Exhibit

(5)

# Certificate of Service



We, Thompson, Cook, Crawford & [redacted] et al, do hereby certify that we have mailed and or served a copy of an Affidavit of Facts Giving Judicial Notice; Seeking Default and Judgment; Seeking To File objections; Renewing the Petition To Remove; Renewing Request for the Appointment of legal Counsel Under ADA; Seeking To Suspend or Relax the Rules For Any defect in filing, Service or Form; Seeking To Supplement the Writ

of mandamus, (80) pages dated MAY 2, 2014, on the Richland Court, Attorney for defendants, the N.J. District Court, the 3rd Circuit and all involved parties, by U.S. mail postage prepaid by placing it in the institutional mailbox on MAY 2, 2014. Thus, it is filed that date, Houston v Lack, 287 U.S. 266, 273-76, 108 S.Ct 2379 (1988).

Respectfully

Douglas M Thomas

anthony Cook

Dominic Gallman

MAY 2, 2014

State of South Carolina
Richland County
State of New Jersey
Bergen County
State of New Jersey
State of S. Carolina
Court of Appeals

Douglas M. Thompson,
Lawrence L Crawford
aka Jonah Gabriel
Jahjah T. Tishbite,
Anthony Cook

Court of Common Pleas
5th Judicial Circuit
The Superior Court
The Civil Division
U.S. District Court
U.S. District Court
For The 3rd Circuit



Case 2013-CP-400-0084,
2294
Also Related to Cases
14-2000 3rd Circuit
5:13-CV-3415-DCN
2013-CP-400-2094

Aerialle T. Crawford
Quinta D. Lee et al,
plaintiffs

14-CV-2218-ES
BER-L-1708-14-1708-
14 et al.,
26-B PCR and all
relevant cases
related thereto

Affidavit of Facts
Giving Judicial Notice;
Seeking Default and
Judgment; Seeking
To File Objections;
Renewing the

VS.

Judge David Norton
Cpl. Bach et al,
defendants

Petition To Remove;
Renewing Request
For The Appointment
of legal Counsel
Under ADA; Seek-
ing To Suspend or
Relax The Rules
For Any defect in
filing, Service or
form; Seeking To
Supplement The
Writ of Mandamus

In Re: To Case 2013-CP-400-0084

5 of [redacted] 92

Appeal 2013-CP-400-2294 pending in the Richland County Court of Commons Pleas

Do: The Richland Court of Commons Pleas,

The New Jersey District Court,

The South Carolina District Court,

The 3rd Circuit Appeals Court,

The New Jersey Superior Court,

The SC Attorney General,

The SC Dept of Corrections et. al,

The plaintiffs give judicial

notice there the parties will find if the documents have not already been previously served upon you, copies of :

(1) A copy of the Certificate of Service and the Writ of mandamus dated March. 24, 2014 and the (5) page affidavit for sanctions dated April 16, 2014 in case 14-2000 3rd Circuit.

(2) Certificate of Service and copy of affidavit of Facts Giving Judicial notice ; seeking Rehearing ; Petition

To Remove, seeking to suspend or relax the Rules for any defect in form, supplementing the New Jersey Complaint and mandamus, (38) pages dated April 28, 2014 related to case 26-13 et al. This document is used to argue the issue of modern day slavery and the T.S.I.A..

(3) A copy of the certificate of service and Affidavit of facts seeking Recusal, motion to Disqualify, motion for Judicial Notice, motion for change of venue and motion to motion there-for filed in case 26-13 further

highlighting the complexity of this case, all cases sought consolidated.

(4) A copy of the Certificate of Service and Affidavit of Facts Giving Judicial Notice; Petition To Remove, (15) pages dated April 22, 2014. This case was filed in New Jersey seeking to disqualify the State of South Carolina in its entirety in handling any civil or criminal case related to these matters including "0084" and "2294" in the Richland County Court. The cases are now removed by Douglas Thompson in case 14-cv-2218-ES.

(5) This is the complaint that makes up CASE 14:CV-2018-ES. FOR the RECORD this is not SERVICE. I AM FORCE to GIVE you PRE-NOTICE for the SAKE of filing this document only.

(6) A copy of Notice of motion scheduling dated FEBRUARY 4, 2014 RELATED to CASE 2013-CP-400-2944. This proves Judge Griffin knew by law he could not proceed with this CASE since it was petitioned REMOVED, knowing he could not EVER file in the CASE [redacted] AN ORDER of CONTINUANCE until the CASE WAS REMANDED.

The same situation existed in case 2013-CP-400-00844. Yet Judge Lee in acts of fraud on the court, filed an order of continuance knowingly fully well she did not have jurisdiction to do so until the case was remanded.

(7) A copy of the (19) page complaint that make up case BER-C-1708-14 et al. seeking to disqualify the state of South Carolina.

(8) A copy of the amended complaint and summons filed in case 2013-CP-400-2294 also filed in case BER-C-1708-14 et al and all other related cases.

Note that it is clocked stamped by the Superior Court of New Jersey. Notice that on page (31) of the (160) page amended complaint that case 2013-CP-400-0084 has been made an intrinsic part of case 2013-CP-400-0084. Also take notice of the order from Hudson County dated December 10, 2013 and Essex County dated January 10, 2014. Once these documents are filed properly with any court, this means the plaintiffs in case 2013-CP-400-0084 have been officially amended by order to include all plaintiffs

listed in the documents. Since all plaintiffs were not before the court on April 3, 2014 where judge Lee issued the order of continuance, it can not be deemed proper or valid since all plaintiffs now party to this case were not present. We objected at the proceedings held on April 3, 2014, We object now. Please do not ever bring us before the courts if all plaintiffs are not present.

(9) A copy of the attorney keys letter dated October 27, 2013. This is the initial discovery sought in all

RELEVANT CASES by MANDAMUS, injunctive relief and OR protective ORDER, which include the appointing of legal counsel in all related cases by writ of mandamus in CASE 14-2000. I, Douglas Thompson supplement the mandamus to require this.

(10) A copy of the certification of counsel filed in CASE BER-L-1708-14 ET AL. and exhibits.

(11) A copy of the PCR in CASE 26-13 and the legal issue that is at the heart of the matter in all related

CASES (69) PAGES.

(12) A copy of the letter to the Florence District Court praying the petition to remove case 2013-CP-400-0084 was placed in the mail box on April 2, 2014 pursuant to Houston v Lack, 287 U.S 266, 273-76, 108 S.Ct 2379 (1988), being filed on that date.

(13) A copy of the certificate of service and motion to supplement the Writ of mandamus being processed (14-2000) in the 3rd Circuit and the § 1983 in pl.J (case 14-cv-2018-RES).

Petition To Remove / Motion For Recusal, (12) pages dated April 1, 2014. Note that it is clocked stamped by the Richland Court on April 3, 2014. This means under Rule 82(C) the court was to proceed no further until the case was remanded. Yet, despite not having jurisdiction. You will now see a copy of form (4) from the Richland Court showing an order of continuance was filed in the case in clear de-fiance of Rule 82(C) making that order of continuance void.

(19) A copy of the original complaint

And summons, (9) pages dated December 24, 2012 filed January 4, 2013, And the Amended complaint (32) pages dated January 9, 2013. These documents prove they had one year to get us before the court to adjudicate the case or place an order of continuance in the case or default. Such was to occur before the (365) days expired not after. This is the main issue of concern that produces this document. The parties And court defaulted creating a procedural defect And or error requiring default,

discovery, the appointing of counsel and this case being placed before a jury. Any claims of lack of service etc must be deemed waived in fundamental fairness to the plaintiffs.

Judicial notice takes place of proof. It simply means that the court will admit into evidence and consider, without proof of facts, matters of common and general knowledge, Moss v Aetna Life Ins Co., 228 Sc 2d 108; State v Broad River Power Co., 177 SC 240, 180 S.E 41; 31 C.J.S.

Evidence §§ 6 and 9; Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(a).

This is a manifest constitutional error. An error on the part of the trial court that has an identifiably negative impact on the proceedings to such a degree, that the constitutional Due Process Rights of the party are compromised. A manifest constitutional error can be reviewed by an appellate court even if the plaintiff did not object at the proceedings. Yet in this case

We did object at the April 3, 2014 hearing (Black Law Dictionary 8th Edition). We seek sanctions.

The plaintiffs humbly contend, in pursuant to Article 1 § 4 of the South Carolina Constitution:

Common Pleas Order

Effective date October 4 1983

IT IS ORDERED, that all common pleas cases in the state of South Carolina "[S]hall" be disposed of within (365) days from the date of filing of the initial complaint in

each case. Provided, however, that the Circuit Court may continue a common pleas case beyond (365) days by written order stating the reasons therefor if the court determines that exceptional circumstances exist in the case.

It is further ordered, that each Circuit Court judge is to continue only and all common pleas cases which have been pending for a period less than (365) days from the date of the initial (emphasis added) filing of each

complaint until such time as there are no cases exceeding (365) days (emphasis added) from the date of the filing of the initial complaint in each case (emphasis added). Cases shall be disposed in chronological order beginning with the oldest case. This shall not include cases which do not require a hearing or cases in which the Chief Circuit Court Judge, by written order (emphasis added) stating the reasons therefor, determines that ex-

exceptional circumstances exist which require the disposition of the case in advance of a case pending for more than (365) days.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Chief Circuit Court Judge for administrative purposes shall be responsible for coordinating the preparation of trial rosters for each term of common pleas court so as to accomplish the timely disposition of cases within the time period established by this

ORDER.

Chief Justice

Columbia, South Carolina
August 17, 1983. (See SC Rules of Court 2003 Edition on page 652 and SC Rules of Court 2004 Edition on page 659).

Article V privileges, Rule 501 General Rule Provides:

"Except as required by the South Carolina Constitution, by the Constitution of the United States, or by the South Carolina statutes, the privileges

of a witness, person, or the govern-
ment (emphasis added) shall be govern-
ed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by
the courts in light of reason and
experience. This Rule modifies the
federal Rule to refer to the South
Carolina Constitution".

Article V provisions in this case
make it mandatory, draconian, requiring
any interpretation of this provision to
be referred to the South Carolina Con-
stitution as a primary Rule and or first
choice, and not to common law or state

law as it pertains to normal administrative matters, especially in light of the fact that we are dealing with a judicial order issued by the S.C. Supreme Court under Article V. Not only regarding judicial orders, but also the provisions of the South Carolina Constitution are to be deemed and construed as mandatory unless there is some language contained therein that would dictate otherwise. This Article V order has never been rescinded. Therefore, it applies today. This order was issued by the

South Carolina Supreme Court in 1983 reviewed 1999, making it mandatory, dispositive, being applicable to every Court of Common Pleas case within this state regarding this (365) day provision.

The S.C. Supreme Court's intent, legislative or otherwise should be ascertained from the plain language of this provision of law. The language must read also in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose. Once the South Carolina Supreme Court has made a choice, there is

No room for the court to impose a different judgment based upon their own notions. If the provision of law's language is unambiguous and clear, there is no need to employ the Rules statutory and or common law construction, even pursuant to the Judges action, Judge Lee had no Right to look for or impose another meaning. Where the language of this provision of law is clear and explicit, the court "cannot" Rewrite the provision of law and interject matters into it which are not in the S.C Supreme Courts

language. Under the plain meaning Rule, it is not the courts place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous provision of law, Bass v. Isochem, 617 SE2d 369 (SCApp 2005); State v Brannon, 666 SE2d 272 (SCApp 2008); State v Pittman, 647 SE2d 144 (SC2007); Liberty mut. Ins. v. Second Injury Fund 611 SE2d 297 (SCApp. 2005).

To further bolster the proposition that this Rule, order, or provision is mandatory, dispositive by nature, the plaintiffs bring the court's attention to South Carolina Rules of Court 2005

Edition, pages 296, 297, 303 and 304, they state:

PURSUANT to Article V § 4 of the South Carolina Constitution;

"IT IS ORDERED, that upon the filing of a post trial motion under Rules 50, 52, 59 or 60(a) S.C.R.C.P., by a party in a JURY or NON-JURY action, the party "SO hall" within (10) days provide a copy of the motion to the trial judge."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, *** the chief judge for administrative

purposes in each Circuit shall ensure compliance with this order, also see SC Rules of Court 2013 edition".

It is perspicuous that if the lower court is not in compliance to Rule(s) 50, 52, 59 or 60(a) by these judicial orders issued from the South Carolina Supreme Court, the higher court(s) cannot entertain jurisdiction, and must remand for further adjudication by the lower court in question, making this particular provision and or order discretionary, mandatory. On this same premise,

the criminal court under the (180) day provision, and or the common pleas court under the (365) day provision, "cannot" continue to invoke and or exert their "powers" of subject matter jurisdiction if they fail to be in compliance to this order, even though they do indeed possess such power. Pursuant to the government blatantly disobeying this order issued by the SC Supreme Court, in the appropriate case, "trial court and or

relevant court, shall not hesitate to grant relief or mistrial where its rulings and or orders were violated to the prejudice of those they were intended to protect", Toyota of Florence Inc v. Lynch, 314 SC 257, 442 SE2d 611, 615 (1994); (SC Rules of Court Annotated 2006 Edition, pg 270).

To make use of the holdings made in Strother v Guernsey, 363 SC 93, 610 SE2d 494, 495 (SC 2005), related to subject matter jurisdiction would be misplaced. That case dealt with

indictment defects. This issue has absolutely nothing to do with indictment defects. To make use of the holdings made in State v. Culbreth regarding Rule 30 would be misplaced. Rule 30 is totally administrative. If the court and parties would take notice of the bottom of the page of 652 and 659 as it relates to this mandate, you will see that the administrative factors related to this provision have been rescinded. Further,

There are two material and distinct differences between Rule 30 and this requirement of Due Process Law. Rule 30 is not tied to the provisions of the South Carolina Constitution. This requirement of criminal and or civil procedure is. Secondly, Rule 30 is not a judicial order issued by the S.C. Supreme Court. This requirement of criminal procedure and civil procedure in the Common Pleas Court is. This has absolutely nothing to do with a speedy trial

issue. This is not what the plaintiffs are arguing. This is simply a matter of judicial order, "Stare Decisis Et Non Quieta Movere", South Carolina Rules of Court, South Carolina Rules of criminal procedure for the criminal court, Rules of Civil procedure for the Common Pleas court and Due Process Law. Once this provision was issued as a judicial order there fired to the provisions of the South Carolina Constitution pursuant to Article V & VI its observance became mandatory by the provisions contained therein making

it discomfort in nature.

SC Code Ann § 1-7-730 and SC Code Ann § 17-13-150 require that the prosecution and or prosecuting body "shall" fulfill and see that all duties, requirements, and Rules of Procedure related to Due Process and the Constitutions are adhered to and completed within the Court. The Attorney General is a defendant. They are well aware of the judicial orders in question.

In order to understand the meaning of any statute or phrase of law, it is necessary to determine

the meaning of the language as it is used in the particular context, Robinson v Shell Oil Company, 117 SCt 843 (1997). Article 12§2 utilizes the words "[S]hall provide, ...". In this context "[S]hall" is mandatory, see United States v Myers, 106 F3d 936, 941 (CA 10 1997). In order to understand the meaning of any word, sentence or phrase, "[T]he cardinal Rule is that the words should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and or interpretation without the court interjecting into them matters or a construing that is

not in the language", Seekinger v. The Vessel Excalibur, 483 S.E.2d 775 (S.C.App. 1997); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises Inc, 109 S.Ct 1026, 1030 (1989); Bass v. Isochem, 617 SE2d 369 (SC App. 2005); State v. Brandon, 666 SE 2d 272 (SC App 2008); State v. Pittman, 647 SE2d 144 (SC 2007); Liberty Mut. Ins v. SC Second Injury Fund, 611 SE 2d 297 (SC App. 2005).

Article 1 § 23 of the South Carolina Constitution dictates:

"The provisions of the South Carolina Constitution shall be taken, deemed and construed to be mandat-

tory and or prohibitory and not merely directory, except where made directory or permissory by its own terms".

Article 12 § 2 of the South Carolina Constitution is clear and unambiguous, "[S]hall" is mandatory, State v Carson, 317 SC 430, 431, 454 SE 2d 888, 889 (1995).

Therefore, it can be factually stated that not only by the provisions of Article 4 § 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, also by judicial order issued by the South Carolina Supreme Court, it is mandatory that the plaintiffs

DUE PROCESS matters be disposed of before the COURT of common Pleas within (365) days of the filing of the initial complaint. If the COURT would take notice of the initial complaint re-lated to these matters, you will see that the initial complaint was filed on JANUARY 4, 2013 and amended JANUARY 9, 2013. If the COURT would take notice of the only ORDER of continuance filed in this CASE by Judge Lee. It was not issued until April 3, 2014. By the initial complaint,

the date filed with the Common Pleas Court. This means the plaintiffs' DUE PROCESS matters should have been disposed of and concluded by JANUARY 4, 2014. Yet the case is still pending and no order of continuance was filed in the action until April 3, 2014, over (90) days past the (365) days prescribed by judicial order and the provisions of the South Carolina Constitution. There is no "written" order (emphasis added) of continuance filed with the Clerk of Court before the (365) day time period expired on which was

served on the plaintiffs at the appropriate time. Such an order of continuance by the plaintiffs' rights of due process and pursuant to judicial order issued by the S.C. Supreme Court, "cannot" be obtained after the fact. It must be obtained before the (365) days expires. This is especially true since the case was removed prior to Judge Lee's filing of the order. Just like Judge Griffin knew he could not place such an order in case "2294" since that case was removed. The same applies

to Judge Lee since case "0084" was and still is removed. To go beyond the prescribed time period and or deadline without a "further" (emphasis added) order of continuance filed in the case prior to the (365) day deadline creates a "[p]rocedural [d]efect" which deprives the Common Pleas Court of subject matter Jurisdiction, and or the "[p]ower" and or "[a]bility" to enact, and or invoke, and or continue its "[p]owers" of subject matter Jurisdiction in compliance to judicial order from the SC Supreme Court, Rules of Court and

DUE PROCESS law to adjudicate any matter before it requiring at least sanctions to be requested against the court and default which we seek, especially in light of the fact, that the case was petitioned removed and Rule 82(c) prevented Judge Lee from acting further in the case, United States ex Rel Echevarria v Silberglitt, 444 F2d 225 (1971); 28 USC §§ 1446(c)(4), 1446(e); Dugas v Hancock County Circuit Court, FSupp 2d 2008 WL 4153765; Johnson v Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1975); Reilly v Phil Jackson Pontiac Inc, 372 FSupp 1205

(NJST 1974); Gallagos v United States, 368 F3d 190 (2nd Cir 2004); State v Dudley, 354 SC 514, 581 SE2d 171 (2003); Monroe v Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct 473, 5 L.Ed2d 492 (1961).

The plaintiffs places forth this issue in a straight forward fashion and want to make certain that there is no misunderstanding as to the specific claims and or question(s) that is being placed before the court. [redacted] First, during the April 3, 2014 hearing the plaintiffs objected and brought this issue to judge Lees attention. Thereupon

she stated, "placing forth the continuance by order was up to her discretion and that this was not a normal case". This statement for one, proves her acknowledgement of the complexity of the case warranting the appointment of legal counsel under ADA.

Yet it is more than this. Yes, we agree with the judge when she stated such was up to her discretion and that this is not a normal case which would justify the continuance. What the plaintiffs don't agree

with and are specifically challenging is whether or not she could use or exercise that discretion to continue the case when she is well past the time frame to do so, which was designated by SC Supreme Court judicial order, especially in light of the fact the case has been officially removed to the federal court and there presently exist no order to remand. We Reiterate our objections previously made at the April 3, 2014 hearing related to case "0004". Rule 82(c) states: Removal to federal court.

When A petition for Removal of any action pending in any court of this State or any court of the United States is filed, no order accepting the petition or directing action to be removed shall be required. We seek sanctions. Such orders referred to in this issue may be used for establishing offensive collateral estoppel, Dunn v Dunn, 298 SC 499, 381 SE2d 734 (1989); Johnson v. Dailey, 318 SC 318, 457 SE2d 613 (SC1995); Dorsey v Witham, 263 SC 183, 209 SE2d 42 (1974); Higgins v medical University of South Carolina, 326 SC 592, 486 SE2d 269 (SC App. May 12, 1997); Plante v State,

315 S.C. 562, 446 S.E.2d 437 (1994); Middleborough Horiz. Property Regime Council of Co-Owners v. Montedison, S.p.A., 320 S.C. 470, 465 S.E.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1995); Gauld v. O'Shaughnessy Realty Co., 671 S.E.2d 79, 84, 380 S.C. 548, 557 (S.C. App. May 20, 2008); Gunnels v. Truesdale, 2009 WL 915479.

Returning back to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs are not arguing whether or not the Court of Common Pleas has subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases of "[t]his" general class to which the proceed-

ings in question belong. The plaintiffs concedes this fact. The plaintiffs in this context agrees with all (3), Guentry, Cotton and Parkhurst court(s) when they determined that criminal courts, and in this case we can add civil courts, do have subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases of their relevant nature and class. This is not the issue. What the plaintiffs are indisputably arguing is a question which clearly was not answered by either the Guentry, Cotton or Parkhurst court(s) is this. Despite the fact that

the criminal court, and in this case, the Civil Court, do have subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases of this general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Do their egregious, blatant failure to be in compliance to said certain, essential, crucial "jurisdictional prerequisites" and or "jurisdictional [p]requisites" at various phases of, and or at the commencement of the subject matter jurisdictionary action and or process. Do their blatant, egregious failure to be in compliance to said certain, essential, crucial "jurisdict-

tional [p]rerequisites" and or "[j]urisdictional [r]equisites at various phases of, and or at the commencement of the subject matter jurisdictionary action and or process, .... halt, check, constrain, restrain, limit, arrest, or stop the continuance of the subject matter jurisdictionary "[p]owers" before the court, even though that court without a doubt do indeed possess such "[p]ower". This is a crucially, materially, distinctly different question related to subject matter jurisdiction that was never answered by any of the (3) three courts involved

pursuant to Gurnsey. This is a new question of law and fact. Thus, using the holdings made in the Gurnsey court would be misplaced. Such a new question of law and fact is not barred in seeking relief for (ei sapletions), does relate to subject matter Juris-diction, "[C]annot" be waived by the plaintiffs, can be raised at "[A]ny" time, and the court "[S]hall [N]ot" fail to take notice, see Indictments Suffi-ciency, 70 Columbia L Rev. 876, 880 (1970); United States v Abrams, 539 FSupp. 378, 384 (SDNY 1982); Stirone v United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); Gaither v United States,

413 F2d 1061 (4th Cir 1969).

The Common Pleas Court, and the defendants involved, acting arbitrarily, conspiring under color of state law, the hand of one is the hand of all by the accomplice liability doctrine, in blatant defiance to Rules of Court, SC Supreme Court judicial order, and the provisions of the South Carolina Constitution, has failed to be in compliance to their own state laws in violation of the plaintiffs substantial Federal Constitutional Rights of Due Process. Thus, such action serves to violate the plaintiffs' rights under

The Equal Protection of the Laws Clause, 42 U.S.C §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 as well as 18 U.S.C §§ 241 and 242 warranting sanctions which we seek by Affidavit, Screws v United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct 1031 (1945); United States v Walsh, 194 F3d 37 (2nd Cir 1999); State v Pirro, 212 F3d 86 (2nd Cir 2000); Dubinka v Judges of Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of Los Angeles, 23 F3d 218; Jones v State of Arkansas, 929 F2d 375; Hicks v Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct 2227, 2229, 65 L.Ed 2d 175 (1980); Dozier v Loop College, City of Chicago, 776 F2d 752; Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co, 457 U.S. 922, 928-30, 102 S.Ct 2744, 2749-50, 73 L.Ed 2d 482 (1982).

Subject matter jurisdiction is the "power" to hear and determine cases of a general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Bell v Monsanto Corp., 579 SE 2d 325 SC 553 (SC 2003). Inasmuch, subject matter jurisdiction does not only cover and or involve whether or not the matter resides in a proper court of jurisdiction to hear and determine it. The court's "power" to hear and determine a case, is also defined as the court's "ability" to hear and determine a case. Thus, subject matter

jurisdiction also involves any issue that may "[a]ffect" and or "[h]inder" that "[p]ower" and or "[a]bility" to act in accordance of Rules of Court, Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure and Due Process Law. Such matters can be raised at "[a]ny" time "[c]annot" be waived by the plaintiffs, and the court "[s]hall [n]ot" fail to take notice before this case can ever move forward, State v Gentry supra; Mathis v State, 355 SC 87, 584 S.E.2d 366 (SC App 2003); Brown v State, ___ SC 348, 540 S.E.2d 846 (2001); State

v. Browning, 320 SC at 368, 46 SE2d at 359; State v. Munn, 357 SE2d 461 (SC 1987). Without a "written" (Emphasis Added) order of continuance filed with the Clerk of Court issued prior to the (365) day deadline prescribed by judicial order, especially in light of the removal, the court and parties were prohibited from continuing the cause. Such deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction and or prohibits the civil court from continuing and or invoking and or exercising their subject matter jurisdic-

fiduciary powers warranting estoppel and sanctions.

Inasmuch, the plaintiffs are not seeking default and judgment on every issue or relief argued in the complaints. What the plaintiffs are seeking by this egregious procedural defect is the following:

(1) That any issue of and or for dismissal by any defendant presently served or in the future be deemed waived and or rendered void and null

(2) That all motions filed by the

plaintiffs be granted in favor of the plaintiffs with the exception of the issues that are to be placed before the jury, scheduled April 3, 2014.

(3) That legal counsel be appointed to represent the plaintiffs and that appointed counsel be given additional time to serve any remaining defendant who was not served,

(4) That protective order and injunction be issued to secure the evidence listed in the Attorney Kays letter, A copy of it which is filed

in case "2294" within (20) days of the filing of this document. This includes the repairing of the Cranford word processor #120, the replacement of his 2 reinkable ribbons, 2 bottles of gold ink, Koss Headphones, Hot pot, muslim oil (2 lbs), #40 captcha replaced, not placed on card, contact be permitted to all plaintiff by mailing due to indigence, DNA and search warrant secured and Sheriff mailing.

(5) That this case be officially scheduled for a jury trial and the case be given class action certi-

fication for the main legal issue filed and argued related to the establishing of modern day slavery by the structural error in the indictments, and notice be given to all inmates within this state and or nationally upon review of discovery,

(6) That name change and the establishing of all Rights and titles as sought by MR Crawford be officially granted and established before the court in the manner he dictated, for the state of South Carolina. This

includes the establishing of Sovereign Power. All other matters are to be placed before the jury.

To all parties and courts involved. We are going to do this thing again, Since somehow you've lost clarity on this issue at hand. Both cases 2013-CP-400-0084 and 2013-CP-400-2294, to include all cases involving Crawford in the Common Pleas Court and SC. Court of Appeals is hereby petitioned REMOVED to be heard in case 14-CV-2218-ES, by both plaintiffs Thompson,

Crawford, also Cook. The Judges and parties conspiring under color of state law in violation of 18 USC § 241, 242 and 42 U.S.C § 1985; 1983 and 1986 REQUIRE SUCH, molinelli - Freytes v University of Puerto Rico, 727 F.Supp.2d 60 (2010); Andre v Castor M.D., Fla 1997, 963 F.Supp 1158; Berrios v Inter Am. University, CA 1 (Puerto Rico) 1976, 535 F2d 1330, 37 A.L.R. Fed 596; O'Bradovich v Village of Tuckahoe, SD N.Y 2004, 325 F.Supp.2d 413; Perry v Barnard, S.D. Ind. 1989, 745 F.Supp 1394; Kohl Idlis Park Co. v. Rockland County, CA 2 (N.Y) 1983, 710

F2d 895 | Myers v Bowman, CA 11 (GA) 2013, 713 F3d 1319 | Jiminez v Wahlie, CA 7 (Ill) 2002, 304 F3d 734; Casa Marie, Inc, 1993, 988 F2d 252; Lopez, 1980, 620 F2d 1229; Gregory v. Thompson, CA 9 (Ariz) 1974, 500 F2d 59; Plaisance v Reese, ED. La 2004, 353 FSupp 2d 735; Bordages v. McElroy, SD Tex 1996, 952 F. Supp. 499; Johnson 39; Kellyatta v Moore, SD Miss 1985, 623 F. Supp 224; Disability Discrimination Under ADA 42 U.S.C § 1985; 20 Am Jurs Proof of Facts 3d 361; Pollack v Ridge, WD NY 2004, 310 FSupp 2d 519;

Bradley v Baltimore Police Dept Md 2012, 887 FSupp2d 642; Baines v Masiello, WD NY 2003, 288 FSupp2d 370; Porter v Selsky, WD NY 2003, 287 FSupp. 2d 180.

Referring back to the issue of the sovereignty related to the plaintiffs involve as it pertain to the members of the reestablished global theocratic state, that would permit us to invoke the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. The Declaration of Sovereignty

And the (85) page document dated October 4, 2009 filed in these cases, also 18 U.S.C § 1116 (a)(b)(4); 18 U.S.C § 1116 (a)(b)(2)(3)(A) define those persons protected under the F.S.I.A.. The lead plaintiff, Yahyah Ibn Yishbitz, being heir to (4) independent thrones that globally exist and the default(s) that exist related to this case, make him a foreign State designated by those defaults and clear Rules of court and by way of the judicial order which is the source of the procedural defect. Thus, there is a bases to

object, remove and consolidate under the F.S.I.A giving the plaintiffs right of venue. A sovereign by the law cited in the Declaration of Sovereignty and will and Testament, Theocratic/ foreign law under Rule 44, related to religious beliefs under the 1st amendment, as well as state and federal law, cannot be planned in an indictment. We are sovereign by way of our original states as sovereigns, English v Thorn, 676 FSupp. 761 (SD Miss 1987); In re Green, 980 F2d 590 (9th Cir 1992); Yicks Wo. v. Hopkins,

118 U.S 356; United States v. Lee 106 U.S 196 At 208; Perry v United States, 294 U.S 330, 353 (1935); Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421. The United States Supreme Court in the case of Wills v. Michigan State Police, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), made it perfectly clear that the Sovereign cannot be named in any statute as merely a "person" or "any person" including indictments which are produced by statute, Lousing v Smith, 4 Wheat. 9, 20 (1829); Afroyim v Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 15 Pet 518,

1841 WL 5024, 2006 A.M.C. 2955, 10 Led 826, U.S. CONN. JANUARY 1841; United States v Wheeler, 98 S.Ct 1079 At 1083.

Decedent domicil issues attach to these cases. The lineal descendents, in infinitum, of any person deceased shall represent his or her ancestor, that is, shall stand in the same person as his Holy ancestors would stand, if he or she were living. The common law required that in order for property, tangible or intangible, which include titles of High Priesthood, Imamate, Khalifate and

kingship, to descend from person to person, it must appear either (1) that the person have obtained the property by purchase; or (2) if he obtained it by descent, that he was seized of the property at the time of his death. The defendants in the cases attached seized my ancestors in acts of brutal, tortorous slavery and seized their property and titles at the time of their captivity and death. Property and titles in this instance, was not considered as passing by descent until

the descendant took possession, and the act of taking possession was called entry. King Solomon took possession from King David. Ali ibn Abu Talib and Fatima took possession from the Prophet Muhammad. Menyelek the son of King Solomon whose mother was the Queen of Sheba, the Ethiopian Queen, took possession of the throne of Africa / Ethiopia from King Solomon. The Prophet muhammad's bloodline was introduced in the African diaspora through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's involvement

in the U.S. Slave trade. Then you brought my ancestors here, kidnapping them by brutal, sadistic, terroristic, torturous force (PBUT). The Head Sovereign Tahjah al mahdi, officially took possession via the Declaration of Sovereignty and the United Nations documents. Thus, we clearly have entry. Tahjah al mahdi is the fiduciary Heir by will and Testament of Gods Holy Prophets and Kings foretold to come. "Haeres Est Eadem Persona Cum Antecessore". The Heir is the same person as his

ancestor. Once the true Heir to the Global Theocratic Throne makes an appearance on the global stage He, by that appearance, establishes Every Christian, Muslim and Jew worldwide, as Kings, Khalifahs, not subject to action before any global court without the consent of Yahyah The Yishbite. This act occurs without their consent under Foreign-Theocratic Law. Our Sovereign power emanates from the same source globally. That being the one true God. Thus, the state statutes must yield by way of preemption

Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6 cl 2, Sec (3) Holy Books and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad; Books entitled, "Before the Mayflower, A History of Black America", by Lerone Bennett; Sunan ibn-e-Majah vol No: 5 ISBN No. 81-7151-294-1 pages 391-395; Signs Before the Day of Judgement by Ibn Kathir ISBN No. 1 870582 039 pages 18-24; Isaiah 14:29-32; 41:25; World's Greatest Men of Color Volume 1 by J.A. Rodgers ISBN No. 978-0-684-81581-7; The Kebra Nagast or "Glory of the Kings"

A Chronicle of The Rulers of Ethiopia; Budge E.A.W., The Queen of Sheba and her only son Menyelek, London 1923; Ormonde, Czenzi, Solomon and The Queen of Sheba, New York, Harper Stars and Young 1954; Zecharigh 6:12-13; Daniel chapt. 11; National Cox v Shalala, 112 F3d 151; English v Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 100 S.Ct 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990); McLeod v. Ford motor Co., 831 F2d 723; Cairns v. Franklin mint Co., 24 F.Supp 2d 1013; Doche-Navas v Secretary of The Interior of U.S., 837 F2d 340 Cert.

denied 108 SCt 2822, 486 U.S. 1055, 100 LEd2d 923; Estate of Harvey v. United States, 678 FSupp. 1268; Bell v United States, 310 FSupp 1189; Stephan v Carothers, 97 FSupp 2d 698; Craig v. United States, 89 FSupp 2d 858; Legette v Rose, 776 FSupp. 229; Casey v Gallagher v Ohio St 2d 40, 227 NE 2d 801 (1967); Miller v United States supra; Sandy v Maxhot, 1 Ohio St 3d 143, 438 NE 2d 417 (Ohio 1982).

To: The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals. I, Douglas M. Thompson hereby supplement the Writ of

Mandamus in case 14-2000 to require all the sought relief in this document. As Thomas Jefferson, one of our founding fathers stated:

"Single Acts of Tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of the day; but a series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period and pursued unalterably through every change of ministers too plainly prove a deliberate, systematic plan of reducing us to slavery".

Regarding any issue of frivolous or

the seeking of Summary Judgement or dismissal. With the 90+ plaintiffs attached to this case being of sound mind, and the claims in part are based upon documented historical facts, Religious tenants, beliefs and doctrine protected under the 1st amendment, it would be highly inappropriate to dismiss such as frivolous without first requiring the defendants in total to Response on the court record. The record is incomplete where SCDC blocked service of the other defendants, conspiring under color of law, just like the New Jersey

defendants, to argue unjust defects and create a complete record to cause harm to future appeal, which we object. The claims cannot be deemed malicious since we are arguing and seeking relief for Due Process violations, violations of the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, violations of the CAT Treaty, International Human Rights Laws, and appropriation by foreign government, name and title reclamation under probate law, matters of divorce and unjust deprival of parental rights, violations of the

Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act bearing a nexus to religion that are also tantamount to the defendants commercial activities here in the United States and abroad, both past and present in the form of the slave trade, Jim Crow laws and this new Jim Crow - modern day slavery by way of this present Judicial system possessing commercial dynamics as well. We stated numerous claims upon which relief can be granted.

It would be an abuse of discretion to dismiss or grant summary judge if we can demonstrate that we are entitled to relief on only single claim

argued upon any theory asserted, especially in light of the fact we presented an arguable basis in law and fact for all claims made. Even though some claims may appear "fantastic" they are not indisputably meritless and are indeed common to the human experience thus demonstrating that sua sponte dismissal, dismissal for not stating a claim or granting defendants summary judgment would be an abuse of discretion. It must appear beyond a doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts to support their claims, which is obvious we can. The

court cannot state with certainty that the plaintiffs are unable to make any rational argument in law and fact. Specific allegations are made. Specific defendants are named. If it appears that the action after discovery would offer facts which would validate the complaint, which it would in this case, it would be highly inappropriate to dismiss or grant Summary judgment. Discovery and an evidentiary hearing would affect disposition of legal questions raised and reduce the work of the courts by preventing through premature dismissal, the creation of appeals based upon in-

complete records, Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Brown v Barry, 207 F.3d 866, 866 (6th Cir 2000); Braddon v District of Columbia Board of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (DC Cir 1984) cert. denied 469 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct 811, 83 L.Ed.2d 804 (1985); Jones v Morris, 777 F.2d 1277, 1278-79 (7th Cir 1985) cert. denied 475 U.S. 1053, 106 S.Ct 1280, 89 L.Ed 2d 587 (1986); William v Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304 (7th Cir 1988); Haggins v Lawine, 415 U.S 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); Lawler v Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (6th Cir 1990); Block v Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir 1998); Parratt v.

Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletics Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 121 S.Ct 924, 930, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001); Robinson v. Lorillard, 155 F.R.D. 535 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious beliefs, is basic in a society of free men, .... It embraces the right to maintain theories of life and death and of the hereafter which are rank heresies to members of orthodox faiths. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to proof of their religious

doctrine or beliefs. Religious experience which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others, ... the fathers of our Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and the lack of any one religious creed on which all men may agree. They fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible tolerance to conflicting views. Man's relationship to his God was made no concern of the state. He is granted the right to

worship as he please and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views, especially in light of the fact he may be a genuine Prophet and Lawgiver of God. See (3) Holy Books; Rule Civ Pro, Rule 44; Cantwell v State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct 900, 84 L.Ed 1213 (1940); United States v Ballard, 322 U.S 78, 86, 64 S.Ct 882, 886, 88 L.Ed 1148 (1944); Stevens v Berger, 428 F.Supp 896, 899-900 (E.D N.Y 1977); Pennhurst State Sch & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S 89, 99, 104 S.Ct 900, 79 L.Ed 2d 67 (1984); Argentina Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, 488 U.S 428, 434, 109 S.Ct 683, 102 L.Ed 2d

818 (1989); Caisaffi v Holland, 635 F2d 1305, 1308 (DC Cir 1981); Watson v Ault, 525 F2d 886 (5th Cir 1976) (adopting same standard); cf Anders v California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct 1396, 18 L.Ed 2d 493 (1967); Bolling v Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct 693, 694, 98 L.Ed 884 (1954) (showing dismissal was premature); Denton v Hernandez, 504 U.S. 33, 112 S.Ct 1728 (1992); White v White, 886 F2d 721 (4th Cir 1989).

Additional Relief Sought by Sanctions due to the procedural defect:

We want all cases placed on the complex case docket, assigned to

Judge Benjamin and allowed to go to trial; the muslims, Christians and Jews in SCDC must be permitted to attend all religious functions during phase and disruptive scheduling; Crawford retains his hair due to his Nazarite vow; no steel cuffs are to be used on him at any time, only plastic restraints; the muslims, Christians and Jews in SCDC must be permitted to grow 4" beards; full meals are to be given at all times during phase and disruptive schedules; some form of speakers are to be given to all inmates to allow them to

ENGAGE IN PROPER EXERCISE ; MUSLIMS MUST BE PERMITTED TO HAVE OIL IN THEIR PERSONAL PROPERTY VIA INMATE COORDINATOR AND ATTEND DAILY CONGREGATIONAL PRAYERS STATEWIDE , ALSO COLLECTIVELY AT EACH INSTITUTION DURING THE MONTH OF RAMADAN ; THAT FAMILY MEMBERS AND FRIENDS WILL BE ALLOWED TO VISIT DURING THE EID FEASTS WITH APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN.

FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY. THE 365 DAY CONTINUANCE ISSUE IS BEING ARGUED FOR CASES 2006 CP 400-3567, 3568, AND 3569 WHICH SAT IN COURT SINCE 2006 WITH THIS DEFAULT ALSO.

These cases are removed also.

Wherefore the plaintiffs pray for this relief to include any and all other relief the court would deem just, fair and proper.

Respectfully

Douglas M. Thompson

Douglas M. Thompson

Anthony Cook

Anthony Cook

Dominique Gallman

Dominique Gallman

May 2, 2014

Lawrence L Crawford aka

Joseph Gabriel Jahjah T. Tishbite

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