

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE SUPREME COURT

---

CERTIORARI to Horry County  
KRISTILEA HARRINGTON,  
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Jeffrey WAYNE RIEBE,

Petitioner,

**RECEIVED**

DEC 17 2015

v.

**S.C. SUPREME COURT**

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

Appellate case NO: 2015-000015

Pro SE Response to JOHNSON  
Petition for writ of CERTIORARI

Jeff Riebe  
Appellate  
MCCIF 2A-166  
386 Redemption way  
M<sup>c</sup> Cormick, SC 29899  
New Address

## ARGUMENT

1) Trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to have quashed a defective indictment.

At the start of the JACKSON-DENNO HEARING The Trial Judge Honorable STEVEN H JOHN (COURT) called the case, the following took place between the court, Ms. Brana Williams (Williams), Jeffrey Riebe's (Petitioner) Trial Counsel and MR. George DeBusk Assistant Solicitor for Horry County, Counsel for State.

MR. DeBUSK: Your Honor, we want to proceed with ... JACKSON-DENNO

The court: ... Why don't we call the name of the case, so we've got it on record, please.

MR. DeBUSK: THIS IS STATE V. JEFFREY RIEBE. I'm sorry, your Honor... I didn't have the indictment number handy. ...

MS Williams: I have it, It's (08-GS-26-01053)  
(08) sic

MR DeBUSK: That is correct, Your Honor.

The court: ALL Right, very good See (APP. 21, I: 4-14)

ON Tuesday, MAY 24, 2011 - FRIDAY, MAY 27, 2011, and Tuesday, MAY 31, 2011 Trial was held See (APP. 1, I) The case was called, but not the indictment number see (APP. 114, I: 14-16) The Petit Jury found Petition guilty, and Deputy clerk of court published the following:

Indictment number (08-GS-26-01053) (sic)  
State of South Carolina, County of Horry versus JEFFREY RIEBE ... MAY 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011 Signed by

foreperson, 302 Stalvey. see (App. 991, II: 7-13)

a) convicted under one indictment, and  
sentence under another indictment.

The petitioner was taken to trial under indictment (08) which the body stated ... strangulation only see (App. 1091-2, III) and petitioner published the indictment at post conviction Relief (PCR) hearing see (App 1031, III: 2-16) The petit jury found Petitioner guilty, and the Deputy clerk of court published the verdict with indictment (08) ID (emphasis added)

The Court: ... (09-GS-26-01053), State of South Carolina, County of Horry, versus JEFFREY WAYNE RIEBE ... see (App. 996, II: 13-14), The Court Reporter informed the Court, there is a problem with the indictment see (App. 997, II: 4-5)

The Court did inquire about the indictment number, and the following took place;

The Court: The indictment number, Solicitor is 2009-- is it (09-GS-26-01053)?

MR. De Busk: I have 2008 Your Honor, but--  
The Court: well, I've got the True-Billed indictments.

MR. De Busk: I will take your word over that, your Honor

The Court: OKAY, and it says 2009--

MR. De Busk: It was true Billed on MARCH 26, 2009

The Court: 26, 2009

MR. DeBusk: ... So it should be 2009, Your  
Honor

The Court: yes, - see App. 997, II (6-17)

The court went by the action of the grand jury  
"Action of the grand jury" the word "true-billed"  
... after the grand jury has deliberated, it then  
reports its finding of "true bill" or "no bill" to  
Court of General Session. This report may be made  
on the same day as the grand jury make its  
finding, or it may be made at some time later  
time Brown v. State 449 SE2d 494, 316 SC 258  
(SC 1994).

By using the action of the grand jury was in  
error in this situation. where the dock number  
and term of court on the first (1st) page was  
typed in Number (8) (Eight) on page two (2)  
the oath and grand jury convicted on (8)  
(Eight) ... AS required by law ... the caption  
of indictment should show the place and date  
at which the court was held... State v.  
Griffin 285 SE2d 631, 277 SC 193 (1981). There is  
no ambiguity or uncertainty in it (caption) it  
is as descriptive of the place as language  
can possibly make it to the nicety and exacting  
laid down in some of the old antiquated English  
reporters. it was disgrace to law. a suffi-  
cient degree of certainty to show the time  
and place is all the law require, and well

word in caption of the indictment under construction  
State v. Brisbane 2 Bay 451, 451. — — —, 1802 WL  
494 (SC const, 1802) Petitioner's certianty show place  
and time as required by Law by having Common  
date of 2008 see (App. 1091-2, III)

The indictment (08) did not have any omission,  
and the Law only permits for insertion for omission  
- The omission may be corrected by other parts of  
the indictment Id Griffin see also State v. State  
549 SE2d 601 (SC, 2001)

In State v. CR Eight 1 Brev 169, — — —, 1802  
WL 558 (SC, const, 1802) (... and even after  
conviction the Statement in an indictment,  
that the presentment of the jury is "upon their  
oath" is part of the caption, and if it has  
been omitted, may be inserted even after  
conviction), But the court could not amended  
petitioner's indictment when grand jury convened  
on October 30, 2008 see (App. 1092, III) and the  
indictment (08) over two (2) years later be  
amended see App. 997, 4-17) on MAY 31, 2011.  
A mere clerical mistake may be amended at  
anytime, but after term expired, the original  
caption cannot be amended State v. Dozier  
29 S.C. 211, 2 Spear 211, 1843 WL 2521 (SCA, 1843?)  
Citing 2 Lord Raymond 968. Amending the caption on  
May 31, 2011 when the term of court for grand  
jury March 26, 2009, or MAY 30, 2011 is well  
outside the week the term of court ended.

The term of court is one week. State v. Campbell, 376 SC 21, 265 SE2d 371, (SC, 2008)

It is long standing rule of law that a trial judge is without jurisdiction to consider a criminal matter once the term of court during which judgement was entered expires State v. Hinson 303 SC 97, 339 SE2d 422 (1990) also State v. Best 257 SC 361, 186 SE2d 272 (1972) (Trial Judge is without Authority to pursue a case after the term of court has adjourned) The grand jury made their finding on indictment (08) ID, and since the grand jury's jurisdiction co-extensive with the criminal jurisdiction of the court in which it is empaneled and for which it making inquiry State v. McClure 289 SE2d 158 (SC, 1982) the grand jury which was empaneled in March 26, 2009 term falls well outside May 31, 2011 term when the indictment (08) was altered.

### b) Different Indictments

The indictment (08) is the offense of strangling mowery only. See (App. 1092; III) The indictment the petitioner should of went to trial by should be mowery ... by means of asphyxia due to manual strangulation and blunt force trauma, Injuries to the neck, The front and back of Head, mouth and body (Ribs) by Belt and fist, corner or wall, floor, hard object or something of that nature (Unknown weapon) See (App II: 564: 1-2), 566: 25-568: 9, 564: 11-16, 569: 12-15, 565: 9-566: 3, 5696-7, 568: 11-569: 5, and 569: 17-570: (13), or, to that effect.

Solicitor called Dr. Proctor would do the Autopsy and testified that mowery died of asphyxia due

to manual strangulation and blunt force trauma  
Id at (557, II:12-18) and also ... The cause of Death?  
"This woman (mowery) died as a result of asphy-  
xia due to manual strangulation, and blunt force  
trauma" Id. This Belt Like Ligation that was  
present at the time of Autopsy - (SEE App. 564, II:1-2)  
"Again, to Break ribs in that matter, it would be  
blunt force," see (App. 570, II:89) "The head being  
banged against the floor, or any blunt object...  
to the front of the head ... blood within the brain  
stem" see (App. 568, II:20-569:6) This offense pre-  
sented to petit jury was different from the grand  
jury indicted petitioner for,

The respondent (Joshua A. Thomas) assistant  
attorney General asserted that the indictment  
(08) presented to grand jury. A presumption of  
regularity attaches to proceeding in the court  
of general session. Pringle v. State 287 SC 409,  
411, 339 SE2d 127, 128 (1986) Citing Britt 235 SC 395,  
111, SE2d 669 (1959) State v. Jones 211 SC 319, 45 SE.  
2d 143 (1918) Absent evidence to contrary, the court  
must presume that a properly returned indictment  
is valid. State v. James 321 SC 75, 472 SE2d 38,  
40 (ct App. 1996) Citing Weather v. State 319 SC  
59, 459 SE2d 838 (1995). State v. Thompson 305 SC 496,  
409 SE2d 420 (ct App. 1991) Applicant's indictment is  
valid on its face because it states all the necessary  
elements of the crime, the date of the offense,  
and the name of the accused Id at 75, 472 SE2d

at 40, the indictment is stamped "true-billed" and signed by the forman 287 SC 410, 339 SE2d 129. See C App 1087, III, 10-19) The respondent asserted that the body of the indictment is without defect and PCR court agreed ID order at 1087 and petitioner agrees this is valid indictment (08) returned by the grand jury mean this indictment (09) is perfected and meet with requirement of the LAW ID Brishman as well

The petitioner published during PCR hearing the indictment (08) See (App 1031, III:4-16 and 1092, III) Respondent asserted that its valid on its face ID. The only defect to the indictment (08) is the amendment to number (8) to make it (09) by handwritten date which goes against common date of (08) which was not omitted, but change. In Griffin and Tate courts ID held the omitted section could be corrected by other part of the indictment. The petitioner's original indictment (08) has all three (3) section filled in with eight (08) which was amended, over two (2) years later in which Dozier court ID held could not be amended outside term of court of judgement in which grand jury making in equity co-existed with court it was enforced McClure ID, and Tate court - indictment which state the essential elements of the crime and, is other wise free from defect in the caption will not invalidate the indictment.

State should of had Indictment (09)

The court: All right, Do you have the book where the indictment numbers are originally recorded? See (App 997, II 23-24).

MR. DeBusk: We have checked the book, we have it present in the court room today.

It is (09-GS-26-01053).

The court: All right, so it's (09-GS-26-01053)

MR. DeBusk: Yes your Honor.

The court: All right, and that's what is reflected on the original indictment, and sentencing sheet, see (App 998, II 15-21) (The court used the (true-Bill) date FD

C) The court knew number on the indictment was essential

The court: Mad... check... you need to look at your book, you need to look at your book, and make sure... well, we'll clear that up. See (App 997, II 19-21; 998:5) In an action for malicious prosecution an averment in the declaration, of the term at which the indictment was given out to the grand jury is material and variance from the record will be fatal, but if the averment be according to the truth, the plaintiff is not concluded by an erroneous statement of the term in the caption of the indictment, and sustain the averment. Vandyke v. Dale 1 bail 165, 1828 WL 783 (SC App 8 Eq, 1828) The court should of known with the number

and advertment (2008 to 2009 and strangulation & strangulation and blunt force trauma) would be fatal to the indictment. The court erred by not looking at the indictment as a whole as the Griffin Court I D (fail to read the indictment as a whole)

The respondent on cross of petitioner counsel asked her about the Autopsy report and in she was surprise and indictment (08) did not mention both words (strangulation and blunt force trauma) see (App. 1064, III: 20-1065; 7 If he received any notice at all, it was from the attorney II the court held that notice from the Attorney was inadequate, and therefore the defendant's constitutional rights were violated Ed MAGAZINE 361 SC 610, 606 SE2d 761 (SC, 2004) citing State v. Green 269 SC 657, 661 239 SE2d 485, 487 (1977). The solicitor giving petitioner's Attorney the Autopsy report and not putting blunt force trauma in the indictment was inadequate to petitioner's constitutional rights to be fully informed.

C) The solicitor Amended the indictment at trial by presentment of evidence outside scope of indictment (08)

The solicitor's opening argument informed Jury that Mowery " had massive contusion on front part of her head, her forehead was all cut up, some of her teeth were knocked out" see (App. 16, II: 11-16) He also said Mowery was very beaten, lying on the floor in helpless position, probably too DRUNK to do anything about it in Pain, spitting out blood with every breath see

App. 116, II 14-16) Citing Petitioner's Counsel Johnson  
Petition for writ of Certiorari (Johnson Brief)  
4: 8-11

The solicitor called Dr. Proctor who testified  
"This woman died as result of asphyxia due  
to manual strangulation, and blunt force trauma"  
App 571, II 17-18) This testimony was presented by  
solicitor for which indictment (08) show only  
strangulation,

Petitioner would like to remind this court of  
the definition of the word "and"; 1) used to  
indicate connection or addition. esp. of items  
with in the same class or type, or to join word  
or phrase of the same grammatical rank or  
function, 2) use to join one finite verb to  
another so that together they are equivalent  
to an infinitive of purpose see Merriam-  
Webster's dictionary and the saurus (paperback)  
Copyright 2006 by Merriam-Webster, Inc, ISBN  
978-0-87779-851-4... 20th printing 8/2013

" Appellant also asserts a fatal variance  
between the indictment and the proof because  
the state did not prove the specific means of  
accomplishing the murder, the state did produce  
evidence tending to show that the victim could  
have been killed by any one of means alleged  
in indictment there was no material variance  
State v. Owens 293 SC 161, 359 SE 2d 275 (SC, 1985)

over ruled on other grounds (Gentry). Unlike Owens petitioner's indictment did not have any additional cause of death, but the cause of death for Mowery in this case was strangulation, and addition of blunt force trauma.

The purpose of the indictment was to state the charge with enough specificity so that the defendant knows what he has to defend against... the jury's question and ensuing discussion with the judge reveals that jury focused ~~\*\*\*~~ on the terms of the indictment and recognized the alternative elements in the homicide Barley v. State 392 SC 422 709 SE2d 671 (SC, 2011) in petitioner's case no one has recognized the additional element of blunt force trauma (emphasis added)

2) The trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to state's closing arguments,

### FACTS

MR: Pe Busk: ... He (petitioner) killed Phyllis Mowery (Mowery). He beat her... He beat her, put cuts on her head, confusion front and back, Broken ribs... He was confronted with a choice... he grabs that belt, put it around her neck... put it around her neck, hold it tight enough to fracture the bone in her trachea... hold it long to kill Phyllis Mowery. See (APP 974, II: 2-975:1)

He had to wrap that belt around her neck

We had to hold with sufficient force to break the bone in her trachea... the effort required was significant, and it had to be done well over a minute to bring about her death... all this happen after he beat her. He knocked out her teeth see (APP. 972, II: 1-10)

Let's talk about that evidence, the real evidence in this case prove Jeffrey Riebe is guilty of MURDER, prove it beyond a reasonable doubt see (APP 956, II: 7-9)... he knew she was dead, the person who tried to hide what he did and that person is Jeffrey Riebe see APP II: 17-18)

The last word's by Solicitor was... the Jeffrey Riebe who is guilty of strangling and murdering Phyllis Mowery, now I ASK you to go back there and do justice for Phyllis Mowery see (APP. 978, II: 2-5) (EMPHASIS ADDED)

The Solicitor's opening argument is as following Mr. Debuski... turn out unfortunately Jeffrey Riebe did not like being fuss at... it made him angry and one night of August 26, 2008 and the early morning hours of August 27, 2008 that anger boiled over, and when Phyllis fussed at Jeffrey Riebe just one to many times, he started beat her... at that point Jeffrey Riebe takes a choice... the alternative was to finish what he had started and that's the

LEGAL  
MURDER ROOM

alternative he chose... He grabbed that belt, He put it around Phyllis's neck and he squeezed, so hard it crushed her trachea and he held it, so long that it killed her from asphyxiation she was n't going to be a witness against him, he made the choice, I going to get away with this, and he carried on with that choice see App. 116, I: 6-117:4) He did not tell the truth they (police) talked to him two (2) different days, and he told two (2) different stories see App. 117, I: 20-23)

a) The post Conviction Relief (PCR) Judge errored in her ruling by not considering the following.

The propriety of closing argument must be reviewed in the context of the trial judge's instruction adequately cured the improper argument and whether there is over whelming evidence of the defendant's guilt Brown v. State 383 SC 506, 516, 680 SE2d 909, 914-15 (2009) (citing Simmons v. State 331 SC 333, 338, 503 SE2d 164, 166 (1998) also order of Dismissal Case No. 2013-CP-26-5292 (2014) There was no curative instruction given by the trial judge in Petitioner Case see C App 979, II: 16-998:16)

c) STATE CASE IS WEAK

The state's DNA expert said "a mixture of

touch DNA was found on the belt, including that of unidentified male" (APP 456, I:13-24, APP 451, I:22-452:16) the DNA expert for state originally testified that petitioner was excluded as a contributor to the DNA on the Belt (APP 452, I:14-25) upon prompting from the solicitor, the state's own DNA expert then said if the male DNA on the Belt were from three people instead of two, that it was "possible" that petitioner was contributor (APP 453, I:21-24) petitioner's DNA expert agreed that petitioner was excluded from being a contributor on the belt (APP 865, I:3-868:14) He disagreed with the SLED expert that if there were more than two contributors, petitioner was a "possible" match because there was not enough "quantity and quality of that DNA... to form a conclusion." (APP 868, II:15-869, II:5) citing Johnson Brief case no 2015-000015) also state expert agreed with petitioner's expert "in this case the male contributor was a very weak profile, so I thought<sup>it</sup> be helpful to determine comparing with Y string testing (APP 453:17-20)... would it be fair to characterize it (DNA) as low quality and low quantity, answered: Yes it is a touch sample (DNA) APP 514 II:2-23 ALSO confirmed Y-

-String tested by state's second DNA expert.  
-State's DNA experts and petitioner's expert  
all testified that unidentified male DNA  
was present on the Belt

(2) NO witness to the offense

The solicitor presented one witness who places  
petitioner in the area of where the offense happened,  
but not at time of the offense, solicitor called  
Michelle Rainey (Rainey) Mowery's niece.

Q: (DeBusk) No on August 26, of 2008, did  
you see Phyllis

A: (Rainey) Not on the 26<sup>th</sup>, No... I'm not  
exactly sure what day... before got murdered  
see (APP 125, F: 16-21)

Q: So the day before this happened, did you see  
Phyllis?

A: Yes, she was with me till about 8:05 (pm)  
that night see APP 126, F: 2-3)

A: because she called Jeff (petitioner), and  
right when she called Jeff it was on my cell  
phone... not long after she called Jeff  
cell phone that's when she went home see  
(APP 126, F: 8-11)

Q: did you hear the -- Phyllis end of the  
conversation?

A: ... she said that he was going to come  
over see (APP 126, F: 16-21)

A: He (petitioner) came over, I'll say

around 10(p.m) something to use can opener to open a can of spaghetti see (App 127, I: 5-6)

Q: After that, after he came over for the can opener did you see Phyllis and Jeff again?

A: NO

Q: when was the next time you saw Jeff Riebe?

A: that -- the morning my aunt (Mowery) was found see App. 127, I: 16-21 (Coroner determined date of death August 27, 2008) see (App 482, I: 4)

Rainey could only confirm that petitioner was in the area right before at around 10 pm at her house next time she see petitioner two days later the morning her aunt was found. She never testified that she seen petitioner leave her aunt Apartment see App.

I:

A: (Rainey) I heard -- there's two apartments right next to each other, if you've seen the picture, but the neighbor's kept coming in and out, in and out, and I heard arguing over there, but I wasn't SURE if it was coming from them (Mowery and petitioner), I wasn't sure if it was come from them, so I did not see no body else going to the apartment after Jeff went over there (she has no personal knowledge that petitioner is over

her Aunt's Apartment ID) see (134, I 1-135:5) (IN Rainey's statement to the police she heard arguing at 2 AM and went to bed at 2:30 AM)

3) Petition is unreliable according to Solicitor

MR De Busk: ... He did not tell the truth, they (police) talk to him two different days and he told two different stories see App. 113, I 20-23) and closing he also said something in the first interview and then change them in the second interview see App. 960 I: 15-17)

the solicitor vouches for state evidence

MR De Busk: ... Ladies and Gentlemen, I would never ask you to convict HIM (petitioner) on evidence of that nature, that's a little speculative instead we are going to look at the real evidence in this case, the firm evidence, the non-speculative evidence, and most of that ladies and gentleman, comes from Jeffrey Riege himself. let talk about that evidence the real evidence. The real evidence in this case prove Jeffrey Riege is guilty of murder, prove it beyond a reasonable doubt (App. 956 II 2-9) (Refusar. Adhed)

Look at the real truth. its there right -- just to her (mowery) right, that way he (petitioner) couldn't miss it. when he left out, It's a blood stain see App. (962, II (4-16))

by stating the real evidence prove petitioner is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt took away petitioner's Constitutional right to presumption of innocent and took away constitutionally unbiased jury by vouching for the state's evidence and using state influence that petitioner is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. no matter what his defense is a lie and he (solicitor) had the real evidence and truth to his guilt. when an accused assert a constitutional right, it is impermissible for state to comment upon or argue in favor of guilt or punishment based upon his assertion of that right State v. Johnson 293 SC 321, 323, 360 SE2d 317, 319 (1987). A solicitor's closing argument must be carefully tailored so as not to appeal to the personal bias of jury State v. Copeland 321 SC 318, 324, 469 SE2d 620, 624 (1996) (the state's closing argument must be confined to evidence in the record and reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence) State v. Smith 375 SC 507, 654 SE2d 523 (SC, 2007)

The solicitor's argument was prejudicial in that it deprived him of the presumption of

JIAN JABEL  
MOON JIAN

innocence and his right to rely upon the failure of state's evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt State v. Primus 341 SC 592, SE2d 152 (SCA, 2000) citing State v. Posey 369 SC 500, 238 SE2d 176 (SC, 1977)

The solicitor's last words were "The Jeffrey Riebe who is guilty of strangling and murdering Phyllis Mowery. Now I ask you to go back there and do justice for Phyllis Mowery, and find him guilty of murder. See (App. 978, I 2-5) @Phases Added)

MR. GASSER personalize the issue to the jury by suggesting they were speaking for Ms. Joyner made their responsibility personal rather than as for jury to decide the issue from the facts and evidence, and interjected I think into the trial, and to the jury an inflammation, and a passion to decide this case for other reason other than the facts, and law State v. Reese 359 SC 260, 597 SE2d 169 (SCA, 2004)

5) the police had evidence of someone else

solicitor calls Detective Dennis Pitsinger (Pitsinger) of North MYRTLE BEACH Police Department: A: (Pitsinger) I actually looked at that quite extensively, and it appears to be that there was blood that let on the

JIAN JABEL  
MOOR JIAN

floor there or dabbled on the floor... I think initially we thought it might be a shoe pattern. on closer examination, and I blew it up a number of times on my computer, it almost seemed like a hand had had smeared through it as if that two, the drag mark and the hand smear could have been together See (App. 291, I: 17-21)

The next day an in camera Hear out side the presence of jury, Pitsinger stated "I'm not certified footwear impression examiner..." See (App 373, I: 17) then back in presence of jury "At the time, I believed it was some sort of footwear impression" but later you made another determination, correct?

"Yes, I did" See (App. 382, I: 3-9)

Pitsinger also testified that no one else in the North MYRTLE BEACH police department was qualified and no one outside help to identify the footwear impression was sought See (App 385, I: 8-386:4)

Another Detective Owen LYMAN (Lyman) of the North Myrtle Beach Police Department who did the interrogation of petitioner two days in a row on the first interrogation. He state the following about the footwear

impression. Q: (Williams) ... there was a foot print at the scene, and in fact, if it wasn't his (petitioner's) foot print, it could exonerate him, right?

A: (Lynn Am) that's correct.

Q: was that the truth on your part?

A: Yeah, if we could prove that it wasn't his foot print. See (App 640, II: 1-9)

Petitioner's counsel calls footwear expert Donald Girndt (Girndt) that he believed this appeared to be bloody partial footwear impression which is not uncommon at a crime scene see (App. 826, II: 19-21) and clearly see the circular patterns here that somewhat outline of a shoe ... plain to see. See (App. 828, II: 18-21) opinion was made with reasonable scientific certainty that it was not petitioner's shoes see (App. 831, II: 2-16)

### 6 Solicitor give his personal OPINION

Solicitor comments on petitioner's crime scene expert Girndt during closing argument.

Mr. DeBusk ... would basically collect anything and everything that was associated with crime or not ... she (ms Williams) talk all the things that could of have been collected, and it makes you wonder if her expert doesn't have a warehouse somewhere, like the end of Indiana Jones you know, when they have that huge ware-

house, he's collected all this evidence because -- he would of pulled up the floor, In fact, I believe that the building would of have fallen down after he did the evidency, because he would of taken the entire house into evidence see App. 954, II:4-11)

I (Solicitor) don't think he was kicking her (Mowery) to make sure she was dead, because if he (petitioner) really wanted to see she was dead, because if he really wanted to see if she was okay he would of knecalt down and checked to see if she was breathing this is I know you are dead, I'm just making sure (App. 962, II:4-8) ... He kick her to make sure she dead see (App. 968: II:11-12)

... He kept on saying I don't remember, when really meant I don't want to tell you see (App. 960, II:14-15) ... every time he said I don't remember there was a reason, Its because he didn't want to answer the question. See App. 963, II:18-20) ... Ladies and gentlemen I don't remember mean, I don't want to answer the question ... but most of all, he remembers that motive. See (App. 965, II: 21-23) He says he think he probably went into a rage, lady and gentlemen that mean he went into a rage see (App. 967, II:17-19) when he did not want to admit something, I can't remember see

(APP. 968, II: 7-8) A prosecutor should refrain from stating his personal opinion during arguments and mislead the jury about the law Boyd v. French 147 F3d 319 (4th, 1998)

The determination of whether an error is harmless depends on circumstance of the particular case State v. Reeves 301 SC 191 391 SE2d 241 (1990) no definite rule of law governs this finding. Id rather, the materiality and prejudicial character of error must be determined from its ~~\*\*\*~~ relationship to the entire case State v. Mitchell 386 SC 572 336 SE2d 150 (1985) AN error is harmless where it could not reasonably have affected the result of the trial. Id State v. Primus 341 SC 592, 535 SE2d 152. Although the instruction constitutional correct statement of the LAW, it does not cure the judge's error or permitting the inappropriate comment by the assistant solicitor during closing argument, the jury was never informed the solicitor's comment was improper. More over the charge on the law does not operate in a reparative vein, so as to eliminate the error which occurred during jury argument. Id the court never gave curative instruction for petitioner's counsel object in opening argument see (APP 114, I: 14 - 118: 18) and no objection was given by petitioner's counsel during close argument see (APP 958, II: 22 - 978: 10) and curative instruction. Id

## Conclusion

The solicitor violated petitioner's United States Constitutional Rights and/or Federal Law, and/or Constitutional Rights and/or Law of the state of South Carolina for failing to take petitioner to trial by notice of Legal indictment.

1) by Presenting the grand jury with indictment (08), and offense of strangulation as cause of death, then presenting a petit jury a indictment (08) (strangulation), then the court changed the indictment from one indictment to another by making it Indictment (09) - Strangulation and Blunt force trauma by various weapon, and unknown (Belt, floor, presser and hard objects ect.,)

2) the indictment as it stand to day is indictment (08) because docket number goes against rest of the numbers on the term and oath the grand jury convened on is October 30, 2008 term the indictment can not be change the term of court in October, 2008 or term of trial may 2011 are expired.

3) The petitioner was not personally notified by indictment as required because Blunt force trauma and various weapon or unknown weapon was not in the indictment.

4) The state cannot produce legally free billed indictment <sup>(09)</sup> nor which the journal show that petitioner was to be taken to trial.

5) The accumulation of these errors or any one cause this indictment to be defective which violated the requirement of notice by indictment.

The solicitor violated petitioner united state constitutional rights and law, and for constitutional right and law of the state of south carolina

1) The solicitor violated petitioner's right to the presumption of innocents by stating three time petitioner is guilty and several time that petitioner did kill, and strangled and what his thought where.

2) The solicitor violated the "Gold Rule" asking the jury to make it person and for money call out for justice that justice would be served by finding petitioner guilty, an ~~other~~ <sup>fact</sup>.

3) By stating the state's evidence is real proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and petition evidence was speculative and not the truth

4) State vouch that his expert's where fact and that petitioner's expert where paid well to lie.

(5) The solicitor violate petitioner right to a fair trial by causing in the jury to state side or mowery side with in flaming jury passions then to look at the evidence, and see the weakness of the case present by state, and determining the evidence to see if the evidence prove the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence alone

for the above reasons the petitioner ask the court to reverse.

Jeffrey Kreber 14 Dec 15  
Jeffrey Kreber

Sworn and subscribed  
before me 14 Dec. 2015  
on J. Frankler  
my commission expire on  
12-16-2019

# Affidavit of Service

I, Jeffrey Hebe, did mail <sup>copy of</sup> PRO SE Response to Johnson Petition for writ of certiorari on date sworn and subscribed to Assistant Attorney General Joshua L. Thomas, Esquire. At;

P.O. Box 11549  
Columbia, SC 29211

~~Jeffrey Hebe~~ 14 Dec 2015  
Jeffrey Hebe

Sworn and subscribed before  
me JCA Tomblin  
on 14 Dec. 2015

My commission expires  
on 12-16-2019

**RECEIVED**

DEC 17 2015

S.C. SUPREME COURT