

87261

**IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals**

**APPEAL FROM HORRY COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas**

Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge

**Case Number 2009-CP-26-3596
Consolidated With
Case Number 2010-CP-26-11320

Appeal No. 2016-001063**

RECEIVED
JUL 11 2018
SC Court of Appeals

Ronald Jarmuth..... Pro Se Appellant,

v.

**The International Club Homeowners
Association, Inc., Rosemary Toth, and
K. A. Diehl & Associates, Inc..... Respondents.**

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

**Ronald Jarmuth
249 Pickering Drive
Murrells Inlet, SC 29576
843-314-4355
Appellant, Pro Se**

EXHIBITS

None added.

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The Appellant hereby Petitions the Court of Appeals to Rehear this Appeal En Banc pursuant to SCRAP Rule 219 or by the Panel per SCRAP Rule 221.

Jarmuth's Rule 60 Motion and Argument at the Hearing on the Motion sufficiently invoked all dimensions of Rule 60(b)(4) SCRPC ("The Judgment is Void")

1. Paragraph 1 of the Motion invoked Rule 12(b)(1) SCRPC's provision relating to a "lack of subject matter jurisdiction" AND the unrestricted authority of Rule 60. The Panel should note that Rule 60 lacks a subdivision for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, instead folding it into the more general subdivision (b)(4) "The Judgment Is Void". A Void judgment goes beyond bringing a claim to a court without statutory jurisdiction. It includes the HOA's failure to sufficiently invoke that authority by stating a proper claim grounded in applicable law to which the HOA has standing to assert. Until a proper claim has been filed AND served the court can not exercise in an actual case the hypothetical jurisdiction it has per statute.

2. The requirement to put an individual on sufficient notice of a claim through a properly plead claim is not just procedural and statutory. It arises from Amendment V to the U.S. Constitution:

"No person (may) be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

The requirement to (a) file a claim in a complaint where (b) adequately pleads the relief sought, the statutory, contractual, or common law right for the claimant to that relief, and the facts that implicate that right; (c) to formally serve the claim on the opposing side; and (d) have discovery in the matter arises because courts have construed these as all essential to satisfying the due process requirement. Arguing a case in the correct court is the second part of satisfying this metric and the Panel and Hearing Judge were amply and sufficiently informed that is all the HOA did.

3. Orders are void per Rule 60(b)(4) for a variety of reasons: a contractual clause that a case may NOT go to a court but must go to arbitration; a notice requirement before suing the state or a physician (and a requirement for a subscribing statement of another physician); limitations of actions; errors in venue; statutory immunity of officials or the state, etc. If bringing a case to the Court of Common Pleas was all that is needed for that court to uphold an order of that court then most of the civil rules would be “suggestions” not enforceable procedure.

4. While perhaps inarticulate, Jarmuth briefed and plead – at the motions hearing and in appellate briefs – all the reasons at law why the

underlying trial order (as to attorney fees and fines) is void as a matter of law (and a lack of applicable facts to invoke the authority to grant such relief).

5. Jarmuth's Motion to Dismiss raised all of these (and more) reasons why the absence of a plead claim, absence of supporting authority for relief, and absence / contradiction of facts meant that the trial court never had the authority to even hear these issues, let alone grant relief for them – that the order is void as to attorney fees and fines. Simply put, the authority of the court was never implicated and if it had been implicated, there is no legal or factual support for that relief. See Motion to Dismiss, pages 1 para 2 and page 2 para 5 through page 6 para 8(b).

6. But for the Special Referee (SR) not paying attention to the case the objectionable aspects of his order would not be before the Panel. The SR is ultimately responsible and accountable for entering provisions of an order which do not relate to any claim, which have no supporting legal authority or predicate facts, and which has not been subjected to such basic due process as discovery. The SR abused his discretion by ignoring the lack of a procedural, factual, and legal underpinning for his award of attorney fees and fines. The SR never

bothered to even read any of the pleadings – they remained locked in the clerk of court’s office during the entire trial. He did not bother to read the exhibits after the trial to determine the facts and what legal conclusions they provide a sufficient legal predicate for. Again, one can not point the finger at the HOA because the order bears the SR’s signature and the HOA never filed insufficient claims in a counter – complaint – they never filed a claim at all to object to. One might think that the record implies that the SR violated Canon 3(b)(2)’s mandate to be true to the law but a conclusion by the panel is not needed here. It is sufficient to observe what the SR and hearing judge did not – that the Order was void from its inception because of procedural and legal frailties.

Canon 3(b)(2) B. Adjudicative Responsibilities. ... (2) A judge shall be faithful to the law

The Panel and Hearing Judge Failed to Apply the Legal Notion That Bringing a Case to a Court of General Jurisdiction is in itself insufficient to perfect subject matter jurisdiction.

7. Before a court (judge) can proceed judicially, jurisdiction must be complete.

A plaintiff must plead a cause of action and until the plaintiff does so the court has no basis upon which to rule judicially.

8. The two halves of subject matter jurisdiction are (a) the statutory or common law authority the action is brought under (the theory of indemnity) and

(b) the evidence of credible evidence of predicate facts regarding the injury (the cause of action). Without both the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and lacks adjudicative authority.

9. Applicable case law that subject matter jurisdiction is not complete, and the judgment is void are:

Absence of a particular claim in the complaint Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930)

Where a claim adjudicated was not presented to the court through proper pleadings, Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill. App.3d 701, 637 N.E.2d 633 (1st Dist. 1994).

Where a claim does not state a cognizable cause of action against the adversary party, Charles v. Gore, 248 Ill.App.3d 441, 618 N.E.2d 554 (1st Dist. 1993).

A judge does not follow statutory procedure, Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 143 (1921)

Violation of due process, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938); Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill.2d 241, 245, 140 N.E.2d 289 (1956); Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill.25 (1936);

the court exceeded its statutory authority, Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F.Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

10. Further case law ties an adjudication without statutory, contractual, or common law authority to an automatically void order from its inception. On review a court does not determine the order is void. It observes the order has always been void:

"without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828);

"A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733 (1878)." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)]

Judgment is a "void judgment" if court that rendered judgment ... or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Klugh v. U.S., D.C.S.C., 610 F.Supp. 892, 901.

"A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which ... lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, ... can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally," Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. 1999)

A Void judgment is one where court's ... entry of order violated due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 - Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment ... acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A., U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 - Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985); Eckel v. MacNeal,

628 N.E. 2d 741 (Ill. App. Dist. 1993).;

Void judgment is one entered by court that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, and it may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally; such a judgment would be a nullity. People v. Rolland, 581 N.E.2d 907, (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1991; (or where the court lacked) “the inherent power to enter the particular order or judgment” In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2000).

11. As it stands now the Panel has ruled strictly that Rule 12(b), lack of subject matter jurisdiction by reason of being in the “right court” does not control, and has ignored the alternative basis for dismissal brought by Jarmuth – Rule 60(b)(4) the Judgment is Void. This is a waste of judicial resources because as written res judicata does not apply since the panel has not rendered a decision on the Rule 60 (void order) issue, meaning that the panel will see the case again on a Rule 60(b)(4) Motion that the Order is void. The Panel should do the right thing and acknowledge that the law mandates recognizing that the decision awarding attorney fees and fines was void from its inception.

The Judge at the April 27, 2016 Hearing Lacked the Authority to enter a decision on June 6, 2016 – That Order is Void

12. The “long order” entered by Hon. Judge Culbertson on June 6, 2016 is void as a matter of law because a Notice of Appeal was filed on May 17, 2016 from the April 27, 2016 Form 4 Order entered by that same judge. As a matter of law there is no June 6, 2016 Order

following a hearing for the appellate panel to affirm.

13. This was noted in the body of Jarmuth's June 24, 2016 Amended Notice of Appeal and on Page 2 of Jarmuth's Appellate Brief. On May 31, 2016 the (then) Chief Administrative Judge, Hon. Steven John, entered and published an order noting that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to take any further action in the case due to the appeal. Hon. Judge Culbertson ignored the cautionary order and the law when entering the long order. Because of the uncertainty of how the Appellate Court would construe and depend on the long order, Jarmuth addressed the deficiencies of the long order. That argument was not a waste because with a bare Form 4 Order, which made no findings of fact nor conclusions of law, the decision (as Jarmuth noted) was before the Court for the first time, not de novo (Jarmuth Brief, p.2 bottom).

The Panel abused its discretion when it failed to note that the hearing judge's order is procedurally void because the motion to dismiss was not properly before that judge.

14. The April 27, 2016 Form 4 Order entered by Hon. Judge Culbertson is void because he "stole the case" from the assigned judge and it was not properly before him. On June 15, 2012 the case, which was scheduled to be tried before Hon. Judge John (it was on his trial roster for January 17, 2012 but never called) was referred to Special

Referee Ralph Stroman for trial AND for hearing of all post-trial motions. When Jarmuth filed a post-trial motion citing numerous issues with how Referee Strohman conducted the trial and with the final order, Referee Strohman entered an Order of Recusal on October 17, 2012 specifically transferring the hearing of post-trial motions to Hon. Judge John. This is why another post-trial matter came before Hon. Judge John on May 31, 2016 and occasioned the “no jurisdiction” order entered that day. Other matters remain pending before Hon. Judge John. A Rule 60(b) motion is always heard before the judge who entered the final order, primarily because that Judge has an understanding of why he construed the final order which is under protest. Immediately after the final Order was entered in September, 2012 Hon. Judge John heard the post-trial pleadings which followed. Hon. Judge Culbertson was “a stranger” to the matter and knew nothing about the case sufficient to comprehend how subject matter questions raised at the 2016 hearing related back to the rationale underlying the 2012 order. Hon. Judge Culbertson “stole” the case; the Order assigning it to Hon. Judge Johns was and still is in force and continues to be acted on by Hon. Judge John.

**The Panel Misunderstood That the Granting of Relief
Without A Claim and Without a legal entitlement
is reversable Judicial Error**

15. It's all about trial court abuse of authority where it is lacking by asserting and granting relief never plead by the HOA which the HOA would not have been entitled to if plead in a claim.

16. The Panel ignored that the lack of authority to grant the relief objected to is rooted in judicial over-reach, not HOA pleading error. It was plainly before the Panel and the Hearing Judge that the Trial Judge (Special Referee (SR)) granted relief without a corresponding claim in a complaint), without statutory or contractual authority entitling the HOA to that relief, and without any form of notice that the relief was even contemplated (no notice, no discovery, no hearing on the merits). The Panel and the Hearing Judge were aware that the unrefuted evidence was that the transactions behind the two checks had nothing to do with the claims (or transactions) being litigated. The Panel and Hearing Judge ignored that the HOA at the hearing never asserted a statutory or contractual basis for any of the relief sought or that Jarmuth erred in any way as to the total lack of authority – and astoundingly, both ignored that even seeking reimbursement for Fair House Act legal defense expenses is a crime (retaliation) in itself, even if

made in a court proceeding, and that no set of facts, contract provisions, common or statutory law allows the award of defense legal costs. Such SR mis-conduct calls in question the judgment of the SR to fairly and logically adjudicate case at the time of the trial – which the public might think is behind the Panel never saying a word about relief in an order unrelated to any claim and without supporting statutory or contractual authority.

The Panel's Assertion that Jarmuth erred by not filing a Rule 12(b) Motion at the onset of the case is an abuse of discretion and a mis-reading of the law

17. The Panel erroneously points to procedure which is applicable only if a claim has been asserted by a party in a complaint (or counter – claim). This is clear because the panel started its order by saying:

“Affirmed pursuant to ... Rule 12(b), SCRCPP (“Every defense . . . to a cause of action in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading”)

18. Clearly the panel “blame shifted” the award of relief without authority to Jarmuth ignoring a flawed claim in an HOA counter-claim. Except the over-reach was the SR in his post-trial final order.

19. Pray tell how the opposing party can ascertain whether any of the grounds for a Rule 12(b) motion opposing a claim are applicable if there is no claim? The filing of a Rule 12 answer is clearly predicated on

being served a claim in a complaint:

“A defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days after the service of the complaint upon him” – Rule 12(a) When Served

20. Clearly there was an “abuse of discretion” by the SR and by the hearing judge and by the Panel.

“error of law or ... based on factual conclusions that are without evidence”

21. At the hearing and in the HOA’s motion and appellate papers the HOA never controverted that the SCHA and Central Electric matters were never part of the actual case, and that they were never mentioned in a pleading. The HOA’s Response Brief never mentioned a statutory or contractual provision entitling the HOA to either.

22. Ignoring that the HOA Brief was silent about the evidence that Check #2 was for Central Electric, accepting the HOA’s version of the facts as true the Court had no statutory or contractual authority from which to reimburse the HOA for either.

23. The HOA’s Response Brief p.7 stated that both attorney checks were spent to defend the 2009 case and defending a SCHA FHA Discrimination Investigation two years before a covenant violation was alleged to have happened. The HOA’s response brief conceded that no additional money was spent to enforce the covenants / cause a violation

to cease or to “collect fines”.

24. At Response Brief p.7 the HOA claimed that the 2009 check (#1, actually the SCHA deductible per the evidence in the HOA’s own ledgers) was spent to DEFEND the covenants. The HOA wrote:

“The defense of the Association was covered under its director's and officer's insurance; the Association paid a \$2,500.00 deductible in connection with defending the 2009 Case. (R. p. 279).”

25. The HOA’s own brief quoted the covenants which state that attorney fees are only permitted if actually spent to sue to eliminate an actual covenant violation. The covenants do not provide authority which the court could look to reimburse attorney fees the HOA spent when sued. [1]

26. At Response Brief p.7 the HOA claims that the 2010 check #2 was spent to DEFEND against a SC Human Affairs Discrimination Investigation (per the HOA’s ledgers the 2010 check was spent for legal expenses related to a Central Electric Easement issue having nothing to do with Jarmuth). The HOA brief says (p.7)

“Jarmuth filed a complaint with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (hereinafter "SCHAC") alleging that the Association discriminated against him in connection with denying his application for a swing set. (R. pp. 198-201).

1 At all times the HOA referred to both checks as legal expenses to “defend” not to advocate or secure any relief.

The Association filed a response and paid an additional \$2,500 deductible in defending the matter”

Neither the HOA counter-claim, nor the trial court’s final order, nor the HOA’s Response Brief on appeal cite any statutory or contractual provision upon which the HOA could ask for these costs. Certainly no such provision has ever been plead and the Panel and Hearing Judge were clearly told this. The SCHA matter was not part of the case at trial and a matter of fact was never a part of any civil case at all.

Certainly this could not invoke a covenant usage violation because the swing set involved was never built nor even alleged to have been built.

If it was, the only place such costs could be requested would have been in that separate, but non-existent case. So the trial judge made believe that there was a count in the case before him and a covenant violation related to the SCHA matter and that the HOA sued to cause the non-existent swing set to non-exist. Worse, South Carolina law provides that no one gets costs from an SCHA investigation and only a prevailing discriminated against plaintiff gets costs in a civil case alleging FHA Discrimination. Far worse, federal law provides that going to court to seek FHA investigation related costs constitutes FHA Retaliation, a federal crime. The panel and the hearing judge were made aware that anyone involved in the award of FHA related attorney fees had

committed a federal civil rights violation – to include judges.[2].

27. The Final Order following the trial stated that Special Referee understood that the checks were paid to DEFEND matters, not to enforce anything. He said so in his final order. However, the Judge cited the covenant provision related to enforcing covenants against violations -and he said that the 2009 check was for the SCHA matter which had nothing to do with the case and never cited any authority to reimburse the HOA for that. This was pointed out to the hearing judge whose order was silent on this enigma. Plaintiff's brief made the absence of authority clear to the panel. It is an outrageous abuse of discretion for these judicial entities to grant relief for matters outside the case and where there not only is no authority but written and case law prohibiting this. To put it in the context the panel defined as an abuse of discretion, at all levels – It is “An abuse of discretion”!

- COVENANT VIOLATION FINES -

The Panel and Hearing Judge Abused their Discretion by Ignoring the Absence of Predicate evidence of a “Covenant Violation” and absence of an enforceable contract provision

28. The award of fines and the decision by the hearing judge and panel to ignore lack of authority and lack of supporting facts is likewise

2 Using official capacity to retaliate against a citizen from the exercise of a statutory right in general and an official act taken as a consequence of filing an FHA complaint..

an abuse of discretion on all levels.

29. As was pointed out in all the appellate briefs, in the hearing briefs, and in the final order, the only authority for the HOA to seek “fines: is after the HOA Board determines on the record [3] that there has been an actual violation of usage restrictions in the covenants, when after notice a homeowner refuses to eliminate the violation, and when thereafter on the record the HOA Board votes to impose a fine. The trial and hearing judges and the panel abused their discretion by ignoring the absence of evidence that the HOA Board actually determined a covenant violation and actually imposed a fine – but they further abused their discretion when confronted with actual documentary evidence that the Board never did either [4]. The necessary fact predicate to invoke contract authority for a fine is absent. All are aware the HOA never plead nor suffered any direct damages from a covenant violation and none was plead.

30. The Covenants are at Exhibit 547 RoA P.737. The Usage Restrictions begin on p.16 of the Covenants RoA p 3754. The Restriction on Fences is:

3 Per the HOA Bylaws and the SC Non-Profit Corporation Act, on the HOA Board’s official minutes perpetuated in its permanent files.

4 HOA Board Meeting Minutes. At trial the HOA President testified that a fine was owed but never testified that a violation was determined or a fine imposed.

Section 7.4. No fences whatsoever shall be erected or allowed to remain in the Subdivision except privacy patio fences or walls ... Said fences shall be made of materials approved ... by the ... Architectural Review Board ... No fences shall be permitted which obstruct the view of any stream or body of water, golf courses or recreational amenity when viewed from inside any other Unit, or which interferes with the playing of golf

Jarmuth requested to build “a fence” (not a wall) using the same vinyl privacy panels previously approved for dozens of homes in the development. But Jarmuth never erected that fence. No one claimed he erected that fence. Jarmuth at all times denied he erected a fence or a wall. The HOA never presented any evidence or first hand [5] witness to say that Jarmuth erected either a wall or a fence nor that Jarmuth did any site preparation work. Without any evidence or fact-witness statement the SR found that Jarmuth erected a wall and the hearing judge and panel ignored the absence of the essential facts before even trying to apply a legal right as to fines. [6]

31. The ARB Guidelines about fences and walls are:

III. Homeowner Guidelines. S. Fences.

- 1. No fence or fence wall shall exceed a height of four feet. No fence can extend beyond the setback lines as indicated on each homeowner's plat/survey.**
- 2. Pre-finished black or white steel, aluminum and vinyl are the recommended materials. ... No chain link fences are permitted.**

5 The trial testimony of William Freiboth was hearsay.

6 HOA pleadings state that Jarmuth did some site preparation work (“a foundation”) for the never-erected fence but ground work is not a fence or a wall and is not prohibited by ARB Guideline or Covenant Usage Restrictions.

3. No fence may be constructed on the portion of the unit between the single family dwelling and the golf course parcel...
 4. Fences will not be constructed in the front yard of any unit.
 5. No fences shall be permitted which obstruct any view from inside or outside any other unit, or which interferes with the playing of golf
- Exhibit #385 RoA P. 3589

32. The Panel and Judge ignored that the HOA counter-claim for “fines” plead without establishing a factually based contractual entitlement was just a bare demand. [7]


“An abuse of discretion arises where the judge issuing the order was controlled by an error of law or where the order is based on factual conclusions that are without evidentiary support” – Panel Order

⁷ The hearing judge and the Panel were shown uncontroverted evidence that fences and walls are permitted under the covenants and more importantly that the HOA board never determined a violation occurred and never imposed a fine; and there was no evidence a wall was actually erected anyway. The HOA never plead any damages attributable to Jarmuth for any reason, plead or unplead.

Conclusion

1. Both orders following the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss are void on procedural grounds. For the “long order” (the second) the court lacked case jurisdiction at the time that order was entered. Because the entire panel review was predicated on having a valid “long order” before them – the panel did not review the matter “de novo” – the panel’s decision is likewise void.
2. As a matter of law the aspects of the trial court’s final order granting attorney fees and fines was legally void at its inception and must be reversed.

WHEREFORE Appellant, for just cause shown, Moves the Court of Appeals to Rehear this Case and to Reverse its Affirmation on the issues presented.



Ronald Jarmuth, Appellant Pro Se
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July 10, 2018

IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM HORRY COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Appeal No. 2016-001063

Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge

CASE NUMBER 2009-CP-26-3596

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v.

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
JUL 11 2018

SC Court of Appeals

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that on July 10, 2018 I served Appellant's "Motion for Rehearing" by depositing a copy of same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Respondent's common counsel, Henrietta Golding and Alicia Thompson; McNair Law Firm, P.A.; 2411 Oak Street; Suite 206; Myrtle Beach, SC 29577-3164

July 10, 2018


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July 10, 2018

The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings, Clerk
South Carolina Court of Appeals
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
Re: **Petition / Motion For Rehearing En Banc or by Panel in Appeal 2016- 001063**
Jarmuth v International Club HOA et al
2009CP263596 in the Court of Common Pleas, Horry County
Appeal 2016- 001063

Dear Madam Clerk:

Please file the attached **Petition / Motion for Rehearing En Banc or by Panel** , which I provide as one unbound plus six bound copies, together with my check in the amount of twenty five dollars, the motion filing fee.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Ronald Jarmuth
Appellant Pro Se
249 Pickering Drive
Murrells Inlet, SC 29576

Enc: as

Cf: **Henrietta Golding and Alicia Thompson, Attorneys for Respondents**

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
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 Next Business Day Delivery Required (additional fee, where available*)
 Signature Required (additional fee, where available*)
 Visit usps.com or local Post Office™ for availability.

PHONE ()

Non Jerry Abbott Kitching
 Clerk SC Court of Appeals
 PO Box 11629
 Columbia SC 29211-1629
 ZIP + 4® (U.S. ADDRESSES ONLY)

- For pickup or USPS Tracking™, visit USPS.com or call 800-222-1811.
- \$100.00 insurance included.



EL744493657US

EL744493657US



PRIORITY MAIL EXPRESS™

ORIGIN (POSTAL SERVICE USE ONLY)

1-Day 2-Day Military DPO

PO ZIP Code 29569	Scheduled Delivery Date (MM/DD/YY) 7/11/18	Postage \$ 24.70	
Date Accepted (MM/DD/YY) 7/10/18	Scheduled Delivery Time <input type="checkbox"/> 10:30 AM <input type="checkbox"/> 3:00 PM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12 NOON	Insurance Fee \$	COD Fee \$
Time Accepted 2:08	<input type="checkbox"/> Flat Rate <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PM	Return Receipt Fee \$	Live Animal Transportation Fee \$
Special Handling/Fragile \$	Sunday/Holiday Premium Fee \$	Total Postage & Fees \$ 24.70	
Weight lbs. ozs.	Acceptance Employee Initials [Signature]		

DELIVERY (POSTAL SERVICE USE ONLY)

Delivery Attempt (MM/DD/YY) 7/11	Time <input type="checkbox"/> AM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PM	Employee Signature [Signature]
Delivery Attempt (MM/DD/YY) 7/11	Time <input type="checkbox"/> AM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PM	Employee Signature [Signature]

LABEL 11-B, OCTOBER 2016

PSN 7690-02-000-9996

3-ADDRESSEE COPY

ATTENTION - DELIVERY
SENDER HAS WAIVED SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT

PLEASE DELIVER PER DMM 263.2

WRITE FIRMLY WITH BALL POINT

U.S. CUSTOMS DECLARATION LABEL MAY BE REQUIRED.



July 2013 OD: 12.5 x 9.5

