

R. MILLS ARIAIL, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW

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June 13, 2018

Via US Mail

Daniel Shearouse
Clerk of Court
South Carolina Supreme Court
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

RECEIVED

JUN 18 2018

S.C. SUPREME COURT

***Re: Notice of Intent to Appeal from State of SC v. Leviticus Young
C.A. No.: 2017-CP-23-5236***

Dear Mr. Shearouse:

I was Court Appointed in the above referenced matter, and I expect that appellate defense will handle the appeal and petition for certiorari. On behalf of my client, enclosed for filing please find the Notice of Appeal and proof of service. I've enclosed a copy of the Honorable Frank R. Addy, Jr.'s Order of Dismissal to be challenged on appeal. By copy of this letter, I am also serving my client, counsel for the State of South Carolina, the South Carolina Commission of Indigent Defense - Appellate Defense Division and the Greenville County Clerk's Office.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter and if you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,
LAW OFFICE OF R. MILLS ARIAIL, JR.
Attorney at Law


R. Mills Ariail, Jr.

RMAjr/dl
Enclosures (as stated)

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

RECEIVED

APPEAL FROM GREENVILLE COUNTY JUN 18 2018
Court of Common Pleas

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2017-CP-23-5236


Leviticus Donyaski Young,..... Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Appellant appeals the Honorable Frank R. Addy, Jr.'s Order of Dismissal dismissing Appellant's application for post-conviction relief. On May 31, 2018, the Frank R. Addy, Jr. signed an order dismissing Appellant's application for post-conviction relief with prejudice. Appellant, through counsel, received written notice of entry of this order on June 7, 2018. A copy of the Honorable Frank R. Addy, Jr.'s Order of Dismissal is attached.



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Attorney for Antonio Ochoa-Tavera

Greenville, South Carolina
June 13, 2018

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

RECEIVED

APPEAL FROM GREENVILLE COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

JUN 18 2018

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Case No.2017-CP-23-5236

Leviticus Donyaski Young,..... Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Denise Tanner LaBeck, paralegal to R. Mills Ariail, Jr., do hereby certify that on this June 13, 2018, I served upon the below named Respondents copies of the **NOTICE OF APPEAL** by depositing copies of the same via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, Registered Mail in an envelope addressed as set forth herein below:

DeShawn Mithcell, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
PO Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
Attorney for the State of South Carolina

Greenville County Clerk's Office
Greenville County Courthouse
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Greenville, SC 29601

Leviticus Young #00311607
4460 Broad River Road
Columbia SC 29210

SC Commission of Indigent Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
PO Box 11433
Columbia, SC 29211-1433

Denise Tanner LaBeck
Denise Tanner LaBeck

June 13, 2018

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
 COUNTY OF GREENVILLE)
)
 Leviticus Donyaski Young, #311607,)
)
 Applicant,)
)
 v.)
)
 State of South Carolina,)
)
 Respondent.)
 _____)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 FOR THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No. 2017-CP-23-05236

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

FILED
 11:06 AM
 11/16/18
 P. M. KENNER
 CLERK
 S.C. JUDICIAL BRANCH 13

THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on April 19, 2018 by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed August 7, 2017 by Leviticus Donyaski Young (Applicant). The State (Respondent) made its Return on March 9, 2018, requesting an evidentiary hearing be held. At the hearing, Applicant was present and was represented by R. Mills Ariail, Jr., Esquire. Assistant Attorney General Kelly Oppenheimer of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office represented Respondent.

The records before this Court indicate Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Greenville County Clerk of Court. During its March, 2015 term, the Greenville County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for first-degree assault and battery (2014-GS-23-008396), armed robbery (2014-GS-23-08398), and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime (2014-GS-23-008398). Lauren M. Taylor, Esquire, represented him on these charges. Assistant Solicitor Mark Moyer of the Thirteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office prosecuted the case. On January 11-12, 2017, Applicant proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Robin B. Stillwell on the assault and battery, first degree and armed robbery charges. The weapons charge was dismissed.

Case marked

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Following deliberations, the jury convicted Applicant as indicted. Judge Stillwell sentenced Applicant to a term of imprisonment of ten (10) years for first-degree assault and battery and eighteen (18) years for armed robbery with the sentences running concurrently.

Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal in the South Carolina Court of Appeals on January 26, 2017. By Order dated May 5, 2017, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failing to timely serve the Notice of Appeal as required by Rule 203, SCACR. The Remittitur was issued on May 23, 2017.

In his application for post-conviction relief, Applicant alleges he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following allegations:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel;
 - a. "Trial counsel fail [sic] to file notice of appeal;"
 - b. "Trial counsel ineffective in failing to move the court to quash the indictment before the jury was sworn on the grounds that the indictment failed to charge criminal liability;"
 - c. "Trial counsel ineffective in failing to move the court to quash the indictment before the jury rendered its verdict" and
 - d. "Trial counsel ineffective in failing to raise a lack of subject matter jurisdiction claim."

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant proceeded forward on the allegations raised in his application for post-conviction relief, as well as an allegation trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare for trial.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS ADDUCED AT TRIAL

On June 6, 2014, Juan Cabrera (hereinafter "the victim") was working at Poinsett Tires by himself. Tr. 179. At approximately six o'clock in the evening, a black Mercedes pulled inside the gate of the tire shop and stopped fifteen to twenty feet from the front door. Tr. 180-81. Applicant was in the passenger seat, wearing a white shirt, and his co-defendant, Steven Williams, was driving. Tr. 183. The two men exited the vehicle and approached the victim. Tr.

182. Applicant was holding a stun gun, and Williams asked the victim for money. Tr. 182-83. Applicant and Williams pushed the victim to the back of the store, and Williams put a gun in the victim's face and demanded money. Tr. 184. The victim took \$150 out of his pocket and threw the money in the air. Tr. 185-86. As Williams picked up the money the victim had thrown, Applicant began fighting with the victim, pushing and hitting him. Tr. 187. As the two were fighting, someone hit the victim in the back of the head with a gun. Tr. 188. Applicant also attempted to hit the victim with the stun gun. Tr. 188. Williams proceeded to the Mercedes, but as Applicant attempted to exit the tire store, the victim hit him on Applicant's side and the back. Tr. 188. Applicant began throwing tires at the victim, returned to the Mercedes, and he and Williams sped away. Tr. 188-89.

The victim could not locate his phone to call 911, so he chased Williams and Applicant in victim's car. Tr. 189-90. The cars proceeded down Fair Street with the Mercedes leading and traveling approximately forty-five to fifty miles per hour. Tr. 144-45. The passenger of the Mercedes, who was wearing a white shirt, was hanging out of the window, looking back. Tr. 146. The victim abruptly stopped at Stephanie Bishop's house, who was outside in her yard, and yelled for her to call 911. Tr. 147-48, 193. The victim then immediately got back in his car and proceeded to follow the Mercedes. Tr. 148.

The two cars proceeded to Old Buncombe Road and were side-by-side at some point. Tr. 107, 109. Witnesses who lived on Old Buncombe Road heard three gunshots around the same time. Tr. 108, 120, 130, 196. The victim reported Applicant, who was in the passenger seat, shot at the victim. Tr. 196. The victim maneuvered his car behind the Mercedes and rammed it, causing the Mercedes to crash into a pole. Tr. 110, 195. Applicant then got out of the car and ran down Morris Street. Tr. 111-12, 132-33, 196. A witness ran after Applicant and yelled for



him to stop. Tr. 112, 114. Applicant looked back at the witness but continued running away. Tr. 112. The driver, Williams, remained in the car after the accident. Tr. 115, 136, 137. The victim drove off and subsequently stopped to advise law enforcement officers of the accident and the robbery at his tire shop. Tr. 121, 159-60, 197-98, 211.

TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified on his own behalf. Respondent presented the testimony of Lauren M. Taylor, Esquire (hereinafter "Counsel"). This Court also had before it a copy of Applicant's trial transcript, Applicant's appellate records, the records of the Greenville County Clerk of Court, and Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections.

During the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified he was incarcerated in the county detention center after his arrest in July of 2014 for approximately ten months, at which point Counsel did not represent him. He further testified he was then released on GPS monitoring but was again arrested in July of 2016. After that arrest, Applicant testified he was denied bond and Counsel was subsequently appointed to represent him.

Applicant testified Counsel did not know anything about his case. He maintained that Counsel told him she did not have enough time to review his case. He further elaborated Counsel told him his case was an old case, and she was trying to get it over with.

Applicant also testified Counsel met with him approximately three times. During these meetings, Applicant testified Counsel presented him with a plea offer for ten years, which he rejected. He also testified he and Counsel reviewed the State's evidence several times and also discussed the fact the evidence did not involve him, but rather was against his co-defendant, Steven Williams. He maintained the State did not have anything against him. He further

testified that he and Counsel did not discuss the impact of Williams' statement, nor did they discuss the consequences if Williams were to testify against Applicant at trial. He also said he told Counsel that the victim had not identified him out of a lineup and also expressed concerns regarding the case detective's bias against him. Applicant testified that he and Counsel never discussed the theory of hand of one, hand of all.

Applicant also testified Counsel failed to object to the indictment. Specifically, Applicant testified the indictment failed to explain subject matter jurisdiction. He further testified Counsel should have moved to quash the indictment because it did not charge criminal liability. He also testified the weapons charge was dismissed, but he was still charged with armed robbery. He elaborated his co-defendant took possession of the firearm. He further testified he was convicted of accomplice liability but complained that he was not charged under such a theory.

Applicant also testified he asked Counsel to file an appeal after his trial. He further testified, however, that he and Counsel did not discuss appealing his case.

Following Applicant's testimony, Counsel testified. Counsel testified she admitted to the practice of law in 2012 and was appointed to represent Applicant, who was initially represented by Susannah Ross, Esquire. She testified although she had a shorter period of time than normal to prepare for trial, she did have enough time to prepare adequately. She also testified she met with Applicant three or four times. She testified that she and Applicant discussed the ten-year plea offer at length, but Applicant insisted this was not a robbery and wanted to challenge the indictment at trial. She further testified she discussed with Applicant the elements of the charges and what the State would be required to prove at trial, as well as the theory of hand of one, hand of all. She maintained that Applicant was aware of the hand of one, hand of all theory and,

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therefore, was aware he could be convicted of the indicted crimes. Counsel also testified she and Applicant discussed the weapon, and Applicant was aware that the devices used could support a charge of armed robbery. She also testified she discussed possible defenses with Applicant.

She testified she filed *Brady* and Rule 5, SCRCrimP, motions, and she reviewed the discovery materials with Applicant. They reviewed the surveillance tape from the tire shop which showed parts of the robbery. They also reviewed photos of the scenes, Williams's statement, witness statements, and the victim's statement. She did say that the surveillance video did not show the actual confrontation between Applicant and the victim. However, Williams's statement clearly implicated Applicant.

Counsel also testified Applicant did not give her any leads or witnesses to investigate, although he did present her with a letter from Williams in which Williams alleged he did not "rat out" Applicant. She testified she did not consider calling the co-defendant as a witness because he gave a conflicting statement which implicated Applicant. She said that presenting his testimony would have muddied the waters for the jury, and she feared the jury would assume both Applicant and Williams were guilty. Therefore, she made a strategic decision not to call Williams as a witness at trial.

Counsel also testified that Applicant maintained this incident was not supposed to be a robbery, but rather a conversation with the victim about a girl. The defense at trial was to allege the victim was more involved in the incident than the State cared to admit. In trial, she sought to poke holes in the State's theory since the victim's version of events arguably did not make sense.

Counsel testified she did not see any reason to move to quash the indictment. She also testified the weapons charge was dismissed the day of the trial, but she was unsure why it was dismissed. She speculated there may have been an issue with whether a gun or a stun gun was



used; however, she did not discuss with the solicitor the specifics of why the State elected not to proceed with that charge.

Counsel also testified Applicant was aware of his right to testify. She further testified Applicant made an informed decision not to testify at trial, particularly in light of Applicant's prior criminal history.

She further testified that she and Applicant discussed his right to appeal, but Applicant never asked her to appeal. She further testified she did not see any meritorious issues which could have been raised on appeal.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has reviewed the record in its entirety, including the full trial transcript, and has heard the testimony at the post-conviction relief hearing. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the hearing, closely pass upon their credibility, and weigh their testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of facts and conclusions of law as required pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-80 (1985).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In a post-conviction relief action, an applicant has the burden of proving the allegations in the application. Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC; *Butler v. State*, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). When an applicant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, the applicant must prove "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); *Butler*, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813.

The proper measure of performance is whether an attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Courts presume that counsel

rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. *Butler*, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813. The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. *Cherry v. State*, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).

Courts use a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the applicant must prove counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, attorney performance is measured by its "reasonableness under professional norms." *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117, 385 S.E.2d at 625 (citing *Strickland*). Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

After careful review based on the standard discussed above, this Court finds Applicant has failed to carry his burden in this action. Below are this Court's findings in regards to each of Applicant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Counsel's alleged failure to file an appeal

Applicant alleges Counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal on his behalf. Counsel has a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult with a defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either: (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. *Roe v. Flores-Ortega*, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). When counsel has consulted with the defendant regarding the right to appeal, "Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner *only* by failing to follow the defendant's express instructions with respect to an appeal." *Id.* at 478 (emphasis added).

Here, Applicant testified he and Counsel did not discuss his right to appeal, but he did ask Counsel to appeal on his behalf. On the other hand, Counsel testified she and Applicant did discuss his right to appeal, and Applicant never asked her to appeal. This Court finds Counsel's testimony with respect to this allegation very credible, whereas Applicant's testimony is not credible. Because Counsel and Applicant did consult regarding Applicant's right to appeal and Applicant never requested Counsel to file an appeal, this Court finds Applicant has failed to establish any deficiency on the part of Counsel. Additionally, having reviewed the trial transcript, the Court is unable to find any meritorious issue which could have been raised on appeal. Therefore, any appeal would have been fruitless. Accordingly, this allegation is dismissed with prejudice.

Counsel's alleged failure to quash the indictment

Applicant alleges Counsel was ineffective for failing to quash the indictments for first-degree assault and battery and armed robbery on the grounds that the indictment charged neither criminal liability nor accomplice liability. Indictments are not jurisdictional in nature but are merely notice documents. *State v. Gentry*, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005). When judging the sufficiency of an indictment, the court must determine "whether (1) the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer and whether he may plead an acquittal or conviction thereon; and (2) whether it apprises the defendant of the elements of the offense that is intended to be charged." *Id.* at 102-03, 610 S.E.2d at 500 (citing *State v. Wilkes*, 353 S.C. 462, 578 S.E.2d 717 (2003)). "An indictment passes legal muster if it 'charges the crime substantially in the language of the . . . statute prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood.'" *State v. Reiddick*, 348 S.C. 631, 635.

560S.E.2d 441, 443 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (1985)). Moreover, “whether the indictment could be more definite or certain is irrelevant.” *Id.* at 103, 610 S.E.2d at 500.

Here, the indictments stated with sufficient certainty and particularity that Applicant was charged with the crimes of first-degree assault and battery and armed robbery. Moreover, the indictments clearly apprised Applicant of the elements of each charged offense. In particular, the indictment for first-degree burglary charged: “That [Applicant] did in Greenville County, on or about the 6th day of June 2014, unlawfully injure [the victim], and the act occurred during the commission of a robbery, burglary, kidnapping or theft.” This is precisely the same language as that of section 16-3-600 of the South Carolina Code, which states in pertinent part: “A person commits the offense of assault and battery in the first degree if the person unlawfully: injures another person, and the act . . . occurred during the commission of a robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or theft.” S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(ii). Similarly, the indictment for armed robbery charged:

That [Applicant] did in Greenville County, on or about the 6th of June, 2014, while armed with a deadly weapon, or while alleging either by action or words he was armed while using a representation of a deadly weapon or any object which a person present during the commission of the robbery would reasonably believe to be a deadly weapon, take by means of force or intimidation, goods or monies described as: U.S. Currency from the person or presence of [the victim].

The language in this indictment reflects that found in section 16-11-330 of the South Carolina Code, which states:

“A person who commits robbery while armed with a pistol, dirk, slingshot, metal knuckles, razor, or other deadly weapon, or while alleging, either by action or words, he was armed while using a representation of a deadly weapon or any object which a person present during the commission of the robbery reasonably believed to be a deadly weapon is guilty of a felony.”

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(A). As each indictment specifically enumerated the offense with which Applicant was charged and described in relevant detail the crime substantially in the language of the statute prohibiting the crime, this Court finds this allegation must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Notwithstanding the sufficiency of these indictments, this Court finds Applicant has failed to establish any deficiency on the part of Counsel or any resulting prejudice. In particular, Counsel testified she explained each charge to Applicant prior to trial, including the elements of each charge and what the State would be required to prove at trial. Furthermore, Counsel testified she explained the hand of one, hand of all theory to Applicant prior to trial, specifically explaining that Applicant could be convicted under this theory of the crimes his co-defendant committed during the course of this incident. From this, Applicant was clearly aware of each offense for which he was charged, the particular elements of each offense, and his liability under a hand of one, hand of all theory. Therefore, this Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden, and this allegation is dismissed with prejudice.

Counsel's alleged failure to raise a lack of subject matter jurisdiction claim

Applicant alleges Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. An applicant may challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court and such a claim is one that may be raised at any time. *See Brown v. State*, 343 S.C. 342, 540 S.E.2d 846 (2001), *overruled in part by Gentry*, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005). However, “[c]ircuit courts obviously have subject matter jurisdiction to try criminal matters.” *Gentry*, 363 S.C. at 101, 610 S.E.2d at 499. *See also* S.C. Const. Art. V, § 7. Thus, Applicant must present evidence that his case is of some class over which the circuit court does not have the authority to preside. Applicant was indicted by the Greenville County Grand Jury for first-

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degree assault and battery, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and the indictments allege the criminal offenses occurred in Greenville County. Moreover, Applicant was prosecuted for these charges in Greenville County Court of General Sessions. Accordingly, this Court finds Applicant has failed to present any facts or evidence which would establish the convictions which he challenges in this application are of a class over which the circuit court lacks the authority to preside. This Court further finds Applicant has failed to establish any deficiency on the part of Counsel or any resulting prejudice therefrom, as the Court of General Sessions in Greenville County clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over these charges. This allegation is dismissed with prejudice.

Counsel's alleged failure to prepare for trial

Applicant alleges Counsel was not prepared for trial. Specifically, Applicant contends Counsel was neither interested in his case nor had the time to prepare for trial. "There is a strong presumption counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in making all significant decision in the case." *Ard v. Catoe*, 372 S.C. 318, 331, 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007). Moreover, when there is evidence that counsel met with Applicant in preparation for trial and there is no evidence additional preparation on the part of counsel would have affected the outcome at trial, counsel cannot be said to have been ineffective. *See Harris v. State*, 377 S.C. 66, 659 S.E.2d 140 (2008), *abrogated on other grounds by Smalls v. State*, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836 (2018). Here, Counsel testified that, although she had a shorter than normal time in which to prepare for trial, she was indeed able to prepare adequately. Furthermore, she testified she met with Applicant three to four times, during which she and Applicant would discuss the charges, the elements of each charge, the theory of hand of one, hand of all, and all of the discovery materials. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds

Applicant has failed to establish any deficiency on the part of Counsel. In addition, Applicant has presented no evidence which would establish any prejudice on the part of Applicant. In particular, Applicant has wholly failed to provide this Court with any reason as to why additional preparation on the part of Counsel would have affected the outcome at trial. Accordingly, this allegation is dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION


Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This Court notes that Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days from the receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to *Austin v. State*, 305 S.C. 453 (1991), an Applicant has a right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of post-conviction relief. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP, provides that if the applicant wishes to seek appellate review, post-conviction relief counsel must serve and file a Notice of Appeal on the Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:



1. That this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. That the Applicant shall be remanded to and remain in the custody of the State.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 31st day of May, 2018.



FRANK R. ADDY, JR.
Presiding Judge
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

Greenwood, South Carolina



R. MILLS ARIAIL, JR.

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