

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM DORCHESTER COUNTY

Court of Common Pleas

Maité Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2016-001977

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
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SC Court of Appeals

The State of South Carolina, Respondent,
v.

Breanna Flannery, Appellant.

INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT



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July 24, 2017

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Statement of Issues on Appeal

Question I: Did the trial court err in allowing the State to submit a video into evidence without any testimony to authenticate or identify the video and without laying a sufficient foundation?

Question II: Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss the case or direct a verdict of not guilty on the charge of DUI first offense where the State failed to properly submit the statutorily required in-car video into evidence?

Question III: Did the trial court err in failing to sequester the State's witnesses, despite granting the Defendant's motion to sequester, allowing officer Tuck to conduct a direct examination of a witness and then later testify himself, in addition to providing an opening statement and a closing argument?

Question IV: Did the trial court err in failing to order a mistrial regarding hearsay evidence that was suppressed by the court prior to trial, upon the State's three overt attempts to present such inadmissible hearsay in opening statements, leading questions on direct and finally in the witnesses introductory testimony?

Question VI: Did the trial court err in allowing the State to introduce the result of the breath test into evidence when it was shown to the court that the machine was 7 months past the expiration date of Calibration, in direct violation of SLED policy and procedure, and material evidence was presented to bring the reliability of the machine into question?

Question V: Did the trial court err in finding that Officer Hayes had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop on the Defendant?

Question VI: Did the trial court err in allowing jury selection to proceed with only 15 qualified jurors where 4 of those potential jurors either worked as police officers or explained having close ties to law enforcement?

Question VII: Did the trial court err in forcing a Monday morning trial to continue well beyond normal working hours, and what any juror might have reasonably expected, because the trial Judge is part time and only works on Mondays?

Question VIII: Did the trial court err in forcing Defense Counsel to manually turn down the volume on the television, during the State's presentation of in-car video, after suppressing information discussed in the video?

Question IX: Did the trial court err in allowing the entire trial to proceed in a manner which continuously showed deference to the inexperienced officers attempting to try a jury trial without the benefit of legal training, insisting that jurors be held for nearly 5 hours after the close of normal business, because of the judge's part-time status, and ultimately creating an unfair, unjust and unconstitutionally partial environment as a cumulative result wherein it was impossible for the case to proceed as it should under the due process clauses of the Constitutions of South Carolina and the United States?

Statement of the Case

Procedural Facts

Breanna Flannery was arrested on September 1, 2014. Officer Tuck charged her with Driving Under the Influence 1st Offense and Unlawful Use of a License. She pled not guilty and was tried before the Honorable Judge P. Brandt Shelbourne and a jury on April 13, 2015 in the Summerville Magistrate Court. She was convicted on both charges. He sentenced her to a fine of \$1229.50 or 30 days on the DUI and a fine of \$237.50 for Unlawful Use of a License. Defense Counsel filed a Motion to Set Aside the Conviction and Grant a Directed Verdict or for a New Trial. An order was issued on August 17, 2015 denying each ground. Notice of the Court's decision was provided to Counsel via email on August 28, 2015. Notice of intent to Appeal was then filed on August 28, 2015. The appellate Judge vacated judgment against Ms. Flannery regarding the unlawful use of a license, however her appeal was denied with regard to her conviction for DUI in an order dated August 5, 2016; the Appellant received written notice on August 10, 2016.

The Notice of Appeal was then filed on September 9, 2016.

Factual Statement

Breanna Flannery was driving on Dorchester Rd, when Dorchester County Deputy Hayes decided he was going to follow her. At the time, Deputy Hayes was not trained in DUI detection. He pulled behind her vehicle at a red light, at the intersection of Ladson Rd. and Dorchester Rd. Deputy Hayes proceeded to follow her vehicle for 2.8 miles, stopping at two more red lights and passing through a third intersection before stopping at the North Charleston Fire Department, where flashing yellow lights suddenly turned red and both vehicles stopped to allow a fire truck to exit the station and answer an emergency call. Deputy Hayes continued to follow Ms. Flannery for another 1.8 miles before initiating a traffic stop at the corner of Dorchester Rd. and Appian Way. In total, Deputy Hayes followed Ms. Flannery for more than 8 minutes over a distance of nearly 4 ½ miles. Deputy Hayes testified that in the entire time he followed Ms. Flannery, he noticed her tires cross the lane lines twice. He first sees her tires touch the line on a curve after three minutes and twenty seconds of following her and then again nearly five minutes later. Upon the second instance of her a tire touching the lane line in 8 minutes of pursuit, Deputy Hayes initiates a traffic stop. Rec. on App. at 4, ll 11-25 to 5, 1-23

Deputy Tuck, is called to the scene to investigate for a potential DUI as he was properly trained and qualified in DUI detection. Deputy Tuck performs Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) and concludes there is probable cause to arrest Ms. Flannery for DUI. Upon searching Ms. Flannery's vehicle Deputies find a driver's license belonging to another person. As a result of their investigation, Ms. Flannery is arrested and transported to Dorchester County Sheriff's Office for Blood Alcohol Breath Testing. Ms. Flannery provided a sample and the machine produced a result of 0.143, indicating the level of alcohol in her system was 143 thousandths of a percent.

Argument

I. The trial court erred in allowing the State to submit a video into evidence without any testimony to authenticate or identify the video and without laying a sufficient foundation.

The South Carolina Rules of Evidence, Rule 901 requires as a condition precedent to admissibility that items entered into the record and submitted as evidence, for a jury to consider in its finding of fact, be authenticated or identified. In the instant case, the only witness capable of identifying the video evidence or authenticating it as an official copy was Deputy Hayes. Deputy Hayes testified on direct, cross-examination and redirect. He was then excused. At no point during Deputy Hayes' testimony did the State attempt to place the copy of his in-car video into evidence. Rec. on App. at 6, l 25 to 7 ll 1-19. After the witness had been excused, the State attempted to offer a video into evidence. Defense Counsel objected to the submission of an unidentified, unauthenticated video into evidence. The Judge took a recess to determine his ruling and returned with the explanation that it was an unorthodox method, but that the State laid a sufficient foundation to enter the video into evidence. Return at 2.¹

Defense Counsel again argued that testimony from Deputy Hayes, explaining that he had placed his video in the Sheriff's Department evidence locker was not sufficient to support a foundation for the evidence the State intended to introduce at trial. The State missed its opportunity to properly submit a key piece of their case into evidence. Instead of following the law, and requiring the State to comply with the SC Rules of Evidence, the court ruled that the State got close enough and entered the video into evidence without any foundation at all.

¹ While the Magistrate's return fails to address the significant recess taken to decide whether a sufficient foundation was laid for entry of the video into evidence, or its finding that the foundation was unorthodox, it makes reference to pre-trial testimony about what happened in a video and specifically references that "Hayes testified that he took the video and entered into the Sheriff's evidence," as proof the disc Officer Tuck submitted into evidence was properly identified and authenticated.

SCRCE 901. Rec on App. at 7, ll1-25 to 8, ll 1-15.

The trial judge ruled improvidently that a video could be placed in evidence without the State's needing to follow proper procedure in an effort to show deference to the well-intentioned but poorly executed procedure of a police officer attempting to manage a jury trial. The judge was well aware of the fatal nature of the mistake made by the State, and further that it was a mistake no lawyer would likely commit. The fact that a recess was taken, with the Judge returning and ruling that an unorthodox but sufficient foundation had been laid sheds light on the stretch the court decided to make. The Rules of Evidence do not bend for the State, and officers prosecuting their own cases without the aid of an attorney should not receive any deference or special treatment, especially not when it erodes the protections afforded to the Defendant under due process.

II. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case or direct a verdict of not guilty on the charge of DUI first offense where the State failed to properly submit the statutorily required in-car video into evidence.

South Carolina law requires that the video recording at the incident site must not begin later than the activation of the officer's blue lights, include any field sobriety tests administered and include the arrest of a person for violation of §56-5-2930, or Driving Under the Influence.² The key case in the analysis of the video taping requirement is City of Rock Hill v. Suchenski, 374 S.C. 12, 646 S.E.2d 879 (2007). In Suchenski, the defendant was convicted in municipal court for driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration (DUAC). Id. At 14, 646 S.E.2d at 879. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the conviction based on the City of Rock Hill's failure to videotape the defendant's entire arrest as the arresting officer's camera "ran out

² See §56-5-2953

of tape.” Id. Although the decision in Suchenski indisputably established that the videotaping provisions of section 56-5-2953 are mandatory and not optional, certain statutory exceptions could exist which might excuse the lack of a video. Here, no such exceptions apply. In fact, it would be the State’s argument that they did have the video and it complied with the requirements of the statute. The only missing component was presenting a video to the court and to the jury, which had been identified and authenticated by Deputy Hayes in the course of his testimony. Neither one was completed.

The return filed by Judge P. Brandt Shelbourne attempts to ground its reasoning for entering the video into evidence by referencing Deputy Hayes’ testimony that “he took the video and entered it into the Sheriff’s evidence.”³ Further reference to the discussion of Defendant’s motion prior to trial, challenging Deputy Hayes’ reasonable suspicion for the stop, is made in an effort to validate what was deemed an unorthodox method, but what the court fails to note tells more of the story. Deputy Hayes testified about video shown to the court and described the events that took place in the video. What the return does not mention and what Deputy Hayes never mentioned at any point in his testimony was that the video presented to the court and the jury was in fact recognized by him as *the video* taken from his car on the night of the incident and fairly represented the events that took place on the day of arrest (emphasis added). Moreover, the State presented no chain of custody evidence in the course of Deputy Hayes’ testimony, which might have shed light on his comment that he placed a video into the Sheriff’s evidence locker. Rec. on App. at 7 ll 3-24

As evidenced by this Court’s decision in Suchenski, the Legislature clearly intended for a *per se* dismissal in the event a law enforcement agency violates the mandatory provisions of section 56-5-2953. Notably, the Legislature specifically provided for the dismissal

³ Magistrate’s return on appeal, page 2.

of a DUI charge unless the law enforcement agency can justify its failure to produce a videotape of a DUI arrest.⁴ The State failed to properly submit a key piece of evidence into the record through the testimony of the only witness with knowledge, the only witness capable of properly identifying or authenticating video evidence crucial to the prosecution of a DUI offense. No such entry was made into evidence. Only later, after Deputy Hayes had been excused, did the State attempt to submit a video into evidence. The lower court erred in giving inexperienced police officers a pass on the requirements of Rule 901, SCRE, a rule of evidence designed to protect parties from inaccurate or potentially misleading information entering into evidence before the trier of fact, and in doing so, attempted write a new set of rules which unfairly and unconstitutionally abridge a defendant's right to due process in violation of the 5th and 14th amendments to the Constitution.

III. The trial court erred in failing to sequester the State's witnesses, despite granting the Defendant's motion to sequester, allowing officer Tuck to conduct a direct examination of a witness and then later testify himself, in addition to providing an opening statement and a closing argument.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the impracticality of a prosecuting attorney presenting every traffic court violation gives way to permitting the practice of allowing an arresting officer to prosecute cases in magistrate's court.⁵ This rule was extended in State ex rel. McLeod v. Seaborn, where the Court decided that a supervisory officer could assist a new or inexperienced officer in prosecuting a case. The Court saw no distinction, for the purpose of evaluating a violation of the statute prohibiting the practice of law without being enrolled as a member of the South Carolina Bar, between the arresting officer and a supervisory officer in

⁴ *Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts*, 393 S.C. 332, 347, 713 S.E.2d 278, 285 (2011)

⁵ *State v. Messervy*, 258 S.C. 110, 187 S.E.2d 524 (1972)

handling the prosecution of a case.⁶

In pre-trial motions Defense Counsel argued to the judge that the State's witnesses should be sequestered. That motion was granted, however, Deputy Tuck was allowed to perform a direct examination of Deputy Hayes before he himself took the stand. Return at 1. Defense counsel objected to this decision arguing that Deputy Tuck's presence in the courtroom was not required for Deputy Hayes testimony and that the purpose of sequestering the State's witnesses would be completely undermined, not only by Deputy Tuck being present, but more importantly by his being able to conduct examination of the witness. Rec. on App. at 9 ll 18-25 to 10 ll 1-25. The opportunity for either purposeful or unintended cohesion of the witnesses' testimony is far too great where a primary witness in a case is able to perform the examination of another witness. State v. Messervy plainly allows an officer to prosecute his own case. He may provide an opening statement, present testimony and evidence, if in accordance with the rules, and finally present a closing argument. The Court found that this did not present prejudice and was instead a means for efficiently handling cases in the lower court. Id.

State ex rel. McLeod v. Seaborn similarly stands for the proposition that a supervisor may step into the role of an attorney and assist in trying a case where an officer is new or inexperienced. Id. However, the lower court in this case erred in attempting to blend these cases' respective findings to say that an officer may take complete control of the courtroom. This trial is a perfect example of a case where Dorchester County should have provided a supervising officer to examine Deputy Tuck and Deputy Hayes, and take on the rest of the responsibilities of presenting the State's case. Instead, the jury was treated to the Deputy Tuck show. Allowing Deputy Tuck to wear so many hats most certainly created an unfair picture of authority and trustworthiness to the jury, both in his statements and arguments as well as in his

⁶ SC Code §40-5-310

questions and testimony, but more importantly, it allowed him to present the jury with a seamless presentation of the State's case, free of any contradiction, discrepancy or possible human error. He was able to play his cards in a hand of bridge with the benefit of staring at all his partners' cards. This should never have been allowed and it created reversible error.

IV. The trial court erred in failing to order a mistrial regarding hearsay evidence that was suppressed by the court prior to trial, upon the State's three overt attempts to present such inadmissible hearsay in opening statements, leading questions on direct and finally in the witness' introductory testimony.

In nearly every case where the South Carolina Supreme Court has addressed the issue of hearsay testimony serving as cause for a mistrial, the Court generally states that the defendant must show both error and resulting prejudice. State v. Gardner and State v. Chisolm both find that where testimony is cumulative and a curative instruction is given, the appearance of hearsay on the record does not amount to reversible error. These and other similar cases all involve attorneys trained in legal theory, the rules of evidence and, more than likely, lawyers with previous trial experience. In such a scenario, both the State's attorney and Defense counsel are well aware of what constitutes inadmissible hearsay, and both will generally not make overt attempts to put such evidence into the record, especially when previously cautioned by the court.

The scenario in this case was far different. Counsel for the Defendant, being fully aware the State's case would be presented by inexperienced police officers, took the time to very deliberately move the court in advance of opening statements seeking to make sure both Deputy Tuck and Deputy Hayes understood that any reference to Deputy Hayes' having been "flagged down in reference to an impaired driver" was inadmissible hearsay. Normally, Defense counsel would wait to object during testimony, but there was concern about the officers' understanding

of the rule and the motion was made pre-trial as a motion to suppress any mention of being flagged down, as that individual was not available to testify. The Judge agreed and took time to explain to both officers that no mention could be made regarding Deputy Hayes being flagged down. Rec. on App. at 11 ll 17-25 to 12 l 1. All parties agreed and stated that they understood and the jury was called in to begin opening statements.

In the course of his opening statement, Deputy Tuck made specific mention of Deputy Hayes being flagged down in reference to an impaired driver. Defense Counsel had to object within less than 2 minutes of the State's presentation of its case. The jury was removed. The judge again explained the rule and that it could not come before the jury as it was inadmissible hearsay. When the jury returned, Deputy Tuck finished his opening statement, Defense counsel gave an opening statement and the State began presenting its case in chief. After asking Deputy Hayes to introduce himself to the jury, the very first question of substance from Deputy Tuck was "what reason did you have to be following the Defendant's car?" Defense counsel was forced to object again, and a sidebar was held in the presence of the jury where the judge explained to Deputy Tuck that he could not directly solicit the hearsay testimony. After the sidebar, Deputy Tuck returned to questioning Deputy Hayes. His opening question was amended to "Tell us what happened on September 1, 2014." Deputy Hayes responded saying, "Well, I was flagged down in reference to an impaired driver." Defense counsel had now lodged three objections from the beginning of opening statements through the second question on direct and the jury was twice required to leave the courtroom for the judge to admonish Deputy Tuck and then Deputy Hayes. Rec. on App. at 12 ll 1-22. Grounds for App. at 4.

The Magistrate's Return seems to gloss over this point, and most others, in an attempt to undermine the overall significance. Rather than respond or offer any contradictory

insight to the detailed references of Appellant's Grounds for Appeal, the Magistrate's Return tends to simply list the court's decision and detail favorable to that response. However, ignoring those points and references made in the Appellant's Grounds for Appeal does not render them invalid. Quite the opposite is true, in fact. Failing to address a specific point or refute the Appellant's assertions, serves as a form of acceptance. The Return may still arrive at error in its decision for one reason or another, but this does nothing to discredit the accuracy or validity of Appellant's specific factual assertions. Here, there is reference to the court granting Defendant's motion to exclude the testimony, however the return fails to address the two prior instances where Counsel had to object, before the third time the State attempted to introduce previously suppressed hearsay when Deputy Hayes made "what appeared to be inadvertent reference . . . to being 'flagged down by a concerned citizen.'" Return at 2. Also, Grounds for App. at 4 & Rec. on App. at 12 ll19-22. The Return also fails to mention the subsequent removal of the jury, and continued explanation to the officers that the hearsay they so desperately wanted to put in front of the jury was inadmissible, before a curative instruction was given. Grounds for App. at 4.

Having to thrice leap from the chair to conceal a statement from the jury, one they no doubt heard at least twice, while they became acutely aware of the Defendant's intention to keep something from them, Defense Counsel moved for a mistrial. The harm and prejudice to the Defendant was clear, in that just as the Deputies began to tell the jury what happened, the attorney kept jumping up and objecting. He must have been trying to hide something. That first impression could not be undone. To have the State's presentation of its case go so terribly wrong at such an early phase of the trial, especially in such a manner that so easily could have been avoided, there would have been no harm or prejudice to either side in simply declaring a mistrial and docketing the case for a future date to pick a new jury. Conversely, the prejudice to the Defendant was enormous. Had it been a single mistake, handled with an objection and a curative

instruction to disregard, the error would arguably be harmless. But on a third occasion, for the jury to spend less time in the courtroom than out of the courtroom for the opening statements and the first two questions on direct, it turned the entire trial into a circus. Failing to order a mistrial was an error and it resulted in immediate and permanent prejudice in violation of Appellant's rights to due process under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution.

V. The trial court erred in finding that Officer Hayes had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop on the Defendant.

As is mentioned previously, Officer Hayes followed the Defendant's vehicle for more than 8 minutes before initiating a traffic stop. He testified that he was not trained in DUI detection at the time of the arrest. Rec. on App. at 4 ll 12-20. Grounds for App. at 3 to 4. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has promulgated a uniform training guide for officers all over the country to detect and investigate DUI. Before an officer can properly stop someone, and before they can complete a full investigation, NHTSA training is strongly recommended and is now taught as the standard rather than the exception at the SC Police Academy. According to NHTSA, Phase one of a DUI investigation is observing the vehicle in motion. Officers are trained that this is the time to decide whether reasonable suspicion exists. NHTSA provides one of three answers: yes – do it now; wait – look for additional evidence; and no – don't do it. Officers must observe the vehicle, what first attracted their attention to the vehicle and note details about the driving before initiating a traffic stop.⁷

Officers are instructed that as an alternative to stopping a vehicle, they may continue to observe it, but if there is no valid reason for the stop, they should disregard the vehicle. In Deputy Hayes' case, he delayed the decision to stop for 8 minutes over the course of

⁷ NHTSA 2013 Participant Manual

a 4 ½ mile stretch. His testimony indicated that the vehicle’s tires touch the outside lane line twice during his observation. Rec on App. at 5 ll 1-10. When asked on cross examination which of the 24 cues he used to develop reasonable suspicion, he could not articulate any such knowledge at the time of the stop, since he lacked NHTSA training. What became apparent in his testimony and from watching the in-car video was that Deputy Hayes had been flagged down by an unknown motorist who put the idea in his head that Ms. Flannery was an impaired driver. Rec. on App. at 5 ll 11- 17. Grounds for App. at 4. From the point he began following her, he was simply waiting, patiently for 8 minutes, to find some confirmation of a bystander’s suggestion. And as Warren Buffet is quoted saying, “you put a police car on anyone’s tail for 500 miles, he’s gonna get a ticket.”

Reasonable suspicion requires an articulable set of facts and inferences. A police officer may stop and briefly detain and question a person for investigative purposes, when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts, short of probable cause for arrest, that the person is involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). “Reasonable suspicion” requires a “particularized and objective basis that would lead one to suspect another of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be considered. *Id.* At 417.⁸ By this standard, Deputy Hayes’ explanation that he was on the hunt for an impaired driver, and during the course of following a vehicle for 8 minutes he observed a vehicle touch the outside lane line twice, does not rise to the required standard of particularized and objective articulable facts or inferences to believe a person is involved in criminal activity. The lower court’s ruling was made in error and the case should have been dismissed for lack of reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop.

⁸ *State v. Williams* (S.C. App., 2016)

VI. The trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the result of the breath test into evidence when it was shown to the court that the machine was 7 months past the expiration date of Calibration, in direct violation of SLED policy and procedure, and material evidence was presented to bring the reliability of the machine into question.

South Carolina Code allows a trial judge, on motion of either party, to exclude evidence of any test results where the court finds a failure to follow SLED policies and procedures and such failure materially affects the accuracy or reliability of the test results or the fairness of the testing procedure.⁹ In deciding to exclude such evidence the trial judge should rule specifically as to the manner in which the reliability of the test results was affected. Prior to the State's introduction of the Breath Test Result, Counsel for the Defendant objected and moved to suppress or exclude the result of the test under §56-5-2950 (J). Counsel presented the court with documents retrieved from SLED's online records showing the machine used in taking Ms. Flannery's sample was 7 months outside of the expiration date for Calibration, a clear violation of SLED policy. Rec. on App. at 14 111-15. These documents were later introduced into evidence through cross-examination of Deputy Tuck. Defense Exhibits 9 & 10.

In arguing the motion for exclusion of the result from the Datamaster, Defense Counsel first presented the court with a violation of SLED regulations. The court was then provided a list of all breath test results taken from the machine at issue between July 19, 2014 and September 1, 2014.¹⁰ During the 45-day period, 17 breath samples were taken. Of those 17 samples, 3 of them registered the exact same reading, 0.143 or 143 thousands of a percent. Defense counsel explained that this was all but a mathematical impossibility. For three separate

⁹ SC Code §56-5-2950 (J)

¹⁰ The final sample listed was the Defendant's.

individuals, two men and Ms. Flannery, to all register the exact same reading within a span of 17 tests administered over the short span of 45 days, this machine would have the court believe that their blood alcohol levels were all exactly the same to the 100,000th. A percent is 100th and the machine's readings are to the 1,000th. Rather than issue a finding that the violation of SLED policy had a material impact of the accuracy of the reading, the Judge decided it was a jury question.

State v. Landon establishes that the Defendant must make a prima facie showing of prejudice in order to shift the burden to the State, regarding a violation of S.C. Code §56-5-2954, which deals with SLED's mandatory record-keeping of machine results and repairs. While not directly on point with the issue here, it provides guidance on what is required of the defendant in alleging a violation of §56-5-2950 (J), regarding other violations of SLED policy and informing the court of how the credibility of the machine's results are materially affected. In the instant case, the court was provided with a violation of SLED policy and a series of results which give rise to obvious and substantial questions about the frequency of a singular result, repeated far too often to make any logical sense, and consequently the same reading or result at issue in the case before the court. Under such circumstances, it was error for the court to ignore what even a degenerate gambler would consider long odds. The breath test result and the entire BAC room video should have been excluded from the trial, and failing to do so creates reversible error.

VII. The trial court erred in forcing a Monday morning trial to continue into the night, well beyond normal working hours and what any juror might have reasonably expected, because the trial Judge is part time and only works on Mondays.

Jurors were summoned to appear at the Dorchester County Courthouse at 10AM on Monday, April 13, 2015 for selection in Ms. Flannery's trial. Of the total 15 eligible jurors

that appeared for trial, a few were late, so selection began shortly after 11AM. As the trial continued into the late afternoon, it was clear that it would not finish by 5PM. Defense Counsel requested an adjournment for the day, concerned about juror fatigue and the potential for inattentive participation. Rec. on App. at 15 ll10-17. The trial judge made it clear that he only sat on the bench on Mondays, and the trial would have to finish that day. Defense counsel objected, citing the fact that no juror who was summoned for court at 10AM could possibly have expected to be required to stay after normal working hours. This was not evening court, and it was a Monday morning trial. With plenty of time left in the week to finish the case, Defense Counsel asked the court to reconsider its position.

No such consideration was given, to either the inconvenience of jurors who sat for hours past when they expected to go home, or to the impact it had on the fairness of the Defendant's trial. The trial judge did finally inquire with the jury around 8PM if they wished to come back the following day or if they would rather wrap up the trial, and hear arguments before deliberating. Return at 1. Grounds for App. at 2. At that point, with the end in sight, the jury did agree to stay a while longer. Having invested the better part of a 9-hour day at the court, jurors were presented with the option of returning again the next day or sitting through a bit more and being able to put the case behind them. Defense Counsel requested this question be addressed far earlier in the day, but the court was adamant that the trial continue until it finished. While the trial judge may not have foreseen just how long the proceedings would last into the night, neither the parties nor the jury should have been held so late on the first day of the work week. The Defendant's right to a fair trial, before an attentive jury was compromised by the schedule of a part-time trial judge. This was a violation of due process and constitutes reversible error.

VIII. The trial court erred in forcing Defense Counsel to manually turn down the volume on the television, during the State's presentation of in-car video, after suppressing information discussed in the video.

Nearly halfway through the video presented by the State, Deputies Tuck and Hayes have a conversation about Zero Tolerance. Defense counsel objected to allowing this portion of the video to be presented to the jury under Rule 403 SCRE as it might potentially confuse the jury regarding the State's burden of proving material and appreciable impairment as presumed by a BAC reading above 0.08. The court granted the Defendant's motion and agreed the jury should not hear that discussion. Defense Counsel requested the State stop the tape before the discussion began and start the video again at the appropriate time. Over Defense Counsel's objection, the trial judge ruled that if the Defendant wanted to suppress that conversation, Defense Counsel would be required to manually turn down the volume on the television, while the tape continued to play, all being done right in front of the jury. Rec. on App. at 13 ll 10-25

Once again, the jury was presented with the familiar image of Defense Counsel intervening in the State's narrative. At the proper time in the video, Defense Counsel had to leave his seat, approach the television with the remote (which did not have a mute button) and hold down the volume button until the audio was completely muted. Then again at the appropriate time, Defense Counsel turned the volume back up until the audio was loud enough for all to hear. Requiring this exercise was completely unnecessary, prejudicial in and of itself, and taken together with the sheer volume of times Defense Counsel had to address an issue of law outside the jury's presence or explain the most basic rule of hearsay for a third time, the Defendant's right to due process and a fair trial was irreparably damaged.

IX. The trial court erred in allowing the entire trial to proceed in a manner which

continuously showed deference to inexperienced officers attempting to try a jury trial without the benefit of legal training, ultimately creating an unfair, unjust and unconstitutionally partial environment as a cumulative result wherein it was impossible for the Defendant to receive a fair trial before an impartial jury as required under the due process clauses of the Constitutions of South Carolina and the United States.

The cumulative impact of mistakes committed by the State, spearheaded by two County Deputies who very clearly did not possess the experience necessary to manage a complex and contested DUI trial in front of a jury, and the trial court's valiant efforts to aid those officers in presenting their case to the jury for deliberation, resulted in an undermining of the Defendant's constitutional protections time and time again. It began with a Deputy who wore every hat possible, aside from that of the judge or the jury. It continued with bending the Rules of Evidence to make accommodation for clumsy presentation of the State's case in chief, and where necessary forcing Defense Counsel to repeatedly appear to be hiding vital facts and information from the jury. And because of the trial judge's part-time status, the farce carried on late into the evening, asking a panel of 6 female jurors to enjoy their delivery pizza and deliberate in earnest, after an 11 hour Monday in the Summerville Magistrate Courthouse. Rec. on App. at 15 ll10-25 to 16 ll 1-7.


In evaluating the merits of the issues raised in this appeal this Court need not venture too far nor delve too deep to find prejudice. The Defendant's trial was rife with procedural impropriety. Admittedly, it would be conceivable that one or several of the rulings made in this case might regularly avoid a challenge. However, evaluating the prejudice to the Defendant and the due process denied as an amalgamation and sum of its parts, this Court ought not struggle to find reversible error.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the conviction of Breanna Flannery and direct that a judgment of not guilty be entered in this matter. In the alternative this matter should be remanded for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

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BY: 
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

North Charleston, South Carolina
July 23, 2017

CERTIFICATION OF FILING

I, Timothy D. Amey, do hereby certify that I, on July 24, 2017, by US Mail or by courier, filed to the Court of Appeals 1220 Senate St. Columbia, SC 29201 the original copy of this Petition.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Timothy D. Amey, hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing, listed below, was sent by US Mail or by courier to the counsel of record for the South Carolina Attorney General's Office; this 24th day of July, 2017

Document(s) Served: Initial Brief on Appeal

Person(s) David Spencer
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Tim Amey - Attorney at Law


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


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