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August 21, 2018

RECEIVED

AUG 24 2018

S.C. SUPREME COURT

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211

RE: Michael E. Hawkins, #316547 v. State of South Carolina
2016-CP-07-02544

Dear Mr. Shearouse:

Please find enclosed a Notice of Appeal along with the accompanying Order for the above-referenced matter. By way of this letter I am copying the Office of Appellate of Defense, as I was appointed to represent Mr. Hawkins.

Best regards,

ASHLEY A. MCMAHAN
ATTORNEY AT LAW

AAM

cc: Michael E. Hawkins
Christian A. Saville, Asst. Attorney General
Beaufort County Clerk of Court
Office of Appellate Offense

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

RECEIVED

APPEAL FROM BEAUFORT COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

AUG 24 2018

S.C. SUPREME COURT

The Honorable Diane S. Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2016-CP-07-02544

Michael E. Hawkins, #316547, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Applicant, Michael E. Hawkins, appeals the order of the Honorable Diane S. Goodstein, dated August 8, 2018, and filed August 13, 2018.

Aug. 21st, 2018


ASHLEY A. MCMAHAN, ESQUIRE
MAC | VANCE ATTORNEYS, LLC
PO Box 5501
West Columbia, SC 29171
803-219-1110
ashley@macvance.com
SC Bar No. 71676
ATTORNEY FOR APPLICANT

Opposing Counsel:
Christian A. Saville, Asst, Attorney General
S.C. Attorney General's Office
PO Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211-1549

RECEIVED

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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APPEAL FROM BEAUFORT COUNTY
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
PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Ashley A. McMahan, certify that I have served the within Notice of Appeal on Respondent by depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

Christian A. Saville, Asst, Attorney General
S.C. Attorney General's Office
PO Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211-1549

I further certify that all parties required by Rule to be served have been served.

Aug. 21st, 2018


ASHLEY A. MCMAHAN, ESQUIRE
MAC | VANCE ATTORNEYS, LLC
PO Box 5501
West Columbia, SC 29171
803-219-1110

FORM 4

**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF BEAUFORT
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS**

**JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
CASE NUMBER 2016CP0702544**

Michael Hawkins		South Carolina State Of	
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PLAINTIFF(S)	DEFENDANT(S)
Submitted by:	Attorney for: <input type="checkbox"/> Plaintiff <input type="checkbox"/> Defendant <input type="checkbox"/> Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. See Page 2 for additional information.
- ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** Rule 12(b), SCRPC; Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit);
 Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); Other: _____
- ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** Rule 40(j) SCRPC; Bankruptcy;
 Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other: _____
- STAYED DUE TO BANKRUPTCY**
- DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other:

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order

Statement of Judgment by the Court:

Order of Dismissal

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.
Additional Information for the Clerk: _____

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. **Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.**

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF BEAUFORT

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

2018 AUG 13 PM 3:55

Michael E. Hawkins, #316547,

2016-CP-07-2544

Applicant, CLERK OF COURT

v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

This matter comes before the Court by way of a post-conviction relief (PCR) application filed on December 1, 2016, and later amended on May 29, 2018. Respondent submitted its return on August 3, 2017. An evidentiary hearing into the matter was convened on June 4, 2018, at the Beaufort County Courthouse. Applicant was present at the hearing and was represented by Ashley A. McMahan, Esquire. Respondent was represented by Assistant Attorney General Christian Saville of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office.

Before this Court are the records of the Beaufort County Clerk of Court regarding the subject convictions, Applicant's appellate records, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the plea transcript, the State's return, and the applications. Based on these records and the testimony presented, the Court finds as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The records before this Court indicate that Michael Hawkins ("Applicant") is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Clerk of Court for Beaufort County. In April 2012, the Beaufort County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for two counts of kidnapping (2012-GS-07-0923; -0721), first-degree burglary (2012-GS-07-0720), assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN) (2012-GS-07-

s/ D. S. Goodstein
Circuit Court Judge

2112
Judge Code

8/8/2018
Date

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on **August 13, 2018**, and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on **August 14, 2018**, to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Michael Hawkins #316547 Allendale Corr. Inst. F2-A-28
Post Box 1151 Fairfax, SC 29827
Ashley A. McMahan PO Box 5501 West Columbia, SC
29169

Christian Saville PO Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

M.Kilby

Court Reporter

Jerri Ann Roseneau - Clerk of Court

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgement to parties who are not E-Filers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCP.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.

0722), criminal conspiracy (2012-GS-07-0723), armed robbery (2012-GS-07-0763), and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime (2012-GS-07-0764). Christopher W. Lempeis, Jr., Esquire ("Plea Counsel"), represented Applicant. Assistant Solicitor Mary Concannon Jones prosecuted the case. On April 18, 2013, Applicant pleaded guilty as indicted, pursuant to Alford,¹ to all charges before the Honorable Carmen T. Mullen. Judge Mullen sentenced Applicant to imprisonment for fifteen years for each kidnapping charge, fifteen years first-degree burglary, fifteen years for ABHAN, fifteen years for armed robbery, five years for criminal conspiracy, and five years of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, all to be served concurrently. Applicant subsequently filed a motion to vacate or in the alternative to withdraw the guilty plea. Judge Mullen denied the motion on May 13, 2013.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal. Benjamin John Tripp, Esquire, of the Office of Appellate Defense perfected the appeal. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Applicant's conviction on June 22, 2016. State v. Hawkins, Op. No. 2012-UP-326 (Ct. App. 2016). The remittitur was returned on July 8, 2016.

II. ALLEGATIONS

In his amended Application, Applicant alleges that he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
 - a. "Failed to properly explain circumstantial evidence to the Applicant."
 - b. "Failure to adequately address the fact that the victims initially indicated that they could point out who the alleged perpetrators were, but really only knew Eric Mack. Trial Counsel did not ask the victims about this and the victims later on indicated they did not know who the perpetrators really were."

¹ North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

- c. "Trial counsel did not adequately address the distance between the locations involved in the case or address that the Applicant was not in the car, as reflected in the video."
- d. "Codefendant's charge in Charleston County that was ultimately dropped was used against the Applicant in his bond hearing."

III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT TESTIMONY PRESENTED

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified on his own behalf. Applicant's Plea Counsel also testified.

Applicant's testimony

Applicant recalled meeting with Plea Counsel "maybe three times." Applicant testified there was no evidence against him other than "hand of one, hand of all" and there was no connection between he and the weapons involved in this case. Regarding his DNA being found in the stolen van, Applicant recalled he never disputed being involved with the van, as he had lawfully driven the van earlier to help the victims move. Moreover, Applicant testified it was clear he was not the person in dashcam footage and he had asked Plea Counsel to conduct a photo lineup to absolve him. Applicant denied ever being involved in the police chase. Applicant testified he did not know the difference between circumstantial and direct evidence, and conceded he did not have an alibi defense.

Applicant testified Plea Counsel never advised him of the potential sentences for his charges. Moreover, Applicant testified he would not have pled guilty if Plea Counsel would have explained to him he could possibly get a greater or lesser sentence than his codefendants.

Applicant acknowledged telling the plea judge he was satisfied with Plea Counsel's services and that Plea Counsel had done everything asked of him. Furthermore, Applicant recalled telling the plea judge he understood all his conversations with Plea Counsel. Applicant also acknowledged the plea judge advised him of the potential sentences for his charges.

Plea Counsel's testimony

Plea Counsel testified he met with Applicant ten or more times for lengthy amounts of time, in contrast to Applicant's testimony of only having met three times. He recalled explaining the evidence to Applicant, and Applicant seemed to understand these conversations. Plea Counsel explained he came to a different conclusion than Applicant about the dashcam footage, but with or without the footage, "you have him in proximity to where the chase ended." Plea Counsel testified codefendant Erick Mack's attorney would not let him talk to Mack. Furthermore, Trial Counsel recalled attempting to put together an alibi but was unsuccessful as all of Applicant's witnesses contradicted his version of the facts. According to Plea Counsel, he did thoroughly investigate the case as he represented Applicant over a year and a half by investigating all relevant witnesses and timing the drive between different locations in relation to the crime scenes. It was Plea Counsel's opinion there was enough evidence to support a conviction had the case proceeded to trial.

Plea Counsel testified he did explain the potential sentencing consequences to Applicant prior to his guilty plea. According to Plea Counsel, however, he did not recall telling Applicant he could receive different sentences than his codefendants, and he felt this would have been important to Applicant. However, Plea Counsel acknowledged Applicant was first to plead guilty, received the mandatory minimum sentence, and did not receive more time for these charges than his codefendants.

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

In a post-conviction relief action, the applicant has the burden of proving the allegations in the application. Rule 71.1(e), SCRPC; Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged as a ground for relief, the Applicant must

prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984); Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985).

The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Courts presume counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).

Courts use a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, attorney performance is measured by its "reasonableness under professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 385 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Strickland). Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625. With respect to guilty pleas, the Applicant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985).

V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the record in its entirety and has heard the testimony at the post-conviction relief hearing. This Court has further had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the hearing, closely pass upon their credibility and weigh their

testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of facts and conclusions of law as required pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-80 (1985).

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Applicant alleges Plea Counsel was ineffective in his representation surrounding his guilty plea. In post-conviction relief cases, an applicant asserting a constitutional violation must frame the issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 363, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747 (1999) (citing Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 9, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993)). An applicant who pleads guilty on the advice of counsel may collaterally attack the plea only by showing that (1) counsel was ineffective and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the applicant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Roscoe v. State, 345 S.C. 16, 20, 546 S.E.2d 417, 419 (2001) (citations omitted). An applicant alleging his guilty plea was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel must prove that counsel's advice was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985).

Furthermore, a guilty plea generally constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects and claims of violations of constitutional rights. See Rivers v. Strickland, 264 S.C. 121, 124, 213 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1975) (a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of violation of constitutional rights prior to the plea); Whetsell v. State, 276 S.C. 295, 277 S.E.2d 891 (1981). A guilty plea is a solemn, judicial admission of the truth of the charges against the defendant. Statements made during the plea should be considered conclusive unless the defendant presents reasons why he should be allowed to depart from the truth of those statements. Crawford v. U.S., 519 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1975); Edmonds v. Lewis, 546 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1976).

In the present case, this Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden in proving Plea Counsel was ineffective in any regard. This Court will address Applicant's allegations in the order in which they were presented in his amended application for post-conviction relief.

"Failure to properly explain circumstantial evidence to the Applicant"

Plea Counsel's testimony described a more than adequate investigation into the facts and evidence of this case. This Court finds Plea Counsel's testimony credible that he met with Applicant many times at length before the plea and explained the evidence and circumstances to Applicant as well as the potential sentences for his charges. Plea Counsel also testified he felt Applicant understand these conversations, and this is corroborated by Applicant's own representations to the plea judge. This Court finds Plea Counsel's testimony credible that he spoke to the relevant witnesses and Applicant's family members who contradicted Applicant's version of the facts. Notwithstanding, Applicant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge the State's evidence when he pled guilty. For these reasons, this Court finds Applicant has failed to satisfy his burden of proving Plea Counsel's conduct was deficient in this regard, and has also failed to satisfy his burden of proving that he would have proceeded to trial but for Plea Counsel's alleged deficiency. Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

"Failure to adequately address the fact that the victims initially indicated that they could point out who the alleged perpetrators were, but really only knew Erick Mack..."

Applicant offered no credible or probative testimony that Plea Counsel was ineffective regarding the issue of identification by the victims with regard to codefendant Erick Mack or otherwise. In fact, this Court found Applicant's testimony to be self-serving and lack credibility.

Plea Counsel testified Erick Mack's attorney would not let him talk to Mack. However, Plea Counsel characterized the evidence in the case as circumstantial and enough to support a conviction. Applicant has presented no credible or probative testimony that this issue was dispositive, and the evidence of Applicant's DNA being found in the getaway vehicle, dashboard footage of an individual resembling Applicant exiting the van, and Applicant being found drenched in the vicinity walking in the roadway later that night comprised the brunt of the State's case. Plea Counsel credibly testified the defense was unable to pursue an alibi defense as witnesses and Applicant's own family contradicted the account he provided. Again, Applicant knowingly and voluntarily waived any defenses when he pled guilty. For these reasons, Applicant has failed to satisfy his burden of proving Plea Counsel was deficient regarding this allegation, and notwithstanding, Applicant has failed to prove how performance in any other capacity would have resulted in Applicant proceeding to trial rather than pleading guilty. Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

"Plea Counsel did not adequately address the distance between the locations involved in the case or address that the Applicant was not in the car, as reflected in the video."

Applicant's allegation that Plea Counsel did not adequately address the distance between locations relative to the crime scene or Applicant's presence in the getaway vehicle is also meritless. While this Court finds Applicant's testimony that he is "clearly" not the individual in the dashcam footage seen exiting the getaway van to lack credibility, Plea Counsel credibly testified he disagreed with Applicant's interpretation. Furthermore, Plea Counsel credibly testified that regardless of the dashcam footage, the State could place Applicant within close enough proximity to where the chase ended, compounded with the evidence of Applicant having been in the van, that the dashcam footage was not dispositive. This Court finds Plea Counsel

exercised reasonable professional judgement with regard to this issue, and Applicant has further failed to prove any prejudice therefrom.

As to the investigation of the distance between locations involved in this case, this Court finds Plea Counsel thoroughly investigated this issue and went as far as to have his investigator drive the various distances involved and time them in efforts to aid Applicant's defense. Trial Counsel credibly testified the results of this investigation did not support Applicant's version of the facts and would not have been helpful at trial. Notwithstanding, both the issues of the dashcam footage and the distances involved in this case are issues Applicant could have raised at trial but knowingly and voluntarily waived when he pled guilty. Plea Counsel's representation was clearly not deficient in this regard, and Applicant has failed to prove he would have proceeded to trial but for Plea Counsel's conduct. Therefore, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

"Codefendant's charge in Charleston ... was used against Applicant in his bond hearing."

Applicant did not present any credible or probative evidence or testimony to support this allegation listed in his amended application. Furthermore, this Court has had the opportunity to review the record and found no evidence to support this allegation. Therefore, Applicant has failed to satisfy his burden of proof regarding both deficiency and prejudice, and this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Disparate Sentencing

While there was no allegation regarding sentencing in Applicant's application, this Court heard testimony from Applicant that he would not have pled guilty had he known his codefendants might receive more or less time than he received for the charges. This Court finds the allegation to be meritless. Plea Counsel testified he explained the potential sentences to

Applicant prior to his guilty plea. Moreover, the plea judge specifically advised Applicant of his potential sentences, and Applicant informed the plea judge he understood the possible sentences. “This court has no jurisdiction to review a sentence, provided it is within the limits provided by the statute for the discretion of the court, and is not the result of prejudice, oppression or corrupt motive.” State v. Franklin, 267 S.C. 240, 246, 226 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1976). In Applicant’s case, he received the mandatory *minimum* of fifteen years for first-degree burglary. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(B). As Applicant was told prior to his plea by both Plea Counsel and the plea judge, the plea judge had no discretion to sentence Applicant to any less time than Applicant received. The sentences of Applicant’s codefendants are wholly irrelevant to Applicant’s sentencing. Notwithstanding, as Plea Counsel acknowledged at the PCR hearing, Applicant’s codefendant Erick Mack also received the mandatory minimum of fifteen years. The record reveals Applicant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty and received the mandatory minimum. This Court finds Plea Counsel was not deficient in advising Applicant of his potential sentences regardless of whether the sentences of codefendants, who had not yet been sentenced, were discussed. Furthermore, this Court does not find it credible that Applicant would have rather proceeded to trial had he known his codefendants might receive different sentences despite the fact he received the mandatory minimum and told the plea judge he understood the possible sentencing consequences. For these reasons, this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this court to grant his application.


Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.


This Court notes that Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days from the receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453 (1991), an Applicant has a right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of post-conviction relief. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP, provides that if the applicant wishes to seek appellate review, post-conviction relief counsel must serve and file a Notice of Appeal on the Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. That the application for Post-Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice in regard to all allegations; and
2. Applicant must be remanded to the custody of Respondent.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of August, 2018.

 South Carolina


DIANE SCHAFFER-GOODSTEIN
Presiding Judge
Fourteenth Judicial Circuit



State of South Carolina
The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit

DIANE SCHAFER GOODSTEIN
JUDGE

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E-MAIL: dgoodsteinlc@sccourts.org

August 8, 2018

Marlene Kinard
Common Pleas Judicial Clerk
Beaufort County Clerk of Court
Post Office Drawer 1228
Beaufort, SC 29901

Re: Michael E. Hawkins, #316547 v. State of SC
Case No.: 2016-CP-07-02544

Dear Ms. Kinard:

I have enclosed the original order in regards to the above referenced PCR matter. Her Honor has requested that you serve all parties a stamped copy for their notice.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter. Please do not hesitate to give me a call should you have any questions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Kaye Parker".

Karen "Kaye" M. Parker
Administrative Assistant to
Judge Diane S. Goodstein

Enclosure


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KAYE M. PARKER
CLERK OF COURT
BEAUFORT COUNTY, S.C.



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


FOREVER

USA



B 1648080 184552



FOREVER

USA

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211