving the dismissal of actions based on a failure to prosecute, those dismissals were imposed to maintain the orderly disposition of cases *in the face of repeated warnings to the offending party or multiple opportunities to proceed with trial, and only then upon a finding of unreasonable neglect*. See Small v. Mungo, 254 S.C. 438, 443, 175 S.E.2d 802, 804 (1970). In Boyd's case, there is no evidence of such repeated warnings, multiple opportunities to proceed, or any intentionally offensive or disrespectful behavior on Boyd's part. Despite this lack of a factual basis, the circuit court applied the harshest sanction possible. A sanction completely out of proportion to Boyd's actions. Absent the most egregious behavior, dismissal is simply too harsh a punishment where it acts as a permanent procedural bar to further litigation on

the merits.

Regardless of the particulars of the analysis, looking at the general rule disfavoring dismissal, ending Boyd's appeal and preventing her from reaching the merits of her appeal is unsupported. "Terminating a party's right to reach the merits by dismissal on procedural grounds absent some egregious pattern of behavior has been frowned upon by our courts. *E.g.*, Orlando v. Boyd, 320 S.C. 509, 511, 466 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1996) (holding that precluding a witness from testifying was an abuse of discretion without a showing of willful disobedience when exclusion amounted to a judgment of default or dismissal)."

Termination of Boyd's right to reach the merits of the case is not appropriate where her action was neither egregious nor resulted in any prejudice to the rights of the state. Where the effect will be the same as granting judgment by default or dismissal, a preclusion order may be made only if there is some showing of wilful disobedience or gross indifference to the rights of the adverse party. Baughman v. AT & T Co., 306 S.C. 101, at 108-109, 410 S.E.2d 537 (1991) (*citing* 4A *Moore's Federal Practice* 37.03 (2d. Ed. 1990); and Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)). Orlando v. Boyd, 320 S.C. 509 (1996).

In Boyd's case, dismissal terminated her action and prevents further hearing


on the merits of her appeal from the magistrate's court. Even Judge Anderson's dissent in McComas discussing the court's inherent power to dismiss for failure to prosecute recognizes that such dismissal should be without prejudice. Here, the circuit court's dismissal of Boyd's appeal ends the case without a hearing on the merits of the issues that she had properly presented to the circuit court through the detailed notice of appeal. The record shows that Boyd sent an email to the court requesting not to have to appear at the hearing. She received a response but was not told that she had to appear. Her subsequent failure to appear does not constitute a willful disrespect for either the court or the rights of the state in the case. The record fails to establish Boyd's acts constitute unreasonable neglect warranting the harshest sanction possible. Even if some sanction were warranted, an order of dismissal with prejudice under the present facts was not justified and constitutes an abuse of discretion.

The appropriate remedy in this case is to remand the case to the circuit court. Procedurally, a remand is the appropriate as it would allow Boyd the opportunity to move to settle the record prior to the circuit court's reaching the merits on the record. This procedure would not be available to Boyd if this Court were to immediately address the merits on the present record.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing the decision of the circuit court should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the appeal from the magistrate's court.

Respectfully submitted,



J. Falkner Wilkes, 12893  
114 Whitsett Street  
Greenville, SC 29601  
(864) 282-1292

Counsel for the Appellant

September 10, 2015.

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
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RULE 211(g) CERTIFICATE

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I certify that the Brief of Appellant is in compliance with Rule 211(g)  
SCACR.

Respectfully submitted,



J. Falkner Wilkes, 12893  
114 Whitsett Street  
Greenville, SC 29601  
(864) 282-1292

Counsel for Appellant

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 10<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2015, I served the Appellant's Brief and certificates on the Respondent by placing a copy of same in the United States Mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to counsel of record as indicated below, and others, and by facsimile if indicated:

Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General  
Office of the Attorney General  
POB 11549  
Columbia, SC 29211-1549

Respectfully submitted,  
*J. Falkner Wilkes*  
J. Falkner Wilkes, 12893  
114 Whitsett Street  
Greenville, SC 29601  
(864) 282-1292  
Counsel for Appellant

September 10, 2015.