THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Andra Jamison, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000914

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
S. Phillip Lenski, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-426
Submitted October 1, 2018 – Filed November 14, 2018

AFFIRMED

Andra Jamison, pro se.

Christina Catoe Bigelow, of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Andra Jamison appeals an order from the Administrative Law Court (the ALC), arguing the ALC erred in affirming the South Carolina Department of Corrections's (SCDC's) interpretation of his sentence. Jamison contends the ALC erred in finding his sentence was properly classified as violent and that he was required to serve 85% percent of his sentence. We affirm.

1. With regards to whether SCDC erroneously classified Jamison's conviction as violent, even if Jamison's offense was initially classified as violent, SCDC informed this court in its brief that he is classified as a nonviolent offender. Accordingly, we find this issue is moot. *See Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley, Inc.*, 369 S.C. 20, 26, 630 S.E.2d 474, 477 (2006) (stating a moot issue exists when "a judgment rendered by the court will have no practical legal effect upon an existing controversy because an intervening event renders any grant of effectual relief impossible for the reviewing court").

2. We find substantial evidence supports the ALC's finding Jamison was required to serve 85% percent of his sentence. *See Murphy v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control*, 396 S.C. 633, 639, 723 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2012) ("As to factual issues, judicial review of administrative agency orders is limited to a determination [of] whether the order is supported by substantial evidence." (quoting *MRI at Belfair, LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control*, 379 S.C. 1, 6, 664 S.E.2d 471, 474 (2008))); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-90(B) (2008) (classifying section 56-5-2945(A)(2) of the South Carolina Code (2018) as a Class B felony); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-100 (2007) ("For purposes of definition under South Carolina law, a 'no parole offense' means a class A, B, or C felony or an offense exempt from classification as enumerated in [s]ection 16-1-10(d)[of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017)], which is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment for twenty years or more."); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-150(A) (2007) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . a prisoner convicted of a 'no parole offense' as defined in [s]ection 24-13-100 and sentenced to the custody of [SCDC] . . . is not eligible for early release, discharge, or community supervision . . . until the prisoner has served at least 85% percent of the actual term of imprisonment imposed.").[1]

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[1] Although Jamison asserts the court in *Bolin v. South Carolina Department of Corrections* found section 24-13-100 unconstitutional, the court in *Bolin* addressed the conflict between sections 44-53-375 and -370 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015), which had been amended by the June 2, 2010 enactment of the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act, and the definition of "no parole offense" in section 24-13-100. 415 S.C. 276, 282-86, 781 S.E.2d 914, 917-19 (Ct. App. 2016). The *Bolin* court held "the legislature's use of the phrase 'Notwithstanding any other provision of law,' in the amendments to sections 44-53-375 and -370 expresse[d] its intent to repeal section 24-13-100 *to the extent* it conflict[ed] with amended sections 44-53-375 and -370." *Id.* at 282, 781 S.E.2d at 917. Because Jamison was not convicted of the offenses in sections 44-53-375 and -370, the holding in *Bolin* does not apply to his case.

AFFIRMED.[2]

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

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[2] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.