Roderick McRae #236188
386 Redemption Way
McCormick, S.C. 29899

Date 8-24 2017

2015-CP-37-0504

Dear Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
South Carolina Supreme Court:

Enclosed Please find a original copy of Notice of ~~Appeal~~ Requesting a clocked-Dated ~~stamped~~. Also final order of Dismissal.

Respectfully Submitted
s/Roderick McRae

c: C; R; M;
cc: H; D; E S;

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM ANDERSON COUNTY

COURT of Common Pleas

Diane S. Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge

Case No# 2015-CP-37-0504

Roderick McRae, 236188. . . Appellant

VS

State of South Carolina. . . . . Respondent

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The Appellant Roderick McRae, 236188, takes this appeal from the case captioned above. The order in this case was Entered on July 7, 2017, Notice of Entry of this order was received on August 8, 2017

Date 8-24-2017

S/ Roderick McRae

Roderick McRae
236188
386 Redemption Way
McCormick, S.C. 29899

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL From ANDERSON County
Court of Common Pleas

Diane S. Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge

Case No: 2015-CP-37-0504

Roderick McRae, 236188. . . . Appellant

VS

State of South Carolina . . Respondent

AFFIDAVIT of Service

The undersigned pro, se does hereby certify that(s) he has served below listed parties with a copy of the pleading (s) indicated below by mailing a copy of same to them in the united states mail, with sufficent postage affixed thereto And Return address clearly marked on the date indicated below.

Parties served

Pleading

Date _____ 2017

Lindsey A McCallister
AAG S.C. Attorney General
off
Columbia S.C. 29211-1549

s/ _____
384 Redemption Way
McCormick S.C. 29835

Roderick McRae #286188
386 Redemption Way
McCormick, S.C. 29899

Date 8-24 2017

2017-CP-37-0504

Dear Lindsey A McCallister AAG
S.C. Attorney General.

Enclosed Please find a original copy file within the South Carolina Supreme Court. Also final order of Dismissal.

Respectfully Submitted
s/ Roderick McRae

c.c. R.M.
cc: H.D.E.S.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF OCONEE	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Roderick McRae, #236188, Applicant, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.	)	2015-CP-37-00504 **FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

This matter comes before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed by Roderick McRae (Applicant) on June 29, 2015. Respondent made its Return On March 2, 2017, requesting the application be summarily dismissed as untimely, successive, for failing to make a *prima facie* case of newly discovered evidence, for failing to state a cognizable claim, and as barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.

Pursuant to this request, and after reviewing the pleadings in this matter and all of the records attached thereto, this Court issued a Conditional Order of Dismissal signed March 24, 2017, and filed April 6, 2017, provisionally denying and dismissing this action, while giving the Applicant twenty days from the date of service of said Order in which to show why the dismissal should not become final. Attached to this Final Order and incorporated herein by reference is an Affidavit of Service dated April 27, 2017, serving the above-mentioned Conditional Order of Dismissal on Applicant.

In a document captioned "Respond Objection to Conditional Order of Dismissal" filed on April 26, 2017, Applicant restates his claims of actual innocence and "newly discovered evidence" of an issue with the chain of custody of evidence presented at his trial. Applicant also

contends that the application was timely pursuant to S.C Code Ann. § 17-27-45, and that "the PCR judge apparently overlooked the discovery rule section 17-27-45(c)."

This Court has reviewed Applicant's responses to the Conditional Order of Dismissal in their entirety, in conjunction with the original pleadings, and finds a sufficient reason has not been shown why the Conditional Order of Dismissal should not become final. Applicant's claim of actual innocence is not proper in a PCR action pursuant to the plain language of the statute. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(a)(6) ("[T]his section shall not be construed to permit collateral attack on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction."); see also Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1975) (interpreting the statute as barring such claims as inappropriate for consideration under the act). Further this Court finds Applicant's allegation of newly discovered evidence to be without merit. Applicant alleges he received a letter from the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division on April 27, 2015, which in some way alerted him to a potential issue involving the chain of custody of evidence presented at trial. However, Applicant has offered no explanation as to why this evidence could not have been discovered prior to his trial or prior to his first PCR action, especially since Applicant's application indicates chain of custody was an issue at trial.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, for the reasons set forth above and in this Court's Conditional Order of Dismissal, the PCR application is hereby **DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.**

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 7 day of July, 2017.

J. CORDELL MADDOX JR.
Chief Administrative Judge
Tenth Judicial Circuit

Anderson, South Carolina.



STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
	)	FOR THE TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF OCONEE	)	
Roderick McRae, S.C.D.C. No. 236188,	)	Case No.: 2015-CP-37-00504
Applicant,	)	**CONDITIONAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL**
v.	)	
State of South Carolina,	)	
Respondent.	)	

This matter comes before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed by Roderick McRae (Applicant) on June 29, 2015. Respondent made its Return, requesting the application be summarily dismissed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Oconee County Clerk of Court. Applicant was indicted at the March 1996 term of the Oconee County Grand Jury for trafficking in cocaine (1996-GS-37-00268), and possession of marijuana (1996-GS-37-00271). Applicant was further indicted at the July 1996 term of the Oconee County Grand Jury for possession of a pistol by a convicted felon (1996-GS-37-00585). Ernest E. Yarborough, Esquire represented Applicant. Applicant proceeded to trial before the Honorable Alexander S. Macaulay and a jury. The jury found Applicant guilty as indicted on August 14, 1996. Judge Macaulay sentenced Applicant to imprisonment for concurrent terms of life[1] for trafficking in cocaine, one year for possession of marijuana, and five years for the weapons charge.

[1] Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45, based upon prior convictions of trafficking in cocaine and manslaughter.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal and a direct appeal was perfected by Richard H. Warder, Esquire, and Cheryl Aaron, Esquire. By unpublished opinion decided May 18, 1999, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Applicant's convictions. State v. McRae, Op. No. 99-UP-303 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 18, 1999). Applicant did not petition for rehearing, and the Court of Appeals issued the remittitur on June 8, 1999.

2000-CP-37-00006

Applicant filed his first application for post-conviction relief on January 6, 2000 (2000-CP-37-00006). He alleged the following grounds for relief in his application:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel

Respondent made its return on March 23, 2000, and an evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on August 6, 2003, before the Honorable J. Cordell Maddox, Jr. Applicant was present at the hearing and represented by James Price, Esquire. W. Bryan Dukes, Esquire, of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office, represented Respondent. Applicant testified on his own behalf.[2] By written order dated August 27, 2004, and filed August 30, 2004, Judge Maddox denied and dismissed the application.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal and a petition for writ of certiorari was filed by Tara Dawn Shurling, Esquire, on Applicant's behalf. Respondent filed its Return on December 30, 2005. Respondent filed a reply to Respondent's Return on or about January 31, 2006. On December 18, 2006, the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied Applicant's petition by letter order. The Remittitur was issued on January 4, 2007.

[2] Trial counsel Ernest E. Yarborough was subpoenaed, but did not appear at the hearing.

Applicant subsequently filed a *pro se* Petition for Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 24, 2007 (C.A. No. 0:07-1521-HFF-BM). In his Petition, Applicant set forth the following grounds for relief (verbatim):

1. "The trial judge erred in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial on the grounds that several members of the jury had read and discussed a newspaper article during the trial which revealed the petitioner's prior criminal record and possible life without parole sentence, which was a denial of due process of law."
2. "The trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial on the court's own motion because during the trial on these charges the jury read and discussed a newspaper article which contained the defendant's prior record, and further because of prosecutorial misconduct in releasing to the media the defendant's prior record and possible sentence in this matter, this was a denial of due process of law."
3. "The disclosure of the newspaper article containing Petitioner's two (2) convictions for violent offenses is not harmless error because it violated Petitioner's due process rights."
4. "Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, which violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Right."
5. "Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a mistrial where the record reflects that the jury engaged in premature deliberation, which violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Right."
6. "Defense counsel was ineffective in acquiescing in a curative instruction that was inadequate to remove the undue prejudice."

Respondent filed its Return and Motion for Summary Judgment on September 5, 2007. The Honorable Bristow Marchant, United States Magistrate Judge, issued on July 24, 2008, a Report and Recommendation that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted. Applicant timely filed objections on August 27, 2008. McRae v. Rushton, 0:07-1521-HFF-BM, 2008 WL 4146382 (D.S.C. 2008) (incorporated in District Court's order). The Honorable Henry F. Floyd, United States District Judge, denied Applicant's Petition on September 2, 2008 and accepted the Report and Recommendation for summary judgment. Id. Applicant gave notice of his appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Applicant's

appeal on August 12, 2009, for want of a certificate of appealability. McRae v. Rushton, 340 Fed.Appx. 855 (4th Cir. 2009).

2012-CP-37-00027

Applicant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in state court on January 10, 2012 (2012-CP-37-00027). He alleged the following grounds for relief in his application (verbatim):

1. "Insufficient evidence (proof) to support convictions."
    a. "[Applicant] submits that since the State failed to establish a Nexus between [Applicant] and the bag by sufficient evidence, he is entitled to relief."
2. "Solicitor (Prosecutor) Misconduct."
    a. "[Applicant] submits that the Solicitor's act of introducing irrelevant evidence of guilt within it being exclusively supported by Perjury-type evidence, and Solicitor's act of vouching for the credibility of Witness Frazier, were acts amounting to Misconduct strong enough for this Court to grant the 'Demanded Relief.'"
3. "Judicial Misconduct."
    a. "[Applicant] submits that the Trial Judge's decision to enter Exhibits which were irrelevant to showing [Applicant's] guilt, was a decision amounting to Misconduct, in light of ultimate Evidence entered, which would support this Court's grant of Demanded Relief."

Respondent made its return and motion to dismiss on July 9, 2014, arguing the habeas petition was improperly filed in circuit court. By written order dated July 17, 2014, and filed September 3, 2014, the Honorable R. Lawton McIntosh dismissed the petition with prejudice.

Applicant timely filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of South Carolina filed an order dated September 18, 2014, transferring jurisdiction over the case to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed Applicant's appeal by order dated December 23, 2014, for failure to provide sufficient explanation as required by Rule 203(d)(1)(B)(vi), SCACR.

II. CURRENT APPLICATION

In his second and current post-conviction relief application, Applicant's fourth collateral action, Applicant alleges he is being held unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Actual innocence, in that;
    a. "Applicant conviction and sentences [are] unjust whereby the trial court was without jurisdiction [to] impose sentences whereby fundamental [miscarriage] of justice occur during jury trial state's Solicitor did not specify the amount of [drugs] seized during the alleges search, and the chain of custody does not specify officer Raymond Douglas Frock of South Carolina Highway Patrol as being the officer's that found and handle the [alleged] drug which was in a black bag and the chain of custody Report does not specify black back and a firearm weapon, and there is a break link in the chain of custody report."
    b. Applicant thereafter argues that the alleged deficiency in the chain of custody "presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial, unless, the Court is also satisfied, that the trial was free of [error], harmless constitutional error, the, Applicant, should be allowed to pass through the gateway, and argue the merits of his underlying claim."
2. Newly-discovered evidence
    a. "Newly discovery evidence state's solicitor withheld Brady material chain of custody report which does not specify the amount of drugs and, does not allegdes firearm weapon that was seize by state trooper C.E. Long, which would been most favor to the defendant and truly Brady material would been most favor to the accuse."
    b. "Applicant [. . .] discovered newly discovery evidence by receive letter the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division on April 27, 2015 pursuant to chain of custody report[.]"

Also before this Court are the Oconee County Clerk of Court records, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the final orders of Applicant's previous collateral actions, and the records of this current PCR action.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Failure to State a Claim

The Court finds the application must be dismissed for failure to state a claim cognizable under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-10 to -160. An Applicant may commence a post-conviction relief action on the following grounds:

1. That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State;
2. That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
3. That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
4. That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
5. That his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional release [was] unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or
6. That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy....

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(A).

The application should be dismissed for failure to state a claim cognizable under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 to -160. Applicant's sole allegation is that he is actually innocent. Claims by an Applicant that he or she is actually innocent, is not guilty, or that the evidence against him was insufficient to prove guilt are not cognizable grounds for post-conviction relief absent a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or newly discovered evidence. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(a)(6) ("[T]his section shall not be construed to permit collateral attack on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction."); Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1975) (interpreting the statute as barring such claims as inappropriate for consideration under the act); Dickson v. State, 247 S.C. 153, 156, 146

S.E.2d 257, 258 (1966) ("The allegation that petitioner is not guilty does not raise a matter for consideration by habeas corpus.").

Furthermore, PCR is not a substitute for an appeal and an issue that could have been raised at applicant's trial or on appeal is not cognizable in an application for PCR. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(b); Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1974). Trial court error is not a cognizable claim for PCR. Roscoe v. State, 345 S.C. 16, 546 S.E.2d 417 (2001); Wolfe v. State, 326 S.C. 158, 485 S.E.2d 367 (1997); Ashley v. State, 260 S.C. 436, 196 S.E.2d 501 (1973). Applicant's allegation that he is actually innocent is based entirely upon his allegation that the chain of custody for evidence supporting his conviction was not adequately established. The adequacy of chain of custody is a ground for objection at trial and subsequent consideration on direct appeal; therefore it does not form a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief. Indeed, Applicant's attorney repeatedly objected at trial on chain of custody grounds.

For these foregoing reasons, the Court shall dismiss the application for failure to state a claim cognizable under the Post-Conviction Relief Act.

Newly Discovered Evidence

The Court finds that Applicant's assertion that his discovery of the chain of custody report constitutes newly-discovered evidence, such that he should be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, is without merit. The Uniform Post-Conviction Relief Act states that a person may institute a post-conviction relief action if "there exists evidence or material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(A)(4). If the applicant contends there is evidence of material fact not previously presented, the post-conviction relief application must be filed within one year after the date of actual discovery of the facts by the applicant or after the date when the

facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence. S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-45(C). An applicant requesting a new trial based on after-discovered evidence after a conviction must show that the evidence:

> (1) Is such as would probably change the result if a new trial was had;
> (2) Has been discovered since the trial;
> (3) Could not by the exercise of due diligence have been discovered before the trial;
> (4) Is material to the issue of guilt or innocence; and,
> (5) Is not merely cumulative or impeaching.

Hayden v. State, 278 S.C. 610, 611, 299 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1983) (citing State v. Caskey, 273 S.C. 325, 256 S.E.2d 737 (1979).

Applicant has failed to allege facts sufficient to support his claim of newly discovered evidence. Each of Applicant's allegations involve "facts" that were, or could have been, discovered before his trial. As previously indicated, and as demonstrated by the very brief transcript quotations provided in Applicant's own application, Applicant knew or at least should have known about the chain of custody issue from his own trial roughly 20 years ago. Before the Court will hold an evidentiary hearing, Applicant must make a *prima facie* showing that he is entitled to relief. Welch v. MacDougall, 246 S.C. 258, 143 S.E.2d 455 (1965); Blandshaw v. State, 245 S.C. 385, 140 S.E.2d 784 (1965). Applicant has failed to make such a *prima facie* showing that he is entitled to relief based on the information set forth and, therefore, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the matter. Accordingly, the Court shall dismiss this matter with prejudice.

Statute of Limitations

The Court finds the application must also be summarily dismissed for failure to comply with the filing procedures of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10 to -160. Specifically, the act requires as follows:

> An application for relief filed pursuant to this chapter must be filed within one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal or the filing of the final decision on appeal, whichever is later.

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45(A).

The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations shall apply to all applications filed after July 1, 1996. Peloquin v. State, 321 S.C. 468, 469 S.E.2d 606 (1996). A motion for summary judgment may properly be used to raise the defense of statute of limitations. McDonnell v. Consolidated School District of Aiken, 315 S.C. 487, 445 S.E.2d 638 (1994). In addition, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(c) authorizes the Court to "grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of [an] application when it appears from the pleadings ... that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Applicant was convicted on August 14, 1996, and the remittitur from his direct appeal issued on June 8, 1999. The current application was not filed until June 29, 2015—well after the one-year statutory filing period expired. Therefore, the Court shall dismiss the application as barred by the statute of limitations.

Laches

The Court finds the application must also be dismissed as barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. To ensure finality of litigation, our courts require reasonable diligence in pursuing collateral relief. McElrath v. State, 276 S.C. 282, 283, 277 S.E.2d 890 (1981). Requiring reasonable diligence "guards the state's legitimate expectation that it will not be called upon without due cause, to defend the integrity of convictions that occurred many years ago, where records and witnesses are no longer available." Id. (quoting Honeycutt v. Ward, 612 F.2d 36, 42 (2nd Cir. 1979)). Where an applicant for post-conviction relief fails to exercise reasonable

diligence, the State may seek the summary dismissal through the equitable doctrine of laches, which is defined as "neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have been done." Bray v. State, 366 S.C. 137, 140, 620 S.E.2d 743, 745 (2005) (quoting Whitehead v. State, 352 S.C. 215, 219, 574 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002)). "Whether a claim is barred by laches is to be determined in light of the facts of each case, taking into consideration whether the delay has worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the other party; delay alone in assertion of right does not constitute laches." Id.

Applicant seeks post-conviction relief more than 20 years after his conviction. Absent some explanation or justification for the delay in seeking post-conviction relief, laches will prevent an applicant from seeking collateral review of his conviction, especially where the delay affects the availability of evidence to review the applicant's claims. McElrath, 276 S.C. at 283, 277 S.E.2d at 890. Applicant has offered no justification for the delay. Because of the delay, witness memories and physical evidence will have naturally faded and degraded. See, e.g., Bray, 366 S.C. at 140, 620 S.E.2d at 745 (affirming PCR judge's ruling that laches barred belated review of denial of PCR seven years after PCR hearing was held); State v. Serrette, 375 S.C. 650, 654 S.E.2d 554 (Ct. App. 2007) (declining to remand for reconstruction of record noting such remedy "would undoubtedly be futile considering the passage of over ten years' time" when the delay was caused by appellant). As a result, Applicant's delay in bringing this action has affected the availability of evidence for this Court to review his claims. Therefore, this application shall be summarily dismissed as barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.

Successive

The Court also finds the application must be summarily dismissed because it is successive to Applicant's previous PCR application. Courts disfavor successive applications and place the burden on applicants to establish that any new ground raised in a subsequent application could not have been earlier raised in a previous application. Foxworth v. State, 275 S.C. 615, 274 S.E.2d 415 (1981); Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992). Section 17-27-90 of the South Carolina Code states:

> All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental, or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application.

Under this statute, successive post-conviction relief applications are forbidden unless an applicant can indicate a "sufficient reason" why new grounds for relief were not raised or were not properly raised in previous applications. Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991). Any new ground raised in a subsequent application is limited to those grounds that "could not have been raised ... in the previous application." Id. at 450, 409 S.E.2d at 394. If the applicant could have raised these allegations in a previous application, then the applicant may not raise those grounds in successive applications. Id. Applicant bears the burden of showing the allegations could not have been previously raised. Land v. State, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d 735 (1980).

Applicant's current allegations were or could have been raised in the proceedings based on Applicant's prior collateral actions; thus, the current application is successive and barred under S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90. Applicant has failed to establish any sufficient reason why he

could not have raised his current allegations in his previous collateral actions. Therefore, he has failed to meet the burden imposed upon him, and the Court shall dismiss the application as successive to Applicant's previous PCR application.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-70(b), the Court intends to dismiss this application with prejudice unless Applicant provides specific reasons, factual or legal, why the application should not be dismissed in its entirety. Applicant is granted twenty (20) days from the date of service of this Order upon him to show why this Order should not become final. Applicant shall file any reasons he may have with the Oconee County Clerk of Court and shall serve opposing counsel at the following address:

Office of the Attorney General
Attn: Lindsey A. McCallister, Esquire
Johnny E. James, Jr., Esquire
PCR Division – 10th Circuit
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Applicant is cautioned that his response to this order must be actually received by the Oconee County Clerk of Court and opposing counsel within twenty (20) days, and that the Court will not consider any issues raised in his response if not so timely filed and served.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 24 **day of** March, **2017.**

/s/ CORDELL MADDOX JR.
Chief Administrative Judge
Tenth Judicial Circuit

Anderson, South Carolina

FILED OCONEE COUNTY, SC
BEVERLY H. WHITFIELD
CLERK OF COURT
2017 APR -6 P 2:38

Roderick McRae #236188
386 Redemption Way
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The Supreme Court South Carolina
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