

Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC

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December 2, 2016

Mr. Daniel E. Shearouse
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, South Carolina 29221

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S.C. SUPREME COURT


RE: Jason Osborne, #246524, v. State of South Carolina
Case No.: 2015-CP-42-0666

Dear Mr. Shearouse:

The York County Court of Common Pleas appointed my office to represent Jason Osborne in his Post-Conviction Relief action. Please find enclosed for filing the original and two (2) copies of the Notice of Appeal, Proof of Service, and one (1) copy of the Order of Dismissal in the above-referenced case. Please return the clocked copies to me in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.

Thank you for your assistance with this matter.

Sincerely,


Leah B. Moody

LBM/lpt

Enclosure

cc Jason Osborne
Alicia A. Olive, Esquire
Sharon Graham, SCCID
Hope Blackley, Clerk of Court, Spartanburg

IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

APPEAL FROM SPARTANBURG COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

The Honorable R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Presiding in Spartanburg County

Case No.: 2015CP4200666


Jason Osborne, #246524, Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Jason Osborne appeals the order of the Honorable R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., dated October 26, 2016 and mailed on November 15, 2016. Appellant received written notice of entry of the final order on November 18, 2016.



Leah B. Moody, Esquire
Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC
235 E. Main Street, Suite 115
Post Office Box 1015
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29731

Other Counsel of record:
Alicia A. Olive, SC Attorney General's Office
Rembert C. Dennis Building
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1549
(803) 734-3970

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

**IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court**

**APPEAL FROM SPARTANBURG COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas**

The Honorable R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Presiding in Spartanburg County

Case No. : 2015CP4200666


Jason Osborne, #246524 Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served the Notice of Appeal on Alicia A. Olive by depositing a copy of it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on 12/9, 2016 addressed to its attorney of record, Alicia A. Olive, Post Office Box 11549, Columbia, South Carolina, 29211-1549.



Leah B. Moody, Esquire
Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC
235 E. Main Street, Suite 115
Post Office Box 1015
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29731

December 9, 2016

cc Jason Osborne
Sharon A. Graham, SCCID
Daniel Shearouse, Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme Court
Hope Blackley, Clerk of Court, Spartanburg County

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF SPARTANBURG
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JASON BRIAN OSBORNE,

Applicant,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,


Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the **Order of Dismissal (2015-CP-42-0666)** has been served upon the applicant by mailing one (1) copy in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:


**Ms. Leah B. Moody, Esquire
Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC
PO Box 1015
Rock Hill, SC 29730**

This 15th day of November, 2016.



Alicia A. Olive
Attorney for Respondent

SWORN to before me this 15th day of November, 2016.



Notary Public for South Carolina.

My Commission Expires: 3-18-2023

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
COUNTY OF SPARTANBURG)

Jason Brian Osborne, #246524,)
)
Applicant,)
)

v.)

State of South Carolina,)
)
Respondent.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

C/A No.: 2015-CP-42-0666

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This matter comes before the Court by way of an Application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR") filed February 12, 2015. Respondent made its Return on September 14, 2015. The Court convened an evidentiary hearing into the matter on June 15, 2016, at the Spartanburg County Courthouse. Applicant was present at the hearing and represented by Leah B. Moody, Esquire. Alicia A. Olive, Esquire, of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office, represented Respondent.

Applicant testified on his own behalf at the evidentiary hearing. Applicant's plea counsel, Matthew Shealy, Esquire, also testified. The Court had before it a copy of the plea transcript, the records of the Spartanburg County Clerk of Court regarding the subject convictions, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the pleadings, the return, and the exhibit introduced at the hearing. The Court finds as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Spartanburg County Clerk of Court. Applicant was indicted at the May 2013 term of the Spartanburg County Grand Jury for the following:

- (1) Failure to stop (2013-GS-42-2366);

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- (2) Receiving stolen goods, third or subsequent (2013-GS-42-2367);
- (3) Three counts of possession of a stolen vehicle, third or subsequent (2013-GS-42-2368, -2369, and -2374);
- (4) Grand larceny, third or subsequent (2013-GS-42-2370)
- (5) Two counts of petit larceny, third or subsequent (2013-GS-42-2371, and -2378)
- (6) Two counts of financial transaction card fraud, third or subsequent (2013-GS-42-2373, and -2375);
- (7) Two counts of breaking into a motor vehicle (2013-GS-42-2372, and -2379);
- (8) Two counts of financial transaction card theft (2013-GS-42-2376, and -2377);
- (9) Forgery, third or subsequent (2013-GS-42-2381);
- (10) Two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses, third or subsequent (2013-GS-42-2380, and -2386);

Applicant was subsequently indicted at the December 2013 term for possession of a stolen vehicle, third or subsequent (2013-GS-42-5562), and at the January 2014 term for possession of a stolen vehicle, third or subsequent (2014-GS-42-0371). Matthew Shealy, Esquire, ("Counsel") represented Applicant on all charges.

On January 28, 2015, Applicant pleaded guilty before the Honorable Edward W. Miller to all charges (a total of nineteen) as indicted. Pursuant to the State's recommendation of fifteen years, Judge Miller sentenced Applicant to imprisonment for a term of ten years for one count of financial transaction credit fraud, a consecutive term of five years for one count of financial transaction card theft, and concurrent terms of three years for failure to stop and ten years for all remaining charges. Applicant did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

II. ALLEGATIONS

In his Application, Applicant alleges that he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically:
 - i. Counsel failed to appeal and "allowed court proceedings to take place"
 - ii. Counsel "allowed the court to accept a plea without any details or without explaining the nature of what happened."
2. Involuntary Guilty Plea, in that:
 - i. "I pled to this charge when I was unaware that I was

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- pleading to the charge.”
- ii. “I spoke to my attorney and specifically told him that I would not [plead guilty] on this charge (2013-GS-42-2376). I involuntar[ily] took a plea.”
 - iii. The judge “violated Rule 11 by failing to make inquiry as to satisfy there was a factual basis to accept the plea.”

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court has reviewed the record in its entirety and has heard the testimony and arguments presented at the evidentiary hearing. The Court has further had the opportunity to observe each witness who testified at the hearing, and to closely pass upon their credibility. The Court has weighed the testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80.

A. Summary of Testimony

Applicant acknowledged that Counsel represented him on nineteen charges, but stated that he did not intend to plead to six of those charges because they happened at a church.¹ He stated that he felt if he pleaded to two-thirds of the charges, he would have gotten less time. He testified that he signed all of his sentencing sheets but that he did not read them. He stated he should have only pleaded to twelve charges and that he could not talk to his attorney at the guilty plea. He stated he was in a “shotgun” plea and that it was confusing. Applicant testified that Counsel showed him some videos, and at that time Applicant told him that he wished to plead guilty. When asked if Counsel went over all the charges with him, he said that Counsel did not go over all of them. He stated that the charges he was pleading to were not read aloud into the record at the plea. He testified that he told Counsel he would not plead guilty to those six charges. He testified the judge did not tell him the maximum penalty for the offenses. He

¹ These charges arose from incidents that occurred on August 12, 2009, and include the following indictment numbers: (2013-GS-2373, -2375, -2376, -2377, -2378, and -2379).

understood that he could be sentenced from zero to ten years on one of the charges. He stated he saw the sentencing sheets thirty minutes after the plea. He testified he tried to speak with Counsel at that time but he "was blowing me off." He said he received consecutive sentences on the charges that he did not intend to plead to. Applicant stated he did not bring this to the plea judge's attention and that he did not remind his lawyer because he did not think he had to. He stated the six charges are as follows: financial transaction card theft, two counts of financial transaction card fraud, petit larceny, and breaking into a motor vehicle. He stated he wanted a trial on these six charges. Applicant acknowledged that he knew at the guilty plea that the State had recommended a sentence of fifteen years and further acknowledged that he was sentenced to fifteen years. Applicant agreed that the parties stipulated to the facts of all nineteen charges and that the chart was made part of the record at the plea as Court's Exhibit 1. Applicant stated the six charges he disputed all arose on the same date: August 12, 2009.

Counsel testified that Applicant did not have any defenses to any of the charges. He testified that he discussed with Applicant the maximum penalty he could receive on all charges in the aggregate, which was 185 years. Counsel testified that when Applicant decided to accept the plea offer, Applicant was about to go to trial on the indictments arising from a November 1, 2009, incident for breaking into a motor vehicle, petit larceny, and grand larceny (2013-GS-42-2370, -2371, and -2372). Counsel discussed with Applicant what he was facing on the six charges along with the rest of the charges. Counsel testified if Applicant had declined the plea offer, the State would have rescinded the offer, and they would have proceeded to trial. Counsel testified Applicant had been on a number of different dockets. Counsel testified the offer was for Applicant to plead to all nineteen charges with a recommendation of fifteen years. Counsel stated the judge had to sentence him consecutively on at least one charge to reach the recommended

fifteen year sentence. Counsel asked the State for a better deal several times before Applicant accepted the offer. He said the fifteen year offer came down from Barry Barnette (the Seventh Circuit Solicitor). Counsel testified he explained to Applicant that if he did not accept the offer, it would be withdrawn. Counsel denied Applicant's allegation that he ignored him after the plea. He stated he was almost certainly dealing with other pleas directly after Applicant pleaded guilty. He further testified that there would be no reason to file an appeal on a guilty plea.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Plea Counsel

Applicant alleges Counsel was ineffective because he allowed the Court to accept Applicant's plea "without any details or without explaining the nature of what happened." At the hearing, Applicant further alleged that Counsel was ineffective for allowing that plea to go forward because he did not wish to plead to the six charges arising out of the August 12, 2009, incident, which occurred at a church.

In this post-conviction relief action, Applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (citing Griffin v. Martin, 278 S.C. 620, 300 S.E.2d 482 (1983)). Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, the applicant must prove counsel's "conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Id. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

The proper measure of performance is whether counsel provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1985); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977)). The Court presumes counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Applicant must overcome this presumption in order to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 118, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989).

The Court uses a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625. First, Applicant must prove counsel's performance was deficient. Id. Under this prong, the Court measures counsel's performance by its "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Second, any deficient performance must have prejudiced Applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. With respect to guilty plea counsel, Applicant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 59 (1985).

This Court finds Counsel conducted a proper investigation, adequately conferred with Applicant, and was thoroughly competent in his representation. Counsel has been a practicing attorney for eight years. Counsel met with Applicant at least five times prior to the plea, filed motions for discovery, and reviewed all discovery with Applicant. In his consultations with Applicant, Counsel informed Applicant of all the charges against him, explained the elements of those offenses, went over the State's evidence pertaining to each of the charges, and informed Applicant of the maximum penalties for each charge. Counsel also added all the maximum penalties together and informed Applicant that, in the aggregate, he could potentially be sentenced to up to 185 years in prison.

Counsel testified he had difficulty getting Applicant to talk to him and that Applicant did

not provide him with any leads or potential witnesses for the purpose of asserting any defenses. Counsel reviewed with Applicant all of his constitutional rights and explained which rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty. Counsel testified it was entirely Applicant's decision to plead guilty and that Applicant never gave any indication that he wished to withdraw his plea. Counsel stated that if Applicant had indicated a desire to withdraw the plea, Counsel would have stepped down and withdrawn the plea.

At the plea, the parties stipulated to the facts of the nineteen charges by submitting a chart of the offenses, which included the warrant numbers, incident dates, and sentencing exposure on each charge as a Court's exhibit. Tr. p. 18, line 7. Applicant acknowledged this at the PCR hearing and agreed that he stipulated to the facts when he entered his plea. That document was also introduced as an exhibit at Applicant's PCR hearing. In mitigation, Counsel also asked the judge to consider suspending a portion of the recommended fifteen year sentence.

Based on these facts, this Court finds Applicant has failed to demonstrate any deficiency in Counsel's performance.

Applicant likewise has failed to demonstrate that but for any alleged error of Counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Applicant was facing nineteen charges. Applicant contends that if he had not pleaded to the six August 12, 2009 charges, he would have gotten a better sentence. Applicant has made no showing that the State made such an offer. On the contrary, Counsel testified that if Applicant had declined the plea offer, the State would have withdrawn the offer, and they would have proceeded to trial on the indictments for breaking into a motor vehicle, petit larceny, and grand larceny. Each of those charges carried a maximum sentence of ten years. In addition, those charges were charges arising from a November 1, 2009, incident—not the August 12, 2009 incident that Applicant claimed he

wanted to be tried for. Further, Counsel testified Applicant had no defense, and no evidence to the contrary has been presented as part of this PCR proceeding. Counsel testified that he tried multiple times to work out a better plea offer from the State, but that the offer of fifteen years to plead to all nineteen charges came directly from Solicitor Barnette. For these reasons, this Court finds Applicant has also failed to show prejudice resulting from the alleged errors of Counsel.

Therefore, Applicant has failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to this allegation. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed.

Failure to appeal from guilty plea

Applicant also alleged Counsel was ineffective for not appealing his guilty plea. Counsel has a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult with defendant about appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal, or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); Jones v. State, 382 S.C. 589, 596, 677 S.E.2d 20, 23-24 (2009).

This Court finds there is no basis to think that a rational defendant would have sought an appeal given the plea judge's sentence did not deviate from the State's recommended sentence of fifteen years given in exchange for Applicant's plea to a total of nineteen charges. Though Applicant alleges he wished to appeal his plea and that Counsel blew him off immediately following the plea, Counsel denied this allegation and stated that he was likely handling more pleas after Applicant's, and that there is no reason to appeal from a guilty plea. Applicant also testified that he could not get in contact with Counsel to ask about an appeal. This Court finds Counsel's testimony to be more credible than Applicant's testimony on this issue. Accordingly, this Court finds Applicant has failed to show that he "reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470. Therefore, this allegation is denied

and dismissed.

C. Involuntary Guilty Plea

Applicant also alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary because he "was unaware [he] was pleading to the charge." he told his attorney he "would not [plead guilty] on this charge (-2376)," and the judge did not "make an inquiry as to satisfy there was a factual basis to accept the plea." This Court finds Applicant has failed to present any evidence in support of these allegations and has therefore failed to satisfy his burden of proving that his guilty plea was involuntarily entered.

In post-conviction relief cases, an applicant asserting a constitutional violation must frame the issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 363, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747 (1999) (citing Drayton v. Fvatt, 312 S.C. 4, 9, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993)). An Applicant who pleads guilty on the advice of counsel may collaterally attack the plea only by showing that (1) counsel was ineffective and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the Applicant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Roscoe v. State, 345 S.C. 16, 20, 546 S.E.2d 417, 419 (2001). An Applicant alleging his guilty plea was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel must prove that counsel's advice was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985); Bennett v. State, 371 S.C. 198, 204, 638 S.E.2d 673, 675 (2006).

To find a guilty plea is voluntarily and knowingly entered into, the record must establish the applicant had a full understanding of the consequences of his plea and the charges against him. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969). Before a court can accept a guilty plea, a criminal defendant must be advised of the constitutional rights

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he is waiving. Id. at 243. Specifically, the accused must be aware of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one's accusers. Id. Moreover, a criminal defendant entering a guilty plea "must be aware of the nature and crucial elements of the offense, the maximum and any mandatory minimum penalty, and the nature of the constitutional rights being waived." Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 599, 524 S.E.2d 623, 624 (1999). A criminal defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of statutory or constitutional rights in a guilty plea "must be established by a complete record and may be accomplished by colloquy between court and defendant, between court and defendant's counsel, or both." Roddy v. State, 339 S.C. 29, 34, 528 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2000).

When determining issues relating to guilty pleas, the Court will consider the entire record, including the transcript of the guilty plea and the evidence presented at the PCR hearing. Anderson v. State, 342 S.C. 54, 57, 535 S.E.2d 649, 657 (2000). Furthermore, "A guilty plea is a solemn, judicial admission of the truth of the charges against an individual; thus, a criminal inmate's right to contest the validity of such a plea is usually, but not invariably, foreclosed. Dalton v. State, 376 S.C. 130, 137-38, 654 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977)). Therefore, statements made during a guilty plea should be considered conclusive unless a criminal inmate presents valid reasons why he should be allowed to depart from the truth of his statements. Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.1975); Edmonds v. Lewis, 546 F.2d 566 (4th Cir.1976).

This Court finds the record fully supports the knowing and voluntary nature of Applicant's plea. Applicant has presented no reason why he should be permitted to depart from the truth of his statements made during his guilty plea. Applicant has presented no evidence that he was unaware that he was pleading to any particular charge of the nineteen, or that he told

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Counsel he did not wish to plead. Counsel stated that if Applicant had informed him he did not wish to go forward, he would have withdrawn the plea, and they would have proceeded to trial on several of the charges. Further, Applicant admitted that he stipulated to the facts of the case, which were made part of the record as a Court's exhibit. Therefore, Applicant has made no showing that the plea judge failed to inquire as to whether there was a factual basis on which to accept the plea. For these reasons and for the reasons stated above, this Court finds Applicant has failed satisfy his burden of proving his plea was involuntary. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed.

D. All Other Allegations

As to any and all allegations that were raised in the application or at the hearing in this matter and not specifically addressed in this order, the Court finds Applicant failed to present any evidence regarding such allegations. Accordingly, the Court finds Applicant has abandoned any such allegations.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds and concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.


The Court notes Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days from PCR counsel's receipt of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991), Applicant has a right to appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of post-conviction relief. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP, provides that if Applicant wishes to seek

appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a notice of appeal on Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.


IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The Application for Post-Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. Applicant must be remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections to complete service of his sentence.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 24 day of Oct., 2016.



THE HONORABLE R. FERRELL COTHAN, JR.
Presiding Judge


_____, South Carolina

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H. HOPE BLANKENHORN



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
The Honorable Hope Blackley
Spartanburg County Clerk of Court
Post Office Box 3483
Spartanburg, South Carolina 29304

RE: Jason Brian Osborne, #246524 v. South Carolina
C.A.: 2015CP4200666

Dear Ms. Blackley:

Please find enclosed the Notice of Appeal and the Proof of Service in the above-referenced matter.

Sincerely,



Leah B. Moody

LBM/lpt

Enclosures

cc Jason Osborne

Alicia A. Olive, Assistant Attorney General

Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme Court

Sharon Graham, SCCID

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
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C.A. No.: 2016-CP-42-0666

Dear Ms. Olive:

The Spartanburg County Court of Common Pleas appointed my office to represent Jason Osborne in his Post-Conviction Relief action. Please find enclosed a copy of the Notice of Appeal and Proof of Service in this matter.

If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact my office. Thank you.

Sincerely,


Leah B. Moody

Enclosures

Cc Jason Osborne
Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme Court
Hope Blackley, Clerk of Court, Spartanburg County
Sharon Graham, SCCID

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Ms. Sharon A. Graham
SC Commission on Indigent Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
Post Office Box 11433
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1433


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Case No.: 2015-CP-42-0666

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Thank you for your attention in this matter.

Sincerely,



Leah B. Moody

Enclosures

cc Jason Osborne
Alicia Olive, Esquire
Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk of Court, South Carolina Supreme Court
Hope Blackley, Clerk of Court, Spartanburg County

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Law Office of Leah B. Moody, LLC
Post Office Box 1015
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730

TO:

Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
PO Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211-1330