

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF DORCHESTER

Molly Morphew,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Stephen Dudek, Doreen Cross, David Collins, Allison Williams, First Federal, Michael Scarafile, Susan Nicholson, Carolina One Real Estate, Carrie Boyer, Woody Law Firm,

Defendants.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Civil Action No.: 2016-CP-18-1706

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS CARRIE BOYER AND WOODY LAW FIRM'S MOTION TO DISMISS

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SC Court of Appeals

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CLERK OF COURT
DORCHESTER COUNTY

Presiding Judge:	Hon. Deadra L. Jefferson
Date of Hearing:	November 7, 2016
Plaintiff's Counsel:	Molly Morphew, <i>Pro Se</i>
Defendant Dudek & Cross's Counsel:	Steve Smith, Esq.
Defendant Williams and First Federal's Counsel:	Jordan Crapps, Esq.
Defendant Woody Law Firm & Carrie Boyer's Counsel:	Claude PreVoust, Esq.
Defendant Scarafile, Nicholson, Collins, & Carolina One's Counsel:	Steve Smith, Esq.
Court Reporter:	Karen Andersen

This Matter came before the Court on Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer's Motion to Dismiss, filed September 29, 2016. Present at the hearing was the Plaintiff Molly Morphew, representing herself *pro se*.¹ Additionally present were Jordan Crapps, Esq., counsel for Defendant Williams and First Federal, Steve Smith, Esq., representing Defendants Dudek and Cross as well as Defendants Scarafile, Collins, Nicholson, and Carolina One, and Claude PreVoust, Esq., representing Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer. For the reasons stated herein Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

¹ Ms. Morphew was accompanied by a next of friend who assisted her throughout the proceedings but did not speak on the record.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Molly Morphew filed this lawsuit in the Dorchester County Court of Common Pleas on August 24, 2016. Plaintiff's sixty four (64) page Complaint purports to allege a total of eighteen (18) causes of action. The Complaint purports to allege the following causes of action against "all Defendants:"²

- Plaintiff's First Cause of Action, identified as "Fraud, Extrinsic Fraud – Fraud on the Court"
- Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action, identified as "Perjury"
- Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action, identified as, "Bad Faith and Unfair Dealings and/or Accompanied by Fraudulent Action; conspiracy to defraud"
- Plaintiff's Twelfth Cause of Action, identified as "Fraud – Untrue assertion of fact [or equivalent]; Assertion made with knowledge of falsity and intent to deceive"
- Plaintiff's Sixteenth Cause of Action, identified as "Obstruction of Justice; SC Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(a)(4), Rule 3.4(a), Rule 3.4(d)"
- Plaintiff's Seventeenth Cause of Action, identified as "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress"
- Plaintiff's Eighteenth Cause of Action, identified as "Tortious Interference with Existing Contractual Relations"

In addition, the Complaint purports to allege the following cause of action against Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer, specifically:

- Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action, identified as "Violation ABA Rules of Professional Conduct"

Defendants Woody Law Firm and Boyer moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on the grounds that the facts alleged in the Complaint do not support a valid claim for relief against either

² The allegations of these purported claims generically refer to "all defendants." However, the substance of these alleged claims contain no allegations against Defendants Woody Law Firm and Boyer and in fact do not reference these defendants aside from the statement that Defendant Nicholson requested The Woody Law Firm to ask for proof of repairs to the damages identified in the CL-100 (Complaint, ¶ 194).

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Defendants Woody Law Firm or Carrie Boyer. Plaintiff opposed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the allegations in the Complaint satisfy the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

This action arises out of Plaintiff Molly Morphew's attempted purchase of property located in Summerville, South Carolina, and a resulting consolidated civil lawsuit, which was recently affirmed by the South Carolina Court of Appeals ("the underlying suit").³ All of the Defendants named in the present action are in some way related to the subject matter of the underlying suit. Defendants Dudek and Cross were competing buyers of the subject property, on which Plaintiff admittedly had a "back-up contract." (Id. at ¶ 39). Defendant Woody Law Firm is a real estate law firm that acted as the closing attorney for Defendants Dudek and Cross with respect to their unconsummated closing of the subject property pursuant to their contract with the Sellers. Defendant Boyer was a paralegal employed by the Woody Law Firm.

In the present action, Plaintiff claims she was "ultimately wronged by failing to be awarded specific performance to purchase [the subject property]" (Complaint, ¶ 5). Plaintiff only references Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer in seven paragraphs throughout the entirety of the sixty-four (64) page complaint. First, Plaintiff asserts that on November 27, 2012, Defendants Dudek, Cross, or Nicholson requested that Woody Law Firm contact the Sellers. (Complaint, ¶ 170). Next, Plaintiff asserts that the Woody Law Firm mailed a letter to the Sellers introducing themselves as the closing attorneys and requesting information. (Complaint, ¶ 171).

³ The underlying suit bears Case Nos. 2013-CP-18-00183 and 2013-CP-18-00074. On September 18, 2013, the above cases were consolidated under Case No. 2013-CP-18-00183. Thereafter, on December 30, 2013, by Consent Order, the matter was referred to the Master in Equity. The Master in Equity ruled in favor of Defendants Dudek and Cross, and Plaintiff and the Sellers appealed the decision. (Complaint, ¶¶ 64-65). The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in Opinion Number, 2017-UP-019, dated January 11, 2016.

Plaintiff then asserts that Defendant Boyer requested that the Sellers provide proof of repairs to minor damages stated in the CL-100. (Complaint, ¶ 172).⁴

Plaintiff then alleges that these actions “created an unjustified expectation or belief as to the status of Defendants Dudek and Cross’s financing status . . . and created a false sense of belief that a closing would take place [in the near future], which was materially misleading to the Plaintiff or the courts.” (Complaint, ¶ 173). Plaintiff further generally alleges that all Defendants’ actions were dishonest and “she (and all parties involved) would never have gone to trial [in the underlying suit] or be in this position today if Defendant or its agent had conducted themselves with honesty. . . .” (Complaint, ¶ 174 and 177).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to SCRCP Rule 8(a), “[a] pleading which sets forth a cause of action . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” See South Carolina Nat’l Bank v. Joyner, 289 S.C. 382, 346 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he principal purpose of pleadings is to inform the pleader’s adversary of legal and factual positions which he will be required to meet on trial.”). Rule 8(a), “requires a litigant to plead the ultimate facts which will be proved at trial.” Clark v. Clark, 293 S.C. 415, 416, 361 S.E.2d 328, 328 (1987); see Stroud v. Riddle, 260 S.C. 99, 194 S.E.2d 235 (1973); Watts v. Metro Sec. Agency, 346 S.C. 235, 240, 550 S.E.2d 869, 871 (Ct. App. 2001) (“Ultimate facts fall somewhere between the verbosity of evidentiary facts and the sparsity of legal conclusions.”). Conclusory allegations in a complaint are insufficient to survive a judgment on the pleadings. Jones v. Gilstrap, 288 S.C. 525, 528, 343 S.E.2d 646, 648 (Ct. App. 1986).

⁴ Plaintiff later references Woody Law Firm and asserts that Defendant Nicholson requested that the firm provide notice that they required proof of repairs to damages stated in the CL-100. (Complaint, ¶ 194).

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Under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRPC, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint based upon "failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action." Jarrell v. Petoseed Co., Inc., 331 S.C. 207, 500 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Ct. App. 1998); O'Laughlin v. Windham, 330 S.C. 379, 498 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 1998). A trial judge may dismiss a claim when the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in the pleadings filed with the court. Williams v. Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 553 S.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 2001). Generally, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the trial court must base its ruling solely on the allegations contained in the complaint. See Holy Loch Distributors, Inc. v. Hitchcock, 332 S.C. 247, 503 S.E.2d 787, 790 (Ct. App. 1998); Jarrell v. Petoseed Co., Inc., 331 S.C. 207, 500 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Ct. App. 1998); O'Laughlin v. Windham, 330 S.C. 379, 498 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 1998).

"The ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint." Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300, 457 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1995). However, when a party has explicitly relied upon documents to form the underlying basis for one or more of its causes of action, the Court can consider those documents in deciding a motion to dismiss without converting that motion into a motion for summary judgment. Brazell v. Windsor, 384 S.C. 512, 516, 682 S.E.2d 824, 826 (2009). A motion to dismiss should be sustained if facts alleged and reasonable inferences derived therefrom would not entitle the plaintiff to any relief on any theory of the case. Stiles at 300, 457 S.E.2d at 603.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Cause of Action – Fraud, Extrinsic Fraud, and Fraud on the Courts is heard and denied.

For the purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion for failure of the pleadings to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, "the [sole] question is whether, in the light most favorable to the

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plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247-248 (2007). If the facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory, then dismissal is improper. Id. "The complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action." Id.

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this Court finds that dismissal of Plaintiff's First Cause of Action – Fraud would be improper. Accordingly, Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Cause of Action is heard and denied.

B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action – Perjury and Sixteenth Cause of Action – Obstruction of Justice and Violations of the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4(a)(4) and Rules 3.4(a)(d) is heard and granted.

Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action is a claim of perjury against all Defendants. South Carolina Code Ann. § 16-9-10 provides, in relevant part,

(A)(1) It is unlawful to give false, misleading, or incomplete testimony under oath in any court of record, judicial, administrative, or regulatory proceeding in this State.

(2) It is unlawful for a person to willfully give false, misleading, or incomplete information on a document, record, report, or form required by the laws of this State.

Perjury is a criminal felony punishable with a fine and up to five years imprisonment.

See Collins v. Doe, 343 S.C. 119, 124, 539 S.E.2d 62, 64 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 352 S.C. 462, 574 S.E.2d 739 (2002). Accordingly, perjury is a criminal charge – not a civil cause of action.

Obstruction of justice is a common law criminal offense. Specifically, "it is an offense to

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do any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes, or hinders the administration of justice.” State v. Cogdell, 273 S.C. 563, 567, 257 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1979). It is a criminal charge and not a basis for civil liability.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s claim fails because there is no independent civil cause of action for perjury. Moreover, this purported perjury claim contains no specific allegations directed at Defendants Allison Williams and First Federal Bank. Plaintiff’s obstruction of justice claim likewise fails because it is not a civil cause of action. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for perjury and obstruction of justice is granted.

Further, the claims by Plaintiff of Defendants’ violation of the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct are also without merit. First, it is well established that violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer. S.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 407, cmt. 7 (2013). The Rules “are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.” S.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 407, cmt. 7 (2013). Instead, they are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and provide a structure for regulating attorney conduct. See also Spence v. Wingate, 395 SC 148, 161, 716 S.E.2d 920, 927 (2011) (“A review of the Scope of Rule 407, SCACR clearly indicates that the rules are intended for guidance and disciplinary purposes, not to form the basis for civil litigation.”). Therefore, there is no civil cause of action for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Plaintiff’s claims grounded on such violations are dismissed.

C. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action – Violation of the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct is heard and granted.

In Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action, she alleges that Defendant Woody Law Firm and its agents have violated Rules 4.1 and 5.3 of the American Bar Association Rules of Professional



Conduct ("ABA Rules").⁵

Plaintiff's claims for violations of the ABA and South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct fail for several reasons. First, it is well established that violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer. S.C. Rules of Professional Conduct R. 407, cmt. 7 (2013). The Rules "are not designed to be a basis for civil liability." S.C. Rules of Professional Conduct R. 407, cmt. 7 (2013). Instead, they are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and provide a structure for regulating attorney conduct. See also Spence v. Wingate, 395 S.C. 148, 161, 716 S.E.2d 920, 927 (2011) ("A review of the Scope of Rule 407, SCACR clearly indicates that the rules are intended for guidance and disciplinary purposes, not to form the basis for civil litigation."). Therefore, there is no civil cause of action for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Plaintiff's claims grounded on such violations are dismissed.

Although the Rules of Professional Conduct do not create a civil cause of action, they are relevant in assessing a lawyer's duty in a malpractice action. Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Geurard, 322 S.C. 433, 472 S.E.2d 612 (1996). However, to the extent that Plaintiff's claim could be construed as a legal malpractice claim, it also fails. The elements of a legal malpractice claim include: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) a breach of duty by the attorney; (3) damage to the client; and (4) proximate cause of the client's damages by the breach. See Brown v. Theos, 345 S.C. 626, 629, 550 S.E.2d 304, 306 (2001); Hall v. Fedor, 349 S.C. 169, 174, 561 S.E.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 2002). Plaintiff's Complaint contains insufficient facts to establish an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant Woody Law

⁵ South Carolina has not adopted the ABA Rules. Instead, South Carolina attorneys are bound by the S.C. Rules of Professional Conduct. However, Rules 4.1 and 5.3 of the ABA Rules are identical to Rules 4.1 and 5.3 of the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. Therefore, the Court will address Plaintiff's claim as though she cited the applicable rules.

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Firm. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a cause of action for legal malpractice. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had pled all of the elements of a legal malpractice claim, the cause of action against Defendant Woody Law Firm is dismissed because Plaintiff failed to comply with the expert affidavit requirements under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-100(B).⁶ Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action is granted.

D. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action – Bad Faith and Unfair Dealings and/or Accompanied by Fraudulent Action; Conspiracy to Defraud is heard and denied.

For the purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion for failure of the pleadings to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, "the [sole] question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247-248 (2007). If the facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory, then dismissal is improper. Id. "The complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action." Id.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this Court finds that dismissal of Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action – Bad Faith and Unfair Dealings and/or Accompanied by Fraudulent Action; Conspiracy to Defraud would be improper. Accordingly, Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer's Motion to Dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint is heard and denied.

⁶ In her Brief in Opposition to Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff further asserts that, even if she were to allege a legal malpractice claim, the allegations in the Complaint fall within the exception to Subsection B regarding negligence involving common knowledge and experience. However, the real estate closing process is not within the ambit of common knowledge and experience. Therefore, this exception is inapplicable. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot have it both ways—she is either asserting a legal malpractice claim or she is not.



E. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Twelfth Cause of Action – Fraud; Untrue Assertion of Fact (or Equivalent); Assertion Made with Knowledge of Falsity and Intent to Deceive) is heard and granted.

The Cause of Action plead by Plaintiff asserts that, through testimony and discovery, the Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer deceived both the Plaintiff and the Court by making untrue assertions. As such, the Plaintiff pleads a claim of perjury rather than fraud. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Twelfth Cause of Action is granted.

F. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Seventeenth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is heard and denied.

For the purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion for failure of the pleadings to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, “the [sole] question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247-248 (2007). If the facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory, then dismissal is improper. Id. “The complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action.” Id.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this Court finds that dismissal of Plaintiff's Seventeenth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress would be improper. Accordingly, Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer's Motion to Dismiss the Seventeenth Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint is heard and denied.

G. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighteenth Cause of Action – Tortious Interference with Existing Contractual Relations is heard and denied.

For the purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion for failure of the pleadings to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, “the [sole] question is whether, in the light most favorable to the

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
plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247-248 (2007). If the facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory, then dismissal is improper. Id. “The complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action.” Id.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this Court finds that dismissal of Plaintiff's Eighteenth Cause of Action – Tortious Interference with Existing Contractual Relations would be improper. Accordingly, Defendants Woody Law Firm and Carrie Boyer's Motion to Dismiss the Eighteenth Cause of Action of Plaintiff's Complaint is heard and denied.

CONCLUSION

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint is granted in part, and denied in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



The Honorable Deadra L. Jefferson
Presiding Judge
First Judicial Circuit

January 26, 2017
Charleston, South Carolina
At Chambers

FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
 COUNTY OF DORCHESTER
 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
 CASE NUMBER 2016CP1801706

Molly M. Morphey	2017 JAN 31 AM 8:56 CLERK OF COURT DORCHESTER COUNTY	Stephen Dudek David Collins First Federal Susan Nicholson Carrie Boyer	Doreen Cross Allison Williams Michael Scarafie Carolina One Real Estate
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PLAINTIFF(S)	DEFENDANT(S)
Submitted by:	Attorney for: <input type="checkbox"/> Plaintiff <input type="checkbox"/> Defendant <input type="checkbox"/> Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

JURY VERDICT. This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.

DECISION BY THE COURT. This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. See Page 2 for additional information.

ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON): Rule 12(b), SCRCP; Rule 41(a), SCRCP (Vol. Nonsuit);
 Rule 43(k), SCRCP (Settled); Other: _____

ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON): Rule 40(j), SCRCP; Bankruptcy;
 Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; Other: _____

DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):
 Affirmed; Reversed; Remanded; Other: _____

RECEIVED
 DEC 12 2018
 SC Court of Appeals

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: See attached order, (formal order to follow) Statement of Judgment by the Court.

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ends does not end the case.
 Additional Information for the Clerk: _____

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX		
Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.		
Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.
 E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the Court will electronically sign this form using a separate electronic signature page.

Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge	2128 Judge Code	1/31/2017 Date
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1/31/17

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

1/31/17

This judgment was entered on, and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box or to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

Molly M Morphew 788 E. Butternut Road Summerville, SC 29483

Michael Christopher Scarafie 4024 Salt Pointe Parkway N. Charleston, SC 29405


Steven L. Smith/Zachary James Closser/Samuel Melvil Wheeler 7455 Cross County Rd., Suite 1 PO Box 40578 Charleston, SC 29423-0578

Amy L.B. Hill/Jordan Michael Crapps PO Box 7368 Columbia, SC 29202

Amy Lynn Neuschafer/William Alfred Bryan Jr. 11945 Grandhaven Drive Suite D Murrells Inlet, SC 29576

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)



Court Reporter: Karen Andersen

Cheryl Graham - Clerk of Court

Court Reporter:

E-Filing Note: In E-Filing counties, the date of Entry of Judgment is the same date as reflected on the Electronic File Stamp and the clerk's entering of the date of judgment above is not required in those counties. The clerk will mail a copy of the judgement to parties who are not E-Fileers or who are appearing pro se. See Rule 77(d), SCRCF.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECISION BY THE COURT AS REFERENCED ON PAGE 1.

This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.

Four horizontal lines for additional information.