

LAW OFFICE OF



TARA DAWN SHURLING, PA

Attorney and Counselor at Law

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E-Mail: tdslaw@shurlinglaw.com

RECEIVED

March 16, 2016

MAR 21 2016

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
South Carolina Supreme Court Clerk
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1330

S.C. SUPREME COURT

RE: Joel Robinson, #251879 v. State of South Carolina; 2013-CP-40-7560.

Dear Mr. Shearouse:

Enclosed please find for filing a Notice of Appeal on behalf of the above-captioned Post-Conviction Relief client. I would appreciate your returning two (2) clocked copies to me in the envelope provided. Inasmuch as I was court-appointed in this matter, I will now be turning this file over to the Appellate Division of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense for perfection of this appeal. If Mr. Robinson and his family decide to hire me I will notify the Court and opposing counsel promptly. I am, of course, advising them that any such decision would have to be made very quickly. With my thanks for your assistance in this matter, as always, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Tara Dawn Shurling".

Tara Dawn Shurling
Attorney and Counselor at Law

TDS/sg

Enclosures

cc J. Clayton Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General
Paula Murdock, South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense
Joel Robinson, #251879
Jaeleah Robinson

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
Tanya A. Gee, Presiding Judge

2013-CP-40-7560

JOEL ROBINSON, #251879

v.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

RECEIVED

MAR 21 2016


Petitioner,

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOW COMES the Petitioner in the above-captioned Post-Conviction Relief matter, acting by and through his undersigned counsel, giving notice of his appeal from the Order of Dismissal filed on January 25, 2016 denying his Post-Conviction Relief Application, and the Order Denying the Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, which was filed with the Richland County Clerk of Court on March 8, 2016.



Tara Dawn Shurling
Attorney and Counselor at Law
S.C. Bar No. 5099

3614 Landmark Drive, Suite A
Columbia, South Carolina 29204
(803)738-8622
(803)738-1600 FAX

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

This 17th day of March, 2016.

Other Counsel of Record:

J. Clayton Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
Attorney for Respondent
(803) 734-3737

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
Tanya A. Gee, Presiding Judge

2013-CP-40-7560

JOEL ROBINSON, #251879

Petitioner,


v.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,


Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that one copy of the Petitioner's Notice of Appeal in the above-entitled cause has been served upon opposing counsel, J. Clayton Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, by mailing in an envelope properly addressed with postage prepaid on this 17th day of March, 2016.


Tara Dawn Shurling
Attorney and Counsel at Law

SWORN TO BEFORE me this 17th day
of March, 2016.


Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: 3/28/24

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
 COUNTY OF RICHLAND
 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 Joel Robinson #251879

FORM 4

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

CASE NUMBER: 2013CP407560

State of South Carolina

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by: _____

Attorney for : Plaintiff Defendant or Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT. This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT. This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON): Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit);
 Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other Dismissed without prejudice
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON): Rule 40(j), SCRPC; Bankruptcy;
 Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other _____
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk : After careful consideration, Applicant's Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled
		\$
		\$
		\$

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

Circuit Court Judge Janya A. Gee Judge Code 2756 Date March 8, 2016

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on the 10 day of Mar, 2016 and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on this 10 day of Mar, 2016 to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter _____

Clerk of Court Jeanette W. McBride

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF RICHLAND
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGM. T IN A CIVIL CASE

CASE NUMBER: 2013CP4007560

Joel Antwan #251879 Robinson

State of South Carolina

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by: _____

Attorney for : Plaintiff Defendant or Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. No. suit); Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other _____
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j), SCRPC; Bankruptcy; Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other _____
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk : _____

INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled
		\$
		\$
		\$

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. **Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.**

Circuit Court Judge _____

Judge Code _____

Date _____

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on the ____ day of _____, 20____ and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on this 26 January 2016 to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Joel Antwan #251879 Robinson

Tara Dawn Shurling

James Clayton Mitchell III

Joel Antwan #251879 Robinson

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter _____

Clerk of Court



STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF RICHLAND

Joel Robinson, #251879,

Applicant,

v.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT


2013-CP-40-07560

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

RICHLAND COUNTY
FILED
2016 JAN 25 PM 4:12
JENNIFER C. DAVIS, CLERK

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) filed December 16, 2013. Respondent made its Return on April 7, 2014, requesting an evidentiary hearing be convened. Kristy G. Goldberg, Esquire was initially appointed by the Richland County Clerk of Court to represent Applicant. Counsel Goldberg was relieved because she represented Applicant when she was with the Richland County Public Defender's Office. Tara D. Shurling, Esquire, was then appointed by the Richland County Clerk of Court on February 21, 2014. An evidentiary hearing was held on August 25, 2015, at the Richland County Courthouse. Applicant was present and represented by Counsel Shurling. J. Clayton Mitchell, Esquire, of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office represented Respondent.

At the PCR hearing, Applicant testified on his own behalf. Also testifying were Applicant's counsel, Micah T. Leddy, Esquire, and Jennifer C. Davis, Esquire. The record was held open to allow Counsel Leddy to further prepare and review his case file and to receive testimony from Counsel Goldberg. The hearing was reconvened on October 15, 2015. This Court had before it the Richland County Clerk of Court records, Applicant's South Carolina Department of Corrections records, the appellate records, the PCR application, the Return, and the transcript.



I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Richland County Clerk of Court. Applicant was indicted during the June 2007 term of the Richland County Grand Jury for Murder (2007-GS-40-2040), Use of a Firearm During the Commission of a Violent Crime (2007-GS-40-2038), and Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill (2007-GS-40-2039). He was also indicted at the February 2009 term of the Richland County Grand Jury for Possession of Crack Cocaine – Second Offense (2009-GS-40-1345) and Possession of Cocaine – Second Offense (2009-GS-40-1346). On March 3-5, 2009, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable J. Michelle Childs, where he was convicted as indicted. Applicant was represented by Counsel Leddy and Counsel Davis at trial. Judge Childs sentenced Applicant to life imprisonment for Murder, twenty (20) years' for Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill, five (5) years' for Use of a Firearm during the Commission of a Violent Crime, and time served for Possession of Cocaine – Second Offense and possession of Crack Cocaine – Second Offense. The sentences were to be served concurrently.

Applicant filed a notice of appeal and an appeal was perfected on his behalf. Following briefing, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Applicant's convictions and sentences by unpublished order filed March 21, 2012. A subsequent Petition for Rehearing was denied. Applicant then petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court for certiorari, which was denied by the Court on August 8, 2013. The Remittitur was issued on August 15, 2013.

In this action, Applicant alleges that he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

- I. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in
 - a. Failing to move to suppress Applicant's statement;

- b. Failing to argue Applicant was subjected to an unlawful search and seizure; and
- c. Failing to advise Applicant that the decision of whether to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter is discretionary with the trial judge.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

In a post-conviction relief action, Applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in the application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, Applicant must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984); Butler, 334 S.E.2d 813.

The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. The courts presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. Applicant must overcome this presumption in order to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).

Courts use a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625. First, Applicant must prove counsel's performance was deficient. Id. Under this prong, courts measure an attorney's performance by its "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Second, any deficient performance must have prejudiced Applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has reviewed the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, observed the witnesses presented at the hearing, passed upon their credibility, and weighed the testimony accordingly. Further, this Court has reviewed the Clerk of Court records regarding the subject convictions, the trial transcript, appellate records, records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the application for post-conviction relief, and the legal arguments made by the attorneys. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 (2003), this Court makes the following findings of fact based upon all of the probative evidence presented.

As a matter of general impression, this Court finds Applicant's testimony and assertions to be not credible. These credibility findings have been applied to the Court's findings and conclusions set forth below.

Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Failing to move to suppress Applicant's statement

First, Applicant alleges Counsel were ineffective in failing to move to suppress Applicant's statement to law enforcement. Applicant argues Counsel should have argued that he was intoxicated and therefore did not give his statement voluntarily.

A Jackson v. Denno hearing was held pre-trial. Applicant stated to a transport officer that the victim had disrespected him several times. (Trial Tr. p. 106, lines 12-17). Applicant also confessed and stated that he killed the victim and that the victim was dead. (Trial Tr. p. 110, lines 16-22; p. 111, line 15; p. 112, line 2). Later, Applicant gave a written statement to investigators after being Mirandized and after signing a waiver of rights consent form. In nearly an hour-and-a-half long interview, Applicant detailed the events leading up to the murder and gave a full confession. Investigator Kevin Reese, who took Applicant's statement, testified that Applicant

did not appear intoxicated and that his statement made "absolute sense." (Trial Tr. p. 127, lines 1-12). The State argued that the initial statements Applicant made were completely unsolicited by the officers and should be admitted. (Trial Tr. p. 136, lines 3-12). Counsel Leddy argued that the initial statement was not given voluntarily and cited the fact that Applicant had not yet been Mirandized. (Trial Tr. p. 138, lines 7-14).

At the PCR hearing, Applicant testified he was under the influence of drugs such as ecstasy, cocaine, crack cocaine, and alcohol when he was taken into custody. He described the effect those drugs had on him, specifically that they made him paranoid. He testified he discussed his intoxication with Counsel Goldberg. He further testified that a drug test was never administered to help show his level of intoxication at the time he gave a statement. Counsel Leddy testified that Applicant did not tell him he was using a number of drugs or that he was intoxicated when he gave his statement to law enforcement. Judge Childs found the statement was given voluntarily and indicated that it would be admitted when offered. (Trial Tr. p. 144, lines 9-14).

This Court finds this allegation is without merit. "The fact that one is intoxicated at the time a confession is made does not necessarily render him incapable of comprehending the meaning and effect of his words." State v. Saxon, 261 S.C. 523, 529, 201 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1973). "Therefore, proof that an accused was intoxicated at the time he made a confession does not render the statement inadmissible as a matter of law, unless the accused's intoxication was such that he did not realize what he was saying." Id. Based on this case law, it was reasonable for trial counsel not to object on the basis of intoxication and not to call Applicant as a witness during the Denno hearing. The testimony at the Denno hearing shows that Applicant had full use of his faculties and that he was thinking clearly and logically when he gave his statements. (Trial

Tr. p. 127, lines 1-12). This Court finds that a motion to suppress Applicant's statement on the grounds that he was intoxicated would have been futile. Applicant's statement was properly admitted. See State v. Collins, 266 S.C. 566, 673, 225 S.E.2d 189, 193 (1976) (the evidence regarding the defendant's intoxicated condition at the time he made a statement to police "presented a factual situation which the judge determined unfavorably to the defendant. We cannot say he erred."). There is also overwhelming evidence of Applicant's guilt so he cannot prove prejudice. This Court denies and dismisses this allegation.

Failing to argue Applicant was subjected to an unlawful search and seizure

Next, Applicant alleges Counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge the initial stop made by officers. Specifically, Applicant argues there was no probable cause for the officers to stop him.

During pre-trial motions, Counsel Leddy argued that the search and subsequent seizure was in violation of the 4th Amendment. He argued that any evidence recovered pursuant to an unlawful stop would have been fruit of the poisonous tree. Counsel Leddy expounded upon this argument: "the stop was initially made because he was suspected. It was a suspicion stop, not a probable cause stop. It was a suspicion stop, that he matched the description of somebody wanted in a shooting, and then investigator Dow came." (Trial Tr. p. 210, lines 19-23). The State took the contrary position and noted that the officers conducted a proper Terry frisk and then a proper search incident to arrest (Trial Tr. p. 212, lines 7-12). Judge Childs ruled that the motion to suppress was denied. (Trial Tr. p. 212, line 13). Counsel Davis testified that Applicant matched the description of the murder suspect in that he was bald, light-skinned, and wore a tan jacket. She testified that it was the defense's strategy to challenge the suggestive show-up identification made by Jeffrey Smith.

This Court finds Applicant failed to meet his burden in proving Counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge the search and subsequent seizure of Applicant and the recovery of the murder weapon. For one thing, Counsel Leddy did challenge the officer's initial stop of Applicant while walking down North Main Street. This issue was ruled upon by Judge Childs. Thus, this allegation is a direct appeal issue that is procedurally barred by S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(b) (2003). Post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 423, 215 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1974). A post-conviction relief application cannot assert any issues that could have been raised at trial or on appeal. Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 8, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993). Applicant could have raised this issue on appeal. Regardless, this Court finds the stop to have been proper and not in violation of the 4th Amendment. Furthermore, Applicant has failed to prove any resulting prejudice because of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.

Failing to advise Applicant that the decision of whether to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter is discretionary with the trial judge

Applicant alleges Counsel were ineffective in failing to advise him that a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction was discretionary. Applicant alleges that if he had known that there was a chance he would not receive the voluntary manslaughter instruction, then he would have accepted the State's plea offer of thirty (30) years' to murder.

This Court finds this allegation is without merit because Applicant *was* properly advised by Counsel on the issue. This Court finds Counsel Goldberg's testimony credible and persuasive. Counsel Goldberg thoroughly explained to Applicant that there was no guarantee that he would be entitled to a voluntary manslaughter charge. See State's Exhibit 1. Counsel Goldberg went so far as to send Applicant a memorandum detailing her analysis and attached relevant case law for him to analyze. This Court also notes Counsel Goldberg's unsuccessful efforts in attempting to

solicit an offer of voluntary manslaughter. This Court also finds Counsel Davis's testimony credible in that a thirty (30) year offer to murder was made and rejected by Applicant. Counsel Davis and Counsel Leddy also advised Applicant regarding voluntary manslaughter and reviewed the relevant penalties with him.

This Court finds Applicant rejected the plea offer after it was fully and properly conveyed to him. This Court finds Applicant was not credible when he testified that he would have accepted the plea offer of thirty (30) years' if he had known there was a possibility that he would not be entitled to a voluntary manslaughter charge. Notably, Applicant testified that he rejected the plea offer of thirty (30) years' because he did not want to serve that much time on a day-for-day sentence.

Finally, this Court notes that there exists overwhelming evidence of Applicant's guilt which bars a finding of prejudice on any alleged deficiency. See Franklin v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 563, 570 n. 3, 552 S.E.2d 718, 722 n. 3 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1114, 122 S.Ct. 2332, 153 L.Ed.2d 162 (2002) (finding overwhelming evidence of guilt negated any claim that counsel's deficient performance could have reasonably affected the result of the defendant's trial); Geter v. State, 305 S.C. 365, 367, 409 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1991) (concluding reasonable probability of a different result does not exist when there is overwhelming evidence of guilt). The State presented several eyewitnesses to the murder who identified Applicant as the shooter. Applicant also gave a detailed confession and account of how he believed his life was in danger and that if he did not take action, then he would be killed himself. This Court denies relief.

All Other Allegations

As to any and all allegations that were raised in this matter and not specifically addressed in this order, the Court finds Applicant failed to present any evidence regarding such allegations.

Accordingly, the Court finds Applicant has abandoned any such allegations.

IV. CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application. Applicant failed to demonstrate counsels' performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; Stalk v. State, 383 S.C. 559, 563, 681 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2009). Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days from PCR counsel's receipt of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991), Applicant has a right to appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of post-conviction relief. Rule 71.1(g), SCRPC, provides that if Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The application for Post-Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant shall remain in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections to complete service of his sentence.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 25 day of January, 2016.


TANYA A. GEE
Residing Judge

Columbia, South Carolina

LAW OFFICE OF



TARA DAWN SHURLING, PA

Attorney and Counselor at Law

3614 Landmark Drive

Suite A

Columbia, South Carolina 29204

(803) 738-8622

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E-Mail: tdslaw@shurlinglaw.com

March 16, 2016

RECEIVED

MAR 21 2016

S.C. SUPREME COURT

J. Clayton Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211-

RE: Joel Robinson, #251879 v. State of South Carolina; 2013-CP-40-7560.

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

Enclosed please find for your records a copy of the Notice of Appeal that was filed in the above-captioned matter. I was court-appointed in this matter and will now forward this file to the Appellate Division of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense in the next few days. Therefore, please direct any further questions to that office after this date. If Mr. Robinson and his family were to decide to hire me to represent him on appeal I will let you know. It was a pleasure working with you on this case. I remain,

Sincerely yours,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Tara Dawn Shurling".

Tara Dawn Shurling
Attorney and Counselor at Law

TDS/sg

Enclosure

cc: The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina ✓
Joel Robinson, #251879
Jaeleah Robinson