

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM PICKENS COUNTY
General Sessions Court
Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2015-GS-39-01893
Case No. 2015-GS-39-01895

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SC Court of Appeals

Appellate Case No. 2017-002042

The State,

Respondent,

v.

Jaron Lamont Gibbs,

Appellant.

INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the trial court err in allowing a witness who was not qualified as an expert to testify as to how certain firearms function?
2. Did the trial court err in allowing an improper demonstration and improper closing argument that was not based on evidence presented during the trial?
3. Was the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors, in combination, so prejudicial as to deny appellant a fair trial?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant, Jaron Lamont Gibbs, was indicted in Pickens County on charges of murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. R. pp. _____. He was tried by a jury September 18-22, 2017, in Pickens County General Sessions Court, with Judge Letitia H. Verdin presiding. The jury found him guilty of both charges. Tr. pp. 696-97. Judge Verdin sentenced him to concurrent terms of 35 years and five years, with credit for 780 days of time served. R. pp. __; Tr. p. 704.

ARGUMENT

These two charges stem from events that occurred August 1, 2015, in daylight, at the intersection of two busy streets in an area of Pickens County between Central and Clemson, in proximity to multiple observers. A firearm went off in a vehicle stopped at the intersection, and Robbie Porter, who was in the front passenger seat, was struck with a single bullet, resulting in his death. The facts concerning what led to the discharge of the firearm were in serious dispute, and the credibility of the state's key witnesses and the integrity of the investigation and preservation of the evidence were in serious doubt.

Hunter Raby and Kalyn Meaders, who was Porter's wife, were the primary witnesses for the state. At trial, they claimed the shooting occurred as the result of a drug deal gone bad. Their testimony, however, was in sharp conflict with the statements they gave the police following the shooting. Following the shooting and before talking to the investigating officers, they manufactured a story to give to law enforcement, in which they claimed appellant had robbed them two weeks earlier and owed them money. Their story at trial, that the shooting was the result of a drug deal gone bad, did not emerge until almost two years later, just weeks before trial.

By all accounts, when the gun fired, appellant was outside the car at the driver's window, Raby was in the driver's seat, Porter was in the front passenger seat, and Meaders was in the back seat behind Porter.

The theory of the case woven by the state was that appellant had shorted Raby and Porter on the amount of marijuana in the purported drug deal, and they began calling appellant, then following the vehicle in which he was riding, in order to get their money back. When the two vehicles were stopped at an intersection, the state claimed, appellant got out with a gun, went to the driver's window, put the gun through the window, and intentionally fired it.

Appellant testified in his defense. By his account, no drug transaction had occurred. Nor had he robbed them weeks earlier. Tr. p. 541. A few weeks earlier, he had lost a bet to Porter and Raby over a basketball game but had not yet paid them. Tr. pp. 542-43. On August 1, he was in a car with Autumn Gilstrap, who was giving him a ride to Atlanta to see a friend who lived there. Tr. pp. 543-46. In his bag was an old gun he had purchased for his and the friend's protection, due to the friend's late-night work as

a stripper in what were not the best places. Tr. pp. 547, 562, 567. As they were leaving the area, appellant saw Raby, Porter, and Meaders in another vehicle, pointing at him. Tr. p. 548. Raby started phoning him, upset and asking for money. Tr. pp. 548-49. Appellant told him he didn't have the money but would give it to him as soon as he was back from Atlanta. Tr. p. 549. Raby became angry and started following closely behind them, driving aggressively and phoning repeatedly. Tr. pp. 549-50. Appellant decided he could give them the gun in payment and, when they stopped at the intersection, he got out and went to Raby's window to give him the gun, which he thought was unloaded. Tr. p. 551. Raby was yelling and appellant, also yelling, was telling Raby he didn't have the money but to take the gun instead. Tr. p. 552. Appellant, who is left-handed, was holding the gun in his right hand by the grip, and his hand was not on the trigger. Tr. pp. 551-53, 555. He pushed the gun inside the car, Raby pushed it back out, he pushed it in again, and it went off. Tr. p. 553. He did not know anyone was hit. Tr. p. 554. It was obvious Raby was not going to take the gun, so he went back to Gilstrap's car, he got in, and they left. Tr. p. 554. He told Gilstrap nobody was hurt, the gun just went off and hit the roof. Tr. pp. 554-55.

Meaders and Raby gave accounts that contradicted their initial statements to law enforcement, that were in certain respects contradictory of each other, and that were inconsistent with the other evidence gathered. Raby had prior convictions for breach of trust with fraudulent intent and shoplifting. Tr. p. 202. Raby initially claimed appellant had robbed them two weeks earlier and owed them money. Tr. pp. 198, 201-04. At trial, he admitted his statement was fabricated. Tr. pp. 203-04, 212-13, 220. He testified he and Meaders conferred immediately after the shooting and agreed not to tell of the drug

transaction that, at trial, they claimed had occurred. Tr. pp. 203-04. By his account, they intentionally lied to law enforcement and made no mention of drugs at all. Tr. pp. 203-05, 212-13, 220.

Both Meaders and Raby claimed they and Porter were headed to the lake that day and first wanted to get marijuana, and they arranged to meet appellant to purchase some. Tr. pp. 126-28, 181-83. However, this story does not square with the evidence. They already had marijuana – following the incident, officers seized quantities of marijuana from two places in the Raby vehicle and over 250 pills. Tr. pp. 159-61, 193, 217, 338-40, 346-50, 483-84. Raby was aware these substances were in the car. Tr. pp. 193, 217. He testified only part of the marijuana found in the car was what they claimed to have purchased from appellant. Tr. p. 193.

Raby's testimony was inconsistent with his prior statement in other respects. He admitted writing in his initial statement that "he thrust the gun toward me and I swatted it off and it went off, hitting my friend in the passenger side." Tr. p. 207, lines 13-15; p. 208, lines 18-22. He crossed that part of his statement out because "they said that that wouldn't count." Tr. p. 207, line 21 – p. 208, line 1. He acknowledged that his statement said, "I swatted it away twice and, the second time, it went off." Tr. p. 209, lines 18-21. His statement said only that appellant thrust the gun in his face and the gun went off, not that appellant pointed it or shot it or pulled the trigger. Tr. p. 211, lines 11-21. He did not testify that appellant pulled the trigger, instead stating he "assumed" he did. Tr. p. 211, lines 21-22.

Consistent with appellant's testimony that appellant did not know anyone had been shot, Raby also did not immediately know that Porter had been shot. Tr. p. 214, line 9 – p. 215, line 6.

Like Raby, Meaders contradicted at trial the statement she gave after the incident. She did not tell authorities it was a drug deal gone bad, stating only that appellant owed them money. Tr. pp. 145-46, 149. At trial, she stated she could not see what occurred and saw the gun only after it had fired. Tr. pp. 133, 149, 154. She affirmed that she did not see who pulled the trigger. Tr. p. 149. All she remembered was that appellant said something about money when he came to the car. Tr. p. 150. She testified that her prior statement was what Raby said and what she assumed happened. Tr. p. 149. She confirmed it stated the gun was "put through the window." Tr. p. 155. She did not deny having told an officer Raby swatted at the gun and it went off. Tr. pp. 155, 172-73. Both Meaders and Raby acknowledged that nothing prevented appellant from standing outside the vehicle and firing in, had he wanted to. Tr. pp. 155-157, 213.

Gilstrap, who was going to take appellant to Atlanta, testified that after she picked him up, another car arrived and tried to prevent them from leaving. Tr. p. 411. She got around it and they followed. Tr. pp. 411-12. They called appellant multiple times. Tr. p. 413. When they stopped at the intersection, appellant got out and walked to the other vehicle with a gun. Tr. p. 414. He was beside the driver's side window holding the gun toward the window. Tr. p. 415. Once his hand went into the car, she couldn't see what occurred but heard the gun go off. Tr. p. 416. In the statement she gave to police two hours after the incident, she said the vehicle following them was driving aggressively and tailing her car. Tr. p. 426. She described one of them calling about appellant having his

money. Tr. pp. 426-27. She said appellant got out, walked to the driver's side holding a gun and reached inside the car. Tr. pp. 427, 429. She testified she never heard appellant threaten anybody or act like he was going to harm anybody. Tr. p. 430. After he returned to the car, she asked him what happened. He told her the gun went off, hit the roof, and everything was okay. Tr. pp. 417-18, 428. Questioned about having previously made a conflicting statement that appellant said he shot into the roof, she testified the correct version of what appellant said, repeatedly, was that the gun went off, hit the roof, and everything was okay. Tr. pp. 432-33.

Various witnesses were in vehicles at the intersection when the incident occurred or shortly thereafter. By all accounts, the car driven by Gilstrap was at the stop on Cambridge Drive at its intersection with Issaqueena Trail, with the SUV driven by Raby stopped behind it. Opposite them and coming to the intersection with Issaqueena from Old Shirley Road was Frederica Gibson. On Issaqueena southbound was the vehicle of Alexander and Lena Saidat. On Issaqueena northbound was Amelia Hood. These witnesses all observed the Gilstrap and Raby vehicles in their position at the intersection and appellant at the driver's side window of the Raby vehicle and heard the gunshot.

Some of these witnesses described appellant and the driver arguing, having a heated discussion, or yelling, and they thought there had been a collision of some sort. Tr. pp. 232-33, 257-58, 263, 275-76. Some saw appellant with a gun, but no one testified he pointed it at anyone. Tr. pp. 258, 268, 275. What they described was consistent with appellant's account. Alexander Saidat testified he thrust his arm inside the vehicle with the gun. Tr. p. 259. He never saw the gun pointed at anybody but just saw it jammed inside. Tr. p. 268. Lena Saidat said he stuck it in the window. Tr. p. 276. She saw the

hand of the driver come out, saw the driver hit the gun, and the gun went off. Tr. pp. 276-77.

The only reference to pointing the gun was in the questioning of Frederica Gibson about a prior statement. Gibson testified she never saw a gun and did not see anyone point a gun. Tr. pp. 246, 252. She acknowledged her prior statement said she saw someone point a gun, but her trial testimony was that she did not. Tr. p. 246. All she remembered was a hand going up and down. Tr. p. 246. She questioned the statement's accuracy and testified she gave her statement when she had been talking to and hugging Kalyn Meaders, with Hunter Raby right there with them. Tr. pp. 246, 251. An officer's report of his questioning of Gibson confirmed she said she never saw a gun but heard a pow. Tr. pp. 250-51. Notwithstanding the other written statement, she was adamant that she never saw a gun, in keeping with what she told the officer that day. Tr. p. 252.

Gilstrap testified the barrel of the gun was toward the window, but she did not say it was pointed at anyone. Tr. p. 415. Her testimony was consistent with appellant's own account that when he tried to give Raby the gun, the barrel was in front of Raby's face. Tr. p. 558. No one testified he pointed at Raby or anyone else.

The lead investigator was Michael Arflin, who did not arrive until about 20 minutes after the shooting. Tr. p. 451. Crime scene tape was already up when he arrived. Tr. pp. 451-52. Porter had already been transported from the scene. Tr. p. 453. A video recording from one officer's body camera, some 15 minutes of which was filmed prior to Arflin's arrival, showed the witnesses were not separated but were milling around, talking to each other, and, as Gibson and Meaders both acknowledged, interacting with Raby and Meaders and even hugging them. Tr. pp. 166, 251, 441, 445, 483, 489, 498.

The video and still photos lifted from it showed that various people – Raby, Meaders, and witnesses – were within the crime scene tape, together, walking around the scene, for at least 15 minutes, with no law enforcement officers separating them. Tr. pp. 483, 498-99. The witnesses discussed what happened among themselves. Tr. p. 264. Two of the witnesses drove Meaders to the hospital where Porter had been taken. Tr. pp. 264-65, 279.

Arflin acknowledged that, in securing a crime scene, the witnesses should be separated. Tr. p. 482. He acknowledged that, once a crime scene has been contaminated, it cannot be uncontaminated. Tr. p. 499.

Raby and Meaders were depicted inside the crime scene tape that should have secured the scene and protected it from tampering. Tr. pp. 496-97. Raby went back to the vehicle and removed items. Tr. pp. 216-17. They were not separated from each other but were allowed to sit together along the edge of the woods, which is where and when they conferred and concocted the fabrication of a prior robbery and agreed not to reveal the purported drug transaction. Tr. p. 204.

Arflin had never before or since served as a lead detective in a homicide investigation. Tr. p. 480. The officers under his direction took only 40-something photographs, which included both the scene and Gilstrap's car. Tr. pp. 341, 481. Not all aspects of the scene were photographed. Tr. p. 351. Arflin acknowledged that ordinarily hundreds and hundreds of photographs are taken, documenting every single aspect of the scene. Tr. pp. 480-81. The drugs found in the Raby vehicle were seized but were never tested. Tr. pp. 338-40, 346-50, 466. Another substance, in the crack of a seat in Raby's vehicle, was not even taken into evidence. Tr. p. 342.

There had been multiple cell phones and one tablet device in the Raby vehicle, but the investigators did not seize all of them to forensically analyze them or to determine the calls and text messages that had been sent and received and their content; rather, they seized only two phones, but they did not attempt any extraction of information or forensic examination of those two phone. Tr. pp. 217, 334, 461, 464-66. Although Raby told Arflin there had been numerous calls between him and appellant, they did not seize Raby's phone. Tr. pp. 461-62, 478.

The investigators did not seize clothing from either Raby or Meaders for forensic analysis. Tr. pp. 168-69, 216, 219, 325. They did not obtain blood or urine samples from Raby or Meaders to test for drugs or alcohol. Tr. pp. 163-64, 215-16, 328, 485. Blood and urine testing from the hospital and autopsy revealed Porter had marijuana, benzodiazapines, and cocaine in his system. Tr. pp. 290, 507, 511-15.

After Raby was out of the vehicle and Porter had been transported from the scene, multiple witnesses observed Raby screaming and yelling, very agitated, and physically punching the vehicle. Tr. pp. 252, 269-70, 271, 440. Raby admitted he was furious with himself and slammed his fists into the vehicle. Tr. p. 216. This conduct occurred after the body-cam officer was present and was captured on the video. Tr. pp. 271, 440.

Raby was also depicted running his hands through his hair, and he testified he does that when he gets really panicky. Tr. p. 216. At some point, he was checked by EMS and his head was found to have been grazed, a wound that he had not been aware of and that was not serious. Tr. pp. 192, 294-95, 443.

Sometime after all this activity, someone put hospital-type gloves on Raby's hands. Tr. pp. 218, 306-07. Even later, those gloves were removed, and his hands and

face were swabbed for gunshot residue (“GSR”). Tr. pp. 304-07. Some GSR was found on his hands. Tr. pp. 368-70. Although the state attempted to elicit testimony from the GSR expert that the small amount of GSR on Raby’s hands was more likely from touching an object with GSR than from firing the weapon, the expert did not express that opinion. Tr. pp. 371-75, 379. The expert did confirm that even a small quantity of GSR could be consistent with having fired the weapon. Tr. pp. 371-72. No GSR was found on Raby’s face. Tr. p. 385.

The GSR expert testified concerning the best way to preserve GSR on a person’s hands. Tr. p. 370. He confirmed that plastic bags are not the preferred method because they can cause the hands to sweat and GSR to be removed. Tr. pp. 370-71. He confirmed the gloves placed on Raby’s hands could have removed some of the GSR. Tr. p. 371. His having gloves on in the August heat and his activities, including punching the car and running his hands through his hair, all could have contributed to the removal of the GSR that was initially there. Tr. pp. 378-79.

Arflin, the lead investigator, had testified in the preliminary hearing. Tr. p. 490. He confirmed at trial that he had testified they did not know whose hand hit the trigger. Tr. p. 491. He also verified there was only one shot. Tr. p. 492. He acknowledged in his testimony, consistent with appellant’s testimony, that guns are very commonly traded on the street and used as cash. Tr. pp. 479-80.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A WITNESS WHO WAS NOT QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT TO TESTIFY AS TO HOW CERTAIN FIREARMS FUNCTION.

No weapon was recovered from the scene. Tr. pp. 313, 457-58. Some witnesses referred to the weapon they saw generically as a revolver, but there was no testimony as

to what specific type of revolver the gun involved in this shooting was. Appellant testified the gun was old and described it as a piece of junk. Tr. p. 567.

Arflin, the lead investigator, was not offered and was not qualified as an expert in any field. He also did not testify that he had any training specifically with revolvers. Tr. p. 458. During his testimony, the state asked him to explain the functioning of single action and double action revolvers. Tr. p. 475. The defense objected, on the basis that the witness had not been qualified as an expert in firearms. Tr. p. 475. The state argued it had established the witness was familiar with revolvers through his training and experience as an officer. Tr. p. 475. The court allowed the testimony. Tr. p. 475. Defense counsel further argued the objection, stating her understanding that officers are not trained on revolvers, but the court adhered to its ruling that the testimony would be allowed. Tr. p. 476. Arflin then testified about the cocking and discharging of single and double action revolvers. As to single action, he said, "The hammer has to be cocked and then fire -- you pull the trigger and it discharges." Tr. p. 476, lines 15-16. He further testified, "That's kind of the rule behind single action. It has to be cocked." Tr. p. 476, lines 18-19. He stated that, with double action, "When you pull the trigger, the hammer both cocks and discharges," and "it's going to be a long, heavy trigger pull." Tr. p. 476, line 21 – p. 477, line 1. The court's admission of this testimony was both erroneous and prejudicial.

Matters of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact are a proper subject of expert testimony. *See* Rule 702, SCRE. To be admissible under Rule 702, such testimony must be given by a witness who has been "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." *Id.* In

determining whether to admit expert testimony, the court must make three inquiries: (1) whether the subject matter is beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury, thus requiring an expert to explain it to the jury; (2) whether the witness has the requisite knowledge and skill to qualify as an expert in the particular subject matter; and (3) whether the substance of the testimony is reliable. *See Graves v. CAS Medical Systems, Inc.*, 401 S.C. 63, 74, 735 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2012). These required inquiries were not conducted by the trial court before allowing Arflin's testimony.

The first of these inquiries is clearly met here. The manner and mechanics of the operation and functionality of a particular kind of firearm is a subject matter beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury, a matter of technical and specialized knowledge, and properly a matter for expert testimony under Rule 702. As to the remaining inquiries, the South Carolina Supreme Court has clarified and explained the role of the trial judge in admitting testimony from an expert where the alleged basis of his expert qualification is experience and training. *See State v. White*, 382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009). Addressing the distinction drawn in earlier decisions between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge under the language of Rule 702, the Court outlined exactly what is required:

We hold that the trial courts of this state have a gatekeeping role with respect to all evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 702, whether the evidence is scientific or nonscientific. ***In the discharge of its gatekeeping role, a trial court must assess the threshold foundational requirements of qualifications and reliability and further find that the proposed evidence will assist the trier of fact.*** The familiar evidentiary mantra that a challenge to evidence goes to "weight, not admissibility" may be invoked only after the trial court has vetted the matters of qualifications and reliability and admitted the evidence.

White, 382 S.C. at 274, 676 S.E.2d at 689 (emphasis added). In later decisions, the appellate courts have further explained, “[t]he expertise, reliability, and the ability of the testimony to assist the trier of fact are all threshold determinations to be made prior to the admission of expert testimony.” See *State v. Tapp*, 398 S.C. 376, 388, 728 S.E.2d 468, 474-75 (2012); *State v. Rose*, 423 S.C. 382, 392, 814 S.E.2d 529, 534 (Ct.App. 2018). In this case, the mandated vetting of Arflin’s qualifications, the reliability of the proposed testimony, and its ability to assist the trier of fact did not occur.

The qualification of a witness as an expert and the admissibility of the expert’s testimony are within the trial court’s discretion. *State v. Chavis*, 412 S.C. 101, 106, 771 S.E.2d 336, 338 (2015); *State v. Schumpert*, 312 S.C. 502, 505, 435 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1993); *Rose*, 423 S.C. at 392, 814 S.E.2d at 534. An abuse of discretion ordinarily occurs when the ruling of the court is controlled by an error of law or based on a factual conclusion that is without evidentiary support. See *Chavis*, 412 S.C. at 106, 771 S.E.2d at 338; *Rose*, 423 S.C. at 392, 814 S.E.2d at 534. However, the failure of the trial court to exercise discretion is in itself an abuse of discretion. See *Patton v. Miller*, 420 S.C. 471, 490, 804 S.E.2d 252, 262 (2017); *State v. Hawes*, 411 S.C. 188, 191, 767 S.E.2d 707, 708 (2015); *Teseniar v. Professional Plastering & Stucco, Inc.*, 407 S.C. 83, 94, 754 S.E.2d 267, 273 (Ct.App. 2014); *CEL Products, LLC v. Rozelle*, 357 S.C. 125, 591 S.E.2d 643 (Ct.App. 2004); *Samples v. Mitchell*, 329 S.C. 105, 112, 495 S.E.2d 213, 216 (Ct.App. 1997). Here, the discretion to evaluate the qualifications of Arflin as an expert in firearms and, in particular, in revolvers, was vested in the trial court. By failing to exercise that discretion and conduct the requisite vetting of his qualifications and the reliability of his testimony, the court committed an abuse of its discretion.

Had that vetting been done, the court would have found that the testimony as to the basis of Arflin's purported expertise was woefully inadequate to support a finding that he was qualified to testify about the workings of revolvers. The only testimony about his training and experience with respect to firearms was brief and conclusory:

Q Are you familiar with firearms?

A Yes.

Q Are you familiar with it, both personally and professionally?

A Yes.

Q Do you get training on firearms?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Are you familiar with revolvers?

A Yes, ma'am.

Tr. p. 458, lines 8-16. No testimony was offered as to the nature and extent of the firearms training he had received, and no testimony was offered to establish that he had received any training whatsoever specifically with revolvers. The only mention of revolvers was that he was "familiar" with them. There was no testimony to establish that he had an understanding of how they operated, where he gained that understanding, or the extent of his experience with such firearms. There was no testimony to establish that he had special knowledge of the different manners of operation of different varieties of revolvers. This passage of testimony about his "familiarity" with firearms was an inadequate evidentiary basis for a determination that he was qualified to render expert testimony about how revolvers function or that his testimony would be reliable and would assist the trier of fact.

Our courts recognize that there are no specific qualifications mandated by the evidence rules and a person may become skilled or knowledgeable in a field in a variety of ways. *See Teseniar*, 407 S.C. at 90, 754 S.E.2d at 270-71. What must be established is that the witness has acquired by study or practical experience such knowledge of the subject matter as will enable him to give guidance and assistance to the jury. *Rose*, 423 S.C. at 393, 814 S.E.2d at 534. In determining a witness's qualification as an expert, the court should make an inquiry broad in scope. *Teseniar*, 407 S.C. at 91, 754 S.E.2d at 271. Such inquiry was not performed in this case.

The state did not formally offer the witness as an expert, and the trial judge did not make a finding that he was an expert, simply stating, "I'm going to allow him to testify to this." Tr. p. 475. Had he been proffered as an expert, much more would have been required in establishing his qualifications than the conclusory passage of his testimony quoted above. The party offering a witness as an expert has the burden of showing the witness possesses the necessary knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education for him to be deemed qualified to testify as an expert. *See White*, 382 S.C. at 273, 676 S.E.2d at 688; *see also Schumpert*, 312 S.C. at 505, 435 S.E.2d at 861. That burden was certainly not met here. There was no vetting of the witness's qualifications through voir dire. The defense was not afforded an opportunity to question his experience, training, and basis of knowledge prior to his testifying about how revolvers operate, in an expert capacity. Indeed, in arguing her objection, appellant's trial counsel expressed her understanding that officers are not trained on revolvers. Tr. p. 476. The witness himself did not testify he had any training with revolvers. Tr. p. 458. Had he been offered as an expert and properly vetted through voir dire, his training or lack of

training and the nature and extent of his experience with revolvers could have been explored. The court's failure to conduct such vetting was an abandonment of its gatekeeping role and clear error. *See White*, 382 S.C. at 274, 676 S.E.2d at 689.

The court's error in allowing this testimony was extremely prejudicial. As detailed above, *supra* at 1-10, the evidence presented by the state and defense was in sharp conflict, and witnesses gave testimony that supported appellant's account. The state's witnesses were impeached through prior convictions and inconsistent testimony. The witnesses had the opportunity to confer with each other and influence each other's testimony. The state's two key witnesses conferred and concocted a lie to tell the authorities. The investigation was incomplete, due to failures of the officers to confiscate and analyze key pieces of evidence. The crime scene and the GSR testing were compromised in numerous ways. The evidence was such that the jury could have accepted appellant's account and found the shooting occurred either through recklessness or accident. Arflin's description of the functionality of the two types of revolvers suggested to the jury that a person would have to affirmatively act to make either type of weapon discharge. This testimony suggested to the jury that it should reject appellant's account that the gun went off during the pushing and swatting of the gun by Raby, and it likely contributed to the jury's finding him guilty as to the murder charge rather than returning a verdict of involuntary manslaughter or an acquittal on the basis of accident. The prejudice from the court's erroneous admission of this evidence is clear, and this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AN IMPROPER DEMONSTRATION AND IMPROPER CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT WAS NOT BASED ON EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL.

In its closing argument, the prosecution conducted a brief demonstration based on Arflin's testimony about revolvers and argued to the jury: "this is what would have had to have happened for this gun to go off because guns do not accidentally go off." Tr. p. 625, line 22 – p. 626, line 1. Appellant's trial attorney objected to this argument and demonstration, on the basis that a demonstration must be based on evidence and testimony and there was no evidence that a gun cannot go off accidentally, especially an old one that had been traded on the street. Tr. p. 626, lines 7-15. The court overruled the objection and allowed the argument. Tr. p. 626, lines 16-18. This ruling was error.

It is a fundamental and long-held principle of our jurisprudence that a solicitor may not in closing argument argue facts that are not in evidence. It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney to treat the defendant in an impartial manner and at all times to confine himself to the evidence adduced in the trial. *State v. Cannon*, 229 S.C. 614, 618, 93 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1956). The state's closing argument must be confined to the evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. *Vasquez v. State*, 388 S.C. 447, 458, 698 S.E.2d 561, 566 (2010); *Vaughn v. State*, 362 S.C. 163, 169, 607 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2004); *State v. Huggins*, 325 S.C. 103, 107, 481 S.E.2d 114, 116 (1997); *State v. Copeland*, 321 S.C. 318, 326, 468 S.E.2d 620, 625 (1996); *cf. Clark v. Cantrell*, 339 S.C. 369, 384, 529 S.E.2d 528, 536 (2000) (demonstrative evidence must be "a fair and accurate representation of the evidence to which it relates"). In this case, the state's argument that guns do not accidentally go off and its related demonstration were not supported by the evidence.

If the testimony of Arflin was erroneously admitted, as argued above, there was no testimony whatsoever about the operation of revolvers on which the state's argument and demonstration could have been properly based. However, if, contrary to appellant's argument, this Court determines Arflin's testimony was properly admitted, that testimony does not provide the necessary evidentiary support for the state's argument that guns do not go off accidentally. While Arflin testified to the mechanics of cocking and pulling the trigger to fire different types of revolvers, he was not asked and did not express the opinion that a revolver cannot fire accidentally. Nor was he asked about malfunction that could occur due to the age or condition of a revolver, such as the one appellant had that was old and a "piece of junk." Nor did he testify that the gun could not have discharged as the result of someone's pushing or swatting it. In fact, his testimony about how a revolver fires was not absolute but was qualified as "kind of the rule," and no testimony was elicited as to conditions that might create exceptions to that so-called rule and allow for a revolver to discharge accidentally. The record is completely devoid of evidence related to the possibility of malfunction or an accidental discharge, and the solicitor's argument was absolutely improper.

This argument was also highly prejudicial. The entire case turned on whether the jury believed appellant intentionally fired the weapon or it simply went off in the back-and-forth with Raby. The solicitor's improper argument went to the heart of what the jury was to determine and likely influenced its deliberations and verdict. This case is unlike *Copeland*, where objections to the solicitor's arguments were either properly overruled or, where objectionable, were corrected by a curative charge. *Cf. Copeland*, 321 S.C. at 324-26, 468 S.E.2d at 624-25. Rather, the argument in this case is comparable

to the improper argument in both *Huggins* and *Cannon*, which in each case pertained to the very theory of the state's prosecution and therefore could not be deemed harmless. *See Huggins*, 325 S.C. at 107-08, 481 S.E.2d at 116-17 (reference to statement, not in evidence, that defendant had a plan and offered money to someone to kill the victim was highly prejudicial and fundamentally unfair in her trial for his murder and for conspiring to commit his murder); *Cannon*, 229 S.C. at 617-19, 93 S.E.2d at 890-91 (argument that insurance existed and the defendant had murdered the deceased for the purpose of collecting \$4,000, where there was no evidence from which that conclusion could be drawn, was prejudicial because the case was tried on the theory that insurance was the motive). Similarly, in this case, where the case turned on the jury's determination of whether appellant fired intentionally or the gun simply went off, the state's argument that guns do not go off accidentally, unsupported by the evidence adduced at trial, cannot be deemed harmless. The prejudice is especially clear in this case where the evidence was in conflict, the credibility of the state's witnesses was seriously called into question, and the integrity of the investigation was compromised in so many respects, all as detailed above, *supra* at 1-10. This Court should find the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the state's closing argument that was outside the evidence in the record.

III. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS WAS SO PREJUDICIAL THAT APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL.

If this Court finds error in the admission of Arflin's testimony and in allowing the state's closing argument based on facts not in evidence but further finds neither error sufficiently prejudicial, standing alone, to warrant reversal, it should review the cumulative effect of these two errors and find they were so prejudicial as to deny appellant the fairness required by due process. *See* U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; S.C.


Const. art. I, § 3; *State v. Blurton*, 342 S.C. 500, 512-13, 537 S.E.2d 291, 297-98 (Ct.App. 2000) (finding cumulative effect of improper comments in closing argument and erroneous exclusion of evidence warranted reversal), *rev'd on other grounds*, 352 S.C. 203, 573 S.E.2d 802 (2002) (finding additional error with respect to a jury charge); *State v. Freeman*, 319 S.C. 110, 123-24, 459 S.E.2d 867, 875 (Ct.App. 1995) (reversing conviction based on combined effect of court's limitation of cross-examination and court's improper comments interjected during the trial).

The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal when multiple errors, which may be found harmless in isolation, in combination prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial and affect the outcome of his trial. In this case, the first error resulted in admission of expert testimony without the proper qualification of the witness and the other inquiries required under Rule 702 and case precedents, and that improperly admitted evidence served as the basis for the state's improper demonstration and argument outside the record. The cumulative effect of these two errors was to give the jury an improper basis on which to reject appellant's defense. These errors viewed together so tainted these proceedings that they denied appellant a fair trial. This Court should reverse and grant appellant a new trial.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set out above, this Court should reverse appellant's convictions and remand for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,



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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM PICKENS COUNTY
General Sessions Court
Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2015-GS-39-01893
Case No. 2015-GS-39-01895

Appellate Case No. 2017-002042

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SEP 26 2018

SC Court of Appeals

The State,

Respondent,


v.

Jaron Lamont Gibbs,

Appellant.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served the appellant's initial brief and designation of matter to be included in the record on appeal, by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to counsel for respondent, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General J. Benjamin Aplin and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody J. Brown, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1549, on September 26, 2018.



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September 26, 2018

VIA HAND-DELIVERY

The Honorable Jenny A. Kitchings
Clerk of Court, South Carolina Court of Appeals
Post Office Box 11629
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

RE: The State v. Jaron Lamont Gibbs
Appellate Case No.: 2017-002042

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
Dear Ms. Kitchings:

Enclosed for filing is the Initial Brief of Appellant and Designation of Matter to be Included in the Record on Appeal, along with the Proof of Service, in the above referenced matter.

By copy of this letter, I am serving Melody J. Brown, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General and J. Benjamin Aplin, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General, with a copy of same.

If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,



Jack B. Swerling

JBS/ksr
Enclosures

cc: Melody J. Brown, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General
J. Benjamin Aplin, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Katherine Carruth Goode, Esquire
Jaron Lamont Gibbs #00366858