

Brief of Appellant
The State of South Carolina
(In The Court of Appeals)

RECEIVED

MAY 04 2018

SC Court of Appeals

Appeal from The ALC
Judge D. Druden

Case # 2017-001484

Vincent Rice #214178

Appellant

v.

Annie Runkle
Counsel for SICDC

Respondents

Final Brief of Appellant

Vincent Rice
L.C. I
P.O. Box 205
Ridgeville, S.C. 29472

Appellant

May 1, 2018

VR

Cases

Bolin v.s SCDC _____ 1

Board of Regents v. Roth 400 U.S. 822 848 _____ 2

4173 S.E. 2d 870 _____ 2

statutes

S.C. 44-53-370(b)(2) _____ 1

S.C. 24-13-710 _____ 1

S.C. 1-23-710 _____ 2

References to Record on Appeal

Does Bolin Apply
(Record on Appeal pages) pg ~~10~~ _____ 1
pg 5, 8-9, pg 10

Arbitrary Decision
(Record on Appeal pages) pg 1, 11 _____ 2

Table of Contents

Citation _____ 1

Statutes _____ 2

Record on Appeal _____ 3

~~Final statement of case~~ _____

Does Balin Apply _____ 1

Arbitrary Decision _____ 2

Conclusion _____ 3

Does the Bolin apply to a 3rd offense per S.C. 44-53-370 (b) (2)

SCDC and SCOPPPS has determined that, I'm a non-parole eligible; 85% term offender because "I have priors greater than simple possession". It is fact code 24-13-150 was repeated after the 2010 Amendments (Bolin Ruling). The question must arise, exactly how am I still a non-parole offender? The DOC staff has evidently construed the following colloquy in the Bolin Ruling strictly to support they're error.

"S.C. Code Ann §44-53-370 (b)(2) a person convicted and sentenced to this subsection for 1st and 2nd offense is eligible for community supervision." In addition, the court stated: "Based on the foregoing we hold that a second offense is eligible under section S.C. 44-53-375 is no longer a non-parole offender!! It should be noted the court relied on the language of section 44-53-375 only to make this holding.

The question here is whether a 3rd offender is eligible for community supervision, etc; And here is where Agency staff have decided to be confused. The court did not rule or mention if a "3rd offender" is no longer a non-parole offender simply because Michael Bolin was convicted of a "2nd offense" under S.C. 44-53-375 therefore a 2nd offense was the subject matter of the Bolin Ruling. However based on the conclusions of law in the Bolin ruling, A 3rd offense would had resulted in the same ruling. Not only because provisions 44-53-370 and -375 are identical in language, but the following colloquy in the Bolin ruling supports this fact.

The DOC argued in Bolin: "Only offenders serving sentences for non-parole offenses ~~are~~ are required to participate in community supervision." However, the Court rebutted: "That may have been true before the amendments of section S.C. 44-53-370 and -375 were enacted but those amendments now expressly allow offenders to participate in community supervision as an alternative to use the tax-payer funds to house them in prison."

Consequently, the case, in point is the "entire" section of 44-53-370 also "expressly allows" supervision alternatives, parole, etc. It is stated in the text, and can be support by a slew of publications.

Notes

I went to two non-violent parole hearings in 2014 + 2015. In 2016 SCDC and SCOPPPS "internally determined" I'm a non-parole offender. My March 2017 parole date was "removed from the database" without any notice. My furlough Sept 10, 2016, release now forfeited because of a 2016 determination (Bolin) that I'm not eligible for early release. The statute only prohibits "Probation"

S.C. Code Ann 24-13-710. supervised furlough permits, screened and selected inmates who have served the mandatory minimum and not have committed a violent crime, nor a non-parole offense. Defined in section 24-13-100. Enacted June 18, 2012 after 2010 amendments.

The courts have ruled and law stated 24-13-100 no longer applies to 44-53-370

Records Page Reference to Support (pg 5, pg 8-9, pg 10 Record of Appeal 1
pg 1

Arbitrary Decision

S.L. Code Ann 1-23-310 - contested case means a proceeding in which the legal rights of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after the opportunity for a hearing.

The final decision in a contested case, which is adverse to a party must be in writing or stated in the record. It must include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact must be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.

It is a fact the Lee staff members did not know how or why my Sept 1, 2016 release was forfeited, but instead gave me vague information about a "decision" that was actually made a few days prior in a invalid email that still not has been released for any public scrutiny on behalf of the Dept and syndicate agencies. (See email as exhibit)

The email is a private correspondence between Agency staff and former circuit solicitor Britton All. The document is evidence the Dept relied on former solicitor's All's advice and opinion, stating, "I should be a 85% offender according to her reading of law," and this was not her, "official legal opinion." It should be noted that Britton All was not a member of the bar at the time of this advice, nor was she in turn; Her opinion did not reflect the 2010 amendments to 44-53-370(b)(2) and b(1), or the public sector. Mrs. All gave unauthorized legal advice. As stated, the document will show that Britton All made the decision and the Sept 14, 2016 Dept hearing was a mere formality to alleviate due process requirements.

Board of Regents of State colleges v. Roth 408 U.S. 616 2d. 548

"The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interest encompassed by the 14th Amendment protection of liberty."
4173 S.F.2d 870 - Resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided were constitutionally sufficient.

I attest that My Sept 14, 2016 SCDC hearing was not constitutionally sufficient. The "executive" staff members within the emails were obligated to conduct the hearing because they "contested" my immediate release on a question of law, and were also capable of making a decision. Secondly, they were obligated to have at the very least, have the former solicitor called as a witness/accuser as state/departamental evidence, as a means of quasi-judicial decisions that explained the constitutionality of why I was not released on Sept 1, 2016 after signing release documents and an supervised fulllength certificate.

Record @ Appeal Reference: (pg 1, pg 11,)

pg 2

Conclusion

In Conclusion, my final claims remain the same as my initial claims being they have not been contested or disputed by the Respondents, the Record of Appeal along with all Appellant's brief will prove the facts. I ask the court make a fair and just decision.

Truly



Appellant

L.C. 1
P.O. Box 208
Ridgeway, S.C. 29472

Proof of Service

I Vincent Rice, Appellant did forward a handwritten copy of a Final Brief and Supplement Record to the Respondents by giving to office to drop in mail on May 1, 2018 to the following address

Annie Rowler
4444 Broad River Rd
Columbia, S.C 29212


Appellant

Local
P.O. Box 245
Ridgelyville, S.C 29402

RECEIVED

MAY 04 2018

SC Court of Appeals

Vincent J. ...
L.C.I.

P.O. Box 205
Ridgewood, S.C. 29044

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

02 1P \$ 001.00
0000235044 MAY 02 2018

RECEIVED
MAY 02 2018
MAIL ROOM
LIEBER C.I.

S.C. Court of Appeals
Clerk of Court
1220 Senate St
Columbia, S.C. 29201

RECEIVED
MAY 04 2018
SC Court of Appeals

