

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM DORCHESTER COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Diane S. Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2014-CP-18-0358
Case No. 2014-CP-18-1792
Case No. 2014-CP-18-1793

Appellate Case No. 2016-002193

RECEIVED

APR 26 2017

SC Court of Appeals

Bank of North Carolina, Respondent,

v.

Anthony M. Whitfield and Cindy Whitfield, Defendants

Of whom Anthony Whitfield is the Appellant and Cindy Whitfield is a Respondent.

Anthony Whitfield, Appellant,

v.

David Swanson, Respondent.

APPELLANT'S INITIAL BRIEF

Andrew J. McCumber, Esquire
Slotchiver & Slotchiver, LLP
S.C. Bar No.: 101559
44 State Street
Charleston, SC 29401
Phone: (843) 577-6531

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities..... 3

Statement of Issues on Appeal..... 4

Statement of the Case..... 5

Summary of Legal Arguments..... 8

Standard of Review..... 9

Legal Arguments..... 10

Conclusion..... 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitutions, Statutes and Court Rules:

Constitution of the State of South Carolina:

ARTICLE I, SECTION 3	14
ARTICLE I, SECTION 15	14

S.C. Code of Laws Annotated (2006):

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-7-10(3)	10, 14
-----------------------------------	--------

11

S.C. Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 12(b)(8)	10–16
Rule 13(a)	10, 14

Cases:

Capital City Ins. Co. v. BP Staff, Inc.,

382 S.C. 92, 99, 674 S.E.2d 524, 528 (Ct. App. 2009)	9–12
--	------

Corbett v. City of Myrtle Beach, S.C.,

336 S.C. 601, 610, 521 S.E.2d 276, 281 (Ct. App. 1999)	11, 12
--	--------

Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v. Gilland,

390 S.C. 312, 701 S.E. 39 (Ct. App. 2010)	11, 12
---	--------

General Plywood Corporation v. Richard Jones, Inc.,

216 S.C. 322, 57 S.E.2d 636	10
-----------------------------------	----

Judson Mills v. Norris,

166 S.C. 422, 164; 310 S.E. 919	10, 11
---------------------------------------	--------

Miami Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Nance,

849 N.E.2d 671, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)	9
--	---

S.C. Public Serv. Comm'n v. City of Rock Hill,

268 S.C. 405, 408, 234 S.E.2d 228, 229 (1977)	11
---	----

Other Authorities:

1 C.J.S. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL § 54 (2005)	11
--	----

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. **Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's claims where each of the underlying actions are not identical for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(8) dismissal?**

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 2007 and 2008, Respondent Bank of North Carolina (hereinafter "Respondent BNC" or sometimes "the bank") made nine (9) loans to the Appellant, Mr. Whitfield, for nine different residential properties. The loans were for five year terms. Beginning in 2012, those loans began coming due. In 2012, Respondent BNC initiated five (5) foreclosure lawsuits covering eight of those properties in Berkeley, Dorchester, and Charleston Counties. In March of 2014, another foreclosure lawsuit covering one of the properties was filed in Dorchester County, bringing the total of six (6) foreclosure lawsuits covering nine (9) different properties. All of the properties were single family residential rental properties, except the Charleston County property which was purchased by Appellant for his spouse at the time, Mrs. Cindy Whitfield, in order to meet his family court obligations in 2007.

In response to the foreclosure lawsuits, Appellant counterclaimed in each of the lawsuits claiming, inter-alia, that Respondent BNC made an agreement to renew all the loans for another five-year term and subsequently breached that agreement, thus causing Appellant to be damaged. Specifically, Appellant met the president of the bank on June 21, 2012 where an agreement was made to renew all nine of Mr. Whitfield's loans for another five-year term, at a reduced interest rate of 4.75%. After the meeting, the bank contacted the closing attorney and set up a closing for the following week, on June 28, 2012. Appellant attended the closing for the renewal of all nine (9) loans on June 28, 2012, and Respondent BNC refused to close any of the nine (9) loans at the closing.

Respondent BNC has denied that it made a contract to renew the loans, and has mainly defended Appellant's claims that the bank breached an agreement to renew the loans on two grounds as enumerated in its various Replies: 1) that Appellant's ex-wife Cindy Whitfield was

required to sign a mortgage to her home in Charleston County in order to renew all of the loans in Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester County; or 2) that a title endorsement was necessary for the property in Charleston County to renew all of the loans in Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester County.

As part of the Respondent BNC's "title endorsement" defense for the failure to renew the loans, Respondent BNC claims it sought the advice of a real estate transactional attorney, Respondent David Swanson (hereinafter "Respondent Swanson") who recommended that the bank should procure a title endorsement to the Charleston County property out of his hypothetical concern for an objection to the loan renewal by Cindy Whitfield (who lives in the Charleston County Property) on the grounds of an equitable subordination theory that has never been applied to a fee interest in real estate in South Carolina .

As alleged in Appellant's Counterclaims, the bank has defended its actions in each Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester Counties by claiming it sought Respondent Swanson's advice in their decisions not to renew loans that cover properties in each Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester Counties. (See, e.g., Plaintiff's Reply filed March 24, 2016, ¶¶ 13, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39 and 41).

Because of newly discovered evidence (See Counterclaims filed on March 8, 2016, ¶¶ 55-72) that supports Appellant's claim that the bank never received the advice it claims to have received and relied upon, Appellant has also sued Respondent Swanson for civil conspiracy and abuse of process.

Respondent Swanson subsequently moved to dismiss in the Berkeley and Dorchester cases primarily travelling under Rule 12(b)(8) by arguing that all of the claims being made in all six lawsuits are the same. As stated above, Appellant was sued six different times by the Respondent BNC for foreclosure of nine different individual properties in each county. Each of the properties in Berkeley

and Dorchester were separate, income producing properties. Appellant has already counterclaimed against the bank six different times that the bank made an agreement to renew the loans and he should never have been foreclosed upon. Appellant has sought and will receive a jury trial in each action. Moreover, the Respondent BNC has interposed its reliance upon the advice of Respondent Swanson in each Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester Counties, including this matter. The motion to dismiss was filed in each of the cases currently pending before the Court of Common Pleas for Dorchester County, Judge Goodstein presiding. The Court dismissed Appellants claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(8) in an Order dated July 7, 2016. Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider, which the Court subsequently denied.

These Orders are now on appeal before this Court.

SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS

- I. **The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's claims as the each of the underlying actions are not identical for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(8) dismissal.**

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The appellate court applies the same standard of review in scrutinizing the application of Rule 12(b)(8), SCRCP. *Capital City Ins. Co. v. BP Staff, Inc.*, 382 S.C. 92, 99, 674 S.E.2d 524, 528 (Ct. App. 2009). While [the Court] utilize[s] the same standard of review as the circuit court in scrutinizing the application of Rule 12(b)(8), each of the components of the rule are determined as a matter of law and thus [the Court applies] a *de novo* standard of review to the grant or denial of this motion. *Id. citing Miami Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Nance*, 849 N.E.2d 671, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The Court may determine whether there is another action involving the same parties, claims (or subject matter), and remedies available as a matter of law. *Id.*

LEGAL ARGUMENTS:

I. The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's counterclaims to a foreclosure action in one county where each of the underlying actions are not identical for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(8) dismissal.

Before delving into the substantive issue of the improper dismissal, Appellant finds it necessary to frame their legal arguments within the context of the laws which apply to foreclosure proceedings:

The purpose of a foreclosure proceeding is to fully determine the entire controversy between the parties, to protect the rights of all parties, to determine the amount of the debt in order to disburse the proceeds of sale, and should the personal property so sold be not sufficient to pay the debt, that a deficiency judgment may be entered against the maker of the obligation. *Judson Mills v. Norris*, 166 S.C. 422, 164; 310 S.E. 919; *General Plywood Corporation v. Richard Jones, Inc.*, 216 S.C. 322, 57 S.E.2d 636. An action ... [for the foreclosure of a mortgage of real property] must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action or some part of the property is situated. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-7-10(3) (2006). A counterclaim is compulsory only if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim. S.C. R. Civ. Pro., Rule 13(a).

In the present matter, Respondent BNC filed six (6) separate foreclosure actions in three (3) separate counties against Appellant pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-7-10(3). Appellant, in response to each of the six (6) foreclosure lawsuits, has counterclaimed against Respondent BNC for a breach of their agreement to renew all the loans for another five-year term, which ultimately has resulted in a tremendous amount of damages to Appellant. Appellant's counterclaims were brought in each separate foreclosure action as each of the counter-claims presented were compulsory in nature pursuant to S.C. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 13(a). Further, the claims for damages sustained by Appellant are necessary in "fully determin[ing] the entire controversy" as to each of the properties that were the

subject matter of each of the six (6) respective actions. *Judson Mills*, 166 S.C. 422, 164; 310 S.E. 919. At no point in any previous Reply filed by Respondent BNC in any of the actions did Respondent BNC ever object to Appellant's being counterclaims filed in each of the underlying actions. It was not until Respondent Swanson became a party to this action did the issue of dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(8) ever get raised by any party. It is under this framework and background that Appellant now turns to the substantive issue before the Court.

In South Carolina, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(8) may be proper when there is (1) another action pending, (2) between the same parties, (3) for the same claim. S.C. R. Civ. Pro., Rule 12(b)(8). The rule has historic ties to a former statute providing a defendant a similar opportunity to demur; and our supreme court traditionally interpreted that statute narrowly, stating that it only applied when there was identity of parties, causes of action and relief, and our supreme court has held such an approach is consistent with modern day practice under rules similar to Rule 12(b)(8). *Capital City Ins. Co. v. BP Staff, Inc.*, 382 S.C. 92, 674 S.E.2d 524 (Ct. App. 2009); *S.C. Public Serv. Comm'n v. City of Rock Hill*, 268 S.C. 405, 408, 234 S.E.2d 228, 229 (1977). To prevail on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(8), the movant must show that the actions in question are between the same parties in their same capacities. 1 C.J.S. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL § 54 (2005). Further, the claims sought to be dismissed, "must be precisely or substantially the same in both proceedings in order for the drastic remedy of dismissal to be appropriate under Rule 12(b)(8)." *Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v. Gilland*, 390 S.C. 312, 701 S.E. 39 (Ct. App. 2010).

In *Corbett v. City of Myrtle Beach, S.C.*, the Court concluded that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(8) because the plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against a beach service involved the same parties and was "based upon the same facts and circumstances" as the plaintiff's first two wrongful death actions. 336 S.C. 601, 610, 521 S.E.2d 276, 281 (Ct. App. 1999). In *Corbett*, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the

identity of the parties, namely, that the Plaintiff's claims had been previously brought in both her individual and her representative capacity, thus barring a separate claim brought in her individual capacity. *Id.*

In *Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v. Gilliland*, the Court, using the *Corbett* decision as a framework, focused on the identity of the claims instead of the parties in determining whether dismissal was appropriate. 390 S.C. 312, 701 S.E. 39 (Ct. App. 2010) The Court applied a narrow interpretation of the Rule to the question of whether claims were identical holding that the claims must be precisely or substantially the same in both proceedings in order for the drastic remedy of dismissal to be appropriate under Rule 12(b)(8). *Id.*, citing *Capital City*, 382 S.C. at 105-06, 674 S.E.2d at 531-32. The *Cricket Cove* Court noted that where a case seeks relief that is different from the relief sought in the causes of action in the first case, dismissal would be improper. *Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC*, 390 S.C. 312, 701 S.E. 39 (Ct. App. 2010) The Court stated that dismissal was improper under the narrow interpretation of Rule 12(b)(8) as no claim in the action was "precisely the same" nor "substantially the same" as any claim in the first proceeding.

In the present case, the claims against brought against Respondent Swanson are not "precisely or substantially the same" as they involve advice the bank has relied upon for the foreclosure of nine (9) different income-producing properties in six different suits—hence, **six different subject matters**. The claims proffered by Appellant are identical in name only, however, they each differ in that the subject matter of the litigation is adjudication of "entire controversy" of the specific properties named in each foreclosure action. In each of the six separate matters, Appellant is not simply filing suit against Respondent Swanson for civil conspiracy and abuse of process as it relates to all of the properties in each case, but rather as they relate to each separate foreclosure.

At the August 25, 2016 hearing on Appellant's Motion to Reconsider, the Court became

focused on the damages aspect of the claims proffered by Appellant. Appellant argued that damages have been alleged in each county, with respect to each property. Appellant further noted that the foreclosure of certain properties, and the ensuing receivership, have caused more damage to Appellant than others. Accordingly, each claim was individualized by the particular damages arising from the foreclosure of the particular property. “*Transcript of August 25, 2016 Hearing*”, *Bank of North Carolina, et al. v. Anthony M. Whitfield, et al.*, 2014-CP-18-0358; 2014-CP-18-1792; 2014-CP-18-1793, 5:14 to 6:13. The Court seemed to focus heavily upon what they believed Appellant would say at trial, rather than the claims themselves:

I can only imagine that as you try your first case that you are not going to just talk about that little property and go whoop. You are going to talk about this as a conspiracy that damaged your client not only here but in his business here and here and here and here and ladies and gentlemen of the jury I want you to understand what my client has suffered fully. You are not just going to say it is a little itty bit here; it in fact is more.

Id., at 7:7 to 7:16. Appellant assured the Court that the case would be limited only to claims for damages sustained by Appellant in Dorchester County, as each claim is due to Respondents’ conduct with respect to the specific properties upon which the foreclosure action is based.

The Court recognizes that Appellant’s claims ought to be able to proceed if each claim was limited to the damages flowing from each specific property in the underlying action. *See, Id.*, at 10:18 to 10:22 (“[I]t was very clear in my mind that [the only way the claim] could in my mind survive is if it was very clear that it was somehow isolated to the one particular piece of property.”) However, the Court improperly granted Respondent’s Motion on the concern that there was no way Appellant could argue for damages specific to each property at trial. Appellant contends that the proper mechanism for safeguarding against such a concern would be allowing Appellant the leave to amend, and issuing a ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence of the other pending suits and a limiting instruction with regard to same—not the drastic remedy of dismissal.

Appellant conceded that the counter-claim could plausibly be read as “general” in the

manner in which the prayer for relief was plead, however, Appellant noted that the allegations contained in the claim were specific to the property. *Id.* at 12:1 to 12:8. Further, Appellant offered to amend same to ensure that damages claimed were specific to Dorchester County. *Id.* at 6:19 to 7:5; 14:22 to 14:25. The Court was dissatisfied, even with the proposed Amendments, because the Court was concerned the damage allegations would still be generalized. *Id.*, at 15:1 to 15:8. This is not a sufficient basis for the dismissal of Appellant's claims.

Moreover, the court's dismissal creates a logical inconsistency that can be summed up in one question: *If not here, then where?* The Court dismisses Appellant's claim due to Appellant's currently pending claims in other counties. Simultaneously, the Court acknowledges that Appellant cannot claim damages in one county if the damages are based upon properties located outside of the county. The Court has now ruled that Appellant's claims for damages are so generalized and necessarily entwined with these other properties, that Appellant cannot bring this counterclaim in Dorchester County. (A ruling which Appellant vehemently opposes.) Extrapolating the Court's logic out to the entire controversy, there would be **no county** in which Appellant could ever bring his claims, because they would necessarily invoke properties which were not the subject of the present suit. Such a conclusion is violates the freedoms afforded to Appellant under the Constitution of this State. *See*, S.C. CONST., ART. I, SEC. 15 (“[E]very person shall have speedy remedy therein for wrongs sustained.”) Appellant is entitled to bring these claims, to exercise his constitutionally protected right to seek remedy for a wrong committed against him. Under the current framework of our law surrounding foreclosure actions, specifically, the venue requirement imposed by S.C. Code § 15-7-10 and the compulsory counterclaim requirement of S.C. R. Civ. Pro. 13(a), the only two outcomes possible with respect to these counterclaims are: (1) Appellant may bring his counter claims in each of the foreclosure actions; or, (2) Appellant may bring his counter claims in none of the foreclosure actions. Only the first option comports with the constitutional protections afforded to Appellant.

Further, the trial court's ruling impermissibly violates Appellant's constitutional right to due process and equal protection under the laws of this state. S.C. CONST., ART. I, SEC. 3 in that in each of the six cases, such a ruling allows one litigant (Respondent BNC) to raise certain affirmative defenses, while simultaneously denying the right of another (the Appellant) to make claims based upon those same set of facts. In the present case, Respondent BNC is permitted to interpose a defense that it relied upon Respondent Swanson's advice in each of the separate cases, yet Appellant is denied the right to make claims based upon allegations that the advice was never given and was fabricated. Such a holding would be fundamentally unfair and a perversion of justice. Each of the six cases ought to be allowed to proceed as the damages of each case arise out of the wrongful foreclosure of that specific property. The generalized nature of some of the damages plead do not make the claims dismissible pursuant to 12(b)(8) as each of the counterclaims pending relate only to the wrongful foreclosure of the specific underlying properties. Accordingly, they are not identical to another proceeding in another county, and Respondent's motion ought to have been denied.

Turning once again to the general framework provided at the beginning of the argument, although the breach of the agreements resulted out of the failure of the Bank to proceed with one closing, the Respondents actions actually affected agreements concerning nine (9) separate properties. Accordingly, Respondent BNC is required to file six (6) different actions, and Plaintiff is left with no choice but to file his counter claims in each of the foreclosure actions. There is no doubt that Appellant's counterclaims are "necessary to fully determine" the controversy as to each foreclosure, and accordingly, Appellant must be allowed to bring his claims in each of the six foreclosure actions to "fully determine" the controversy for each specific property. Appellant should be allowed to continue forth with their claims, as the Appellant has suffered particularized damages at each property which is the subject matter of each case. At the very least, the Court ought to have allowed Appellant to amend its pleadings. Invoking the drastic remedy of dismissal was both

contrary to the laws of this State and to the interests of justice.


CONCLUSION:

Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's counterclaims to a foreclosure action in one county where each of the underlying actions are not identical for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(8) dismissal. Accordingly, the Appellant respectfully prays this Court to **REVERSE** the trial court's Order, to **REMAND** this matter to the inferior court for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted this 24th day of April, 2017

By:

SLOTCHIVER & SLOTCHIVER, LLP



Andrew J. McCumber, Esquire

S.C. Bar No.: 101559

44 State Street

Charleston, SC 29401

Phone: (843) 577-6531

Facsimile: (843) 577-0261

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT

Charleston, South Carolina

SLOTCHIVER & SLOTCHIVER, L.L.P.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

EST. 1959

IRVIN J. SLOTCHIVER
DANIEL S. SLOTCHIVER
STEPHEN M. SLOTCHIVER
ANDREW J. McCUMBER

44 STATE STREET
CHARLESTON, SC 29401-2810
TELEPHONE (843) 577-6531
FACSIMILE (843) 577-0261

April 24, 2017

VIA REGULAR MAIL ONLY:

THE HONORABLE JENNY ABBOTT KITCHINGS
CLERK, SOUTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
POST OFFICE BOX 11629
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211

RECEIVED

APR 26 2017

SC Court of Appeals

RE: Bank of North Carolina v. Anthony M. Whitfield

Appellate Case No.: 2016-002193

Case Nos.: 2014-CP-18-0358; 2014-CP-18-1792; 2014-CP-18-1793


Dear Ms. Kitchings:

Counsel for the Appellant is in receipt of your April 14, 2017 letter regarding certain deficiencies contained in Appellant's initial brief. With regard to same, enclosed you will please find two (2) copies of the corrected Appellant's Initial Brief. Please return one clocked copy to my office using the self-addressed, postage-paid envelope you will also find enclosed.

Please note that I have copied all counsel of record to this correspondence pursuant the South Carolina Appellate Rules.

I thank you in advance for your time and attention to this matter, and please do not hesitate to let me know if the Court requires anything further from us in this regard.


Sincerely,



Andrew J. McCumber
Attorney for the Appellant

AJM/ssh
Enclosure(s) as stated.

cc: David W. Overstreet, Esquire (*via regular mail*)
Brian C. Duffy, Esquire (*via regular mail*)
Paul B. Ferrara, III, Esquire (*via regular mail*)
Brent Halversen, Esquire (*via email*)
Daniel S. Slotchiver, Esquire (*via email*)



CHARLESTON SC 294
MON 24 APR 2017 PM

SLOTCHIVER & SLOTCHIVER, L.L.P.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
44 STATE STREET
CHARLESTON, SC 29401-2810

RECEIVED
APR 26 2017
SC Court of Appeals

THE HONORABLE JENNY ABBOTT KITCHINGS
CLERK, SOUTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
POST OFFICE BOX 11629
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211