

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS**

---

Appeal from Charleston County  
Court of Common Pleas

J.C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

---

Appellate Case No. 2016-000419  
Trial Court Case No. 2013-CP-10-03251

---

**RECEIVED**  
AUG 31 2016  
SC Court of Appeals

Rosemary Connelly,

Respondent,

v.

Winsor Custom Homes, LLC,

Appellant.

---

**INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT**

---

YOUNG CLEMENT RIVERS, LLP  
Stephen L. Brown (SC Bar No. 66468)  
Russell G. Hines (SC Bar No. 72100)  
25 Calhoun Street, Suite 400  
Charleston, South Carolina 29401  
P.O. Box 993 (29402)  
(843) 720-5488

*Counsel for Appellant  
Winsor Custom Homes, LLC*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page:</u>
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	iii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL.....	2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....	3
STATEMENT OF FACTS.....	9
 ARGUMENT	
<b>I.    The trial court erred in denying Winsor judgment as a matter of law.....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>A.    The trial court erred in determining that Winsor owed Mrs. Connelly a legal duty to maintain the silt fence and, in consequence, erred in determining that Mrs. Connelly had a viable claim against Winsor for ordinary negligence—which, defective though it was, was the only claim that Mrs. Connelly did not effectively abandon or dismiss, leaving her with no viable claim against Winsor and entitling Winsor to judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court wrongfully denied.....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>B.    The trial court erred in refusing to rule as a matter of law that, in light of South Carolina’s adoption of the rule stated in § 343A and the only reasonable conclusion capable of being drawn from the evidence presented, Winsor was not liable to Mrs. Connelly for the Subject Accident.....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>C.    The trial court erred in refusing to rule as a matter of law that, in light of the only reasonable conclusion capable of being drawn from the evidence presented, Mrs. Connelly was at least 51% at fault for the</b>	

<b>Subject Accident and, therefore, she could not recover against Winsor because of her comparative negligence. ....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>II. Assuming, <i>arguendo</i>, Winsor is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this case should be remanded for a new trial on account of prejudicial errors in the proceedings below.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>A. The trial court erred in denying Winsor’s motion for a mistrial when Mrs. Connelly raised the subject of insurance to the jury. ....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>B. The trial court erred in partially directing a verdict against Winsor as to liability (i.e., as to the issues of duty and breach).....</b>	<b>288</b>
<b>C. The trial court erred refusing to give Winsor’s requested jury charge regarding § 343A.....</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>D. The trial court erred in denying Winsor’s challenge to the reliability and admissibility of Mrs. Connelly’s medical expert testimony with respect to the alleged causal connection between the Subject Accident and the Smell/Taste Problem.....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>E. The trial court erred in denying Winsor’s motion for a new trial absolute because the jury’s damages determination was grossly excessive, indicating that the jury was motivated by some improper influence.....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>40</b>

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s):

### Cases

<u>Berberich v. Jack,</u> 392 S.C. 278, 709 S.E.2d 607 (2011).....	32
<u>Bowman v. Bowman,</u> 357 S.C. 146, 591 S.E.2d 654 (Ct. App. 2004) .....	18
<u>Brazeale v. Piedmont Mfg. Co.,</u> 184 S.C. 471, 193 S.E. 39 (1933).....	24, 26
<u>Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corp.,</u> 305 S.C. 123, 406 S.E.2d 361 (1991).....	6, 18
<u>Cole v. Raut,</u> 378 S.C. 398, 663 S.E.2d 30 (2008).....	32
<u>Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.,</u> 398 S.C. 90, 727 S.E.2d 407 (2012).....	31
<u>Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., Inc.,</u> 381 S.C. 326, 673 S.E.2d 801 (2009).....	29
<u>Hubbard v. Taylor,</u> 339 S.C. 582, 529 S.E.2d 549 (2000).....	15
<u>Humphrey v. Day &amp; Zimmerman Inc.,</u> 997 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D.S.C. 2014) .....	23
<u>Lane v. Gilbert Constr. Co. Ltd.,</u> 383 S.C. 590, 681 S.E.2d 879 (2009).....	17
<u>Moore v. Weinberg,</u> 373 S.C. 209, 644 S.E.2d 740 (Ct. App. 2007) .....	15
<u>O'Neal v. Bowles,</u> 314 S.C. 525, 431 S.E.2d 555 (1993).....	41

<u>Ravan v. Greenville County,</u> 315 S.C. 447, 434 S.E.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1993) .....	16
<u>Roddy v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, U.S.,</u> 415 S.C. 580, 784 S.E.2d 670 (2016).....	23, 29
<u>Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,</u> 353 S.C. 208, 578 S.E.2d 329 (2003).....	29
<u>S.C. Fed. Credit Union v. Higgins,</u> 394 S.C. 189, 714 S.E.2d 550 (2011).....	31
<u>S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen &amp; Hamilton, Inc.,</u> 289 S.C. 373, 346 S.E.2d 324 (1986).....	16
<u>Shaw v. City of Charleston,</u> 351 S.C. 32, 567 S.E.2d 530 (2002).....	17
<u>Snow v. City of Columbia,</u> 305 S.C. 544, 409 S.E.2d 797 (Ct. App. 1991) .....	30
<u>State v. White,</u> 382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009).....	35
<u>TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue,</u> 331 S.C. 611, 503 S.E.2d 471 (1998).....	18
<u>Tucker v. Doe,</u> 413 S.C. 389, 776 S.E.2d 121 (Ct. App. 2015) .....	30
<u>Watson v. Ford Motor Co.,</u> 389 S.C. 434, 699 S.E.2d 169 (2010).....	30, 35
 <b>Other Authority</b>	
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A .....	6, 8, 18, 22, 31, 32
 <b>Rule</b>	
Rule 702, SCRE.....	35

## INTRODUCTION

This is a personal injury lawsuit arising out of an alleged trip-and-fall accident (the “Subject Accident”) while Mrs. Connelly<sup>1</sup> was jogging on the sidewalk in front of the property—at the time, a construction site, where Winsor,<sup>2</sup> a general contractor, was building a new home—located at 1376 Smythe Street on Daniel Island (the “Premises”). In conjunction with the ongoing project, Winsor had installed a silt fence around the perimeter of the Premises, and according to Mrs. Connelly, the Subject Accident happened because the sidewalk was partially obstructed by detached black plastic silt-fence material, and even though, admittedly, *she recognized the obstacle beforehand and tried to run around it*, the wind blew it into contact with her foot.

As it now stands, in the wake of a jury trial and unsuccessful post-trial motions, Winsor has a \$325,000 judgment against it, and most respectfully, this appeal is about why it should not. In broadest terms, Winsor intends to show, first and foremost, that the trial court erred in denying it judgment as a matter of law but, at a minimum, that this case should be remanded for a new trial on account of a number of prejudicial errors in the proceedings below.

---

<sup>1</sup> “Mrs. Connelly” is Plaintiff-Respondent Rosemary Connelly.

<sup>2</sup> “Winsor” is Defendant-Appellant Winsor Custom Homes, LLC.

## STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

- I. Did the trial court err in denying Winsor judgment as a matter of law?<sup>3</sup>**
- A. Did the trial court err in determining that Winsor owed Mrs. Connelly a legal duty to maintain the silt fence and, in consequence, err in determining that Mrs. Connelly had a viable claim against Winsor for ordinary negligence?**
- B. Did the trial court err in refusing to rule as a matter of law that, in light of South Carolina's adoption of the rule stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A and the only reasonable conclusion capable of being drawn from the evidence presented, Winsor was not liable to Mrs. Connelly for the Subject Accident?**
- C. Did the trial court err in refusing to rule as a matter of law that, in light of the only reasonable conclusion capable of being drawn from the evidence presented, Mrs. Connelly was at least 51% at fault for the Subject Accident and, therefore, she could not recover against Winsor because of her comparative negligence?**
- II. Assuming, *arguendo*, Winsor is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, should this case be remanded for a new trial on account of prejudicial errors in the proceedings below.**
- A. Did the trial court err in denying Winsor's motion for a mistrial when Mrs. Connelly raised the subject of insurance to the jury?<sup>4</sup>**
- B. Did the trial court err in partially directing a verdict against Winsor as to liability (i.e., as to the issues of duty and breach)?**

---

<sup>3</sup> This issue, and the corresponding argument below, addresses and includes error in denying Winsor's directed-verdict motions and its motion for JNOV.

<sup>4</sup> In addition to the initial error in denying Winsor's motion for a mistrial because of Mrs. Connelly's testimony (which, to be clear, warrants reversal standing alone), this issue, and the corresponding argument below, addresses and includes other and/or further error and prejudice to Winsor on account of the subject of insurance being raised to the jury.

- C. **Did the trial court err refusing to give Winsor’s requested jury charge regarding § 343A?**
- D. **Did the trial court err in denying Winsor’s challenge to the reliability and admissibility of Mrs. Connelly’s medical expert testimony with respect to the alleged causal connection between the Subject Accident and Mrs. Connelly’s claimed loss of her sense of smell and decreased sense of taste?**
- E. **Did the trial court err in denying Winsor’s motion for a new trial absolute because the jury’s damages determination was grossly excessive, indicating that the jury was motivated by some improper influence?**

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

The Subject Accident happened on June 6, 2011, and Mrs. Connelly commenced this suit on June 4, 2013, in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas. (*See generally* Summons; Compl.)<sup>5</sup> Referring to herself as “an invitee of the sidewalk or right of way at the sidewalk located directly in front of the Premises”<sup>6</sup> and alleging that “Winsor, as builders and agents of the owners of the Premises, owed [her] a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the safety and well-being of persons passing by on the [sidewalk] at the Premises,”<sup>7</sup> Mrs. Connelly averred that, at the time of the Subject Accident, the silt fence “was in

---

<sup>5</sup> As reflected in the caption of her summons and complaint, Mrs. Connelly sued four other defendants besides Winsor. By the time of trial, however, Winsor was the only defendant remaining in the case, and the trial court amended the case caption to its present form. (Order Amending Caption [filed September 2, 2015].)

<sup>6</sup> (Compl. p. 4 [¶ 24].)

<sup>7</sup> (Compl. p. 5 [¶ 39].)

disrepair and was encroaching on the sidewalk or right of way at various places along, within, and/or abutting the property line of the Premises and the sidewalk or right of way[;]”<sup>8</sup> that, as she approached it, she did not know the silt fence “was inadequately secured to the ground[;]”<sup>9</sup> and that, “through no fault of her own,” she was caused to trip and fall when, “[w]hile [she] was jogging on the sidewalk located on the Premises, a gust of wind caused the [silt fence] to suddenly and unexpectedly encroach into the sidewalk or right of way.” (Compl. p. 4 [¶¶ 26-29].) She asserted a single cause of action styled “Negligence/Negligence Per Se/Gross Negligence.” (Compl. pp. 5-7 [¶¶ 37-45] (original emphasis and capital lettering omitted).)

Winsor timely answered, denying Mrs. Connelly’s material allegations and pleading a number of affirmative defenses,<sup>10</sup> and following a period of discovery, the case came on for a jury trial; it lasted four days, from August 25-28, 2015, the Honorable J.C. Nicholson, Jr., presiding. (Trial Tr.)<sup>11</sup>

In pre-trial proceedings on August 24, 2015, the trial court denied Winsor’s challenge to the medical expert testimony Mrs. Connelly intended to offer to prove

---

<sup>8</sup> (Compl. p. 3 [¶ 22].)

<sup>9</sup> (Compl. p. 4 [¶ 25]; *see also* Compl. p. 4 [¶27].)

<sup>10</sup> (Answer.)

<sup>11</sup> Jury selection—which is not relevant to this appeal—was actually conducted by the Honorable Roger M. Young, Sr. Judge Nicholson presided over all proceedings relevant to this appeal.

the requisite causal connection between the Subject Accident and her claimed loss of the sense of smell and diminished sense of taste (the “Smell/Taste Problem”),<sup>12</sup> rejecting Winsor’s argument that Mrs. Connelly’s experts’ opinions’ were unreliable in this regard and, therefore, inadmissible. (Trial Tr. pp. 28:10-50:11, pp. 55:13-57:22, pp. 82:1-83:7, pp. 85:4-93:7; Court’s Ex. 1.)<sup>13</sup>

When trial began the next day, Mrs. Connelly was the first witness to testify. During cross-examination, Mrs. Connelly raised the subject of insurance to the jury, and Winsor promptly moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. (Trial Tr. pp. 217:4-226:21.)

At the close of Mrs. Connelly’s case, and again at the close of all evidence, Winsor moved for a directed verdict. Distinguishing a claim of negligence under a premises-liability theory from a claim of ordinary (non-premises-liability) negligence, Winsor argued that Mrs. Connelly did not have a viable claim for ordinary negligence because Winsor did not owe Mrs. Connelly a duty to maintain

---

<sup>12</sup> Mrs. Connelly intended, and ultimately was allowed, to present medical expert testimony on the alleged causal connection via Drs. Thomas Funcik and Mark Ghegan, both of whom had been deposed the week before on video. (Court’s Ex. 1 [Funcik Dep. (8/19/15) and Ghegan Depo (8/21/15)].)

<sup>13</sup> Far and away, the most substantial damage claimed in this case relates to the Smell/Taste Problem. (*See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. p. 114:10-16.) Mrs. Connelly’s other claimed damages are comparatively modest—chief among them a nondisplaced-to-minimally-displaced nasal fracture and related surgical procedure, the same time as which she elected to have unrelated cosmetic enhancements. (Def’s Ex. 4 [RMC 49-51, 62-63].) Her only claimed pecuniary loss consists of medical expenses totaling less than \$13,500. (Pl.’s Ex. 4.)

the silt fence—the supposed legal duty upon which her ordinary-negligence theory rested. Winsor further argued that, while it did have a duty under the law of premises liability not to create an unsafe condition on the sidewalk, the evidence was such that, as a matter of law, Mrs. Connelly could not prevail on a premises-liability claim in light of South Carolina’s adoption of the rule stated in § 343A, regarding “Known or Obvious Dangers.”<sup>14</sup> For that matter, Winsor argued that, even were Mrs. Connelly to have a potentially viable ordinary negligence claim against it based on negligent maintenance of the silt fence, such a claim would nonetheless fail as a matter of law under § 343A because the rule stated therein applied to “any activity or condition,” which would cover silt-fence maintenance. Further still, Winsor argued even assuming, *arguendo*, § 343A did not apply, no reasonable jury could find Mrs. Connelly to be less than 51% at fault for the

---

<sup>14</sup> Section 343A states as follows:

(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.

(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.

South Carolina adopted the rule stated in § 343A in Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corporation, 305 S.C. 123, 126, 406 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (1991).

Subject Accident; thus, in any event, Winsor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on account of Mrs. Connelly's comparative negligence. Except for in two respects not relevant to this appeal, the trial court denied Winsor's motions. (Trial Tr. pp. 465:21-477:7, pp. 537:15-538:8; Court's Ex. 9.)<sup>15</sup>

In arguing against Winsor's first directed-verdict motion, Mrs. Connelly, through her counsel, made clear that she was not pursuing a premises-liability claim against Winsor; rather, her claim was for "simple," i.e., ordinary, negligence, premised on Winsor's alleged breach of a legal duty that it owed her to maintain the silt fence. (Trial Tr. p. 469:18-470:20.) Then, at the close of all evidence, Mrs. Connelly moved for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence, arguing Winsor owed her a legal duty to maintain the silt fence and that the evidence was such that the trial court should find Winsor breached that duty as a matter of law. (Trial Tr. pp. 530:8-531:7.) Notwithstanding Winsor's objection and argument to the contrary, the trial court determined that this was not a premises-liability case, but an ordinary-negligence case, founded on the duty, which it determined Winsor owed to Mrs. Connelly, to maintain the silt fence. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the evidence left no jury question as to whether Winsor had breached this duty and, thus, determined the issue of breach as a matter of law, granting a partial

---

<sup>15</sup> Though irrelevant to this appeal, the trial court did grant Winsor a directed verdict on Mrs. Connelly's claim of negligence *per se* (Trial Tr. p. 472:12-13) and also struck punitive damages from the case. (Trial Tr. p. 537:20-21.)

directed verdict in favor of Mrs. Connelly. (Trial Tr. pp. 531:8-537:15, pp. 539:22-540:17.)

Instructed that, “[a]s a matter of law, [the trial court] ha[d] found that [Mrs. Connelly] has met the burden of proving [Winsor’s] duty and breach,”<sup>16</sup> the jury was then given the case to determine issues of proximate cause, comparative negligence, and damages with respect to Mrs. Connelly’s ordinary-negligence claim—the trial court having refused Winsor’s proposed jury charge on § 343A and, also, over Winsor’s objection, given a “curative” instruction regarding insurance. (Trial Tr. pp. 587:13-607:1; Verdict Form; Def’s Ex. 13.) The jury returned a verdict finding Winsor had proximately caused Mrs. Connelly damages that it valued at \$500,000 but also finding Mrs. Connelly to have been 35% comparatively negligent. (Trial Tr. pp. 608:5-610:10; Verdict Form.) The trial court then entered judgment in favor of Mrs. Connelly, against Winsor, in the amount of \$325,000, i.e., \$500,000 reduced by 35%. (Judgment.)

This appeal, notice of which was served February 26, 2016, timely follows the trial court’s hearing and denial of Winsor’s timely post-trial motions, which had sought JNOV or, alternatively, a new trial. (Def’s Post-Trial Mots.; Post-Trial Mot. Hr’g Tr.; Post-Trial Motion Order [filed January 28, 2016]; Notice of Appeal.)

---

<sup>16</sup> (Trial Tr. p. 594:4-7.)

## STATEMENT OF FACTS<sup>17</sup>

Though she herself lived on Sullivan's Island, Mrs. Connelly had been regularly jogging on Daniel Island for several years before the Subject Accident. Her friend Cori Smith ("Smith"), a fitness trainer by trade, lived on Daniel Island, and three days a week on average, Mrs. Connelly would drive over, and she and Smith would run together. (Trial Tr. p. 132:3-5, pp. 135:17-137:9, pp. 183:20-184:5-7, pp. 302:14-303:4, pp. 303:16-305:8.)

At the time of the Subject Accident, a new home was under construction on the Premises, and as required by the Daniel Island Architectural Review Board ("ARB"), general contractor Winsor had installed a silt fence—made of black plastic material attached to wooden support stakes—around the perimeter of the Premises for erosion control. (Trial Tr. pp. 376:4-378:20; Pl.'s Ex. 7; Pl.'s Ex. 10; Pl.'s Ex. 11; Def's Ex. 1.)

The Subject Accident happened on a windy, but otherwise pleasant, Monday morning when, while out jogging with Smith, about halfway through their run,<sup>18</sup> Mrs. Connelly tripped and fell on the sidewalk in front of the Premises. Mrs. Connelly claims it happened because the silt fence was in disrepair; indeed, she

---

<sup>17</sup> Please note that this factual statement is not intended to be exhaustive; additional facts will be presented in support of the arguments that follow.

<sup>18</sup> At the time of the Subject Accident, Mrs. Connelly was running roughly four miles at a time, for a total of about 12 miles per week. (Trial Tr. pp. 136:17-137:9, p. 304:14-18, p. 306:16-21.)

claims it was in obvious disrepair and that it looked, for all intents and purposes, just as depicted in the photo Bates Labeled RMC 96 (the “Claimed Accident Condition”). (Trial Tr. p. 138:4-10, p. 311:1-11, pp. 352:18-353:9, p. 550:11-15; Pl.’s Ex. 8; Def’s Ex. 2.)<sup>19</sup> Mrs. Connelly says—literally, her own words are quoted below, as are those of Smith and Mrs. Connelly’s counsel—the Subject Accident happened because detached black plastic fencing material was partially obstructing the sidewalk, and even though, admittedly, *she recognized the obstacle beforehand and tried to jog around it*, the wind blew it into contact with her foot, causing her to trip and fall:

#### From Mrs. Connelly’s Testimony

[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: All right. Let me show you the photo of -- that we have of [the Premises (i.e., the Claimed Accident Condition)], and let me ask you, [Mrs. Connelly], take a look at it. And the jury can all see it. Does that accurately depict what [the Premises] looked like that day?

[MRS. CONNELLY]: I would say yes. Maybe, you know, an inch here or an inch there, but I would say overall, yes.

---

<sup>19</sup> Smith took this picture the day after the Subject Accident at the request of Mrs. Connelly’s husband, Bill Connelly (“Mr. Connelly”), an attorney. (Trial Tr. pp. 215:23-216:23, p. 310:7-16, pp. 336:19-338:25.) The accident location is in the foreground, and the sidewalk along which the ladies were running as they approached it is in the background; in other words, they were running toward the place where Smith was standing when she took the photo, with the Premises to their right. (Trial Tr. p. 310:3-20.)

(Trial Tr. p. 138:4-10.)

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Okay. *Did you see that when you came upon it* that day?

[MRS. CONNELLY]: Well, when I run, I look forward. I look down. And, *yes, I saw there was plastic. I mean, I avoided it. I tried to avoid it, to not go -- you know, you adjust your running* when you go -- and I run a 10 minute mile. I'm not saying I'm running any great distance here. Okay. And -- but I adjust to see what kind of conditions are -- you know, if there's a stop sign, I'm going to stop at the stop sign and look both ways crossing the street. *So, yeah, I saw that there was something black, yes.*

(Trial Tr. p. 139:9-20 (emphasis added).)

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Okay. Tell the jury *as you came upon this fence*, to the best of your recollection, what happened?

[MRS. CONNELLY]: Okay. I'm running down here. [Smith] is running -- I'm on the right hand -- I'm on the right hand side, and she's on the left hand side. And so she's -- I'm running a little bit faster than she is to get through there. You know, I put my foot down -- I put my left foot down, you're running, you're running you're running, you're running.

*It was a windy day. I saw a fluttering motion of this black plastic.* The plastic is like garbage can plastic, you know, that sort of -- you know, it's thin. *I ran to avoid it* -- excuse me -- when I put my left foot down, I had my right foot up, and it caught on the plastic, and I fell forward, I -- toward my body. . . .

(Trial Tr. p. 140:4-18 (emphasis added).)

### From Smith's Testimony

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Is this picture [(i.e., the Claimed Accident Condition)] -- does it accurately represent your memory of what the tarp looked like on June 6, 2011?

[SMITH]: Uh-huh, yes, sir.

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: How was the weather that day?

[SMITH]: It was nice. It was windy, but nice.

(Trial Tr. p. 311:1-6.)

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what happened as you and [Mrs. Connelly] ran past [the Premises] and *came upon this black plastic barrier?*

[SMITH]: *We were running past it*, and it was fine, and just going at a normal stride. And she stepped down and the tarp kind of flew up a little bit and got her foot, and she tripped and fell on her head.

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: A couple things I want to go over on that. First of all, did you see any movement in the tarp from the wind as you were approaching it?

[SMITH]: I mean it was moving just a little bit, like a - *you could tell it was windy*, but not crazy movement.

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Well, was it flopping up and down like a garbage bag or something like that?

[SMITH]: No. No. *It was like just fluttering like wind would do to something.*

(Trial Tr. pp. 311:12-312:2 (emphasis added).)

### From Mrs. Connelly's Counsel's Opening Statement

On . . . June 6, 2011, as [Mrs. Connelly and Smith] *approached that black plastic barrier fence . . . as they were jogging . . . they saw that the fence was partially in the sidewalk*, they did what many of us may have done. And that's *they just sort of jogged over to the left a little bit, because there was plenty of sidewalk there still*.

. . . *And [Mrs. Connelly] sort of jogged a little bit to the left to avoid it*. It was a little bit of a windy day, and that black plastic barrier -- it's kind of *made of a light, almost like hefty bag material* -- all right. . . .

And what happened was when it moved a little bit in the wind, . . . it caught [Mrs. Connelly's] right foot and she went forward. . . .

(Trial Tr. p. 111:10-112:9 (emphasis added).)

### From Mrs. Connelly's Counsel's Closing Argument

You folks have seen that photo [(referring to the Claimed Accident Condition)] over and over and over again in this trial. And *the fence was laying in the sidewalk, partially in the sidewalk*. All right. *That's what it looked like on June 6, 2011. The photo was taken on the next day, June 7, 2011. . . .*

(Trial Tr. p. 550:11-14 (emphasis added).)

*[W]hen [Mrs. Connelly and Smith] saw the fence was down a little bit*, they did what most of us would do. If it's over here, just sort of jog over to the left a little bit. And, unfortunately, the wind caught it a little bit, and it caught [Mrs. Connelly's] foot. And the accident happened. You all heard that. . . .

(Trial Tr. pp. 551:21-552:1 (emphasis added).)

## ARGUMENT

### I. The trial court erred in denying Winsor judgment as a matter of law.

- A. The trial court erred in determining that Winsor owed Mrs. Connelly a legal duty to maintain the silt fence and, in consequence, erred in determining that Mrs. Connelly had a viable claim against Winsor for ordinary negligence—which, defective though it was, was the only claim that Mrs. Connelly did not effectively abandon or dismiss, leaving her with no viable claim against Winsor and entitling Winsor to judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court wrongfully denied.

In short, with Mrs. Connelly’s consent, the only claim actually submitted to the jury was for ordinary negligence based on Winsor’s supposed duty to maintain the silt fence; by proceeding in this way, Mrs. Connelly effectively dismissed or abandoned any/all other causes of action against Winsor; and, because Winsor did not owe Mrs. Connelly a duty to maintain the silt fence, her ordinary-negligence claims, i.e., her only claim, necessarily fails, and Winsor was—and is—entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

“The issue of negligence is a mixed question of law and fact.” Moore v. Weinberg, 373 S.C. 209, 221, 644 S.E.2d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). “An essential element in a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a legal duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff[.]”<sup>20</sup> and “the court must [first] determine, as a matter of law, whether the law recognizes a *particular*

---

<sup>20</sup> Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 355 S.C. 329, 332, 585 S.E.2d 275, 276 (2003).

duty.” Moore, 373 S.C. at 221, 644 S.E.2d at 746 (emphasis added). It is only if a duty does exist that the jury then determines whether there was a breach of the duty and resulting damages; otherwise, i.e., if there is no duty, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

“Duty is generally defined as ‘the obligation to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.’” Huggins, 355 S.C. at 333, 585 S.E.2d at 277 (citing Hubbard v. Taylor, 339 S.C. 582, 529 S.E.2d 549, 552 (2000)). “Duty arises from the *relationship* between the alleged tortfeasor and the injured party. In order for negligence liability to attach, the parties must have a relationship recognized by law as the foundation of a duty of care.” Huggins, 355 S.C. at 333, 585 S.E.2d at 277 (emphasis added); *see also* Ravan v. Greenville County, 315 S.C. 447, 468, 434 S.E.2d 296, 308 (Ct. App. 1993) (“It is essential to liability for negligence to attach that the parties shall have sustained a relationship recognized by law as the foundation of a duty of care.”). “Where this relationship is ‘too attenuated,’ a duty will not arise.” Ravan, 315 S.C. at 467, 434 S.E.2d at 308 (citing S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 376, 346 S.E.2d 324, 325-26 (1986)); *see also* Huggins, 355 S.C. at 333, 585 S.E.2d at 277 (“The concept of duty in tort liability will not be extended beyond reasonable limits.”).

As a builder on Daniel Island, Winsor had to abide by the ARB's construction guidelines, which, as noted above, required Winsor to, among other things, "[i]ninstall erosion control measures (silt fencing) to the perimeter of the [Premises]" and under which the ARB had the right to enforce compliance. (*See generally* Pl.'s Ex. 11.) Winsor owed the ARB, not Mrs. Connelly, a duty to install and maintain the silt fence; this duty, imposed by the ARB's construction guidelines, arose solely out of Winsor's relationship to the ARB as a builder on Daniel Island, a relationship to which Mrs. Connelly was a complete stranger.

To illustrate this point, suppose the silt fence—which went around the entire Premises, not just along the sidewalk—was completely down on all sides of the Premises except the side abutting the sidewalk; or it was down on the side of the Premises abutting the sidewalk but none of it actually encroached upon the sidewalk; or, for that matter, suppose Winsor had simply never installed the silt fence to begin with. In all of these scenarios, Winsor would have been in breach of a duty owed to the ARB, but in none of them would it have been in breach of duty to Mrs. Connelly—because Winsor did not owe Mrs. Connelly a duty to maintain the silt fence, and most respectfully, the trial court erred in determining it did and, in consequence, in failing to grant Winsor judgment as a matter of law on Mrs. Connelly's ordinary negligence claim, which was ultimately, though not viable, the only basis upon which Mrs. Connelly sought to establish Winsor's liability.

To be clear, as noted above, Winsor is distinguishing a claim of negligence under a premises-liability theory from a claim of ordinary negligence. Winsor's position is not that it had no duty at all to Mrs. Connelly with respect to its activities/the conditions on, or abutting, the Premises; it owed her a duty, as it would any other member of the public making use of the sidewalk, not to create a hazardous condition on the sidewalk. *See Lane v. Gilbert Constr. Co. Ltd.*, 383 S.C. 590, 681 S.E.2d 879 (2009) (under a premises-liability theory, a contractor, generally equates to an invitor and has the same duties that the property owner would have to invitees); *Shaw v. City of Charleston*, 351 S.C. 32, 567 S.E.2d 530 (2002) (while the general rule is that an abutting landowner does not owe a duty of care with respect to the safety of the sidewalk there is an exception to this rule when the landowner creates an unsafe condition on the sidewalk). This duty, however, is not a duty to maintain the silt fence, and it arises under the law of premises liability, not ordinary negligence—and Mrs. Connelly effectively dismissed or abandoned any potential claim against Winsor under a premises-liability theory (or, for that matter, any other theory).<sup>21</sup> Consequently, her entire

---

<sup>21</sup> As noted above, during argument on Winsor's first directed-verdict motion, through her counsel, Mrs. Connelly agreed with the trial court that her theory of liability was ordinary negligence, based on alleged negligent maintenance of the silt fence. Indeed, Mrs. Connelly abandoned her prior requests for jury charges related to premises liability (*see* Ex. D to Def's Post-Trial Mots. [at proposed charges VI, VII, VIII, and IX]), took no exception to the trial court's ordinary-negligence charge, and, without objection, allowed the case to be

case rests solely upon her ordinary-negligence claim, which fails as a matter of law—as, respectfully, the trial court should have found.

**B. The trial court erred in refusing to rule as a matter of law that, in light of South Carolina’s adoption of the rule stated in § 343A and the only reasonable conclusion capable of being drawn from the evidence presented, Winsor was not liable to Mrs. Connelly for the Subject Accident.**

Again, South Carolina has adopted § 343A,<sup>22</sup> and it provides as follows:

(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.

(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.

With respect to subsection (2), comment g explains that, even where it is applicable,

---

submitted to the jury on that basis alone—without any charge on premises liability, or any other potential basis of liability against Winsor. Accordingly, Mrs. Connelly effectively consented to the dismissal of, or abandoned, any claim against Winsor but for her (defective) claim of ordinary negligence. Cf. TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 617, 503 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1998) (“An issue conceded in a lower court may not be argued on appeal.”); Bowman v. Bowman, 357 S.C. 146, 591 S.E.2d 654 (Ct. App. 2004) (a party may not “seek and receive a particular result at trial and then challenge it on appeal”).

<sup>22</sup> Callander, 305 S.C. at 126, 406 S.E.2d at 362.

*defendants, however, may reasonably assume that members of the public will not be harmed by known or obvious dangers which are not extreme, and which any reasonable person exercising ordinary attention, perception, and intelligence could be expected to avoid. This is true particularly where a reasonable alternative way is open to the visitor, known or obvious to him, and safe.*

(emphasis added).

It cannot reasonably be denied that the hazard at issue (the Claimed Accident Condition) was known and/or obvious to Mrs. Connelly.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, even though, as addressed below, Winsor contends the jury could not reasonably have found (and did not reasonably find) Mrs. Connelly to be less than 51% at fault for the Subject Accident, the fact that the jury found Mrs. Connelly 35% at fault plainly reflects that the hazard was known and/or obvious to her.

Moreover, during trial, Mrs. Connelly made much of just how bad the Claimed Accident Condition was; indeed, as shown above, her counsel highlighted

---

<sup>23</sup> Comment *b* on subsection (1) provides as follows:

*b.* The word “known” denotes not only knowledge of the existence of the condition or activity itself, but also appreciation of the danger it involves. Thus the condition or activity must not only be known to exist, but it must also be recognized that it is dangerous, and the probability and gravity of the threatened harm must be appreciated. “Obvious” means that both the condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man, in the position of the visitor, exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment.

the obvious disrepair of the Claimed Accident Condition in both his opening statement and closing argument and even underscored the fact that the silt-fence material was lightweight, like a garbage bag, and easily blown around. Nonetheless, as also shown above, it was admitted that, as Mrs. Connelly approached the Claimed Accident Condition, she saw that the sidewalk was partially obstructed—downed black plastic silt-fencing material fluttering in the breeze—and, recognizing this, she jogged over to the left to avoid it. (*See also* Trial Tr. p. 270:16 ([Mrs. Connelly]: “***I saw the plastic on the ground. I ran to avoid it.***”) (emphasis added).) Mrs. Connelly said herself, she knew the Claimed Accident Condition was not supposed to be like it was; the silt fence was supposed to be taut and secured to wooden stakes but, instead, was down and encroaching upon the sidewalk, unsecured, and moving on a windy day. (Trial Tr. p. 142:6-21.)

Mrs. Connelly was not forced to run along the sidewalk, and she approached the Claimed Accident Condition from an unobstructed vantage point on a clear (albeit windy) day. (Trial Tr. p. 184:8-10; Pl.’s Ex. 8 [RMC 96]; Def’s Ex. 2 [RMC 96].) Not even Smith could have obstructed Mrs. Connelly’s view: both testified Mrs. Connelly was in front. (Trial Tr. p. 140:4-18, p. 311:21-25.) And they were not running particularly fast; according to Mrs. Connelly, she ran about a 10-minute mile—in other words, 6 miles per hour. (Trial Tr. p. 139:9-20.)

Mrs. Connelly agreed it was important to watch for safety hazards while jogging, and she testified that she paid attention to the conditions around her<sup>24</sup>— and, again, it was admitted that she, in fact, observed and appreciated the Claimed Accident Condition, recognizing it as a hazard, and attempted to run around it but was tripped up, not simply because of the hazard posed by the downed silt fence, but because a sudden gust of wind (on a windy day) blew it into her foot.

Further still, Winsor notes, Mrs. Connelly’s facebook post from the day after the Subject Accident makes no mention of the silt fence or being tripped at all; in fact, she herself lightheartedly blames the fall on her age:

Hi!! an update! running yesterday I fell on the sidewalk and fractured my nose!! Thank goodness I didn’t break any teeth—the moral of this story ***I guess is running is dangerous for our crowd!!*** No, not really, as soon as I can I will be back out there. In the meantime I look like I got hit with 10 uglysticks!!!!

(Def’s Ex. 3 [RMC Production 154] (emphasis added).)

Most respectfully, the trial court erred in denying Winsor judgment as a matter of law under § 343A. This is so even assuming, *arguendo*, Winsor owed Mrs. Connelly a duty to maintain the silt fence that could support an ordinary-negligence claim. By its plain language, § 343A applies to “any activity or condition . . . [.]” and maintenance of the silt fence, or lack thereof, or the Claimed

---

<sup>24</sup> (Trial Tr. p. 139:9-20, p. 185:3-12.)

Accident Condition as a result, would be covered under § 343A. Consequently, even if a duty of care did exist that could theoretically support a cause of action by Mrs. Connelly against Winsor for ordinary negligence, such a claim nonetheless fails as a matter of law under § 343A, and the trial court erred in denying Winsor judgment as a matter of law.

**C. The trial court erred in refusing to rule as a matter of law that, in light of the only reasonable conclusion capable of being drawn from the evidence presented, Mrs. Connelly was at least 51% at fault for the Subject Accident and, therefore, she could not recover against Winsor because of her comparative negligence.**

Most respectfully, even assuming, *arguendo*, § 343A does not apply, for the same reasons set forth above, Mrs. Connelly could not reasonably be found to be less than 51% at fault for the Subject Accident (and, indeed, the jury's finding to the contrary was unreasonable); consequently, in any event, the trial court should have found, as a matter of law, that recovery by Mrs. Connelly against Winsor was barred by her comparative negligence, entitling Winsor to judgment as a matter of law. Roddy v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, U.S., 415 S.C. 580, 588, 784 S.E.2d 670, 675 (2016) ("In a comparative negligence case, the trial court *should* grant a directed verdict motion if the sole reasonable inference from the evidence is the nonmoving party's negligence exceeded fifty percent.") (emphasis added); *see, e.g., Humphrey v. Day & Zimmerman Inc.*, 997 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D.S.C. 2014) (finding, as a matter of law, on summary judgment, the plaintiff's negligence

greater than the negligence attributable to the defendant and, accordingly, the plaintiff's claims barred under the doctrine of comparative negligence).

**II. Assuming, *arguendo*, Winsor is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this case should be remanded for a new trial on account of prejudicial errors in the proceedings below.**

**A. The trial court erred in denying Winsor's motion for a mistrial when Mrs. Connelly raised the subject of insurance to the jury.**

The day after the Subject Accident, Mr. Connelly, again, a lawyer, wrote Winsor a letter, on his law firm's letterhead, advising,

*My client* fell on the sidewalk on 6/6/2011 in front of this construction site due to the dangerous conditions which as of this morning still exists [sic]. Your company still has dangerous debris on the pedestrian walk. She may have a broken nose. She has multiply [sic] cuts and abrasions to her face, arms, and shoulder and is currently under a doctor's care.

Please *have your attorney call me . . . . Should I not hear from you, I will assume you prefer the more formal route of filing a complaint at law. . . .*

Also, please advise Karen Nelson, John Edelen, Clark Design Group and Daniel Island Realty of my *accusation* against the owners and agents of this property. . . .

(Court's Ex. 3 (emphasis added).) Notably, the letter referred only to Mr. Connelly's "client, not mentioning that the fall involved his wife. (Court's Ex. 3.)

During cross-examination of Mrs. Connelly at trial, the following exchange occurred in the presence of the jury:

[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]: And on the day after the accident, your husband contacted some folks to threaten legal action about this fall; right?

[MRS. CONNELLY]: I don't think he was threatening legal action about this fall. I think he was just telling them what happened. I think it was like, this is what happened and do you guys have insurance and whatever -

(Tr. p. 217, lines 4-10.)

Winsor promptly moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied,<sup>25</sup> reasoning as follows:

All right. Before we broke for lunch, there was a motion for a mistrial that the court denied the motion. And the court was referring -- relying on [Brazeale] vs. Piedmont Manufacturing Company, 193 S.E. 39; and Benjamin Keller vs. Pierce, Young, Angel 171 S.E. 2nd 352.

The court finds that the -- the [Mrs. Winsor] was being asked about a letter that her husband wrote about -- about her fall to Winsor [], and made the comment that her husband asked them "do you have insurance". Number one, I don't think that places the insurance issue before the Court. She was just quoting what her husband asked [Winsor]. If, in fact, it does, the court finds that it was inadvertent -- it was inadvertently stated, it's not grounds for a mistrial.

(Trial Tr. p. 223:7-22.)

---

<sup>25</sup> (Trial Tr. pp. 217:11-226:21.)

First off, the trial court's view of Mrs. Connelly's testimony—that it did not place the insurance issue before the court because “[s]he was just quoting what her husband asked [Winsor]”—is plainly contradicted by the record. Mr. Connelly's letter says nothing at all about insurance. (Court's Ex. 3.) At that, immediately following her above-quoted answer, which raised the subject of insurance to the jury, Mrs. Connelly said, “I don't know. I haven't read -- I wasn't -- I didn't write the letter, so I don't know what he meant.” (Trial Tr. p. 217:12-13.) In other words, to put it bluntly, she conceded she did not really know what she was talking about to begin with—yet she somehow knew to raise the issue of insurance.

With regard to the trial court's view of her reference to insurance as inadvertent, this is also belied by the record. Mrs. Connelly, again, the spouse of an attorney and, as the record shows, a sophisticated person in her own right, had been present in the courtroom only the day before when, during pre-trial proceedings, *her* counsel had argued that Winsor should not be allowed to present evidence that it was a small company—a “mom and pop shop,” in counsel's words—or else Mrs. Connelly should be able to introduce evidence of Winsor's liability insurance policy. (Trial Tr. pp. 50:12-55:10.) Mrs. Connelly had also been present when Winsor's counsel clarified that references to insurance in Winsor's contract with the owners of the Premises would be redacted. (Trial Tr. p. 167:6-7.) Again, to put it bluntly, she knew—or certainly should have known—

that her reference to insurance was out of bounds, and her answer cannot reasonably be viewed as inadvertent. It would be fundamentally unjust for Mrs. Connelly to be allowed to introduce the subject matter of insurance into the trial of the case in this way, while Winsor, now facing a \$325,000 judgment, is left without any meaningful recourse for her having done so—which, of course, only rewards Mrs. Connelly for her own impropriety and, more broadly, shows other litigants they, too, may engage in this tactic with impunity.

Moreover, the trial court's reliance upon Brazeale v. Piedmont Manufacturing Co., 184 S.C. 471, 193 S.E. 39 (1933), and Keller v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 253 S.C. 395, 171 S.E.2d 352 (1969), was misplaced. Brazeale was a case where a *witness*, not a *party* to the action, “volunteered” a statement about insurance. 184 S.C. 471, 193 S.E. at 44 (wherein the Brazeale Court noted that the fact that the subject of insurance was injected into the proceedings by a *witness*, “*for which the plaintiff is not responsible,*” as opposed to a *party*: “Of course, in cases of this kind, *if plaintiff should bring out* on examination of the witnesses that the defendant carried indemnity insurance, *our decisions are to the effect that a mistrial should be ordered.*” These decisions, however, several of which are cited by the appellant, are not controlling under the facts of this case. Where improper reference is made to insurance, or an insurance agent, by the *witness*, as was here done, *and for which the plaintiff is not responsible*, it seems that the only remedy

that the court can give is to grant a motion to strike out the objectionable testimony and to instruct the jury to disregard it.”). Likewise, Keller was a case where a *witness* for the plaintiff, not the *plaintiff, i.e., party*, himself, inadvertently raised the subject of insurance, and in determining a mistrial was not required, the Keller Court focused on the plaintiff’s lack of responsibility for the “inadvertent slip.” *See* 253 S.C. at 398-99, 171 S.E.2d at 354.

Most respectfully, the trial court’s denial of a mistrial here was erroneous and prejudicial and itself requires a new trial. This error, along with prejudice to Winsor, was then repeated and compounded by the trial court’s subsequent denial of a mistrial upon the second mention of insurance in the presence of the jury, i.e., during Dr. Funcik’s testimony,<sup>26</sup> its *sua sponte* “curative” instruction regarding insurance thereafter,<sup>27</sup> and its jury charge in the form of a “curative” instruction about insurance. (Trial Tr. pp. 593:10-594:4, p. 605:8-11.)<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> (Trial Tr. pp. 294:3-296:20.)

<sup>27</sup> (Trial Tr. pp. 296:25-299:3.)

<sup>28</sup> Winsor’s position is, and has been, that it was simply not possible to cure the prejudice, and further mention of insurance to the jury via “curative” efforts only further infected the trial with prejudice against Winsor—in reality, each attempt at un-ringing the bell only serving to clang it once more before the jury. (Trial Tr. pp. 223:23-224:19.) Respectfully, it strays beyond legal fiction into the realm of fantasy to view the situation otherwise.

**B. The trial court erred in partially directing a verdict against Winsor as to liability (i.e., as to the issues of duty and breach).**

The trial court granted Mrs. Connelly a partial directed verdict as to duty and breach. (Trial Tr. 530:8-540:17.) As explained above, the trial court erred in determining Winsor owed a duty to Mrs. Connelly under ordinary-negligence law to maintain the silt fence, and Winsor incorporates that argument herein. Moreover, even assuming, *arguendo*, Winsor had such a duty of silt-fence maintenance under ordinary-negligence principles—indeed, regardless of whether the theory of negligence asserted against Winsor was founded on premises liability or ordinary negligence—the trial court nonetheless erred in determining there was no issue of fact for the jury to determine as to Winsor’s alleged breach of duty.

In granting this partial directed verdict, the trial court explained,

[A]s far as the duty to maintain the fence, and the breach of that duty, I’ve heard no testimony that would contradict what was said by the plaintiff and her witness, and the pictures show. So I’m going to direct a partial directed verdict as to duty and breach of duty. And I will amend the charge to say that and amend the verdict form to say that. The issue of causation as to damages is still an issue. That’s my ruling based upon the plaintiff’s argument for directed verdict.

(Trial Tr. p. 540:8-17.)

First off, the trial court’s ruling fails both to consider the evidence in favor of Winsor that had been presented and to view the evidence in the requisite light favorable to Winsor. The standard for a directed verdict mirrors the summary-

judgment standard. *See* Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 281, 578 S.E.2d 329, 334 n. 4 (2003); *cf.* Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., Inc., 381 S.C. 326, 673 S.E.2d 801 (2009) (addressing the summary-judgment standard: “[W]e hold that in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”). “When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must view all evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, the trial court should submit the case to the jury.” Roddy, 415 S.C. at 588, 784 S.E.2d at 675.

Winsor’s owner, Jeff Thomas (“Thomas”), testified at trial. (Trial Tr. pp. 361:23-362:8.) He testified that, generally, with certain exceptions, he was on the job site on a daily basis, and he never saw the silt fence in the Claimed Accident Condition. (Trial Tr. p. 366:10-12, p. 366:21, pp. 404:11-407:15.)<sup>29</sup> He further testified that, while he was aware that silt fences could be damaged during the course of construction, his practice was to have them fixed as soon as possible and, at that, the ARB was vigilant with respect to silt-fence repair and would fine him if he did not act promptly. (Trial Tr. p. 368:13-17, p. 384:5-9, pp. 435:7-438:15.) At

---

<sup>29</sup> To be clear the Subject Accident happened fairly early on a Monday morning. (Trial Tr. pp. 135:19-136:3; Compl. p. 3 [¶ 23].)

that, the only evidence that the silt fence was in the Claimed Accident Condition came from Mrs. Connelly and Smith—and, notably, Smith, who testified at trial that she had seen the fence down the week before the Subject Accident, was impeached on this point with her prior deposition testimony to the contrary. (Trial Tr. pp. 319:11-322:10, pp. 324:2-325:16.)

Moreover, in effect, the trial court relied on *res ipsa loquitur* and/or a standard of absolute liability (as opposed the reasonableness-based standard of negligence law) and/or improperly shifts the burden to Winsor to prove that it was not negligent. “South Carolina does not recognize *res ipsa loquitur*.” Tucker v. Doe, 413 S.C. 389, 406, 776 S.E.2d 121 (Ct. App. 2015); *see also* Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 389 S.C. 434, 453 n. 7, 699 S.E.2d 169, 179 n. 7 (2010) (“*Res ipsa loquitur* is a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was negligent where an accident is one which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence.”); Snow v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 544, 555 n. 7, 409 S.E.2d 797, 803 n. 7 (Ct.App.1991) (noting that because South Carolina does not recognize *res ipsa loquitur*, a plaintiff is required to prove affirmatively each element of his cause of action).

Notwithstanding the evidence referenced above, the trial court found that Winsor had breached its duty to Mrs. Connelly as a matter of law because Mrs.

Connelly and Smith said the silt fence was down on that Monday morning<sup>30</sup> and, having not been there at the time, Thomas could not directly refute their claim—although, as noted above, he did testify that he had no knowledge of the fence being in the Claimed Accident Condition and about his practice, which was, as a practical matter, reinforced by the ARB’s monitoring efforts, of being both regularly present on the job site and of promptly attending to silt fences in need of repair—Winsor was necessarily negligent. Most respectfully, the trial court erred in granting a partial directed verdict against Winsor.

**C. The trial court erred refusing to give Winsor’s requested jury charge regarding § 343A.**

“Ordinarily, a trial judge has a duty to give a requested instruction that correctly states the law applicable to the issues and evidence.” Fairchild v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 398 S.C. 90, 104, 727 S.E.2d 407, 414 (2012) (citation omitted).

“Where a request to charge is timely made and involves a controlling legal principle, a refusal by the trial judge to charge the request constitutes reversible error.” Id. “Moreover, when general instructions to the jury are insufficient to enable the jury to understand fully the law of the case and issues involved, a

---

<sup>30</sup> Wrongfully taking the questions of credibility and evidentiary weight away from the jury. S.C. Fed. Credit Union v. Higgins, 394 S.C. 189, 194, 714 S.E.2d 550, 552 (2011) (when considering a motion for directed verdict, “The trial court should be ‘concerned only with the existence or nonexistence of evidence,’ not its credibility or weight.”) (citation omitted).

refusal to give a requested charge is reversible error.” Id.; *see also* Berberich v. Jack, 392 S.C. 278, 709 S.E.2d 607 (2011) (“A jury charge consisting of irrelevant and inapplicable principles may confuse the jury and constitutes reversible error where the jury’s confusion affects the outcome of the trial.”) (quoting Cole v. Raut, 378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008)).

Most respectfully, assuming, *arguendo*, the case should have been submitted to the jury at all, for the reasons set forth above, § 343A was applicable, and the trial court’s refusal of Winsor’s requested jury charge thereon was prejudicial error.

**D. The trial court erred in denying Winsor’s challenge to the reliability and admissibility of Mrs. Connelly’s medical expert testimony with respect to the alleged causal connection between the Subject Accident and the Smell/Taste Problem.**

Although it was, again, by far the most substantial aspect of Mrs. Connelly’s claimed damages, there is no record of her having made any complaint about the Smell/Taste Problem to any healthcare professional until her April 4, 2013, visit to Charleston ENT Associates, approaching *two years after* the Subject Accident on June 6, 2011. (Def’s Ex. 5 [RMC 78-79].) And Winsor challenged the medical expert testimony Mrs. Connelly intended to offer—via Drs. Funcik and Ghegan—as to the alleged causal connection between the Subject Accident and the Smell/Taste Problem.

Dr. Funcik never treated Mrs. Connelly for the Smell/Taste Problem at all; in fact, Mrs. Connelly had not even reported the problem to him until May 28, 2013, after she had already seen Charleston ENT on her own the month before. (Court's Ex. 1 [Funcik Dep. (8/19/15) p. 160:22-161:1; *see generally* Def's Ex. 4 [Funcik Records]; Def's Ex. 5 [Charleston ENT Records].) Dr. Funcik conceded that he did not see patients complaining of loss of smell as a regular part of his practice and that he "probably would not be the first doctor in Charleston they would see for that concern"<sup>31</sup>—when discussing the possibility of him treating a member of his office staff were they to come to him with such a complaint, he even mentioned that he "would probably sit down and Google it to make sure I wasn't missing anything . . . ." (Court's Ex. 1 [Funcik Dep. (8/19/15) p. 145:4-24].) Dr. Funcik even admitted that, when he was first deposed he had trouble making the timing of the Subject Accident and Mrs. Connelly's recognition of the Smell/Tate Problem add up; at that, he testified that the reason he felt comfortable offering his opinion on causation in his second (i.e., the video deposition, which was used at trial) was because *Mrs. Connelly's counsel* had related certain information to him about recent deposition testimony by Mrs. Connelly's daughter Christina and on account of his recollection of a certain incident where he

---

<sup>31</sup> (Court's Ex. 1 [Funcik Dep. (8/19/15) p. 16, lines 22-24]; *see also id.* at pp. 71:2-73:12.)

experienced some sort of nerve-related—but completely unrelated to Mrs. Connelly’s medical condition at issue in this case—lessening of strength in one of his own hands. (*See generally* Court’s Ex. 1 [Funcik Dep. (8/19/15) pp. 81:10-82:18, pp. 98:4-100:22, pp. 174:17-195:6].)

Although he did treat Mrs. Connelly for the Smell/Taste Problem, Dr. Ghegan confirmed that his treatment involved a single office visit on April 4, 2013; the total visit lasted about 30 minutes, with Dr. Ghegan’s interaction with Mrs. Connelly being 10-15 minutes. (Court’s Ex. 1 [Ghegan Dep. pp. 44:8-46:23].) He further testified that, even though he was offering the opinion that the Subject Accident was the cause of the Smell/Taste Problem, he did not have—and therefore, of course, had not reviewed—*any* of Dr. Funcik’s records of Mrs. Connelly for the Subject Accident,<sup>32</sup> and, although he answered, “not necessarily,” when asked if his review of those records would be important in understanding the relationship between the Subject Accident the Smell/Taste Problem, he conceded the possibility that review of these records could change his opinion. (Court’s Ex.

---

<sup>32</sup> Primarily a fascial plastic surgeon, and someone with whom Mrs. Connelly had an ongoing doctor-patient relationship on account of past cosmetic procedures, Dr. Funcik was the first doctor Mrs. Connelly saw after the Subject Accident—indeed, she drove herself straight to his office. (Trial Tr. p. 140:20-141:12; *see generally* Def’s Ex. 4 [Funcik Records].) Though, again, he did not treat Mrs. Connelly for the Smell/Taste Problem, it was Dr. Funcik that treated Mrs. Connelly for the Subject Accident. (Court’s Ex. 1 [Funcik Dep. (8/19/15) pp. 160:22-161:1; *see generally* Def’s Ex. 4 [Funcik Records].)

1 [Ghegan Dep. pp. 53:7-54-23]; *see also id.* at pp. 66:14-68:11 (where Dr. Ghegan agrees there is information potentially material to his opinion that he does not have).)

Most respectfully, the trial court erred in denying Winsor's challenge to Mrs. Connelly's experts' testimony with respect to the alleged causal connection between the Subject Accident and the Smell/Taste Problem, because their testimony on this issue could not reasonably be found to be substantively reliable. *See Watson*, 389 S.C. at 446-47, 699 S.E.2d at 175 ("[E]xpert testimony receives additional scrutiny relative to other evidentiary decisions. Specifically, in executing its gatekeeping duties, the trial court must make three key preliminary findings which are fundamental to Rule 702 [SCRE] before the jury may consider expert testimony. First, the trial court must find that the subject matter is beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury, thus requiring an expert to explain the matter to the jury. Next, while the expert need not be a specialist in the particular branch of the field, the trial court must find that the proffered expert has indeed acquired the requisite knowledge and skill to qualify as an expert in the particular subject matter. Finally, the trial court must evaluate the substance of the testimony and determine whether it is reliable. Expert testimony is not admissible unless it satisfies all three requirements with respect to subject matter, expert qualifications, and reliability. Thus, only after the trial court has found that expert testimony is

necessary to assist the jury in resolving factual questions, the expert is qualified in the particular area, and the testimony is reliable, may the trial court admit the evidence and permit the jury to assign it such weight as it deems appropriate.”) (internal citations omitted); State v. White, 382 S.C. 265, 274, 676 S.E.2d 684, 689 (2009) (observing that the “familiar evidentiary mantra that a challenge to evidence goes to ‘weight, not admissibility’ may be invoked only after the trial court has vetted the matters of qualifications and reliability and admitted the evidence”). If Winsor is not granted judgment as a matter of law, this case should be remanded for a new trial, and Mrs. Connelly should not be able to present evidence of or claim damages relating to the Smell/Taste Problem.

**E. The trial court erred in denying Winsor’s motion for a new trial absolute because the jury’s damages determination was grossly excessive, indicating that the jury was motivated by some improper influence.**

The jury’s finding that Mrs. Connelly suffered damages in the amount of \$500,000 was grossly excessive indicating the jury was motivated by some improper influence.<sup>33</sup>

To begin, in addition to the error, argued above, with respect to the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial on account of Mrs. Connelly raising the subject of

---

<sup>33</sup> Again, as noted above, Mrs. Connelly’s total claimed pecuniary loss was less than \$13,500. (Pl.’s Ex. 4.) Accordingly, the jury found more than \$485,000 in nonpecuniary damages.

insurance to the jury (along with the other insurance references), this incident (and the prejudice done to Winsor) should also be noted in this context. Additionally, a great deal of evidence cuts sharply against such a large damages determination. Again, the Smell/Taste Problem is, by far, the most significant damage Mrs. Connelly claimed in this suit. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that, while she claimed to have had the Smell/Taste Problem ever since the date of the Subject Accident, she did not actually notice this loss for at least a year thereafter. Not to mention being inconsistent with the only medical evidence in the record regarding the mechanism of injury in cases of traumatic loss of smell, i.e., a sudden and permanent shearing of the olfactory nerve filaments,<sup>34</sup> the very idea that such a loss was capable of going unnoticed by Mrs. Connelly for a year or more is wholly inconsistent with such a large value being given to it.

In other words, it is simply illogical for Mrs. Connelly to have it both ways; she cannot, on the one hand, attempt to explain away the year-plus lapse in time between the Subject Accident and her noticing the Smell/Taste Problem because she simply did not notice it, but, then, on the other hand, claim tremendous damage on account of the Smell/Taste Problem, i.e., the same problem that she lived with for at least a year without realizing it. Compare this with a loss of the senses of

---

<sup>34</sup> (*See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. pp. 117:11-122:3 and pp. 554:21-560:9 (wherein Mrs. Connelly's counsel explains the plaintiff's theory of traumatic smell loss).)

sight, hearing, or touch; it is simply inconceivable that a person could lose any of those senses without noticing their absence for any significant period of time. This is not to say that the Smell/Taste Problem is trivial, but the interests of justice require maintaining a reasonable perspective about Mrs. Connelly's claimed loss, and not just generally, but under Mrs. Connelly's particular circumstances, which, again, involve her not even recognizing the loss for a year or more.

The lack of such perspective is well illustrated, in fact, by considering Mrs. Connelly's counsel's closing argument about valuing the Smell/Taste Problem in terms of a job Plaintiff would be working every waking hour for the rest of her life. (Trial Tr. p. 564:2-22.) Common sense tells us that she is not, in fact, "suffering" from the Smell/Taste Problem every waking hour of her life, because common sense tell us that there a many times—if not, in fact, the vast majority of our waking hours—when a person simply does not notice any particular smell at all—and, of course, not all smells are pleasant. Similarly, common sense tells us that a person does not spend the entirety of their waking hours eating; consequently, a person does not spend the entirety of their waking hours "suffering" from a deficit in their ability to taste.

Moreover, beyond the mere fact that it took Ms. Connelly at least a year before she even noticed the Smell/Taste Problem, the evidence in this case about Mrs. Connelly's life with the Smell/Taste Problem is inconsistent with the jury's

large damages determination. Mrs. Connelly's daughter Christina testified that she has a close relationship with her mother and communicates with her on, essentially, a daily basis. According to Christina, Mrs. Connelly is a happy person and still goes out to eat regularly. (Trial Tr. pp. 460:22-462:24.)<sup>35</sup> In this same vein, there is Mrs. Connelly's facebook account activity that was admitted into evidence. (Def's Ex. 3.) And Smith, Mrs. Connell's friend, even testified that she

---

<sup>35</sup> Curiously, Christina also referenced her mother having a "decreased" sense of smell, which cuts against Mrs. Connelly's claim that she has not smelled at all the Subject Accident. (*Compare* Trial Tr. p. 143:17-19 with pp. 462:25-463:17.) On this point, Winsor notes that, when Mrs. Connelly first sought medical treatment for the Smell/Taste issue (on April 4, 2013, with Dr. Ghegan at Charleston ENT), although Dr. Ghegan used the word "anosmia" in his impression, Dr. Ghegan's note reflects that Mrs. Connelly "present[ed] with [a] chief complaint of *decreased* sense of smell and taste." (Def's Ex. 5 [at RMC 79 ("We discussed that I think most likely her *decreased* sense of smell, and subsequent decreased taste, are result of the trauma a couple of years ago.") (emphasis added)].) Similarly, on her second visit to Charleston ENT, when she saw Dr. Hester on April 26, 2013, although Dr. Hester's impression uses the word "anosmia," Dr. Hester's note indicates the history Mrs. Connelly gave was "regarding *decreased* smell and taste." (Def's Ex. 5 [at RMC 80 (emphasis added)].) This theme is continued in Dr. Funcik's note from May 28, 2013, wherein he reflects Plaintiff "mentioned that she has had *hyposmia* since her injury." (Def's Ex. 4 [at Funcik note of 5/28/13 (emphasis added)].) Dr. Funcik testified that "hyposmia" is the medical term for decreased sense of smell; whereas, "anosmia" is the medical term for total absence of the sense of smell. (Court's Ex. 1 [Funcik Dep. (8/19/15) pp. 62:5-63:3].) Even the record of Mrs. Connelly's initial visit with Dr. Dozier at Charleston ENT, i.e., her third visit to the practice overall, on June 26, 2014, reflects Dr. Dozier saw Mrs. Connelly "regarding [her] chief complaint of *decreased* smell and taste." (Def's Ex. 5 [at RMC 160 (emphasis added)].) It was not until Mrs. Connelly presented for her second visit with Dr. Dozier, on January 16, 2015, about a year and a half after this lawsuit was filed, that her complaint was actually described as "anosmia." (Def's Ex. 5 [at RMC 169].)

playfully teased Mrs. Connelly about the Smell/Taste Problem. (Trial Tr. pp. 316:22-317:23, p. 318:12-15, pp. 345:19-348.)

Most respectfully, the trial court erred in refusing to grant it a new trial absolute on account of the jury's shockingly excessive damages determination. *See O'Neal v. Bowles*, 314 S.C. 525, 527, 431 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1993) ("If the amount of the verdict is grossly inadequate or excessive so as to be the result of passion, caprice, prejudice, or some other influence outside the evidence, the trial judge must grant a new trial absolute.")

### **CONCLUSION**

For the reasons set forth herein, Winsor asks the Court to reverse the judgment below and grant judgment in its favor as a matter of law or, as a lesser alternative, to reverse the judgment below and remand this matter for a new trial.

**<SIGNED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE>**

Respectfully submitted,

YOUNG CLEMENT RIVERS, LLP

By: 

Stephen L. Brown (SC Bar No. 66468)

Russell G. Hines (SC Bar No. 72100)

25 Calhoun Street, Suite 400

Charleston, South Carolina 29401

P.O. Box 993 (29402)

(843) 720-5488

*Counsel for Appellant*

*Winsor Custom Homes, LLC*

Charleston, South Carolina

Dated: 8/27/16

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS**

\_\_\_\_\_  
Appeal from Charleston County  
Court of Common Pleas

J.C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

\_\_\_\_\_  
Appellate Case No. 2016-000419  
Circuit Court Case No. 2013-CP-10-03251  
\_\_\_\_\_

**RECEIVED**

AUG 31 2016

SC Court of Appeals

Rosemary Connelly,

Respondent,

v.

Winsor Custom Homes, LLC,

Appellant.

\_\_\_\_\_  
**PROOF OF SERVICE**  
\_\_\_\_\_

YOUNG CLEMENT RIVERS, LLP  
Stephen L. Brown (SC Bar No. 66468)  
Russell G. Hines (SC Bar No. 72100)  
25 Calhoun Street, Suite 400  
P.O. Box 993 (29402)  
(843) 720-5488  
*Attorneys for Appellant*  
*Winsor Custom Homes, LLC*

I, Russell G. Hines, of Young Clement Rivers, LLP, counsel for the Appellant above named, do hereby certify that I have served the **Initial Brief of Appellant** and **Appellant's Designation of Matter** on the above-named Respondent by depositing a copy of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on August 29, 2016, addressed as follows to Respondent's counsel:


Christy Ford Allen, Esquire  
John A. Massalon, Esquire  
Wills Massalon & Allen, LLC  
P.O. Box 859  
Charleston, SC 29402  
*Attorneys for Respondent*  
*Rosemary Connelly*

YOUNG CLEMENT RIVERS, LLP

By:   
Russell G. Hines  
*Attorneys for Appellant*  
*Winsor Custom Homes, LLC*

Charleston, South Carolina

Dated: 8/29/16



**YCR LAW**  
Young Clement Rivers, LLP

Russell G. Hines  
Partner

Direct Dial: (843) 720-5488  
Direct Fax: (843) 579-1327  
E-mail: RHines@ycrlaw.com

August 29, 2016

Jenny Abbott Kitchings, Clerk of Court  
South Carolina Court of Appeals  
P.O. Box 11629  
Columbia, SC 29211

**RECEIVED**  
AUG 31 2016  
SC Court of Appeals

Re: Rosemary Connelly v. Winsor Custom Homes, LLC  
Appellate Case No.: 2016-000419  
Case No.: 2013-cp-10-03251  
Claim No.: CPP001009129  
YCR File: 10857-20130494


Dear Ms. Kitchings:

Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced matter, please find the original and one (1) copy of the **Initial Brief of Appellant**; the original and one (1) copy of **Appellant's Designation of Matter**; and the original and one (1) copy of the **Proof of Service** regarding the same.

With best wishes and kindest regards, I am

Sincerely,

YOUNG CLEMENT RIVERS, LLP

  
Russell G. Hines  
Partner

RGH/amj  
Enclosures

cc: Christy Ford Allen, Esquire, Wills Massalon & Allen, LLC  
John A. Massalon, Esquire, Wills Massalon & Allen, LLC

Hasler

PRIORITY MAIL


08/29/2016

**US POSTAGE** \$006.80<sup>0</sup>



ZIP 29401  
011D12603180

**First Class Mail**



**YCR LAW**

25 Calhoun Street, Suite 400  
P.O. Box 993  
Charleston, SC 29402-0993

KBB  
10857-  
20130494

Jenny Abbott Kitchings, Clerk of  
Court  
South Carolina Court of Appeals  
P.O. Box 11629  
Columbia, SC 29211

**RECEIVED**  
AUG 31 2016  
SC Court of Appeals