

THE BOOZER LAW FIRM, LLC

Lance S. Boozer, Esq.*
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September 28, 2018

RECEIVED

OCT 02 2018

S.C. SUPREME COURT

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina
P.O. Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211

The Honorable Scott B. Suggs
Clerk of Court
1 Public Square
Darlington, SC 29532

RE: Jamie Ray Lewis, #299085, v. State of South Carolina
2016-CP-16-0065


Dear Mr. Shearouse and Mr. Suggs:

Enclosed for filing is a Notice of Appeal in the above-referenced case. Also enclosed are the following:

- (1) Proof of Service of the Notice of Appeal;
- (2) A copy of the Order which is to be challenged on appeal; and
- (3) Prior Order of Appointment of Counsel.

As I was appointed to represent Mr. Lewis in his PCR proceeding, I anticipate that the Office of Appellate Defense will represent Mr. Lewis in this appeal.

Yours very truly,



Lance S. Boozer

Enclosures

cc: Johnny E. James, Jr., AAG
Loriene French, OAD
Jamie Ray Lewis, #299085

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

RECEIVED

OCT 02 2018

APPEAL FROM DARLINGTON COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

S.C. SUPREME COURT

The Honorable Larry B. Hyman, Jr. Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2016-CP-16-0065

Jamie Ray Lewis, #299085,Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina,.....Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The Petitioner appeals the Honorable Larry B. Hyman, Jr.'s Order dated August 28, 2018, denying post-conviction relief to the Petitioner. The Order was received by undersigned counsel on September 27, 2018. A copy of the Order on appeal is attached to this notice.

Respectfully submitted,



Lance S. Boozer
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September 28, 2018

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OCT 02 2018

S.C. SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM DARLINGTON COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

The Honorable Larry B. Hyman, Jr. Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2016-CP-16-0065


Jamie Ray Lewis, #299085,Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina,.....Respondent.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Lance S. Boozer, appointed attorney for Petitioner, certify that I have today served within Notice of Appeal upon the Respondent by depositing a copy of it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Assistant Attorney General Johnny E. James, Jr., P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, SC 29211. I further certify that all parties required by Rule to be served have been served this 28th day of September, 2018.


Lance S. Boozer
The Boozer Law Firm, LLC
1419 Pendleton Street
Columbia, SC 29201
Tele: 803-608-5543

[Handwritten mark]

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF DARLINGTON) FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
))
Jamie Ray Lewis,) Case No.: 2016-CP-16-00065
S.C.D.C. No. 299085,))
))
Applicant,))
)) **ORDER OF DISMISSAL**
v.))
))
State of South Carolina,))
))
Respondent.))
_____))

This matter comes before the Court by way of an application for post-conviction relief filed by Jamie Ray Lewis ("Applicant") on January 29, 2016. Respondent made its return on or about June 14, 2017. The Court convened an evidentiary hearing into the matter on Monday, July 23, 2018, at the Darlington County Courthouse in Darlington, South Carolina. Applicant was present at the hearing and represented by Lance S. Boozer, Esq. Johnny Ellis James Jr., of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office, represented Respondent.

Applicant testified on his own behalf at the evidentiary hearing. Applicant's plea counsel, J. Richard Jones, Esq. ("Counsel") also testified. The Court had before it Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections, a copy of the original plea transcript, the records of the Darlington County Clerk of Court regarding the subject convictions, and the pleadings. The Court finds as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Applicant is confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Darlington County Clerk of Court. Applicant was indicted at the August 2013 term of the Darlington County Grand Jury for murder (2016-CP-16-00065). J. Richard

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J. RICHARD JONES
CLERK OF COURT / R/O D.
DARLINGTON COUNTY, S.C.

Jones, Esq. represented Applicant, and Kendall Burch, Esq., of the Fourth Circuit Solicitor's Office, prosecuted the case. On May 18, 2015, Applicant pled guilty to the lesser-included charge of voluntary manslaughter. The Honorable Roger E. Henderson sentenced Applicant to imprisonment for a term of 24 years. Applicant did not appeal his plea or sentence.

Present Application

In his post-conviction relief application, Applicant alleges he is being held unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, in that:
 - a. "Trial Counsel failed to provide the Applicant effective assistance of counsel in that he failed not having the Applicant mentally evaluated prior to Applicant plea proceeding. Which violated Applicant statutes [S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-17-530, 44-23-410, 44-23-420, and 44-23-430.] Which Applicant was under Mental Health while in Darlington County Jail."
 - b. "Applicant received ineffective assist from counsel during his proceeding that Applicant did not have a preliminary which violates [S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-23-130, 17-23-160, and 17-23-162 as well as Rule 2, S.C.Crim.P.]"
 - c. "Applicant received ineffective assist from counsel during and prior of his trial proceeding. Which counsel did not disclose motion of Discovery which violated [Rule 5, S.C.Crim.P.]"
2. Involuntary Guilty Plea, in that:
 - a. "Counsel failed to provide client effective assistance of counsel prior and during his guilty plea proceeding. The Applicant's plea of guilt were coerced by Counsel's failure to provide adequate representation."

II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has reviewed the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, observed the witnesses presented at the hearing, passed upon their credibility, and weighed the testimony accordingly. Further, this Court has reviewed the records submitted to it by the parties and the legal arguments made by the attorneys. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80, this Court makes the following findings based upon all of the probative evidence presented.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In a post-conviction relief action, an applicant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her application. Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP; Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). When an applicant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, he or she must prove “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Butler at 442, 334 S.E.2d 441 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). The proper measure of performance is whether an attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Id.

“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Butler at 442, 334 S.E.2d 441 (quoting Strickland at 690). The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 118, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, as it is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or an adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 456-57, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011). “[W]hen counsel articulates a valid reason for employing a certain strategy, such conduct will not be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel.” Smith v. State, 386 S.C. 562, 567, 689 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2010) (citing Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103, 110, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000)).

Courts use a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the applicant must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient. Under this

prong, attorney performance is measured by its “reasonableness under professional norms.” Cherry at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Strickland at 688). Second, counsel’s deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cherry at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Strickland at 694). With respect to guilty plea counsel, Applicant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

The standards do not establish mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. Strickland at 696. A court need not first determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies; if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696-97.

1. Failure to Subject Applicant to Mental Evaluation

Applicant alleges Counsel was ineffective in failing to have him mentally evaluated prior to the plea proceeding. A defense counsel may reasonably rely upon his or her own perceptions and judgment in determining whether his or her client is competent prior to and in the course of proceedings. Jeter v. State, 308 S.C. 230, 233, 417 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1992); see also Garren v. State, 423 S.C. 1, 13, 813 S.E.2d 704, 710 (2018) (finding no deficiency where plea counsel testified that, based on his interactions with his client, an evaluation was unnecessary, and that he believed his client to be competent at the time of the plea). “When establishing Strickland prejudice in the context of plea counsel’s failure to request a mental competency evaluation, the

applicant need only show a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time of the plea.” Garren, 423 S.C. at 12, 813 S.E.2d at 710. As is the case with any allegation of failure to investigate, an applicant must present evidence to show what plea counsel would have discovered and how it would have resulted in a different outcome; mere speculation as to an applicant’s competency is not sufficient to support a grant of relief. Id., 423 S.C. at 13-14, 813 S.E.2d at 711; Glover v. State, 318 S.C. 496, 498-99, 458 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995).

Applicant pled to killing Edward Brewington by stabbing him some 16 times in an effort to rob him of pills. (Tr. 7-8; see also Indictment 2013-GS-16-01642). At the plea proceeding, the Court inquired whether Applicant was under the influence of any alcohol or drugs, which Applicant denied. (Tr. 4, ll. 18-20). Applicant further denied that there was anything interfering with his ability to think, reason, and understand. (Tr. 4, ll. 21-24).

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified he was placed on medication while in jail during the pendency of his charges. Applicant claimed to suffer from severe depression and that he was still struggling with it. Applicant listed various medications prescribed for the treatment of his condition. Applicant indicated he told Counsel of his problems, but didn’t ask for any investigation of the subject. Applicant affirmed he understood what he was doing at the time of his guilty plea.

Counsel testified Applicant was depressed and was concerned about what would happen to his children as a result of incarceration. Counsel confirmed he did not seek any mental evaluation of Applicant because he had no reason to do so. Counsel testified there was no question in his mind that Applicant understood everything occurring in the course of his representation. Counsel noted Applicant was unable to remember the killing itself due to being

heavily medicated at the time. Counsel additionally noted Applicant didn't want a trial, but rather asked for the best deal that he could get.

No mental health records, evaluation reports, or expert testimony were admitted at the evidentiary hearing. The SCDC records before the Court, dated Wednesday, March 23, 2016, indicate treatment for drug addiction during prior terms of incarceration, but no such special admittance since beginning his present term of incarceration in SCDC on May 22, 2015. Similarly, the SCDC records indicate Applicant was disciplined for "mutilation" in 2004, but no such incidents during his present term of incarceration. Applicant appears to have worked as a recreation aide and a food service aide during his present term of incarceration. Applicant's mental classification in SCDC indicates no current mental health treatment.

The Court finds no deficiency on the part of Counsel, nor prejudice therefrom. There is no evidence to demonstrate a reasonable probability that Applicant would have been found incompetent to enter a guilty plea had a competency evaluation been conducted. To the contrary, Applicant himself testified, both at the plea and at the evidentiary hearing, that he understood the proceedings and what he was doing. Further, Counsel properly relied upon his own perceptions and judgment of Applicant's competency in the course of his representation of Applicant and found no reason to question his competency. Further, as no competency evaluation was submitted to the Court, it could only speculate as to what, if anything, any such report would reveal. For all of these reasons, Applicant has failed to meet his burden as to either prong of Strickland and his request for relief by way of this allegation is **DENIED**.

2. Failure to Seek Preliminary Hearing

Applicant alleged Counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a preliminary hearing. "In South Carolina, the Preliminary Hearing serves the purpose of determining whether the State can

show probable cause[.]” State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 242, 133 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1963). No preliminary hearing shall be held “if the defendant is indicted by a grand jury or waives indictment before the preliminary hearing is held.” Rule 2, S.C.Crim.P.

No meaningful testimony was provided at the evidentiary hearing as to this allegation. Applicant was properly indicted by the Darlington County Grand Jury upon a finding of probable cause. Counsel testified Applicant only wished for the best deal possible and did not wish to go to trial. This Court can discern from the record no evidence of either deficiency on the part of Counsel, nor any resulting prejudice to Applicant. Accordingly, Applicant has failed to meet his burden under Strickland, and the request for relief by way of this allegation is **DENIED**.

3. Failure to Disclose Discovery

Applicant alleges Counsel was ineffective in failing to disclose and discuss with him the contents of his discovery. During the plea proceeding, the Court informed Applicant that by pleading guilty he would be relinquishing certain rights, including his right to discovery, which Applicant affirmed he understood. (Tr. 6, ll. 6-14). Applicant also affirmed he’d had enough time to talk to Counsel, that Counsel had answered all of his questions to his satisfaction, that he was fully satisfied with Counsel, and that Counsel had done everything he expected of him. (Tr. 4; pp. 6-7).

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant recalled meeting with Counsel five or six times, then an additional four times as trial approached. Applicant testified he received discovery in two parts and reviewed the materials with Counsel. Applicant claimed Lee Correctional Institute confiscated and lost his paperwork. Applicant claimed Counsel had no strategy, and never actually sat down and planned a trial strategy with him, but rather told Applicant he had no chance upon receiving and reviewing DNA evidence.

Counsel confirmed Applicant's recollection of how many times they met. Counsel testified he filed and received complete discovery and reviewed the materials he received with Applicant. Counsel characterized the matter as a sad case and noted several damaging pieces of evidence: video recording from a convenience store camera pointed in the direction of the victim's house; Applicant's bloody clothing and eyewitness testimony that Applicant was wearing bloody clothing shortly after the killing; and the testimony of the victim's blind mother, to whom Applicant spoke after the killing, and who was familiar with Applicant by way of a previously good family relationship. The State's theory of the case was that Applicant attacked the victim in order to steal his medication. Counsel recalled Applicant's explanation was that the victim was holding Applicant's medication by agreement in order to prevent Applicant from abusing necessary prescriptions. Counsel noted Applicant only ever wanted the best plea deal possible and expressed no interest in trial. Specifically, Applicant wanted a deal for less than 20 years. However, Counsel recalled, the prosecutor was familiar with Applicant due to prior charges that Applicant stole a safe from the victim, and was unwilling to go so low. The best deal ever provided was for 24 years, which came only after the victim's mother, a key witness, unexpectedly died.

This Court finds no deficiency on the part of counsel, nor prejudice therefrom. There is no evidence before this Court to show Counsel either failed to obtain discovery or discuss it with Applicant. Both Applicant and Counsel indicated discovery was received and reviewed. There is no indication of what, if anything, could have been further discussed between Applicant and Counsel and how any such discussion could have resulted in a different outcome. Counsel demonstrated a thoroughly competent grasp of the underlying facts of the case and the evidence against Applicant as derived from the discovery materials. The Court accepts as credible

Counsel's testimony that Applicant never wished to go to trial, but only directed him to negotiate the most favorable possible plea deal. For all these reasons, Applicant has failed to meet his burden under either prong of Strickland, and his request for relief by way of this allegation is accordingly **DENIED**.

B. Involuntary Guilty Plea – Threat of Life Sentence

Applicant claims his plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily because he was coerced by Counsel's advice that Applicant would receive a life sentence at trial and that his father, who was also charged in the crime, would receive the maximum under the law. To find a guilty plea is voluntarily and knowingly entered into, the record must establish Applicant had a full understanding of the consequences of his plea and the charges against him. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991). In determining guilty plea issues, it is proper to consider the guilty plea transcript as well as evidence presented at the PCR hearing. See Harris v. Leeke, 282 S.C. 131, 134, 318 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1984).

Because a guilty plea is a solemn, judicial admission of the truth of the charges against an individual, the PCR applicant's right to contest the validity of such a plea is usually, but not invariably, foreclosed. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). Statements made during a guilty plea should be considered conclusively, unless an Applicant presents valid reasons why he should be allowed to depart from the truth of his statements. See Crawford v. U.S., 519 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1975) (overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Whitley, 759 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.1985)).

An applicant who enters a plea on the advice of counsel may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by showing that trial counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial instead. See Roscoe v. State, 345 S.C.16, 20, 546 S.E.2d 417, 419 (2001); see also Richardson v. State, 310 S.C. 360, 362 426 S.E.2d 795, 797 (1993). Given Applicant's burden of proof and the analysis to be applied to this claim, Applicant's claim of involuntary plea is, in essence, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and it will be treated as such.

During the plea proceeding, the Court inquired if Applicant was promised anything other than the negotiated terms; Applicant denied any other promises. (Tr. 4, ll. 6-11). Applicant denied being threatened by anyone in order to plead guilty. (Tr. 4, ll. 12-14). Applicant affirmed he was pleading freely and voluntarily. (Tr. 4, ll. 15-17).

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified Counsel told him he would get a life sentence if convicted at trial and that his father, also charged for assisting him after the killing, would get the maximum under the law. As previously indicated, Applicant affirmed both at the plea proceeding and during the evidentiary hearing that he understood what was occurring during the plea proceeding.

Counsel testified he'd been engaged in the practice of criminal law since 1976. As indicated in prior sections, Counsel articulated the facts and evidence of the case as exceptionally brutal and damning—Applicant could not recall what occurred due to severe intoxication, but the evidence showed he stabbed the victim 16 times in a dispute over pills, resulting in the victim's death. Counsel denied guaranteeing Applicant would receive a life sentence if he went to trial, but did confirm that he warned it was likely. Counsel reaffirmed his analysis based on his prior experience in defending murder cases, and noted the prior difficulties between Applicant and the victim. Counsel admitted he had not tried a murder before the Honorable Roger E. Henderson,

but that his understanding was that Judge Henderson had tended to impose harsh sentences in family court matters prior to taking the circuit court bench. Counsel opined the threat of a life sentence was not the primary motivator behind Applicant's decision to plead, but rather that he was enticed by the opportunity to plead to voluntary manslaughter and take the best offer extended.

The Court finds Applicant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea. Applicant was fully aware of the charges against him, his sentencing exposure, and the rights he would be giving up. The Court finds Applicant participated in his own defense, and in directing Counsel to plea negotiations. The Court finds Counsel did not guarantee a life sentence if Applicant went to trial, but rather correctly counseled Applicant on his sentencing exposure and on the very real and likely possibility that he would receive a life sentence if convicted for a particularly heinous killing. Applicant has failed to meet his burden of showing some ineffectiveness of counsel resulting in an involuntary plea, has failed to meet either prong of Strickland, and accordingly his request for relief by way of this allegation is **DENIED**.

[Conclusion and signature on following page]

III. CONCLUSION


Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This Court notifies the Applicant that he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days from the receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991), an Applicant has a right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of PCR. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP provides that if the Applicant wishes to seek appellate review, PCR counsel must serve and file a Notice of Appeal on the Applicant's behalf. Your attention is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. That the Application for Post-Conviction Relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice; and
2. The Applicant must be remanded to the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 28 day of Aug


 LARRY B. HYMAN, JR.
 Presiding Judge
 Fourth Judicial Circuit

2018 SEP - 7 AM 11:07
 CLERK OF COURT
 DARLINGTON COUNTY, S.C.

FILED

Cowley, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF DARLINGTON)
Jamie Ray Lewis,)
Plaintiff(s),)
-vs-)
South Carolina State Of,)
Defendant(s).)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Fourth JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
CASE NO.: 2016CP1600065
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL OR GAL
(Select one.)

ORDER
 AMENDED ORDER

TYPE OF CASE/PROCEEDING: (Check one.)

- Post-Conviction Relief (PCR)/habeas case Adoption Juvenile
 SVP case Custody and/or Visitation Abuse and Neglect
 Minor Name Change Other: Post Convict Rel 500

It appears Jamie Ray Lewis, who is a litigant in this case, is entitled to court-appointed counsel or a guardian ad litem.

It further appears that: (Select only one.)

- counsel/guardian ad litem has not yet been appointed by the court; therefore, an appointment for counsel/guardian ad litem is necessary.
 counsel or a guardian ad litem was previously appointed by the court but has indicated either a possible conflict of interest, an entitlement to exemption, or other good cause warranting the appointment of new counsel or guardian ad litem based on:
 counsel was previously appointed by the court but has not indicated that the litigant has retained private counsel and is no longer entitled to appointed counsel.
 court appointed counsel has obtained , Esquire as substitute counsel pursuant to Rule 608(h)(2); provided, however, only the member who originally received the appointment and who sought substitute counsel shall receive credit.
 Other: .

Therefore, it is ordered that Lance Boozer hereby is appointed as (Select one.)

counsel lead counsel (if capital PCR case) guardian ad litem
for the above-named person. Any counsel or GAL previously appointed is/are hereby relieved.

(If Death Penalty PCR Case) It is further ordered that , Esquire, is hereby appointed as second counsel in this capital PCR case.

The clerk of court is directed to forward a copy of this order to all persons entitled to notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED
March 1, 2016

Scott B. Suggs
 Circuit Judge Clerk of Court

Plaintiff Attorney:

Lance Boozer	
807 Gervais Street Suite 203	
Columbia, SC 29201	

Defendant Attorney:

Jessica Elizabeth Kinard	
PO Box 11549	
Columbia, SC 29211	

NOTICE: SC Supreme Court Order of September 29, 2006, requires appointed counsel entitled to payment from the Office of Indigent Defense (OID) to register the case online with OID within fifteen (15) days of this appointment at www.sccid.sc.gov, and further directs that reimbursement vouchers be submitted directly to SCCID and not to the trial judge or clerk of court. See SCCID website for further details.


CP20 (08/08)
SCCA/267 (03/07)

Scott B. Suggs
CLERK OF COURT/RMC
DARLINGTON COUNTY, SC

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CLERK OF COURT
DARLINGTON COUNTY, SC

THE BOOZER LAW FIRM, LLC

1419 Pendleton Street
Columbia, SC 29201



The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina
P.O. Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211