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November 26, 2018

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina
P.O. Box 11330
Columbia, SC 29211

The Honorable James C. Campbell
Clerk, Sumter County
215 N. Harvin Street
Sumter, SC 29150

RE: Joseph Manners, #367122, v. State of South Carolina
2017-CP-43-2366

Dear Mr. Shearouse and Mr. Campbell:

Enclosed for filing is a Notice of Appeal in the above-referenced case. Also enclosed are the following:

(1) Proof of Service of the Notice of Appeal;
(2) A copy of the Order which is to be challenged on appeal; and
(3) Prior Order of Appointment of Counsel.

As I was appointed to represent Mr. Manners in his PCR proceeding, I anticipate that the Office of Appellate Defense will represent Mr. Manners in this appeal.

Yours very truly,

Lance S. Boozer

Enclosures
cc: Megan Jameson, AAG
Loriene French, OAD
Joseph Manners, #367122

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM SUMTER COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

The Honorable Kristi F. Curtis, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2017-CP-43-2366

Joseph Manners, #367122, ...Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina,.....Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The Petitioner appeals the Honorable Kristi F. Curtis's Order dated October 31, 2018, denying post-conviction relief to the Petitioner. The Order was received by undersigned counsel on November 21, 2018. A copy of the Order on appeal is attached to this notice.

Respectfully submitted,



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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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APPEAL FROM SUMTER COUNTY
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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Lance S. Boozer, appointed attorney for Petitioner, certify that I have today served within Notice of Appeal upon the Respondent by depositing a copy of it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Assistant Attorney General Megan Jameson, P.O. Box 11549, Columbia, SC 29211. I further certify that all parties required by Rule to be served have been served this 26th day of November, 2018.

Lance S. Boozer
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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA COUNTY OF SUMTER	)	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Joseph Michael Manners, #367122,	)	2017-CP-43-2366
Applicant,	)	
v.	)	**ORDER OF DISMISSAL**
State of South Carolina,	)	
Respondent.	)	

This matter comes before this Court by way of a post-conviction relief (PCR) application filed on December 12, 2017, by Joseph Michael Manners (Applicant). The State of South Carolina (Respondent) submitted its Return and Motion for More Definite Statement on March 30, 2018. Applicant filed an amended application on July 12, 2018. An evidentiary hearing was held on July 26, 2018, at the Sumter County Courthouse. Applicant was present at the hearing and was represented by Lance S. Boozer, Esquire. Respondent was represented by Assistant Attorney General Julie A. Coleman of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office.

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified on his own behalf and presented testimony from his Aunt, Nora Lee Harmon. Respondent presented testimony from Timothy L. Griffith, Esquire ("Trial Counsel") and Assistant Solicitor Bronwyn McElveen. This Court had before it the records of the Sumter County Clerk of Court regarding the subject convictions, the record on appeal, Applicant's records from the South Carolina Department of Corrections and Applicant's appellate records and the pleadings. This Court finds as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The records before this Court indicate Applicant is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Sumter County Clerk of Court.

In February 2014, the Sumter County Grand Jury indicted Applicant for two counts of murder and one count of first degree arson (2014-GS-43-0170). These charges resulted from Applicant setting the victim's house on fire, resulting in the death of both Applicant's grandparents.

Timothy Griffith, Esquire represented Applicant. Assistant Solicitor John P. Meadors, Esquire prosecuted the case. On February 16, 2018, Applicant proceeded to trial before the Honorable W. Jeffrey Young. The jury found Applicant guilty as indicted. Judge Young sentenced Applicant to imprisonment for consecutive terms of thirty years for arson and life for each count of murder.

Applicant filed a timely notice of appeal. Taylor D. Gilliam, Esquire, of the Office of Appellate Defense filed an Anders[1] brief on Applicant's behalf. After review, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Applicant's conviction in an order dated October 18, 2017. State v. Manners, Op. No. 2017-UP-393 (S.C. Ct. App. filed October 18, 2017). The remittitur was returned to the circuit court on November 3, 2017.

II. ALLEGATIONS

In his current application, Applicant alleges that he is being held in custody unlawfully for the following reasons:

1. "Ineffective Assistance of Counsel- Due To Plea Bargain"
   a. "There was a plea offer that petitioner didn't understand completely"
2. "Due Process Violated Under Violation of Miranda Rights"
   a. "Petitioner was young and addicted to drugs, he never understood his rights"

Applicant filed an amended application on July 26, 2018, adding the following allegations:

i. Counsel failed to investigate, advise Applicant of and put forth any defense at trial.
ii. Counsel failed to investigate witnesses or present witnesses at trial.

[1] Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

iii. Counsel misadvised Applicant to not testify at trial.

III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT TESTIMONY PRESENTED

Applicant's testimony

At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant testified he was first represented by Timothy Murphy, before Trial Counsel was appointed to represent him. He stated he met with Murphy every other month to talk about defenses to the indicted charges, and they were preparing for trial because the State would not give him a plea offer. Applicant testified he was eventually offered a plea deal for a sixty year sentence, which he rejected, and later was given a deal for fifty years, which he again rejected. Applicant testified that he did not discuss any witnesses with Murphy, and stated he felt Murphy had a conflict of interest. Murphy eventually withdrew from the case because he and Applicant did not get along, and shortly thereafter Trial Counsel was appointed.

Applicant testified he met with Trial Counsel three or four times before his trial. He stated Trial Counsel tried to get him another plea offer, and he was only able to get an offer for fifty years, day for day. Applicant stated he could not make his mind up about the plea because he was too young and he has a little girl, so he rejected the offer, even though Trial Counsel recommended he take it. Applicant testified that he could not remember discussing defenses or trial strategy with Trial Counsel and stated he wanted to testify at trial, but Trial Counsel told him he should not testify because Applicant would not make a good witness.

Applicant testified that he took his grandpa's life because his grandpa had killed his grandma, but stated he does not know how his grandma was killed. He stated he does not remember anything except "flipping out" and driving away fast from his grandparent's house. Applicant testified he lived with his grandparents, and there was a lot of drinking in the house. Applicant testified when his grandfather was sober, he was like his father, but when his grandfather was

drunk, he was very different. Applicant testified his grandfather hit him once, but cannot remember when. He stated he feared what his grandfather might do to him, and that it was a matter of time before his grandpa flew over the edge and killed his grandmother. He testified he tried to kill himself a week before the fire happened. Applicant testified he took his grandfather's life with his bare hands in the heat of passion, and he didn't realize what happened until he was running out of the house to his car. He stated he does not know how the fire started, nor could he remember if he told any of this to Trial Counsel.

Applicant testified that three witnesses spoke on his behalf during sentencing—his Aunt, Lee Harmon, his Aunt Jane, and his Uncle Jim. Applicant stated he told Trial Counsel about these witnesses while in jail and before the trial at the courthouse, and that Trial Counsel attempted to add these three witnesses to the witness list during the trial, but the Solicitor would not agree and they did not testify. Applicant testified that he told his aunts that his grandmother was already dead when he "flipped out" on his grandfather.

Nora Lee Harmon's testimony

Harmon testified she is Applicant's great-aunt, and the one of the victims, Applicant's grandmother, was her sister. She stated she lives in Sumter and she was close with her sister and with Applicant before the murder.

Harmon testified Applicant told her he did not kill his grandmother, but that he knocked his grandfather out.[2] She stated that, based on her conversations with Applicant, she believed there was alcohol in the house all the time, and both grandparents were violent alcoholics. She testified she had personally witnessed Applicant's interactions with his grandfather. She stated he was

[2] This testimony, and the following testimony, was allowed over Respondent's objection to hearsay. This Court allowed the hearsay testimony for purposes of the PCR hearing, but recognized that the hearsay testimony would not be admissible at trial.

volatile when he was drinking, and she saw him hit and shove Applicant on one occasion when Applicant was sixteen years old.

Harmon testified that she spoke with her sister, the victim, the Thursday before she was killed.[3] She testified her sister was an invalid and had macular degeneration, so she was unable to see. Harmon stated her sister's husband, Applicant's grandfather, hit her, and she wanted to go live in a nursing home to get away from him.

Harmon testified she never spoke with Trial Counsel before the trial although she tried to contact Trial Counsel's office numerous times because she thought she was going to testify at trial, and wanted to tell him about the conditions of the house Applicant lived in with his grandparents. She testified she tried to get in touch with Trial Counsel twenty times before the trial but was never able to speak with him. She stated she was never notified of the trial, and that she wanted to say all of this at trial, but was not given the chance. Harmon testified that when she appeared at Applicant's trial, she told all of this to Trial Counsel, and he told her that he would try to get her in as a witness, but he was not able to.

Trial Counsel's testimony

At the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel testified he took Applicant's case after Timothy Murphy was relieved as Counsel, and was appointed sometime before August of 2014, about six or seven months before Applicant's trial. He stated he and Applicant got along just fine. Trial Counsel testified he discussed the potential maximum sentence with Applicant and tried to negotiate a favorable plea offer. He stated the State offered a plea deal for sixty years, which Applicant rejected. Trial Counsel testified he met with the Solicitor's Office numerous times and originally told him Applicant would have to plead straight up, but later offered Applicant a plea of

[3] This testimony was admitted over Respondent's objection to hearsay.

fifty years. Applicant rejected this offer despite Trial Counsel's advice to take the deal. Trial Counsel testified he talked about the alternatives of a trial versus a plea with Applicant, and Applicant decided to take the plea offer, but was hesitant to sign the sign-up sheet at his plea. He stated he told Applicant it was his decision whether or not to accept the plea offer, and after about forty minutes, Applicant decided not to plead and the offer was withdrawn.

Trial Counsel testified he reviewed the discovery carefully with Applicant. He testified the defense strategy at trial was to argue that the victims were dead before the fire started, that Applicant's grandfather was drunk and passed out, and the large amounts of alcohol stored under the steps inside the house caused the fire. He testified he cross-examined all the witnesses on what else could have started the fire in the victims' home. Applicant told Trial Counsel that he had nothing to do with the house fire, and later told Trial Counsel that a man named Jason Compton, who Applicant met in jail facing similar charges, had set the fire that killed Applicant's grandparents.

Trial Counsel testified Applicant recounted multiple versions of the facts and kept changing his story, to the point that Trial Counsel stopped believing him to be credible. Further, Trial Counsel told Applicant that it was his decision whether or not he testify at trial, but advised Applicant not to testify out of fear he would lie and make it appear that Trial Counsel was condoning the false testimony.

Trial Counsel testified Applicant gave different statements to the police about Applicant's involvement in the house fire and deaths of his grandparents. Trial Counsel stated he tried to suppress the statement Applicant gave to law enforcement when arrested in Ohio on the charges, but was unable to do so. He stated the story Applicant told him was different than what Applicant testified during the PCR hearing, and his story has changed constantly. He testified Applicant's

story changed three times during the trial alone. Trial Counsel stated that had Applicant testified at trial as he had during his PCR hearing, he may have been able to argue a self-defense or manslaughter defense. However, Applicant never told Trial Counsel that his grandfather came at him. Instead, Trial Counsel stated Applicant told him he "flipped out" and killed his grandfather, and this led Trial Counsel to the opinion that Applicant did not have a valid argument for self-defense.

Trial Counsel testified he told Applicant it was not in his best interest to go to trial, because he expected Applicant to be found guilty. He stated that he did not speak to Applicant's Aunt, Lee Harmon, before the trial and he would have known and noted if Harmon had come by his office or called, because his paralegal records every communication with every client, but there is no record of such communication. Trial Counsel stated he met Harmon for the first time in the courtroom before Applicant's trial.

Trial Counsel testified he spoke with Applicant about potential witnesses before the trial. He stated that during the trial Applicant's family gave him information, and he tried to get them in to testify, but the trial judge would not allow it. Trial Counsel did not recall Harmon telling him about Applicant's grandfather's abuse of his grandmother. He stated he wanted to use any information about living conditions of the home in mitigation at sentencing, and he did. He stated that, after hearing what Harmon had to say, he would have liked to use her as a witness at trial to show the living conditions of the house and have her testify about her personal knowledge of Applicant being hit by his grandfather. But, he testified, he would not have been able to admit Harmon's hearsay testimony about Applicant's version of the story. Trial Counsel stated that, in his opinion, this evidence would not have changed the result of the trial, because, based on the autopsy report of the victims, the grandmother died as a direct result of the fire. He opined that the

State had very strong evidence of Applicant's guilt, and he believed it was sufficient to convince a jury.

Solicitor Bronwyn McElveen's testimony

Assistant Solicitor Bronwyn McElveen testified at the PCR hearing about the involvement of Jason Compton as a possible suspect in Applicant's case. She testified she is employed by the Third Circuit Solicitor's Office and was not involved in the prosecution of Applicant's case, but she did prosecute crimes that were committed by inmate Jason Compton. Trial Counsel testified he investigated Compton as a potential defense for third-party guilt after Applicant told him Compton was the one who set the fire. McElveen explained that Jason Compton was charged with other murders from a very similar arson case. She stated Compton wanted the death penalty, so he gave false confessions for crimes he had nothing to do with, including this murder, in the hopes that he would be found responsible. She testified she looked into his potential involvement in Applicant's case, but the evidence was insufficient to connect Compton with the house fire and resulting deaths, so she did not charge him with anything associated with this crime.

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

In a post-conviction relief action, the applicant has the burden of proving the allegations in the application. Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP; Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged as a ground for relief, the Applicant must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984); Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985).

The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Courts presume that counsel rendered

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).

Courts use a two-pronged test in evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the Applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, attorney performance is measured by its "reasonableness under professional norms." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 385 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Strickland). Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18, 386 S.E.2d at 625.

V. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Court has had the opportunity to review the record in its entirety and has heard the testimony at the post-conviction relief hearing. Further, this Court has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses presented at the hearing, closely pass upon their credibility and weigh their testimony accordingly. Set forth below are the relevant findings of facts and conclusions of law as required pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-80 (1985).

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Failure to explain plea offer

Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proving his allegation that Trial Counsel was ineffective in any regard in conveying the State's plea offers. Applicant claims that he did not fully understand the States's plea offer of fifty years because he was young. Trial Counsel credibly testified that he conveyed multiple plea offers to Applicant from the State, including an offer of fifty years, which Applicant originally agreed to accept. However, Trial Counsel stated when they

appeared at the guilty plea hearing, Applicant could not make up his mind about the plea, and after about forty minutes, he decided to reject the plea offer and withdraw his guilty plea. The testimony presented shows Trial Counsel fully conveyed and explained the offer to Applicant, as well as carefully reviewed the discovery and evidence against him and discussed the risks of going to trial and the amount of time he faced if convicted at trial. Trial Counsel testified that he advised Applicant to accept the plea offer because he believed he would be found guilty at trial in light of the very strong evidence against him. Trial Counsel advised Applicant that it was his final decision to make and he could not make the decision for him.

This Court finds Trial Counsel's advice to Applicant regarding the plea offers and the risks and benefits of going to trial versus entering a guilty plea was within the range of reasonableness under professional norms, and none of Trial Counsel's actions in this regard were deficient. Applicant was fully aware of the gravity of his decision and the risks and benefits of all his options, and it was his choice to make. He ultimately made the decision to proceed to trial, despite Trial Counsel's advice to accept the State's offered plea of fifty years. This Court finds Trial Counsel was not ineffective in this regard, and this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Failure to investigate, advise Applicant of and put forth a defense at trial

Applicant's allegation that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, advise Applicant of, and present a defense at trial is meritless. "[C]riminal defense attorneys have a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation, which at a minimum includes interviewing potential witnesses and making an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case." Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 456, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011). Failure to conduct an independent investigation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when the allegation is supported only by mere speculation as to result. Porter v. State, 368 S.C. 378, 385-86, 629 S.E.2d 353, 357

(2006) (citing Moorehead v. State, 329 S.C. 329, 334, 496 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1998)). "In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003).

Trial Counsel credibly testified he investigated this case by hiring and speaking with his investigators, meeting with the solicitor to discuss the case and review evidence, and analyzing the police reports. He testified Applicant did not give him information on any witnesses to investigate, and there were no other witnesses. He testified that, based on the evidence and on his conversations with Applicant, there was no basis for a self-defense or a manslaughter defense. Trial Counsel's defense at trial was to call into question the way that the fire started by suggesting it may have been caused by the alcohol stored under the stairs in the home and argue that Applicant's grandfather was drunk and passed out on the floor before the house caught fire.

This Court finds Trial Counsel's investigation was reasonable under the circumstances and he presented a reasonable defense based on the evidence and the information he was given. None of his actions were deficient in this regard. This Court further finds Applicant has failed to present any credible or admissible evidence that could have been used in his defense to change the outcome of the trial, and has therefore failed to prove prejudice. Accordingly, neither prong of the Strickland test is met, and this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Failure to investigate or present witnesses at trial

This Court finds Applicant's allegation that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or present witnesses at trial is meritless. At the evidentiary hearing, Applicant presented testimony from his Aunt, Lee Harmon. Harmon testified she attempted to get in contact with Trial Counsel twenty times before the trial to tell him about the conditions of the home Applicant was

living in, but she was unable to contact him. However, Trial Counsel credibly testified that he and his office had no record of her attempting to contact him. This Court finds Trial Counsel had no duty to investigate this witness, as Applicant did not provide him with any information about her. Regardless, when Harmon did finally speak to Trial Counsel during the trial, Trial Counsel attempted to add her to the witness list, but the trial judge would not allow it. ROA 323. Because Trial Counsel did speak with her before the trial and attempted to add her as a witness, this Court finds Trial Counsel was not deficient in this regard.

Most importantly, this Court finds there was no prejudice from Trial Counsel's failure to call Harmon as a witness at trial because her testimony was inadmissible hearsay evidence. Almost all of Harmon's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was based on her conversations with Applicant and with her sister, one of the victims. Her secondhand knowledge, which was based on conversations with others, was inadmissible under Rule 802 of the SCRE and therefore could not have been used at trial or affected the outcome of the trial. Although she could have testified about her personal experience when she witnessed Applicant's grandfather pushing Applicant and hitting him when he was sixteen years old, this Court finds this evidence would not have changed the outcome of the trial. This testimony alone does not qualify for a valid self-defense argument at trial, especially in light of Applicant's testimony at the PCR hearing. Applicant admitted to killing his grandfather with his bare hands, even though his grandfather had not threatened him or provoked him at that time.

Accordingly, this Court finds no deficiency and no prejudice in light of the very strong evidence against Applicant. This allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Counsel misadvised Applicant not to testify at trial

This Court finds Trial Counsel was not ineffective for advising Applicant not to testify at trial. First, this Court notes the decision to testify is Applicant's decision alone, as it is his constitutional right to choose to present a defense or to remain silent under his Fifth Amendment protections. Applicant was fully advised on the record of his right to choose whether to testify or not, and he was informed that his attorney could not make the decision for him. ROA 326-329. After speaking with his attorney and his family members, Applicant made the decision not to testify. Therefore, Trial Counsel should not be found deficient for Applicant exercising his constitutional right to decline to testify.

Second, this Court finds Trial Counsel was not deficient in advising Applicant not to testify at trial, because this advice was reasonable under the circumstances. Trial Counsel testified that Applicant was not a credible witness, as Applicant had changed his story numerous times during preparation for the trial, and Trial Counsel could not rely upon any of his recitations of the facts. Based on Applicant's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, there was no valid evidence of a self-defense argument. Even if Applicant had testified in this manner at trial, it's unlikely to have changed the outcome of the trial. In fact, it is likely that Applicant's testimony would have harmed his case more than helped, given the testimony Applicant presented at the evidentiary hearing, as well as the fact that he could be impeached by the State with his prior inconsistent statements. Finally, Trial Counsel voiced his ethical concerns about condoning Applicant's testimony on the stand. Because Applicant had changed his story numerous times, Trial Counsel did not believe he would present honesty testimony at trial.

Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds Trial Counsel's advice that Applicant not testify at trial was reasonable and not deficient. This Court further finds that

Trial Counsel's advice did not result in prejudice to the Applicant as his testimony would likely still have resulted in a "guilty" verdict. Accordingly, neither prong of the Strickland test is met, and this allegation is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

DUE PROCESS VIOLATION

This Court finds Applicant's allegation of a due process violation raises a direct appeal issue that is procedurally barred by S.C. Code Ann. §17-27-20(b) (2003). Post-conviction relief is not a substitute for a direct appeal. Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1974). A post-conviction relief application cannot assert any issues that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. Ashley v. State, 260 S.C. 436, 196 S.E.2d 501 (1973). At trial Applicant alleged his Miranda rights were violated when Trial Counsel moved to suppress his statement given to police while Applicant was at the hospital in Ohio. Applicant could have raised this issue on direct appeal, and the issue was, in fact, raised and ruled upon in his Anders brief on appeal. This allegation is therefore improper for post-conviction relief. Therefore, this Court finds the allegation should be denied and dismissed.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application for post-conviction relief. Therefore, this application must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This Court notes that Applicant must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days from the receipt by counsel of written notice of entry of judgment to secure the appropriate appellate review. See Rule 203, SCACR. Pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453 (1991), an Applicant has a right to an appellate counsel's assistance in seeking review of the denial of post-

conviction relief. Rule 71.1(g), SCRCP, provides that if the applicant wishes to seek appellate review, post-conviction relief counsel must serve and file a Notice of Appeal on the Applicant's behalf. Applicant is directed to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 243 for appropriate procedures for appeal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. That the application for Post-Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed with prejudice; and

2. Applicant must be remanded to the custody of Respondent.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED this 31st day of October, 2018.

Kristi Curtis

KRISTI F. CURTIS
Presiding Judge
Third Judicial Circuit

Sumter, South Carolina

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

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse
Clerk, Supreme Court of South Carolina
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