

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM SPARTANBURG COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2017-001943

Circuit Court Case No. 2016-CP-42-04147

RECEIVED
JUN 08 2018
SC Court of Appeals

ABB, Inc., and BFP, LP, a/k/a
Bullington Family Partnership, ... Respondents,

v.

Integrated Recycling Group of SC,
LLC, John Murphy Armstrong, Jr.,
and Michael T. Armstrong, ... Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Gregory J. English (SC Bar # 65470)
WYCHE, P.A.
P.O. Box 728
Greenville, SC 29602
(864) 242-8200

Attorneys for Respondents

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM SPARTANBURG COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2017-001943

Circuit Court Case No. 2016-CP-42-04147

ABB, Inc., and BFP, LP, a/k/a
Bullington Family Partnership, ... Respondents,

v.

Integrated Recycling Group of SC,
LLC, John Murphy Armstrong, Jr.,
and Michael T. Armstrong, ... Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Gregory J. English (SC Bar # 65470)
WYCHE, P.A.
P.O. Box 728
Greenville, SC 29602
(864) 242-8200

Attorneys for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL	1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	2
STATEMENT OF FACTS	3
ARGUMENT	5
I. The Circuit Court correctly granted judgment to Creditors where the Debtor, a limited liability company, was not represented in Circuit Court by an attorney and its owners admitted the amount due.	5
II. Because their opposing affidavit was not made on personal knowledge as required by Rule 56(e), SCRCP, Appellants failed to present any admissible evidence that would preclude summary judgment.	6
III. Appellants lack standing to raise a third-party lender's priority to the Pelletizer portion of the Collateral securing the debt due Creditors.	7
IV. Creditors maintained their priority to the Pelletizer.	7
V. The Pelletizer remained personal property and did not become a "fixture" covered by the third-party lender's mortgage.	8
CONCLUSION	11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Adams v. B & D, Inc.</i> , 297 S.C. 416, 377 S.E.2d 315 (1989)	8
<i>Carson v. Living Word Outreach Ministries, Inc.</i> , 315 S.C. 64, 431 S.E.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1993)	10
<i>Creative Displays, Inc. v. South Carolina Highway Dept.</i> , 272 S.C. 68, 248 S.E.2d 916 (1978)	9, 10
<i>Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n</i> , 284 S.C. 81, 326 S.E.2d 395 (1985)	7
<i>Furman Univ. v. Livingston</i> , 244 S.C. 200, 136 S.E.2d 254 (1964)	7
<i>In re South Atlantic Packers Association, Inc.</i> , 30 B.R. 836 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983)	10
<i>Renaissance Enter. v. Summit Teleservices</i> , 515 S.E.2d 257, 334 S.C. 649 (S.C. 1999)	6
<i>South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation v. Najma Records, Inc.</i> , 288 S.C. 169, 341 S.E.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1986)	10
<i>Talley v. S.C. Higher Educ. Tuition Grants Cmte.</i> , 289 S.C. 483, 347 S.E.2d 99 (1986)	8

Other Authorities

S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-611	7
---------------------------------	---

Rules

Rule 56(e), SCRCF	6
-------------------------	---

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

- I. Did the Circuit Court correctly grant judgment to Creditors where the Debtor, a limited liability company, was not represented in Circuit Court by an attorney and its owners admitted the amount due?
- II. Because their opposing affidavit was not made on personal knowledge as required by Rule 56, SCRCP, did Appellants fail to present any evidence that would preclude granting of summary judgment?
- III. Do Appellants lack standing to raise their landlord's lender's priority to the Pelletizer portion of the Collateral securing the debt due Creditors?
- IV. Did Creditors maintain their priority to the Pelletizer?
- V. Did the Pelletizer remain personal property and not become a "fixture" covered by the third-party lender's mortgage?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This debt collection action was commenced by ABB, Inc., and BFP, LP, a/k/a Bullington Family Partnership (collectively, “Creditors”) on November 21, 2016. (R. pp. 13-110). Attorneys from Holcombe Bomar, P.A. filed an answer on behalf of Integrated Recycling Group of SC, LLC, a South Carolina limited liability company (the “Debtor”), on January 16, 2017. (R. pp. 111-116). Richard Stewart, Esq., filed an answer on behalf of John Murphy Armstrong, Jr., and Michael T. Armstrong, the members of Debtor (collectively, the “Armstrongs”), on January 12, 2017. (R. pp. 117-118).

On April 13, 2017, Creditors filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. pp. 119-216).

On May 17, 2017, Holcombe Bomar, P.A., was relieved as counsel for Debtor so that it could “retain new counsel to represent it in this matter.” Consent Order for Relief of Counsel for Integrated Recycling Group of SC, LLC, at 1. (R. p. 10). The Debtor, however, never retained new counsel to represent it in this action until this appeal was filed.

On July 17, 2017, Creditors filed a motion to strike the answer of and enter default judgment against Debtor because no attorney had appeared to represent it. (R. pp. 217-218).

On July 31, 2017, the Circuit Court held a hearing on Creditors’ motions. (R. p. 249). At the hearing, the Armstrongs’ attorney admitted that Debtor owed Creditors principal and interest but requested additional time to determine the amount. (R. p. 259). The Court granted Appellants an extension to supplement the record with their accountant’s calculations. On August 4, 2017, Appellants’ accountant’s calculations were submitted to the Court, showing principal of \$1,145,717.06 and interest of \$75,267 was due to Creditors. Email from Richard Stewart to Judge Cole dated August 4, 2017. (R. p. 259). Creditors accepted these calculations and the Court

granted their motions and entered a Final Order and Judgment against Debtor of \$1,221,984.06 on August 23, 2017. (R. p. 1).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The record shows that this appeal is simply the latest chapter in Appellants' long history of attempting to delay paying their debt to Creditors. After filing bankruptcy earlier in 2011, on October 27, 2011, Creditors and Appellants entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement, which was approved and given an Effective Date of November 10, 2011, by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina in Bankruptcy Case No. 11-03117-jw (the "Loan Agreement"). Affidavit of Bryan Bullington filed April 13, 2017 (the "Bullington Affidavit"), at ¶ 3, Exhibit A (R. pp. 125-146).

Pursuant to the Loan Agreement, on October 27, 2011, Debtor gave Creditors a Promissory Note in the principal amount of \$1,400,000.00, with interest at the rate of four percent (4.00%) per annum, with principal and interest being due and fully payable on or before November 9, 2016. Bullington Affidavit at ¶ 4, Exhibit B (the "Loan") (R. pp. 148-150).

To secure the Loan, on October 27, 2011, Debtor signed a Blanket Continuing Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement") granting Creditors a security interest in Debtor's inventory, general intangibles, accounts, chattel paper, instruments and documents, equipment, commercial tort claims, letter-of-credit rights, and all parts, replacements, substitutions, profits, products, accessions and cash and non-cash proceeds and supporting obligations of any of the foregoing (collectively, the "Collateral"). Bullington Affidavit, ¶ 6, Exhibit C (R. pp. 152-164).

To further secure the Loan, on October 27, 2011, Debtor and the Armstrongs signed a Continuing Pelletizer Security Agreement (the "Pelletizer Agreement") granting Creditors a security interest in that certain 60 Ton Air Cooled Pelletizing Machine/Cooler, Model

#NGR105VSP, Series #Q02028 (the “Pelletizer”). Bullington Affidavit, ¶ 7, Exhibit D (the Pelletizer is included in the definition of the “Collateral”) (R. pp. 170-191).

Debtor defaulted on the Promissory Note by failing to make timely payments for August 2016, September 2016, October 2016, and November 2016. Bullington Affidavit ¶ 10. (R. p. 215). On November 10, 2016, the entire principal balance of the Promissory Note came due, but Debtor failed to pay. Bullington Affidavit ¶ 13. (R. p. 215). Debtor has made no payments on the indebtedness due Creditors since November 10, 2016. Bullington Affidavit ¶ 15. (R. p. 216). Appellants admitted that principal of \$1,145,717.06 and interest of \$75,267 is due to Creditors for a total indebtedness of \$1,221,984.06 (the “Total Indebtedness”). Email from Richard Stewart to Judge Cole dated August 4, 2017. (R. p. 259). As a result of Debtor’s failure to pay the indebtedness when due, Debtor is in default of the loan documents. Bullington Affidavit ¶ 15. (R. p. 216).

Creditors provided the purchase money for all Collateral, including the Pelletizer. Bullington Affidavit ¶ 16. (R. p. 216). The Total Indebtedness includes purchase money for all Collateral and the Pelletizer. In seeking to recover the Total Indebtedness, Creditors seek to recover purchase money that is past due for all Collateral and the Pelletizer. *Id.* (R. p. 216).

The Appellants’ sole argument to the Circuit Court was that their landlord – Armstrong-Cowpens LLC – gave a mortgage in 2002 to a third-party lender that included “fixtures,” that the Pelletizer is a fixture, and that Creditors failed to perfect their security interest in the Pelletizer because they did not file a UCC-1 before 2011. Transcript of Hearing at 9, lines 2-12. (R. p. 257, lines 2-12). The Collateral and Pelletizer, however, are not “fixtures,” but rather are personal property that can be removed from the real property without damaging it. Reply Affidavit of Bryan

Bullington filed July 28, 2017 (the “Reply Affidavit”), ¶ 6. (R. p. 238). Because the Collateral is personal property, it is not a “fixture” covered by the third-party lender’s mortgage.

Moreover, the argument that Creditors did not file a UCC-1 covering the Collateral until 2011 – which is not made on personal knowledge – is contradicted by the public records. As shown by Exhibit C attached to the Reply Affidavit, in connection with lending the purchase money to Appellants for the Collateral in 2006, Plaintiffs did file a UCC-1 financing statement on July 31, 2006, which showed it would not lapse until July 31, 2011. Reply Affidavit ¶ 7, Exhibit C. (R. pp. 239, 247-248).

Appellants raise a new argument on appeal, *i.e.*, that there was a lapse in Creditors’ UCC filings. Creditors never admitted a lapse, nor does the record reflect any such lapse. In fact, the record shows that the UCC-1 was subsequently renewed in 2009, 2011 and 2016. Bullington Affidavit ¶ 7, Exhibit D (“Continuing Pelletizer Security Agreement”), pp. 6-7 (“The Secured Party has a valid and perfected Security Interest in the Collateral, as evidenced by that certain UCC-1 Financing Statement attached hereto as Exhibit B, and that certain UCC-1 Financing Statement, as continued and assigned to the Secured Party, attached hereto as Exhibit C (together, the “UCC Statements”).”) (R. p. 175-176), sub-Exhibit B (UCC-3 Continuation Statement filed January 14, 2009) (R. p. 189), and Exhibit E (UCC-3 Continuation Statements filed November 2011 and November 2016) (R. pp. 203-212); Reply Affidavit ¶ 7 (R. pp. 239, 247-248).

ARGUMENT

- I. The Circuit Court correctly granted judgment to Creditors where the Debtor, a limited liability company, was not represented in Circuit Court by an attorney and its owners admitted the amount due.**

Debtor has failed to preserve any argument for appellate review because it was not represented at the hearing on Creditors’ motions for summary judgment and to strike its answer and enter default judgment against it. Although it had been given over two months to obtain new

counsel, Debtor was not represented at the hearing on Creditors' motions. A limited liability company like the Debtor may not appear *pro se*. *Renaissance Enter. v. Summit Teleservices*, 515 S.E.2d 257, 334 S.C. 649 (S.C. 1999) ("a non-lawyer cannot represent a corporation in circuit or appellate courts."). Therefore, Debtor's answer was properly stricken and Creditors were entitled to judgment for the relief sought in their complaint.

Moreover, at the hearing, the Armstrongs' attorney admitted that Debtor owed Creditors principal and interest and on August 4, 2017, Appellants' accountant's calculations were submitted to the Court, showing principal of \$1,145,717.06 and interest of \$75,267 was due to Creditors, which Creditors accepted. Email from Richard Stewart to Judge Cole dated August 4, 2017. (R. pp. 257, lines 9-15, and 259). Therefore, both the fact and the amount of Debtor's liability to Creditors were admitted and uncontested.

Nor do Appellants question the validity of Creditors' security interest in the Collateral or the Pelletizer. Instead, their appeal focuses on their landlord's lender's alleged **priority** to the Pelletizer. Appellants, however, presented no admissible evidence to support their argument, have no standing to raise this argument for the landlord's third-party lender and, even if they had such standing, the record demonstrates that their argument is factually and legally wrong.

II. Because their opposing affidavit was not made on personal knowledge as required by Rule 56(e), SCRCF, Appellants failed to present any admissible evidence that would preclude summary judgment.

Rule 56(e), SCRCF, requires that affidavits opposing summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, [and] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." The only affidavit submitted by Appellants failed to comply with these requirements. For example, Appellants' affidavit does not set forth any basis for the statement that the alleged mortgage between their landlord and its lender "is still in effect." Therefore, Appellants failed to preserve any argument that summary judgment should have been denied.

III. Appellants lack standing to raise a third-party lender's priority to the Pelletizer portion of the Collateral securing the debt due Creditors.

Appellants argue that their landlord's lender has priority to one piece of Collateral, the Pelletizer. The third-party lender who Appellants claim has priority to the Pelletizer, however, is not a party to this action. Instead, if it has in place the proper filings, that lender will either receive notice of the sale of the Pelletizer or any rights to it will be unimpaired by such sale. S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-611.

In any event, Appellants have no standing to raise the third-party lenders' priority to the Pelletizer. "In order to have standing...a party must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the lawsuit." *Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n*, 284 S.C. 81, 96, 326 S.E.2d 395, 404 (1985); *see also Furman Univ. v. Livingston*, 244 S.C. 200, 204, 136 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1964) (holding a party has no standing to sue for a refund of taxes in which it has no financial interest). Moreover, to support standing, such personal stake must not be "too contingent, hypothetical, [or] improbable." *Duke Power Co.*, 284 S.C. at 98, 326 S.E.2d 405.

Appellants have submitted no evidence of any "personal stake" in their landlord's lender's priority to the Pelletizer. Any claimed interest in this issue would be "too contingent, hypothetical, and improbable" to support standing. Therefore, Appellants' appeal should be dismissed.

IV. Creditors maintained their priority to the Pelletizer.

Even if they had standing to raise the issue, Appellants' argument that their landlord's third-party lender has priority is factually wrong. Appellants' argument at the hearing was premised on the assumption that Creditors did not file a financing statement before 2011. (R. p. 257, lines 2-8). As demonstrated by the Reply Affidavit, in connection with lending the purchase money to Appellants for the Collateral in 2006, Plaintiffs did file UCC-1 financing statements on

July 31, 2006, which showed it would not lapse until July 31, 2011. Reply Affidavit ¶ 7, Exhibit C (R. pp. 239, 248).

Appellants raise a new argument on appeal, *i.e.*, that there was a lapse in Creditors' UCC filings. This argument was not raised to the Circuit Court in either their answers or at the hearing, see Transcript of Hearing at 9, lines 2-12 (R. p. 257, lines 2-12), and therefore is not preserved for review. *Adams v. B & D, Inc.*, 297 S.C. 416, 419, 377 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1989) ("An issue not raised before the trial court will not be addressed on appeal."); *Talley v. S.C. Higher Educ. Tuition Grants Cmte.*, 289 S.C. 483, 487, 347 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1986) ("It is an axiomatic rule of law that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.").

Moreover, Creditors never admitted a lapse, nor does the record reflect any such lapse. In fact, the record shows that the UCC-1 was subsequently renewed in 2009, 2011 and 2016. Bullington Affidavit ¶ 7, Exhibit D ("Continuing Pelletizer Security Agreement"), pp. 6-7 ("The Secured Party has a valid and perfected Security Interest in the Collateral, as evidenced by that certain UCC-1 Financing Statement attached hereto as Exhibit B, and that certain UCC-1 Financing Statement, as continued and assigned to the Secured Party, attached hereto as Exhibit C (together, the "UCC Statements").") (R. p. 175-176), sub-Exhibit B (UCC-3 Continuation Statement filed January 14, 2009) (R. p. 189), and Exhibit E (UCC-3 Continuation Statements filed November 2011 and November 2016) (R. pp. 203-212); Reply Affidavit ¶ 7 (R. pp. 239, 247-248).

V. The Pelletizer remained personal property and did not become a "fixture" covered by the third-party lender's mortgage.

Finally, Appellants are wrong that the Pelletizer is a "fixture" covered by the third-party's lender's mortgage. A fixture is "generally defined as 'an article which was a chattel, but by being physically annexed to the realty by one having an interest in the soil becomes a part and parcel of

it.’ By mere affixation the chattel does not become a fixture.” *Creative Displays, Inc. v. South Carolina Highway Dept.*, 272 S.C. 68, 72, 248 S.E.2d 916, 917-18 (1978). The Court in *Creative Displays* noted that the test for determining whether an item remains personal property or becomes a fixture as: “(1) mode of attachment, (2) character of the structure or article, (3) the intent of the parties making the annexation, and (4) the relationship of the parties.” *Id.*

As in *Creative Displays*, there is no basis for determining that the Pelletizer ceased to become personal property and instead became a fixture. Appellants introduced no evidence that the Pelletizer was permanently attached so as to become “part and parcel” of the “soil.” The Pelletizer was a piece of equipment that was purchased and moved to the real estate and likewise can be removed without damaging it. Reply Affidavit at ¶ 7 (R. p. 239). Further, the intent of the parties was that it not become a fixture, because Debtor was a tenant and granted Creditors a security interest in the equipment. Bullington Affidavit, ¶ 7, Exhibit D (R. pp. 170-191) (granting Creditors a security interest in the Pelletizer). Finally, Debtor was a tenant, not the owner of the realty, and its relationship with Creditors was that of debtor-creditor. (R. pp. 219, 221, 230). In other words, just like *Creative Displays*, where the “nature and content of the lease require a determination that the sign remained personalty,” the nature and content of the Pelletizer Security Agreement required that the Pelletizer remain personal property.

In fact, *Creative Displays* and other authorities hold that, so long as a tenant’s personal property can be removed from the land – even where removal causes some damage – it remains personal property and does not become a fixture:

When land is taken under the power of eminent domain, the ownership of personalty kept on the premises taken, but not permanently affixed thereto, is not affected A majority of the State Courts hold that, in the absence of a statute or agreement to the contrary, the removal costs of a stock of merchandise, or other personal property, and the breakages or other injury to such property caused by such removal, from a leasehold or fee in land, where there is an entire taking of the

whole of the condemnee's estate under the sovereign power of eminent domain, cannot be considered as an element of damage, since such loss is not a taking of property.... This is simply because personal property, unlike fixtures, can be removed from the condemned premises.

Creative Displays, 272 S.C. at 72-73, 248 S.E.2d at 918.

The cases cited by Appellants actually support Creditors, because Debtor is not an owner of the real estate, but only a tenant of the mortgagor. “[B]etween landlord and tenant, there is a presumption that the tenant, by annexing fixtures, did so for his own benefit and not to enrich the freehold, and the law accordingly construes the tenant’s right to remove his annexations liberally, except where removal may materially injure the freehold.” *Carson v. Living Word Outreach Ministries, Inc.*, 315 S.C. 64, 431 S.E.2d 615, 618 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding HVAC system was a fixture because “removal of the air conditioning system caused substantial material damage”); *see also In re South Atlantic Packers Association, Inc.*, 30 B.R. 836, 839 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983) (“when property is placed on leased premises for trade purposes, it may remain personal by implication if the lessor neither paid for the property nor its installation; otherwise, the lessor would be unjustly enriched.”).


It was uncontested that the Pelletizer can be removed from the real property without damaging it. Reply Affidavit at ¶ 6 (R. p. 238). Accordingly, the Pelletizer does not fall within the legal definition of a “fixture” to which the landlord’s third-party lender’s mortgage applies. *Creative Displays*, 272 S.C. at 72-73, 248 S.E.2d at 918; *see also South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation v. Najma Records, Inc.*, 288 S.C. 169, 341 S.E.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that, even though equipment “was attached by bolts, screws and wooden encasements, which were also attached by bolts and screws,” equipment was not a fixture where it “was removed, and there is no evidence ... of physical damage to the equipment because of its removal.”).

CONCLUSION

Appellants admit both the fact and the amount of Debtor's liability to Creditors. Further, Appellants do not question the validity of Creditors' security interest in the Collateral or the Pelletizer. Their appeal, based upon an inadequate affidavit, solely concerns their landlord's third-party lender's alleged priority to the Pelletizer, which they have no standing to raise. Moreover, Appellants raise new arguments that were not preserved for review and are wrong both factually and legally, because there was no failure to file or renew financing statements and the Pelletizer was not a fixture.

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents request that the Court affirm the Circuit Court's Final Order and Judgment.

Respectfully submitted,



Gregory J. English (SC Bar # 65470)
WYCHE, P.A.
P.O. Box 728
Greenville, SC 29602
(864) 242-8200

Attorneys for Respondents

June 6, 2018


ABB, Inc., and BFP, LP, a/k/a
Bullington Family Partnership, ... Respondents,

vs.

Integrated Recycling Group of SC,
LLC, John Murphy Armstrong, Jr.,
and Michael T. Armstrong, ... Appellants.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the **BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS** complies with Rule 211(b), SCACR, in that it is identical to the initial brief previously served under Rule 208, SCACR, except for references to the Record and corrections of typographical errors and/or misspellings contained in the initial brief.



Gregory J. English (SC Bar # 65470)
WYCHE, P.A.
P.O. Box 728
Greenville, SC 29602
(864) 242-8200

Attorneys for Respondents

June 6, 2018

RECEIVED
JUN 08 2018
SC Court of Appeals

ABB, Inc., and BFP, LP, a/k/a
Bullington Family Partnership, ... Respondents,


vs.

Integrated Recycling Group of SC,
LLC, John Murphy Armstrong, Jr.,
and Michael T. Armstrong, ... Appellants.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this date caused to be served by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, the **BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS** upon counsel for Appellants, addressed as follows:

J. Falkner Wilkes, Esq.
114 Whitsett Street
Greenville, SC 29601



Gregory J. English (SC Bar # 65470)
WYCHE, P.A.
P.O. Box 728
Greenville, SC 29602
(864) 242-8200

Attorneys for Respondents

June 6, 2018

RECEIVED
JUN 08 2018
SC Court of Appeals