

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
COUNTY OF HORRY)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
CASE NO. 2009-CP-26-10053

HARLEYSVILLE GROUP INSURANCE,)
A PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION)

PLAINTIFF,)

VS.)

HERITAGE COMMUNITIES, INC, A)
SOUTH CAROLINA CORPORATION;)
HERITAGE RIVERWALK, A SOUTH)
CAROLINA CORPORATION; BUILD-)
STAR CORPORATION, A SOUTH)
CAROLINA CORPORATION, RIVER-)
WALK AT ARROWHEAD COUNTRY)
CLUB HORIZONTAL PROPERTY)
REGIME, RIVERWALK AT ARROW-)
HEAD COUNTRY CLUB PROPERTY)
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., A)
SOUTH CAROLINA CORPORATION,)
NATIONAL SURETY CORP., AND)
TONY L. POPE AND LYNN POPE,)
INDIVIDUALLY AND REPRESENTING)
AS A CLASS ALL UNIT OWNERS AT)
RIVERWALK AT ARROWHEAD)
COUNTRY CLUB HORIZONTAL)
PROPERTY REGIME.)

DEFENDANTS.)

**AMENDED
ORDER DENYING
HARLEYSVILLE'S MOTION TO DEPOSIT
FUNDS UNDER RULE 67, S.C.R.C.P.**

RECEIVED

MAY 31 2017

SC Court of Appeals

HARLEYSVILLE GROUP INSURANCE,)
A PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION)

PLAINTIFF,)

VS.)

HERITAGE COMMUNITIES, INC., A)
SOUTH CAROLINA CORPORATION;)
HERITAGE MAGNOLIA NORTH,)
INC., RIVERWALK, A SOUTH)

CASE NO. 2009-CP-26-11862

Harleysville was represented by Brian P. Crotty of Nelson Mullins Riley and Scarborough, LLC and the judgment creditors were represented by John P. Henry and Philip C. Thompson, of Thompson & Henry, P.A. The attorneys were present and both sides presented both Motions and oral arguments. Based upon the foregoing, I have amended the Order as set forth in this Amended Order Denying Harleysville's Motion to Deposit Funds Under Rule 67, S.C.R.C.P.

Background

The judgment creditors secured judgments against the Harleysville insureds in 2009. These judgments are final judgments ending with a dismissal of the Grant of Certiorari on September 30, 2015.¹ In the Riverwalk case, the jury awarded Five Million Five Hundred Thousand (\$5,500,000.00) Dollars which was subsequently reduced by set-off to Four Million Four Hundred Seventy-One Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Eight and 31/100 (\$4,471,178.31) Dollars. In the Magnolia North Case, the jury rendered a verdict of Eight Million Five Hundred Thousand (\$8,500,000.00) Dollars which was subsequently reduced by set-off to Six Million Nine Hundred Sixty-Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six and 85/100 (\$6,968,936.85) Dollars.

Soon after the verdicts were rendered in 2009, Harleysville filed the within declaratory judgment action to determine what part of the judgments in the underlying actions, if any, were covered. The cases were consolidated and the declaratory judgment action was referred to the Honorable Judge John Milling, as special referee. On March 5, 2013, Judge Milling issued his Order finding the entire verdicts were covered, but also finding that "time-on-risk" applied to the verdicts. This Order was appealed by all parties. On January 11, 2017, the Supreme Court issued its decision upholding Judge Milling's Order with a slight modification to the Pope Class Action verdict. Petitions for rehearing were filed by Harleysville and the judgment creditors, and they

¹ Magnolia North Properties Association, Inc., v. Heritage Communities, Inc., et al., 414 S.C. 198, 777 S.E.2d 831 (2015).
Pope v. Heritage Communities, Inc., et al., 414 S.C. 199, 777 S.E.2d 832 (2015).

remain pending. The judgments are not final judgments until remittitur is sent by the Supreme Court to the Horry County Clerk of Court. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company v. State, 401 S.C. 15, 736 S.E.2d 651 (2012) (The filing of a rehearing petition stays the remittitur and the judgment is not final.)

Statutory postjudgment interest began to accrue upon filing the judgments in 2009. (S.C. Code §34-31-20) Until filing the Motion, Harleysville has made no effort to stop the accrual of postjudgment interest. Two issues should be initially mentioned about Harleysville's Motion: 1) The Motion's sole purpose is to deposit the amounts found covered "pursuant to Rule 67 to prevent the further accrual of post-judgment interest." (See Harleysville's Motion, para. 7). 2) Harleysville proposes to deposit the amounts the Supreme Court at this stage says is due plus accrued interest since 2009 on the entire judgments and estimated costs, even though the amounts of Harleysville's liability for the judgments have not become final. Upon deposit, there would be a total remaining balance of Four Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Two and 81/100 (\$4,750,822.81) Dollars on the underlying judgments.

For the reasons hereinafter set forth, the Court denies Harleysville's Motion to Alter or Amend, grants the judgment creditors' Motion to Alter or Amend, and again denies Harleysville's Motion to Deposit Funds Under Rule 67, S.C.R.C.P. Dept. of Trans. V. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 369 S.C. 150, 631 S.E.2d 533 (2006) ("The granting of leave to deposit money with the Court pursuant to Rule 67, S.C.R.C.P., is a matter within the discretion of the trial Court and will not be overturned absence an abuse of discretion."); Cajun Elec. Power-Coop., Inc. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 901 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1990) (Relief under Rule 67 is committed to the sound discretion of the Court.)

Rule 67

The S.C. Appellate Courts have addressed the use of Rule 67 to stop the accrual of interest on very few occasions. Russo v. Sutton, 317 S.C. 441, 454 S.E.2d 895 (1995); Manning v. Brandon Corp., 163 S.C. 178, 161 S.E.2d 405 (1931); Duval v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 339 S.C. 616, 529 S.E.2d 566 (Ct. App. 2000); Small Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 330 S.C. 62, 496 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1998); Renaissance Enterprises v. Ocean Resorts, 334 S.C. 324, 513 S.E.2d 617 (1999) However, all of these cases are distinguishable from the instant case because none involved an insurance policy. Our Courts have made it clear that Rule 67 cannot be used to alter or affect the contractual or legal relations of the parties, including contractual provisions regarding the payment of interest. Renaissance, supra. (There is nothing in Rule 67 indicating that a deposit in Court will affect the parties' contract regarding interest); Turner Coleman, Inc., supra. (There is nothing in Rule 67 that abrogates or overrides the intent of the parties regarding interest rates as expressed in their contract.) The Court in Renaissance pointed out that our Rule 67 is substantially the same as Rule 67, Fed. R. Civ. P. and the Federal Courts have also uniformly held that Rule 67 could not be used to alter or affect the contractual and legal duties of the parties. Renaissance, supra at 619. The Renaissance Court also noted "Stopping the contractual accrual of interest would in effect substitute the interest rate of the Court's deposit account for that provided by contract which the Court has no authority to do." Id. at 619 (citing LTV Corp. v. Gulf State Steel, Inc. of Alabama, 969 F.2d 1050 (D.C. App. 2006))

HARLEYSVILLE'S POLICIES

Harleysville issued basically two forms of policies: a Commercial General Liability Form; and a Commercial Blanket Excess Liability Policy. These policies obligate Harleysville to pay postjudgment interest under the following provision:

SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS-
COVERAGES A AND B

We will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any "suit" against an insured we defend:

7. All interest on the **full amount of any judgment** that accrues after entry of the judgment and before we have paid, offered to pay, **or deposit in Court the part of the judgment that is within the "applicable limit of insurance"**. [Emphasis Supplied]

These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance.

This provision (known in the insurance industry as the "**Standard Interest Provision**") in the Harleysville policies is what governs payment of interest while Harleysville appeals to try and lessen its liability. As noted above, Harleysville cannot use Rule 67 to change its contractual duty under the policy. The proposed deposit by Harleysville does not comply with the "**standard interest provision**" in their policy and does not comport with judicial policy to encourage payment of the judgments:

A. The deposit abrogates the very purpose of the standard interest clause.

It is obvious from the plain language of the **standard interest clause** that its purpose is twofold: (1) to protect the insureds from the accumulation of postjudgment interest while the insurer appeals; and (2) to give the insurer a way out if it does not want to suffer the interest liability. Stamps v. Consolidated Underwriters, 208 Kan. 630, 493 P.2d 246 (1972) (Where the insurer controls the litigation and appeal insurer should be required to pay interest on the entire judgment until the insurer, under the **standard interest provision**, has satisfied its obligation under the policy.); McPhee v. American Motorists, Co. Inc., 57 Wis. 2d 669, 205 N.W. 2d 152 (1973) (Under the **standard interest clause**, where the insurer controls the litigation and appeal, the accumulation of interest on the entire judgment should be born by the insurer until insurer has discharged its obligation under the policy. Otherwise, the insurer could place any amount into the Court and stop the accrual of interest.)

The South Carolina Supreme Court has long recognized the equity in requiring the insurer to pay interest on the entire judgment because of its control of the litigation and appeal. In Cook v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241 (1960) the injured party had sued the insured and recovered a judgment and then sought payment from the insured's insurer, State Farm, and secured a judgment against State Farm. The judgment holder sought interest from State Farm in addition to his judgment. In holding State Farm liable for interest on the judgment, the Court stated:

The appellant in this case had complete control of the litigation between the respondent and the insured. It had the right to settle the case, or defend it, irrespective of the desires of the insured. It elected to defend the injury action resulting in the judgment heretofore stated. It likewise elected to defend this action brought by the respondent against it upon the contract of insurance. It *467 is only fair to compel the insurer to pay all the interest which accrues from the date of the original judgment.

Harleysville agreed that it would pay interest on the entire judgment to protect its insured until it satisfied its obligation under the policy. Harleysville's proposed deposit is not in accord with its policy because it does not fulfill Harleysville's contractual obligation to protect its insured from postjudgment interest until it satisfies its liability. If I were to allow Harleysville to deposit the contingent proceeds as it proposes, the insured would be left with the Four Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Two and 81/100 (\$4,750,822.81) Dollars, the balance of the judgment and could not satisfy his excess liability because the deposit is contingent and the insured would not know the amount he should satisfy. Since the insurer controls the litigation, settlement and appeal, pending appeal, the insured cannot satisfy the excess liability, and so the insurer must continue paying interest on the entire judgment until the insurer satisfies its liability leaving the insured free to settle its excess (after payment of the insurer's liability) and stop the interest against him. Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 707 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1997) Harleysville's deposit in Court of a contingent amount and contingent costs does not

stop the running of interest on the judgment because no part of the judgment has been satisfied. Until the amount of the judgment for which Harleysville is determined liable is applied to the judgment, interest, by statute and contract, continues to accrue on the judgment. Harleysville cannot deposit the funds out of the reach of the judgment creditors and at the same time, terminate the statutory interest it agreed to pay.

B. Harleysville's proposed deposit does not comply with its agreement to pay interest on the full amount of the judgment until it, Harleysville, pays, offers to pay or deposits its liability in Court.

I agree with the judgment creditors that the Court's holding in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 300 Pa. Super. 528, 446 A.2d 1284 (1982) does not allow Harleysville to make the deposit as they propose. The Court in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 300 PA. Super. 528, 446 A.2d 1284 (1982) had before it a petition from the insurance carrier ("National") to deposit into Court its limits of \$10,000.00 plus costs and interest to stop the interest on a \$150,000.00 judgment obtained against its insured. The petition provided as follows:

²The said insuring Agreement II(b)(2) provides, inter alia, that the insurer will "pay ... all interest accruing after entry of judgment until the company has paid or tendered or deposited in court such part of such judgment as does not exceed the limit of the Company's liability thereon", in this case \$10,000.00.

5. In order to limit its liability for interest under this paragraph, your Petitioner desires to pay into this Court, **to hold pending the outcome of the appeal which it is prosecuting on behalf of its insured**, a sum equal to the limits of the policy plus interest on the verdicts up to the date of the payment into Court, a total of \$23,875.00.

6. Under the terms of the policy, specifically "Exhibit A" hereto, your Petitioner's ultimate liability to its insured cannot exceed the said sum of \$23,875.00, even if the verdicts totaling \$150,000 should be sustained on appeal.

7. If this motion is not granted, your Petitioner would be seriously and irreparably prejudiced because its only alternatives would be to (a) pay the

² Notice- Language is practically identical to Harleysville policies.

said \$23,875.00 to plaintiff with the knowledge that the money can never be recovered if the verdicts are overturned on appeal, or (b) do nothing and have to defend a claim that is obligated to pay not only its limits but interest on the verdicts until the date of payment, after appeal (if the appeal is unsuccessful) which interest would accrue at the rate of \$750.00 per month for as long as the appeal is pending in the Superior and Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, your **Petitioner prays this Honorable Court permit your Petitioner to pay the said sum of \$23,875.00 into this Court, to be held pending the final appellate decision as to whether or not your Petitioner's insured is liable to Plaintiffs above named.** [Emphasis supplied]

The lower Court granted the petition. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed. The Court agreed that money paid into Court becomes the absolute property of the other party. The Appellate Court also agreed with the Plaintiffs that National's payment into Court with the agreement that if the insured's appeal was successful, it would get their money back, could not stop the accrual of interest. The Court held that in the order to stop the accrual of interest National had to relinquish its claim to the money. Otherwise, National, under the terms of its policy would be required to pay interest on the entire \$150,000.00 judgment despite their limit of liability being only \$10,000.00. The Court, in discussing the interest provision of National's policy (practically identical to that in the Harleysville's policies) noted:

The context of the phrase "**deposited in court**" in National Indemnity's policy is a standard clause providing that the company's interest liability continues to accrue "until the company has paid or tendered or deposited in court such part of such judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company's liability thereon." Thus "deposited in court" is set up in parallel with "paid" and "tendered." **What these three methods of stopping further accrual of the company's interest liability are intended to have in common is that in each method, the company makes an amount equal to the limits of its total liability to date unconditionally and immediately available to the judgment holder.** [Emphasis supplied]

In the Cohen case, the part of the judgment that was in the "applicable limit of insurance" was their policy limits of liability and thus, to stop the accrual of their interest liability, they were required to pay, tender or deposit into Court their limit of liability without contingency and make

the proceeds available to the judgment creditor. In this case, "that part of the judgment that is within the applicable limit of insurance" is to date the entire judgment; the amount Harleysville would have to deposit to stop the accrual of interest in accordance with the terms of their policy. See also Baughn v. Busick, 1975 OK. CIV. APP. 41, 541 P.2d. 873 (1975) (Under **standard interest clause** obligating the insurer to pay, offer to pay or deposit in Court that part of the judgment which does not exceed the limit of the companies liability thereon, the payment, offer to pay or deposit in Court must be unconditional in order to stop the accrual of interest.)

In a different context, our Court has addressed the requirements necessary to stop the running of interest. In Ruscon Const. Co. v. Beaufort-Jasper Water Authority, 259 S.C. 314, 191 S.E.2d 715 (1972) the Court said a valid tender stops the running of interest. The Court went on to say that a valid tender can only be in money, in the proper amount due, and without conditions annexed to its acceptance. Tender with a requirement of a release is not a valid tender. See also McNeil v. Herring, 155 S.C. 187, 152 S.E. 189 (1930) (Holding a conditional offer is not a valid tender. In order to be a valid offer (tender), it must be unconditional. The law is plain. Now, to keep a tender open, you offer the man the money unconditionally, and if he refuses it, you go and place it in the hands of the Clerk of Court without any conditions attached to it. This keeps the tender open so the creditor can go get it. The Court also opined:

"Now, under the law, if you owe a man a debt and you go to him and offer him the money, offer to pay the debt, and he doesn't take it, you still owe the debt, and in order to stop interest and costs on the case, the law requires you to go and deposit that money in the hands of the Clerk of Court, so that the man can go and get it whenever he wants it, but you have to deposit it unconditionally."

Smith v. Keels, 15 Rich. 318, 49 S.C.L 318 (1868) (An offer to pay money to constitute a valid tender must be unconditional.)

C. Harleysville's proposed deposit cannot be allowed because there is no final determination of that part of the judgment for which Harleysville is liable.

Harleysville agreed to pay interest on the full amount of the judgment until it deposited in Court "the part of the judgment that is within the 'applicable limit of insurance'". During oral arguments on the Motion, Harleysville argued that it was willing to deposit the amount of their maximum liability as found by the Supreme Court. The Court is not sure of the basis of this argument since petitions for rehearing have been filed by the parties.³ Until the Supreme Court finally decides Harleysville's liability, there is no crystal ball to determine "the part of the judgment that is within that applicable limit of insurance". Lancer Co. v. Sunrise Removal, Inc., 914 NYS 2d 174 (2010) (Where the policy provided that the accrual of interest would terminate upon the payment of, offer to pay or depositing in Court [**standard interest provision**] of its share of the judgment, the policy did not provide a mechanism for the extinguishment of the insurer's obligation to pay interest before the existence of a final judgment. The Court indicated that until there was a final judgment, insurer had to pay interest on the entire judgment.) Harleysville's proposal to deposit funds into Court will not stop the accrual of interest because it does not comply with Harleysville's contract (policy) regarding interest because at this point, it is impossible to determine the part of the judgment within "the applicable limit of insurance". Renaissance, *supra*.

D. Harleysville's proposed deposit is not in accord with its policy because Harleysville proposes to place contingencies on the deposit and the judgment creditors' access to the proceeds.

The Court would first note that there is no provision in Harleysville's policy for a contingent payment, offer to pay or deposit in Court. In Harleysville's proposed order attached to its Motion, it asks that the clerk not disburse the money until the parties litigate who is entitled to the proceeds and also asks the Court to hold that "a deposit of the judgment funds will have the

³ Harleysville notes in its Motion that it has filed a petition for rehearing and does not agree with the amounts of the judgments owed or the interest owed, if any.

same effect as a supersedes bond” and which stays execution and enforcement of the judgment. Again, there is nothing in Harleysville’s policy that allows for such a contingent deposit and the Court will not rewrite Harleysville’s policy to allow for such a contingency. DiBenedetto v. Estate of DiBenedetto, 219 N.J. Super 440, 530 A.2d 800 (1987) (In order to stop the accrual of interest the deposit must be made without contingency and cannot be used as a supercedeas to stop the accrual of interest. To stop the accrual of interest, the deposit must be continuously available to the claimant and placed beyond the reach of the carrier.) Dinkins v. General Airline and Film Corp., 214 F. Supp. 281, 283 (D.C. S.D. NY 1963) (The deposit under Rule 67 of a sum of money in Court is not to be used to circumvent the stringent prerequisites of seizure or attachments of a defendant’s assets.)

The Courts have all been in accord that a deposit, to stop the accrual of interest under the “**Standard Interest Clause**” as contained in Harleysville’s policy must be unconditional and the proceeds must be made available to the judgment creditor. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams 513 F.2d 355 (D.C. Tex. 1975) (In order to stop accrual, there must be an unconditional offer to give up the disputed fund and cease any dominion over the fund. The policy does not provide for a contingent, estimated, amount to be deposited.) U.S. v. American Home Assur. Co., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1371 (2014) (The accrual of interest will continue when the depositor seeks to impose conditions upon payment into the depository fund); U.S. For Use of Garrett v. Midwest Const. Co., 619 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1980) (In order to stop the accrual of interest under Rule 67, Midwest had to make the money available to Garrett without attempting to impose conditions on its acceptance.); Knippen v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 525 (Dist. Of Cola. Cir. 1997) (The insurance company must relinquish control over the money before the interest would cease.) Bossert v. Douglas, 557 P.2d 1164 (1976) (Where policy required there be a “paid or tendered or deposited in Court” in order to stop interest accruing after the judgment, there must be an unconditional, payment, tender

or deposit in Court to stop interest from accruing.) Davis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 434 Mass. 174, 747 N.E.2d 141 (2001) (Because there was nothing in Allstate's policy that allowed for a conditional offer to pay, Allstate was required to make an unconditional offer to pay to stop its obligation to pay postjudgment interest.) Whiddon v. Hutchinson, 668 So.2d 1368 (La. 1996) (Where Allstate's Motion was to deposit the funds with a requirement "forbidding the withdrawal of the funds without a determination of the amount and validity of the competing claims" and the Court ordered the funds to be deposited with this requirement, the deposit was not unconditional. The funds must be placed so as to allow Plaintiff's access to stop accrual of interest.) Farmers-Merchants Bank and Trust Co. v. St. Katherine Ins. Co., 570 So.2d 1186 (La. 1990) (Fire insurers deposit of funds into Court with condition that depositor was to be relieved from further liability was not an unconditional deposit.); Blasini-Stern v. Beech-Nut Life Savers Corp., 429 F. Supp. 533 (1976) (It seems the Defendant is seeking the best of all possible worlds. He is making a conditional tender and at the same time disputing what he owes. The tender cannot be made so to deprive the Plaintiff of his money. Rule 67 does not allow such a [contingent] deposit to stop the accrual of interest.)⁴

E. Harleysville's proposed deposit is not in accord with its policy because it changes the interest rate contained in its policy.

In Harleysville's Memorandum, Harleysville states that there is no interest rate set in the policy. The Court disagrees. Harleysville agreed to pay "any interest that accrues after entry of the judgment". The Court can think of no other reasonable way to interpret that provision other than payment of the judgment interest rate established by *S.C. Code §34-31-20* which, in 2017, is 7.75%. To allow the deposit would reduce the interest rate Harleysville agreed to pay which the Court has no authority to do. Renaissance, supra.

⁴ Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Drive Trademark Holding, LP, 680 F. Supp. 2d 639 (D.C. De. 2010) (Rule 67 cannot be used to alter the contractual relations of the parties. Moreover, it cannot be used to deposit in Court a fund to secure the satisfaction of a prospective judgment.)

F. By allowing Harleysville to make the proposed deposit, Harleysville loses all incentive to pay the judgments.


The proposed deposit by Harleysville will eliminate any incentive it has to pay the judgment. As Harleysville pointed out in its Motion, our Court has pointed out two reasons to use Rule 67 to allow a deposit in Court while litigation is pending. First, the deposit in Court encourages the debtor to pay the judgment, and secondly, assures the judgment creditor that the funds will be available at the end of litigation. Russo v. Sutton, *supra*. The only reason Harleysville seeks by its Motion to make the deposit is to stop the accrual of interest. Nowhere in their Motion do they say how this deposit will encourage them to pay their liability, or assure the judgment creditors the funds will be there. In fact, under Harleysville's proposed contingent deposit, the judgment creditors have no assurance what, if any, funds will be available. Harleysville's only purpose is to relieve itself of their contractual duty to pay statutory interest on the entire judgments.⁵

The only incentive Harleysville has at present to pay their liability is the requirement that they pay statutory interest on the entire judgment as provided in their policy. If Harleysville is relieved of any duty to pay interest by the deposit, they can continue their appeals with impunity while postjudgment interest continues to accrue against their insureds. River Val. Cartage Co., Inc. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d 242, 161 N.E.2d 101, 104 (1959) (By allowing the insurer to deposit a sum which is not in compliance with its contract, the insurer relieves itself of the provision for the payment of interest which is its incentive for speedily discharging its entire obligation.)

⁵ In its Motion, Harleysville states: "The Motion is for the express purpose of stopping further post-judgment interest from running."

Based on the foregoing reasons it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Harleysville's Motion be, and the same is hereby denied.

5-31-17
Date


The Honorable Larry B. Hyman, Jr.
Circuit Court Judge