

State of South Carolina

In The Supreme Court

Certiorari to Richland County

Honorable Tanya A Gee Circuit Court Judge

NATHANIEL MURRAY
PETITIONER

v.

State of South Carolina
RESPONDENT

RECEIVED

OCT 28 2016

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Appellate Case No. 2016-000901

Pro se Johnson Petition for writ of Certiorari

Nathaniel Murray
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Statement of the Case

Petitioner was convicted of Failure to Stop for a blue light and two counts of Armed Robbery after a jury trial held before the Honorable L. Casey Manning on October 12-14, 2009 in Richland County. A sentence of three (3) years was imposed for failure to stop for a blue light and life without parole was imposed for the Armed Robbery charges. Mark E. Schnee, Esquire was defense counsel. Luck Campbell and Aaron Gophin were assistant solicitors.

Petitioner appealed his convictions and the appeal was dismissed in April 12, 2012. Opinion No. 2012-48-228

Petitioner filed an application for post conviction relief on December 4, 2014, and evidentiary hearing was held on August 27, 2015, before the Hon. Tanya H. Gee, Petitioner was represented by Jonathan D. Walker, Esquire, on January 19, 2016 Judge Gee issued an order denying and dismissing petitioner's application for post conviction relief.

This pro se petition follows.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Did ^{the} PCR COURT ERRE when the COURT ruled that TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE when he failed to require a hearing to determine which charges could be used, when the state wanted to seek SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT UNDER S.C. CODE ANN. 17-45-25?

Did the PCR COURT ERRE when it ruled that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to request a charge on a lesser included offense or a direct verdict, when the evidence introduced at trial did not support the charge in the indictment?

Did the PCR COURT ERRE when the COURT ruled that TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE, when he failed to appeal sentence pursuant to Rule 29 of South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure?

Did PCR COURT ERRE when the COURT ruled that TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE when he failed to request the TRIAL COURT to poll the jury on whether petitioner was guilty of armed robbery with a weapon or without a weapon?

ARGUMENT

Did PCR COURT ERB when the COURT Ruled that Trial Counsel was NOT ineffective when he failed to require a hearing to determine which charges could be used, when the State wanted to seek sentence enhancement under S.C. Code Ann. 17-45-25?

Once the State has proven a prior conviction, that the State seeks to use under a sentence enhancement statute, the defendant must prove it is constitutionally defective or otherwise invalid by a preponderance of the evidence. SEE KOON V. STATE 643 SE2D 680

At trial petitioner's prior convictions were never proven, there was only a discussion on the record between the court and the state, see Trial Trans. P. 240 L. 10-16. There was no effort on the part of the state to prove petitioner's prior convictions, when discussing the petitioner's record, and thus did not designate which items appearing on petitioner's "RAP sheet" he would not consider. Despite broad

DISCRETION LEFT TO THE TRIAL COURT IN ASSESSING BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES THE DEFENDANT RETAINS THE RIGHT NOT TO BE SENTENCED ON BASIS OF INVALID PREMISES. SEE STATE V. RICH 239 S.E.2D 731. PETITIONER WAS DENIED A HEARING WHEN HIS COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST A HEARING WHERE HE COULD CHALLENGE THE SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT. SUCH A RESULT WHETHER CAUSED BY CARELESSNESS OR DESIGN, IS INCONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND SUCH A CONVICTION CANNOT STAND. PETITIONER WAS NEVER AFFORDED A HEARING WHERE HE COULD HAVE CHALLENGED THE UNAMBIGUOUS TIMING FEATURE OF A "CONVICTION" UNDER 17-25-50 "CONSIDERING CLOSELY CONNECTED OFFENSES AS ONE OFFENSE IN DETERMINING THE NUMBER OF OFFENSES FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE, THE COURT SHALL TREAT AS ONE OFFENSE ANY NUMBER OF OFFENSES WHICH HAVE BEEN COMMITTED AT TIMES SO CLOSELY CONNECTED IN POINT OF TIME THAT THEY MAY BE CONSIDERED AS ONE OFFENSE, NOT WITHSTANDING UNDER THE LAW THEY CONSTITUTE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES. SEE BRYANT V.

STATE 683 SE2D 280. PETITIONER CONTRAVES THE LANGUAGE OF 17-25-50 TO PRECLUDE A LIFE WITH-OUT PAROLE SENTENCE WHEN THE MULTIPLE OFFENSE ARE INEXTRICABLY CONNECTED AND SHARE AN IMMEDIATE TEMPORAL PROXIMITY. IT IS APPARENT FROM THE RECORD, SEE TRIAL TRANS. P. 240 L. 10-16. THAT THE PETITIONER WAS SENTENCED BASED ON THE INSTANT OFFENSES (THE COURT AND THE STATE AGREED NOT TO USE PETITIONERS OUT OF STATE RECORD).

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHEN HE FAILED TO REQUEST A HEARING ON THE SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT BY THE STATE, SEE STATE V. STEWART 272 SE2D 628. HAD COUNSEL REQUESTED A HEARING PETITIONER WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO LIFE WITH OUT PAROLE.

THE P.C.R. COURT ERRED WHEN DECIDING THIS CLAIM WHEN THE COURT OVERLOOKED S.C. CODE 17-25-50 AND THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL.

Did the P.C.R. COURT ERRA when it ruled that TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE when he failed to REQUEST A CHARGE ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OR A DIRECT VERDICT, when the EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL DID NOT SUPPORT THE CHARGE IN THE INDICTMENT?

At trial MR HAMPTON (the victim) testified "during the encounter I grabbed petitioner's by the jacket" "I step back and grabbed petitioner AGAIN" when Hampton grabbed the petitioner the first time "the jacket popped open buttons and EVERYTHING" SEE TRANS. P. 85 LN. 6-25, P. 86 LN. 1-6. P. 92 LN. 18-24.

At trial MR. LANGFORD (victim) testified "did petitioner point a gun at you" MR. LANGFORD ANSWERED "NO", "I NEVER SEE IT" TRANS P. 144 L. 6-14.

At Trial MR Woods (victim) testified "that he pushed petitioner away from him" SEE TRAN P. 118 LN 8-15.

Under SECTION 16-11-330 (4)³ THE STATE MAY PROVE ARMED ROBBERY BY ESTABLISHING THE COMMISSION OF A ROBBERY AND EITHER ONE OF TWO ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS THE STATE MUST PROVE EITHER (1) THE ROBBER

WAS ARMED WITH A DEADLY WEAPON OR
(2) THE ROBBER ALLEGED HE WAS ARMED WITH
A DEADLY WEAPON, EITHER BY ACTION OR WORDS
WHILE USING A REPRESENTATION OF A DEADLY WEAPON
OR ANY OBJECT WHICH A PERSON DURING THE COMMI-
SSION OF A ROBBERY WOULD REASONABLY BELIEVE TO
BE A DEADLY WEAPON.

NONE OF THE VICTIMS TESTIFIED THAT THEY EVER
SAW A GUN OR WHAT APPEARED TO BE A GUN. IN
FACT NONE OF THE VICTIMS SHOWED ANY FEAR OR
THREATEN BY PETITIONER. MR HAMPTON, GRABBED
APPELLANT TWICE. HE COULD NOT HAVE FELT THE
PETITIONER HAD A GUN IF HE WAS TO GRAB HIM TWO
TIMES. MR LANGFORD, STATED "HE NEVER SAW A GUN".
MR WOODS WHEN CONFRONTED BY PETITIONER PUSHED
HIM AWAY TWICE. IF THE PETITIONER HAD A GUN
HE WOULD HAVE SHOWN IT! NONE OF THE VICTIMS
SHOWED ANY FEAR OF THE PETITIONER WHICH IS
APPARENT FROM THEIR ACTIONS

IN STATE V. MULBROW 559 S.E.2D AT 264, THIS COURT
FOUND THAT WORDS ALONE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A CONVICTION FOR ARMED ROBBERY ID AT 269. AS A
RESULT THIS COURT HELD THE STATE MUST SHOW EVI-
DENCE CORROBORATING THE ALLEGATION OF BEING ARMED

i.e. the use of a physical representation of a deadly weapon to establish armed robbery. Facts presented by the state did not include the requisite corroborating evidence for armed robbery, nor did it allege petitioner took any type of action which would allow a victim to reasonably believe that he was armed. Facts produced at trial prove that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to request a charge on a lesser included offense, because the facts show that there was no gun shown or found at the beginning or after this incident. Had counsel requested a charge on the lesser included offense there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different. The trial court is required to charge a jury on a lesser included offense, if there is any evidence from which it could be inferred the lesser, rather than the greater offense was committed see State v. Gourdine 472 S.E2d 241, State v. Smith 446 S.E2d 411, see also Didier Van Sellner v. State 2016 WL

3595804

Counsel's failure to request a direct verdict on the charge of armed robbery, based on the lack of evidence that supports the charge, made counsel ineffective. Petitioner was denied his 6th Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had counsel requested that the court give a jury charge on the lesser included offense and or a direct verdict, because of the lack of evidence that supports the charge of armed robbery there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.

Did the P.C.R. COURT err when the COURT ruled that TRIAL COUNSEL was NOT ineffective, when he failed to appeal sentence pursuant to Rule 29 of South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure.

TRIAL COUNSEL failed to appeal petitioner's sentence based on actual innocence under Rule 29 S.C.R.C.P., because there was no weapon was presented prior to the incident and no weapon was found after the incident pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. 16-11-330(A). Counsel was deficient for failure to file motion under Rule 29 within 10 days. Had Counsel filed this motion because there was no gun there is reasonable probability that the out-come would have been different.

Did the PCR Court ERRA when the Court ruled that Trial Counsel was not ineffective when he failed to request the trial Court to poll the jury on whether PETITIONER₁ was guilty of armed robbery with a weapon or without a weapon?

After the verdict, the trial Court poll the jury on two questions, regarding their verdict, were these your verdict? And are they still your verdicts? SEE TRANS. P. 384 LN 18-25 AND P. 385 L. 1-8.

PETITIONER₁ was prejudiced when Counsel by his failure to poll the jury on whether Appellant was found guilty of Armed Robbery with or without a weapon, because without a weapon the offense is a lesser included offense, but with a weapon the crime is violent, evidence was legally sufficient to convict on lesser offense of Strong Arm Robbery, given that evidence was convicted by jury of Armed Robbery, but insufficient evidence supported finding that defendant either used deadly weapon or representation of deadly weapon, Armed Robbery included all elements of Strong Arm Robbery Code 1976 16-11-330(a)

STATE V. DANIEL, 77 S.C. 53, 57 S.E. 639 (S.C. 1907)
WHERE A JURY PUBLISHES THE VERDICT, AND SIGNIFIES
ON BEING POLLED, IT MAY BE SENT BACK TO AMEND
THE VERDICT TO CONFORM TO THE FINDINGS.

CONCLUSION

This Court gives great deference to the factual findings of the PCR Court and will uphold them if there is any evidence of probative value to support them *Quadan v. State* 752 S.E.2d 538. Questions of law are reviewed de novo and we will reverse the PCR Courts decisions when it is controlled by an error of law *Jamison v. State* 765 S.E.2d 123

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Petitioner

Certificate of Service

v.

State of South Carolina
Respondent

Petitioner declares under the penalty of perjury that he mailed a copy of his Pro Se Johnson brief to the parties listed below, by placing in the U.S. Mail clearly addressed as below.

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