

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Aminah A. Richburg,)
Plaintiff,)

Civil Action No. 2016-CP-23-02113

vs.)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL

E.A. "Rico" Williams, Director,)
District One S.C. Basketball)
Officials Association, and the South)
Carolina High School League,)
Defendants.)

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MAY 26 2017

SC Court of Appeals

This matter came before the court on March 20, 2017, upon the following motions:

(a) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, (b) Defendant E.A. "Rico" Williams' Motion for Summary Judgment, and (c) Defendant South Carolina High School League's (SCHSL) Motion for Summary Judgment. After due deliberation, review of the memoranda and exhibits submitted, case law, affidavits, and arguments of the parties, the court grants the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel.

FACTS

Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts are as follows. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 31, 2016, and her allegations arose out of a dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant, Rico Williams of the District One of the South Carolina Basketball Officials Association (SCBOA). In her Complaint, the plaintiff alleged a cause of action for defamation and asserted that Rico Williams created a "false narrative" about the plaintiff's performance as a basketball referee when he reported issues

involving her to the District One Board of Directors. The communication at issue is an email Rico Williams sent on February 5, 2016 to the plaintiff, in response to a text message she had sent him. Members of the District One Board of Directors, along with Skip Lax, Commissioner of Officials for the SCHSL, also received a copy of this email. Ultimately, the District One Board of Directors voted on February 29, 2016, to inform the plaintiff that any future application to District One would not be accepted.

With respect to the SCHSL, plaintiff alleged that it improperly failed to investigate the reports by Rico Williams regarding the plaintiff and failed to intervene on her behalf when her membership was reviewed by the District One Board of Directors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The purpose of summary judgment is “to expedite disposition of cases which do not require the services of a factfinder.” S. Glass & Plastics Co. v. Duke, 367 S.C. 421, 427, 626 S.E.2d 19, 22 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001)). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ellis v. Davidson, 358 S.C. 509, 517, 595 S.E.2d 817, 821 (Ct. App. 2004). All ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising from the evidence “must be construed most strongly against the moving party.” Id. However, when plain, palpable, and indisputable facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ, summary judgment should be granted. Id. at 518, 595 S.E.2d at 822.

ANALYSIS

I. The SCHSL did not make any defamatory communications.

Under South Carolina law, the elements of defamation include (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another, (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. *See Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc.*, 332 S.C. 502, 508, 506 S.E.2d 497, 501 (1998).

As previously stated, this case involves a dispute that arose between the plaintiff and Rico Williams, the District One Director of the SCBOA. The SCBOA, which operates under the SCHSL, is responsible for the training and development of basketball officials, along with the maintenance of a booking office for basketball contests between schools that are members of the SCHSL. The SCBOA has its own constitution and bylaws, and members of the SCBOA are divided into twelve regional districts. Each district has a director and a board of directors.

The SCHSL consists of approximately 400 high school and middle school members throughout South Carolina. Day-to-day operations of the SCHSL are conducted by the League's staff of approximately ten individuals, and the SCHSL has its own separate constitution and bylaws. Under the bylaws of the SCBOA, the Executive Committee of the SCHSL appoints a "Commissioner of Officials." For the relevant period, Skip Lax, Associate Commissioner of the SCHSL, was appointed to serve as the Commissioner of Officials for the SCBOA. The SCHSL works closely with the SCBOA with respect to

training and certification of officials, keeping and maintaining records and ratings of officials, and assigns varsity contests through its software system, Arbiter.

The plaintiff joined District One of the SCBOA in 2013. As part of her membership, the plaintiff was required to sign a contract specific to District One. The contract included several provisions regarding professional standards for basketball officials, along with an acknowledgement that the District One director had the authority to enforce professional standards and to accept or reject the official's re-admittance to the SCBOA.

On or about February 2, 2016, the defendant, Rico Williams, received information from another official, John Williams, who officiated a middle school basketball game with the plaintiff on February 1, 2016. John Williams informed the defendant, Rico Williams, that the plaintiff wore "jogging/workout" pants during the basketball game. These kinds of pants are not approved attire for basketball officials, as the SCBOA bylaws require "straight leg black trousers without cuffs" that may be pleated or plain front. Rico Williams had previously spoken to the plaintiff the year prior about an incident in which she wore inappropriate pants to an assignment.

After Rico Williams left several messages for the plaintiff requesting contact, the plaintiff called Rico Williams on February 3, 2016. In that conversation, Rico Williams confirmed an upcoming assignment for the plaintiff at Furman University, and he informed her that it been reported to him that she was wearing jogging pants at the recent middle school basketball game. He asked Ms. Richburg if the report was true. Ms. Richburg replied that she does not wear jogging pants. Rico Williams then asked if it was problematic that he was asking that question, and the plaintiff repeated that she does not

wear jogging pants and that she was at work. Rico Williams did not dispute the plaintiff's response and agreed to end the call, stating they would talk again soon.

A few minutes after their telephone conversation, the plaintiff sent the following text message to Rico Williams:

Please discontinue the harassing communications. Previous District One leaders presented a higher level of professionalism which made officiating enjoyable unfortunately the present leadership standards have declined. I will communicate your monopoly status with assigning games with various organizations and how it manipulates the District One organization and your leadership position to the SCHL. If I do not respond to a text or call, I am unavailable. I confirmed my availability for Thursday earlier. If you have games for me in the future I welcome any professional communication you send. If I do not receive any game assignments I will communicate my disdain to the SCHL.

On February 5, 2016, Rico Williams emailed the plaintiff and copied in the District One Board of Directors and Skip Lax. After recapping the prior telephone conversation, Rico Williams quoted the text message sent by the plaintiff. Mr. Williams concluded the email with the following paragraphs:

I communicated your text and above information to Skip Lax, and I received requested information from Bob Wnukowski and Kevin Brown. From our records you are marked off by two schools and by ten (10) officials and literally every one of them are higher rated either sub-Varsity officials or officials at the Varsity level who still work JV games. Many of them have indicated to me your unwillingness to accept constructive criticism, advice, instruction or any information given by them that you may deem unnecessary. Additionally, before the season I required officials working other SCHSL sports (such as Volleyball that you work) to attend four (4) of our regularly (non required) scheduled meetings which began at 6 pm and ended at 8 pm. You were present at the first meeting from beginning to end; a Sept. 21 meeting you arrived at 7:35 pm; an Oct. 19 meeting you arrived at 7:05; and a Nov. 2 meeting you arrived at 6:50 pm. Therefore your meeting attendance equates to about 2 1/2 meetings. In addition, you were absent from our required Mechanics meeting and required Mid-season meeting which would bring your absent total to roughly eight (8) out of eleven (11) meetings.

Upon realizing these facts I contemplated removing you from your JV tournament assignment Saturday (Feb. 6) afternoon. But I will leave your schedule as is, and you will not be considered for any future assignments until your status as a District 1 member is reviewed by the Board of Directors, which brings me to the final issue if you will. Without repeating again word for word your comments concerning "professionalism", "declining standards", etc. it is obvious that you feel your membership is not being served adequately by the "present leadership". I and we certainly don't want any member to be so uncomfortable in our District, therefore a transfer to another District that best suites you may be in order. As a matter of fact, I will facilitate the communication to any District in South Carolina that you choose if that is the route that you deem favorable.

The plaintiff alleges that this email (hereinafter referred to as the "February 5th email") created a "false narrative," which led to a vote by the Board of Directors not to accept any of her future applications into District One of the SCBOA.

It is undisputed that the recipients of the February 5th email were members of the District One Board of Directors and Skip Lax. Moreover, the plaintiff has produced no evidence that Commissioner Lax responded to the email from Rico Williams, nor is there any evidence that Commissioner Lax forwarded the email to anyone else. After the plaintiff received the February 5th email, she forwarded the email to Commissioner Lax along with a lengthy message. The plaintiff did not explicitly ask Commissioner Lax to intervene or to do anything in particular, and she expressed her displeasure with Rico Williams and his February 5th email. Additionally, she requested the names of the officials who "blocked" her, as referenced in the February 5th email. Commissioner Lax responded to the plaintiff's email by simply stating, "Aminah, we do not share with any officials blocks by schools or their peers. Your concerns are a local matter to be handled at your district level."

Based on the foregoing, summary judgment is appropriate for the SCHSL on the basis that Commissioner Lax did not make or publish any defamatory statements to a third-party. *See Holtzscheiter*, 332 S.C. at 508, 506 S.E.2d at 501.

The plaintiff has also complained about communications she had with an individual named Joedy Moots. Mr. Moots was the principal at Gray Collegiate Academy in West Columbia, South Carolina, and he also served as the Officials' Representative on the Executive Committee of the SCHSL in 2015-2016. The Executive Committee is the governing body of the SCHSL, and it is comprised of 16 representatives from various schools and organizations, including the South Carolina Officials' Association.

On February 16, 2016, the plaintiff forwarded Rico Williams' February 5th email to Mr. Moots and stated, "You are listed as the Officials Representative please advise on this matter." Following the plaintiff's initiation of communication with Mr. Moots, several more emails were exchanged between Mr. Moots and the plaintiff. It appears that Mr. Moots also forwarded his initial email response from February 22, 2016, to Rico Williams.

To the extent that plaintiff argues that Mr. Moots committed actionable defamation by forwarding his February 22nd email response to Rico Williams, this argument fails as a matter of law. First, Mr. Moots was not acting on behalf of the Executive Committee or the SCHSL. Instead, he was acting as a representative of the South Carolina Officials' Association *in response to* the plaintiff seeking him out for advice. Secondly, the emails from Mr. Moots are not defamatory toward the plaintiff. While the plaintiff did not like the response she received from Mr. Moots, the substance of Mr. Moots' email did not defame her in any way. *See Erickson v. Jones Street Publishers, LLC*, 368 S.C. 444, 471, 629 S.E.2d 653, 658 (2006) (stating that "[t]he law of defamation does not prevent a person

from expressing and publishing truthful or non-defamatory statements- including pointed criticisms- of a guardian's actions in a particular case, regardless of whether the guardian is designated a public official, public figure, or private figure").

Accordingly, the plaintiff has not presented any evidence of defamatory statements made by the SCHSL and, therefore, summary judgment is appropriate.

II. Mr. Williams' statements were true.

Both defendants have asserted the absolute defense of truth in this case. South Carolina courts have held that truth of the matter is a complete defense to an action based on defamation. *See Ross v. Columbia Newspapers, Inc.*, 266 S.C. 75, 80, 221 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1976). In fact, the defense of truth is sufficient where the evidence establishes that the statement was *substantially* true. *Id.* (citing *Dauterman v. State-Record Co.*, 249 S.C. 512, 514, 154 S.E.2d 919, 919 (1967)) (emphasis added).

The following factual statements were included in Rico Williams' February 5th email that are allegedly defamatory: (1) Ms. Richburg was marked off/blocked by two schools and ten officials; (2) all of the officials that had blocked the plaintiff were rated higher than the plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiff had technically not attended all of the required District One meetings. As shown below, all of these statements are true.

A. Blocks by Schools and Officials

Both the SCHSL and Rico Williams provided a list of blocks against the plaintiff.¹ Rico Williams' list of blocks includes ten names, along with the dates each block was entered. Nine of the officials who blocked sub-varsity basketball assignments with the plaintiff entered their blocks in 2014 or 2015, and one official entered a block on January 20, 2016. Additionally, two schools were listed as blocked from assignments with the plaintiff on the SCHSL list. The schools' blocks were entered by a member of the SCHSL staff on November 6, 2013. Therefore, the SCHSL has provided evidence that the statement regarding blocks in the February 5th email was true.

At the hearing and in her court filings, the plaintiff's only rebuttal to this supporting documentation provided by the defendants has been to claim that the records have been falsified. However, the plaintiff has not provided any evidence that questions the authenticity of these documents.

B. Ratings of Officials Who Blocked Plaintiff

The SCHSL publishes ratings of basketball officials every year, and the formula for the rating is found in the SCBOA bylaws. The SCHSL has produced in this case the complete set of ratings for the years 2013-2016. For every official identified by Arbiter as having blocked the plaintiff at the sub-varsity basketball level, their respective ratings are higher than the plaintiff's rating. This fact was not disputed by the plaintiff.

¹ The SCHSL explained that the lists are not identical due to the fact that the SCHSL would have had access to officials' blocks against the plaintiff in all varsity sports, while local district officials would have access to officials' blocks against the plaintiff in sub-varsity sports.

C. Plaintiff's Failure to Attend Meetings

In support of the statements in his February 5th email regarding plaintiff's meeting deficiencies, Rico Williams produced documents created by the Secretary/Treasurer of District One, Kevin Brown. This chart, as well as comments taken from Mr. Brown's attendance spreadsheet, verify the information in the February 5th email about the plaintiff's attendance at meetings, along with other officials who may have left early or arrived late. In addition, in the plaintiff's first email to Commissioner Skip Lax complaining about Rico Williams' February 5th email, the plaintiff acknowledged that she had not attended all of the required meetings. Thus, the defense of truth has been established.

In conclusion, the statements in Rico Williams' February 5th email have been shown to be true. At the hearing on this matter, the plaintiff could not identify any information in the February 5th email that was untrue, and her main complaint was with the way Rico Williams framed and represented the information to the recipients of the email. The fact that plaintiff simply rejects the evidence presented by the defendants is not sufficient grounds to defeat summary judgment. *See Shupe v. Settle*, 315 S.C. 510, 516–17, 445 S.E.2d 651, 655 (Ct. App. 1994) (“A conclusory statement as to the ultimate issue in a case is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for purposes of resisting summary judgment.”); *Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co.*, 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Unsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.”).

III. Mr. Williams' statements were protected by a qualified privilege.

Even if the defense of truth had not been established, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on the defense of qualified privilege.

In a defamation action, a defendant may assert the affirmative defense of qualified privilege. Murray v. Holnam, Inc., 344 S.C. 129, 139, 542 S.E.2d 743, 748 (Ct. App. 2001). "Where the occasion gives rise to a qualified privilege, there is a prima facie presumption to rebut the inference of malice, and the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice or that the scope of the privilege has been exceeded." Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 485, 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999).

The threshold issue is whether a qualified privilege exists between the SCHSL and the SCBOA. In general, the question of whether an occasion gives rise to a qualified privilege is a matter of law for the court. Murray, 344 S.C. at 140, 542 S.E.2d at 749. "A communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest or duty is qualifiedly privileged if made to a person with a corresponding interest or duty even though it contains matter which, without this privilege, would be actionable." Id. at 140-41, 542 S.E.2d at 749.

Clearly, there is a common interest for both the SCHSL and the SCBOA regarding the dispute that arose between the plaintiff and Rico Williams. The SCBOA operates to provide basketball officials for SCHSL contests, and Skip Lax serves as both the Associate Commissioner of the SCHSL and the Commissioner of Officials with outlined responsibilities under the SCBOA bylaws. As previously stated, before being allowed to officiate a basketball contest, the plaintiff had to sign a District One SCBOA Contract and

an SCHSL code of ethics. Given the relationship between the two organizations and their overlapping responsibility with basketball officials, a qualified privilege existed between the SCHSL and the SCBOA with respect to this situation involving the plaintiff. Additionally, the plaintiff herself threatened to report these issues with Rico Williams to the SCHSL in her text message to him *before* the February 5th email.

An abuse of a qualified privilege occurs when (a) a statement is made in good faith that goes beyond the scope of what is reasonable under the duties and interests involved; or (b) a statement is made with actual malice. Fountain v. First Reliance Bank, 398 S.C. 434, 444, 730 S.E.2d 305, 310 (2012); Murray, 344 S.C. at 142, 542 S.E.2d at 749 (in defamation action, if defendant proves qualified privilege, plaintiff may not recover unless he overcomes privilege by proving actual malice). In the absence of a controversy as to the relevant facts, it is for the court to say whether the privilege has been abused or exceeded. Fountain, 398 S.C. at 444, 730 S.E.2d at 310.

In this case, the defendants have not abused their qualified privilege. First, Rico Williams did not exceed the scope of the privilege because he only sent a copy of the February 5th email to the Board of Directors and the Commissioner of Officials. Secondly, there is no evidence that Rico Williams acted with malice. To begin with, it should be noted that, under the District One SCBOA Contract, Rico Williams, as the Director, had the sole authority to reject any future renewal applications. However, as testified to by Williams in his affidavit, instead of unilaterally deciding the repercussions of the plaintiff's actions, he submitted the matter to the Board of Directors out of fairness to the plaintiff.

Furthermore, because the plaintiff accused Rico Williams of "harassing" her and stated her intention to report Williams' alleged "monopoly status" to the SCHSL in her

initial text message, Williams testified in his affidavit that he felt it necessary to provide the SCHSL and the District One Board of Directors with a summary of his prior communications with the plaintiff. Also, Williams testified that, in his experience, the District One Board of Directors would typically become involved in disciplinary issues. The evidence thus leads to only one conclusion, namely that Williams communicated this information in a proper manner and only to proper parties who had a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the communication.

Additionally, there was no history of animosity between Rico Williams and the plaintiff. Before February 2016, Rico Williams often communicated with the plaintiff about non-SCHSL officiating opportunities. Additionally, according to the plaintiff, Rico Williams previously asked her to participate on a committee for District One, which the plaintiff declined due to time constraints. The plaintiff further testified that she never had any problems with Rico Williams before February 2, 2016. Thus, the record shows that Rico Williams had no motive to act towards the plaintiff with malice of any kind.

Given that a qualified privilege exists with respect to the allegedly defamatory February 5th email, the plaintiff must come forward with some evidence that Rico Williams acted with actual malice in his communications. For the reasons set forth herein, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rico Williams acted in good faith, and the information discussed by him was not done with any malice. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on the basis of qualified privilege.

IV. The SCHSL was not negligent by “failing to intervene.”

At the hearing and in various court filings, the plaintiff has claimed that Commissioner Lax and the SCHSL were negligent in failing to properly investigate the actions of Rico Williams. To prevail under a theory of negligence, “the plaintiff must provide evidence of three essential elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damages proximately caused by a breach of duty.” Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 399, 477 S.E.2d 715, 720 (Ct. App. 1996).

None of these elements have been met in this case. First, the SCHSL owes no duty to a basketball official, who is an independent contractor, to intervene in a dispute at the district level. In other words, the District One SCBOA Contract sets forth certain expectations between the members of District One and the district’s leadership, and the plaintiff can point to no evidence that required the SCHSL to unilaterally adjudicate the dispute.

Furthermore, Commissioner Lax did not “fail to intervene” in the strict sense of the term; rather, the plaintiff is upset that Commissioner Lax deferred the dispute to be addressed at the district level. The same is true with Mr. Moots. The plaintiff asked for Mr. Moots’ advice, but she did not like the advice she received. This is certainly not grounds for a negligence claim. Moreover, it should be noted that the SCHSL is a governmental entity subject to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.² As such, the SCHSL is entitled to discretionary immunity pursuant to South Carolina Code section 15-78-60(5).

² S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 through-220.

To the extent the plaintiff argues that the SCHSL's duty to intervene is based on some provision of the SCHSL or SCBOA's bylaws, the SCHSL is immune from liability under South Carolina Code section 15-78-60(4), which provides that an entity cannot be held liable for loss resulting from the "adoption, enforcement, or compliance with any law or failure to adopt or enforce any law, whether valid or invalid, including, but not limited to, any charter, provision, ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, or written policies."

As to the second element of negligence, the plaintiff failed to prove that the SCHSL breached any duty to her by acting unreasonably in responding to the plaintiff's situation. Commissioner Lax did not make any decisions in favor of or against either the plaintiff or Rico Williams, and he simply assessed the dispute as a local matter. Commissioner Lax's conduct did not make it more or less likely that the District One Board of Directors would make the decision it ultimately reached on February 29, 2016. Accordingly, the plaintiff also cannot prove the third element of negligence.

For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff has not set forth any evidence sufficient to charge the SCHSL with negligence and, therefore, the SCHSL is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL

At the hearing held on March 20, 2017, the plaintiff claimed she was entitled to additional documents that had not been produced by the defendants. However, the plaintiff could not identify with any specificity the documents she maintains should be produced. The defendants, on the other hand, provided evidence that they had fully responded to plaintiff's discovery requests, and to the extent objections had been asserted, such objections were valid and reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the plaintiff has

not met her burden of proof with respect to her Motion to Compel. Additionally, and more importantly, the arguments made by plaintiff in her Motion to Compel, as well as any other motion she has filed with respect to discovery, are moot in light of the court's ruling on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasoning set forth herein, the court grants the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and denies the plaintiff's Motion to Compel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Honorable Perry H. Gravely
Presiding Judge

_____, South Carolina

April_____, 2017.

FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

COUNTY OF GREENVILLE
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CASE NUMBER 2016CP2302113

Aminah A Richburg

E A Rico Williams

South Carolina
School League

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by:

Attorney for: ☐ Plaintiff ☐ Defendant

☐ Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

☐ JURY VERDICT. This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.

☒ DECISION BY THE COURT. This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. ☐ See Page 2 for additional information.

☐ ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRCP; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRCP (Vol. Nonsuit);

☐ Rule 43(k), SCRCP (Settled); ☐ Other: _____

☐ ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 40(j) SCRCP; ☐ Bankruptcy;

☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; ☐ Other: _____

☐ STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY

☐ DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): MAY 26 2017

☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded; ☐ Other: _____

SC Court of Appeals

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☒ See attached order; (formal order to follow) ☐ Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ☒ ends ☐ does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk: _____

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as

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interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. **Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.**

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.

2755	4/17/2017
Circuit Court Judge	Judge Code Date

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on , and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on, to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Aminah A Richburg 217 Plum Creek Lane Greenville, SC 29607

Sarah Day Hurley PO Box 1509 Greenville, SC 29602
Rebecca Laffitte PO Box 11449 Columbia, SC 29211
John Michael Montgomery PO Box 11449 Columbia, SC 29211

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter

Paul B. Wickensimer Greenville County Clerk of Court - Clerk of Court

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgement to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.

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SC Court of Appeals



Greenville Common Pleas

Case Caption: Aminah A Richburg vs. E A Rico Williams , defendant, et al
Case Number: 2016CP2302113
Type: Order/Form 4

Motion/Order Granted

s/ Honorable Perry H. Gravely, #2755

Electronically signed on 2017-04-18 16:12:54 page 19 of 19

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