

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SUPREME COURT

—————
Certiorari to Calhoun County

Honorable Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge
—————

Opinion No. 2018-UP-198 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed May 9, 2018)

2014-GS-09-00260
—————

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

CHARLES WINSTON, JR.,

PETITIONER

APPELLATE CASE NO 2016-001029
—————

APPENDIX
—————

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

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**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals**

The State, Respondent,

v.

Charles Winston, Jr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001029

Appeal From Calhoun County
Maité Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-198
Submitted April 1, 2018 – Filed May 9, 2018

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., both of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of
Orangeburg, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-24-20(A) (2014) ("A defendant is guilty but

mentally ill if, at the time of the commission of the act constituting the offense, he had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to recognize his act as being wrong . . . but because of mental disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."); S.C. Code Ann.

§ 17-24-20(B) (2014) ("To return a verdict of 'guilty but mentally ill' . . . the burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence that when he committed the crime he was mentally ill . . ."); *State v. White*, 372 S.C. 364, 373, 642 S.E.2d 607, 611 (Ct. App. 2007) ("On appeal, we are limited to determining whether the trial [court] abused [its] discretion."), *aff'd in result*, 382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009); *id.* ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion that is without evidentiary support."); *State v. Wilson*, 345 S.C. 1, 6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) ("[The appellate court] does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines whether the trial [court]'s ruling is supported by any evidence."); *State v. Tutton*, 354 S.C. 319, 325-26, 580 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The determination of a witness's credibility must be left to the trial [court that] saw and heard the witness and is therefore in a better position to evaluate his or her veracity.").

AFFIRMED.¹

HUFF, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

¹ We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

CHARLES WINSTON, JR.,

PETITIONER

APPELLATE CASE NO 2016-001029

Appeal from Calhoun County

Honorable Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2018-UP-198

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 221(a), SCACR, counsel for Charles Winston, Jr., petitions the Court for rehearing and respectfully submits that the Court overlooked the fact that the unchallenged evidence in the record only supports a finding that Petitioner was guilty but mentally ill. The evidence in support of the guilty but mentally ill finding was not challenged by the State during the hearing. Instead, the State challenged Petitioner's position that he should be found not guilty by reason of insanity by introducing a copy of the court ordered competency evaluation pursuant to S.C. Code §44-23-410, (R. pp. 135-145). The competency evaluation found Petitioner competent to stand trial but not address whether Petitioner was guilty but mentally ill.

The trial judge found that Petitioner failed to prove that he was not guilty by reason of insanity and that finding is **not** challenged on direct appeal. (R. p. 118, line 19- p. 119, 120, 121, lines 1-15). The trial judge also found that Petitioner was competent to stand trial and that finding is **not** challenged on direct appeal. The State's evidence, in the form of the competency evaluation, went to prove competency and challenge the insanity defense, neither of which are challenged on direct appeal. The challenge on direct appeal goes to the trial judge's refusal to find petitioner guilty but mentally ill. A person may be mentally ill yet not legally insane and still competent to stand trial. See State v. Curry, 410 S.C. 46, 52–53, 762 S.E.2d 721, 724–25 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 484 S.E.2d 869 (1997).

The competency evaluation was conducted pursuant to S.C. Code §44-23-410 and only addressed competency to stand trial. The evaluation relied upon by the State does not make a finding with regard to guilty but mentally ill pursuant to S.C. Code §17-24-20(A). The evaluation, however, shows that Petitioner has a history of mental health issues dating back to 2010. (R. p. 139). Defense expert, Dr. Amanda Salas, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that Petitioner was guilty but mentally ill. (R. p. 64, lines 6-11). The trial judge's finding that Petitioner failed to prove that he was guilty but mentally ill is not supported by the record. The trial judge abused her discretion in refusing to find Petitioner guilty but mentally ill when the court ordered evaluation only evaluated Petitioner for competency to stand trial and Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was guilty but mentally ill by the unchallenged testimony from the forensic psychiatrist who testified that Petitioner suffered from a delusional disorder which impaired his ability to conform.

On Monday May 9, 2016, trial counsel waived Petitioner's presence and advised the judge that Petitioner wished to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial.¹ (R. pp. 4-7). At this time trial counsel also stipulated that Petitioner was competent to stand trial. (R. p. 4, lines 10-20). A copy of the State ordered competency evaluation was marked as both Court's Exhibit #1 and State's Exhibit #1. (R. p. 5, lines 2-3; p. 8, lines 7-10; R. pp. 135 – 145). The State ordered competency evaluation did not address capacity to distinguish right from wrong or capacity to conform conduct to the requirements of law. On May 11, 2016, Petitioner proceeded to a bench trial, stipulating to the facts alleged in the indictment but presenting mental health defenses. (R. p. 8, lines 2-13). The indictment alleges that on September 30, 2014, Petitioner did, with the intent to kill, attempt to kill Courtney Glover with malice aforethought by cutting her throat and face area. (R. p. 9, lines 4-12, R. pp. 132 – 133). Ms. Glover testified that Petitioner was a neighbor who she had known since she was fourteen. (R. p. 10, lines 7-11). On the night in question she went to Petitioner's house because he had texted her and stated that he needed someone to talk to. (R. p. 12, line 23 – p. 13, lines 1-6). Ms. Glover testified that Petitioner attacked her as she was leaving his house. (R. p. 14, lines 2-13).

Petitioner called Dr. Amanda Salas as an expert witness in forensic psychiatry. (R. pp. 37-94). Dr. Salas testified that Petitioner suffered from a delusional disorder. (R. p. 38, lines 18-23). Dr. Salas testified that Petitioner believed that the victim and others placed devices in his body that they could control remotely to torture him. (R. p. 40, line 10 – p. 41, lines 1-8; p. 43, lines 14-17). Dr. Salas testified that Petitioner could tell the difference between legal right and wrong. (R. p. 61, lines 22-23). The doctor testified, however, that the delusional disorder "impaired his ability not only to discriminate a moral right from wrong, but also the inability to

¹ The record does not contain a waiver from Petitioner in regard to his right to a jury trial. This issue may need to be raised in post-conviction relief.

conform.” Although Petitioner stipulated that he was competent to stand trial, the doctor was of the opinion that Petitioner was not competent to stand trial. (R. p. 77, line 17 – p. 78, lines 1-2).

Trial counsel argued that Petitioner was not guilty by reason of insanity. (R. pp. 106-107). The State argued that Petitioner did not prove that he was not guilty by reason of insanity but told the judge, “I would submit that at most there is a question as to whether or not he had the capacity to conform his acts. And at most, this is guilty but mentally ill.” (R. p. 117, lines 16-19). The judge found Petitioner guilty rather than guilty but mentally ill or not guilty by reason of insanity. (R. p. 123, lines 2-3). The judge found that Petitioner failed to establish that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. (R. p. 118, line 19 – p. 119, 120, 121, lines 1-15). In regard to guilty but mentally ill the judge stated:

The only time the defendant has sought prior treatment for any alleged condition is because of judicial enforcement. There are no fact witnesses regarding past or current condition to show sufficient evidence that at the time of the attack he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conducts to the requirements of the law. Dr. Salas actually testified that he knew legal right from legal wrong. And the mental illness has not been established. The defendant’s conduct contradicts this on every stage of this trial. He clearly is intelligent, articulate, and I think, quite frankly, he knew his only defense to mitigate or escape his responsibility for these heinous acts are to allege that he was hearing voices in order to escape liability for his actions. Therefore, the Court finds the defendant guilty of attempted murder.

(R. p. 122, line 14- p. 123, lines 1-3).

The trial judge erred. First, Dr. Salas testified that Petitioner suffered from a delusional disorder which impaired his ability to conform. The State ordered competency evaluation does not address ability to conform but notes prior diagnoses for depressive disorder and alcohol-induced psychotic disorder. (R. p. 139). If this case had been tried before a jury, the trial judge

would have erred in not giving the jury the option of finding Petitioner guilty but mentally ill. See State v. Hartfield, 300 S.C. 469, 388 S.E.2d 802 (1990).

In State v. Curry, 410 S.C. 46, 52–53, 762 S.E.2d 721, 724–25 (Ct. App. 2014) (fn. #3 omitted), this Court wrote:

As defined by section 17–24–20(A) of the South Carolina Code (2014), A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the commission of the act constituting the offense, he had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to recognize his act as being wrong as defined in [s]ection 17–24–10(A), but because of mental disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. S.C.Code Ann. § 17–24–20(A) (2014). The guilty but mentally ill statute ensures the jury applies the legal definition of insanity properly by emphasizing that a person may be mentally ill, yet not legally insane. State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 130, 484 S.E.2d 869, 874 (1997). “The [guilty but mentally ill] verdict clarifies the distinction between a defendant who is not guilty by reason of insanity and one who is mentally ill yet not criminally insane and, therefore, is criminally liable.” Id.

The evidence in the record establishes that Petitioner was mentally ill but criminally liable – guilty but mentally ill.

Second, contrary to the statement of the trial judge, a finding of guilty but mentally ill does not allow Petitioner to escape responsibility for his actions. As noted by this Court in Curry, “Although a defendant’s sentence is the same regardless of whether he is merely guilty or guilty but mentally ill, a defendant found guilty but mentally ill ‘is entitled to immediate treatment and evaluation.’ (citing S.C. Code §17-24-70).” 410 S.C. at 54, 762 S.E.2d at 725.

The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the crime he was mentally ill. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-24-20(B). Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally ill, suffering from a delusional disorder, and because of that mental disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. This is not a case where there was contradictory evidence in regard to capacity to conform. The State presented no evidence in

regard to Petitioner's capacity to conform. The only evidence before the judge in regard to guilty but mentally ill was Dr. Salas' testimony that because of Petitioner's delusional disorder, he lacked the capacity to conform.

The judge's findings of fact in regard to refusing to find Petitioner guilty but mentally ill are not supported by the record. When reviewing an action at law, on appeal of a case tried without a jury, this Court will not disturb the judge's findings of fact "unless found to be without evidence which reasonably supports the judge's findings." Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976). The only testimony presented in this case supports a finding of guilty but mentally ill. The State presented no evidence to contradict this finding and in fact conceded "... that at most there is a question as to whether or not he had the capacity to conform his acts. And at most, this is guilty but mentally ill." (R. p. 117, lines 16-19).

Respondent asserts that, "Aside from Dr. Sala's testimony, all of the evidence presented supported the conclusion that Appellant's alleged mental illness was fabricated in order to escape liability for his crime." (BOR p. 10). As discussed above, in regard to the trial judge's opinion that Petitioner alleged that he was hearing voices to escape responsibility for his actions, a finding of guilty but mentally ill does not allow Petitioner to escape liability for his actions. Respondent additionally asserts:

While Appellant contends the MUSC evaluation made no findings regarding Appellant's capacity to conform, the MUSC report did not make such findings because the examiners conducted an M-FAST test and found indication Appellant was feigning symptoms and 'the symptoms he currently reports are not consistent with bona fide psychosis and, thus, a psychotic-spectrum disorder is not warranted.' A person feigning symptoms who does not have a bona fide psychosis necessarily has the capacity to conform his actions to law. No specific finding in this regard would be expected.

(BOR p. 10). The only suggestion of possible fabrication is included in the M-FAST and diagnostic portions of the competency evaluation. (R. pp. 141-142). As also discussed above, the evaluators from MUSC who conducted the competency evaluation were only asked to evaluate Petitioner for competency to stand trial. They were not asked to determine if Petitioner was guilty but mentally ill. Importantly, at the end of the M-FAST portion the evaluators wrote,

“Additional assessment is warranted to further evaluate the possibility that he may be exaggerating psychopathology. It should be noted that additional testing was not conducted at the time of the evaluation, as Mr. Winston did not attempt to feign deficits related to the psycho-legal question at hand (competency to stand trial).” (R. pp. 141-142).

The evaluators did not omit a determination as to capacity to conform because, as suggested by Respondent, the evaluators found he was exaggerating. Instead, the evaluators did not make a finding in regard to capacity to conform because they were only asked to determine competency to stand trial. The evaluators did not make a conclusive finding that Petitioner was exaggerating or feigning symptoms. As noted by the evaluators, additional assessment is warranted in regard to the possibility of exaggerating.

At the close of the case the trial judge stated, “And I suppose, I guess, as far as the defendant is concerned, if he truly does need medical attention while he is incarcerated, whether it’s guilty but mentally ill or just guilty, the Department of Corrections is required to provide mental health treatment while he is incarcerated regardless.” (R. p. 130, lines 8-13). Again, as noted by the Court in Curry:

We are aware that a defendant found guilty but mentally ill “must be sentenced as provided by law for a defendant found guilty.” Hornsby, 326 S.C. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 872. Although a defendant's sentence is the same regardless of whether he is merely guilty or guilty but mentally ill, a defendant found guilty but mentally ill “is entitled to immediate treatment and evaluation.” Id. (citing S.C.Code Ann. § 17-24-70 (Supp.1995)). The circuit court included a recommendation for mental health treatment when it issued Curry's sentence, but the court did not mandate treatment as is required for a defendant found guilty but mentally ill pursuant to section 17-24-70 of the South Carolina Code (2014). Because evidence was presented from which the jury could have concluded Curry was guilty but mentally ill under section 17-24-70, the circuit court's failure to include this jury charge amounted to reversible error.

410 S.C. at 54-55, 762 S.E.2d at 725-26 (Ct. App. 2014) (footnotes omitted). The only evidence presented in the present case supported a finding of guilty but mentally ill which would

have mandated immediate treatment and evaluation within the Department of Corrections. The trial judge erred in refusing to find Petitioner guilty but mentally ill. The error requires reversal.


In affirming the finding of guilty rather than guilty but mentally ill this Court wrote:

Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-24-20(A) (2014) ("A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the commission of the act constituting the offense, he had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to recognize his act as being wrong . . . but because of mental disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-24-20(B) (2014) ("To return a verdict of 'guilty but mentally ill' . . . the burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence that when he committed the crime he was mentally ill . . ."); State v. White, 372 S.C. 364, 373, 642 S.E.2d 607, 611 (Ct. App. 2007) ("On appeal, we are limited to determining whether the trial [court] abused [its] discretion."), *aff'd in result*, 382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009); *id.* ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion that is without evidentiary support."); State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) ("[The appellate court] does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines whether the trial [court]'s ruling is supported by any evidence."); State v. Tutton, 354 S.C. 319, 325-26, 580 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The determination of a witness's credibility must be left to the trial [court that] saw and heard the witness and is therefore in a better position to evaluate his or her veracity.").

State v. Charles Winston, Jr. Op. No. 2018-UP-198 (S.C.Ct.App. Filed May 9, 2018).

Counsel respectfully submits that no evidence supports a finding that Petitioner was guilty instead of guilty but mentally ill. Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was guilty but mentally ill. The State presented no evidence to contradict this finding. The judge abused her discretion. Counsel seeks rehearing on the grounds discussed above and asks this Court to reverse the finding of the trial judge.

Respectfully Submitted,



KATHRINE H. HUDGINS
Appellate Defender

This 24th day of May, 2018.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Calhoun County

Honorable Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,


V.

CHARLES WINSTON, JR.,

PETITIONER


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a copy of the Petition for Rehearing in the above-entitled case has been served upon V. Henry Gunter, Jr., Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201; and Charles Winston, Jr., #368128, at Broad River Correctional Institution, 4460 Broad River Road, Columbia, SC 29210, this 24th day of May, 2018.



Kathrine H. Hudgins
Appellate Defender
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE
ME this 24th day of May, 2018.

 (L.S)
Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: July 5, 2027.

The South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,


v.


Charles Winston, Jr., Appellant.


Appellate Case No. 2016-001029

ORDER

After careful consideration of the petition for rehearing, the Court is unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting a rehearing. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.


 _____ J.


 _____ J.


 _____ J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc: Alan McCrory Wilson, Esquire
 Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, Esquire
 Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., Esquire
 David Michael Pascoe, Jr., Esquire
 The Honorable Maité Murphy

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JUN 22 2018

APPELLATE DEFENSE

FILED

June 22, 2018