South Carolina Supreme Court
Daniel Shearouse, Clerk
P.O. Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29221

RE: Notice of Appeal

Case No. 2016-CP-10-3386

Dear Clerk:

Enclosed please find notice of appeal that is served upon you with proof of service.

Sincerely,

Samuel Wilder

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

RECEIVED

MAR 29 2017

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Appeal From Roger M. Young, Sr.
Chief Administrative Judge
Ninth Circuit
C/A No. 2016-CP-10-3386

THE STATE — RESPONDENT

V.

SAMUEL A. WILDER — APPELLANT

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The undersigned hereby appeal the Conditional Order of Dismissal and the Order Restricting Future Filing that were filed November 21, 2016 and received by me March 17, 2017.

Samuel A. Wilder
386 Redemption Way
McCormick, SC 29899

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

Appeal from Roger M. Young, Sr.
Chief Administrative Judge, 9th Circuit
C/A No. 2016-CP-10-3386

THE STATE — RESPONDENT

V.

SAMUEL A. WILDER — APPELLANT

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certify that he served a true copy of this notice of appeal on the Supreme Court of South Carolina, P.O. Box 11330, Columbia, S.C. 29221 and Charleston County Clerk of Court, Julie J Armstrong, 100 Broad Street, suite 106, Charleston, S.C. 29401 and Office of the Attorney General, Alan Wilson, P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, SC 29221 this 24 day of March 2017 by depositing same in the U.S, mail.

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME
THIS 24 DAY OF March 2017
J C Franklin
NOTARY PUBLIC OF SOUTH CAROLINA
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 12.16.2019

Samuel A. Wilder
Samuel A. Wilder
386 Redemption Way
McCormick, SC 29899

CC
AT
SS

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF CHARLESTON	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Samuel A. Wilder, #258295, Applicant, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.	2016-CP-10-3386 **CONDITIONAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

This matter comes before this Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed June 29, 2016.

Procedural History

The Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Charleston County Clerk of Court. The Applicant was indicted at the February 1998 term of the Charleston County Grand Jury for murder (1998-GS-10-1213) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime (1998-GS-10-1212). He was represented by Edward Brown, Esquire, and Rita Roache, Esquire.

On May 5, 1999, the Applicant proceeded to trial at which he was found guilty as indicted. On May 7, 1999, the Applicant was sentenced by the Honorable Luke N. Brown to life for the murder charge and five (5) years, consecutive, for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.

A Notice of Appeal was filed on the Applicant's behalf on May 14, 1999. On November 9,

1999, the Honorable Luke N. Brown heard a *pro se* post-trial motion filed by the Applicant. However, the hearing was continued for additional presentations. By Order dated June 11, 2001, the South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the Applicant's appeal without prejudice because the post-trial motion pending in the circuit court had not been ruled upon. The Remittitur was issued on June 28, 2001.

Before the hearing on the *pro se* post-trial motion was reconvened, the Applicant filed a Federal Habeas Corpus Petition on October 16, 2001. By Order dated February 6, 2002, the Honorable Margaret B. Seymour dismissed the Applicant's petition without prejudice to enable the Applicant to exhaust state remedies. Judge Seymour also denied the Applicant's motion for a preliminary injunction and motion for an emergency restraining order. The Applicant appealed Judge Seymour's order. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the Applicant's certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal. Wilder v. Catoe, No. 02-6397, decided April 30, 2002.

The hearing on the Applicant's *pro se* post-trial motion was held on December 20, 2001. Judge Brown denied the *pro se* motion in a written order dated January 11, 2002. The Applicant appealed his convictions and sentence and was represented by Milton Stratos, Esquire. By Order dated March 10, 2006, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the Applicant's direct appeal for failure of the Applicant to provide information regarding the transcript. The Remittitur was issued on March 29, 2006.

2006-CP-10-3454

The Applicant subsequently filed an application for post-conviction relief on September

5, 2006. In his application, the Applicant alleged he was being held unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in that trial counsel failed to

    a. Suppress all evidence from the search by the Charleston Police Department outside the city limits;
    b. Suppress the photograph of the Applicant as the fruit of an improper show-up;
    c. Suppress all evidence seized from his car due to false information in the search warrant;
    d. Inform the trial court of specific facts during the suppression hearing;
    e. Impeach a State's witness with prior convictions;
    f. Ensure the Applicant's post-trial motion was timely heard;
    g. Object to the testimony of Jerome Garland;

2. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in that appellate counsel failed to follow the appellate court's instructions, allowed the appeal to be dismissed, and failed to move to reinstate the appeal; and

3. Prosecutorial misconduct in that the prosecutor interviewed the victim's minor child without the Applicant's attorney present and obtained and used fabricated testimony at trial.

4. The Applicant also submitted amendments to the application in which he asserted trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an expert to examine the blood at the scene, the gunshot residue on the victim's clothing, and the angle of the bullet entry and exit.

The Respondent made its Return to the application on May 7, 2007. An evidentiary hearing was convened at the Charleston County Courthouse on September 11, 2007. The Applicant was present at the hearing and was represented by Charles Brooks, Esquire. The Respondent was represented by Salley W. Elliott of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office. By Order dated November 12, 2007, the Honorable John C. Few denied and dismissed the PCR application but granted the Applicant a belated appeal of his convictions pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 110,

208 S.E.2d 35 (1974).

PCR counsel filed a Notice of Appeal Out of Time. The Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed to review the denial of Applicant's PCR by Writ of Certiorari in its Original Jurisdiction even though the Notice of Appeal was untimely filed to avoid this court having to resolve the matter in a second PCR application. Upon review of Appellant's case, the Supreme Court dismissed the Writ of Certiorari on July 26, 2010. State v. Wilder, Op. No. 26841 (S.C. Sup. Ct. July 26, 2010). The Remittitur was issued August 16, 2010.

The Applicant filed a second Federal Habeas Corpus Petition on February 26, 2008. The Petition was dismissed by the Honorable Margaret Seymour without prejudice to allow the Applicant to exhaust his State remedies. The Applicant appealed Judge Seymour's Order to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Appeal was dismissed on October 21, 2009.

The Applicant filed a third Federal Habeas Corpus Petition on February 10, 2011. The State's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by the Honorable Margaret Seymour by Order dated March 9, 2012.

2012-CP-10-1025

The Applicant subsequently filed his second PCR application on February 10, 2012, in which he alleged that he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
   a. Failure to file a motion or make any objection to the sentence.
   b. Failure to do a reasonable investigation and file suppression motions.
   c. Failure to object or make motions to the unconstitutional jury charge of criminal intent.
   d. Failure to object to Judge dedicating his discretion to the Solicitor
   e. Waiving the Applicant's fundamental right to decide whether or not to take a new appeal for the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

In his amended application filed February 29, 2012, the Applicant alleged that he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reason:

1. Applicant contends he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal the ruling from his last PCR application.

The Respondent filed its Return and Motion to Dismiss and a hearing was held before the Honorable Roger E. Henderson. Applicant was present at the hearing and represented by Rodney D. Davis, Esquire. On August 28, 2015, Judge Henderson signed an Order of Dismissal on the basis that Applicant had already had a full review by the Supreme Court of South Carolina of his first PCR application and thus, was not entitled to a second, successive PCR appeal. Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal dated September 25, 2015. The Honorable Costa M. Pleicones issued an Order of Dismissal dated March 25, 2016.

In his current application for PCR, the Applicant alleges that he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. "Denied right to a direct appeal from his State conviction"
2. "Denied right to have a review of denial of a PCR filed 2/10/2012"
3. "Denied the benefit of Ander's Brief and Johnson's Brief due to procedure error"
4. "Denied the benefits of the plea bargain" in that Applicant had relied to his detriment on insurance monies
5. "Denied the right to be heard on his new trial motion in violation of his Due Process Clause"
6. "Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel" in PCR appeal
7. "Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel" in failing to appeal issues from PCR

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court finds that the current application for post-conviction relief must be summarily

dismissed because it is successive to his prior application(s) for post-conviction relief. S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-90 provides that:

> All grounds for relief available to an application under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended Application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding Applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent Application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended Application.

Successive applications are disfavored and the burden is on Applicant to establish that any new ground raised in a subsequent application could not have been raised by him in a previous application. Foxworth v. State, 275 S.C. 615, 274 S.E.2d 415 (1981); Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991); Arnold v. State/Plath v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992).

This Court finds that the current allegations were or could have been raised in the proceedings based on Applicant's prior application for post-conviction relief and thus, the current application is successive and barred under S.C. Code § 17-27-90. Applicant has failed to establish sufficient reason why he could not have raised his current allegations in his previous application for post-conviction relief; therefore, he has failed to meet the burden imposed upon him. Land v. State, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d 735 (1980); Aice v. State, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991); Arnold v. State/Plath v. State, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992).

This Court additionally finds that this Application for Post-Conviction Relief should be summarily dismissed for failure to comply with the filing procedures of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 to –160 . S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-45(a) reads as follows:

> An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgement of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal or the filing of the final decision upon an appeal, whichever is later.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations shall apply to all applications filed after July 1, 1996. Peloquin v. State, 321 S.C. 468, 469 S.E.2d 606 (1996). The Applicant was convicted of the offense(s) he challenges in this Application on May 5, 1999. The Remittitur following Applicant's unsuccessful appeal was issued on March 29, 2006. The Applicant therefore was required to file his application on or before March 30, 2007. This Application was filed on June 29, 2016, which was well after the statutory filing period had expired.

A motion for summary judgment may properly be used to raise the defense of statute of limitations. McDonnell v. Consolidated School District of Aiken, 315 S.C. 487, 445 S.E.2d 638 (1994). In addition, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(c) (1985) authorizes the Court to "grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of [an] application when it appears from the pleadings ... that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Therefore, this Court finds that the application for post-conviction relief is summarily dismissed for failure to file within the time mandated by statute and for being successive.

Additionally, this Court finds that the current application for post-conviction relief must be summarily dismissed because it fails to make a prima facie showing that he is in possession of newly discovered evidence that would likely result in his guilty plea being vacated. Generally, an applicant may raise a newly discovered evidence claim within one year of actual discovery or within one year of when, by the exercise of due diligence, such evidence could have been ascertained. S.C. Code

Ann. § 17-27-45(c) (2014). When an applicant seeks relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence following a guilty plea, relief is appropriate only when the applicant presents evidence showing (1) the newly discovered evidence was discovered after the entry of the plea and, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered prior to the entry of the plea and (2) the newly discovered evidence is of such weight and quality that, under the facts of circumstances of that particular case, the "interest of justice" requires the applicant's guilty plea be vacated. Jamison v. State, 765 S.E.2d 123, 129, 410 S.C. 456 (2014).

"[I]n South Carolina, a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of nonjurisdictional defects and claims of violations of constitutional rights." State v. Rice, 401 S.C. 330, 331-32, 737 S.E.2d 485, 485-86 (2013) (citing Hyman v. State, 397 S.C. 35, 44, 723 S.E.2d 375, 379 (2012)). A guilty plea is a solemn, judicial admission of the truth of the charges against an individual; thus, a criminal defendant's right to contest the validity of such a plea is usually, but not definitely, foreclosed. Dalton v. State, 376 S.C. 130, 137, 654 S.E.2d 870, 874 (2007). Further, "a defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action." Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970).

In this case, Applicant failed to set forth any newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered prior to his guilty plea in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Furthermore, Applicant fails to show how its weight and quality require his guilty plea and sentence to be vacated in the interests of justice. Before the circuit court will hold an evidentiary hearing, Applicant must make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief. Welch v. MacDougall, 246 S.C. 258, 143

S.E.2d 455 (1965); Blandshaw v. State, 245 S.C. 385, 140 S.E.2d 784 (1965). The Court finds that Applicant failed to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief based on the information set forth and, therefore, is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the matter.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(b), the Court intends to dismiss this Application with prejudice unless the Applicant provides specific reasons, factual or legal, why the Application should not be dismissed in its entirety. The Applicant is granted twenty (20) days from the date of service of this Order upon him to show why this Order should not become final. The Applicant shall file any reasons he may have with the Charleston County Clerk of Court and shall serve opposing counsel at the following address:

Office of the Attorney General
Attn: Alicia A. Olive, Esquire
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of November, 2016.

ROGER M. YOUNG, SR.
Chief Administrative Judge
Ninth Judicial Circuit

Charleston, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF CHARLESTON	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Samuel A. Wilder, #258295, Applicant, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.	)	2016-CP-10-3386 **ORDER RESTRICTING FUTRUE FILINGS**

This matter comes before this Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed June 29, 2016.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Charleston County Clerk of Court. The Applicant was indicted at the February 1998 term of the Charleston County Grand Jury for murder (1998-GS-10-1213) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime (1998-GS-10-1212). He was represented by Edward Brown, Esquire, and Rita Roache, Esquire.

On May 5, 1999, the Applicant proceeded to trial at which he was found guilty as indicted. On May 7, 1999, the Applicant was sentenced by the Honorable Luke N. Brown to life for the murder charge and five (5) years, consecutive, for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.

A Notice of Appeal was filed on the Applicant's behalf on May 14, 1999. On November 9,

1999, the Honorable Luke N. Brown heard a *pro se* post-trial motion filed by the Applicant. However, the hearing was continued for additional presentations. By Order dated June 11, 2001, the South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the Applicant's appeal without prejudice because the post-trial motion pending in the circuit court had not been ruled upon. The Remittitur was issued on June 28, 2001.

Before the hearing on the *pro se* post-trial motion was reconvened, the Applicant filed a Federal Habeas Corpus Petition on October 16, 2001. By Order dated February 6, 2002, the Honorable Margaret B. Seymour dismissed the Applicant's petition without prejudice to enable the Applicant to exhaust state remedies. Judge Seymour also denied the Applicant's motion for a preliminary injunction and motion for an emergency restraining order. The Applicant appealed Judge Seymour's order. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the Applicant's certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal. Wilder v. Catoe, No. 02-6397, decided April 30, 2002.

The hearing on the Applicant's *pro se* post-trial motion was held on December 20, 2001. Judge Brown denied the *pro se* motion in a written order dated January 11, 2002. The Applicant appealed his convictions and sentence and was represented by Milton Stratos, Esquire. By Order dated March 10, 2006, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the Applicant's direct appeal for failure of the Applicant to provide information regarding the transcript. The Remittitur was issued on March 29, 2006.

PCR APPLICATIONS

A. **Wilder v. State (2006-CP-10-3454)**

Filed:	9/5/2006
Conviction:	1999
Allegations:	Ineffective assistance of counsel; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; prosecutorial misconduct
Hearing:	9/11/2007
Judge:	John C. Few
Ruling:	Order Dismissing PCR 10/12/ 2007
Appeal:	Dismissed – 7/26/2010

B. **Wilder v. State (2006-CP-10-1853)**

Filed:	2/10/2012
Conviction:	1999
Allegations:	Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Hearing:	07/23/2015
Judge:	Roger E. Henderson
Ruling:	Order of Dismissal 8/28/2015
Appeal:	Dismissed – 3/25/2016

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court finds that Applicant had a full opportunity to litigate his current allegations in prior court proceedings. The Applicant continues to raise the same meritless claims by repeated collateral attacks on his convictions. The public interest in finality of judgments requires that litigation must eventually come to an end.

Due to the repetitive and frivolous nature of Applicant's numerous applications, this Court directs the Charleston County Clerk of Court to not accept any further PCR applications from the Applicant unless he pays the normal filing fee generally required for the filing of a summons and complaint. The United States Supreme Court has denied litigants who have filed repetitive, frivolous petitions the right to proceed *in forma pauperis*, resulting in the litigants having to pay the required

filing fee with that Court. In re Whitaker, 513 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 2, 130 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994); In re Anderson, 511 U.S. 364, 114 S.Ct. 1606, 128 L.Ed.2d 332 (1994); In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 111 S.Ct. 1569, 114 L.Ed.2d 20 (1991); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989).

Additionally, this Court finds that the Applicant is required to provide a properly notarized affidavit certifying that the Applicant believes, in good faith, that the matter raised is not frivolous. In In re Theron Maxton, 325 S.C. 3, 478 S.E.2d 679 (1996), the South Carolina Supreme Court required Maxton, who had filed numerous meritless petitions with the Court, to pay a filing fee and accompany any future filings with a properly notarized affidavit by Maxton certifying that he, in good faith, believed that the matters he was raising were non-frivolous and proper for the Court to consider. Id. Other courts have required that the abusive litigant file an affidavit certifying that he believes the petition raises an original claim or is non-frivolous before accepting filings from the litigant. In the Matter of Verdone, 73 F.3d 669 (7th Cir.1995); Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329 (3d Cir.1990); Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 461 U.S. 960, 103 S.Ct. 2436, 77 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1983).

This Court also finds that if the Applicant submits an Application that is accompanied with a notarized affidavit, that, before filing, the Clerk's office be directed to submit the Application to the Chief Administrative Judge for Common Pleas. The Administrative Judge should then make a finding on whether the issues raised in the Application are non-frivolous and proper for the Court to consider. If the Administrative Judge finds the Application proper, it would then be submitted to the Clerk's office for filing. **No Application should be filed without a proper finding from the Chief**

Administrative Judge.

This Court also cautions the Applicant that should he continue to file Applications containing matters that are frivolous, he may be held in contempt or for the Court to impose sanctions as circumstances of the case and discouragement of like conduct in the future may warrant. The Supreme Court imposed such warning on an Applicant in In re Theron Maxton, 325 S.C. 3, 478 S.E.2d 679 (1996).

There is a strong interest in finality of the criminal process; judicial review must stop at some juncture and finality must be realized. Aice v. State, 305 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991). The Court quoted Justice Harlan when discussing the importance of finality in litigation when they stated the following:

> Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in plain view. . . . At some point, the criminal process, if it is to function at all, must turn its attention from whether a man ought properly to be incarcerated to how he is to be treated once convicted. If law, criminal or otherwise, is worth having and enforcing, it must at some time provide a definitive answer to the question litigants present or else it never provides an answer at all. Surely it is an unpleasant task to strip a man of his freedom and subject him to institutional restraints. But this does not mean that in so doing, we should always be halting or tentative. No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.
>
> A rule of law that fails to take account of these finality interests would do more than subvert the criminal process itself. It would also seriously distort the very limited resources society has allocated to the criminal process. While men languish in jail, not uncommonly for over a year, awaiting a first trial on their guilt or innocence, it is not easy to justify expending substantial quantities of the time and energies of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity under present law of criminal convictions that were perfectly free from error when made final. (citation omitted) This drain on society's resources is compounded by the fact that issuance of the habeas writ compels a State that wishes to continue enforcing its laws against the successful petitioner to relitigate facts buried in the remote past through presentation

of witnesses whose memories of the relevant events often have dimmed. This very act of trying stale facts may well, ironically, produce a second trial no more reliable as a matter of getting at the truth than the first.

Anderson v. Leeke, 271 S.C. 435, 441-442, 248 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1978) citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1179, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971).

CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that the Applicant has received his full bite at the apple. The Applicant's repetitive filings shall be restricted in order to preserve the Court's time and resources and stop any interference with the fair administration of justice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. The Clerk of Court should refuse to accept further petitions from the Applicant asking the Court to entertain matters unless he pays a filing fee generally required for filing motions and petitions with this Court.

    a. The Applicant should be prohibited from filing any legal actions in any jurisdiction in South Carolina without submitting the requisite filing fees[1] and providing a properly notarized affidavit certifying that the Applicant believes in good faith that the matter raised is not frivolous.

    b. Any Applications submitted with properly notarized affidavits be submitted to the Chief Administrative Judge to make a finding on whether the allegations are non-frivolous and proper for the Court before they are filed.

    c. The Clerk of Courts should be instructed to return all documents that do not comply with this order.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of November, 2016.

ROGER M. YOUNG, SR.
Chief Administrative Judge
Ninth Judicial Circuit

Charleston, South Carolina.

[1] S.C. Code Ann. § 8-21-310(11)(a) (Supp. 2004)