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AUG 16 2016  
SC Court of Appeals

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT  
Ralph King Anderson, Chief Administrative Law Judge  
Docket No. 15-ALC-15-0056-AP

Appellate Case No.  
2016-000530

Charlton Davis, 231377,

Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation,  
Parole and Pardon Services,

Respondent

SUPPLEMENTAL  
RECORD ON APPEAL

Charlton Davis, 231377  
HC117/KER.CI  
4848 Goldmine Hwy.  
Kershaw, SC 29067

pro se

**LEGAL**

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State of South Carolina  
Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services

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September 10, 2015

Mr. Charlton Davis #00231377  
Kershaw Correctional Institution  
4848 Goldmine Hwy.  
Kershaw, SC 29067

RE: NOTICE OF REJECTION

Dear Mr. Davis:

It is my responsibility to inform you, on behalf of the South Carolina Parole Board, that the Board has reached a decision regarding your parole hearing. The Board hereby makes the following CONCLUSION OF LAW:

After careful consideration of: (1) the characteristics of your current offense(s), prior offense(s), prior supervision history, prison disciplinary record, and/or prior criminal record, as described in the findings of fact below; (2) the factors published in Department Form 1212 (Criteria for Parole Consideration); (3) the factors outlined in Section 24-21-640 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, and (4) actuarial risk and needs assessment factors pursuant to Section 24-21-10 (F) (1) of the South Carolina Code of Laws. The Parole Board had determined that your parole must be denied.

You will be notified 30 days prior to your next scheduled parole consideration date.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Nature And Seriousness Of Current Offense  
Indication Of Violence In This Or Previous Offense  
Use Of Deadly Weapon In This Or Previous Offense

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature of Larry Ray Patton, Jr.

Larry Ray Patton, Jr.  
Director of Parole Board Support Services

9/9/2015

**South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services  
Criteria For Parole Consideration**

SC (Board of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services)  
P. O. Box 5066  
Columbia, SC 29250

Inmate Name	SCDC #
-------------	--------

**Criteria For Parole Consideration**

The South Carolina parole law creates no right to be released on parole. Parole in South Carolina is strictly a matter of privilege or grace. The South Carolina Board of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services has absolute discretion to grant or deny parole. As such, the publication of these parole criteria in no way creates an expectancy of release; nor does it bind the Parole Board in any way to a favorable parole decision or establish any presumptions of entitlement to parole.

In deciding whether or not to grant parole, the Parole Board considers, among other things, the inmate's record before incarceration as well as during incarceration. The record itself is prepared through investigations conducted for the Parole Board, and it becomes a part of the inmate's parole file. These files are maintained by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services and are, by the statute, privileged and confidential. The confidentiality of the parole file is far reaching; inmates themselves have no right to inspect the contents of their files. If the inmate thinks his/her file is somehow incomplete or contains some error or other inaccuracy, he/she must notify the Board of the specific error or inaccuracy. The Board will investigate the inquiry and notify the inmate of the action taken.

Inmates do, however, enjoy certain rights in the parole process. The inmate has the right to appear at his parole hearing. If the inmate fails to appear, the Board may decide his/her case in absence. The inmate has the right to be represented by an attorney; however, he/she has no right to have an attorney appointed if he/she cannot afford one. At the hearing, the inmate has the right to present witnesses and evidence on his/her own behalf, but an inmate does not have a right to confront witnesses.

In deciding whether or not an inmate should be granted parole, the Board or Panel of the Board exercises its absolute discretion to the limits allowed by state and federal law. The discretion of the Board or panel aims at protecting the best interest of both society and the inmate being considered for parole. In its concern for the protection of society's and the inmate's best interests, the Board or Panel deliberates upon the "reasonable probability" that an inmate will not again violate the law, if parole is granted. When deliberating upon the reasonable probability that an inmate will not again violate the law, the Board or Panel weighs the factors listed below. The Board or Panel, in its absolute discretion, also considers any other factors not listed below which it considers relevant in a particular case.

1. The risk the inmate poses to the community;
2. The nature and seriousness of the inmate's offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, and the inmate's attitude toward it;
3. The inmate's prior criminal records and his/her adjustment under any previous programs or supervision;
4. The inmate's attitude toward his/her family, the victim, and authority in general;
5. The inmate's adjustment while in confinement, including his/her progress in counseling, therapy, and other similar programs designed to encourage the inmate to improve himself/herself;
6. The inmate's employment history, including his/her job training and skills and his/her stability in the work place;
7. The inmate's physical, mental and emotional health;
8. The inmate's understanding of the cause of his/her past criminal conduct;
9. The inmate's efforts to solve his/her problems, such as seeking treatment for substance abuse, enrolling in academic and vocational education courses, and in general using whatever resources the Department of Corrections has made available to inmates to help with their problems;
10. The adequacy of the inmate's overall parole plan. This includes inmates living arrangements, where he/she will live and who he will live with; the character of those with whom the inmate plans to associate in both his/her working hours and his/her off-work hours; the inmate's plans for gainful employment;
11. The willingness of the community into which the inmate will be released to receive the inmate;
12. The willingness of the inmate's family to allow him/her to return to the family circle;
13. The attitudes of the sentencing judge, the solicitor, and local law enforcement officers respecting the inmate's parole;
14. The feelings of the victim's family, and any witnesses to the crime about the release of the inmate;
15. Other factors considered relevant in a particular case by the Board.

**Reservation of Discretionary Power of the Parole Board**

These criteria in no way limit the absolute discretion of the Parole Board or Panel to make parole decisions on a case-by-case basis and to grant or deny parole as it determines to be in the best interest of society and the inmate under review.


In some cases, the Board may decide that an inmate should be granted parole if the inmate completes one or more stated conditions. When this is the case, the Board may grant a parole that becomes effective when the inmate completes one or more stated conditions. Should the inmate disobey any rule or regulation of the South Carolina Department of Corrections before satisfying the stated conditions to make his parole effective, the Board may rescind the inmate's parole and treat the case as though parole had been rejected. In other cases, the Board may feel it needs more time to form its decision. In such cases, the Board may simply take the parole consideration under advisement and reschedule it at a later date. Similarly, the Board may postpone a parole hearing in order to dispose of detainers or pending charges.

If the Board rejects an inmate for parole, the inmate will be given written notice of rejection stating the reasons for rejection. Decisions of the Board have no precedential effect whatever and in no way limit the Board's absolute discretion at later parole hearings.

After rejection for parole, the procedure of scheduling of rehearing is as follows:

1. An individual serving time for a violent offense defined in §16-1-80 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 1976 will be reheard for parole two years following the date of parole rejections. Applicable legal exceptions may allow for a one year hearing.
2. An individual serving time for a nonviolent offense defined in §16-1-70 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 1976 will be reheard for parole one year following the date of parole rejections.

*I certify that the above material has been explained to me, and I have received a copy.*

Inmate's Signature	Date	Witness	Date
			

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT**

Charlton Davis, #231377,	)	
	)	Docket No. 15-ALJ-15-0056-AP
Appellant,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	<b>ORDER</b>
	)	
South Carolina Department of Probation,	)	
Parole and Pardon Services,	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	
<hr/>		

This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to the appeal of Charlton Davis (Appellant), an inmate incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Appellant disagrees with the decision of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (Department) rejecting him for parole.

**BACKGROUND**

Appellant concedes on February 1, 1996, he was given a forty year sentence for assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, 1st degree; armed robbery; and burglary, 1st degree. In a letter dated September 10, 2015, the Department notified Appellant that the Board had rejected his parole request for the following reasons: (1) nature and seriousness of current offense; (2) indication of violence in this or previous offense; and (3) use of deadly weapon in this or previous offense. On September 29, 2015, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal challenging the Department's decision. When Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal, he also filed his brief. In the Notice of Appeal and in his brief, Appellant claims that the Parole denied him parole for the same reasons all three times he has appeared before the Board in violation of his liberty interests as the nature of his crimes will not change. In addition, Appellant filed a reply brief in which he asserted that the decision of the Board was arbitrary, capricious, and without findings of fact.

**JURISDICTION**

The Court's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived from the decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court in *Al-Shabazz v. State*, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000) and *Furtick v. S.C. Dep't of Probation, Parole and Pardon Servs.*, 352 S.C. 594, 576 S.E.2d 146 (2003). The

**FILED**

February 11, 2016

SC ADMIN. LAW COURT

Court is authorized to dismiss inmate appeals that do not implicate a state-created liberty or property interest. See *Skipper v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.*, 370 S.C. 267, 279 n.5, 633 S.E.2d 910, 917 n.5 (Ct. App. 2006).

### DISCUSSION

"The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake." *Wilkinson v. Austin*, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from the Constitution itself or from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies. *Id.*; *Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983), *overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

Regarding the Constitution itself, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence." *Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates*, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). In other words, "given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty." *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). Thus, if Appellant has a liberty interest in parole, then it must emanate from state law. See *Ellis v. District of Columbia*, 84 F.3d 1413, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

A state statute may create a liberty interest in parole where it uses mandatory language. See, e.g., *Bd. of Pardons v. Allen*, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); *Greenholtz*, 442 U.S. 1.<sup>1</sup> In interpreting our parole statutes, South Carolina courts have generally held that the temporary denial of parole to a parole-eligible inmate does not, **on its own**, implicate a state-created liberty interest. See, e.g., *Furtick v. S.C. Dep't of Probation, Parole and Pardon Servs.*, 352 S.C. 594, 598 n.4, 576 S.E.2d 146, 149 n.4 (2003); *Sullivan v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections*, 355 S.C. 437, 443, 586 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2003); *James v. S.C. Dep't of Probation, Parole and Pardon Servs.*, 376 S.C. 392, 656 S.E.2d 399 (Ct. App. 2008). However, this does not mean that the Board's parole-related decisions can never impinge upon a state-created liberty interest. For instance, South Carolina courts have held that a state-created liberty interest is implicated by the permanent denial of parole eligibility, by a

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<sup>1</sup> As explained in *Brown v. S.C. Dep't of Probation, Parole and Pardon Servs.*, 05-ALJ-15-00013-AP (Nov. 17, 2006), it is the Court's view that the correct methodology to apply in determining whether state law creates a liberty interest **with respect to parole matters** is the methodology used in *Greenholtz* and *Allen*, not that used in *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

change in the time frame in which the Board reviews parole, and by the Board's failure to follow proper procedure in making its decision to deny parole. *See Furtick*, 352 S.C. 594, 576 S.E.2d 146 (denial of parole eligibility); *Steele v. Benjamin*, 362 S.C. 66, 606 S.E.2d 499 (Ct. App. 2004) (change in time frame for reviewing parole); *Cooper*, 377 S.C. 489, 661 S.E.2d 106 (failure to follow proper procedure).

In this case, Appellant challenges the procedure employed by the Board in denying him parole. Clearly, the Board may not grant parole unless it is satisfied that **all** of the criteria set forth in Section 24-21-640 are met. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 2010). Additionally, in *Cooper v. S.C. Dep't of Probation, Parole and Pardon Servs.*, 377 S.C. 489, 661 S.E.2d 106 (2008), the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the ALC's review of these matters. In that case, an inmate who had been convicted of murder was denied parole by the Board. In its decision letter, the Board cited the following reasons for denying the inmate parole: "(1) the nature and seriousness of the current offense; (2) an indication of violence in this or a previous offense; and (3) the use of a deadly weapon in this or a previous offense." *Id.* at 492-93, 661 S.E.2d at 108. The inmate appealed the Board's decision claiming the Board did not consider all relevant factors in making its decision, and therefore the Board's denial of his parole deprived him of a state-created liberty interest under S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640.<sup>2</sup> Upon review of the matter, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the Board's decision was "arbitrary and capricious" since the Board "neither offered an explanation nor indicated that it had considered the statutory criteria of section 24-21-640 and the fifteen criteria listed on the parole form." *Id.* at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112. The Supreme Court, however, explained that:

We emphasize that in future parole review hearings the Parole Board may avoid the result in the instant case if it clearly states in its order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640 and the fifteen factors published in its parole form. If the Board complies with this procedure, the

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<sup>2</sup> Section 24-21-640 provides in pertinent part:

The board must carefully consider the record of the prisoner before, during and after imprisonment, and no such prisoner may be paroled until it appears to the satisfaction of the board: that the prisoner has shown a disposition to reform; that, in the future he will probably obey the law and lead a correct life; that by his conduct he has merited a lessening of the rigors of his imprisonment; that the interest of society will not be impaired thereby; and, that suitable employment has been secured for him. The board must establish written, specific criteria for the granting of parole and provisional parole. This criteria must reflect all of the aspects of this section and include a review of a prisoner's disciplinary and other records.

S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 2010).

decision will constitute a routine denial of parole and the ALC would have limited authority to review the decision to determine whether the Board followed proper procedure. Under that scenario, the ALC can summarily dismiss the inmate's appeal.

*Cooper*, 377 S.C. at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112.

Without a doubt, the Board "is the sole authority with respect to decisions regarding the grant or denial of parole." *Cooper*, 377 S.C. at 499, 661 S.E.2d at 111. Therefore, according to Cooper, this Court's review is limited to ascertaining whether the Board "followed proper procedure." *Cooper*, 377 S.C. at 500, 661 S.E.2d at 112. In other words, the Court may summarily dismiss Appellant's appeal unless it determines that the Board considered inappropriate factors in making its determination.

Here, in its parole denial letter, the Board expressly stated that it considered "all of the factors published within Department Form 1212 (criteria for parole consideration), as well as the factors outlined in Section 24-21-640 of the South Carolina Code of Laws" in reaching its decision. The Board stated that its decision was based on the following four factors: (1) nature and seriousness of current offense; (2) use of deadly weapon in this or previous offense; and (3) use of deadly weapon in this or previous offense. All of these factors fall within the scope of the criteria set forth in Section 24-21-640 and the Board's parole form.<sup>3</sup> Appellant nevertheless claims that the Board decision was erroneous because some of its reasons are based upon the facts of his criminal offense and cannot be changed by his actions while incarcerated. However, the Board may not grant parole unless it is satisfied that **all** of the criteria set forth in Section 24-21-640 are


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<sup>3</sup> The Board's parole form lists the following non-inclusive criteria: (1) The risk the inmate poses to the community; (2) The nature and seriousness of the inmate's offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, and the inmate's attitude toward it; (3) The inmate's prior criminal records and his/her adjustment under any previous programs or supervision; (4) The inmate's attitude toward his/her family, the victim, and authority in general; (5) The inmate's adjustment while in confinement, including his/her progress in counseling, therapy, and other similar programs designed to encourage the inmate to improve himself/herself; (6) The inmate's employment history, including his/her job training and skills and his/her stability in the work place; (7) The inmate's physical, mental and emotional health; (8) The inmate's understanding of the cause of his/her past criminal conduct; (9) The inmate's efforts to solve his/her problems, such as seeking treatment for substance abuse, enrolling in academic and vocational educational courses, and in general using whatever resources the Department of Corrections has made available to inmates to help with their problems; (10) The adequacy of the inmate's overall parole plan. This includes inmates living arrangements, where he/she will live and who he will live with; the character of those with whom the inmate plans to associate in both his/her working hours and his/her off-work hours; the inmate's plans for gainful employment; (11) The willingness of the community into which the inmate will be released to receive the inmate; (12) The willingness of the inmate's family to allow him/her to return to the family circle; (13) The attitudes of the sentencing judge, the solicitor, and local law enforcement officers respecting the inmate's parole; (14) The feelings of the victim's family, and any witnesses to the crime about the release of the inmate; and (15) Other factors considered relevant in a particular case by the Board. See *Cooper*, 377 S.C. at 494 n.2, 661 S.E.2d at 109 n.2.

met, including that "the interests of society will not be impaired thereby." S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Board followed proper procedure in denying parole to Appellant and that the ALC may therefore dismiss Appellant's appeal.

**ORDER**

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that this appeal is DISMISSED.  
**AND IT IS SO ORDERED.**



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Ralph King Anderson, III  
Chief Administrative Law Judge

February 11, 2016  
Columbia, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

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APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT  
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Appellate Case No. 2016-000530

Charlton Davis, 231377

Appellant

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation,  
Parole and Pardon Services,

Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

The undersigned certifies : Supplemental Record on Appeal contains all material proposed to be included in the Record on Appeal by all parties, and that it complies with SCACR.

*Charlton Davis*  
Charlton Davis, 231377  
HC117/KER.CI  
4848 Goldmine Hwy.  
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August 8, 2016

pro se

**LEGAL**

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**AUG 16 2016**

**SC Court of Appeals**

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT  
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Charlton Davis, 231377

Appellant

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation,  
Parole and Pardon Services,

Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Charlton Davis, the Appellant, pro se, certify that I have served the Supplemental Record on Appeal, and Certificate of Counsel dated August 8, 2016 on Respondent by depositing a copy of the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, the 8th day of August, 2016, addressed to: Tommy Evans, Jr.

Assistant General Counsel  
SCDPPPS  
P.O. Box 50666  
Columbia, SC 29250

s/ *Charlton Davis*

Charlton Davis, 231377  
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**LEGAL**

N. DAVIS # 231377

CORR INST HC#117

LD MINE HWY

N. S.C.

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AUG 16 2016

SC Court of Appeals

TO: HONORABLE JENNY KITCHINGS  
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