

R. MILLS ARIAIL, JR.
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RECEIVED

SEP 29 2016

September 23, 2016

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Via US Mail

Daniel Shearouse
Clerk of Court
South Carolina Supreme Court
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

***Re: Notice of Intent to Appeal from State of SC v. Vincent Missouri
C.A. No.: 2015-CP-23-5901***

Dear Mr. Shearouse:

I was Court Appointed in the above referenced matter, and I expect that appellate defense will handle the appeal and petition for certiorari. On behalf of my client, enclosed for filing please find the Notice of Appeal and proof of service. I've enclosed a copy of the Honorable George C. James' Order of Dismissal to be challenged on appeal. By copy of this letter, I am also serving my client, counsel for the State of South Carolina, the South Carolina Commission of Indigent Defense - Appellate Defense Division and the Greenville County Clerk's Office.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter and if you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,
LAW OFFICE OF R. MILLS ARIAIL, JR.
Attorney at Law



R. Mills Ariail, Jr.

RMAjr/dl
Enclosures (as stated)

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

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SEP 29 2016
S.C. SUPREME COURT

APPEAL FROM GREENVILLE COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

George C. James, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2015-CP-23-5901


Vincent Missouri,..... Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Appellant appeals the Honorable George C. James' Order of Dismissal dismissing Appellant's application for post-conviction relief. On August 23, 2016, the Honorable George C. James signed an order dismissing Appellant's application for post-conviction relief with prejudice. Appellant, through counsel, received written notice of entry of this order on September 8, 2016. A copy of the Honorable George C. James' Order of Dismissal is attached.



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Telephone (864) 232-9390
Facsimile (864) 232-9392
Attorney for Vincent Missouri

Greenville, South Carolina
September 23, 2016

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

RECEIVED
SEP 29 2016
S.C. SUPREME COURT

APPEAL FROM GREENVILLE COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

George C. James, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Case No.2015-CP-23-5901

Vincent Missouri,..... Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Denise Tanner LaBeck, paralegal to R. Mills Ariail, Jr., do hereby certify that on this September 23, 2016, I served upon the below named Respondents copies of the **NOTICE OF APPEAL** by depositing copies of the same via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, Registered Mail in an envelope addressed as set forth herein below:

Patrick Schmeckpeper, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
PO Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
Attorney for the State of South Carolina

Greenville County Clerk's Office
Greenville County Courthouse
305 East North Street
Greenville, SC 29601

Vincent Missouri SCDC# 197996
Broad River Correctional Institute
4460 Broad River Road
Columbia, SC 29212

SC Commission of Indigent Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
PO Box 11433
Columbia, SC 29211-1433

Denise Tanner LaBeck
Denise Tanner LaBeck

September 23, 2016

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
CASE NO: 2015CP2305901

FILED-CLERK OF COURT
GREENVILLE, O. S. C.
PAUL B. WICKENSIMER
2016 SEP 6 PM 11:25

Vincent Missouri vs. South Carolina State Of

CHECK ONE:

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a),
SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit); Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other: _____
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j) SCRPC; Bankruptcy;
 Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award;
 Other: _____
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded;
 Other: _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order; Statement of Judgment by the Court:

Dated at Greenville, South Carolina, this .

Court Reporter:

PRESIDING JUDGE - George C James Jr

This judgment was entered on the , and a copy mailed first class this , to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

R. Mills Ariail Jr. 11 North Irvine Street, Suite 11
Greenville, SC 29601

Patrick Schmeckpeper PO Box 11549 Columbia,
SC 29211

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Paul B. Wickensimer Greenville County Clerk Of Court
- Clerk of Court

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF GREENVILLE

Vincent Missouri,
S.C.D.C. No. 197996

Applicant,

v.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

) THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

) C.A. No. 2015-CP-23-5901

) **ORDER OF DISMISSAL**
) **(with prejudice)**

2016 SEP 6 PM 11 25

FILED-CLERK OF COURT
GREENVILLE CO. S.C.
PAUL B. WICKENHISMER

This matter comes before the Court by way of a post-conviction relief (PCR) application filed on September 28, 2015. Respondent filed its Return on December 9, 2015. An evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on June 15, 2016, at the Greenville County Courthouse. Applicant was present and testified. Applicant's plea counsel, Symmes W. Culbertson, Sr., also testified. Applicant was represented by R. Mills Ariail, Jr., Esquire. Respondent was represented by Patrick Schmeckpeper, Esquire, of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Applicant is incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to the Greenville County Clerk of Court's orders of commitment. The Greenville County Grand Jury indicted the Applicant at the November 2013 term of General Sessions for two counts of bank robbery (2013-GS-23-3420, -6402). Attorney Culbertson represented the Applicant.

On October 31, 2014, the Applicant pled guilty. The Honorable James R. Barber, III sentenced the Applicant to concurrent terms of 10 years on both counts of bank robbery. Judge Barber ordered these sentences to run consecutively to a twenty-year sentence imposed on May

20, 2014 in indictment 2012-GS-39-2203 out of Pickens County. The Applicant did not appeal.

Allegations

In his application for post-conviction relief, the Applicant alleges he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reason:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
 - a. "Conspired to interfere with his client's defense with the solicitor and judge presiding within the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (Judge L. Verdin)."
 - b. "[C]oncealed" from the Court of Appeals that the Applicant "immediately appealed Judge Verdin's denial to proceed pro-se."
2. Violation of Due Process/Biased Judge.
 - a. "[D]enied due process and a fair proceeding by the pre-trial delay from the January 16, 2013 arrest and the October 31, 2014 guilty plea."
 - b. Biased judge presided over his case.
3. Violation of Thirteenth Amendment/Fourteenth Amend.
4. Lack of Subject-Matter-Jurisdiction.
 - a. Plea judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the Applicant had immediately appealed Judge Verdin's order denying his request for plea counsel to be relieved.

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal Judge Verdin's ruling denying his request to proceed *pro se*; failing to object to the sufficiency of the indictment; failing to move to request that Judge Verdin be recused; failure to pursue an involuntary intoxication defense; failure to ensure that a five year plea offer was honored by the State. Applicant also alleged the plea court was without jurisdiction to entertain his guilty plea because he had filed a *pro se* appeal from Judge Verdin's denial of his motion to relieve counsel.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I have reviewed the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, observed the witnesses presented at the hearing, passed upon their credibility, and weighed the testimony accordingly. Further, I have reviewed the Clerk of Court's records regarding the subject guilty pleas, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the application



for post-conviction relief, the transcripts and documents from the prior proceedings, and the legal arguments of counsel.¹ Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-80 (2015), I have made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon all of the probative evidence presented.


Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In a post-conviction relief action, the applicant has the burden of proving the allegations in the application. Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC; Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged as a ground for relief, the Applicant must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984); Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985).

The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Courts presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).

Courts use a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, attorney performance is measured by its "reasonableness under professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 385 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Strickland). Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

¹ This Court has also reviewed post-hearing submissions from both parties, including 1) an email by Applicant's PCR counsel, dated June 27, which included an attachment of cases Applicant wished to submit; 2) Applicant's June 28 letter to his PCR counsel; and (3) the State's memorandum of law.



Id. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Because Applicant pled guilty, he must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have instead insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

Failure to File Interlocutory Appeal

The Applicant's first PCR claim stems from Judge Verdin's denial of his motion to have Mr. Culbertson removed as his attorney and to proceed pro se. Judge Verdin ruled on September 5, 2014 that plea counsel would continue to represent the Applicant. No appeal (other than the applicant's improper *pro se* appeal discussed below) from that ruling was filed. I conclude that any properly filed immediate appeal from that ruling would have been interlocutory.

As a general rule, a criminal defendant may not appeal until sentence is imposed. State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 183, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013). The Supreme Court has explained that

"[i]t is a bad practice, and generally condemned, to hear appeals by piecemeal, **especially in criminal cases**; for it is destructive of the prompt administration of justice, which is so essential to the peace of society. To allow appeals to be heard from such preliminary rulings would enable a party charged with the most serious crime always to secure a continuance, when otherwise not entitled to it, by simply moving to quash the indictment, and, when his motion is overruled, give notice of appeal from such ruling, and thereby stop the trial."²

Isaac at 183-84, 747 S.E.2d at 680 (citing State v. Hughes, 56 S.C. 540, 35 S.E. 214, 215 (1900) (emphasis added)). Absent some specialized statute, the immediate appealability of an interlocutory or intermediate order depends on whether the order falls within section 14-3-330 of the South Carolina Code. State v. Simuel, 411 S.C. 602, 604, 769 S.E.2d 662, 663 (2015) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Rearick, Op. No. 27654 (Sup. Ct. filed August 17, 2016) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 33 at 21-22). Section 330 provide that interlocutory appeals are

² This reasoning is perhaps more compelling in this case, where Applicant – through his testimony at the evidentiary hearing – has shown a sincere willingness to abuse the judicial process.

appropriate from (1) judgments or orders on the merits of a case; and (2) orders affecting a substantial right that (a) in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken or discontinues the action.³

The trial court's order denying Applicant's request to proceed *pro se* was not immediately appealable because it was not an issue "on the merits" of his underlying case, and it did not "determine the action" or otherwise prevent a judgment from which an appeal might have been taken.⁴ If Applicant wanted to challenge the trial court's ruling, the proper procedure was to proceed to trial and appeal if convicted. Instead, Applicant chose to plead guilty, thus waiving all prior claims of constitutional rights or deprivations thereof. See State v. Truesdale, 278 S.C. 368, 370, 296 S.E.2d 528, 529 (1982) (expressly holding that South Carolina does not accept conditional pleas).

Because Applicant could have raised this issue on direct appeal and failed to do so, he may not raise it in this forum. Post-conviction relief "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or conviction." S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(b); *see, also, Simmons v. State*, 264 S.C. 417, 423, 215 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1975) ("It is uniformly held that an application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal."). Therefore, a post-conviction relief application cannot assert any issues that could have been raised at trial or on appeal unless couched as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. *Drayton v. Evatt*, 312 S.C. 4, 8, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993) (*citing*,

³ Subsection (3) involves "special proceedings," or "a civil action in which some special remedy is sought; i.e., writ of mandamus, writ of habeas corpus, etc." Rule 2, SCRCP, advisory committee's note. Subsection (4) is not applicable to orders in general sessions court.

⁴ For additional cases involving whether an order is immediately appealable in a criminal case, *see, e.g., Isaac, supra* (order denying immunity request not immediately appealable); *In re Lorenzo B.*, 307 S.C. 439, 439, 415 S.E.2d 795 (1992) (order adjudicating juvenile delinquent is not appealable until imposition of final judgment at the dispositional hearing); *Parsons v. State*, 289 S.C. 542, 542, 347 S.E.2d 504, 504 (1986) (denial of bail pending trial is not immediately appealable); *State v. Miller*, 289 S.C. 426, 427, 346 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1986) (denial of claim of double jeopardy is not immediately appealable); *State v. Washington*, 285 S.C. 457, 458, 330 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1985) (a conviction at a trial in absentia prior to imposition of sentence is not immediately appealable).

Hyman v. State, 278 S.C. 501, 299 S.E.2d 330 (1983)). Applicant's waiver of this direct appeal issue bars it as a ground for relief. Applicant simply cannot use post-conviction relief to bring this free standing claim of a constitutional violation. This allegation is therefore denied.

Additionally, the Applicant has not met his burden to prove he actually requested such an appeal. During the evidentiary hearing, the Applicant testified that he notified plea counsel that he wanted to appeal from the guilty plea of October 31, 2014. The Applicant's testimony on that issue is not credible. Part of my reason for so concluding is that the Applicant was sworn to tell the truth at the plea proceeding. The plea transcript establishes that he was satisfied with plea counsel's services, he understood the negotiated sentence, and he desired that the plea judge accept the plea and impose the negotiated sentence. It is apparent he was fully engaged with the plea judge during that proceeding. However, at the PCR hearing, the Applicant testified that he did not testify truthfully to the plea judge just so he could move his case along to the PCR stage and pursue a PCR claim that his right to represent himself had been violated. I conclude that the Applicant had numerous opportunities during the plea colloquy to express that desire to the plea judge, but he did not do so. I find his testimony at the plea proceeding was truthful and that his testimony at the PCR hearing was not truthful.

My conclusion that the applicant did not request an appeal is further based on the fact that I find credible plea counsel's testimony that he does not recall that the applicant told him he wanted to appeal. He explained to the court the PD office's procedure that was in place and that had the applicant notified him he wanted to appeal, an appeal would have been filed. As Applicant has failed to meet his burden with respect to this allegation, relief on this ground is denied.



Failure to Object to Sufficiency of the Indictment

Citing Rule 3(c), SCRCrP, the applicant claims that because the indictment was presented to the grand jury more than 90 days from the date the arrest warrant was received by solicitor from the clerk of court, the proceedings from that point forward were void. Relief on this ground is denied pursuant to *State v. Culbreath*, 282 SC 38, 316 SE2d 681 (1984) and *State v. Edwards*, 374 SC 543, 649 SE2d 112 (Ct. App. 2007). Rule 3 is administrative and not jurisdictional, and the solicitor's delay does not within itself invalidate a warrant or prohibit subsequent prosecution.

Partial Judge

The applicant claims Judge Verdin was not a partial judge and that plea counsel knew or should have known that the applicant wanted to appeal Judge Verdin's rulings denying him the right to represent himself. This is the same argument set forth above couched in slightly different words. Relief on this ground is denied for the same reasons as stated in his allegation that counsel failed to file an interlocutory appeal.

Moreover, Applicant's claim that Judge Verdin was not a partial judge is a direct appeal issue, and not proper before this court. This Court first finds that this allegation is a direct appeal issue, and is therefore not appropriate for consideration on post-conviction relief.

Post-conviction relief "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or conviction." S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(b); *see, also, Simmons v. State*, 264 S.C. 417, 423, 215 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1975) ("It is uniformly held that an application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal."). Therefore, a post-conviction relief application cannot assert any issues that could have been raised at trial or on appeal unless couched as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.



Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 8, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993) (citing, *Hyman v. State*, 278 S.C. 501, 299 S.E.2d 330 (1983)). Applicant could have raised at trial or on appeal any issues he had with the State's discovery response. The failure to do so bars this allegation as a ground for relief. Applicant simply cannot use post-conviction relief to bring this free standing claim of a constitutional violation.

In any event, Applicant's claim is without merit. A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Canon 3(E)(2)(a) of Rule 501, SCACR. It is not enough for a party seeking disqualification to simply allege bias or prejudice. *Roche v. Young Bros., Inc., of Florence*, 332 S.C. 75, 5034 S.E.2d 311 (1998). The Applicant has not presented evidence of any fact or issue that might call the judge's impartiality into question. Relief on this ground is therefore denied.

Failure to Pursue Involuntary Intoxication Defense

As for the ground for relief based upon the Applicant's desire to pursue an involuntary intoxication defense, I conclude that plea counsel's refusal to pursue such a defense was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Refusing to pursue a defense that is not legally or factually viable is not ineffective assistance of counsel. The Applicant claims he could have produced expert testimony that his long term addiction to crack cocaine was a disease that affected his freedom of choice and resulted in "irresistible impulses". He testified that he was under the influence of crack during the subject bank robberies and that while he was aware that his conduct was wrong, his brain was not working properly and he therefore had impulses to do things a normal person wouldn't do. In my view, plea counsel was correct in his assessment that this was not a viable defense. In *State v. Vaughn*, 268 S.C. 119, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1977), our Supreme Court adopted the rule that "voluntary intoxication, *where it has not produced*



permanent insanity, is never an excuse for or a defense to crime..." (emphasis added). The Applicant has presented no evidence that his conduct amounted to either (1) involuntary intoxication or (2) voluntary intoxication producing permanent insanity that destroyed his ability to know right from wrong. Also, no such testimony from any experts on the issue of involuntary intoxication was presented at the PCR hearing, so any relief on this ground would be based on speculation. Relief on this ground is therefore denied.

Failure to Enforce Plea Offer

The Applicant claims that plea counsel failed to ensure that the five year plea offer was honored by the State. Plea counsel testified that the five year offer was withdrawn when the case was assigned to a new assistant solicitor and it came to light that the Applicant had additional charges. Plea counsel testified that the State then served an LWOP⁵ notice and that the Applicant was eager to negotiate a sentence for less than life. Plea counsel testified that when Judge Verdin denied the motion to proceed pro se, the Applicant ultimately decided to agree to a negotiated plea of two concurrent ten-year sentences for the Greenville bank robberies, with those sentences to run consecutive to the twenty-year Pickens County bank robbery sentence the Applicant had already received. I find plea counsel's testimony to be credible and I further conclude that plea counsel performed very effectively in representing the applicant and working out a plea deal that avoided the LWOP prospect.

Jurisdiction to Enter Plea

The Applicant claims that the plea court did not have jurisdiction to entertain his plea because he had filed a *pro se* appeal from Judge Verdin's September 5, 2014 denial of his request to represent himself. The Applicant's Exhibit #4 at the PCR hearing is his purported notice of intent to appeal Judge Verdin's ruling. The material presented does not include any

⁵ Life without parole.



order from the Supreme Court addressing that appeal. However, the record does contain the Applicant's letter to the Supreme Court dated July 29, 2013 in which he takes issue with the rule that a criminal defendant does not have the right to hybrid representation. In a letter dated August 20, 2013, the Clerk of the Supreme Court, the Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse, advised the Applicant that because he was represented by counsel, no action would be taken on his letter because any submissions to the Supreme Court, other than a motion to relieve counsel, must be submitted by counsel. Quoting *Miller v. State*, 388 SC 347, 697 SE2d 527 (2010), the Clerk advised the Applicant that any filings submitted by him were "essentially a nullity". Not to be denied, the Applicant wrote back to the Clerk on August 25, 2013 and asked the Supreme Court to abolish the rule prohibiting *pro se* filings by a person who has an attorney. The Clerk evidently did not write back, presumably and understandably because he had already told the Applicant that his *pro se* submissions were improper and a nullity. It therefore stands to reason that the Supreme Court did not act upon the applicant's September 8, 2014 notice of appeal on the basis that since the applicant was represented by counsel, the notice of appeal was a nullity. Since that notice of appeal was a nullity, the circuit court still had jurisdiction over the criminal case on the date of the plea, October 31, 2014; therefore, any claim for relief on plea counsel's failure to object on jurisdictional grounds to the taking of the plea is denied.

ALL OTHER ALLEGATIONS

As to any and all allegations that were raised in the application or at the hearing in this matter and not specifically addressed in this order, the Court finds Applicant failed to present any evidence regarding such allegations. Accordingly, the Court finds Applicant has abandoned any such allegations.



CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application for post-conviction relief. The Court concludes that the Applicant's pleas were entered freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This Court notes that Applicant must file and serve a notice of intent to appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Rule 71.1(g), SCRPC; Bray v. State, 336 S.C. 137, 620 S.E.2d 743 (2005), for the obligation of Applicant's counsel to file and serve notice of appeal. The Applicant's attention is also directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures after notice has been timely filed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED

1. That the Application for Post-Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant must be remanded to the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 23 day of August, 2016.




GEORGE C. JAMES, JR.
Presiding Judge
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit


_____, South Carolina

R. MILLS ARIAIL, JR.

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