

Bobby C. Jenkins #271240  
Evans, CI Inst. (Rhu B108)  
610 Hwy 9 West  
Bennettsville, SC 29512

June 23, 2016

The Honorable Daniel E Shearouse  
Clerk of Court  
South Carolina Supreme Court  
P.O. Box 11330  
Columbia, S.C. 29211

RECEIVED

JUN 27 2016

S.C. SUPREME COURT

RE: Bobby C. Jenkins v State  
Appellate case No. 2016-001251

Dear Honorable SIR:

In compliance with your with your  
Letter head dated June 15, 2016  
received and signed on June 17, 2016  
from Evans, CI Mailroom, to file  
the written Explanation Required  
by Rule #243(c), SCACR. The Appellant  
hereby files his Explanation into  
the S.C. Supreme Court, and the  
same was served on the Honorable  
Caitlin B. Hasting, SC Attorney General  
Office. ALSO ASK the court to  
except the 64 pages

Sincerely

Bobby Jenkins  
Bobby Jenkins

cc

Bobby C. Jenkins #271240  
Evans Corrin St (RHUB108)  
610 Hwy 9 West  
Bennettsville, SC 29512

June, 23, 2016

The Honorable Daniel E Shearouse  
Clerk of Court  
South Carolina Supreme Court  
PO Box 11330  
Columbia, SC 29211

RE: Bobby C. Jenkins v State  
Appellate case NO# 2016-001251

Dear Honorable SIR:

I wrote the court previously explaining I was not in population but segregation and my legal material was not in my possession. I just received the documents but could not obtain copies to send to the Attorney General of my exhibits which the state already have. I ask the courts to forward only copies of the exhibits because its not my fault I could not obtain copies.

Bobby Jenkins

In The state of South Carolina  
In The Supreme Court

Appellate Case No. # 2016-001251

Bobby C. Jenkins #271240  
Appellant

v.

The state of South Carolina  
Appellee

Certificate

of

Service

comes now Bobby C. Jenkins #271240, Appellant, and hereby certify that a copy of the written Explanation, pursuant to Rule #243(c) SCACR, was served upon the Appellee, the Honorable Caitlin Bazan Hastings, S.C. Ass. Attorney General; S.C. Attorney General's office, P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, S.C. 29211, via United States Postal Mail, by depositing it in the U.S. Mailbox, here at Evans, Corr. Inst. 610 Hwy 9 West, Bennettsville, SC 29512

Bobby Jenkins  
Bobby C. Jenkins  
#271240

The Appellant's written Explanation pursuant to Rule #243(c), SCACR, and the certificate of service, is hereby filed in compliance with:

- (1) Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988)
- (2) Lomax v. Armontrout, 923 F.2d 574, 8th Cir cert. denied, 112 S.Ct 60 (1991)
- (3) Sudduth v Arizona Atty Gen, 921 F.2d 206, (9th Cir. 1990)

This day \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_, 2016:

Affirmed to and subscribed to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2016

\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

\_\_\_\_\_  
My Commission Exp.

cc:

Bahlygenkins

NO Notary the Day  
mailed out at work

In The state of South Carolina  
In The Supreme Court

Appellate case NO # 2016-001251

Bobby C. Jenkins #271240,  
Appellant,

v

The State of South Carolina  
Appellee,

Notice of Appeal

"Explanation"

Pursuant to Rule  
#243(c), SCACR

Comes now Bobby C. Jenkins, Appellant  
pursuant to Rule #243(c) SCACR and  
order by the Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse,  
Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme  
Court to submit AN EXPLANATION as  
to why the circuit court's Ruling  
was Improper!!!

The Appellant Asserts the circuit  
court's Ruling was Improper and  
violates his fourteenth (14th)  
Amendment due process Rights  
and humbly Asks this Honorable  
Court to "Remand" his Case back  
to the circuit court for AN Evidentiary  
hearing and shows the court the  
Following:

1

(1) The Appellant Asserts the final order: Issued by the Honorable William H. Seals, Jr. on May 3, 2016. Is not in Accord with the S.C. Courts Ruling in Jamison v. State, 410 S.C. 456, 470, 76 S.E. 2d 123, 130 (2014) and McCoy v. State, — S.E. 2d —, 2013 WL 441549 (February 6, 2013)!!!

In McCoy v. State, supra the court stated... when considering the state's motion for summary dismissal, where no evidentiary hearing has been held the PCR Judge must assume facts presented by the Applicant are true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the Applicant. see eg. Leamon v. State, 363 S.C. 432, 434, 611 S.E. 2d 494, 495 (2005) citing S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 Judge Seals Jr. focuses on the issues he thought could be dismissed and not all issues that was clearly ignores a substantial constitutional Rights violations. Whereas the Applicant asserted and presented Evidence (VIA Exhibits) that at the time he pleaded guilty to

Kidnapping, CSC 1st and Armed Robbery  
on December 6, 2000. The newly  
discovered evidence was discovered  
after the entry of the plea and,  
in the exercise of reasonable  
diligence, could not have been  
discovered prior to the entry of  
the plea, and (2) the newly discovered  
evidence is of such weight and  
quality that, under the facts  
of circumstances of that particular  
case, the "interest of Justice"  
requires the applicant's guilty plea  
be vacated. Jamison v State 410 S.C.  
456, 470, 765 S.E. 2d 123, 130 (2014)  
If my co-defendant went to  
trial AFTER my conviction and  
sentence (see Exhibits 1 and  
his transcript was incorporated  
AFTER the remanded PCR 2007  
which was Denied 2008 when  
I received this transcript  
of co-defendant Eric Jenkins  
AFTER my conviction and sentence  
as well as my post conviction hear-  
ing why wouldn't I be entitled  
to bring these issues forth  
Applicant has not failed to establish  
ed that we could not have discover-  
ed this Alleged Evidence before

he entered his guilty plea, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence because it was discovered 2012 it was brought forth but dismissed by the Honorable Benjamin H. Culbertson January 10, 2013. The through reasonable diligence those issues present in his successive PCR was within the one year statute of limitations for PCR Actions. There are also Errors of Law and Due process violations that render vacatur of conviction and sentence according to the United States Constitution and South Carolina Constitution.

Carter v State, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987)  
Generally successive applications for post conviction relief are viewed with disfavor and the applicant has the burden of showing that a new ground for relief could not have been raised in a previous application. Foxworth v St., 275 S.C. 615, 274 S.E. 2d 415 (1981)  
Land v State, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E. 2d 735 (1980) If the Applicant meet this burden a hearing must be afforded despite the successive.

ness of the Application. Case v State  
277 S.C. 474, 289 S.E. 2d 413 (1982)  
South Carolina civil rules merely  
requires that the pleadings give  
notice of the claim being made  
against the Adversary and of the  
grounds upon which it rests, rather  
than allege in detail the specific  
facts upon which the claim is based.  
The purpose of notice pleading  
is simply to give fair notice to  
to the opposing party of the  
legal claims, but the resolution  
of facts which sustain a pleading  
is left to discovery.

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(B) (2003) see  
also Talley, 640 S.E. 2d at 882 (determining  
that the limitations period set  
forth in section 17-27-45(B) applied  
in Talley's post-conviction relief  
application because the application  
was filed within one year of Alabama  
v Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) which  
announced a watershed rule of criminal  
procedure that applies retroactively).  
see Franklin v Maynard, 588 S.E. 2d 604,  
606 n. 7 (S.C. 2003) (citing S.C. Code Ann.  
§ 17-27-45(B) (A) (An applicant is not barred  
from raising mental retardation in  
a second PCR Application).  
South Carolina courts are required  
to follow the United States Supreme

court decisions on retroactivity. See e.g. Danforth v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. —.

128 S.Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008) Talley v. State  
640 S.E.2d 878, 880-81 (S.C. 2007)

Second, if a PCR Applicant has newly discovered evidence, she or he may benefit from a more lenient statute of limitations.

Specifically,

If the applicant contends that there is evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence, the application must be filed under this chapter within one year after the date of actual discovery of the facts by the applicant or after the date when the facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(c) (2003).

A Defendant has the procedural right to one fair bite at the Apple.

Did Defendant Jenkins get one Fair bite?

From the beginning to the end Defendant Jenkins rights was violated, by the courts and his Attorneys.

§ 17-27-20(a)(1) Deals with the state created right.

(1) the conviction or sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United States, the South Carolina Constitution, or South Carolina State Law; (2) the court was without Jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; (4) there is evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of Justice; (5) the sentence has expired; probation, parole, or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked; or that the applicant is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; and (6) the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error previously available under any common law, statutory, or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy.

If Applicant can show "sufficient reason" for why the ground was not asserted or was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original application. § 17-27-90

The court was strictly construed

the term "sufficient reason" holding that it means that the ground "could not have been raised" in previous application.  
Odom v State, 253 S.E.2d 753, 755 (S.C. 1991)  
: Tilley v State, 511 S.E.2d 689, 691 (S.C. 1991)

Some exceptions to the general bar against successive petitions. (1) Court allowed a successive PCR application where the applicant's first PCR application was dismissed without assistance of counsel and without hearing. Case v State, 289 S.E.2d 413, 413-14 (S.C. 1982)

(2) Where the applicant's trial counsel served as his PCR counsel; Carter v State, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987) where the applicant did not have direct review of a claim he brought in PCR due to "so many procedural irregularities." Washington v. State 478 S.E.2d 833, 835 (S.C. 1996) and where the applicant was denied his right to appeal the denial of his PCR application, Austin v State, 409 S.E.2d 395, 396 (S.C. 1991) (per curiam) The South Carolina supreme court has also suggested that a mentally incompetent PCR Applicant should, after regaining competency, be allowed to raise issues in a successive proceeding that could not have been raised earlier because of incompetency Council v Catoe 597 S.E.2d 782, 787 (S.C. 2004) The court has said that such claims must be "fact-based"

and that the Applicant's incompetency must prevent the Applicant from aiding his PCR counsel on that fact-based claim. Id. appeal. Aice, 409 S.E. 2d at 395

PCR Applicant requested and was denied an opportunity to seek appellate review from a PCR denial, or if the right to appeal was not knowingly and intelligently waived, an applicant can petition for certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court for a New appeal.

Id. odom v. State, 523 S.E. 2d 753, 756 (S.C. 1999) A successive Application may be permitted where the court's refusal to hear the claim would constitute a "gross miscarriage of Justice". Aice, 409 S.E. 2d at 394 where government interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis of the claim impeded counsel's ability to raise the claim, McCleskey v Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 468 (1991) or where some other circumstance beyond the applicant's control occurred, Id. at 503

To obtain a new Trial based on After discovered evidence, the party must show that the evidence (1) would probably change the result if a New Trial is had

! (2) has been discovered since trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial; (4) is material to the issue of guilt or innocence; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching." McCoy v State, 401 S.C. 363, 368 n. 1, 737 S.E. 2d 623, 625 n. 1 (2013) (quoting Clark v State, 315 S.C. 385, 387-88, 434 S.E. 2d 266, 267 (1993))

Motion for a New Trial based on After Discovered Evidence encompasses claims predicated on the presentation of evidence that existed at the time of trial but of which the defendant was "excusably ignorant." State v Haulcomb, 195 S.E. 2d 601, 606 (S.C. 1973) New trial motions should be considered when new evidence is discovered shortly after the trial has concluded or when new evidence is discovered after the completion of state PCR, see Simpson v Moore 627 S.E. 2d 701, 708 (S.C. 2006)

29(b) shows that the evidence (1) would probably change the result if a new trial is had (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial; (4) is material to the issue of guilt or innocence; and (5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.

State v Taylor, 508 S.E. 2d 870, 879 (S.C. 1998), see also S.C.R. CRIM. P. 29(b)

After discovered evidence affects the case, the evidence "must be material to any mitigating or aggravating circumstances," as opposed to the defendant's guilt or innocence. South, 427 S.E. 2d at 670. Petitioner bears the burden of proof and must satisfy each element for the court to grant the motion. See Hayden v State, 299 S.E. 2d 854, 855 (S.C. 1983)

The motion must be filed before Trial Court with jurisdiction over the conviction. See S.C.R. CRIM. P. 29.

There is no limitation on a motion for new trial based on after-discovered evidence. See State v Spann, 513 S.E. 2d 98, 100 (S.C. 1999) (granting motion for new trial where new evidence was discovered 18 years later.) See also State v Hinson, 361 S.E. 2d 120, 121-22 (S.C. 1987)

Town of Hilton Head Island v Godwin, 634 S.E. 2d 59, 61-62 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006)

State v DeAngelis, 182 S.E. 2d 732, 735 (S.C. 1971) - existence of such evidence at the time of the trial and that he used due diligence to discover such evidence, or that he could not have been discovered it by the exercise of due diligence.

McCray v State, 408 S.E. 2d 241, 241 (S.C. 1991) (reversing order denying Applicant relief and remanding for a new PCR hearing where PCR court's order failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient for appellate review.  
McCullough v State 464 S.E. 2d 340, 341 (S.C. 1995) Pruitt v State, 423 S.E. 2d 127, 128 (S.C. 1992)

Did Trial court violated his Due process Rights when Applicant was Allowed to plead guilty without ordering a mental competency test

Final order only focus on the After discovered Evidence Issue and clearly ignores a substantial Constitutional Rights violation. when considering a summary dismissal In McCoy v State, supra the court states, where there is no evidentiary hearing has been held, the PCR Judge must assume facts presented by the Applicant are true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the Applicant. see e.g. Leamon v State, 363 S.C. 432

434, 611 S.E. 2d 494, 495 (2005) (CITING S.C. CODE ANN § 17-27-80) The Applicant Assented and presented evidence (VIA Exhibits) that at the time he pled guilty, to Kidnapping, CSC 1st and Armed Robbery, on Dec 6, 2000. The Evidence of a Mental History, clearly supports the fact Applicant was Incapable of Assisting his Attorneys In his Defense, Nor understand the nature of the crimes he was charged with or pled guilty too. Also there were Mitigating Evidence, VIA Mental Health History had his Attorneys properly and thoroughly Investigated Applicant's case, Both the court and his Attorneys, would have Requested that he be giving a competency - TO stand - Trial Hearing.

Applicant Asserts the trial court Violated his due process Rights under the fifth (5th) and fourteenth (14th) Amendments of the United States Constitution. Evidence was Introduced during the Applicant's plea, that he had been in a very serious Automobile accident and had suffered AN Head

In Jury!!!

Applicant Asserts trial counsel subjected him to Ineffective Assistance of counsel, In violation of his sixth (6th) Amendment Rights under the united states constitution. When trial counsel failed to ASK for a continuance; or ASK the trial court for a mental competency To stand trial Test. After the Horry county solicitor, the Honorable Jimmy Richardson, informed her about the Applicant's serious Automobile Accident.

The Applicant Asserts that on Dec. 6, 2000. when he plead guilty, In the Horry county court of General sessions to the charges of Kidnapping, criminal sexual in the first (1st) Degree, and Armed Robbery. The Trial court violated his Due process Rights under both the fifth (5th) and fourteenth (14th) Amendments of the united states constitution. when it failed to order a mental competence to stand trial Evaluation Test. After the Honorable Jimmy Richardson (Horry county solicitor) had informed trial counsel,

that the Applicant had been in a serious Automobile Accident, and trial counsel brought it to the trial court's Attention when he plead guilty, on December 6, 2000. Applicant's sister, who is also an Horry County Court official (Mrs. Delores Jenkins-Dewitt, testified that he had suffered a "serious Head Injury" from that Automobile Accident, and he was never the same afterwards.

In the case Pate v Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct 836 (1966) The United States Supreme Court Ruled — "the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's Right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process Rights to a Fair trial. See also Drope v Missouri 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896; and Thomas v Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1963) However, the Applicant's states both the trial court or his counsel, protected his due process Rights to a Fair guilty plea. Especially, ... After the state offered the Evidence in regards to the Automobile Accident!!

The Trial court, before it Accepted Applicant's guilty plea. Should have ordered a continuance and requested a mental competence to stand trial Evaluation Test. Matthews v. State 596 S.E. 2d 49 (S.C. 2004) / State v Blair 273 S.E. 2d 536; and State v Blair 282 S.E. 2d 596. The Standard for determining whether a defendant's mental condition at time of offence rendered him criminally responsible, ... Is the M'Naghten Test !!!

In spite of compelling Evidence Introduced by two (2) competent and reliable witnesses, who are court officials of Horry County. The trial court Ignored their testimonies, and credibility, on December 6, 2000, At Applicant's guilty plea. Therefore, violating his due process Rights under the Fifth (5th) and Fourteenth (14) Amendment of the United States Constitution. By Accepting his guilty plea. Without ordering a continuance or requesting a mental competence to stand trial Evaluation Test. Also, the failure to do so, the trial court did not protect his due process Rights to a fair guilty plea proceeding.

16

see Pate v Robinson, supra!!!

Applicant asserts Trial counsel subjected him to Ineffective Assistance of counsel. In violation of his Sixth (6th) Amendment Rights under the United States Constitution. When trial counsel failed to Ask the Trial Court for a continuance and ask for a mental competence to stand Trial Evaluation Test, before allowing him to plead guilty. Especially After receiving compelling and reliable evidence that Applicant had been in a serious Automobile accident and suffered serious head injury. This evidence was given to trial counsel, by the state and a state official. The Honorable Jimmy Richardson, Horry County Solicitor and Mrs. Deloris Jenkins-Dewitt, who is an Horry County Court official and the Applicant's sister!!!

Trial counsel's Actions were both deficient and prejudicial and fell below professional norms and therefore violated both prongs under Strickland v Washington 466 US 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984) Trial counsel's actions were "A classic Example of a complete

breakdown in the adversarial process.  
"As the Evidence that were given to  
Trial counsel, by two (2) Horry County  
Court officials was credible and  
Favorable to the Applicant and the  
Protection of his due process Rights  
of a fair trial.

Had trial counsel Asked for a con-  
tinuance and Asked for a Mental  
Competence to Stand Trial Evaluation  
would have been to grant trial  
request because of the Information  
Regarding Applicant's serious head  
Injury. In regarding Applicant's  
serious head Injury. In the case  
Wiggins v Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123  
S.Ct 2527 (2003), the United States  
Supreme Court ruled — Counsel's  
failure to Investigate and pre-  
sent Mitigating Circumstances  
deprived defendant of effective  
assistance of counsel see also  
McKnight v State, 661 S.E.2d 354  
(2008); Nance v OZmint, 626 S.E.2d  
878 (S.C. 2000 and Cobbs v State, 408  
S.E.2d 223 (S.C. 1991)

Trial counsel's Inaction and failures  
can not be deemed a trial court  
strategy. Because counsel's per-  
formance was deficient, very  
prejudicial to the Applicant, fell  
below, professional norms, and

caused him to suffer a Flagrant due process, Rights violations under the fifth (5th) and fourteenth (14th) Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Applicant again, Cites the United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Pate v Robinson supra; "...the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's Right not be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process Rights to a Fair trial." Applicant's Sixth (6th) Amendment Rights to Effective Assistance of Counsel were violated and because of the due process Rights Ramifications in this matter, an Evidentiary hearing is called for. Because Applicant is undergoing Mental Health Treatment and has been through out his whole Incarceration!!!,

Did the Court err and prejudice Defendant's Rights by allowing the Brady violation to be dismissed.

The Newly Evidence or After Discovered was discovered Dealing with this Brady violation After the guilty plea, on December 6, 2000 In Essence Like McCoy

V. State — S.E. 2d — 2013 WL 441549

The Applicant for the sake of Brevity<sup>4</sup>  
... submit names of witnesses one  
who was an Alibi witness to the Alleged  
Crime along with transcript pages  
In his codefendant trial State v  
Eric Jenkins, that shows Horry  
County Police Department and  
Horry County Solicitor's Office  
destroyed Evidence that played  
a key part to the investigation  
into this Alleged crime in order  
to get a conviction. This Brady  
violation consist of a 9-1-1 tape  
and a police report that was  
withheld. The 9-1-1 tape was  
destroyed before any arrest  
by Myrtle Beach Police Depart-  
ment of Horry County and the  
Solicitor's office knew this.  
This shows the Horry County  
Solicitor's office knew and used  
perjured testimony that com-  
pelled him to plead guilty. The  
Action of the solicitor, is a  
Brady v Maryland violation because  
this Evidence was withheld  
from the Applicant and his Attorneys  
prior to him pleading guilty, on  
December 6, 2000. before the  
20

Brevity... submit names of witnesses  
one who was a Alibi witness to the  
Alleged crime along with transcript  
pages In his codefendant trial  
State v Eric Jenkins, that shows  
Horry County Police Department  
and Horry County Solicitors office  
destroyed Evidence that played  
a key part to the investigation into  
this Alleged crime in order to get  
a conviction. This Brady violation  
consists of a 9-1-1 tape and a police  
report that was destroyed before  
any arrest by Myrtle Beach Police  
Department of Horry County and  
the Solicitors office knew this.  
This shows the Horry County  
Solicitors office knew and used  
perjured testimony that compelled  
him to plead guilty. The Action of  
the solicitor, is a Brady v Maryland  
violation because this evidence  
was withheld from the Applicant  
and his Attorneys prior to him  
pleading guilty, on December  
6, 2000 before the Honorable  
Sidney T. Floyd I A the Horry  
County Court of General Sessions.

According to the solicitors and the victim I was the one calling the shots the first Assailant. I was the one who first sexually assaulted the victim. I was suspect number 1\*. According to this statement the Judge looked at me in a whole different light. In my co-defendant transcript the Actual caller Scott Chaisson (see VIA Exhibits 1) Got in his car and started following this truck because it kept turning around in his yard and he got suspicious. In his testimony he came Door to Door with this vehicle the window was rolled down halfway he said he seen a male driving the vehicle he was wearing glasses. He ask real sternly What are you doing the vehicle took off he immediately got on his car phone and called 9-1-1 there was no one else in the vehicle. He said he never lost sight of this vehicle because he had a fast vehicle. He was describing the person driving the vehicle. He said he was on the car phone through the entire time with the 9-1-1 operator. He continue to identified a male was driving the vehicle who was wearing

glasses. He said then on the next street he saw two males run from the pampas grass toward the vehicle and jump in and afterwards or before there was gun fire. This tape was destroyed according to the Solicitor Investigative Report (see VIA Exhibits). It was protocol to destroy 99-1-1 tape after 60 days after such a violent crime happening and no one being arrested. Is this acceptable behavior by Myrtle Beach Police Department.

This why the Brady violation took place and the police report withheld of the driver of the vehicle because in re-pute the probable cause hearing that took place. It shows mistaken identity. It shows the misconduct of the solicitor to get a conviction and perjured testimony. It shows coercion of my guilty plea. It places me in the vehicle and not running back to the vehicle. It shows I was neither suspect number one or the number two suspect according to the solicitor and the victim.

(See VIA Exhibits) of what the State trooper took from defendant when he arrested the following

day or less than 24 hours later in the same vehicle. According to the tag number given by Scott Chaisson to the 9-1-1 operator and Myrtle Beach Police Detective Division. You will see in my co-defendants transcript these testimonies and other Exhibits.

This evidence was withheld by the Solicitor in violation of Brady v Maryland 473 U.S. 667; 105 S. Ct 3375; 87 L. Ed 2d 481; (1985) There is a constitutional error because reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense the result of the proceeding would have been different. 719 F.2d 1462 reversed and remanded. There is no way possible I was suspect number one or two, "According to the victim testimony at trial, Neil N-Bigger hearing and police report. suspect number one the Boss the one giving orders the oldest and tallest ejaculated in his hand because he got mad at suspect number two who she is certain did not ejaculate inside of her as well but got some semen on her leg, The victim said suspect number ~~one~~ got mad at suspect number

two he said wipe that off her leg and  
keep private. I did it in my hand the  
police can test this stuff. (see Exhibits  
Police Reports of victim. She the victim  
also said she identified me when  
the solicitor and Myrtle Beach  
police Department Allowed a suggested  
identification hearing took place.  
They allowed myself and my codefendant  
to come into the court in orange  
Jail suit the only two, "while the victim  
stood behind a two way window and  
lied at the probable cause hearing  
that we was the suspects but  
testified something totally  
different at the Neil-N-Bigger  
hearing and at trial. she changed  
her statement that maybe I was  
suspect two not number one. (see  
codefendant Transcription Sandra  
Weaver on stand along with the  
Neil-N-Bigger transcript and the  
police reports. The police incident  
report suspect number two she  
said she never seen his face.  
It was mistaken identity and  
newly discovered Evidence  
that contradicted victim state  
there was gross prosecutorial

Misconduct and perjury on part of the solicitor. The 9-1-1 tape and transcript of my co-defendant, see Exhibits 1 where my property sheet identify glasses that was taken off my persons and placed in my property. In order to establish due process violations arising from the states failure to preserve evidence a defendant must demonstrate 1) that the evidence state destroyed was in bad faith, or 2) that the evidence possessed an exculpatory value apparent before the evidence was destroyed and the defendant cannot obtain other evidence other evidence of comparable value by other means.

State v Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 538, 552 S.E. 2d 300, 307 (2001) see also State v Jackson, 302 S.C. 313, 315, 396 S.E. 2d 101, 102 (1990) State v Ward WL 11735659 S.C. App. 2011. These four 9-1-1 tapes the actual caller Scott Chaisson who gave the police a statement of the driver of the truck who had on glasses and that he came door to door with this individual who had the window rolled half way down. He testified at my co-defendant trial he was

on the phone in his car throughout the whole time this incident occurred. When the police arrived he was still on his car phone.

The solicitor version of the event at my guilty plea was myself and my co-defendant while sexually assaulting the victim threaten her and after they found out that the vehicle that Scott Chaisson was driving the actual caller was following this vehicle they stop the assault laid on top of the victim to shield her, told her not to go to the police and they would be watching her. They then ran from the wooded area. The victim said two black males and a Hispanic male ran out the wooded area. The actual caller said he seen only two males run from the Pampas grass. (see Exhibits police report of Scott Chaisson and transcript of co-defendant trial. The solicitor said I was the first rapist the one calling the shots the aggressor the boss and once I finish we switch spots suspect number two finish the assault because the vehicle in which was circling ground waiting 27

for them. They then ran from the Wooded Area threaten the victim not to go to the police myself and my co-defendant.

This Brady vs Maryland Material would of given me a defense against the charges that I would of been going against because how could I be the driver and suspect number one who ran from the Wooded Area after the assault. It would of given my Attorney room to suppress the Evidence that was obtained from an tainted court procedure which obtain my D.N.A because it would of been proven that there was no probable cause because the victim testified and in her police statement never seen the driver of the vehicle nor did he participate in the Attack. It would impeach her testimony and the solicitor. It would of shown both committed perjury and illegal destroyed and withheld documents to get a conviction. It would of stop me from getting convicted of such and repulsive crime. The police report of the victim and the Neiln-Bigger hearing.

Also trial transcript. She states plainly  
suspect number one stated he came  
in his hand and not inside of her. My  
question to the court how did my  
D.N.A get inside of her. If I was not  
suspect 1# or suspect 2#. If I was  
the driver of the vehicle according  
to the actual caller and the victim  
said the Driver never assaulted  
her nor did she see his face.  
This shows all day that this evidence  
would of changed the guilty plea  
proceeding and Trial proceeding.  
The burden of proof would be on  
the state to prove every element  
of this crime to the Jury but  
they could not cause it would  
cast doubts into the solicitor  
version and the victim.

The victim after she found out my  
codefendant was taller and younger  
than me, and that I was the actual  
shortier and the older one. She  
changed her testimony at trial that  
maybe I was not suspect number  
one but suspect number two.  
This is a misidentification all  
day long and her statement

contradicts her prior statement at  
the probable cause and my co defendant  
Neiln-Bigger hearing.

There are several cases that back this  
up.

Neil v Bigger 409 U.S. 188; 93 S.Ct. 375  
34 L.Ed 401; 1972 U.S.

U.S. v Bonner 648 F. 3d 209; 2011 U.S.  
App. California v Trombetta et AL

467 U.S. 479; 104 S.Ct. 2528; 81 L.Ed.  
2d 413; 1983 U.S.

Arizona v Youngblood  
488 U.S. 51; 109 S.Ct. 333; 102 L.Ed.2d  
281; 1988 U.S.

The solicitor Deceived the court  
and the public that I was this  
Monster when he let the real  
perpetrators still be at large while  
I serve a 501 year sentence that  
was obtain by false and perjured  
testimony.

My next important question to the  
court is can a Judge that conducted  
a probable cause hearing that seized  
D.N.A reside over Defendant PCR  
that was remanded for a full  
evidentiary hearing.

In several cases the Supreme  
Court states that a Judge  
must not sit on a bench if he

Conducted any proceeding dealing with a Defendant case. (See Exhibits) that Judge E Lockemy ruled on a probable cause hearing that seized D.N.A. from the Defendant and caused him to be convicted and sentence to 150 years. He also stated in his Denial of March 13, 2007 that my testimony was not credible and the victim testimony had remain the same through out the whole court proceedings, when it had not. (See Exhibits) of Judge Lockemy Denial of my PCR the victim contradiction in court proceeding and police report that her statement changed. The Judge also stated that my prior Attorney Orrie West didn't know about the identification procedure when she was my Attorney at the probable cause hearing. Tumey v State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S. Ct 437 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927) Justice must satisfy the appearance of Justice Oftutt v United States 348 U.S. 11, 14 75 S. Ct. 1199 L. Ed 11 (1954) The court of Appeals Sloviter, Circuit Judge held that, (1) Judge should have sua sponte

recused himself from considering  
petition challenging Trial over which  
he presided as state court Judge,  
and (2) court of Appeals would direct  
district court Judges to recuse  
themselves in similar circumstances  
in future, vacated and remanded  
Plain Error Standard

Harrison, 644 N.E. 2d at 1249 clear  
abuse of Discretion undisputed  
claim of Prejudice when the  
trial court expresses an opinion  
on the merits of the controversy

The court must Assume the truth  
of the factual Assertions even if  
know them to be false. Tezak F. 3d  
United States v Dalton plain error

Seriously affects the fairness.  
The relevant Federal statute  
28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) provides that  
any Justice Judge or Magistrate  
Judge of the United States shall  
disqualify himself in any pro-  
ceeding in which his impartiality  
might reasonably be questioned  
28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) The Supreme  
Court has stated that the purpose  
of this provision is to promote

public confidence in the integrity of  
Judicial process. Liljeberg v Health  
Servs. Acquisition Corp. 486 U.S. 847, 860,

108 S.Ct 2194, 100 L.Ed2d 855 (1988)

Clemmon v Wolfe 377 F.3d 322, 328

3d Cir. 2003)

To satisfy that requirement. An imma-  
te must present both the operative facts  
and the legal principles that control  
each claim to the state Judiciary

Wilson v Briley 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001) Surely pre-Judice or  
interest of a Judge may become  
apparent prior to trial and require  
the removal of that Judicial officer  
in order to satisfy the requirements  
of due process. Anderson v Sheppard,

856 F.2d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 1988) Bias  
or pre-Judice on the part of a Judge

may exhibit itself prior to the  
trial by Acts of statements on his  
parts. Internal quotation marks  
and citations omitted Judge

who appears to be tainted require  
ment that Justice must satisfy  
the appearance of Justice. Its a

Bedrock principle that a Judge  
should recuse himself.

In re Asbestos Litig 977 F.2d

764-776-782 (3d Cir. 1992)

No Judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the Decision of case he participate in. The Bed Rock Principle. (Congress) A Judge should disclose on the record information that the Judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to question of disqualification. Apply. unless disqualification was waived by parties after disclosure by Judge. Canon 3 is known by the Judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding.

Remittal of Disqualification a Judge disqualified by the terms of section 3 E may disclose on record the basis of the Judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of whether to waive disqualification. Cuyler v Sullivan 446 U.S. 355, 349-50 (1980)

Judicial MISconduct, not only Judicial Actions but also on Judicial conductor. Rules of professional conduct. Matter of White (S.C.)

1988 (330 S.C. 505, 499 S.E. 2d 813)

Rule 501 Code of Judicial Conduct  
Rules Governing the Judiciary employees  
of the Judicial Dept. and others Assist  
ing the Judiciary Judge must recuse  
himself and it's not up to the Judge's  
discretion to provide Applicant re-  
quests it by Motion. Floyd v State  
400 SE 2d 145, 146 (S.C. 1991) Id S.C.  
Code Ann § 17-27-160 (a) (2003)

Applicant found this out later on  
and brought this to the Attention  
of both Appellate Attorneys  
that this Judge was the one who  
resided over a probable cause  
hearing. This was never brought  
to the Attention of the courts  
so that the courts could over-  
turn the Judge who presided  
over the Defendant hearing  
so that it could be remanded  
back for another hearing in the  
lower court. It was my PCR Attorney  
Duty to investigate this and both  
Duties when Defendant brought  
it to their Attention so that it  
could be brought to the Higher  
courts attention. I have a right

to a PCR. This argument alone should give me another PCR.

See Exhibits to Attorneys & Judge James E Lockemy.

Did my PCR Attorney violate Defendants Rights by not Amending his issues he requested her to do. The Defendant ascerts if his counsel would of Assist him the outcome of all these proceedings would of been different.

### Memorandum of Law

South Carolina Supreme Court Rules 50 C.S.R. and 71 D.I.M. make it mandatory, that post conviction Attorneys make sure that all Available grounds are raised in post conviction proceedings after being given court appointed counsel a pro-se litigant cannot thereafter file and further pleading and any Amendments to his Application must be made by counsel. State v Sanders 269 S.C. 215. 237 S.E.2d 53 (1977) Foster v State, 298 S.E. 306, 379 S.E. 2d 907 (1989) Thus if post conviction counsel does not Amend the pro-se Application

the Applicant has no way to have all supporting grounds heard. State v Carpenter, 277 S.C. 309 286 S.E. 2d 394 (1982) and State v Carpenter 277 S.C. 281, 350 S.E. 2d 180 (1986) prohibits South Carolina litigants from raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during their initial direct appeals the post conviction proceedings must be viewed as the first appeal as of right on that particular claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Aice v State, S.C. 409 S.E. 2d 392 (1991) holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post conviction proceeding is based on a far stretched reading of the Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania v Finley, 148 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed 539 (1987) The decision in Finley merely held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state court discretionary appeal after the appellate stage has been exhausted Id. 107 S.Ct. at (1993-94), because the claim of ineffective assist-

Section 17-27-90 for the general proposition, that successive applications are reviewed with disfavor and the Applicant has the burden of showing that a new ground for relief could not have been raised in a previous application. However Aice supra does not give Attention to court decision in Case v State S.C. 494, 289 S.E. 2d 413 (1982) which held that if the Applicant meet in the burden a hearing must be afforded despite the successiveness of the Application. The facts in case established that case had no Attorney in his first Application and that it was highly doubtful whether in point of fact that he could have raised the appropriate Arguments Aice, supra Id. 409 S.E. 2d at 394.

In a situation where a post conviction applicant is not assisted by his post conviction Attorney in properly amending his first Application to include all supporting grounds

underlying a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and does not know how to raise them and is barred from presenting pro-se pleading in light of state v sanders, supra and Foster v state supra. he or she must be seen to be without counsel and in the same position as that of the Applicant in case v state supra. The court under such circumstances should find that the second Application should be heard despite its successiveness because the first Application lack specificity unless it can find that the Applicant intentionally waived his or her right to have the grounds stated in the subsequent Application heard in the first.

If south carolina litigants are entitled to appeal from denials of post conviction relief under Austin v state, S.C. 409 S.E. 2d 395 (1991) if they can establish that they did not voluntarily waive their right to appeal, they should also be allowed to file subsequent

Application Alleging that all grounds supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not presented in the first Application due to ineffective assistance of post conviction counsel. What in reality is ~~not~~ post conviction counsel on such claim, but instead is Appellate Attorney in the first Appeal as of right on that particular claim. 479 SE2d 805 David E Thompson Blanke 565 SE2d 757

Did Attorney violate Defendant Due process on plea agreement?

The Applicant Attorney failed to disclose a 30 year plea agreement that the solicitor offered on April 6 of 2000. Applicant was prejudiced by his Attorney in adequate representation and cause the Applicant to get a consecutive sentence of 50 years causing the Applicant to serve 20 more years in the Department of Correction because of this unprofessional

40

error. Strickland v Washington Reason  
Probability that my Attorneys  
would of presented this offer  
in time the Applicant would of ex-  
cepted the concurrent sentence  
that was offered by the prosecution  
and it would not of been with-  
drawn. The sixth Amendment re-  
quires effective Assistance of  
Counsel at critical stages of  
criminal proceeding stages of  
criminal proceeding stage of pro-  
ceedings as Affecting right.  
Edwards v Garrison 529 F.2d 1374  
1975 (4th cir.

The sixth Amendment's protections  
against ineffective Assistance of  
Counsel are not designed simply  
to protect the trial. even though  
of a criminal proceeding stages  
rogate from the accused rights  
to a fair trial. The constitutional  
guarantee of effective assistance  
of counsel applies to pretrial  
critical stages that are part  
of the whole course of a  
criminal proceeding in which

defendants cannot be presumed to make critical decisions without counsel's advice. Defendant have a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal, even though that cannot in any way be characterized as part of trial event though sentencing does not concern the defendant's guilt or innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel during a sentencing hearing can result in prejudice prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel because any amount of additional jail time has sixth amendment significance even if the trial itself is free from constitutional flaw the defendant, who based on counsel, goes to trial instead of taking a more favorable plea may be prejudiced, as element of ineffective assistance of counsel, from either a conviction on more serious counts or the imposition of a more serious count of the imposition of more severe sentence. Applicant was offered a concurrent

sentence of 30 years from the  
Solicitor of fice. The Applicant  
Attorney s withheld this plea  
and went in front of Judge Floyd  
on a open plea because they felt  
they could get a better deal be-  
cause Judge Floyd had been an  
administrative Judge there for  
years. Judge Flody warn them that  
he did not like the fact that  
Applicant was coming before him  
on a open plea. My Attorney s did  
not take the warning and pro-  
ceeded without Applicant signing  
a plea agreement and as a result  
Applicant received a consecutive  
sentence of 50 years. The court  
should conduct an evidentiary  
hearing to determine whether  
the defendant has shown reason-  
able probability that but for counsel's  
errors he would have accepted  
the plea, and if the showing is  
made, the court may exercise  
discretion in determining whether  
the defendant should receive  
the term of imprisonment  
the government offered in

the plea. the sentence he received  
at trial, or something in between.  
Halberstam v Michigan 545 U.S. 605,  
125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 and  
the right to counsel during sentencing,  
see Glover v United States, 531  
U.S. 198, 203-204, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.  
2d 604. Lockhart v Fretwell, 506  
U.S. 364 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180  
modified Strickland does so again  
here. Fretwell and Nix v Whiteside  
475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.  
2d 123 Williams v Taylor, 529  
U.S. 362, 391-392, 120 S.Ct. 1495,  
146 L.Ed.2d 389 Missouri v Frye  
132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379,  
80 U.S.L.W. 4253. In Missouri v Frye  
counsel failure to inform Frye  
of the written plea offer before  
it expired fell below an objective  
reasonableness standard. vacated  
and remanded 311 S.W.3d 350  
My Attorney James G. Moore  
also violated my sixth Amend-  
ment in Strickland v Washington  
supra and because of his un-  
professional error and inadequate  
representation he prejudiced

Applicant. Reason probability is sufficient to undermine the outcome. James Galmore did not represent me at my plea hearing he was the lead Attorney according to him and Attorney orriewest. He admitted that he did not speak at my plea bargain. He admitted he should have but did not. The Judge ask if he have Anything to say he said no. Attorney James Galmore also admit that he did think he had a chance at trial the evidence supposively was over whelming according to my Attorney. He admits he did not investigate the facts surrounding my case. He admitted that the solicitor office Bonded the victim out of jail, He also told me that if I took it to trial that the courts wouldnt believe me because the victim was white and I was black. I filed a civil suit on Attorney James Galmore which was dismissed. 45

because of how it was filed, I see now why I really was not represented because of this civil suit toward him which was a conflict of interest. Jordani v State, 406 S.C. 443, 752 S.E. 2d 538 (2013) conflict of interest, Reversed Remanded for a new trial. Outten v Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 422 3rd Cir. failure to investigate counsel has a duty to make reasonable decision that makes particular investigation necessary Strickland 446 U.S. at 69 one component of that duty is to investigate of a witness identified by a defendant.

Did the solicitor commit prosecutorial misconduct?

When ineffective ~~assistance~~ ~~of~~ ~~counsel~~ is alleged as a ground for relief in a PCR Action, the Applicant must prove that counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the Adversarial process that the trial cannot be

relied upon as having produced a  
Just result. Strickland v Washington  
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2064, 80  
L.Ed 2d 674, 692 (1984) Butler v State  
286 S.e. 441, 334 S.E. 2nd 813 (1985)  
The courts use a two pronged  
test in evaluating Allegations  
of ineffective assistance of  
counsel.

First the Applicant must prove  
that counsel's performance  
was deficient under this prong  
Attorney performance is measured  
by its "reasonableness" under  
professional norms Cherry v State  
306 S.C. 115, 118, 386 S.E. 2d 624  
625 (1989)

Second counsel deficient per  
formance must have prejudiced  
the Applicant such that "there is  
a reasonable probability that  
but for counsel's unprofessional  
error the result of the pro-  
bability that but for counsel's  
unprofessional errors the result  
of the proceeding would have been

different. Cherry v State 300. In interpreting the prejudice prong our state supreme court in State v Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 527 S.E. 2d 105 (S.C. 2000) held consistent with existing Federal precedent, that a defendant must show either deliberate prosecutorial misconduct or prejudice to make out a violation of Sixth Amendment but not both. Id. 527 S.E. 2d at 109. The court determined that deliberate prosecutorial misconduct raised a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. Id. 527 S.E. 2d 109. Moreover claim alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to trial court errors are cognizable in PCR proceedings. This includes failure to object to inadmissible evidence. Dawkins v State, 346 S.C. 151 S.E. 2d 260 say. (Failure to object to hearsay. Improper arguments by the prosecution. Matthews v State 200 WL 1887491 S.C. Ct. decided June 17th 2002: Erroneous jury instructions. Plyer v State, 309 S.C. 408. 424 S.E. 2d 477 (1982)

Counsel deficient for failing to object to improper charge on malice, which improperly shifted burden of proof from the state to the defendant; or any other matter that could otherwise be reviewed to direct appeal if not for counsel's failure to properly preserve the issue. Accordingly was ineffective for failing to object to an indictment obtained through acts of perjury, fraud and conspiracy as well as gross prosecutorial misconduct, can be raised in a PCR proceeding pursuant to the Strickland standards of review.

Perjury and Gross prosecutorial Misconduct; Did the prosecutorial Misconduct?

Here, Applicant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by allowing Applicant to plea to avoid indictment convicted and sentence as well as charged under indictments obtained through willful acts of perjury, fraud and conspiracy as well as prosecutorial misconduct. 49

Therefore Applicant would show the Supreme Court the following. Applicant True Billed indictments indicate that they were returned by a court of General sessions on April 6, 2000. These indictments were prepared and processed by Chief Solicitor Gregory Hembree was the state Judicial official assigned the responsibility of processing these indictments. The grand Jurors presented upon their oath that these indictments were returned on the dates indicated. However, the evidence can conclusively be established that April 6th, 2000 are in fact false. By examining the indictments orders and corresponding certified true copies of the Judicial Department court term calendar for the indicated month and year, this calendar indicate that there was no court of General sessions on the date that the indictment indicate (see Exhibits) ~~with~~ Thus False information is contained in the state indictment prepared and processed by chief

Solicitor Gregory Hembree.

South Carolina law is very specific concerning matters of false info. in a state document. It is an offense against Public Justice to willfully give false, misleading or ~~in~~ complete information in a state document. S.C. Code Ann § 16-9-10 perjury and subordination of perjury states in pertinent part:

(A)(2) It is unlawful for a person to willfully give false, misleading or incomplete information on a document, record form or report required by the law of this state.

B(2) A person who violates the provisions of subsections is guilty of misdemeanor and must be imprisoned not more than 6 months or fined not less than one hundred.

(C) A person may be convicted under this section -- if he commits perjury by his own act, consent or agreement.

The issue here contends that the Court of General Sessions failed to comply with statutory law jurisdictional in nature specifying the manner and means

for lawful return of true billed indictments.

The Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a proceeding is determined by the constitution and the law of the state, and is fundamental. State v Heyward, 564 SE 2d 379 (S.C. App. 2002) citing Anderson v Anderson 299 SC 110, 115, 382 SE 2d 897, 900 (1989) Emphasis added Subject matter jurisdiction not waived even with consent of parties and may be raised at any time Brown v State, 343 SC 342, 540 SE 2d 846 (2001) and no indictment may be true billed by grand jury when circuit courts lacks jurisdiction is co extensive with criminal jurisdiction of the court in which it is impaneled and for which it is to make inquiry --- State v McClure 277 SC 432, 289 SE 2d 158 (SC 1982) and State v Funderburk 259 SC 256, 191 SE 2d 520 (1972) State v Wheeler 259 SC 571, 193 SE 2d 515 (1972)

The primary Question before this Court are whether SC Code Ann § 14-9-210 is Jurisdiction in nature

and whether it requires that all criminal indictments must be issued through a grand Jury impaneled before the court of General Sessions, and whether state non-compliance with mandatory indictment proceeding or procedures and willful acts of perjury have rendered all judicial proceedings invalid and its indictments null.

It is a cardinal rule of statutory

construction that primary purpose in interpreting statutes is to ascertain the intent of the legislature

Hodges v Rainey 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533

S.E. 2d 578, 581 2000. State v Martin

293 SC 46, 358 SE 2d (1987) there is

no room for statutory construction

and a court must apply to the statute

according to its literal meaning Carolina

Power & Light Co. v City of Bennettsville

314 SC 137, 139, 44 SE 2d 177, 179 (1994)

Moreover penal statutes must be

construed strictly against the state

and in favor of defendant. State

v Blackmon 304 SC 270 403 S.E. 2d

660 (SC 1991)

Accordingly section 14-9-210,

requires strict compliance with

its provisions, and mandates that the grand jury must be impaneled under the jurisdiction of the court of General Sessions before lawful return of a true billed indictment can take place. When legislative enactment limits the manner in which something may be done the enactment also evinces the intent that it shall not be done no other way.

Failure to comply at the time defendant was indicted dealing with the statutory law jurisdiction nature deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. State v Lee 564 SE 2d 372

(SC App 2002) Gray v State, 276 SC 634 281 SE 2d 226 (SC 1981) and many more

And Acts of the court take outside those statutory restrictions would be necessity be null and void. Before

this was changed. In fact our supreme court has held and determined that no indictment may

be true billed by a grand jury when the court lacks jurisdiction.

The grand jury must be impaneled under the jurisdiction of the court of General Sessions before lawful return of indictments.

No local rule of court Administrative  
order, policy, or other procedure can  
take precedent over statutory law.  
Which is always controlling see SC  
Constitution Article I, 4 and State  
v Cottingham 77 SE 2d 897, 224 SC  
181 (SC 1980) circuit rule promulgated  
by individual circuit was unconstitut-  
ional. Additionally at the time of  
my indictment the court of common  
pleas is vested with NO Authority  
to take any action no matters per-  
taining to return of true bill criminal  
Indictments. Dove v Goldkist Inc.  
314 SC 235, 442 SE 2d 598, 600 (SC  
1994) see also SC Constitution Art.  
VET

When I was indicted there was no  
grant of concurrent jurisdiction  
and therefore for no true bill criminal  
indictment could be lawfully issued  
through the court of common pleas,  
under our judicial system the pre-  
siding Judge in the circuit court  
loses jurisdiction with the  
A Journment of the term see  
State v Best 257 SC 361, 186 SE  
2d 272 (1972) Citing State v Thompson  
122 SC 407, 115 SE 326. Also see

State v Rinheart 430 SE 2d 536 (SC APP.  
1993)

Thus, No term of court, No lawful Judicial  
Authority. Accordingly and in this case  
No court rules or order or other procedure  
can be invoked or cited by state to  
save its unlawful grand Jury and Jury  
process, and resulting in Null indictment  
and Righteousness. Also brought  
before the court for Judgment  
are a violations of SC Code Ann  
§16-9-10. offense against public  
Justice and SC Ann §16-17-410.  
But we know that the law is good  
if one use it lawfully.

It must be emphasized for purposes  
of blame that all Solicitor/he holds  
full knowledge and understanding  
of the law of this state. It is  
requirement of the High office  
of Prosecutor.

The prosecutor occupies a quasi-  
Judicial position and must see  
that Justice is done. 00-GS-26-849  
is a Null and void indictment

With no binding affect.

The primary purpose of an indictment  
are to put the defendant on notice  
what he is called upon to answer  
to, apprise him of the elements to  
plead guilty or stand trial and to enable  
the circuit court to know what judg-  
ment to pronounce if the defendant  
is convicted see Evans v State 363  
SC 495, 508-13, 611 SE 2d 510, 517-19 (SC  
2005) citing Gentry, 363 at 102-03 610  
SE 2d at 5001

This required notice is a component  
of the due process that is accorded  
every component of the due process  
that is accorded every criminal  
defendants. see U.S. Constitution  
Amendment V SC Constitution  
Article I § 3 additionally a criminal  
defendant has a constitutional  
and statutory right to have the  
indictment issued by legally con-  
stituted grand jury see eg. State  
v Means OP No. 26105 SC Supreme  
Court filed February 6 (2006)  
See Evans v State 363 SC 495  
611 SE 2d 510 (2005) State v Williams

263 SC 290, 210 SE 2d 298 (1974) 9150  
See SC constitution Article I § 11  
and Article VI § 22 SC code Anne  
14-9-210

In this case however, petitioner  
takes the position that a challenge  
to either the illegal grand jury  
process or null indictment would  
be immaterial, because no valid  
waiver can be entered absolving  
the state of its criminal conduct  
and null indictments of no legal  
effect and therefore no binding  
under law! Petitioner's Null indict  
ment is by its very nature in-  
sufficient to support a convict-  
ion or sentence and protect  
against double jeopardy. It is  
an axiomatic rule of law that an  
indictment deemed to be a nullity  
is something that is legally void and  
of no legal effect. citing BLACKS  
LAW DICTIONARY, 8th E 2004 Nullity  
and void see eg. Hardison v Glendhill,  
72 GA APP. 432, 33 SE 2d 921, 924 (void  
Null, ineffectual, negatory, unable  
in law to support the purpose for

which it was intended, and most certainly, a conviction and sentence based on the Fruits, of criminal Acts cannot be allowed to stand under any circumstances.

The facts and evidence in this case very clearly show that the state committed perjury, criminal conspiracy and fraud in order to secure its conviction against petitioner. Surely the Evans ruling does not stand for the proposition that because state was not caught for its criminal acts in a timely manner it is granted Absolution.

For these reasons state petitioner asserts that an objection to states illegal grand jury and Null indictment would be pointless. However, for the sake of Argument petitioner would show this court that, In Murray v Carrier 106 S. Ct. 2639 2645 (1986) the united states Supreme court held that the existence of cause for procedural default [for failure to comply with a states contemporaneous objection rule] must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner

can show that some objective fact or external to the defense impeded counsel's errors to comply with the state procedural rule. The court stated without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule we note that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, see Reed v Ross, 468 U.S. at 16, 104 S.Ct. at 2910 or that some interference by officials "Brown v Allen" 344 U.S. 443, 486, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953) made comparable would constitute cause under this standard. Id. 106 U.S. at 2645 S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-10, petitioner would show to this court that as a result of criminal violations committed by state in this case the lower trial court was divested to the requisite authority to impose sentencing. Section 17-25-10 provides that.

No persons shall be punished for an offense unless duly and legally

convicted thereof, in court having competent Jurisdiction of the cause and of the person.

South Carolina law holds that words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning see State v Muldrow, 348 SC 264, 559 SE 2d 847 (2003) and statutory prescription couched in language such as "shall" or "must" are mandatory in application and effect. see eg. South Carolina Police Officers Ret. Sys v City of Spartanbury, 301 SC 188, 191, 391 SE 2d 239, 241 (1990) Starnes v South Carolina Dept of Public Safety, 342 SC 216, 224, 535 SE 655, 667 (Ct. App. 2000) A plain reading of section 17-25-10 requires that a criminal defendant cannot be punished [sentence] for an offense until after the state has duly and legally convicted the individual that did not happen in this case.

Accordingly, it would be hard to imagine a situation where the state of South Carolina

has violated more of criminal defendants rights than in the case found here. Indeed it would allow the state to maintain a conviction and sentence under the circumstances described to adopt such rule of law here would be tantamount to an unwarranted, and perverted judgment.

Petitioner has established that he was not duly and legally convicted and therefore was sentenced in this case should be vacated.

Judicial Integrity will have been lost if the state is not constrained by its own statutory and criminal laws. Basic United States Constitutional Due Process Law dictates with Authority, that under no circumstances can a state commit criminal acts against its citizens in the name of Judicial Economy.

The state prosecution knowingly violated U.S.C.S Section 1623 False Declaration Before The Grand Jury 1038 False INFO and Hoaxes 15050 obstruction of proceeding Before Departments agencies

and committees. 1621 Per Jury and 2071  
concealment, removal or mutilation  
CA1 and CB1 Thus said misconduct by  
the state so affected the proceed-  
ings with unfairness. That it has  
poisoned the entire legal process.  
Furthermore in Bergen v U.S. S.C.  
S.Ct 629 and United States Supreme  
Court in Marbury v Madison it states  
if the solicitor knew before  
hand that the indictments was  
fraudulent, this constitutes  
prosecutorial misconduct  
Does enough to bar re prosecution  
State v Anderson 439 S.E 2d 835  
S.C. 1983

See Appellate Court Rules Rule 407  
Rules of professional conduct  
Rule 3.8 comment. Also see  
Quattlebaum

Rule 8.4. (b) It is professional  
misconduct for a lawyer to engage  
in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or  
misrepresentation

Rule 8.4(c) It is professional mis-  
conduct for a lawyer to engage in  
conduct that is prejudicial to  
defendant 63

## "Conclusion"


The Applicant asserts that his PCR Application at bar consist of factual Allegations, that were Inadequately Raised In The original Application. Therefore, under s.c. Code Ann Sec. 17-27-90 -- Affords him opportunity to be heard In the PCR court. Be- Cause Applicant's due process Rights to a Fair trial were grossly violated.

Applicant has been denied Effective Assistance of Trial counsel, in violation of Strickland v Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. He not trying to bring Martinez v Ryan to the state level but showing how the Federal courts, Rule that PCR counsel was in violation 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) and been denied Effective Assistance of Appellate counsel. In regards to any and all Appeals, In violation of Evitts v Lucey 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985) Defendant never receive a Fair bite of the Apple but only Fruits of the Poisoness Tree

Date: 6-23-16 64

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South Carolina Supreme Court  
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