

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ORIGINAL

Appeal from Anderson County

Honorable R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

PATRICK TODD SMITH,

APPELLANT

APPELLATE CASE NO 2018-000414

ANDERS BRIEF OF APPELLANT

RECEIVED

JUN 18 2018

SC Court of Appeals

ROBERT M. PACHAK
Appellate Defender

South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense
Division of Appellate Defense
PO Box 11589
Columbia, SC 29211-1589
(803) 734-1330

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

KATHERINE HUDGINS
Appellate Defender

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STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL

Whether the court erred in revoking appellant's probation for failing to pay restitution without giving a reason why the failure to pay was willful?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 23, 2018, appellant appeared before the Honorable Lawton McIntosh in Anderson County for a probation revocation hearing. He had pled guilty to multiple offenses. Probation was revoked for forty (40) months on the following charges: burglary in the second degree-non-violent, shoplifting, two counts of grand larceny, and two counts of breaking into a motor vehicle.

This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Probation Revocation – Failure to Pay

Our appellate courts have continued to maintain that “probation may not be revoked *solely* for failure to make required payments of fines or restitution without the circuit judge first determining on the record that the probationer has failed to make a bona fide effort to pay.” Hamilton, 333 S.C. 642, 649, 511 S.E.2d 94, 97 (Ct. App. 1999) (discussing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983)); Nichols v. State, 308 S.C. 334, 337, 417 S.E.2d 860, 861 (1992); Barlet v. State, 288 S.C. 481, 483, 343 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1986). “Therefore, in those cases involving the failure to pay fines or restitution, the circuit judge must, in addition to finding sufficient factual evidence of the violation, make an additional finding of willfulness.” Hamilton, 333 S.C. at 649, 511 S.E.2d at 97.

“Willful failure to pay means a voluntary, conscious and intentional failure.” People v. Davis, 216 Ill.App.3d 884, 159 Ill.Dec. 841, 576 N.E.2d 510, 513 (1991); see State v. Sowell, 370 S.C. 330, 336, 635 S.E.2d 81, 83 (2006) (“A willful act is defined as one ‘done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.’ ” (quoting Spartanburg County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Padgett, 296 S.C. 79, 82-83, 370 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1988))). “The trial court may infer that the failure to pay is intentional where a probationer has the ability to pay a fee, but does not do so.” Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 641 (Tex.App.1999) (citations omitted).

State v. Spare, 374 S.C. 264, 268–69, 647 S.E.2d 706, 708–09 (Ct. App. 2007)

ARGUMENT

The Court erred in revoking appellant's probation for failing to pay restitution without giving a reason why the failure to pay was willful.

In 1972 the United States Supreme Court handed down the opinion of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593 setting forth minimal due process requirements for the revocation of parole. The Court noted that "revocation deprives an individual... of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions." 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S. Ct. at 2600. The Court went on to write that there must be an orderly process before a liberty protection is terminated. 408 U.S. at 482, 92 S. Ct. at 2601. First, the Court dealt with the parolee's arrest and the need for a preliminary hearing. The Court stated:

Due process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available. Cf. Hyser v. Reed, 115 U.S. App. D.C. 254, 318 F.2d 225 (1963). Such an inquiry should be seen as in the nature of a 'preliminary hearing' to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S., at 267-271, 90 S. Ct. at 1020-1022, 25 L.Ed2d 287.

408 U.S. at 484, 92 S. Ct. at 2602

With respect to the preliminary hearing before this officer, the parolee should be given notice that the hearing will take place and that its purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe he has committed a parole violation. The notice should state what parole violations have been alleged. At the hearing the parolee may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant information to the hearing officer.

408 U.S. at 486-487, 92 S. Ct. at 2603.

With respect to the revocation hearing the Court wrote:

We cannot write a code of procedure; that is the responsibility of each State. Most States have done so by legislation, others by judicial decision usually on due process grounds. Our task is limited to deciding the minimum requirements of due process. They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.

408 U.S. at 488 – 489, 92 S.C. at 2604.

In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411, U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973) the Court made the same procedures set out in Morrissey applicable to probation revocations. A short time later the Court held that due process is violated when the state revokes probation with no evidence that probation was violated. Douglas v. Burden, 412 U.S. 430, 93 S. Ct. 2199 (1973). Then in Bearden v. Georgia, 466 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064 (1983) the Court held that the State can not revoke a defendant's probation because he is too poor to pay a fine. A probation violation has to be willful. The South Carolina Supreme Court a short time later also held the probation could not be revoked "solely" on the ground that one on probation failed to pay fines or to make restitution (emphasis in original). Barlet v. State, 288 S.C. 481, 343 S.E.2d 620 (1986). The judge has to make a finding "on the record that the probationer failed to make a bona fide effort to pay." Id.

In this case the court told appellant that he had been cited for failing to report. Appellant responded that he always reported but he did admit that he failed to pay some of his restitution

(R. p. 6, line 18- p. 7, line 4). The probation agent agreed that appellant has not made restitution.

(R. p. 7, line 23-p. 8, line1).

The court ruled that he was going to send appellant to prison. The court told appellant, "You didn't pay any monies." Then it said, "You willfully didn't pay any monies." (R. p. 15, lines 10-14).

The court erred in this case by merely saying that appellant "willfully didn't pay any monies" It was supposed to give a reason for why the failure to pay was willful.

CONCLUSION

The decision to revoke appellant's probation should be reversed.



Robert M. Pachak
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

This 18th day of June, 2018.

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Appeal from Anderson County

Honorable R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

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
PETITION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

Counsel for Patrick Todd Smith states:

1. He is Appellate Defender for the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, and was appointed to represent appellant.
2. He has reviewed the record of appellant's trial before Judge R. Lawton McIntosh, which was held on February 23, 2018, and, in his opinion, the appeal is without legal merit sufficient to warrant a new trial.
3. He has, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), briefed an arguable legal issue which arose during the course of the trial.

WHEREFORE, He asks the Court to relieve him as counsel for Patrick Todd Smith.

Respectfully Submitted,



Robert M. Pachak
Appellate Defender
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

This 18th day of June, 2018.

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
DESIGNATION OF MATTER TO BE
INCLUDED IN RECORD ON APPEAL

Appellant proposes the following be included in the Record on Appeal:

- (1) February 23, 2018 Transcript
- (2) Probation Citations

I certify that this designation contains no matter which is irrelevant to this appeal.

June 18, 2018


Robert M. Pachak
Appellate Defender


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Division of Appellate Defense
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

The undersigned certifies that to the best of my ability this Anders Brief of Appellant complies with Rule 211(b), SCACR, and the April 15, 2014 order from the South Carolina Supreme Court entitled "Revised Order Concerning Personal Identifying Information and Other Sensitive Information in Appellate Court Filings."

June 18, 2018.


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
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
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the Anders Brief of Appellant and Designation of Matter in the above referenced case has been served upon Matthew Buchanan, Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201; and a copy of the Anders Brief of Appellant and Designation of Matter have been served on Patrick Todd Smith, 290802, at Goodman Correctional Institution, 4556 Broad River Road, Columbia, SC 29210, this 18th day of June, 2018.



Robert M. Pachak
Appellate Defender
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me
this 18th day of June, 2018.

 (L.S)
Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: May 12, 2027.