

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Certiorari to Charleston County

Honorable R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

RECEIVED

APR 17 2017

SC Court of Appeals

Opinion No. 2017-UP-015 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed January 11, 2017)

2013-GS-10-02839 & 2013-GS-10-02840

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

JALANN WILLIAMS,

PETITIONER

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2015-000115

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Counsel for petitioner certifies that the Petition for Rehearing was made and finally ruled on by the Court of Appeals on February 23, 2017.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding it was not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense where there was evidence of self-defense, and particularly where the court's two reasons for refusing to charge self-defense were erroneous as a matter of law?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural history

Petitioner was indicted by the Charleston County grand jury for the offenses of murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during a violent crime. R. 394. His case was called to trial on January 5, 2015, before the R. Lawton McIntosh, and a jury. Christopher Murphy represented petitioner. Greg Voigt and David Osborne were the assistant solicitors. R. 1.

On January 8, 2015, the jury found petitioner guilty of murder and possession of a firearm during a violent crime. The jury could not reach a verdict on the armed robbery charge, and the judge declared a mistrial on that count. R. 390, l. 2 – 392, l. 4. Judge McIntosh sentenced petitioner to thirty years imprisonment for murder, and five years imprisonment for possession of a weapon during a violent crime. R. 393, ll. 8-12.

Petitioner's convictions were affirmed in a summary opinion in State v. Jalann Lee Williams, 2017-UP-015 (filed January 11, 2017), which concluded petitioner was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. App. 1-2.

Petitioner filed for rehearing noting the Court of Appeals "apparently overlooked the fact that the trial judge gave **several legally erroneous** reasons for refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense, and this Court should respectfully address them in a revised opinion. The judge stated he had "consulted with my fellow brethren up here and I'm not charging self-defense." The judge reasoned that appellant armed himself "early on in the situation. **He wasn't allowed to carry -- there is no evidence he had a concealed weapons permit.**" R. 295, ll. 3-25. (emphasis in rehearing petition). **The judge also reasoned: "He [petitioner] voluntarily went to a drug transaction. While he's at the drug transaction he engaged in an argument with the victim in this case. There was no basis of the drug deal argument -- but he actually started the**

altercation with the victim. That's argued." R. 295, ll. 3-25. That is legally and factually incorrect." (emphasis in rehearing petition). App. 3-4. Rehearing was denied. App. 11. This petition for a writ of certiorari follows.

Relevant Facts

North Charleston police officer Fredrick Hoose was on patrol on January 30, 2013, in the Midland Park neighborhood. He was also working with other law enforcement personnel to solve burglaries in the area. He was dispatched to a shooting call. R. 22, l. 13 – 23, l. 24.

Hoose arrived at the mobile home park and he saw a white Ford Expedition "kind of resting against a trailer. . ." R. 24, ll. 7-12. The driver's front and back side doors were both open, and the rear side "passenger side door on the other side was open as well." R. 24, ll. 7-14. Hoose described the strange position of the decedent inside the car: "His feet were in the passenger seat, the floorboard, the front passenger floorboard and *he was stretched out face down into the back floorboard.*" R. 25, ll. 16-19. (emphasis added). As will be seen *infra*, the strange position of the decedent -- his face and body stretching into the back seat -- corroborated petitioner's testimony about the decedent assaulting and strangling him when he shot him.

Petitioner's testimony that he was defending himself from the decedent inside the Ford Expedition when he shot him *was corroborated* by state's witness Robert Mitchell. R. 203, ll. 8-15. Mitchell remembered: "They were fighting over the gun." R. 203, ll. 13-15.

Petitioner testified in his own defense that Mitchell had borrowed a hundred and fifty dollars from him to purchase "exotic marijuana" from the decedent. The decedent being found in this position by Officer Hoose inside the SUV was consistent with the testimony of Mitchell and petitioner about the fight inside the vehicle when the decedent was shot. R. 197, l. 25 – 198, l. 17.

Mitchell testified that on January 30, 2013, he intended to buy the marijuana from the decedent, Mr. Ladson: "He was going to sell me a quarter pound of loud, which is exotic weed." R. 197, l. 25 – 198, l. 7. The price was six hundred dollars. Mitchell remembered "I had four hundred and fifty dollars. I had called Jalann and ask him to borrow the other money—well, my bad four hundred and forty dollars, I had called Jalann and asked him to borrow a hundred and fifty dollars. And he was like alright come get it. So I went to his house to get the money." R. 197, l. 25 – 198, l. 17. Lauren Thrower was also present when Mitchell went to make the marijuana purchase. Petitioner went with Mitchell. R. 198, l. 24 – 199, l. 25.

Mitchell, testifying as a state's witness, said petitioner mentioned doing "a lick" before they met with the decedent. Mitchell told the solicitor that a lick "could be a robbery," but not necessarily. It could be a "quick way" of raising money. R. 199, l. 23 – 201, l. 5. Mitchell told petitioner that *he did not think the decedent was going to have any money "because he is supposed to get six hundred dollars from me.* I said so you know what I am saying I don't think he is going to have any money on him." Mitchell also told petitioner: "Let me handle my transaction. . . . let me get on through you know what I am saying." R. 199, l. 23 – 201, l. 5. (emphasis added).

Mitchell remembered while they were riding in the car they were trying to use the decedent's scale to weigh the marijuana. The decedent was in the front seat at the time and his girlfriend was driving. Petitioner was sitting behind the decedent. Mitchell testified that petitioner always carried a gun with him "for protection." "In our line of business some people carry guns." R. 201, l. 11 – 203, l. 5.

Mitchell said his intention was to buy the marijuana from the decedent. However, "I heard a commotion and when I looked up Akim [the decedent] and Solo [petitioner] was fighting. Akim had jumped across the seat and they were fighting. Then I heard a shot and I jumped out of the car

and ran. Mitchell clarified that petitioner and the decedent were “fighting over the gun.” Mitchell was taken by surprise when he saw the gun. R. 203, l. 3 – 204, l. 20.

Mitchell told the jurors that his plan was to purchase four ounces of marijuana from the decedent, and he did not know how the argument and the fight between the decedent and petitioner started. “Akim [the decedent] was getting the better of him [petitioner].” R. 205, l. 3 – 206, l. 7; R. 216, ll. 20-22.

The decedent and petitioner were “*locked together*” in the struggle at the time the decedent was shot. Mitchell did not think petitioner knew that the decedent had been fatally shot during the struggle. He watched the news that evening “and when I looked on the news I called Solo and [I was] like that man is dead.” R. 217, ll. 8- 22.

Mitchell testified that petitioner also ran from the scene after the shooting. He remembered that petitioner “hid the gun under the trailer.” Mitchell did not take the marijuana he intended to purchase with the six hundred dollars. R. 206, ll. 2-25.

On cross-examination, Mitchell repeated that he told petitioner he did not think the decedent would have any money with him. R. 209, ll. 5-10. Mitchell also confirmed that he had been in an unrelated argument earlier in the day at a store with “Snoopy” and “Trouble.” Snoopy and Trouble had threatened to “shoot me.” R. 211, ll. 1-10.

The decedent was his “business partner,” and he had no reason for the decedent to get harmed. Mitchell estimated he purchased marijuana from the decedent *four to five times per month*. He did not expect the decedent to have any money since the decedent was the seller, and Mitchell’s plan was to purchase the marijuana from the decedent. R. 199, l. 23 – 201, l. 5.

Mitchell intended to pay petitioner back the hundred and fifty dollars he had borrowed from him. R. 211, l. 14 – 215, l. 1. The scales were used because he did not want to “get ripped off.” R. 215, ll. 2-10.

The decedent’s girlfriend, Alayah Hamlin, was the driver of the car on the day of the marijuana deal. The decedent told Alayah that: “I know them its okay so I went okay [and drove during the deal.]” Alaya admitted she was not paying attention to what the men were doing as she drove. She claimed she heard someone – allegedly petitioner – say “give it to me . . . it was like a struggle and I heard a gunshot go off and then another after that.” Alaya said she jumped out of the car, and ran for help, “I didn’t put the car in park so when I got out it just continued to roll until it hit the trailer.”¹ R. 28, l. 23 – 41, l. 17.

Petitioner was twenty-two years old at the time of his trial. He took the stand and testified in his own defense. R. 228, ll. 11-14. He admitted: “I smoke a good bit of marijuana.” Nonetheless, he had worked at Ryan’s Steakhouse and the Taco Bell in Goose Creek. R. 229, l. 8 – 230, l. 5.

Petitioner had known Robert Mitchell for about a year and a half. Petitioner went with Mitchell about two to three times a week to purchase drugs, seemingly marijuana. R. 230, ll. 6-20.

On January 30, 2013, petitioner planned to take his children, whom he had with their mother, Taylor McLean, to the park. However, Mitchell texted petitioner, and petitioner told Mitchell to come over to his house. R. 230, l. 21 – 231, l. 22.

Mitchell asked petitioner to borrow one hundred and fifty dollars for a purchase of marijuana. Petitioner told Mitchell he needed the one hundred and fifty dollars back by the end of the week. The total purchase price of the marijuana was six hundred dollars. The six hundred

¹ As in most criminal cases, there was conflicting evidence in this case. That obviously does not change the fact that the standard for self-defense or for a lesser-included offense is if, in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was **any evidence supporting self-defense**, any other defense or lesser-included offense. See State v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 555 S.E.2d 391 (2001).

dollar selling price seemed very low to him for the "very expensive type of weed" Mitchell wanted to purchase. R. 230, l. 21 – 233, l. 4.

Mitchell had feared for his life earlier in the day. Mitchell had gone to the store and his girlfriend told petitioner Mitchell "got into a fight at the store and they are talking about shooting him. I said shooting him? Who is he fighting with? And she named Trouble and Snoopy." R. 232, l. 21 – 233, l. 19.

Petitioner recalled that Mitchell came running back to his house, and Mitchell reminded him that Trouble and Snoopy had robbed him in the past. Trouble had just said he was going to get a gun. Petitioner said he was worried about Trouble and Snoopy coming over to his house so he grabbed "a gun at that time. I go in the house and I came back outside and I sat down with him." R. 233, l. 21 – 234, l. 20. Petitioner got the gun "just for protection; I didn't grab it to do nothing wrong." R. 235, ll. 2-5.

Petitioner never discussed a robbery attempt with Mitchell. He just wanted to be sure Mitchell paid him back the one hundred and fifty dollars. He thought Mitchell would also give him a small amount of marijuana to "smoke a joint" for the favor of the short term loan. R. 235, ll. 13-21.

When petitioner got in the car he sat behind the decedent. Mitchell sat behind the driver. As she drove, petitioner saw that the decedent had the marijuana that Mitchell was going to purchase. The decedent handed the marijuana to Mitchell, and Mitchell asked petitioner for the scales. Petitioner asked the driver to stop the car so they could weigh the marijuana on "a flat surface." The exotic marijuana that Mitchell wanted to purchase had a distinct smell to it. However, "I could barely smell it [this marijuana]," which made petitioner suspicious of what Mitchell was buying. R. 239, l. 3 – 240, l. 14.

Petitioner asked the decedent to completely open the package so that they could view the marijuana more closely. The decedent apparently became angry at the request to inspect the marijuana. “[H]e just starting getting loud and I was like man, it’s not that serious. I’m not doing business with you . . .” Petitioner told the decedent that he was doing business “with my friend at the time so I was like why are you getting loud at me and he was like man, you need to just mind your own business and he started cursing at me.” Petitioner admitted: “I did say who the fuck are you talking to like that? . . .” R. 241, l. 19 – 245, l. 5.

Petitioner recalled his feelings at the time: “I was like man, please – I was like Mitch are you going to buy this weed? And he was like man, I don’t know. I want to see it open. I grabbed the scales and I went for the door, and that it is when Mr. Ladson grabbed me.” R. 241, l. 19 – 242, l. 15.

Petitioner and the decedent were yelling at each other. Petitioner recalled: “So my first reaction was *to jump back. And that is when he jumped and grabbed my shirt.*” The decedent was pulling on petitioner. “[H]e ended up getting his hands around my neck. I was like man I started panicking.” Petitioner was looking for Mitchell for help. However, Mitchell was not attempting to help him in his struggle. “I am struggling with him and I started panicking. I ended up pulling out the gun and shoot (sic).” Petitioner testified that when he pulled the trigger on his gun he was “just trying to get him off me. I just been trying to get him off me. I was trying to stop the threat.” R. 242, l. 16 – 247, l. 11.

Petitioner remembered that the car crashed. Petitioner ran along with Mitchell and Lauren, and petitioner testified that he hid the gun under the trailer, “and I went in the house.” R. 245, l. 10 – 250, l. 19.

Petitioner told the jury that he tried to get away from the decedent before he shot him but the decedent “[k]ept pulling me. I pulled it out of my right pocket; I am right handed. I just shot. I just shot.” R. 241, l. 19 – 245, l. 5.

On cross-examination petitioner repeated that he was scared for his life while he was being attacked by the decedent, and that it was the decedent that “grabbed me,” and started the fight. R. 271, l. 15 – 273, l. 5; R. 275, ll. 2-13.

Petitioner explained that his sometimes inconsistent statements to the police were because he was being threatened with the arrest of the mother of his children if they did not like what he was saying. “I didn’t want my kids to be in DSS.” R. 275, ll. 15-23.

Request to charge

Defense counsel requested that the judge instruct the jury on self-defense, and involuntary manslaughter in addition to murder. The judge stated that he was not inclined to charge either self-defense or involuntary manslaughter, but he was thinking about charging voluntary manslaughter. The judge deferred ruling until the next day. R. 288, l. 14 – 291, l. 25.

The following day, and the last day of trial, the judge stated he had “consulted with my fellow brethren up here and I’m not charging self-defense.” The judge reasoned that petitioner “armed himself early on in the situation. He wasn’t allowed to carry -- **there is no evidence he had a concealed weapons permit.** He voluntarily went to a drug transaction. While he’s at the drug transaction he engaged in an argument with the victim in this case. There was no basis of the drug deal argument -- **but he actually started the altercation with the victim.** That’s argued.” R. 295, ll. 3-25. (emphasis added).

The judge also reasoned that petitioner failed “on the last element.” The judge reasoned that “there is no evidence that once the altercation started **the defendant did anything whatsoever to**

extricate himself from the situation. The judge reasoned that petitioner went “straight to his weapon and killed the victim.” R. 295, ll. 3-25. (emphasis added). Defense counsel Murphy took exception to the judge’s refusal to charge self-defense. R. 296, ll. 1-4.

The judge ruled that he would charge voluntary manslaughter. However, after a colloquy with defense counsel and petitioner the voluntary manslaughter instruction was waived with the agreement of the solicitor. R. 296, l. 4 – 301, l. 18.

ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals erred by holding it was not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense where there was evidence of self-defense, and particularly where the court's two reasons for refusing to charge self-defense were erroneous as a matter of law.

As will be explained more fully *infra*, the fact that petitioner did not have a concealed weapons permit did not disqualify him from a self-defense claim. The fact petitioner went “voluntarily to a drug deal” also did not disqualify him from a self-defense case. Further, if there was any evidence petitioner started the physical altercation it was certainly disputed evidence, and petitioner was still entitled to a self-defense instruction under the “any evidence” standard. Finally, the judge was respectfully unreasonable in reasoning petitioner could have retreated by apparently jumping out of the moving car – even if that was possible during the struggle. There was testimony the decedent was getting the best of petitioner, and also evidence the decedent was on top of the petitioner.

In determining whether to charge self-defense or a lesser-included offense, our Supreme Court has said that it will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant when determining if there is *any evidence* to justify the charge. State v. Byrd, 323 S.C. 319, 474 S.E.2d 430 (1996). Self-defense must be charged if there is *any evidence* in the record to support that charge. See, State v. Hill, 315 S.C. 260, 433 S.E.2d 848 (1993); State v. Muller, 282 S.C. 10, 316 S.E.2d 409 (1984).

Self-defense involves four elements. State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 442-43, 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989). First, the defendant must be without fault in bringing on the difficulty. As will be shown *infra*, the judge erred here as a matter of law by ruling petitioner could not meet this element

because he allegedly did not have a concealed weapons permit, or because he may not have been in “legal possession” of the gun.

Second, the defendant must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger. Third, if his defense is based upon his behalf of imminent danger, a reasonable prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief. If the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the circumstances were such as would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm or losing his own life.

These elements are not in dispute in this case. As seen, Mitchell testified that the decedent was getting “the better” of petitioner during the fight inside the SUV, and the location of the decedent’s body corroborated the fact that the struggle occurred with the decedent attacking petitioner in a moving vehicle.

Fourth, the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular instance. State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 442-43, 377 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1989). Again, petitioner was being beaten in a moving vehicle, and retreat was not possible.

Thus, there was evidence of self-defense in this case. The judge erred by ruling petitioner was not without fault in bringing on the difficulty. The record shows that the decedent was the first person to make physical contact once there was a disagreement. If the evidence on that was element disputed petitioner still gets the self-defense instruction under the “any evidence” standard. See State v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 555 S.E.2d 391 (2001). Further, the fact that petitioner apparently did not have a concealed weapons permit for the gun was irrelevant. The fact petitioner “voluntarily

went to the drug transaction, or was engaged in illegal activity” also did not deny him his right to act in self-defense. Petitioner was not obligated to suffer great bodily injury or be killed once he was physically attacked in a place where he had a right to be at the time.

The right to self-defense **often arises** when the defendant is doing something stupid or illegal. For example, in State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 377 S.E.2d 328 (1988), defendant Fuller was soliciting a prostitute when the difficulty arose. This angered men in the area, and a dispute arose. The Supreme Court found not only that Fuller was entitled to a self-defense instruction, but that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction tailored to the facts of that case. See, also, State v. Day, 341 S.C. 410, 535 S.E.2d 431 (2000).

Further, in State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 513 S.E.2d 104 (1999), our Supreme Court made clear that a defendant being in unlawful possession of a weapon is merely incidental to the defendant’s lawful act of arming himself in self-defense. In short, the unlawful possession of the weapon will not prevent the defenses of self-defense or accident from being viable.

Here, the gun was not produced until the decedent attacked petitioner. Petitioner had no legal duty to allow the decedent to strangle him unabated.

Although Burriss involved the defense of accident our Supreme Court held the analysis is equally applicable in determining if a defendant is in unlawful possession of a weapon is entitled to a charge on self-defense. State v. Slater, 373 S.C. 66, 71, 644 S.E.2d 50, 53 (2007), was an unusual outlier case where Slater saw an altercation taking place across a parking lot, and he went out of his way to an altercation with a loaded gun by his side “into an already violent attack in which had had no prior involvement.” Under these highly unusual circumstances Slater was not “without fault in bringing on the difficulty.”

The judge here erred by reasoning that petitioner not having a concealed weapons permit disqualified him from claiming self-defense. The judge also erred by reasoning that being involved in a marijuana purchase disqualified petitioner from asserting self-defense. Marijuana sales probably occur daily on college campuses, and they are not thought to be inherently dangerous. Further, there was evidence the parties knew each other, and had done "business" with each other in the past. The mere fact petitioner had a gun in his possession, and had to use it when he was attacked did not disqualify him from a self-defense instruction. The standard again was "any evidence," and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, or the disputed evidence, are the province of the jury, and not the judge. State v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 555 S.E.2d 391 (2001). The judge respectfully overstepped his bounds when he took the issue of self-defense out of the province of the jury, and imposed his own erroneous legal analysis upon the facts, or the disputed facts.

Moreover, the judge erred by reasoning that petitioner did not meet the last element of self-defense. Retreat was not possible in a moving automobile. The fourth element of self-defense is that "the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious injury than to act as he did in this particular incident. See, State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 545, 500 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1998). Certainly, this was an issue for the jury to decide in this case.

In the light most favorable to petitioner, the evidence showed that the decedent grabbed him, and they were "locked together," as petitioner attempted to get the decedent off of him.

Petitioner testified he feared for his life during this violent attack, and that he was fortunate to be able to get the handgun from his pocket to shoot the attacking decedent. As stated above, the judge made his second error of law in reasoning petitioner had some other probable means of

avoiding the danger as this violent attack occurred in moving automobile. Even if it was reasonable for petitioner to be expected to jump out of a moving vehicle while being held -- which it was not -- petitioner testified that the door was locked during the violent struggle.

Petitioner believed he was in imminent danger, and any reasonable man of ordinary fitness and firmness would have believed he had to strike the fatal blow to save himself from suffering serious bodily injury or from losing his own life. Petitioner thus met the second and third elements of self-defense, and as argued above, the judge was in error in his legal reasoning as to petitioner bringing on the difficulty, the first element. The judge also erred by reasoning petitioner had an opportunity to retreat or extricate himself from the violent attack by the decedent, the fourth element of self-defense. See, State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984).


Petitioner properly raised the issue of self-defense in this case, and the judge should have charged it. The state would then have had the burden of disproving petitioner acted in self-defense beyond a reasonable if the judge had properly charged the jury. See, State v. Burkhardt, 350 S.C.252, 565 S.E.2d 298 (2002); State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 716 S.E.2d 97 (2011).

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial judge's ruling that he would not charge self-defense under the facts of this case. A criminal defendant, such as petitioner here, is entitled to have the issue of self-defense decided by a jury of his peers where the evidence raises the issue.

CONCLUSION

By reason of the foregoing argument, the opinion of the Court of Appeals should be reversed, and this case remanded to the Charleston County Court of General Sessions for a new trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. M. Dudek", written over a horizontal line.

Robert M. Dudek
Chief Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

This 17th day of April, 2017.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

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Certiorari to Charleston County
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THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,


V.

JALANN WILLIAMS,

PETITIONER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and a copy of the Appendix in this case has been served on Sherrie Butterbaugh, Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201; and Jalann Williams, #362634, at Broad River Correctional Institution, 4460 Broad River Road, Columbia, SC 29210, this 17th day of April, 2017.



Robert M. Dudek
Chief Appellate Defender
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE
ME this 17th day of April, 2017.

Wanda Henderson (L.S)
Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: July 3, 2023.