

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In the Supreme Court

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CERTIORARI TO CHARLESTON COUNTY  
Court of Common Pleas  
William Seals, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2018-000089

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ALONZA DENNIS,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

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**RETURN TO PETITION FOR  
WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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    The post-conviction relief court properly denied post-conviction relief  
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**RESPONDENT'S ISSUES PRESENTED**

Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when she failed to obtain Detective Lawrence's personnel file to impeach his testimony at the suppression hearing, where trial counsel had no reason to know that fruitful information could be gathered from said file?

## STATEMENT

During the October 2009 term, the Charleston County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill, Attempted Armed Robbery, and Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Violent Crime. App. 700-705.

Petitioner's trial was held on March 14-16, 2011, in front of the Honorable Roger M. Young, and a jury. App. 1. Jenifer Shealy and Timothy Finch represented the state. Id. Andrew Grimes and Megan Ehrlich represented Petitioner. Id.

Part of the State's case was a statement given by Petitioner to Detective Lawrence, Petitioner was found guilty as of ABWIK and Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Violent Crime. App. 599, ll. 2-8. Due to a prior conviction, Judge Young sentenced Petitioner of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for ABWIK pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §17-25-45(A)(2)(b) and five years' imprisonment for Possession of a firearm during the Commission of a Violent Crime. App. 602, l. 5-606, ll. 22; S.C. Code Ann. §17-25-45 (A)(2)(b).

Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal. His appeal was perfected by Lanelle Durant, Esquire, of the Office of Appellate Defense. The Applicant's convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. State v. Alonza, No. 5111 (S.C. Ct. App. April 3, 2013). The Supreme Court denied the Applicant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on August 21, 2014. The Remittitur was issued on August 27, 2014.

Petitioner filed his post-conviction relief application on September 3, 2014. App. 608-61. The state filed its return on April 27, 2015. App. 615-618. An evidentiary hearing was held on January 12, 2017 in front of the Honorable William H. Seals. App. 620. Rodney Davis represented Petitioner and Alicia Olive represented the state. Id.

By an order filed November 11, 2017, Judge Seals denied Petitioner's post-conviction relief application because trial counsel, "had no reason to suspect Detective Lawrence was untruthful or did not perform his job adequately at the time." App. 682-699.

## STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for post-conviction relief matters depends on the specific issues before the appellate court. Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 810 S.E.2d 836 (2018). On appellate review, courts give great deference to a post-conviction relief court's findings of fact and will uphold them if there is **any** evidence in the record to support them. Smalls, 422 S.C. at 179, 810 S.E.2d at 839-40 (citing Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016); Jordan v. State, 406 S.C. 443, 448, 752 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2013); Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103, 109, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000)). However, pure questions of law will be reviewed *de novo* without deference to the lower court. Id. Appellate courts will reverse the decision of the post-conviction relief court when it is controlled by an error of law. Goins v. State, 397 S.C. 568, 573, 726 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2012).

## RELEVANT FACTS

On June 22, 2009, Applicant fired five shots at Moses Alford. (Tr. p. 182.) Out of the five shots, three of the bullets hit Alford.

Earlier that day, applicant went to the home of La Seto Gibson (Quan). Quan's cousins, Kaylab Wright and Trevor Gibbs, were also at Quan's house (Tr. p. 224-225.) Quan called Alford to see if he could purchase some clothes. (Tr. p. 166-167; Tr. p. 225.) Alford agreed to meet Quan at the Kangaroo gas station in McClellanville. (Tr. p. 168.)

According to Gibbs, Applicant wanted to rob Alford; however Quan, Wright, and Gibbs left Applicant at Quan's house because they did not want to be involved in a robbery. (Tr. p. 229-230.) Quan's grandfather drove Applicant to the Kangaroo where Quan, Wright, and Gibbs were located. Applicant got into Quan's car. Quan and Wright got out of Quan's car and went to Alford's car to look at the clothing. (Tr. p. 177.) Wright returned to Quan's car because he did not like any of the clothes. (Tr. p. 234.)

At some point, Wright took Applicant's gun from him. Applicant wanted his gun back. (Tr. p. 235.) Wright gave Applicant his gun back and told Applicant to not do anything stupid. (Tr. p. 235-236.) Upon Applicant's request, Wright let Applicant out of the car. (Tr. p. 236.)

While Alford was looking in the back seat of the car for an article of clothing, Applicant approached Alford's car. (Tr. p. 179-181.) Applicant pointed a gun at Alford and said, "Give me everything." (Tr. p. 180-182.) When Alford reached for his gun, Applicant shot Alford in the arm, leg, and back. (Tr. p. 182; Tr. p. 480.) At trial, Applicant testified he did not intend to kill Alford; he just wanted to scare him. (Tr. p. 484; Tr. p. 508.) However, Applicant testified he shot

to the side of Alford instead of shooting in the air. (Tr. p. 507.) After Applicant shot Alford, Applicant ran into the woods. (Tr. p. 184.)

On the day of the shooting, Peggy Owen testified she saw Applicant hide behind a car in her driveway, and Applicant ran away when the police got close. (Tr. p. 293-294.) Shortly thereafter, a canine unit found Applicant. (Tr. p. 311.) The police found a crack pipe in Applicant's pocket. (Tr. p. 492; Tr. p. 549.) two days after the shooting, the police found the gun Applicant used to shoot Alford in a drainage pipe near Owen's house. (Tr. p. 295-297; Tr. p. 334-337.) At trial, Investigator Kathy Kjellman testified that no shell casings were found at the scene of the shooting. (Tr. p. 363.) However, revolvers do not eject shell casings. Moreover, the gun found in the drainage pipe near Owen's house was a revolver.

After the canine unit found Applicant, the police brought Applicant back to the Kangaroo. (Tr. p. 40-41.) At the time, Applicant was under arrest for trespassing. (Tr. p. 78-79.) Detective Wagner conducted a gun residue test on Applicant, and Detective Albert Casale read Applicant his rights under Miranda. (Tr. p. 41-43; Tr. p. 47.) According to Detective Casale, Applicant cooperated and did not seem to be confused or intoxicated. (Tr. p. 45; Tr. p. 48.) Detective Casale told Applicant that if Applicant wanted to talk to the police, then he needed to sign the waiver form. (Tr. p. 47.) Applicant told Detective Casale that he did not really want to talk "at that time." (Tr. p. 48; Tr. p. 51-52.) At that point, Detective Casale secured Applicant in the car and informed Applicant that Detective Charles Lawrence would speak to Applicant later that day. (Tr. p. 47-48; Tr. p. 52-53.) Thereafter, Deputy Robert Thornley transported Applicant to the police headquarters. (Tr. p. 271.)

Approximately five to six hours after Detective Casale advised Applicant of his rights at the Kangaroo station, Detective Kip Cooke advised Applicant of his rights at the police

headquarters. (Tr. p. 55; Tr. p. 57; Tr. p. 129.) While Detective Cooke was advising Applicant of his rights, Detective Lawrence came into the room. (Tr. p. 57.) Applicant signed the waiver of rights form. (Tr. p. 61.) Detective Casale left the room in order to work on another case.

At 9:04 p.m. Detective Lawrence began the interview. (Tr. p. 91.) Neither Detective Cooke nor Detective Lawrence knew that Applicant told Detective Casale that he did not want to talk "at that time." (Tr. p. 67; Tr. p. 99-100.) Furthermore, Applicant never told Detective Lawrence he did not want to talk. (Tr. p. 81-82.) Moreover, Applicant never asked for an attorney. (Tr. p. 62; Tr. p. 82.)

During the interview, Detective Lawrence did not make any promises or threats. (Tr. p. 82.) Applicant made a statement essentially denying any involvement in the robbery. Applicant stated he did not know why he was under arrest. The interview lasted approximately two hours. (Tr. p. 81.)

On June 29, 2009, after learning new developments in the case, Detective Lawrence decided to interview Applicant again. (Tr. p. 84-85.) Detective Lawrence transported Applicant to the police headquarters and read Applicant his Miranda rights. (Tr. p. 84; Tr. p. 86.) Applicant signed the acknowledgment and waiver of rights form. (Tr. p. 87-89.) Detective Lawrence did not make any threats or promises. (Tr. p. 89; Tr. p. 381.) Although Applicant claimed Detective Lawrence told him that if the federal authorities picked up his case it would be hard on him, Detective Lawrence testified he never threatened to turn over Applicant's case to the federal authorities. (Tr. p. 82-83; Tr. p. 111-112.) However, Detective Lawrence did inform Applicant that Alford identified Applicant as the shooter. (Tr. p. 90.) At that point, Applicant made a statement. (Tr. p. 90-91.)

According to Applicant's June 29<sup>th</sup> statement, Quan, Wright, and Gibbs wanted to rob someone, and they wanted Applicant to be involved. (Tr. p. 106.) However, before the robbery took place, they told Applicant that they did not need him. Quan, Wright, and Gibbs left Quan's house, and Quan's grandfather gave Applicant a ride to the Kangaroo. Applicant saw Quan, Wright and Gibbs at the Kangaroo. They "forced" Applicant into Quan's car. They told Applicant to get the gun and rob Alford. Someone told Alford to give "us" your money. At that point, Alford went for his gun as he attempted to run away from Applicant. Applicant admitted he shot Alford; however, Applicant claimed he only shot Alford to keep Alford from shooting him. Applicant's testimony at trial was largely consistent with his June 29<sup>th</sup> statement. (Tr. p. 467-485.) However, at trial, Applicant admitted no one threatened or forced him to rob and shoot Alford; Applicant was just scared of Quan, Wright, and Gibbs. (Tr. p. 504-505; Tr. p 509; Tr. p. 514.)

### **PCR Hearing**

At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel Megan Ehrlich testified. She testified she was the lead attorney handling Applicant's case and had assistance from Andrew Grimes, a fellow public defender who has since passed away. (PCR Tr. 6). She testified Applicant was questioned by law enforcement three separate times, including June 22, 2009, and seven days later on June 29, 2009. (PCR Tr. 7, 9, 31). She testified the lead detective handling this case was Detective Lawrence, who was present when Applicant gave at least two of his statements. (PCR Tr. 7-8). She testified the defense tried to suppress these statements and Grimes handled the pre-trial motion to suppress hearing. (PCR Tr. 7-9). She testified the defense theory for why these statements should be suppressed was that Applicant initially said he did not want to speak to law enforcement and law enforcement continued to question him. (PCR Tr. 9, 31-32). She testified

that three different detectives were involved in the questioning of Applicant and none of his statements were recorded. (PCR Tr. 10). She testified law enforcement did not do a report pertaining to any of Applicant's statements. (PCR Tr. 10-11). She testified defense counsel argued Applicant's statements were coerced, but that there was no allegation of physical abuse or threats of harm to Applicant. (PCR Tr. 47). Trial counsel testified Applicant testified at the motion to suppress hearing and ruling trial. (PCR Tr. 11). She testified the trial court denied the motion to suppress and the statements were introduced at trial. (PCR Tr. 11).

Trial counsel testified that three years after Applicant's trial, in 2014, she was made aware that Detective Lawrence was fired from the Sheriff's Office for having a sexual relationship with a suspect's mother in a homicide investigation. (PCR Tr. 11, 13). She testified this made her think of Applicant's case and how crucial Detective Lawrence's testimony had been in Applicant's case. (PCR Tr. 11). She testified she sought and obtained a copy of Detective Lawrence's personnel file pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. (PCR Tr. 11-12, 14) She testified Detective Lawrence's personnel file was quite large and contained numerous instances that she could have used to attack his credibility, including lying about speaking with parents in a missing child investigation, shooting at another vehicle that almost hit his car while he was off-duty, and circumstances surrounding a domestic dispute. (PCR Tr. 13-16, 21-23). She testified the personnel file also revealed Detective Lawrence's investigative skills were marked a 2.5 out of 4 on an evaluation. (PCR Tr. 13-14). She testified she was not aware of any of this information at the time of Applicant's trial in 2011 and had no reason to suspect Detective Lawrence was untruthful or did not perform his job adequately at the time of Applicant's trial. (PCR Tr. 15, 22, 29). She testified if she had known Detective Lawrence had all of these issues before trial, she also would have requested the personnel file for Detective Cooke to try to attack

the validity of Applicant's statements further. (PCR Tr. 17-18). She elaborated that Detective Cooke did not prepare a report of his interrogation of Applicant and was testifying from memory of events that transpired more than two years earlier. (PCR Tr. 18). She testified it was not her standard practice at the time of Applicant's trial to obtain the personnel files of detectives who worked on her client's cases, but she does this more frequently now. (PCR Tr. 33, 53).

Trial counsel testified the case involved Applicant and three cousins, who were younger than Applicant and appeared to be more sophisticated and could manipulate Applicant. (PCR Tr. 19, 49). She testified two cousins gave statements to law enforcement immediately after they were arrested, but the third cousin, Trevor Gibbs, did not initially provide a statement but testified at trial. (PCR Tr. 19-21). She testified the victim identified Applicant as the shooter from a photo array and that Applicant's hand tested positive for gunshot residue. (PCR Tr. 20).

Trial counsel testified there were some minor inconsistencies between the victim's statement and testimony and that provided by Gibbs, including the location of the first few shots and the color of Applicant's gun, but no major inconsistencies. (PCR Tr. 24-26, 48-49). She testified she reviewed the statements given to law enforcement and highlighted any inconsistencies in preparation for cross-examination. (PCR Tr. 47). She testified he also investigated Gibbs and was able to determine he had violated his house arrest. (PCR Tr. 48). She testified she was not able to find much information to use for cross-examination of the victim. (PCR Tr. 48).

Counsel testified Applicant was originally arrested for trespassing and was not charged with the three offenses for which he was indicted until the following day. (PCR Tr. 26-27). She testified there was no proof that Applicant was not allowed to be on the property or had otherwise been put on trespass notice. (PCR Tr. 27). She testified there was also an allegation

that Detective Lawrence had threatened Applicant by mentioning within Applicant's earshot that the case might become federal if Applicant did not cooperate with law enforcement, which defense counsel raised to the trial court. (PCR Tr. 23-24, 47). She testified she requested jury instructions on self-defense and ABHAN, but both were denied by the trial court. (PCR Tr. 50).

Trial counsel testified she and Grimes spent a significant amount of time with Applicant explaining the advantages and disadvantages of testifying at trial. (PCR Tr. 50-51). She testified that Applicant needed to testify to explain his version of events to the jury, particularly once the motion to suppress his statement was denied. (PCR Tr. 51).

Next, Applicant testified on his own behalf and stated he has a tenth grade education. (PCR Tr. 35-36). Applicant testified he believes he was coerced into giving a statement to law enforcement and his attorneys should have moved for suppression on that ground (PCR Tr. 36-39). He elaborated that Detective Lawrence said his case would be handed over to federal authorities if he did not cooperate and he only provided a statement after he was arrested for trespassing, but before he had been charged with any of the more serious charges for which he was ultimately indicted. (PCR Tr. 39). He testified Detective Lawrence was questioned about this and denied making such a statement. (PCR Tr. 38-39). Applicant testified he was apprehended by a SWAT team with a canine unit and was originally told he was not under arrest but was being detained for questioning. (PCR Tr. 40). He testified he originally told law enforcement he did not want to talk. (PCR Tr. 41). He testified it was not until he said he did not want to talk that Detective Lawrence told him he was under arrest for trespassing. (PCR Tr. 42). Applicant testified he was not on trespass notice and otherwise had not been told not to be on the property where he was apprehended. (PCR Tr. 42).

Applicant testified there were discrepancies between the testimony of the victim and Gibbs and that his attorneys should have discovered this and used it to his benefit. (PCR Tr. 44-45). Applicant testified at both the pre-trial motions hearing and at trial. (PCR TR. 38, 46).

## ARGUMENT

### **Respondent's Issue Presented**

Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when she failed to obtain Detective Lawrence's personnel file to impeach his testimony at the suppression hearing, where trial counsel had no reason to know that fruitful information could be gathered from said file?

The central issue in Petitioner's argument is whether or not trial counsel should have obtained Detective Lawrence's personnel file in order to impeach his testimony. Trial counsel is charged with making reasonable investigations in preparation for trial and to make further investigations when they have knowledge that such investigation might be necessary. In the order denying Petitioner's PCR, the PCR judge found that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to acquire the personnel file. The PCR court cited to trial counsel's testimony at the PCR hearing where she testified that she had no reason to believe Detective Lawrence was untruthful or did not do his job properly prior to Petitioner's trial. The PCR court also found that Petitioner failed to meet his burden in establishing that Detective Lawrence's role in Applicant's case involved any unprofessional or untruthful behavior. The State concurs with the PCR Court that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to investigate Detective Lawrence's personnel file when she testified she had not reason to believe that needed to be done. Trial counsel is charged with a reasonable investigation, if trial counsel has no reason to investigate, then she cannot be held deficient for failing to do so.

The PCR court properly found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to acquire Detective Lawrence's file. Petitioner appears to make a clairvoyance argument, arguing that trial counsel should have pulled Detective Lawrence's file because we now know there is information in there that could be of interest. Also, Petitioner argues that the suppression hearing and impeaching Detective Lawrence was the ultimate deciding factor in this case. This is not the case, as the record makes clear that the victim identified petitioner as the shooter in a photo array and there were three co-defendants who either gave statements or testified that petitioner was the shooter. Thus, the PCR court did not err in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in petitioner's case. App. 364-368; See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (provides that a petitioner must show that counsel was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of petitioner's proceedings); (see also) Gallman v. State, 307 S.C. 273, 414 S.E.2d 780 (1992).

In a PCR action, "the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." Frasier v. State, 351 S.C. 385, 389, 570 S.E.2d 172, 174 (2002) (citing Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP). Where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged as a ground for relief, the applicant must prove that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985).

The proper measure of performance is whether the attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Courts presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Butler, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813. The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).

First, the applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, attorney performance is measured by its "reasonableness under professional norms." *Id.* at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the applicant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Id.* at 117-118, 386 S.E.2d at 625. Specifically, "a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial." *Johnson v. State*, 325 S.C. 182, 186, 480 S.E.2d 733, 735 (1997) (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694 (1984)); see *Cherry*, 300 S.C. at 117-118, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (1989).

In this case, trial counsel made reasonable efforts in her investigation of the case and had no reason to know that pulling Detective Lawrence's file would be fruitful. Petitioner's statement was not the hinge upon which his entire case hung and trial counsel attempted to impeach Detective Lawrence on cross-examination concerning the lack of recordings. Counsel made every effort to "discover all reasonably available mitigation evidence and reasonable available evidence tending to rebut any aggravating evidence introduced by the State." *McKnight v. State*, 378 S.C. 33, 46, 661 S.E.2d 354, 360 (2008).

Furthermore, in *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 691, the United States Supreme Court held that, "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." See *Ard v. Catoe*, 372 S.C. 318, 642 S.E.2d 590 (2007) (provides that "without a doubt, a criminal defense attorney has a duty to investigate, but this duty is limited to reasonable investigation.") (quoting *Thompson v. Wainwright*, 787 F.2d 1447, 1450 (1986)). The United States Supreme Court has also held that "in assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's investigation,... a court must not only consider the quantum of

evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003).

Here, trial counsel’s investigations fell well within the reasonableness standard set in Ard. The standard is that counsel is required to make reasonable investigations and if there is known evidence that requires further investigation, they must do so. At the time of petitioner’s suppression hearing there was no indication to trial counsel that investigating Detective Lawrence’s personnel file would have yielded any useful information, therefore, she should not be considered ineffective for later discovering (through discovery in a completely unrelated case years later) something that might have been helpful in this case. The State does not believe it to be reasonable or standard practice for defense attorneys to have to pull personnel files every time a Detective is to be put on the stand. Even if the suppression hearing was as important as Petitioner now argues, which it was not, trial counsel should not be found ineffective for failing to have the gift of clairvoyance when she testified at the PCR hearing that she had absolutely no reason to believe that there would be anything impeaching in Detective Lawrence’s file. Therefore, trial counsel, based on the facts known to her at the time, did not have a duty to investigate Detective Lawrence’s personnel file, where she had no reason to know such an investigation was necessary. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; (see also) McKnight, 378 S.C. at 46, 661 S.E.2d at 360.

Even if this court finds that trial counsel was deficient in her representation, petitioner was not prejudiced. At the PCR hearing, trial counsel testified to the significant amount of evidence that the State had against petitioner in this case. All three of petitioner’s codefendants, his cousins who were in the car with him, all eventually either gave statements to police or testified against petitioner at trial. (PCR Tr. 19-21). Counsel also testified at the PCR hearing that

the victim in this case was able to identify petitioner from a photo array and there was gunshot residue on petitioner's hands. (PCR Tr. 20). The three statements of the co-defendants were all relatively consistent and all cited petitioner as shooter in this case, as well as the victim identifying petitioner from the photo array. Even if petitioner was successful at his suppression hearing, the State still would have had significant evidence against petitioner to use at trial. The State did not need petitioner's statement to Detective Lawrence in order to convict him, and therefore, there can be no prejudice to petitioner for any alleged deficiency in trial counsel's investigations leading into said suppression hearing.

In conclusion, the PCR court properly found that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to acquire Detective Lawrence's personnel file. Trial counsel is charged with reasonably investigating and conducting a further investigation when she has reason or information that should cause her to do so. Here, trial counsel testified that she had no reason to believe that Detective Lawrence was untruthful or did not perform his job adequately at the time of Petitioner's trial. Counsel cannot be found to be deficient for failing to acquire a personnel file where she had no reason to believe she would find useful information and no knowledge at the time that should have led her to that conclusion.

**CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Should this Court grant the petition, the State seeks permission to more fully brief the issues herein.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dec 7, 2018

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In the Supreme Court

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CERTIORARI TO CHARLESTON COUNTY  
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William Seals, Circuit Court Judge

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Appellate Case No. 2018-000089

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ALONZA DENNIS,

PETITIONER

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

RESPONDENT

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

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The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the **Return to Petition for Writ of Certiorari** has been served upon the applicant by mailing two copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

**Victor R. Seeger, Esquire  
S.C. Commission on Indigent Defense  
PO Box 11589  
Columbia, SC 29211**

This 7<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2018,

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Jennifer Jennison  
Legal Assistant for Respondent



ALAN WILSON  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

December 7, 2018

RECEIVED  
DEC 07 2018  
S.C. SUPREME COURT

The Honorable Daniel E. Shearouse  
Clerk of Court — SC Supreme Court  
Post Office Box 11330  
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

**RE: Alonza Dennis v. State of South Carolina**  
**Appellate Case No.: 2018-000089**

Dear Mr. Shearouse:

Enclosed please find the original and six copies of the **Return to Petition for Writ of Certiorari** in the above matter for filing. Please let me know if anything additional is needed.

Sincerely,

*Benjamin Limbaugh*

Benjamin H. Limbaugh  
Assistant Attorney General  
S.C. Bar # 103334

BHL/jaj  
Enclosures

cc: Victor R. Seeger, Esquire  
Victim Advocacy Division