

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT
S.C. Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services

Ralph K. Anderson, III, Chief Administrative Law Judge

Case No. 2017-001904

Bernard Bagley, #175851,

Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation,
Parole and Pardon Services,

Respondent.

RECORD ON APPEAL

RECEIVED
DEC 19 2017
SC Court of Appeals

Bernard Bagley
#175851/HD133/KER.CI
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P.O. Box 50666
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ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

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2017-001904

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT

Bernard Bagley, #175851,)
)
Appellant,)
)
vs.)
)
South Carolina Department of Probation,)
Parole and Pardon Services,)
)
Respondent.)
_____)

Docket No. 17-ALJ-15-0007-AP

ORDER

This matter is before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to the appeal filed by Bernard Bagley (Appellant) from a decision of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (Department) denying him parole. Appellant filed this appeal with the Court on March 28, 2017.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant is in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections as a result of his April 12, 1991 conviction of murder.¹ He was sentenced to life imprisonment, with parole eligibility upon service of twenty (20) years. Appellant initially appeared before the Parole Board (Board) on September 8, 2010, was denied parole, and has been denied parole following each of his three subsequent appearances before the Board. Appellant's last appearance before the Board occurred on March 15, 2017. Thereafter, Appellant was notified of his denial of parole in a letter dated March 16, 2017. In reaching its decision, the Board considered: (1) the characteristics of Appellant's offense(s), prior offense(s), prior supervision history, prison disciplinary record and/or criminal record; (2) the parole consideration criteria published in the Department Form 1212; the factors outlined in S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640; and (4) the actuarial risk and needs assessment factors pursuant to Section 24-21-10(F)(1). The Board weighed these considerations in light of the following findings of fact: (1) the nature and seriousness of Appellant's current offense; (2) an

¹ Appellant had also been arrested on August 23, 1990 on the charge of burglary 1st degree, but that charge was not pressed on or about August 22, 1996 and was subsequently expunged from Appellant's record pursuant to an order from the circuit court dated April 4, 2001. The Court only mentions this charge because Appellant has made it an issue in his appeal.

10/12

FILED

August 15, 2017
SC ADMIN. LAW COURT

indication of violence in this or a previous offense; and (3) the use of a deadly weapon in this or a previous offense.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court on March 28, 2017, alleging that the Parole Board erred in “consider[ing] information on the sentencing sheet ‘other condition consecutive to 90-GS-40-5864’ that was officially expunged from [his] criminal record . . .” in denying him parole. He also alleged that the Board had applied a “2 1/3 sentence requirement” as a parole-eligibility factor rather than a “1/3” requirement, and that they were basing his parole eligibility on a consecutive sentencing structure that included his expunged offense. On May 12, 2017, Appellant filed his brief, in which he argued the same assertions. The Department filed the Record on Appeal on May 22, 2017 and its brief on July 17, 2017. Appellant filed a Reply Brief on July 20, 2017.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the Department err in denying Appellant parole by applying an improper review criterion?²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived from the decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court in *Furtick v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob., Parole and Pardon Servs.*, 352 S.C. 594, 576 S.E.2d 146 (2003) and *Cooper v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob., Parole and Pardon Servs.*, 377 S.C. 489, 499, 661 S.E.2d 106, 111 (2008). When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate parole matters, the ALC sits in an appellate capacity. *Furtick*, 352 S.C. at 599; 576 S.E.2d at 149; *see also* S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(E) (Supp. 2016) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in § 1-23-380). Consequently, an Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency “as to the weight

² Appellant lists three issues in his brief, but his first and third issues are essentially the same – that the Parole Board erred in considering his expunged burglary 1st offense in denying him parole. Therefore, the Court will combine these two issues into one. As to the second issue, it, too, falls under the issue as presented above. Though Appellant appears to be arguing in his second issue that the Board applied the incorrect sentencing/parole eligibility structure, the foundation for this argument is that the Board was considering Appellant’s sentencing sheet that contained an offense that had subsequently been expunged. Therefore, this second issue can be reduced to the other (combined) one: the Board erred in its decision to deny Appellant parole because it considered an improper review criteria, namely, an offense that had been expunged. Moreover, even were the Court to consider this second issue separately from the other (combined) one, the Court would still consider the resolution of the other issue to be dispositive because this second issue hinges on the same premise – that the Board considered Appellant’s expunged offense, a premise that the Court rejects. Nevertheless, the Court will address these arguments in the Discussion, *infra*.

of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2016). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or modify an agency’s decision unless the Record reflects that substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the decision is clearly arbitrary or affected by an error of law. *See Marietta Garage, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety*, 337 S.C. 133, 137, 522 S.E.2d 605, 607 (Ct. App. 1999); *S.C. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis*, 332 S.C. 162, 166, 503 S.E.2d 490, 492 (Ct. App. 1998). Finally, “when appealing an agency’s decision, the burden rests squarely on the appellant to prove that substantive rights were prejudiced” *S.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. Mitchell*, 377 S.C. 256, 260, 659 S.E.2d 233, 235 (Ct. App. 2008).

DISCUSSION

Did the Department err in denying Appellant parole by applying an improper review criterion?

Appellant argues that the Board erred in considering an expunged offense from his sentencing sheet in denying him parole. Contrary to Appellant’s argument in his Reply Brief, he has the burden of proving his allegation. *See Leventis v. S.C. Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Control*, 340 S.C. 118, 132-33, 530 S.E.2d 643, 651 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing the general rule that in an administrative proceeding, “the burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative issue” or seeking “relief, benefits, or a privilege”) (quotations altered and citations omitted). Here, Appellant has provided no evidence whatsoever to substantiate his claim that the Board considered the expunged offense. Instead, Appellant points to a statement in the sentencing sheet from 1991 listing the expunged offense as running consecutively with his murder conviction and to a statement in an “SCDC Offender Management System Commitment Application Inquiry from 1999 listing a 2 1/3 (i.e., 2/3) sentencing requirement as a parole-eligibility factor. Because the Board stated in its decision denying Appellant parole that it considered the characteristics of his prior offenses and/or criminal record, Appellant concludes that these aforementioned statements are evidence that the Parole Board must have considered them in reaching its decision to deny him parole.

As an initial matter, the Board, in its determination letter used the phrase “and/or” with regards to the first set of considerations and therefore does not specifically state that the characteristics of Appellant’s “prior offense(s)” were actually considered. Also, these first set of considerations are those as described further below, in the Findings of Fact section. Even under

this section, the "Indication of Violence" and "Use of Deadly Weapon" that the Board considered could have been "In This Or Previous Offense" (emphasis added). Again, the Board never stated that it considered any of Appellant's previous offenses; and Appellant's "current offense" of murder, which involved a gun, was sufficient to support the Board's findings.

In addition, not only is there no mention whatsoever in the Board's decision that it considered Appellant's expunged offense, the fact that Appellant was required to serve twenty (20) years of his sentence prior to parole eligibility was because of his murder conviction.³ At the time of Appellant's crime of murder, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A)(1990) provided in pertinent part: "A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder must be punished by death or by imprisonment for life and is not eligible for parole until the service of twenty years" Thus, Appellant's service of two 1/3 sentences had nothing to do with the expunged burglary 1st offense and everything to do with his murder conviction.

Moreover, Appellant just assumes that the Board ignored the 2001 order from the circuit court expunging the burglary 1st offense, even though it was clearly issued subsequent to the 1991 and 1999 documents that Appellant focuses on. He then makes a further assumptions about what the Board did consider. Without more, Appellant has failed to carry his burden of proving that the Board considered the expunged offense.⁴

Furthermore, the Record reflects that Appellant was afforded due process and equal protection under law, notwithstanding his claim to the contrary. "The requirements of due process include notice, an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way, and judicial review." *Leventis v. S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control*, 340 S.C. 118, 132, 530 S.E.2d 643, 650 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting *Ogburn-Matthews v. Loblolly Partners*, 332 S.C. 551, 562, 505 S.E.2d 598, 603 (Ct. App. 1998); see also S.C. Const. art. I, § 22. The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that "[t]here

³ Appellant argues that under a 2/3 sentence requirement, "although he is parole-eligible he really will not be meaningful [sic] considered for parole until 2 1/3 sentence has been served, i.e. 40 years" What Appellant fails to sufficiently explain or prove is why the Board would consider an inmate to be parole eligible but not "meaningfully consider" parole for that inmate for an additional amount of time. This is nothing more than unsubstantiated conjecture and utter nonsense.

⁴ In the absence of any proof to the contrary, public officers are presumed to have properly discharged the duties of their offices and to have faithfully performed the duties with which they are charged. *S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Florence Sporting Goods, Inc.*, 241 S.C. 110, 115-16, 127 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1962); 30 S.C. Jur. *Evidence* § 29 (2006); see also *Felder v. Johnson*, 127 S.C. 215, 217, 121 S.E. 54, 54 (1924) ("In the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts are bound to presume that public officers have properly discharged their duties and that their acts are in all respects regular."

is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” *Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates*, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). In other words, “given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty.” *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). Thus, if Appellant has a liberty interest in parole, then it must emanate from state law. *See Ellis v. Dist. of Columbia*, 84 F.3d 1413, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

It is possible for a parole-related decision by the Board to impinge upon a state-created liberty interest. For instance, South Carolina courts have held that a state-created liberty interest is implicated by the Board’s failure to follow proper procedure in making its decision to deny parole. *See Cooper v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob., Parole and Pardon Servs.*, 377 S.C. 489, 661 S.E.2d 106 (2008). For example, Section 24-21-10(F)(1) requires the Board to evaluate an inmate’s risk using the Department’s adopted assessment tool (COMPAS) in reaching its decision to grant or deny parole.⁵

Here, Appellant was allowed to appear before the Board and present mitigating evidence. Also, the March 16, 2017 letter from the Board to Appellant reflects that in arriving at its decision, the Board considered the parole factors in Department Form 1212, those outlined in Section 24-21-640, and the “actuarial risk and needs assessment factors pursuant to Section 24-21-10(F)(1).” It also took into count the nature and seriousness of the current offense – murder; the indication of violence in this offense, and the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of this offense. The South Carolina Supreme Court in *Compton v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs.*, 385 S.C. 476, 685 S.E. 2d 175 (2009) upheld a very similar rationale to the one at issue in this case found it “sufficient under *Cooper*” for “a routine denial of parole” that “the Parole Board clearly stated in its notice of rejection that it considered the statutory criteria and the criteria set forth in Form 1212” 385 S.C. at 478-79, 685 S.E.2d at 176-77. Because this is precisely how the Board rendered its decision in this case, I conclude that the Board followed the proper procedure. Therefore, I find no due process violation.

In addition, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to its consideration of the above factors in reaching a decision to deny Appellant parole. *See S.C. Code*

⁵ The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently noted this requirement, as Appellant cites, in *Spigner v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob., Parole and Pardon Servs.*, No. 2015-UP-204 (April 15, 2015), as well as in several other unpublished opinions.


2017-001904

Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2016); *see also id.* § 1-23-600(D) (“An administrative law judge shall not hear an appeal from an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections . . . involving the denial of parole to a potentially eligible inmate by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services.”).

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department’s decision is **AFFIRMED**.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ralph King Anderson, III". The signature is written in a cursive style. To the right of the signature, there is a small, faint stamp that says "eSign".

Ralph King Anderson, III
Chief Administrative Law Judge

August 15, 2017
Columbia, South Carolina

2017-001904

State of South Carolina
Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services

HENRY McMASTER
Governor



JERRY B. ADGER
Director

2221 Devine Street, Suite 600
Post Office Box 50666
Columbia, South Carolina 29250
Telephone: (803) 734-9220
Fax: (803) 734-9440
www.dppps.sc.gov

March 16, 2017

Mr. Bernard Bagley #00175851
Kershaw Correctional Institution
4848 Goldmine Hwy.
Kershaw, SC 29067

RE: NOTICE OF REJECTION

Dear Mr. Bagley:

It is my responsibility to inform you, on behalf of the South Carolina Parole Board, that the Board has reached a decision regarding your parole hearing. The Board hereby makes the following CONCLUSION OF LAW:

After careful consideration of: (1) the characteristics of your current offense(s), prior offense(s), prior supervision history, prison disciplinary record, and/or prior criminal record, as described in the findings of fact below; (2) the factors published in Department Form 1212 (Criteria for Parole Consideration); (3) the factors outlined in Section 24-21-640 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, and (4) actuarial risk and needs assessment factors pursuant to Section 24-21-10 (F) (1) of the South Carolina Code of Laws. The Parole Board had determined that your parole must be denied.

You will be notified 30 days prior to your next scheduled parole consideration date.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Nature And Seriousness Of Current Offense
Indication Of Violence In This Or Previous Offense
Use Of Deadly Weapon In This Or Previous Offense
Vote Count: Unanimous To Reject

Sincerely,

Larry Ray Patton, Jr.
Director of Parole Board Support Services

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2017-001904

State of South Carolina
Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services

HENRY McMASTER
Governor



JERRY B. ADGER
Director

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March 20, 2017


Bernard Bagley
Inmate number: 175851
Kershaw Correctional Institution
4848 Goldmine Hwy.
Kershaw, SC 29067

Dear Mr. Bagley:

I am responding to your Request for Reconsideration from your recent parole denial. While I understand your disappointment please be advised that there is no appeal process for the routine denial of parole. Also, keep in mind that the Board is an independent body and makes its decisions in its absolute discretion. However, in an effort to assist you, this letter will be placed in your parole file for review by the Board at any future hearings.

Thank you for your letter.

Sincerely,


Larry Patton, Jr.
Director, Board Support Services

cc: Matthew Buchanan, General Counsel

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2017-001904
Murder

SENTENCE

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

CASE NO. 90-GS-5849

Richland COUNTY

The defendant Bernard Bagley is committed to the State Department of Corrections/County for a term of Life ^(the balance of his NATURAL Life) ~~months/years~~ and/or to pay a fine of \$ _____; provided upon the service of _____ months/years and/or payment of \$ _____, plus pay/waive costs and assessments as applicable*, ~~the balance suspended with probation for _____ months/years.~~ Consecutive.

Restitution For physical injury \$ _____
Yes/No property damage \$ _____
to be paid _____

to clerk for _____**

Other conditions Consecutive to 90-GS-40-5864

Date April 13, 1991

[Signature]
Presiding Judge

*Costs and Assessments
Non-waivable \$ _____
Not waived \$ _____
Total \$ _____

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL FILED,
Jeanette Williams
C.C.C.P.&G.S.
RICHLAND COUNTY
SOUTH CAROLINA

[Signature]
Clerk of Court

**Pay to Victim's Compensation Fund if subrogated.

2017-001904

00110001
00000000

SCDC OFFENDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
COMMITMENT APPLICATION

08/14/15
000000

SCDC #: 175851
BAGLEY, BERNARD -

INQUIRY

CYRS LOC: KERSHAW

NONCONFORM SENT: N BORN TO COURT:

OFFENDER TYPE: ADULT-STRAIGHT SENTENCE

CONVICTION NUM: S00001 INDICT NUM: 90-GS-405849 WARRANT NUM: C 746074

DATE SENTENCED...: 04/12/1991 JUDGE LAST...: LANEY, JR. FI: D

STATUTE: CIR CODE...: GPS IND: N

OFFENSE: 0999 MURDER OFFENSE DATE: 08/23/1990

CHARACT: F FACILITATION OF COUNTS: 01 OFFENSE CNTY: 40 RICHLAND

FLEA...: G GUILTY TYPE OF COURT...:

TYPE SENTENCE... : S ADULT-STRAIGHT SCDC JURIS DATE...: 08/23/1990

TOTAL SENTENCE...: 999 99 999 MAND SERV REQMT...: 000 00 000

INCARC SENTENCE...: 999 99 999 PAROLE FACTOR...: 2 1/3 SENT. REQ.

PROBATION SENT...: 000 00 000 PAROLE SERV REQMT: 020 00 000

HIP SENT...: 000 00 000

RESTITUTION REQMT: N AMT: .00 JAIL CRED: 00000 EXTRA CRED: 00000

CONVICTION STATUS: AC ACTIVE SENT START DATE: 08/23/1990 DOM.IND: N

CONSECUTIVE IND...: N SPOUSE ABUSE: STATUTE CLASSIFICATION...: VIOLENT

DNA OFFENSE IND...: Y EEC ELIG: N SCDC CLASSIFICATION...: VIOLENT

SEX REG: N PRED OFF: N LAST UPDATE: KMINIT DATE: 02/22/12

NO PAROLE: NOT APPLIC CREATED BY.: DATE: 05/23/91

FF8-NEXT CONVICTION

FF9-DETAIN

FF4-RESTITUTION PAID(FA ONLY)

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South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services
Criteria For Parole Consideration

2017-001904

SC Board of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services
 P. O. Box 50566
 Columbia, SC 29250

Inmate Name Bernard Eugene	SCDC # 175331
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Criteria For Parole Consideration

The South Carolina parole law creates no right to be released on parole. Parole in South Carolina is strictly a matter of privilege or grace. The South Carolina Board of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services has absolute discretion to grant or deny parole. As such, the publication of these parole criteria in no way creates an expectancy of release; nor does it bind the Parole Board in any way to a favorable parole decision or establish any presumptions of entitlement to parole.

In deciding whether or not to grant parole, the Parole Board considers, among other things, the inmate's record before incarceration as well as during incarceration. The record itself is prepared through investigations conducted for the Parole Board, and it becomes a part of the inmate's parole file. These files are maintained by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services and are, by the statute, privileged and confidential. The confidentiality of the parole file is far reaching; inmates themselves have no right to inspect the contents of their files. If the inmate thinks his/her file is somehow incomplete or contains some error or other inaccuracy, he/she must notify the Board of the specific error or inaccuracy. The Board will investigate the inquiry and notify the inmate of the action taken.

Inmates do, however, enjoy certain rights in the parole process. The inmate has the right to appear at his parole hearing. If the inmate fails to appear, the Board may decide his/her case in absence. The inmate has the right to be represented by an attorney; however, he/she has no right to have an attorney appointed if he/she cannot afford one. At the hearing, the inmate has the right to present witnesses and evidence on his/her own behalf, but an inmate does not have a right to confront witnesses.

In deciding whether or not an inmate should be granted parole, the Board or Panel of the Board exercises its absolute discretion to the limits allowed by state and federal law. The discretion of the Board or panel aims at protecting the best interest of both society and the inmate being considered for parole. In its concern for the protection of society's and the inmate's best interests, the Board or Panel deliberates upon the "reasonable probability" that an inmate will not again violate the law, if parole is granted. When deliberating upon the reasonable probability that an inmate will not again violate the law, the Board or Panel weighs the factors listed below. The Board or Panel, in its absolute discretion, also considers any other factors not listed below which it considers relevant in a particular case.

1. The risk the inmate poses to the community;
2. The nature and seriousness of the inmate's offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, and the inmate's attitude toward it;
3. The inmate's prior criminal records and his/her adjustment under any previous programs or supervision;
4. The inmate's attitude toward his/her family, the victim, and authority in general;
5. The inmate's adjustment while in confinement, including his/her progress in counseling, therapy, and other similar programs designed to encourage the inmate to improve himself/herself;
6. The inmate's employment history, including his/her job training and skills and his/her stability in the work place;
7. The inmate's physical, mental and emotional health;
8. The inmate's understanding of the cause of his/her past criminal conduct;
9. The inmate's efforts to solve his/her problems, such as seeking treatment for substance abuse, enrolling in academic and vocational education courses, and in general using whatever resources the Department of Corrections has made available to inmates to help with their problems;
10. The adequacy of the inmate's overall parole plan. This includes inmates living arrangements, where he/she will live and who he will live with; the character of those with whom the inmate plans to associate in both his/her working hours and his/her off-work hours; the inmate's plans for gainful employment;
11. The willingness of the community into which the inmate will be released to receive the inmate;
12. The willingness of the inmate's family to allow him/her to return to the family circle;
13. The attitudes of the sentencing judge, the solicitor, and local law enforcement officers respecting the inmate's parole;
14. The feelings of the victim's family, and any witnesses to the crime about the release of the inmate;
15. Other factors considered relevant in a particular case by the Board.

Reservation of Discretionary Power of the Parole Board

These criteria in no way limit the absolute discretion of the Parole Board or Panel to make parole decisions on a case-by-case basis and to grant or deny parole as it determines to be in the best interest of society and the inmate under review.


In some cases, the Board may decide that an inmate should be granted parole if the inmate completes one or more stated conditions. When this is the case, the Board may grant a parole that becomes effective when the inmate completes one or more stated conditions. Should the inmate disobey any rule or regulation of the South Carolina Department of Corrections before satisfying the stated conditions to make his parole effective, the Board may rescind the inmate's parole and treat the case as though parole had been rejected. In other cases, the Board may feel it needs more time to form its decision. In such cases, the Board may simply take the parole consideration under advisement and reschedule it at a later date. Similarly, the Board may postpone a parole hearing in order to dispose of detainees or pending charges.

If the Board rejects an inmate for parole, the inmate will be given written notice of rejection stating the reasons for rejection. Decisions of the Board have no precedential effect whatever and in no way limit the Board's absolute discretion at later parole hearings.

After rejection for parole, the procedure of scheduling of rehearing is as follows:

1. An individual serving time for a violent offense defined in §16-1-60 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 1976 will be reheard for parole two years following the date of parole rejections. Applicable legal exceptions may allow for a one year hearing.
2. An individual serving time for a nonviolent offense defined in §16-1-70 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 1976 will be reheard for parole one year following the date of parole rejections.

I certify that the above material has been explained to me, and I have received a copy.

Inmate's Signature 	Date 11-10-16	Witness B. C. P. S.	Date 11/10/16
--	------------------	------------------------	------------------

SELF Report 11/10/16 (Test date 12/18/14)

Personality 67-76

Self Efficacy 77-102

Aspirations 103-108

ANGER 109-129

Self Report 11/10/16 (Test date 12/18/14):

Personality 67-76

Self Efficacy 77-102

Aspirations 103-108

Anger 109-129