

State of South Carolina

In the Supreme Court

Particular to Harvey County

Honorable William H. Seale Circuit Judge

Kirkon K. Coleman

Petitioner

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OCT 15 2018

State of South Carolina

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Harvey County

Case No. 2018-000693

Kirkon K. Coleman Petitioner

Petition for writ of Certiorari

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Issue Presented

Whether petitioner's conviction should be reversed because trial counsel's failure to request a mere presence instruction pursuant to **Wainwright v. State** 324 S.C. 117, 477 S.E.2d 711 (1996) constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

Background

On October 20, 2015 petitioner filed a PCR application App 453, on September 18, 2017, The Honorable William H. Seals held a hearing, App 514 Daniel A Selwa II represented petitioner App 514 Johnny Ellis James jr represented the State App 514 on December 6, 2017 judge Seals denied petitioners allegation App 568, this petition follows.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in PCR cases depends on the specific issue before the court. A PCR court's findings of fact will be upheld if there is evidence in the record to support them. **Wainwright v. State** 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (Citing **Wainwright v. State** 406 S.C. 443, 448, 752 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2013)) Questions of law are reviewed de novo, with no deference to trial courts.

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Petitioner's conviction should be reversed because trial counsel's failure to request a mere presence instruction pursuant to ~~§ 17-2-203~~ 324 S.C. 117, 477 SE2d 711 (1996).

Constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

Trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction for mere presence. The evidence and testimony at trial supported a charge of mere presence. The jurors could have acquitted Coleman based on a mere presence instruction from the judge and based on Coleman's testimony.

"The law to be charged is determined by the evidence presented at trial. Mere presence instructions are required when evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant was merely present at the scene where drugs were found and it was whether the defendant had a right to exercise dominion and control over them. ~~Lawson v. State~~, 324 S.C. 117, 477 SE.2d 711 (1996), citing ~~State v. Cooper~~ 298 S.C. 362, 380 SE2d 834 (1989)

Coleman's testimony at trial was that he remained in the car upon arrival at the Marotte house which is the subject of the charged burglary. Coleman believed that he, Dudley, and Cowan were at the Marotte residence to collect on a debt from an associate of Cowan's. Coleman was unaware that Dudley had committed a burglary until they were apprehended and arrested by police. The jury was free to believe Coleman's testimony which supported a jury instruction of mere presence. The PCR court erred in finding neither deficient performance nor prejudice. App 573 The court first erred for not holding counsel to the rule of law when there was plain and clear evidence that the petitioner met both prongs of mere presence and counsel's claim does not meet ~~the standard~~ 466 U.S. 668 (1984) as justifiable for failing to request a mere presence charge. In the PCR court ruling stated that "At the evidentiary hearing, Counsel expressed ambivalence about seeking an expanded instruction on mere presence" But the fact is there was no mere presence instruction made by the court until his charge or in his charge conference this decision could have only been made during the court's charge of the hand of one is the hand of all instruction where the court made a partial instruction on mere presence". Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to convict one as a principal on the theory of aiding and abetting

Mr Long at Closing "I hate to borrow other people's words, but I think it some what prophetic when Mr Muredda came to you and stood here and made his opening statement" And what was his point that he wanted buried in your mind for you to think about throughout this trial. Some times you get involved with some people that will get you in trouble, that you didn't otherwise intend or plan, that you otherwise wouldn't have done. App 467 10-17. The second part of the PCR court judgement was that "The court finds that the record clearly indicates that the court did so instruct the jury." Applicant consequently cannot show any prejudice and, accordingly, his request for relief as to this allegation is Denied App 573. The standards of ineffective Assistance Counsel focus is whether or not counsel's performance was deficient the courts instruction dose not elevate counsel from his failure especially when the courts instruction was in error "Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to convict one as a principal on the theory of aiding and abetting. App 573. Mere presence is generally applicable in "two circumstances" The standard on which must be met IS whether a person is guilty of a crime by virtue of accomplice liability, or that the defendants mere presence near the contraband dose not establish guilt.

393 S.C. 524, 549, 713, SE2d
591, 604 (2011) A jury charge is correct if when
read as a whole charge, the charge adequately
covers the law. ID A jury charge that is
substantially correct and covers the charge
does not require reversal. This would be true if
the jury heard the second part of the mere
presence charge along with "mediate possession:
Possession of a thing through someone else, such
as an agent. In every instance of mediate possession
there is a direct possessor (the principal)
This is what I argued also in my testimony that I
was handed the contraband through the car
window from someone else. The prejudice comes
from witness testimony either testifying that I was
the one with the contraband "jewelry" or the one
near it throughout trial "App 156-23-25 App 157-01
App 183-18-24 App 280-8-14 App 300-14-26
App 314-26-23 App 416-14-18 App 418-7-8
The DCR Court erred in holding petitioner
could not prove deficient performance and prejudice
under Strickland and this should reverse the partial
instruction by the court should not be considered
a cure to the prejudice obtained by the failure of
hearing the second part of mere presence which
would have allowed the jury to know not to infer
guilt from being near contraband was fatal to the
defense from the jury's ignorance of the law.

Without the mere presence request where there was actual grounds to argue and the partial instruction by the court that my right to fair trial was violated and that there is not only grounds to reverse but also vacate my sentence.

Thank you from
the Coleman family

My humble respects goes to the victims of this case

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

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~~State of South Carolina~~

~~In The Supreme Court~~

~~Certiorari to Horry County~~

~~Honorable William H. Seals Circuit Judge~~

~~Kevin K. Coleman~~

~~Petitioner~~

~~vs~~

~~State of South Carolina~~

~~Respondent~~

~~APPELLATE Case No. 2018-00002~~

~~Kevin K. Coleman - Pro.~~

~~Filed for writ of certiorari~~

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OCT 15 2018

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Issue Presented

Whether Petitioner's Conviction should be reversed because trial Counsel failed to request a charge on Res Gestae instruction and *Stat v Lyle* 125 S.C. 406 415-16, 118 SE 803, 807 (1923) balancing test as required in *State v Brian K Spears* Appellate case Noth 2010-162287) Constitutes ineffective assistance of Counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

Statement

On October 20, 2015 Petitioner filed a PCR Application App 453, on September 18, 2017, the Honorable William H. Seals held a hearing, App 514 Daniel A Selwa II represented petitioner App 514 Johnny Ellis James jr represented the State App 514 on December 6, 2017 Judge Seals denied petitioner's Allegation App 508, this Petition Follow's.

Standard of Review

The Standard of review in PCR cases depends on the specific issue before the court. A PCR Court Findings of Fact will be upheld if there is evidence in the record to support them *Sellner v State* 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 SE2d 525, 527 (2016) (Citing *Jordan v State* 406 S.C. 443, 448, 752 SE2d 538, 540 (2013)) Questions of law are reviewed de novo, with no deference to trial courts.

Summary of Issues

Counsel was ineffective in inquiring what actions were the state speaking about that they would be addressing in the res gestae is deficient performance and unreasonable *Strickland v Washington* 446 US 668 (1984) once the state said they would not be addressing the pending charges App. 16-33
Counsel never inquired about the res gestae evidence and its contents is ineffective assistance counsel. And his failure to request the 911 recording confirming Ms Ross allegation that she made the allegation before she wrote her statement after the officer returned helping her with her report is ineffective assistance counsel and the fact the 911 recording was not there but testified to as a fact without objection and request for evidence is ineffective assistance counsel under *Jencks v US* 353 US 657, 1 Ed 2d 1103 S.Ct 1007 (1957) we hold that the criminal action must be dismissed when the government, on the ground of privilege elect's not to comply with an order to produce. For the accused inspection and for admission in evidence "relevant statements" or reports, in its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial. "The government must either produce their witnesses written reports and oral statements for inspection by the defense or dismiss the charges. Recordings are in the motion of discovery in Brady and are required as well.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner's conviction should be reversed because trial counsel's failure to request a balancing test, on the *res gestae* testimony being introduced by the state. Citing *Fletcher*, 379 S.C. at 23, 664 S.E.2d at 483. If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime, evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing. *Id.* Even if the prior bad act is clear and convincing and falls within exception it must be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. *Id.* (Citing rule 403, S.C.R.) constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and right to fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Trial counsel failed to request a balancing test of Mrs. Nancy Sue Ross *res gestae* testimony prior to hearing the state's plan to introduce it at trial. "Well, Lyle goes to prior bad acts and the state may not attempt that. But if the state does, the state would have to comply with the Lyle exceptions. You understand that common plan, scheme, design, things of that nature. App. 15-15-19. "Your Honor, we do not plan to bring in any of the other charged burglaries. There are certain actions on the day that this occurred before immediately before and immediately after the burglary." "In fact", there probably *res gestae* really the only thing we would go into. App. 15-20-25

When ever res gestae or prior bad acts testimony is going to be introduced the court in State v Spears Appellate Case NO 2010-162287 found such error was not harmless and case was remanded.

Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is not admissible to show criminal propensity to commit the crime charged or to demonstrate the bad character of the accused, Rule 404(b) The Fletcher Court held that it was improper to admit the neighbor's testimony regarding these prior bad acts where there's was no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, as to which caretaker perpetrated the prior bad acts. Petitioner was accused of being a prowler at the Ross house then during testimony retracked the prowling allegation "Okay so you may not have used the word prowl" App 113-215 or sneak, but you were concerned enough to call the police. App 114-1-2 "yes App App 114-7" "Since there's no audio and there's a quiet moment here, is it normal procedure in a stop like that, to call for backup? App 168-18-20 "when there's a prowler complaint in a call like that, yes. And on traffic stops, we generally try to have more than one person there. App 168-21-23"

And this wasn't really traffic. This was a stop for suspicion is that correct App 168-24-25

"Correct. Correct. App 169-1 "It was never established that a crime took place at Mrs Ross home when Mrs Ross was asked about our conduct "I don't want to put words in your mouth, I promise you. But how was their body posture when they were walking to the front door? Were they walking as anybody else would in a mall, or were they crouching and creeping what were they doing? App 106-14-18 "They were walking as you would normally expect. App 106-19 "So it didn't appear from their outward appearance that they were trying to hide anything is that correct? App 106-20-22

"I suppose you could say that, right. App 106-23

At trial Mrs Ross testified that I tried to open her back sliding door this was suppose to be recorded on her cell call "And then I heard the door try to be opened.

And I was very "frightened" at that point so on "911" I said, you need to get here now, they're trying to get in my house. App 96-3-6 The issue with this is the state failed to give us a copy of the 911 call to see if this

is what she said when she made the call or if this was added to her testimony after the officer came back to do the second part of her interview. "All right. And were you in the process of writing your written statement with him at the time when he went to chase, or was this given by you at a later date? App 104-13-16

"I was in the process of writing it. App 104-17
"And do you remember where it was when how far
you had gotten with it when you said, wait, that's
the car? App 104-18-20 "I can't remember that. App
104-21 Without the recording confirming that I tried
to open her back sliding door which counsel failed
to argue Brady by its rule that the state had violated
Brady by not giving us a copy of the 911 call to be
analyzed for its truthfulness it would have confirmed
if she did say I tried to open her door or if this
was added to her voluntary statement and testimony
to further strengthen their case considering after all
the time the lead investigator had after the fact to
go back and have her finish her report that gives
the police the advantage to add or remove from her
testimony has to be considered prejudicial and with
out the 911 recording to confront her allegation violates
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment right
to confront my accuser's in the Court of law. They
needed a reason to support there probable cause and
other than her testimony of me trying to open her
sliding door which theres no testimony by officer
Rick Gibbott or any one mention to check the slider
door for finger prints MS Ross never testified to
seeing me wearing gloves we never made it off the
property to discard of my gloves or were gloves
ever found on me or the car or the property itself
but they never checked to further confirm her story.

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To further add to the conflict of her testimony Ms Ross testifies to getting help in her voluntary statement "Okay 15 there anything in that statement that you didn't tell this jury today? App 100-17-18 "I don't know if "we" mentioned the woman driving. App 100-19 we mentioned if argued would have questioned here in her testimony if she'd been coached and the legitimacy of her voluntary statement should have been in question also. Over all the prejudice of her Res Gestae testimony was based on the propensity to commit the crime and how afraid she was throughout her testimony was skillfully put together to say without saying we came there to break in her house at first then state got bolder as the trial went on when the state during cross examination of me pitting me against the witness. "So if she says she saw you jiggling the knob, she's lying. App 387-24-25 This was fatal to the defense the testimony of Ms Ross and Mr DeBusk for a fact is propensity to commit the crime when you hear Mr DeBusk's closing argument not only does it suggest that App 409-1-25 App 410-1-7 App 412-12-17 "He says he never tried to get into Ms Ross door Ms Ross says, "I saw the man" tall man with the gray sweatshirt, trying to open my door and I said over the phone, hurry up, he's trying to get in. So he's got a history of lying and a reason to lie. There is no where in my Ross testimony she said she saw me counsel should have objected.

And second he pitted me against the witness a second time the first time the state disregarded his statement with no curative by the court other than outright App 388-6 Only to pitee me against the witness a second time with no objection or cure from the judge App 412-12-17 "Who was it that went to the door and tried to open it at Ms Ross house? Mr. Coleman Ms Ross "saw him": App 414-8-10 The testimony of Ms Ross would have eiled State v Lyle Based on it's propensity to prove guilt Mr DeBuse testimony suggest that our sole purpose was to committ a burglary at the Ms Ross home went post Res-gestae. Once Counsel was alerted that res gestae testimony was going to be introduced "In fact, they're probably res geste really the only thing we would go into. App 15-2425 This was indication enough to request a balancing test I believe Counsel eiled to because the trial judge was the subject in State v Spears judge Larry B Hyman where in the case of State v Spears it was decided in the Court of appeals Justice Pieper held that (1) Trial court eiled to conduct requisite on the record balancing test with respect to prior bad act testimony. (2) Such failure was not harmless (3) Remand to permit trial court to conduct on the record balancing test was appropriate. Case remanded

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

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In State v Martucci 380 S.C. 232: Even if prior bad act evidence is relevant under theory of res gestae prior to admission the trial judge should determine whether its probative value clearly outweighs any unfair prejudice. Even after notice that res gestae evidence would be introduced neither the court or defense ask to hear the testimony before it was admitted I believe this was a conflict of interest on counsel the state needed that testimony to come in and counsel did nothing to object to the res gestae evidence neither was he asked about it by the state in PCR as far as Allegation #4 - Failure to object to testimony of Nancy Sue Ross. Applicant testified at the evidentiary hearing that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the testimony of witness Nancy Sue Ross on grounds that her report to law enforcement was racially motivated there is no evidence in the record before this court to show any racial prejudice on the part of the witness it be relevant to her competence to testify. Rule 601 (S.C.R.E) Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules. Accordingly, the court finds no deficiency of counsel or prejudice therefrom and Applicant's request for relief by way of this allegation is denied. This was not my allegation first my allegation was "To object to testimony in violation of rule 403. App 27-5-25 / App 28-1-25 App 29-1-21

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During the hearing the state never questioned Mr Long in regards to allegation #4 or did he deny my allegations in number four. Counsel never put up any argument to the allegations when the state never examined him on the issue of PCR are or any of allegation #4. To render a verdict it is Counsel duty to answer the claim accusing him in violation of Strickland v Washington in allegation #4. With no relating from Counsel. The RR Court failed to conduct proper findings of facts and conclusion of law to allegation #4 were there is no record of response to the allegation at the PCR hearing relating the allegation by Counsel or dose the PCR Court render its facts and conclusions on the proper allegation. I ask for the same reason as all my other allegations that my sentence be reversed or vacated.

Thank you from the
Coleman Family

P.S. Respect to the victims of this case.

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S.C. SUPREME COURT

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