

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal From Hampton County
Honorable Thomas W. Cooper, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

Vs.

LARRY HEYWARD,

APPELLANT

APPELLATE CASE NO. 2016-002033

INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

RECEIVED

Larry Heyward #369902
Pro Se, Appellant

AUG 17 2017

SC Court of Appeals

Broad River Corr. Inst
4460 Broad River Rd.
Saluda Dorm 105-B

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. The trial Court erred in refusing to allow appellant to Cross-examine the Complainant about a Civil lawsuit he filed regarding his allegations where the Civil Case demonstrated a financial motive which related to his bias and Credibility.

II. The trial Court erred in denying Appellant's Credit, for time Served Prior to trial.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 18, 2015, appellant was indicted by a Hampton County grand jury for lewd act, Second-degree Criminal Sexual Conduct with a minor, and third-degree Criminal Sexual Conduct With a minor. R.579-582. On August 18, 2016, Appellant was indicted for Misconduct in office. R. 583-584. On September 19, 2016, Appellant was tried before the Honorable Thomas W. Cooper, and a jury. R.1. The Honorable Jean H. Toal also presided. R.1. Sean P. Thornton and Brian Hollen represented the State.

R.2. Scott W. Lee, and Christopher W. Lempesis represented appellant. R.2. The jury acquitted appellant of Second-degree CSC. R. 536, 1.4- 537, 1.14. The jury convicted appellant of lewd act, Third-degree CSC, and Misconduct in office.

R. 536, 1.4- 537, 1.14. Judge Cooper sentenced appellant to Concurrent terms of Fifteen, ten, and ten years' imprisonment, respectively. R. 563, 11.12-21. This appeal follows.

ARGUMENT

In this Case, the trial Court erred in refusing to allow appellant to Cross-examine the Complainant about a Civil lawsuit he filed regarding his allegations where the Civil Case demonstrated a financial motive which related to his bias and Credibility.

Appellant was a School resource officer at a middle School in Hampton County. R. 158, 11. 6-10. Complainant was a student at the middle school. R. 215, 11. 7-24.

Complainant had a long disciplinary history at the school. R. 392, 1. 20-395, 1. 14. Complainant was disciplined for putting hot sauce on his penis. R. 394, 11. 15-23.

Complainant was also disciplined for spreading rumors about teachers. R. 394, 11. 4-6.

On January 4, [2013], Complainant got into trouble in one of his Classes and was sent to the Principal. R. 164, 11. 9-11. The Principal asked him to write his problem on a piece of Paper, and Complainant Complied. R. 164, 1. 12-165, 1. 5. The note Claimed appellant was molesting Complainant. R. 165, 11. 10-16 R. 263, 11. 5-10.

Complainant anticipated that the Principal would not believe him. R. 166, 11. 5-11. He told the Principal, "If you don't believe me, I have Proof."

R.166, 11.5-11. Complainant played a recording from his i pod that allegedly contained a sexually explicit conversation between him, and appellant.

R.166, 1.12-167, 1.7. (State's Ex.1).

This approximately two-minute recording of a telephone call begins midway through the conversation. (State's Ex.1). While the recording does contain sexually explicit conversation, it is difficult to understand the context of the conversation without hearing the earlier part of the call. (State's Ex.1). The recording was published to the jury with an overlay of a transcript prepared by a SLED employee. R.232, 11.4-7. Complainant testified he made the recording on December 28, 2012. R.227, 1.23-228, 1.8. However, the state's computer expert admitted on cross-examination that it was possible to alter the time an i pod displays something was recorded. R.285, 11.12-21.

Complainant testified that the very first time he met appellant, Appellant sexually assaulted him in appellant's office at the school. R.216, 1.23-218, 1.13. Supposedly within minutes of entering appellant's office at the school. R.216, 1.23-218, 1.13. Supposedly within minutes appellant began rubbing Complainant's penis. R.216 1.23-218, 1.13. Complainant claimed they had oral sex on the floor of his office, [Appellant's office]. R.216, 1.23-218, 1.13.

Appellant's office was "just around the corner from the assistant principal's office" and "directly across from the Cafeteria". R.160, 11.6-14. The School's Social Worker agreed the area where appellant's office was located had "a lot of coming and going." R.160, 11.15-18.

Complainant alleged he had sex with appellant "hundreds of times" at various locations. (R.251, 11.4-14). He claimed they had oral, and anal sex at appellant's office at the school, at Appellant's office at the new school (which was in the library), at Appellant's house, and at appellant's deceased father's house. R.251, 11.4-14. Complainant admitted he wanted to move away from the small town in Hampton County and was able to move to Jacksonville, Florida after making these allegations against appellant. R.246, 1.4-247, 1.19.

Complainant's mother was the state's first witness. R.141, 11.22-24. During cross-examination, appellant asked Ms. Johnson to identify a "gentleman with the purple tie" sitting in the courtroom. R.154, 11.19-23. Complainant's mother identified him as "Attorney Mario Pacella." R.154, 11.19-23. The state objected and the court sustained the objection. R.154, 1.25-155, 1.4. Appellant asked to be heard and Judge Cooper stated he would take it up out of the presence of the jury at the next break. R.155, 11.8-17.

When the Court took up appellant's argument, appellant explained that Mario Pacella was "the civil lawyer" for Complainant's family. R.184, 1.7-185 1.11.

Complainant's family filed suit "pretty quickly" after Complainant make the allegations against appellant. R.184, 1.7-185, 1.11. Appellant argued that the Civil Suit was relevant and related to motive, bias, and Credibility. R.184, 1.24-193, 1.8.

Trial Counsel argued that introduction of the lawsuit was his "best and primary defense". R.192, 11.9-14.

Judge Cooper indicated he would do further research. R.192, 11.21-25.

During Complainant's testimony, appellant asked for a ruling from the Court before beginning Cross-examination. R.242, 11.5-7. Oddly, the Court ruled that the Civil Suit "has no bearing, really, on this particular case". R.242, 1.11-243, 1.5.

Oddly, the Court stated that the existence of the Civil suit had "very limited" relevance to Complainant's Credibility. R.242, 1.11-243, 1.5. Appellant proffered the Civil Complaint. R.275, 1.7-277, 1.11. R.567-576.

The Complaint alleged that appellant "at all times", Acted under Color of state law, in the course and scope of [his] employment." R.567. Complainant alleged four causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asked for actual damages, Punitive damages, and attorneys fee. R.576.

The trial judge erred in sustaining the state's objection and refusing to allow cross-examination regarding Complainant's financial motive for making the allegations against appellant.

Witnesses can always be cross-examined for bias. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Provides in pertinent part that "in All Criminal Prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right, to be confronted with the witnesses against, and the opportunity to a full and effective cross-examination.

This right extends to State Prosecutions through the Due process Clause of the fourteenth Amendment See Poniter vs. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)

A witness who is subject to a full, and effective cross-examination enhances the accuracy of factfinding by reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent man.

See Md. vs. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990)

In this case the trial judge erred in sustaining the state's objection, and refusing to allow a full, and effective cross-examination

regarding Complainant's financial motive.

See Davis vs. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1991).

Bias, Prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced." SCRE 608(c). Permits a Party to impeach a witness by establishing bias or

Prejudice wither through examination or otherwise." State V. Starnes, 340 S.C. 312, 325, 531 S.E. 2d 907, 914-15 (2000). On Cross-examination, any fact may be elicited which tends to show interest, bias, or Partiality of the witness." Id.

"Considerable latitude is allowed in the Cross-examination of an adverse witness for bias".

State Vs. Brown, 303 S.C. 169, 171, 399 S.E. 2d 593, 594 (1991)

In Yoho Vs. Thompson, 345 S.C. 361, 548 S.E. 2d 584 (2001), the trial court erred in prohibiting Cross-examination of a doctor for financial bias.

The lawsuit stemmed from a Car wreck, and the only issue was the extent of the Plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 363, 548 S.E. 2d at 585. The defense intended to call a doctor who had a significant business and consulting relationship with the defendant's insurer, Nationwide. Id. The plaintiff wanted to cross-examine the doctor on the extent of his financial dealing with Nationwide. Id. at 364, 548 S.E. 2d at 585.

The Supreme Court reversed because the trial judge refused to permit Cross-examination for the doctor's financial bias. Id. at 365-66, 548 S.E. 2d at 585-86.

Testimony that the witness is contemplating a lawsuit may indicate the witness is biased, and may be relevant and admissible."

State Vs. McFarlane, 279 S.C. 327, 330, 306 S.E. 2d 661, 612 (1983)

In *McFarlane*, the defendant was charged with a lewd act. *Id.* The trial judge refused to allow the defendant to cross-examine the victim's mother about a contemplated lawsuit. *Id.* While the defense in *McFarlane* failed to make an adequate proffer, the court clearly believed that it was a error to bar the cross-examination because it conducted a harmless error analysis. *Id.*

Here, not only was litigation contemplated, it had already been initiated. Unlike *McFarlane*, appellant made a correct proffer by entering the civil complaint into the record. *McFarlane* shows that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow appellant to cross-examine complainant on his financial motive to bring these allegations. In this case where the jury acquitted appellant of the most serious charge, the error cannot be harmless and this court should reverse, and remand this case for a new trial.

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant Credit for time served prior to trial.

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-40 Subsection (C). States: The Court shall have designated a specific time for the commencement of the service of the sentence, In every case

in Computing the Served by a Prisoner, Full Credit against the Sentence shall be given for time Served Prior to trial and Sentencing. See State vs. Boggs (SC App. 2010) WL 2671819. Sentencing, and Punishment. also State vs. Boggs, 388 SC. 314, 696 S.E. 2d 597 (2010)

In this case Appellant Heyward was Placed on House Arrest/Electronic Monitoring with the Offender Management Service on March 1, 2013. In which Appellant Stayed on House Arrest until September 19th, 2016. A total of 3 years 7 months, 43 months total, which Cost Appellant \$13,020.⁰⁰ Over that Period of time.

Appellant is entitled to Full Credit against the Sentence the trial Court imposed, Appellant Pursuant to 24-13-40, was not imprisoned Prior to trial, nor was Appellant an escapee from another Penal Institution. Appellant was not imprisoned serving a Sentence for one offense and a waiting trial for a Second offense. Appellant was on home Detention, in which he not only did 43 months, but Appellant Paid \$13,020.⁰⁰. Appellant feels because of the Language of the statute Mandating that a defendant receive Credit for time they served Prior to trial unless one of two exception. (See State vs. Boggs (SC App. 2010) 388 S.C. 314, 696 S.E. 2d 597.)

Plea judge's denial of jail Credit for time Served in Pretrial detention based upon state's decision to drop Charges against the defendant from armed robbery to strong arm robbery Constituted an error at Law, because the Statute (24-13-40) mandated that a defendant receive Credit for time Served Prior to trial, unless the defendant was a escapee, or s/he was already serving a Sentence on another offense.

Neither exception apply to Appellant Heyward. Therefore because of the Language of the Statute §§ 24-13-40. Appellant is entitled to full Credit for time Served prior to trial, and Sentencing, Which is 3 years 7 months.

Accordingly, the trial Court erred in not giving Appellant Credit for time Served, In addition, the trial Court erred in refusing to allow appellant to Cross-examine Complainant on his financial Motive to bring these allegations.

In this case the jury acquitted appellant of the most Serious Charges, the error cannot be harmless and this Court should reverse.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse, and remand this case for a new trial or, in the alternative, that this Court finds the errors to be harmless, issue an order granting Appellant Credit for time served.

Respectfully Submitted,
~~Larry Heyward~~ 8/15/17

Larry Heyward

Date: 8/14/17


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
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