

Petitioner proceeded to trial before the Honorable H. Dean Hall and a jury, where he was convicted as indicted. Judge Hall sentenced Petitioner to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart of the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense represented Petitioner and perfected an *Anders*² brief on his behalf. Thereafter, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. *State v. Jones*, Op. No. 2001-UP-55 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed July 11, 2001). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Rehearing, which was denied on August 23, 2001. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a *pro se* Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which was denied on January 24, 2002.

2002-CP-04-1817

Petitioner then filed an application for post-conviction relief on July 6, 2002. In his application, Petitioner set forth the following allegations:

1. Counsel was ineffective for presenting and failing to object to evidence of the Applicant's use of drugs;
2. Counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that the crime was committed by someone else; and
3. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a *pro se* document entitled "Applicant's Additional Supplemental to Original Post-Conviction Relief Application" on August 6, 2002. In this amended application, Petitioner raised the following allegations:

1. Counsel was ineffective for failing to properly and thoroughly impeach State witnesses Joshua Stewart and Shirley Rainey with their out-of-court statements;

² *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

2. Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's circumstantial evidence instruction to the jury;
3. Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Solicitor's improper hypothetical questions to the medical examiner;
4. Counsel was ineffective for failing to present favorable witnesses and evidence in the Applicant's defense;
5. Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of irrelevant evidence;
6. Counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine State witnesses; and
7. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise in a merits brief that the trial court erred in allowing the State to bolster testimony of Jackie Sanders with her consistent out-of-court statement.

Petitioner again amended his application in a document captioned "Applicant's Supplement to Original Post-Conviction Relief Application" on September 13, 2002. In this amendment, he raised the following additional ground for relief:

1. Because the Solicitor failed to comply with the procedures that are laid down by the courts, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Applicant's case and convict him.

Respondent made its Return on June 9, 2004, requesting an evidentiary hearing be held. An evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on December 15, 2004, at the Anderson County Courthouse. Petitioner was present at the hearing and proceeded *pro se*. Assistant Attorney General Christopher L. Newton of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office represented Respondent. By Order dated February 9, 2005, the Honorable J. Cordell Maddox, Jr., denied and dismissed the application with prejudice. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Motion to Alter or Amend pursuant to Rule 59(c), SCRCP, which Judge Maddox denied on March 5, 2005.

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. Assistant Appellate Defender Aileen P. Clare of the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense represented Petitioner and perfected an appeal on his

behalf. On November 16, 2005, the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The Remittitur was issued on December 2, 2005.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a *pro se* document in the Circuit Court entitled "Motion for New Trial Based on After Discovered Evidence of Unconstitutional Grand Jury Proceedings" on November 5, 2008. On October 7, 2009, Judge Maddox denied Petitioner's Motion for New Trial and again dismissed Petitioner's post-conviction relief action.

Petitioner appealed from this Order on October 9, 2009, and filed a *pro se* Petition for Writ of Certiorari on February 16, 2010. By Order dated May 13, 2011, the Supreme Court of South Carolina denied Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The Remittitur was issued on June 1, 2011.

3:06-788-TLW-JRM

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on March 24, 2006, in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. In his Petition, Petitioner alleged the following grounds:

- Ground One:** Lower Court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict were [sic] evidence was constitutionally insufficient.
- Supporting Facts:** States case was wholly circumstantial, there was no DNA, no forensics, no eyewitness, no fingerprints to place Petitioner at the scene. Coroner did nothing scientific to determine time of death thus giving the State a 6 hr window. State used testimony Petitioner had money days after crime to say he robbed the victim.
- Ground Two:** Counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to bring fourth [sic] evidence of third party guilt.
- Supporting Facts:** Counsel admitted during PCR that he only perused the evidence concerning third party guilt the day before trial. Sam Mackey committed murder and a suicide after he was asked [if] he killed the victim. Sam Mackey's nephew gave

- Statement that Mackey said it was a hit and he was paid . . . to kill victim.
- Ground Three:** Counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to ask for an alibi charge.
- Supporting Facts:** Before trial counsel sent a notice of alibi to the State no State witness place Petitioner at the scene during the time period victim was killed. Counsel's defense was to show his client was not at the scene and Petitioner told counsel [sic] from the beginning as counsel . . . at PCR that I was innocent and wasn't there.
- Ground Four:** Counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not pointing out to jury that unseemingly [sic] stain was not blood.
- Supporting Facts:** All of Petitioner[']s clothing was tested by SLED lab and his shirt the State reported no blood identified. However the shirt had two stains that appeared to have dried blood circled with a permanent marker this shirt went back to the jury. Detective testified when he 1st received shirt there were no stains on shirt.

On June 15, 2006, Respondent filed a Return and Motion for Summary Judgment. By Order dated March 23, 2007, the District Court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the Petition with prejudice.

On April 26, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and Request for Certificate of Appealability to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit subsequently denied the certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal on July 31, 2007. Petitioner subsequently petitioned for rehearing *en banc*, which was denied on September 24, 2007.

In his current Petition, Petitioner argues "The State Tried and Convicted the Petitioner for an Unindicted Murder Offense." Petitioner contends the indictment charging him with murder, dated January 5, 1999, is in direct violation of an Order from the South Carolina Supreme Court cancelling the Anderson County General Sessions Court for that day.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A mandamus will issue only to compel a public official to perform a mandatory duty. *State v. Ansel*, 76 S.C. 395, 414, 57 S.E. 185 (1907); *Lombard Iron Works v. Town of Allendale*, 187 S.C. 89, 196 S.E. 513 (1938). The primary purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right and to enforce a corresponding imperative duty created or imposed by law. *Charleston County School District v. Charleston County Election Commission*, 336 S.C. 174, 519 S.E.2d 567 (1999). It is issued “only to **enforce** a clear legal right requiring the performance of only ministerial duties.” Toal, et al, *Appellate Practice in South Carolina*, p. 281 (1999) (citing *Wiblen v. Long*, 262 S.C. 430, 205 S.E.2d 174 (1974)) (emphasis added). To obtain a writ of mandamus requiring performance of an act, a petitioner must show: (1) the opposing party has an indisputable and plainly defined duty to perform the act, (2) the ministerial nature of the act, (3) the opposing party’s specific legal right for which discharge of the duty is necessary, and (4) the lack of other legal remedy. *Id.* at 282. The writ of mandamus lies solely within the discretion of the court of which it is requested. *In Interest of Lyde*, 284 S.C. 419, 327 S.E.2d 70 (1985). Moreover, mandamus is unavailable where the legal right is doubtful. *Id.*

In his Petition, Petitioner asserts he has satisfied the requirements for issuance of a writ of mandamus because:

(1) S.C. Code § 14-9-210 imposes a duty upon all SC Solicitors to submit a bill of indictment to the grand jury (while it is in attendance upon general sessions court § 14-9-170) for prosecution of a criminal case; (2) the S.C. Constitution, Art. I, § 11, mandates that an indictment is a prerequisite for all criminal prosecution; (3) the petitioner has a constitutional right to be prosecuted upon a presentment of indictment returned by a grand jury; and (4) the petitioner has exhausted his direct appeal, PCR, and habeas corpus remedies and has no other available remedy except a writ of mandamus.


Petitioner contends because the South Carolina Supreme Court issued an Order cancelling the General Sessions term of court for January 5, 1999, the Grand Jury could not have legally met and, therefore, could not have obtained an indictment against him. Indictments are not jurisdictional in nature but are merely notice documents. *State v. Gentry*, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005). When judging the sufficiency of an indictment, the court must determine “whether (1) the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer and whether he may plead an acquittal or conviction thereon; and (2) whether it apprises the defendant of the elements of the offense that is intended to be charged.” *Id.* at 102-03, 610 S.E.2d at 500 (citing *State v. Wilkes*, 353 S.C. 462, 578 S.E.2d 717 (2003)). “An indictment passes legal muster if it ‘charges the crime substantially in the language of the . . . statute prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood.’” *State v. Reddick*, 348 S.C. 631, 635, 560 S.E.2d 441, 443 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (1985)). Moreover, “whether the indictment could be more definite or certain is irrelevant.” *Id.* at 103, 610 S.E.2d at 500.

Here, Petitioner wholly fails to set forth any reason as to why his indictment for murder was insufficient in providing him with notice that he was, in fact, charged with murder. The indictment clearly sets forth the date upon which the murder occurred, the victim, and the manner in which the crime was committed. Furthermore, the indictment uses the very language used in the statute defining the crime of murder. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (1976). In addition, Petitioner’s contention that the indictment is invalid is wholly without merit. This Court noted during the hearing that there is no requirement that a term of

General Sessions Court be convened for the Grand Jury to meet. This Court finds the indictment was sufficient to give Petitioner notice; and, therefore, he cannot show any reason why this Court should allow him to proceed with this extraordinary writ.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petition be DENIED AND DISMISSED. This Court hereby advises Petitioner that he must file and serve a Notice of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the service of this Order to secure appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of February, 20 .



J. CORDELL MADDOX, JR.
Presiding Judge
Tenth Judicial Circuit Court

_____, South Carolina.

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ANDERSON SC
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COMMON PLEAS AND
GENERAL SESSIONS



ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 2, 2018

The Honorable J. Cordell Maddox, Jr.
Tenth Judicial Circuit
Post Office Box 8002
Anderson, South Carolina 29622

Re: Gavin V. Jones, #259726 v. State of South Carolina
2012-CP-04-0861

FILED-CLERK'S OFFICE
ANDERSON SC
2018 FEB -9 PM 4:31
COMMON PLEAS AND
GENERAL SESSIONS

Dear Judge Maddox:

Enclosed please find the original proposed **Order of Dismissal** in the above-captioned case. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me by phone at (803) 734-0964 or by electronic mail at koppenheimer@scag.gov.

Sincerely,

Kelly Oppenheimer
Assistant Attorney General

KO
Enclosure

cc: Gavin V. Jones, #259726