

THE

GIESE

LAW FIRM, LLC

RECEIVED

MAY 11 2017

S.C. SUPREME COURT

May 8, 2017

Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk of Court
Supreme Court of South Carolina
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211


Re: Robin Gray Reese vs. State of South Carolina
C/A No: 2014-CP-40-5657

Dear Mr. Shearouse:

Please find enclosed one (1) original and one (1) copy each of Applicant's Notice of Appeal and Certificate of Service in the above referenced case. I would appreciate you filing the original and returning the clocked copies in the enclosed envelope.

I was appointed to represent Mrs. Reese in this matter and am also enclosing a copy of the Order of Dismissal and the Order Denying Applicant's Motion to Alter or Amend. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to ask. My telephone number is 803-708-6767.

Sincerely,



Jonathan D. Waller

Cc: Jessica E. Kinard, South Carolina Office of Attorney General

Enclosures

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

2014-CP-40-5657

RECEIVED

MAY 11 2017

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Robin Gray Reese, #350020,

Appellant,


v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Robin Gray Reese, #350020, appeals the Order of Dismissal denying her Application for Post-Conviction Relief filed November 14, 2016 issued by the Honorable Jocelyn Newman, Presiding Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit and the Order Denying Applicant's Motion to Alter of Amend filed April 21, 2017 issued by the Honorable Jocelyn Newman, Presiding Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit.



Jonathan D. Waller

Giese Law Firm
SC Bar No.: 76290
1315 Blanding Street
Columbia, SC 29201
803-708-6767 (phone)
803-708-6769 (fax)
jonathanwallerlaw@gmail.com
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

This 6 day of May, 2017.

Other Counsel of Record:
Jessica Kinard, Assistant Attorney General
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 734-3319

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

2014-CP-40-5657

Robin Gray Reese, #350020,

Appellant,


v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that one copy of the Appellant's Notice of Appeal in the above-entitled case has been served upon opposing counsel, Jessica Kinard, Assistant Attorney General, by mailing in an envelope properly addressed with postage prepaid on this 8th day of May, 2017, to her office located at P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, SC 29211.



Kelly Giese

Robin Reese, #350020
PLAINTIFF(S)

State of South Carolina
DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by:

Attorney for : Plaintiff Defendant
or
 Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. See Page 2 for additional information.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit); Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j), SCRPC; Bankruptcy; Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other

RICHLAND COUNTY
FILED
2016 NOV 14 PM 6:44
JEANETTE M. MURPHY
C.P. CLERK
S.C.

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.
Additional Information for the Clerk :

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)
		\$
		\$
		\$

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

Jocelyn Yeman
Circuit Court Judge

2757
Judge Code

11/09/16
Date

SCANNED

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on the _____ day of _____, 20____ and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on this 16 day of Nov, 20 16 to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)
CLERK OF COURT *Jeanette W. McBride*

Court Reporter:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.

Multiple horizontal lines for additional information.

SCANNED

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF RICHLAND

Robin Gray Reese, #350020,

Applicant,

v.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
) FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

) Case No. 2014-CP-40-5657

) **ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

2016 NOV 14 PM 4:44
JEANETTE W. MORRIS
C.C.P. & G.S.
RICHLAND COUNTY
FILED

This matter came before the Court by way of an Application for Post-Conviction Relief filed September 14, 2014. Respondent filed a return on or about March 11, 2015. The Court convened an evidentiary hearing into the matter on August 30, 2016, at the Richland County Courthouse. Applicant was present and represented by Jonathan Waller, Esquire. Jessica E. Kinard, Esquire of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office represented Respondent.

Applicant and Applicant's trial counsel, Andrew Farley, Esquire, testified at the hearing. The Court had before it a copy of the trial transcript, the records of the Richland County Clerk of Court regarding the subject conviction, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, and the pleadings. The Court finds as follows:

I. Procedural History

The Applicant is incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to the Richland County Clerk of Court's orders of commitment. The Richland County Grand Jury indicted the Applicant at the March 2010 term of General Sessions for Lynching – First Degree (2010-GS-40-0040) and at the October 2011 term for Murder (2011-GS-40-4916). Andrew Farley, Esquire represented Applicant on the charges. Applicant proceeded to trial on

SCANNED



March 2, 2012. The jury returned verdicts of guilty and the Honorable G. Thomas Cooper Jr. sentenced the Applicant to thirty (30) years imprisonment on each charge.

A notice of appeal was filed at the South Carolina Court of Appeals. Katherine Haggard Hudgins, Esquire perfected the appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Applicant's conviction and sentence on July 30, 2014. State v. Reese, Op. No. 2014-UP-300 (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 30, 2014). The Remittitur was returned on August 15, 2014.

II. Allegations

In her application, Applicant alleges he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel.
 - a. "Failed to ask for lesser charge on record"
 - b. Failed to elicit testimony from prosecutor

Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Applicant's counsel provided Respondent with informal amendments, which Respondent stipulated to consideration. These were placed on the record at the evidentiary hearing, and are as follows:

- a. Failure to move to suppress Applicant's statement as not voluntarily given.
- b. Failure to object to impermissible comments during Solicitor's closing argument
- c. Failure to object to Applicant being seen by jury while wearing both ankle and wrist shackles.
- d. Failure to properly advise Applicant with regards to her decision to testify.
- e. Failure to obtain Applicant's phone records.
- f. General failure to prepare.
- g. Failure to investigate and speak with state's witnesses.
- h. Failure to object during the testimony of Campbell Streeter and William Pegram.

III. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The Court has reviewed the record in its entirety and has heard the testimony and arguments presented at the evidentiary hearing. The Court has further had the opportunity to

SCANNED

observe each witness who testified at the hearing, and to closely pass upon their credibility. This Court finds Counsel's testimony credible and Applicant's testimony not credible. The Court has weighed the testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 (2003).

Summary of testimony

Robin Gray Reese - Applicant

Applicant began by testifying that she turned herself in to law enforcement on February 19, 2010. At her bond hearing, she was represented by an attorney other than trial counsel, though he began his representation of her before her murder indictment. Applicant testified that she served thirteen days before she was bonded out, and met with trial counsel approximately five times between his office and her apartment. She did not recall discussing what potential punishment her charges carried or what elements the State would have to prove, though she knew that her charges were serious. She further testified that she and trial counsel never talked about potential defenses or witnesses to call on her behalf, and that trial counsel told her to "go and live" after her murder indictment. Applicant testified that she met the private investigator hired by trial counsel one time, and was informed that they would pursue her co-defendant because the beating victim and witnesses put him at the scene.

Applicant testified regarding the circumstances surrounding her providing her statement to police, which included the police picking her and her daughter picking her up at home and taking them to the station in unmarked cars. She recalled four people being in the room during her questioning, and only one was in uniform. She did not recall if she was free to leave, and stated that she was not allowed to be with her daughter while she was questioned, though the police took them home in the same car. She testified that she told trial counsel she was not

SCANNED

ju

mirandized, and did not recall discussing with him whether her statement was voluntary or could be suppressed, though she felt like she was forced to give the statement.

Regarding trial preparation, Applicant testified that she never reviewed the discovery with trial counsel, and she was not aware of her daughter's statement. She relayed her version of the facts to trial counsel. They spoke briefly about what she would testify to, but she told trial counsel that she did not want to testify. He advised her that she would benefit from testifying, so she did. She stated that a lot of their discussions centered on the chair that she threw during the altercation. Applicant did not recall any plea offers being made to her, nor did she recall discussing the potential testimony of expert witnesses with trial counsel. Lastly, she testified that even though she was dressed in street clothes during the trial, she was shackled and walked in front of the jury in shackles. On re-direct examination, however, the Applicant admitted that she spoke with trial counsel about the discovery.

Andrew Farley, Esquire – trial counsel

Trial counsel testified that he was appointed in October of 2011. He received a call before Applicant was arraigned and met her there. Trial counsel testified that he immediately filed a notice of representation and Rule 5 discovery motion, the product of which he received within a month or two of appointment, as well as supplemental discovery. He recalled that there was a good bit of discovery, including all medical reports, and trial counsel testified that he had enough time to review and familiarize himself with all of it. He testified that he met with the Applicant five or six times, both at his office and at her apartment, to review the discovery. He testified that he vividly remembered a basketball game on the television at the Applicant's apartment that occupied more of her attention than his attempts at conversation could. He further testified that he reviewed all charges against the Applicant and the elements of those charges, the potential

SCANNED



punishments and consequences of the charges, the state's burden of proof, her constitutional rights, defensive strategies, and what her potential testimony may be. To assist in preparation, trial counsel hired the late David MacDougall as a private investigator.

Trial counsel was aware that the Applicant had provided a statement to law enforcement prior to her arrest, and he considered the necessity of a motion to suppress it. However, trial counsel testified that his biggest concern was whether the solicitor would use it. Out of an abundance of caution, trial counsel made a pre-trial motion to suppress the motion, to which the solicitor's office responded that they did not intend to use the statement. The trial judge issue a ruling *in limine* to allow a Jackson v. Denno¹ hearing if and when the solicitor's office decided to bring in the statement. Out of an abundance of caution, Trial counsel had also filed a pre-trial motion for a mental competency evaluation that he did not pursue at the time trial because no concerns had arisen regarding the Applicant's competency. It was filed as a best practice – trial counsel wanted to give Applicant every opportunity to be okay with her situation and to buy time before trial if needed. He testified that it was until approximately a week before trial that the importance and severity of the trial and its consequences hit home with the Applicant.

The most important pre-trial motion, testified trial counsel, was a motion to sever Applicant's trial from her co-defendant. Trial counsel testified at length that Applicant's trial would have been fairer to her if she was tried alone, as it would have been easier for a jury to distinguish her actions from those of her co-defendant. He believed that assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature was a more appropriate charge for the Applicant, and that he may have been able to get such a charge if the trial were severed. Regardless, trial counsel understood that the trial judge's denial of the motion to sever was in the interest of judicial economy.

¹ Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

SCANNED

ju

Trial counsel briefly testified about jury selection in this trial. He recalled that there was a large jury pool from which the initial jury was selected; however, the prosecution made a Batson² claim, which was granted against the defense. At the PCR hearing, trial counsel testified that his motives behind juror selection were not racially influenced, but he could not satisfy the trial judge of that fact. A second jury was pulled, and trial proceeded. At that time, the trial judge remanded the defendants into custody and said that they would be shackled. Trial counsel did not recall objecting to his client being shackled in front of the jury, as he was under the clear understanding that the trial judge intended for them to remain in shackles.

PCR counsel examined trial counsel on several specific points in the transcript. The first was regarding mentions of gang activity, beginning on page 318 of the trial transcript. When asked why he did not ask for a limiting instruction on references to gang activity, trial counsel did not recall his reasoning behind the decision at that point in the trial, yet testified that he knew gangs would have to be discussed, as it was a group of Blood members that rescued the Applicant's daughter. This same logic applied when PCR counsel asked trial counsel why there was no objection later in the trial to the solicitor asking if there was any sort of affiliation between the defendants and the Blood gang.

Another specific point of questioning was found at page 747, line 13 of the trial transcript, in which Investigator Streeter testified that a witness's statement "seemed forthcoming." Trial counsel did not object at the time, and testified that he still did not see a reason to object. Comparatively, when asked why he did not object to Sergeant Pegram offering his opinion on the law at page 779, lines 3-6, trial counsel stated that he should have objected. Lastly, when Sergeant Pegram began referencing the Applicant's statement on page 786 at line

² Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

SCANNED

gn

17, trial counsel could not recall why he did not renew his request for a Jackson v. Denno hearing at that time.

PCR counsel questioned trial counsel about two potentially objectionable statements in the prosecution's closing argument. The first, on page 1119 at line 22, drew an objection from trial counsel because it referred to a witness as a liar. PCR counsel then compared a statement on page 1129 at line 9, in which it could have been possible to infer that the solicitor was calling the Applicant a liar due to testimony presented earlier in trial. Trial counsel testified that he did not hear the statement that way at the time of trial, and did not believe that it was worthy of an objection.

Regarding the defense's expert, Dr. Sandra Conrady, trial counsel testified that he consulted with and hired her because of her excellent reputation and referrals, as well as her review of thousands of cases. He further testified that he had several calls with her about her conclusions and what her testimony would be at trial. Ultimately, her testimony was that the victim died as a result of a head injury that most likely occurred before the Applicant even arrived at the scene. This was in line with the overall defensive strategy that all of the injuries and the death of the victim occurred before the Applicant arrived, and that everything Applicant did was out of her concern as a mother.

Trial counsel recalled that Applicant wanted to testify and tell her side of the story. He did not think that this was necessarily a bad idea, as it allowed the Applicant to share her personal feelings when she found out about the assault on her daughter, notably the fact that she had been sexually assaulted as a teenager. He further testified that, even if her statement had been suppressed, it would not have changed his opinion on her testifying as he recalled discussing the potential for impeachment with her.

SCANNED



Lastly, trial counsel testified that, despite his efforts, the solicitor's office did not make any plea offers to Applicant until the fourth day of trial. That offer required Applicant's co-defendant to plead to voluntary manslaughter in order for Applicant to receive reduced charges. Unfortunately, Applicant's co-defendant, who was also her brother, refused to plead, so both went to trial.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In this post-conviction relief action, Applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in her application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (citing Griffin v. Martin, 278 S.C. 620, 300 S.E.2d 482 (1983)). Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel as a ground for relief, Applicant must prove trial counsel's "conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).

The proper measure of performance is whether trial counsel provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1985); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977)). The Court strongly presumes trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Applicant must overcome this presumption in order to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 118, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989).

The Court applies a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625. First, Applicant must prove trial counsel's performance was deficient. Id. Under this prong, the Court measures trial counsel's

SCANNED



performance by its “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Second, trial counsel’s deficient performance must have prejudiced Applicant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

This Court finds Applicant has failed to show that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. All testimony indicated that trial counsel was extremely familiar with the facts of Applicant’s case. This Court finds trial counsel met with Applicant an adequate number of times and was familiar with the discovery materials. Trial counsel indicated that he explained Applicant’s constitutional rights, and explained the differences between going to trial and entering a guilty plea. Counsel indicated he never had trouble communicating with Applicant, and he never had any concern that Applicant did not fully understand their conversations.

Trial counsel refuted all allegations that Applicant made in her application as well as during her testimony including, but not limited to, voluntariness of her statement; preparation for the trial; specific potential objections during the course of trial; issues regarding the Applicant being shackled; Applicant’s decision to testify; and allegedly impermissible comments made by the solicitor during closing argument. This Court finds that, through the presentation of evidence at the post-conviction relief hearing, Applicant has failed to demonstrate both deficiency by trial counsel, as well as any prejudice caused by trial counsel’s actions. Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

All Other Allegations

As to any and all allegations that were raised in the application or at the hearing in this matter and not specifically addressed in this order, the Court finds Applicant failed to present any

SCANNED



evidence regarding such allegations. Accordingly, the Court finds Applicant has abandoned any such allegations.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds and concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant her application. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.


The Court notes Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991), Applicant has a right to appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of post-conviction relief. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP, provides that if Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, her post-conviction relief attorney must serve and file a notice of appeal on Applicant's behalf. Applicant and her attorney are directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

~~Remainder of page intentionally left blank.~~ 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:


1. This Application for Post-Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and

SCANNED



2. Applicant must be remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections to complete service of her sentence.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of November, 2016.



JOCELYN NEWMAN
Presiding Judge
Fifth Judicial Circuit

Columbia, South Carolina

ROBIN GRAY REESE (SCDC #350020)

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by: NEWMAN, J.	Attorney for : <input type="checkbox"/> Plaintiff <input type="checkbox"/> Defendant
	or
	<input type="checkbox"/> Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. See Page 2 for additional information.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit); Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j), SCRPC; Bankruptcy; Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court: Applicant's Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(e) SCRPC to Amend is DENIED.

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk :

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX		
Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.		
Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)
		\$
		\$
		\$
If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order: ..		

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.


 Circuit Court Judge

2757
 Judge Code

April 21, 2017
 Date

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on the _____ day of _____, 20____ and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on this 24th day of April, 2017 to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Jonathan D Waller

Jessica Elizabeth Kinard

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter _____

Clerk of Court

Jeanette W. McBride

B86716.03
\$1.820
US POSTAGE
FIRST-CLASS
062S0009473977
29201



Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk of Court
Supreme Court of South Carolina
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211



C