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August 1, 2017

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina
P.O. Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211

The Honorable Mary Brown
Clerk, Berkeley County
300 California Dr.
Moncks Corner, SC 29461

RECEIVED

AUG 03 2017

S.C. SUPREME COURT

**RE: Joseph Mack, #359321, v. State of South Carolina
2015-CP-08-2874**

Dear Mr. Shearouse and Ms. Brown:

Enclosed for filing is a Notice of Appeal in the above-referenced case. Also enclosed are the following:

- (1) Proof of Service of the Notice of Appeal;
- (2) A copy of the Order which is to be challenged on appeal; and
- (3) Prior Order of Appointment of Counsel.

As I was appointed to represent Mr. Mack in his PCR proceeding, I anticipate that the Office of Appellate Defense will represent Mr. Mack in this appeal.

Yours very truly,



Lance S. Boozer

cc: Judah VanSyckel, AAG
Office of Appellate Defense
Joseph Mack, #359321

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

RECEIVED

AUG 03 2017

APPEAL FROM BERKELEY COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

S.C. SUPREME COURT

The Honorable Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2015-CP-08-2874

Joseph Mack, #359321,.....Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina,.....Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The Petitioner appeals the Honorable Brooks P. Goldsmith's Order dated July 14, 2017, denying post-conviction relief to the Petitioner. Undersigned counsel received notice of entry of the Order on July 25, 2017. A copy of the Order on appeal is attached to this notice.

Respectfully submitted,



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August 1, 2017

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

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APPEAL FROM BERKELEY COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

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The Honorable Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2015-CP-08-2874

Joseph Mack, #359321,.....Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina,.....Respondent.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Lance S. Boozer, appointed attorney for Petitioner, certify that I have today served within Notice of Appeal upon the Respondent by depositing a copy of it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Assistant Attorney General Judah VanSyckel, P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, SC 29211. I further certify that all parties required by Rule to be served have been served this 1st day of August, 2017.



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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
 COUNTY OF BERKELEY)
 Joseph Mack, Jr., SCDC No. 359321,)
 Applicant,)
 v.)
 State of South Carolina,)
 Respondent.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No. 2015-CP-08-2874

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

FILED
 2017 JUL 24 PM 3:36
 MARY P. BEDWIN
 CLERK OF COURT
 BERKELEY COUNTY, S.C.

This matter comes before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed by Joseph Mack, Jr. (Applicant) on December 22, 2015, alleging various claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and state and federal constitutional violations. Respondent made its Return on June 6, 2016, requesting an evidentiary hearing be held. Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Applicant, through counsel, filed an amended application. An evidentiary hearing was convened in the Berkeley County Court of Common Pleas on April 18, 2017, at the Berkeley County Courthouse. Applicant was present at the hearing and was represented by Lance S. Boozer, Esquire. Respondent was represented by Assistant Attorney General Alicia Olive of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court denied the application from the bench. This order follows.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The records before this Court establish Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Berkeley County Clerk of Court. During its February 2013 term of court, the Berkeley County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for three counts of armed robbery (2013-GS-08-0331, -0332, -0333), one count of failure to stop for a blue light (2013-GS-08-0330), and one count of possession of a weapon

during the commission of a violent crime (2013-GS-08-0334). David Schwacke, Esquire, of the Berkeley County Public Defender Office represented Applicant. The State was represented by Assistant Solicitors Colleen Dixon Taylor and Charles Condon. On March 17, 2014, Applicant proceeded to jury trial in the Berkeley County Court of General Sessions before the Honorable Carmen T. Mullen., circuit court judge. On March 18, 2014, the jury convicted Applicant as indicted for failure to stop for a blue light, for three counts of the lesser included offense of strong arm robbery, and acquitted Applicant of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Judge Mullen sentenced Applicant to fifteen years' imprisonment for each count of strong arm robbery, all to be served concurrently, and to a consecutive three years' imprisonment for failure to stop for a blue light.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal and an appeal was perfected on Applicant's behalf by Appellate Defender LaNelle C. Durant of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense—Division of Appellate Defense. Following the submission of an Anders¹ brief and Applicant's *pro se* brief, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed Applicant's appeal. State v. Joseph Mack, Jr., Op. No. 2015-UP-495 (Ct. App. filed Oct. 21, 2015). The Remittitur was returned to the circuit court on November 13, 2015.

ALLEGATIONS RAISED

In his application for post-conviction relief, Applicant alleges he is being held in custody unlawfully based on allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and state and federal constitutional violations and violations of state and federal precedent. In his amended application, Applicant alleged trial counsel was ineffective for “fail[ing] to object or to otherwise challenge the Applicant remaining in shackles throughout the

¹ Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

duration of the jury trial.” At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant went forward solely on allegations against trial counsel.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL

On the afternoon of January 6, 2013, Applicant drove a Green Chevrolet pickup truck into a truck yard in Hanahan. He approached three different truck drivers who were preparing their trucks for the trip the following day. First, Applicant approached John Rhodan and was friendly at first, then drew what the victims described as a pistol and robbed him. Applicant then did the same thing with Jackie Meyers, another truck driver who was the girlfriend of Rhodan, and took her jewelry. He then robbed Keith Blake who was the third driver and went into his truck. (Trial Tr. p. 112-113.)

Unbeknownst to Applicant, Keith Blake was on his Bluetooth during the robbery and asked the person on the other line to call the police for assistance. Law enforcement arrived very quickly. The victims provided a description of Applicant’s vehicle and a BOLO for the vehicle went out to dispatch. Applicant’s truck was spotted nearby and police activated their blue lights; Applicant did not stop. After a half mile chase, during which Applicant threw items from the vehicle, Applicant’s vehicle crashed into a camper at a mobile home park. Applicant was apprehended, and charged with three counts of armed robbery, failure to stop for a blue light, and possession of a weapon during a crime of violence. (Trial Tr. p. 114, p. 220, p. 223).

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified on his own behalf. He testified he was arrested on January 5, 2013, following allegations he had robbed three people at gunpoint. (PCR Tr. p. 8-9). Applicant testified he had not robbed the people, but instead had been selling them cocaine when a dispute arose. (PCR Tr. p. 9-10). Applicant testified that he testified at trial and

explained to the jury this was a drug transaction that ended in a disagreement, not a robbery. (PCR Tr. p. 9-11, 27).

He testified trial counsel David Schwake (trial counsel) was appointed to represent him and he met with trial counsel five times prior to trial. (PCR Tr. p. 8-9). Applicant testified he and trial counsel discussed his version of events—this was a drug deal gone awry, not a robbery. (PCR Tr. p. 11-12). He testified they watched the various surveillance videos from the scene and trial counsel agreed it did not look like a robbery. (PCR Tr. p. 12). He testified trial counsel told him others in his office who had watched the videos also agreed it did not look like a robbery. (PCR Tr. p. 13). He testified trial counsel argued to the jury that this was a drug deal, not a robbery and he was in agreement with this argument. (PCR Tr. p. 14-15).

Applicant testified he was in wrist, waist, and ankle shackles throughout his trial and these were visible to the jury. (PCR Tr. p. 21-22). He testified he discussed his shackles with trial counsel and that they tried to conceal the shackles as much as possible. (PCR Tr. p. 23). He testified he had not been disruptive in jail and did not have any prior charges that would have warranted the need for shackles during his trial. (PCR Tr. p. 23-24). He denied having a prior escape charge that is reflected on his Department of Corrections records. (PCR Tr. p. 24, 28-30). Applicant denied his shackles were removed during his testimony and disputed the trial transcript references indicating his shackles were removed to allow him to testify. (PCR Tr. p. 24-25, 31-32). Applicant disputed that the table where he was seated had a curtain covering his legs. (PCR Tr. p. 30). Applicant testified his shackles were visible to the jury. (PCR Tr. p. 25-26).

Trial counsel took the stand next and testified he had been practicing criminal defense for more than thirty-five years. (PCR Tr. p. 34). He testified he was appointed to represent Applicant

shortly after his arrest and met with Applicant for the first time on February 21, 2013. (PCR Tr. p. 34-35). Trial counsel testified he met with Applicant ten times and reviewed all discovery materials with Applicant, including numerous videos. (PCR Tr. p. 36). He testified they discussed Applicant's version of events and potential witnesses. (PCR Tr. p. 36). He testified based on their discussions, the defense's theory was this was a drug deal that led to a dispute, not a robbery. (PCR Tr. p. 37). He testified discussing the ramifications of this defense, including implications from telling the jury Applicant was a drug dealer and Applicant wanted to pursue this defense despite the drawbacks. (PCR Tr. p. 37, 41).

Trial counsel testified he thought the trial went well and they had selected a good jury, and that based on this, he elected to forge a curative instruction to the trial court's improper jury instruction. (PCR Tr. p. 38, 50). Trial counsel also testified he believed a curative instruction would have highlighted the improper argument to the jury. (PCR Tr. p. 38, 50).

Trial counsel testified Applicant's trial was in courtroom E in the historic courthouse and the tables were draped with a black curtain that concealed the legs of those seated at the tables, including Applicant's legs. (PCR Tr. p. 38-39, 46). Trial counsel testified Applicant had on leg shackles during his trial but did not have on any wrist or waist shackles. (PCR Tr. p. 39). Trial counsel testified he is absolutely certain Applicant did not have on wrist shackles, as he has never seen a defendant tried in wrist shackles at the Berkeley County Courthouse. (PCR Tr. p. 42). Trial counsel testified the decision whether to have a defendant restrained and what type of restraints are used is determined by the trial judge and courtroom security, not the State or defense counsel. (PCR Tr. p. 39, 44-46). Trial counsel testified Applicant's leg shackles were never visible to the jury throughout the entirety of his trial. (PCR Tr. p. 40, 47). He testified Applicant's ankle shackles were removed at trial counsel's request before Applicant testified.

(PCR Tr. p. 40-41, 43). Trial counsel testified he does not think the jury heard any noise from the shackles either, as he rehearses moving to avoid making any noise with his clients in advance of trial. (PCR Tr. p. 43-44, 46).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the record in its entirety and has heard the testimony at the post-conviction relief hearings. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the hearing, closely pass upon their credibility and weigh their testimony accordingly. Specifically, this Court finds trial counsel's testimony credible and finds Applicant's testimony not credible. Set forth below are the relevant findings of facts and conclusions of law as required pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-80 (1985).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In a post-conviction relief action, an applicant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her application. Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP; Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). When an applicant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, he or she must prove "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813. The proper measure of performance is whether an attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Courts presume counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813. The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, as it is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after

conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "[W]hen counsel articulates a valid reason for employing a certain strategy, such conduct will not be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel." Smith v. State, 386 S.C. 562, 567, 689 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2010) (citing Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103, 110, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000)).

Courts use a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, attorney performance is measured by its "reasonableness under professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 385 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Strickland). Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. The standards do not establish mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. A court need not first determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668

After careful review of the entire record, including the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, based on the standard discussed above, this Court finds Applicant has failed to carry his burden in this action. Below are this Court's rulings in regards to each of Applicant's specific allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel:

Allegation—Trial counsel was ineffective for failing object or otherwise challenge Applicant remaining in shackles throughout the duration of the jury trial.

Applicant alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or otherwise challenge Applicant remaining in shackles throughout the duration of the jury trial. Applicant alleges he was shackled at the wrist, waist, and ankle, and that these onerous shackles were visible to the jury, thereby depriving him of his right to a fair trial.

Whether a defendant is tried in shackles is within the trial court's discretion. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629, (2005) (holding the use of physical restraints visible to the jury are prohibited absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial); State v. Tucker, 320 S.C. 206, 209, 464 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1995) (providing that the trial judge is to balance the prejudicial effect of shackling with the considerations of courtroom decorum and security; whether a defendant is restrained during trial is within the trial judge's discretion; and the trial judge is the best equipped to decide the extent to which security measures should be adopted to prevent disruption of the trial, harm to those in the courtroom, escape of the accused, and prevention of other crimes). In the present case, the credible testimony and record reveals Applicant was tried in ankle shackles that were never visible to the jury.

During the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified he was in wrist, waist, and ankle shackles throughout his trial, including when he testified before the jury. Trial counsel's testimony sharply refuted Applicant's version of events—counsel testified Applicant only had on ankle shackles (not wrist or waist shackles as Applicant alleged), which were out of the view of the jury during the entire trial due to a dark curtain that encompassed the table where Applicant sat throughout the trial. Trial counsel also testified Applicant's ankle shackles were removed

before he testified at counsel's request; this is confirmed by the trial transcript. See Trial Tr. p. 292. Furthermore, trial counsel testified he practiced with Applicant how Applicant should move before the jury to avoid making any sound with his shackles and he does not think the jury heard Applicant's shackles during trial.

As previously noted, this Court finds trial counsel's testimony credible and Applicant's testimony not credible. This is particularly relevant to this allegation, where the testimonies of Applicant and trial counsel are wholly contradictory. This Court agrees with trial counsel's version of events, which is supported by the record, and finds trial counsel performed effectively in ensuring his client received a fair trial. Trial counsel requested Applicant's ankle shackles be removed prior to his testimony before the jury and instructed Applicant how to move to reduce, if not remove, any possible noise caused by the ankle shackles. Moreover, this Court finds trial counsel properly did all he could to ensure Applicant had a fair trial despite the trial court's determination Applicant should be shackled by the ankle during his trial. Trial counsel's performance was reasonable and in accordance with professional standards. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 385 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Strickland).

Furthermore, Applicant cannot satisfy his burden of establishing any prejudice from trial counsel's alleged deficient performance regarding his ankle shackles, as there is no "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Trial counsel's credible testimony and the record establish Applicant was not presented to the jury with any visible shackling or restrains, and therefore, Applicant cannot establish the result of the trial would have been different—that he would have been acquitted—but for trial counsel's failure to object to his ankle shackles. This Court finds this allegation must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Allegation—Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial following the trial court's jury instruction

Applicant alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial after the following portion of the trial court's instruction which he alleges amounted to improper burden shifting. The specific portion of the trial court's instruction to the jury follows:

Ladies and gentlemen, you and I are acting for the community and that's why we must see to it that this trial is fair and the verdict is just.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, not get the idea that I'm trying to tell you how I think you should decide this case because, again, as I've already told you, under the laws of the State of South Carolina, you, the jury, are the sole judge of all facts. And it would be highly improper for me to influence you in your performance of that duty.

However, ladies and gentlemen, I do want to tell you that as the presiding judge of this court, I am vitally concerned that whatever verdict you reach will be the result of you going back into your jury room and confining your consideration to the evidence and the law that you've heard here in this courtroom, weighing it fairly and impartially as I have every confidence you will.

Ladies and gentlemen, everyone is entitled to justice in this case, both the State and the defense. You owe no support or sympathy to anyone. The Court is of confirmed opinion that whatever verdict you reach, it will be and shall represent truth and justice for all parties involved.

(Trial Tr. p. 405-06). Thereafter, the trial court continued with its jury charge, and following the conclusion of the trial court's instruction, trial counsel noted his objection to the aforementioned passage. (Trial Tr. p. 413). After a discussion with the trial court, declined a curative instruction, noting, "a curative instruction might just draw undue attention to the comment." (Trial Tr. p. 413-14). After further discussion with the State, the trial court found its charge as a whole

adequately covered the presumption of innocent and reasonable doubt, and therefore, did not impermissibly shift the burden to Applicant. (Trial Tr. p. 414-15).

Applicant argues the trial court's comments were improper and trial counsel's failure to request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial prejudiced him by depriving him of his right to a fair trial. In support of this allegation, he cites to State v. Daniels, 401 S.C. 251, 737 S.E.2d 473 (2012).

After reviewing the record in its entirety in conjunction with Daniels and other applicable case law, this Court finds this allegation must be denied and dismissed with prejudice. The trial court's instruction is a proper recitation of law when considered as a whole does not impermissibly shift the burden to Applicant or otherwise deprive him of a fair trial. See State v. Daniels, 401 S.C. 251, 260, 737 S.E.2d 473, 477-78 (2012) ("However, despite the trial court's mistake, the instruction as a whole properly conveyed the law to the jury and it is not reasonably likely that the jury acted in contravention of the reasonable doubt standard."); see also Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 29, 538 S.E.2d 248, 252-53 (2000) (finding reversal not required when the trial court's improper instructions were given in the context of witness credibility and not reasonable doubt)). Therefore, trial counsel performed in accordance with professional standards when electing not to receive a curative instruction or move for a mistrial.

Moreover, since the trial court's entire instruction was proper, a curative instruction would not have had any impact on the outcome of the trial and a motion for a mistrial would not have been granted. Applicant is unable to establish the result of his trial would have been different absent trial counsel's errors. This allegation must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION


Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This Court notes Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days from the receipt of this Order by counsel of record to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453 (1991), an applicant has a right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of post-conviction relief. Rule 71.1(g), SCRPC, provides if the applicant wishes to seek appellate review, post-conviction relief counsel must serve and file a Notice of Appeal on the Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. This application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. The Applicant shall remain in the custody of the State.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 14 day of July, 2017.


BROOKS P. GOLDSMITH
Presiding Judge
Ninth Judicial Circuit


_____, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
 COUNTY OF BERKELEY)
 Joseph Mack 359321 Jr.,)
 Plaintiff(s),)
 -vs-)
 State of South Carolina,)
 Defendant(s).)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 Ninth JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
 CASE NO.: 2015CP0802874
 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL OR GAL
 (Select one.)

ORDER
 AMENDED ORDER

TYPE OF CASE/PROCEEDING: (Check one.)

- Post-Conviction Relief (PCR)/habeas case Adoption Juvenile
 SVP case Custody and/or Visitation Abuse and Neglect
 Minor Name Change Other: Post Convict Rel 500

It appears Joseph Mack 359321 Jr., who is a litigant in this case, is entitled to court-appointed counsel or a guardian ad litem.

It further appears that: (Select only one.)

- counsel/guardian ad litem has not yet been appointed by the court; therefore, an appointment for counsel/guardian ad litem is necessary.
 counsel or a guardian ad litem was previously appointed by the court but has indicated either a possible conflict of interest, an entitlement to exemption, or other good cause warranting the appointment of new counsel or guardian ad litem based on:
 counsel was previously appointed by the court but has not indicated that the litigant has retained private counsel and is no longer entitled to appointed counsel.
 court appointed counsel has obtained , Esquire as substitute counsel pursuant to Rule 608(h)(2); provided, however, only the member who originally received the appointment and who sought substitute counsel shall receive credit.
 Other: .

FILED
 2015 MAR 31 PM 3:27
 MARY P BROWN
 CLERK OF COURT
 BERKELEY COUNTY, S.C.

Therefore, it is ordered that Lance Boozer hereby is appointed as (Select one.)

counsel lead counsel (if capital PCR case) guardian ad litem
 for the above-named person. Any counsel or GAL previously appointed is/are hereby relieved.

(If Death Penalty PCR Case) It is further ordered that , Esquire, is hereby appointed as second counsel in this capital PCR case.

The clerk of court is directed to forward a copy of this order to all persons entitled to notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED
 March 31, 2016

Mary P Brown
 Circuit Judge Clerk of Court

Plaintiff Attorney:

Lance Boozer	
807 Gervais Street, Ste 203	
Columbia, SC 29201	

Defendant Attorney:

James Rutledge Johnson	
PO Box 11549	
Columbia, SC 29211	

NOTICE: SC Supreme Court Order of September 29, 2006, requires appointed counsel entitled to payment from the Office of Indigent Defense (OID) to register the case online with OID within fifteen (15) days of this appointment at www.sccid.sc.gov, and further directs that reimbursement vouchers be submitted directly to SCCID and not to the trial judge or clerk of court. See SCCID website for further details.