

**IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court**

**APPEAL FROM YORK COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas**

The Honorable R. Lawton McIntosh, Presiding in York County

Case No. 2016-CP-46-02637


Davontay Henson, #348736 Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Davontay Henson appeals the order of the Honorable R. Lawton McIntosh, dated, September 13, 2017 and mailed on September 15, 2017. Appellant received written notice of entry of the final order on September 18, 2017.


Leah B. Moody, Esquire
Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC
235 E. Main Street, Suite 115
Post Office Box 1015
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29731

Other Counsel of record:
Justin Hunter, SC Attorney General's Office
Attorney for Respondents
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Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1549
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**IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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**APPEAL FROM YORK COUNTY
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The Honorable R. Lawton McIntosh, Presiding in York County

Case No. 2017-CP-46-02637


Davontay Henson, #348736 Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served the Notice of Appeal on Justin Hunter by depositing a copy of it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on September 18, 2017, addressed to its attorney of record, Justin Hunter, Post Office Box 11549, Columbia, South Carolina, 29211-1549.



Leah B. Moody, Esquire
Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC
235 E. Main Street, Suite 115
Post Office Box 1015
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29731

September 18, 2017

Cc Davontay Henson
Justin Hunter, Esq.
David Hamilton, Clerk of Court, York County
Sharon Graham, SCCID

FORM 4

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF YORK
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS**

**JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
CASE NUMBER 2016CP4602637**

Davontay D Henson		South Carolina State Of	
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PLAINTIFF(S)	DEFENDANT(S)
Submitted by: Justin J. Hunter	Attorney for: <input type="checkbox"/> Plaintiff <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Defendant <input type="checkbox"/> Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. See Page 2 for additional information.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit);
 Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other: _____
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j) SCRPC; Bankruptcy;
 Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other: _____
- STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other:

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order; (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk: _____

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)
n/a	n/a	n/a

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk.

Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.

s/ R. Lawton McIntosh

Circuit Court Judge

2155

Judge Code

9/01/2017

Date

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on **September 15, 2017**, and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on **September 15, 2017**, to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Leah B. Moody 235 E. Main St., Ste 115 PO Box 1015 Rock Hill, SC 29730

Justin James Hunter PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211-1549

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

David Hamilton

Court Reporter

David Hamilton - Clerk of Court

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgement to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRPC.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF YORK)
)
Davontay Darrell Henson,)
S.C.D.C. No. 348736,)
)
Applicant,)
)
v.)
)
State of South Carolina,)
)
Respondent.)
_____)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

2016-CP-46-2637

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

FILED-RECEIVED
2017 SEP 15 PM 2:08
DAVID H. SETTLER
C.C. CP. & G.S.
YORK COUNTY, SC

This matter comes before the Court by way of an Application for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) filed September 7, 2016. Respondent made its Return on or about November 28, 2016. An evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on July 31, 2017, at the Moss Justice Center in York, South Carolina. Applicant was present at the hearing and represented by Leah Moody, Esquire. Justin J. Hunter, Esquire, of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office represented the Respondent. At the hearing, Applicant testified on his own behalf. Phil Jamieson, Esquire, also testified.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Clerk of Court for York County. Applicant was indicted by the December 2010 term of the York County Grand Jury for murder (2010-GS-46-04457), assault and battery with intent to kill (2010-GS-46-04458), three counts of armed robbery (2010-GS-46-04459, 04460, 04461), and five counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime (2010-GS-46-04457A, 04458A, 04459A, 04460A, 04461A). Applicant was represented by Philip Wayne Jamieson (hereinafter referred to as "Counsel"), Esquire. On May 28,

2015, Applicant pled guilty under North Carolina v. Alford¹ to all charges. Pursuant to the plea, all possession of a firearm indictments were dismissed other than the one relating to the murder indictment (-04457A). Applicant was sentenced on May 28, 2015 by the Honorable John C. Hayes, III to a negotiated sentence of thirty years imprisonment for murder, thirty years imprisonment for each count of armed robbery, twenty years imprisonment for assault and battery with intent to kill, and five years imprisonment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. All sentences were to be served concurrently. Applicant was given credit for 1,393 days of time served.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal. The South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed Applicant's appeal in an order filed September 9, 2015. State v. Henson, Appellate Case No. 2015-001241 (Filed S.C. Ct. App. 2015). The Remittitur was returned on September 25, 2015.

PCR Allegations

In his application, Applicant alleges he is being held in custody unlawfully for ineffective assistance of counsel. At the hearing he testified that Counsel was ineffective for giving erroneous advice concerning his possibility of a life sentence, giving erroneous advice concerning his parole eligibility, failing to correct the amount of time-served he was credited, failing to investigate, and failing to ascertain the effect of Applicant's medication during the plea hearing.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

In a post-conviction relief action, the applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in their application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, the Applicant must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

¹ 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984); Butler, 334 S.E.2d 813.

The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. The courts presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. Applicant must overcome this presumption in order to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).

Courts use a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625. First, the applicant must prove counsel's performance was deficient. Id. Under this prong, courts measure an attorney's performance by its "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Second, any deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. With respect to guilty plea counsel, the Applicant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has reviewed the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, observed the witnesses presented at the hearing, passed upon their credibility, and weighed the testimony accordingly. Further, this Court has reviewed the Clerk of Court records regarding the subject convictions, the plea transcript, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the application for post-conviction relief, and the legal arguments made by the

attorneys. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 (2003), this Court makes the following findings of fact based upon all of the probative evidence presented.

As a matter of general impression, this Court finds the testimony of Applicant's counsel to be credible and persuasive on all matters. These credibility findings have been applied to the Court's findings and conclusions set forth below.

Advice concerning the possibility of a life sentence

Applicant testified that Counsel was ineffective because he either gave erroneous advice or did not know that Applicant could not get a sentence of life without parole as a juvenile. Applicant testified that after his plea, he corresponded with the Cornell Juvenile Justice Center, who informed Applicant that pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, (2012) minors cannot receive a sentence of life without parole. Applicant testified that Counsel told him that he faced a life sentence for the murder charge and testified that this is erroneous advice because of the holding in Miller.

Counsel testified that there was no notice from the State to seek a sentence of life without parole. He testified that he never told Applicant that he could receive a sentence of life without parole. He further testified that he understood Miller v. Alabama to concern minors being sentenced to life without parole and not simply life sentences. Counsel testified that he explained to Applicant the differences between a life sentence that has the possibility of parole and a sentence of life without parole.

This Court finds that Counsel was not ineffective concerning his advice about Applicant's potential sentence. "Miller v. Alabama requires that before a life without parole sentence is imposed upon a juvenile offender, he must receive an individualized hearing where the mitigating hallmark features of youth are fully explored." Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 545,

765 S.E.2d 572, 578 (2014). This Court finds that Applicant's concern with Miller v. Alabama does not apply in his case because he was not facing a sentence of life without parole. This Court finds that Counsel's testimony to be credible that he explained that Applicant was facing a sentence of thirty years to life imprisonment for murder, and not a sentence of life without parole. As Counsel gave correct advice concerning Applicant's potential sentences, his advice was not deficient, nor was Applicant prejudiced by his advice. Accordingly, this allegation must be dismissed.

Advice concerning parole eligibility

Applicant testified that Counsel told him that he would only have to serve 85% of his sentences as a result of his guilty pleas. Counsel testified that he never told Applicant that he would only have to serve 85% of his sentence. He further testified that Applicant appeared to understand the amount of time he would be serving at the plea hearing. Applicant's convictions for murder, ABWIK, and armed robbery are no-parole offenses. Murder must be served day for day, and ABWIK and armed robbery require Applicant to serve 85% of the sentence before he can be eligible for early release, discharge, or community supervision. See S.C. Code § 24-13-150. The record reflects that Applicant's signed plea waiver form indicates that those charges are "no-parole" and that murder is also "day for day."

It is well settled that parole eligibility or ineligibility is a collateral consequence of sentencing about which a defendant need not be specifically informed. See Brown v. State, 306 S.C. 381, 382, 412 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1991) ("Parole eligibility ... is a collateral consequence of sentencing about which a defendant need not be specifically advised before entering a guilty plea."). See also Jackson v. State, 349 S.C. 62, 64, 562 S.E.2d 475, 475-476 (2002) ("It is well settled that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence of sentencing, and that trial counsel need

not advise a client of his parole eligibility, or ineligibility, in order to render effective assistance.”). The classification of a crime as violent and the attendant consequences of that classification are also collateral issues, and defendants need not be informed about them. Smith v. State, 329 S.C. 280, 286, 494 S.E.2d 626, 629 (1997). A guilty plea may be attacked “if the defendant's attorney undertakes to advise the defendant about parole eligibility and gives erroneous advice.” Smith v. State, 329 S.C. 280, 283, 494 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1997) (internal citations omitted). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding erroneous advice as to parole eligibility, an applicant must prove counsel’s advice induced his decision to plead guilty or proceed to trial. See Griffin v. Martin, 278 S.C. 620, 621, 300 S.E.2d 482, 482 (1983) (upholding PCR Court’s decision denying relief because the applicant “failed to prove his attorney’s erroneous advice concerning parole eligibility induced his guilty plea....”).

This Court finds that Counsel was not deficient in his advice and Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving that Counsel gave erroneous advice. This Court finds that Applicant’s testimony that Counsel told him he would only have to serve 85% of his sentences is not credible. This Court finds that Counsel provided credible testimony that he did not advise Applicant that he would only have to serve 85% of his sentences. As Counsel did not give erroneous advice, this Court finds that his actions were not deficient. Applicant has also failed to prove prejudice as he has failed to show that he was induced to plead guilty based on parole eligibility advice or that he would have rather proceeded to trial but for Counsel’s actions. Accordingly, this allegation must be dismissed.

Time-served issue

Applicant alleged that the plea court did not calculate his amount of time-served. Counsel testified that he did not do any calculation concerning Applicant’s time-served because the South

Department of Corrections does all calculations.

This Court finds that Applicant's allegation does not support a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief under any of the statutory grounds. PCR relief is only proper when the application collaterally attacks the validity of the conviction or sentence. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Claims that affect only the duration of the sentence or quality of the inmate's confinement do not affect the validity of the conviction or sentence and therefore are considered *non-collateral* attacks on the conviction. Cooper v. State, 338 S.C. 202, 525 S.E.2d 886 (2000). A credit-related claim or challenge to other conditions of confinement does not fall into that category. Id. In Cooper the petitioner made a similar claim as Applicant here, that he was not given correct credit for the time served before his conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Cooper stated that PCR was improper for the petitioner because by challenging the duration of the sentence, the petitioner was trying to enforce his sentence under law and therefore *not* challenging the validity of the underlying conviction or sentence. Id. A claim for time served is a *non-collateral* attack of a conviction and must be pursued through Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Id.

This Court finds that Applicant's allegation that the amount of time-served was not calculated correctly concerns a matter which must first be raised through SCDC's disciplinary or grievance procedure. If Applicant is dissatisfied with the decision rendered by SCDC, then he may seek review of the decision under the APA. As this allegation fails to state a claim for post-conviction relief, it must be dismissed.

Failure to investigate

Applicant alleged that Counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate. Applicant claimed that Counsel should have investigated more concerning the potential for a life sentence.

Applicant testified that he met with Counsel three to four times prior to the plea and wrote him a letter. He testified that they went over his case and examined discovery. He testified that he asked Counsel to call witnesses for his defense.

Counsel testified that he met with Applicant seven times and went over discovery. He testified that the State had a strong case at trial, which included three codefendants and the victim testifying against Applicant. He testified that his private investigator talked to the witnesses from Applicant's first trial and they told him that they would testify the same as they did in the first trial.

"[C]riminal defense attorneys have a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation, which at a minimum includes interviewing potential witnesses and making an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case." Walker v. State, 397 S.C. 226, 235, 723 S.E.2d 610, 615 (Ct. App. 2012). "Failure to conduct an independent investigation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when the allegation is supported only by mere speculation as to result." Porter v. State, 368 S.C. 378, 385-86, 629 S.E.2d 353, 357 (2006) (citing Moorehead v. State, 329 S.C. 329, 334, 496 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1998)). This Court finds that Counsel undertook reasonable investigation that included hiring a private investigator to interview potential witnesses. This Court finds that Counsel met with Applicant prior to the plea and discussed the evidence. This Court finds that Applicant has failed to show how Counsel's investigation was deficient. Applicant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by Counsel's actions as he has failed to show how the outcome would have been different and that he would not have pled guilty but would have gone to trial had Counsel undertaken different investigation.

This Court further finds that Applicant has failed to show that Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or call witnesses. This Court finds that Counsel provided credible testimony

that his private investigator interviewed witnesses and discovered that their testimony would likely be the same as they were at the first trial. This Court finds that Applicant has failed to show that Counsel's actions were deficient in this regard. Similarly, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by Counsel's actions. The South Carolina Supreme Court has "repeatedly held a PCR applicant must produce the testimony of a favorable witness or otherwise offer the testimony in accordance with the rules of evidence at the PCR hearing in order to establish prejudice from the witness' failure to testify at trial." Bannister v. State, 333 S.C. 298, 303, 509 S.E.2d 807, 809 (1998). "The applicant's mere speculation what the witnesses' testimony would have been cannot, by itself, satisfy the applicant's burden of showing prejudice." Id., 333 S.C. at 303, 509 S.E.2d 809 (citing Glover v. State, 318 S.C. 496, 458 S.E.2d 538 (1995)). Applicant has failed to produce witnesses at the PCR hearing and thus cannot establish that he was prejudiced by Counsel's failure to call witnesses. Accordingly, this allegation must be dismissed.

Counsel's failure to ascertain the effect of Applicant's medication

Applicant alleged that Counsel was ineffective for failing to establish the effect that Applicant's medication had on his understanding and ability to function at the plea hearing. He testified that he could not function on his medication and that Counsel should have asked him how the medication was affecting him. He testified that his medication was listed on the plea affidavit. Applicant further testified that he did not tell Counsel that he was on medication.

Counsel testified that Applicant did not appear to be under the influence of medication at the plea hearing. He testified that he asked if the medication would cause Applicant difficulties and Applicant told him that it would not.

This Court finds that Applicant has failed to prove that Counsel was ineffective. This

Court finds that Counsel's actions were not deficient as Counsel inquired about Applicant's medication and Applicant gave no indication that his medicine made him unable to understand the plea proceeding. This Court finds that Applicant never gave any indication to Counsel or the plea judge that he could not understand the plea proceedings or that his medication was hindering his cognitive or functional abilities at the plea hearing. The record reflects that the plea judge asked Applicant if he was "under the influence of anything that would cause [Applicant] to be intoxicated," and Applicant replied "no, sir." Plea Transcript p. 12, ll. 10-12. This Court finds that Applicant has failed to show how his medication negatively affected his ability to understand the plea proceeding. Furthermore, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by Counsel's actions as he has failed to show that his plea was involuntarily given or that he would have proceeded to trial but for Counsel's actions. Accordingly this allegation must be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds and concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application. Applicant failed to demonstrate counsels' performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625; Stalk v. State, 383 S.C. 559, 563, 681 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2009). Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.


The Court notes Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days from PCR counsel's receipt of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991), Applicant has a right to appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial

of post-conviction relief. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP, provides that if Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The application for Post-Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant will remain in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections to complete service of his sentence.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of Sept, 2017.



R. LAWTON MCINTOSH
Presiding Judge
Sixteenth Judicial Circuit

Anders, South Carolina

Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC

Leah B. Moody
Lbmatty@comporium.net

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Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730
Telephone (803) 327-4192
Facsimile (803) 329-1344

RECEIVED

September 18, 2017

SEP 26 2017

Mr. Daniel E. Shearouse
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, South Carolina 29221

S.C. SUPREME COURT


RE: Davontay Henson, #348736, v. State of South Carolina
C.A. No.: 2016-CP- 46-02637

Dear Mr. Shearouse:

The York County Court of Common Pleas appointed my office to represent Davontay Henson in his Post-Conviction Relief action. Please find enclosed for filing the original and two (2) copies of the Notice of Appeal and Proof of Service in the above-referenced case. Please return the clocked copies to me in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. Also enclosed is a copy of the Order Dismissing Post-Conviction Relief Application.

Thank you for your assistance with this matter.

Sincerely,



Leah B. Moody

LBM/emb

Enclosures

Cc Davontay Henson
Justin Hunter, Esq.
David Hamilton, Clerk of Court, York County
Sharon Graham, SCCID

Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC

Leah B. Moody
Lbmatty@comporium.net

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SEP 26 2017

September 18, 2017

S.C. SUPREME COURT


Ms. Sharon A. Graham
SC Commission on Indigent Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
Post Office Box 11433
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1433

RE: Davontay Henson, #348736, v. State of South Carolina
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If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact my office. Thank you for your attention in this matter.

Sincerely,

Leah B. Moody

LBM/emb

Enclosures

Cc Davontay Henson
Justin Hunter, Esq.
Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme Court
David Hamilton, Clerk of Court, York County

Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC

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September 18, 2017

Justin Hunter, Esquire
South Carolina Attorney General's Office
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211


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Sincerely,



Leah B. Moody

LBM/emb

Enclosures

Cc Davontay Henson

Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme Court
David Hamilton, Clerk of Court, York County
Sharon Graham, SCCID

Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC

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September 18, 2017

The Honorable David Hamilton
York County Clerk of Court
Post Office Drawer 649
York, South Carolina 29745


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Sincerely,



Leah B. Moody

LBM/emb

Enclosures

cc Davontay Henson
Justin Hunter, Esq.
Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme Court
Sharon Graham, SCCID

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Post Office Box 1015
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730

TO: [Redacted]

Daniel Shearouse
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
PO Box 11330
Columbia SC 29211-1330