

Rodney D. Davis
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June 5, 2018

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearhouse
Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina
P.O. Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211

RECEIVED

JUN 18 2018

RE: Lavonte Fabor v. State of South Carolina, Case No.: 2017-CP-18-1681 S.C. SUPREME COURT

Dear Mr. Shearhouse:

Enclosed for filing is the Notice of Appeal (original and clocked copy) in the above Post Conviction Relief (PCR) case. Also enclosed are the following:

- (1) Proof of service of the Notice of Appeal on the respondent;
- (2) The Order of Dismissal &
- (3) A Request for Representation on Appeal.

The Applicant-Appellant was represented by me as an indigent pursuant to my contract with the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense (SCCID) to handle PCR cases. By copy of this letter, I am forwarding a duplicate set of documents to the SCCID.

The Request for Representation on Appeal and the Affidavit in Support thereof are signed by me as attorney for Applicant-Appellant. If you need anything further, do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Rodney D. Davis
South Carolina Bar #: 12396
101 Meeting Street, 5th Floor
Charleston, SC 29401
(843) 882-5065
Davis@LowcountryLawOffice.com

CC: Christian Saville
Assistant Attorney General

Paula Murdoch
Appellate Division, SCCID

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM DORCHESTER COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Case No.: 2017-CP-18-1681

RECEIVED
JUN 18 2018
S.C. SUPREME COURT

Lavonte Fabor,

Appellant,

v.


State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Lavonte Fabor appeals the denial of his Post Conviction Relief application in this case. The Application for relief was denied, following an evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Maite Murphy on March 2, 2018. A copy of the Order was received by counsel on May 14, 2018.

June 8, 2018
//



Rodney D. Davis
101 Meeting Street, 5th Floor
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Attorney for Appellant

Other Counsel of Record:
Christian Saville, Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General, State of South Carolina
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211-1549
Attorney for Respondent

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM DORCHESTER COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Case No.: 2017-CP-18-1681

Lavonte Fabor,

Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

Maite Murphy
Clerk of Court
DORCHESTER COUNTY


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NOTICE OF APPEAL

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June 5, 2018


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Other Counsel of Record:
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Columbia, SC 29211-1549
Attorney for Respondent

RECEIVED

JUN 18 2018

S.C. SUPREME COURT

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CLERK OF COURT
DORCHESTER COUNTY

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM DORCHESTER COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Case No.: 2017-CP-18-1681

Lavonte Fabor,

Appellant,

v.


State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served the Notice of Appeal on the State by mailing a copy of it to the address of record, Christian Saville, P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1549, on 6/11, 2018.

6/11, 2018



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Attorney for Appellant

Other Counsel of Record:
Christian Saville, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General, State of South Carolina
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211-1549
Attorney for Respondent

2018 MAY 10 PM 12:53

Lavonte Fabor,

2017-CP-18-1681

Applicant,

Cheryl Beahm
CLERK OF COURT
DORCHESTER COUNTY

v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

This matter comes before the Court by way of a post-conviction relief (PCR) application filed on November 2, 2017. Respondent submitted its return on January 30, 2018. An evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on March 2, 2018, at the Dorchester County Courthouse. Applicant was present at the hearing and was represented by Rodney D. Davis, Esquire. Respondent was represented by Assistant Attorney General Christian Saville of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office.

Before this Court are the records of the Dorchester County Clerk of Court regarding the subject convictions, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the plea transcript, the State's Return, and the application.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The records before this Court indicate that Lavonte Fabor ("Applicant") is presently confined pursuant to orders of commitment of the Clerk of Court for Dorchester County. The Dorchester County Grand Jury first indicted Applicant at their September 2016 term for trafficking heroin, 14-28 grams (2016-GS-18-1533), trafficking cocaine, 28-100 grams (2016-GS-18-1534), trafficking cocaine base, 28-100 grams (2016-GS-18-1535), manufacturing, possession of schedule IV drugs with intent to distribute (2016-GS-18-1536), and possession of a

impeachment of the law enforcement officers to be credible. Plea Counsel was prepared to proceed to trial if Applicant did not plead guilty.

Plea Counsel also credibly testified he advised Applicant he would most likely be found guilty if he proceeded to trial, but it was Applicant's decision to plead guilty. The guilty plea transcript reveals Applicant was fully advised of the consequences of his guilty plea and had no more questions for Plea Counsel. Applicant told the plea judge he did not want to proceed to trial and had not been promised anything or threatened in exchange for pleading guilty. Tr. p. 17, ll. 16-17; p. 18, ll. 6-12. The record reveals Applicant understood he was facing a possibility of life imprisonment without parole if he was convicted of these charges. Tr. p. 16, ll. 13-20. Furthermore, the record reveals Applicant understood the State had the burden of proving his charges at trial. Tr. p. 18, ll. 1-2. There is no reasonable probability that, but for any alleged deficiencies, Applicant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial. Plea Counsel secured a favorable plea deal for Applicant which avoided a substantially likely conviction and possible sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Therefore, Applicant has failed to offer any evidence of deficiency or prejudice from these allegations. Accordingly, these allegations are denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Failure to investigate

Applicant alleges Plea Counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate. This Court finds this allegation to be meritless. At the PCR hearing, Plea Counsel credibly testified his investigation of this case included sending his investigator to look into the body camera footage worn by officers during the traffic stop and also an investigation into the disciplinary history of the law enforcement officers involved. Plea Counsel also testified he investigated whether Applicant was a "permissive user" of the rental car he was driving at the time. Plea Counsel also credibly testified he was prepared to go to trial and argue for the suppression of evidence. This

- Possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime (2016-GS-18-1537): five years.
- Trafficking cocaine, 10-28 grams, first offense (2017-GS-10-2566): ten years.
- Distribution of cocaine base, first offense (2017-GS-10-2567): fifteen years.
- Distribution of cocaine base, first offense (2017-GS-10-2568): fifteen years.

Applicant did not appeal from his guilty plea or sentences.

II. ALLEGATIONS

In his Application, Applicant alleged that he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel
 - a. Failure to investigate.
 - b. Failure to inform client of right to direct appeal.
2. Subject matter jurisdiction
 - a. "Court lacked jurisdiction to accept my plea because I was denied my preliminary hearing, I was arrested without a warrant."

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant alleged Plea Counsel was ineffective for failing to explain his charges and the State's burden of proof, and failing to consider and discuss defenses. Applicant also argued the limited amount of time Plea Counsel served as Applicant's attorney of record prior to the guilty plea was insufficient time to prepare and prejudiced Applicant. Plea Counsel served as attorney of record for three months before being substituted for another attorney, and then one month after the other attorney had ceased representing Applicant.

III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT TESTIMONY PRESENTED

Applicant testified on his own behalf at the hearing. Applicant's Plea Counsel also testified at the hearing.

Applicant's testimony

At the PCR hearing, Applicant explained he first retained a different attorney to represent him on his charges, and this representation lasted for about eight months to one year before the representation ended and Plea Counsel was appointed to represent Applicant. Applicant testified

all of his allegations for post-conviction relief pertained to Plea Counsel, not the counsel who represented him beforehand. Applicant recalled Plea Counsel representing him for approximately six months.¹

Applicant testified he met with Plea Counsel two or three times in Dorchester County and once in Charleston County prior to his plea, and the meetings lasted ten to fifteen minutes. Applicant testified he also met with Plea Counsel once at the courthouse, where they discussed his Dorchester and Charleston charges. Applicant recalled he “heard” he could receive life imprisonment without parole for his charges, and Plea Counsel discussed this and other potential sentencing consequences with him close to the guilty plea. However, Applicant also testified there was no discussion of parole eligibility, strikes, or a mandatory eighty-five percent sentence. According to Applicant, Plea Counsel did not talk to him about a trial or possible defenses, nor did Plea Counsel talk about any search and seizure issues. Applicant recalled he was pulled over for speeding which led to the original traffic stop. Applicant also testified he never saw the arrest warrant for heroin distribution which led to his arrest. According to Applicant, Plea Counsel told him to plead guilty, but Applicant told Plea Counsel he wanted to “fight” the charges. Applicant testified he had no option but to plead guilty because he had no one to fight for him.

Applicant conceded he told the plea judge Plea Counsel had done everything he had asked him to, he did not need any more time to speak with him, and he was satisfied with Plea Counsel’s services. Applicant did not deny telling the plea judge he was pleading guilty because he was, in fact, guilty.

Plea Counsel’s testimony

Plea Counsel testified this was the first case in which he served as lead counsel, but he

¹ Records indicate Plea Counsel actually served as attorney of record for a total of approximately four months prior to Applicant’s guilty plea.

had sat as co-counsel on other cases. He recalled meeting with Applicant on roughly six occasions over a total of four months of representation and was prepared to go to trial if Applicant did not choose to plead guilty. Plea Counsel described Applicant's behavior as "tense and uncooperative," and wavered back and forth between a trial or guilty plea before finally pleading guilty. Plea Counsel recalled Applicant provided no leads or witnesses to investigate. Nevertheless, Plea Counsel testified he had his investigator seek out body camera footage from the traffic stop and arrest and checked for any disciplinary history of the involved law enforcement officers. While Applicant had claimed there was no discussion of possible defenses, Plea Counsel testified he discussed defenses with Applicant, including the challenges to suppress the evidence and statements as well as impeachment of the investigators. Furthermore, Plea Counsel explained he was prepared to argue a motion under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), and was prepared to argue for suppression of the fruits of the traffic stop. Plea Counsel explained it was Applicant who decided to plead guilty. While Plea Counsel testified he did not assign a numerical value to Applicant's chances of being convicted at trial, he did advise Applicant that he would more likely than not be convicted if he proceeded to trial.

Plea Counsel testified he did indeed discuss the arrest warrant with Applicant and showed it to him and his family the day of the plea. As to an appeal, Plea Counsel testified Applicant never asked him to appeal from the guilty plea. Plea Counsel did not recall any appealable issues, and Applicant and his family advised Plea Counsel they did not want him to handle Applicant's appeal.

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

In a post-conviction relief action, the applicant has the burden of proving the allegations in the application. Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC; Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985).

Where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged as a ground for relief, the Applicant must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984); Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985).

The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Courts presume counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Butler, 286 S.C. 441; 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).

Courts use a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, attorney performance is measured by its "reasonableness under professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 385 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Strickland). Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. With respect to guilty pleas, the Applicant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985).

V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the record in its entirety and has heard the testimony at the post-conviction relief hearing. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the hearing, closely pass upon their credibility and weigh their

testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of facts and conclusions of law as required pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-80 (1985).

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Applicant alleges Plea Counsel was ineffective in his representation surrounding his guilty plea. In post-conviction relief cases, an applicant asserting a constitutional violation must frame the issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 363, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747 (1999) (citing Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 9, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993)). An applicant who pleads guilty on the advice of counsel may collaterally attack the plea only by showing that (1) counsel was ineffective and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the applicant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Roscoe v. State, 345 S.C. 16, 20, 546 S.E.2d 417, 419 (2001) (citations omitted). An applicant alleging his guilty plea was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel must prove that counsel's advice was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985).

In the present case, this Court finds Applicant has failed to prove that he is entitled to post-conviction relief on any of his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the PCR hearing, Applicant conceded he told the plea judge, under oath, that he was satisfied with Plea Counsel and Plea Counsel had done everything Applicant asked him to do. Moreover, Applicant told the plea judge he did not require any more time with Plea Counsel. Plea Counsel credibly testified he met with Applicant approximately six times before his guilty plea. This Court finds Applicant's testimony that Plea Counsel never discussed any defenses with him not to be credible. By contrast, this Court finds Plea Counsel's testimony that he discussed defense strategies with Applicant such as arguments to be made at suppression hearings and

impeachment of the law enforcement officers to be credible. Plea Counsel was prepared to proceed to trial if Applicant did not plead guilty.

Plea Counsel also credibly testified he advised Applicant he would most likely be found guilty if he proceeded to trial, but it was Applicant's decision to plead guilty. The guilty plea transcript reveals Applicant was fully advised of the consequences of his guilty plea and had no more questions for Plea Counsel. Applicant told the plea judge he did not want to proceed to trial and had not been promised anything or threatened in exchange for pleading guilty. Tr. p. 17, ll. 16-17; p. 18, ll. 6-12. The record reveals Applicant understood he was facing a possibility of life imprisonment without parole if he was convicted of these charges. Tr. p. 16, ll. 13-20. Furthermore, the record reveals Applicant understood the State had the burden of proving his charges at trial. Tr. p. 18, ll. 1-2. There is no reasonable probability that, but for any alleged deficiencies, Applicant would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial. Plea Counsel secured a favorable plea deal for Applicant which avoided a substantially likely conviction and possible sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Therefore, Applicant has failed to offer any evidence of deficiency or prejudice from these allegations. Accordingly, these allegations are denied and dismissed with prejudice.

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Applicant alleges Plea Counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate. This Court finds this allegation to be meritless. At the PCR hearing, Plea Counsel credibly testified his investigation of this case included sending his investigator to look into the body camera footage worn by officers during the traffic stop and also an investigation into the disciplinary history of the law enforcement officers involved. Plea Counsel also testified he investigated whether Applicant was a "permissive user" of the rental car he was driving at the time. Plea Counsel also credibly testified he was prepared to go to trial and argue for the suppression of evidence. This

Court finds Plea Counsel conducted a thorough investigation in this case. Applicant has therefore failed to meet his burden of proving Plea Counsel was deficient in this regard. Moreover, Applicant has failed to offer any evidence of what further investigation would have revealed, and there is no reasonable probability Applicant would have chosen to proceed to trial had Plea Counsel investigated differently. Accordingly, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Insufficient Time as Attorney of Record

Applicant alleges Plea Counsel's limited time as attorney of record for Applicant did not allow Plea Counsel enough time to prepare, and prejudiced Applicant. This Court finds this allegation to be meritless. At the hearing, Applicant testified Plea Counsel represented him for approximately six months. Plea Counsel credibly testified he was prepared to proceed to trial if Applicant had not pled guilty. Furthermore, this Court has found Plea Counsel thoroughly investigated the circumstances of the case regardless of the duration of representation, and Applicant affirmed his own satisfaction with Plea Counsel's services at the guilty plea hearing and did not need any more time to speak with him. Tr. p. 18, l. 18 – p. 19, l. 1. This Court therefore finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving deficiency due to the duration of Plea Counsel's representation. Applicant has also failed to establish prejudice from the time Plea Counsel served as his attorney of record. The duration of representation was clearly enough time for Plea Counsel to negotiate a favorable plea deal on behalf of Applicant, and there is no evidence that Applicant would have rather proceeded to trial but for any alleged deficiency. Accordingly, this allegation is dismissed with prejudice.

Arrest Warrant

Applicant alleges Plea Counsel was ineffective for not addressing an issue regarding the arrest warrant for which Applicant was detained. This Court finds this allegation to be meritless.

At the PCR hearing, Plea Counsel credibly testified he had possession of this arrest warrant on the day of Applicant's plea and discussed the warrant with Applicant and Applicant's family. Moreover, the guilty plea transcript reveals this matter was addressed and settled at Applicant's guilty plea hearing. Tr. p. 21, l. 2 – p. 22, l. 24. There has been no evidence presented against the sufficiency of this warrant or the procedures involved in its obtainment. For these reasons, Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving Plea Counsel's performance was deficient in this regard. Furthermore, Applicant has presented no evidence to suggest he was prejudiced by Plea Counsel's conduct in this regard. Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

Applicant alleged a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in his original PCR application. Applicant did not proceed on the allegation regarding subject-matter jurisdiction, nor did he present any evidence or testimony to support such an allegation. Accordingly, this Court finds this allegation to be abandoned and it is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this court to grant his application. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This Court notes that Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days from the receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453 (1991), an Applicant has a right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of post-

conviction relief. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCF, provides that if the applicant wishes to seek appellate review, post-conviction relief counsel must serve and file a Notice of Appeal on the Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. That the application for Post-Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice in regard to all allegations; and
2. Applicant must be remanded to the custody of Respondent.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 1 day of May, 2018.

St. George, South Carolina

Maité Murphy
MAITÉ MURPHY
Chief Administrative Judge
First Judicial Circuit

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

CERTIFIED COPY

COUNTY OF DORCHESTER)
2018 JUN 11 PM 3:28
Case No.: 2017-CP-18-1681

LAVONTE FAVOR,
Applicant.

Cheryl Blahem
CLERK OF COURT
DORCHESTER COUNTY

-versus-

REQUEST FOR REPRESENTATION ON APPEAL

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

On behalf of the request of the above-named Applicant, to be represented by the South Carolina Commission of Indigent Defense, Appellate Division (SCCID), the undersigned attorney would show unto this Honorable Court that:

1. He is the attorney for the Applicant-Appellant in the above captioned case. The Applicant-Appellant was in custody during and taken into custody immediately following the Post Conviction Relief (PCR) hearing and was not available to personally sign this request;
2. The Applicant-Appellant was represented by the undersigned attorney as an indigent, pursuant to a contract with the SCCID;
3. The Applicant-Appellant has been informed that he may request assistance from the SCCID Appellate Division in perfecting his appeal;
4. A timely Notice of Intent to Appeal has been filed on the Applicant-Appellant's behalf;
5. The Applicant-Appellant has been informed that nothing requires SCCID Appellate Division to pursue this appeal unless that office's Chief Attorney is satisfied that there is arguable merit to this appeal and that he cannot afford to hire an attorney.

At this time, the Applicant-Appellant requests the aid of the SCCID Appellate Division in perfecting his appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals.

Respectfully Submitted,

Rodney D. Davis


Rodney D. Davis
South Carolina Bar #: 12396

6/11, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
COUNTY OF DORCHESTER)


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
PERSONALLY appeared before me, Rodney D. Davis, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has read the foregoing *Request for Representation on Appeal* on behalf of Lavonte Fabor and the same is true of his knowledge except those matters alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, he believes them to be true.



Rodney D. Davis
South Carolina Bar #: 12396

SWORN to and subscribed to me
this 17th day of JUNE, 2018.


Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission expires 11/17/2026



1000



29211

U.S. POSTAGE
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The Honorable Daniel E. Shearhouse
Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina
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