

**NOTICE OF APPEAL IN A CIVIL CASE**  
**APPEAL TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**In The Court of Appeals**

**Case#: 2016-002024**

**RECEIVED**

DEC 28 2018

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY S.C. SUPREME COURT**

**Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge**  
**Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd**

**VS**

**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,**  
**Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police**  
**Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**APPEAL BRIEF**

David Lynd

2605 Rustown  
Mesquite TX 75150

**TABLE OF CONTENTS AND CASES.**

|                                                                                            |       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Table of contents                                                                          | 2     |
| Statement of Issues                                                                        | 3     |
| Statement of case                                                                          | 4     |
| Argument                                                                                   | 12    |
| Conclusion                                                                                 | 38    |
| Certificate of service                                                                     | 41    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>Rule 56(c), SCRCP.</u>                                                                  | 18    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>SECTION 15-78-110.</u>                                                                  | 14    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>SECTION 15-78-90.</u>                                                                   | 13,15 |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>SECTION 56-5-5635.</u>                                                                  | 16    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>SECTION 56-5-5660.</u>                                                                  | 20    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>SECTION 56-5-5940</u>                                                                   | 21    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>SECTION 56-5-5945.</u>                                                                  | 23    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>Abbott v. State, 979 P.2d 994, 997-998 (Alaska 1999)</u>                                | 31    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>Anonymous Taxpayer v. Dept. of Revenue, 661 SE 2d 73 - SC: Supreme Court 2008</u>       | 27    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>Braudie v. Richland County, 219 S.C. 130, 64 S.E. (2d) 248 (1951)</u>                   | 14,15 |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>Hancock v. Mid-South Management Co., Inc., 673 SE 2d 801 - SC: Supreme Court 2009</u>   | 19    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>Hooper v. Ebenezer Senior Services, 659 SE 2d 213 - SC: Court of Appeals 2008</u>       | 29    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>Hill v. York County Sheriff's Dep't, 313 S.C. 303, 437 S.E.2d 179 (Ct.App.1993)</u>     | 19    |
| <br>                                                                                       |       |
| <u>Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435</u> | 31    |

|                                                                                                                                                          |       |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| <u>Lanham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 563 SE 2d 331 - SC: Supreme Court 2002</u>                                                                      | 35,36 |
| <u>Moates v. Bobb, 322 S.C. 172, 176, 470 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1996)</u>                                                                              | 34    |
| <u>Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 334 S.C. 150, 163-64, 511 S.E.2d 699, 706 3(Ct.App.1999), aff'd, 341 S.C. 320, 534 S.E.2d 672 (2000).</u> | 34    |
| <u>Searcy v. SC DEPT. OF EDUCATION, 402 SE 2d 486 - SC: Court of Appeals 1991</u>                                                                        | 14    |
| <u>Scovill v. Johnson, 190 S.C. 457, 3 S.E. (2d) 543 (1939).</u>                                                                                         | 29    |
| <u>State v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 175 SE 2d 203 - SC: Supreme Court 1970</u>                                                                         | 29    |
| <u>Summer v. Carpenter, 328 S.C. 36, 492 S.E.2d 55 (1997).</u>                                                                                           | 18    |
| <u>Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 589, 553 S.E.2d 110, 114 (2001).</u>                                                                  | 33    |

### **STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL.**

Note: This brief is filed by MEMEORY, I have made 9 requests for the record to the clerks and still have not received the record, or files of any kind, including my file in possession of my former atty. This is an intentional act to impede my filing and winning of the appeal. I have 2 transcripts with giant double spaced text one 6 pages, and one 12 pages, that is all I have to base this FAIR AND JUST appeal on.

Tolled statute of limitations

Equitable estoppel

Fraudulent inducement

Lynd filed A verified claim to enact the 3 yr statute of limitations was made.

Conduct of IOP employees to commit fraud is a material fact

Conduct of Atty (officers of the court) is a material fact

Due diligence to do pre-suit investigation does not start SOL running

All 3 parties cannot use the same SOL dates

Failure to follow notification statutes constitutes conversion under the law.

Conversion nullifies any Sol argument under which IOP claims their duties were fulfilled

Does a numerous volume of errors that must be sorted through prior to suit, toll SOL

A material fact exist on disclosure under the FIOA that nullifies Summary Judgment

Can a court just pick a random date to start the tolling of the SOL without facts

Due diligence of the facts surrounding an issue must be done prior to filing suit

Does IOP claims of 'no wrongdoing' finding by SLED force Lynd must wait to verify that prior to filing suit to avoid a frivolous suit?

In effective assistance of counsel

### **STATEMENT OF THE CASE.**

In 2004 a pair of Jet skis owned by David Lynd were stolen in Texas, and ultimately ended up in South Carolina. The skis were impounded by IOP det. Caldwell from a 3<sup>rd</sup> party (*thief*) without cause, due to an officers belief they were stolen. Even though the officer felt the action was helping to save the jet skis, the subsequent act in turn caused their destruction without notice to Lynd, or proper S.C. impound procedure and notifications followed.

The statute requires notification of the owner of the titled property as shown on the title, and the impounding department, and/or 3<sup>rd</sup> party designee (*private impound lot*), both, to notify by certified mail, the owner listed on the title, and is required to do an exhaustive search to locate the titled owner, even if title records cannot be found. In this instance the owner was shown on the title and could have easily been found by either the TX styled registration numbers on the jet skis, or the hull I.D. number. Both of which are shown in the police records.

I.O.P. not only did not notify Lynd of them being impounded, they subsequently **failed in every single step the statutes require to protect property owners**, all the way from notice, to paperwork and documentation required to destroy "unclaimed" property.

The jet skis in question were stolen from TX where Lynd lives, an arrest was made and a statement was given by the alleged thief as to the jet skis location in S.C. down to a specific address. This becomes a very important fact in this appeal. Upon being given a copy of this statement made, Lynd contacted the IOP police department and spoke to a then Det. Caldwell, Caldwell was faxed a copy of the statement and on 3 separate occasions by her claims went to the address and searched for the Jet Skis, even speaking with the property owners on the 3<sup>rd</sup> occasion.

Caldwell then sent a statement to the police dept. in TX **and stated as a fact** that she had gone to the address 3 times and spoke to the owners, and stated the owners claimed the thief had stayed there but at no time did he have any jet skis in his possession. Caldwell stated IOP had done all it could do in searching for the skis and that the skis in question were not on the Isle of Palms. This entire investigation took approx. 3 weeks. In this time Lynd and Caldwell had numerous conversations. Lynd was known to Caldwell and IOP as the stolen properties owner, and the correct address and phone numbers were in IOP possession.

**Nowhere does any of this action or conduct exist in the I.O.P. file.**

Upon Caldwell's notice to the TX local PD that the statement given, and address given were false, the thief was confronted in TX on the skis not being where stated. The thief then tried to take the skis from TX to SC and was assumed going to try and leave them there someplace. Caldwell claims to have noticed them and stopped the person with them.

June 1 2004 Caldwell stopped the thief with the skis and instead of documenting it and having them returned to TX, impounded them and failed at that point, to follow the statutes of impounded titled property. The skis at the time were not listed in the NCIC as stolen and should not have been impounded. Subsequently Caldwell claimed they were hauled off from the IOP pound by a non-existent salvage company, and non-existent person. This destruction is a mere handwritten note in the IOP file and was signed off on by her superiors. NOT A SINGLE required document was filled out, title search done, or any of the documents and procedures the statutes require followed. It appears she just had it done without records if you believe the altered file.

All of this is admitted to by Caldwell in 3 separate statements, 2 of which are sworn statements.

*( that itself is an entire separate issue, the statutes and code requires IOP and subsequently SLED, to take action upon an admission of conversion by an officer and they failed to do so)*

This type of police and court conduct, and the courts covering by excuse of such conduct is exactly why the country is in an uproar of the justice system.

All of this is fact, documented, sworn to, and undisputed and cannot be excused or dismissed under a manufactured SOL date.

Fast-forward to 2012, all this time the skis are still listed as titled to Lynd and the estimate value considered an asset of Lynd. In an action to remove them as an asset Lynd contacted the ***Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept.*** Now on referenced as the **TPWD**. The clerk told him the notes showed they were impounded by the I.O.P. police dept. It turned out the notation was made by the local police due to the earlier mentioned false statement, not any papers submitted by the I.O.P.

But the clerk statement made Lynd again 8 yrs. later contact I.O.P.to inquire.

Subsequently caused the start of the Fraud by IOP, SLED, and Caldwell. At no time did any of the involved parties admit to the errors made and resolve the issue, instead they went on a massive and extensive cover-up to include lies and false statement by their own attorneys in an attempt to reach some imaginary SOL date. Even though later it is all admitted too, in SLED sworn statements.

As the original trial briefs and this brief outlines, the went on a campaign of lies, falsifying records, altering the official file, and closing investigations prematurely to further their own agenda in prosecuting Caldwell. The FACTS that IOP altered the police file, and SLED closed the investigation in which Caldwell agave a sworn statement admitting to the conduct, conversion, and failure to follow state procedures,,,, IS UNDISPUTED.

The fact they altered the file and official state record, and SLED excused that, cannot be allowed, that ACTION in and of itself is grounds for the COA to step in and investigate, or hear argument of the conduct, or assign the appropriate party to do so.

At this point in the issue Lynd called and emailed several times following a FIOA request to IOP, IOP appeared to be stalling the production of the file, and facts prove out they were. Lynd's FOIA request went to Tracy Waldron, secretary to the IOPPD Chief of Police. Contained within her file are inter-office emails to Defendant Caldwell explaining that certain documents, including, but not limited to destruction documents, Certified Mailing Notices, and insurance adjuster notes were not in the file. Also contained therein is a reply from Defendant Caldwell stating *"that she has the documents on her personal flash drive, will add them to the file, and deal with Plaintiff personally"*. This very disturbing in and of itself.

Defendant IOPPD complied with Plaintiff's FOIA request and provided him with file # 04-18619. The file itself is dated June 1, 2004. However, the page dates jump back and forth. The facts now show the delay was due to Defendant Caldwell altered this particular file on September 11, 2012. After Tracy Waldron explained what was missing. Each page of the report, though in numeric order, has different dates accompanying its entry. Pages one and three for instance have the date 6-1-2004. Pages 2 and 4 have the date 9-11-2012. Most importantly, Defendant Caldwell and IOPPD added two (2) additional pages (five and six) to the file on 9-11-2012. The facts show the file was altered and changed in violation of the law. The computer program automatically changed the dates as Caldwell or someone at IOP made changes to the file to cover-up the original errors.

**\*\*\*\* A huge point here on the SOL is this alleged flash drive Caldwell claims to have the documents on, has never been produced after numerous request, which tolls the SOL under the due diligence required before filling suit. If it exist or not, and/or the contents and the ex-fil dates of the origination of the file dates would be the entire foundation of a case, and premature filing without those facts and proof would hindered Lynd's ability to properly prosecute the case.**

On pages five and six of the file, Defendant Caldwell and IOP added a "Supplementary Report," on September 12, 2012, roughly eight (8) years after the initial report. Despite eight years having passed from the original date, Defendants Caldwell and IOP seem to have a precise recollection of the events described therein.

However, as will be evident from her later interview with SLED agents, Defendant Caldwell admits to fabricating a majority of the information contained on pages five and six. Defendant Caldwell claims to have sent Plaintiff three (3) letters. Again, these purported letters were not present in the original file, but later altered and added by IOP on September 11, 2012. The letters appear to be an attempt to notify Lynd that he had ninety (90) days to pick up his property. These letters were allegedly mailed regular us mail, not certified as required, and show an incorrect address. Caldwell and IOP had the correct address in the file. This falsification of the record was done intentionally to try and claim some clerical error as an excuse why the destruction happened without notice to Lynd. This too is undisputed.

Caldwell and IOPPD's rendition of the alleged facts in their Supplementary Report states that Caldwell met with an insurance adjuster on behalf of Lynd on July 21, 2004. As stated earlier, these particular water craft were not insured at the time of loss. No such insurance adjuster would have come out to Isle of Palms on behalf of Lynd. Defendant Caldwell asserts that she had telephone contact with Lynd on June 24, 2004 advising him the water craft were at the IOPPD office, and that he needed to make arrangements to pick them up, that the condition of the jet skis was poor, and that he'd likely need a flat-bed tow truck to transport them, as "the trailer, and most importantly the axle was rusted to the point of breaking."

Lynd was not, and did not make any such insurance claim on this property. This is further proof that Defendants Caldwell and IOP created a bogus rendition of the facts some eight years after the fact to cover up their malfeasance. **IOP and Caldwell knew they would be required to make restitution under the statutes** and made this false addition to the file, **to try and generate a false and fraudulent value of the skis they would have to pay for.** The file shows no

record of this adjuster, nor a condition report, or appraisal; no adjuster would have looked at them and not documented it in some way or taken photos. IOP and Caldwell just assumed they would have been insured, and manufactured this for a cover-up.

Again comes in the Question of this alleged flash drive and its contents which is required for a complete pre-suit investigation of the issue. Therefore no SOL has been reached.

IOP at this time had filed Lynd's claim/complaint with its insurance program, On October 18, 2012, Chief Buckhannon requested that SLED review this particular case as well, referenced as OCA # 04-18619. SLED did open an investigation, **but did not notify Lynd of said investigation, nor did they interview him.** *(that act is highly questionable in and of itself, why not call the complainant?)* Instead, they appear to have conducted an investigation in secret wherein they interviewed only Caldwell and reviewed file # 04-18619 , and then administratively closed it, without even so much as mentioning the addition of documents and reports some eight (8) years after the fact, At no time did SLED mention, note, or investigate IOP's failure to comply with statutory notice requirements, or the numerous discrepancies contained in IOP's numerous documented account of events.

Defendant Caldwell provided a Statement to Chief Buckhannon on September 12, 2012 in connection with the SLED Investigation. These statement, and the account provided on September 11, 2012 in the Supplementary Report are not even close to the same story or facts.

On the same date, Defendant Caldwell provided an Affidavit of Fact to the Texas Parks & Wildlife Department. This statement also conflicts with her other renditions. **3 separate reeditions in a 2 day span.**

On or about August 5, 2013, Defendant SLED notified Defendants Caldwell and IOP that they had administratively closed their investigation without finding any wrongdoing. However, Lynd was not provided the same notice. The facts are at that time Capt. Neil of SLED had started an investigation of Caldwell and IOP and closed the Lynd investigation to show the appearance of the matter closed to Caldwell and IOP, all the while having them under investigation.

The act of closing to pursue a criminal investigation subsequent result was to nullify Lynd's complaint that was fwd. to them from IOP without a proper investigation; All the while

Lynd is not told and is completely unaware of any investigation ongoing or being closed. IOP in an attempt to avoid liability and continue the cover-up IOP conspired with SLED's Capt. Neil to transfer Caldwell to Charleston PD before Capt. Neil acted. This was to give IOP cover, distance, and deniability when the story broke, while using Lynd's complaint and facts uncovered, to terminate Caldwell before the transfer.

That conduct shows IOP and SLED knew the Lynd claim was valid, used Lynd's *claim (because it was known to Caldwell)* closed it administratively to alleviate Caldwell anxiety, use her failures to follow statutes as an excuse to transfer her out, all the while investigating her for the other acts discovered by Lynd's complaint.

On or about July 8, 2014, Caldwell was arrested by SLED for allegedly selling evidence, and her service weapon, to a pawn shop while she was still employed with the police department. Court records indicate that Defendant Caldwell, while employed as a police captain with the IOPPD, fraudulently pawned and sold a number of items taken from the police department's evidence room to the Money Man Pawn Shop.

This pawn Shop evidence and the persons used to pawn items prior to Money Man were never disclosed to Lynd. The missing jet skis could well have gone there or to the prior pawn shop Caldwell used, but those facts and names have been withheld from Lynd, those facts or material and for a jury to decide.

In an attempt to generate a SOL start date by the cert letter, IOP and Lynd's email response to it. IOP sent a letter stating they had turned it over to SLED and SLED found 'no wrong doing'. Lynd's email response shows he is unsure and questions IOP's claims but the court uses this email as the start of the SOL by literally just taking IOP's word on it in the SJ hearing, and references no other date in the record as a SOL start date. Even when that response clearly states the info in the letter and claims of a Sled investigation cannot be found.

At this time in **2014 well within the SOL 2yr; Lynd has no knowledge of the SLED investigation;** facts are Lynd did not even know what the acronym SLED meant when he was first informed. Lynd has made a verified claim to IOP and IOP turned over this claim to its INS. Co. As of this date no claim denial has been provided.

Lynd was only notified of SLED's existence and involvement on 5-16-13 when he received the letter dated 4-26-13. IOP and SLED, claims an email dated 5-16-13 is the start of the SOL. Barely 3 weeks to contact and investigate the claims that SLED found no wrong doing. And SLED's investigation, failures, and file were not turned over to Lynd till April 2014 well within the 3yr SOL and even the 2yr SOL. The FIOA request to sled was filed April 2014 while Lynd's due diligence requirement was being met.

So SLED's MSJ, which was granted using the same dates as IOP was error. **The Sled SOL did not start till 2014.**

Lynd was then in contact with Tim Domin the Atty, that would represent the IOP INS co. By email and phone, starting on 10/02/13 at 12:41 PM, requesting the claim information. Domin (*an officer of the court*) repeatedly claim the SOL had already passed and refused to act on Lynd's claim, **stating he did not represent IOP**. The facts prove out, **in fact he was the attorney for IOP** and was stalling to try and get past some imaginary SOL date. Once Domin thought the date had passed, he sent an email with no facts and a vague account of the skis being destroyed, Feb of 2014. Lynd's emails to Domin both IOP's Atty, and the Ins. Programs Co. Atty shows still no records fwd to Lynd as of Feb 2014, **no way a SOL countdown could have started back in 2013, either 3yr or 2 yr.**

Lynd's verified claim to IOP and the IOP insurance program, and reiterated to IOP's counsel and (court officer) Domin constitutes a 3yr statute of limitations standard not a 2yr SOL. Then the most important document is the email IOP and Domin provide with their SJ brief, **dated Feb. 3 2014 from Domin to Lynd, Domin acknowledges the claim to IOP and The IOP ins. Program, and that he was subsequently hired.** He goes on to fraudulently state the SOL calculations and expiration date for filing suit, (*this is fraud on the court*), **Domin makes a single statement that the claim is without merit, but does not deny the Ins. Claim.** So even being liberal with IOP's time arguments **the Ins. Claim itself is a verified claim which as of this date has not been denied, and is only stated to be without merit in Feb 3 2014 email**, well within the 3yr SOL and also well within the 2yr SOL. **No way under the law can, or could Lynd file suit with the Ins. Claim pending. So the running of the Sol would not have started in 2013.**

No party, individual or a municipality, or government agency can lie and intentionally stall to prolong an event pass a SOL date. The lies and misrepresentation would fall under fraudulent inducement even if the dates were not crystal clear, and the verified claim to the Ins. Co not crystal clear.

### ARGUMENT

IOP claims the 2ys Sol had expired prior to Lynd filing suit. That is inaccurate to the facts Lynd had filed a verified claim with the Government entity that claim was forwarded to the insurance company and never action taken on it, nor denied. That verified claim also claimed an act of malfeasance by IOP so was forwarded to SLED for investigation.

When the 'claim' was sent to both the Ins. Co. who hired counsel to defend it, and Sled whom started an official investigation it is clearly a verified claim under the rules. That claim is still un-denied or disallowed. The only time it was even mentioned as to any form of denial was Domin email statement that it was without merit in Feb 2014.

The Sol argument made by IOP references no known date, or instance. (*See transcripts 9-2-15 pg. 4, line13*) IOP references a 'magic date' by going back 2 yrs. from the dater of filing, but IOP does not reference any known notice or certified mail giving notice to Lynd that would start the SOL, as required in the statutes listed below on the impoundment, and destruction of the skis in question. IOP has basically picked a date out of the air stating that any contact prior to that date starts the SOL. That is a jury question and a material fact question that nullifies a Summary judgment in favor of the non-movant.

The SOL limits starts when IOP noticed Lynd according to the statue, and/or notice Lynd of the upcoming destruction, and/or noticed by the salvage/destruction facility they were turned over too. All of these notices are required by South Carolina Statute, IOP did none of them, **and IOP can't claim a statutory argument** when it failed to follow the statutes required in the first place. You cannot ignore dozens of statues and then try and excuse yourself from those errors by claiming you are protected by another statute, a statute that you are manipulating for your own benefit. Especially when the prior statutes, are what invoke the statue

you are relying on. This is the exact reason why the public is protesting in the street, *(a Police dept. ignores the rule of law under dozens of statutes, then claims it's not at fault, and manufactures a fault to place on the victim for an excuse and way out, and a court rubber stamps with no evidence.)*

As well as the statutes named below involving the destruction, **not only can IOP not produce those documents required, it cannot even produce an existing salvage company that allegedly destroyed them.** This goes to the original IOP PD file that has yet to be produced; only the altered file has been fwd. to Lynd. The Tracy Waldron memo *(see Lynd's response to IOP's motion for summary Judgment)* clearly references the prior file, but Caldwell altered it, and that altered version is what was fwd. to Lynd.

A summary judgment is granted when no material fact exist, 1) the fact the statues were not followed, 2) no certified letters sent, 3) no impounded documents and 4) title search done, 5) no destruction documents or 6) court order for abandonment 7) nor notices from the alleged salvage yard exist. **The statute calls IOP's failures conversion or theft, and that statute by law does not involve Lynd's filing date.** All of these are material facts and questions for the jury! And must be ruled in favor of the non-movant by law.

The court must weight Non-movant Lynd's extensive due diligence against the time Statutes, and IOP lack of any form of diligence against numerous statutes that as the Governmental Police Dept. must and should know by heart!

The court must weight Non-movant Lynd's extensive due diligence against the time Statutes, and the knowledge by IOP of the verified claim, that was both turned over to SLED for investigation and the Insurance co for processing, that is a verified claim under every precedent listed.

The statue and precedents are clear as to the **Suit is barred from being filed!!!!** Till one of the 3 prongs is meet. And this invokes the 3 year SOL.

So in any argument the 3 yr. statute prevails.

**SECTION 15-78-90. Settlement of claims and actions; institution of action where claim has or has not been filed.**

(b) Whether or not the claim is filed, the claimant is entitled to institute an action against the appropriate agency or political subdivision. Provided, however, **if a claimant files a claim, he may not institute an action until after the occurrence of the earliest of one of the following three events: (1) the passage of one hundred eighty days from the filing of the claim with the governmental entity, (2) the governmental entity's disallowance of the claim, or (3) the governmental entity's rejection of a settlement offer.**

**SECTION 15-78-110. Statute of limitations.**

Except as provided for in Section 15-3-40, any action brought pursuant to this chapter is forever barred unless an action is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered; provided, that if the claimant first filed a claim pursuant to this chapter then the action for damages based **upon the same occurrence is forever barred unless the action is commenced within three years of the date the loss was or should have been discovered**

**Braudie v. Richland County, 219 S.C. 130, 64 S.E. (2d) 248 (1951)**

**Searcy v. SC DEPT. OF EDUCATION, 402 SE 2d 486 - SC: Court of Appeals 1991**

Section 15-78-80 expressly requires the person to file a "verified claim." A twofold purpose is served by a requirement of this kind. First, the governmental entity is put on notice so that it can both conduct an investigation while the facts are fresh and preserve the evidence. Cochran v. City of Sumter, 242 S.C. 382, 131 S.E. (2d) 153 (1963), overruled on other grounds, McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E. (2d) 741 (1985). Second, a verification serves to discourage the filing of false claims because a verification permits a prosecution for perjury if the claim is fraudulent. *See State v. Cockran, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 50 (1828) (perjury prosecution allowed under what is now S.C. Code Ann. Section 16-9-30 (1976) for making a false affidavit).*

In an effort to ward off needless litigation, Section 15-78-90(b) places a restriction on a person choosing the first method regarding when the person may initiate suit. **The section bars the person from bringing an action until one of the following three events occurs: (1) 180 days elapses between the date the person files the claim and institutes the action; (2) the governmental entity involved disallows the claim; or (3) the governmental entity involved rejects a settlement offer from the claimant.**

To encourage a person to file a claim before bringing suit, Section 15-78-100(a) gives a person whose claim is later disallowed or rejected three rather than two years from the date the loss was or should have been discovered to commence an action under the Tort Claims Act. Section 15-78-110, which parallels Section 15-78-100(a), bars a person who has "first filed a claim pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act]," from bringing an

action under the Tort Claims Act "unless the action is commenced within three years of the date the loss was or should have been discovered."

**Sections 15-78-90(b), 15-78-100(a) and 15-78-110 must be read with Section 15-78-80 because together they are a constituent part of a scheme designed to encourage a person first to seek by a route other than litigation the recovery of damages for a loss proximately caused by a tort of a governmental entity, while at the same time affording a governmental entity a measure of protection against fraudulent claims.**

("Where the statute...requires verification, failure to comply with such requirement will invalidate the notice or statement ... even though no prejudice to the municipality results from the omission.");

***contra Braudie v. Richland County, 219 S.C. 130, 64 S.E. (2d) 248 (1951) (wherein the Supreme Court held that an appearance before the County Board of Commissioners and a letter to the county attorney constituted substantial compliance with a statute requiring the filing of a verified claim as a prerequisite to suit).***

In this instance Non-movant Lynd filed the verified claim, it was fwd. to not only SLED for investigation, but filed with the Insurance company as well, AND ALSO Lynd was in contact with the Ins. Co. Atty and IOP (gov. entity) Atty; the same as in the ***Braudie v Richland*** standard above where a letter to the county Atty constituted substantial compliance. **Lynd did not only that, but well past those standards outlined in Braudie.**

Therefore no court, in good conscience, can deny the 3 yr. statute of limitations applies. IOP's wishful thinking and incorrect calculations in its attempt to stall pass the 2year date were in error. Not to forget IOP hired Domin as counsel knowing it was a verified claim.

It puts non-movant Lynd and other plaintiffs in a dammed if you do and dammed if you don't situation, due diligence is common knowledge to the general public, and performing such diligence does not start a SOL counting down, especially when records requested have still not been surrendered. As of this date the alleged destruction is just alleged, there are no produced records on such acts, and the statutes require the 'salvage co.' to also do these notices to Lynd as well. **So it would be this extraordinary coincidence!!!, that IOP failed in every notice, and**

yet they picked the one salvage co. in the state that just happened to fail on notification as well.

**PLUS** that salvage co just conveniently goes under, and the alleged owner dies during the interim of 2004 -2012 when they finally disclose it to Lynd.

The sheer odds of all those coincidences is astronomical, it is more likely that that salvage co. was used as an excuse, because in 2012, IOP while needing a cover-up knew it, nor its owner can be questioned. So that was conveniently added as a cover-up and claimed entity they were turned over too. When reality is the never were turned over to any salvage co. So the court would have to *weigh under the law the* facts in light of the non-movant Lynd, and not take IOP's word for it. That is a material fact in question, and a fact still undiscovered, unknown, and a material fact that is still under research by Lynd.

**SECTION 56-5-5635.** Law enforcement towing and storage procedures; notification of registered owner; disposition of vehicle and personal property.

(B) Within ten days following a law enforcement's towing request, the proprietor, owner, or operator of any towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must provide to the sheriff or chief of police a list describing the vehicles remaining in the possession of the proprietor, owner, or operator of any towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop. **A person who fails to provide the law enforcement agency with this list forfeits recovery of any storage fees that have accrued from the date of towing until the day after the mailing of the notification to the owner and all lienholders by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, pursuant to Section 29-15-10.** Within ten days of receipt of this list, the sheriff or chief of police must provide to the towing company or storage facility, the current owner's name, address, and a record of all lienholders along with the make, model, and identification number or a description of the vehicle at no cost to the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop. The proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop having towed or received the vehicle must notify by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, the last known registered owner and all lienholders of record that the vehicle has been taken into custody.

(C) If the identity of the last registered owner cannot be determined, or if the registration contains no address for the owner, or if it is impossible to determine with reasonable certainty the identity and addresses of all lienholders, the proprietor, owner,

or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must provide notice by one publication in one newspaper of general circulation in the area from which the vehicle was abandoned which is sufficient to meet all requirements of notice pursuant to this article. The notice by publication may contain multiple listings of abandoned vehicles.

(D) Before a vehicle is sold, the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must apply to the appropriate titling facility including, but not limited to, the Department of Motor Vehicles or the Department of Natural Resources for the name and address of any owner or lienholder. For nontitled vehicles, where the owner's name is known, a search must be conducted through the Secretary of State's Office to determine any lienholders. The application must be on prescribed forms as required by the appropriate titling facility or the Secretary of State. If the vehicle has an out-of-state registration, an application must be made to that state's appropriate titling facility. When the vehicle is not titled in this State and does not have a registration from another state, the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop may apply to the sheriff or chief of police in the jurisdiction where the vehicle is stored to determine the state where the vehicle is registered. The sheriff or chief of police shall conduct a records search. This search must include, but is not limited to, a search on the National Crime Information Center and any other appropriate search that may be conducted with the vehicle's identification number. The sheriff or chief of police must supply, at no cost to the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop, the name of the state in which the vehicle is titled.

(E) The proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop that has towed and stored a vehicle has a lien against the vehicle and may have the vehicle sold at public auction pursuant to Section 29-15-10. The proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop may hold the license tag of any vehicle until all towing and storage costs have been paid, or if the vehicle is not reclaimed, until it is declared abandoned and sold. Storage costs may be charged that have accrued before the notification of the owner and lienholder, by certified or registered mail, of the location of the vehicle. **Notification to the owner and lienholder by the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must occur within five days, after receiving the owner's and lienholders' identities from the appropriate law enforcement agency. If the notice is not mailed within this period, storage costs after the five-day period must not be charged until the notice is mailed. If the vehicle is not reclaimed within thirty days after the day the notice is mailed, return receipt requested, the vehicle is considered abandoned and may be sold by the magistrate**

pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 29-15-10.

(F) After the vehicle is in the possession of the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop, the owner of the vehicle as demonstrated by providing a certificate of registration has one opportunity to remove from the vehicle any personal property not attached to the vehicle. The proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must release any personal property that does not belong to the owner of the vehicle to the owner of the personal property.

**(G) When a law enforcement agency stores a vehicle at a law enforcement facility, the agency must follow the notification procedures contained in this section and submit vehicle information to a magistrate in the county where the vehicle is stored to provide for the sale of the vehicle at public auction.** A law enforcement agency is exempt from paying filing fees in any matter related to the towing and storing of a vehicle.

Lynd skis were impounded and this statute was not followed. IOP has no records of this request and the TPWD where the titles are held does not show the request. There is no notice to the magistrate in the file as required; no title search in the file as required; IOP would have obtained Lynd's correct name and address, if it had attempted any of these procedures in the required statutes. NOT ONLY would the statutes been followed Lynd would have been notified by certified mail at numerous times during the procedures. Multiple notifications to Lynd should have taken place, yet IOP claims they did it correctly and none of this is in the file, and all of them never made it to Lynd, ridiculous! AND IT IS UNDISPUTED! **Caldwell admitted in both a statement to Chief Buchanan, and to SLED in a sworn affidavit.** (see *Lynd's response to motion for summary judgment*)

**These are material facts that exist.** These are also facts and records that are required to be researched under the due diligence requirement.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law. **Rule 56(c), SCRCF.** When determining if any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the

light most favorable to **the non-moving party**. *Summer v. Carpenter*, 328 S.C. 36, 492 S.E.2d 55 (1997). Lynd here is the non-moving party and the mountains of record errors, FIOA request and verified claims amounts to undisputable evidence, not a mere scintilla of evidence. As the non-movant with this mountain of material fact, even just the material fact amounting to the calculation of date is more than a mere scintilla.

*at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, it is only necessary for the nonmoving party to submit a "scintilla of evidence warranting a determination by a jury." (citing Hill v. York County Sheriff's Dep't, 313 S.C. 303, 437 S.E.2d 179 (Ct.App.1993) for support).*

Here in this case is documented proof from, the IOP file, the SLED investigation notes, etc. the contact between the Government entities counsel, and the pending Insurance Claim are clear proof that the evidence in weight for the non-movant Lynd was substantial and was more than a preponderance of evidence.

**Hancock v. Mid-South Management Co., Inc., 673 SE 2d 801 - SC: Supreme Court 2009**

The rule followed in the federal court system provides that "a 'mere scintilla of evidence' is not sufficient to withstand the challenge." *Rogers v. Norfolk Southern Corp.*, 356 S.C. 85, 93, 599 S.E.2d 87, 90 (2003), quoting *Crinkley v. Holiday Inns*, 844 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir.1988). We recognize that the court of appeals has been somewhat inconsistent on whether a mere scintilla of evidence will overcome a motion for summary judgment.<sup>[2]</sup> This Court, however, has consistently held that where the federal standard applies or where a heightened burden of proof is required, there must be more than a scintilla of evidence in order to defeat a motion for summary judgement. **Accordingly, we hold that in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment.**

In our view, the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Petitioner's testimony, Daughter's testimony, and the former employee's affidavit showed that the parking lot was in a state of disrepair. **Thus, taken in a light most favorable to Petitioner, evidence shows that Respondent knew or should have known that a dangerous condition existed on its premises and that invitees would have to encounter this condition.** See *Henderson*, 303 S.C. at 180, 399 S.E.2d at 769 (reversing the trial court's grant of a JNOV motion because the plaintiff presented evidence that a hospital failed to keep its parking lot reasonably safe

In this case IOP is basing its summary Judgment motion on an email response to a letter.

**The letter itself does not meet the statutory requirements of notice for the title property.**

The statues below clearly outline the duties required of the impounding agency and its failure by IOP to follow them. Those duties would create a document trail that could easily be followed.

Undone there is nothing but an altered files, a single scribbled note in said file that they were destroyed. The note speaks of a non-existent salvage company and a deceased person that supposedly the skis went too.

Non-movant Lynd's evidence of numerous FIOA request dooedlv nursuit of records and facts clearly outline more than a scintilla of evidence, much more than the lone email response IOP referenced to get a SJ granted. **Lynd the non-moving party's evidence clearly out weights the IOP evidence in stating a material fact still exist, on any grounds claimed notwithstanding the date argument.**

**The verified claim constitutes a 3ys statute of limitations, the mountain of unanswered errors answers any other material fact of law question or if such material facts still exist.**

**SECTION 56-5-5660.** Repealed by 2012 Act No. 242, Section 7, eff December 15, 2012.

Former Section 56-5-5660 was entitled "Application for and issuance of disposal authority certificates" and was derived from 1962 Code Section 46-490.16; 1972 (57) 2459; 2004 Act No. 269, Section 6.

**South Carolina Code 56-5-5660. Application for and issuance of disposal authority certificates**

(A) Any person or unit of government upon whose property or in whose possession is found an abandoned vehicle, or any person who is the owner of a vehicle whose title certificate is faulty, lost, or destroyed, may apply to the sheriff or chief of police of the jurisdiction in which the vehicle is located for authority to sell or give the vehicle to a demolisher.

(B) The application must give the name and address of the applicant, the year, make, model, and identification number of the vehicle, if ascertainable, along with any other identifying features, and must contain a concise statement of the facts surrounding the abandonment, or that the title of the vehicle is lost or destroyed, or the reasons for the defect of title in the owner. The applicant must execute an affidavit stating that the facts alleged are true and that no material fact has been withheld.

(C) If the sheriff or chief of police determines that the application is executed in proper form, and demonstrates that the vehicle has been abandoned upon the property of the applicant, the notification procedures set forth in Section 56-5-5630 must be followed. If the vehicle is not reclaimed in accordance with Section 56-5-5630, the sheriff or chief of police must follow the procedure set forth in Section 56-5-5660(D) for issuance of disposal authority certificates.

(D) If the application demonstrates that the vehicle is not abandoned but that the applicant appears to be the rightful owner, the sheriff or chief of police must give the applicant a certificate of authority to sell or give the vehicle to any demolisher for demolition, wrecking, or dismantling. A disposal authority certificate may contain multiple listings. The demolisher must accept such certificate in lieu of the certificate of title to the vehicle.

This section of the statute is repealed, but was required in 2004 when the skis were impounded, but these records do not exist in the file either and just adds to the laundry list of missing records the law requires IOP have.

**SECTION 56-5-5940. Seizure, sale or disposal of vehicle in violation of article constitutes conversion.**

**(a) Seizure, sale, or disposal of an abandoned or derelict motor vehicle in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of this article shall constitute conversion for which the owner shall have redress in any court of competent jurisdiction.**

#### *Conversion*

*n. a civil wrong (tort) in which one converts another's property to his/her own use, which is a fancy way of saying "steals." Conversion includes treating another's goods as one's own, holding onto such property which accidentally comes into the convertor's (taker's) hands, or purposely giving the impression the assets belong to him/her. This gives the true owner the right to sue for his/her own property or the value and loss of use of it, as well as going to law enforcement authorities since conversion usually includes the crime of theft.*

~~Under this statute the IOP police department advised, the law was considered settled.~~  
**Conversions definition is theft.** No way a 2 year SOL defense could have even been made and argued much less granted summary judgment on. The statute's remedies when failed to be adhered

too are invoked. Also the SLED investigation and 'no wrong doing' finding are questioned and clearly present a material fact to deny SJ.

Conversion is a wrongful act and has been defined as the unauthorized assumption in the exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner's rights. Owens v. Andrews Bank & Trust Co., 265 S.C. 490, 220 S.E. (2d) 116 (1975). Powell v. A.K. Brown Motor Co., 200 S. C. 75, 20 S.E.2d 636 (1942). Conversion may arise by some illegal use or misuse, or by illegal detention of another's chattel. Id. Money may be the subject of conversion when it is capable of being identified and there may be conversion of determinate sums even though the specific coins and bills are not identified. Id; 89 C. I. S. Tresser and Conversion § 23 (1955). To establish the tort of conversion, it is essential that the plaintiff establish either title to or right to the possession of the personal property. Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Burgess, 303 S.C. 534, 402 S.E.2d 480 (1991). A claim for conversion can be based on an unauthorized detention of property, after demand. Castell v. Stephenson Finance Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E. (2d) 311 (1964). Punitive damages are recoverable in conversion cases in the event it is determined the defendant's acts have been willful, reckless, and/or committed with conscious indifference to the rights of the plaintiff. Id. v. Castell, 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E. (2d) 311 (1964).

Conversion has been defined in our case law as an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights. Ray v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 206 S.C. 344, 34 S.E. (2d) 218, 34 S.E. (2d) 218 (1945). Conversion may arise by some illegal use or misuse, or by illegal detention of another's chattel. Castell v. Stephenson Finance Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E. (2d) 311 (1964).

Conversion § 84 (1985); McPherson v. Neutter & Hendrix, 45 S.C.L. (11 Rich.) 267, 281 (1858) (if a party wrongfully assumes property belonging to another or wrongfully uses it, it amounts to a direct conversion and a demand and refusal are not necessary before bringing an action).

"An action for conversion may be maintained by persons having the immediate right to possession of the article converted. Indeed, ordinarily, an immediate right to possession at the time of conversion is all that is required in the way of title or possession to enable the plaintiff to maintain his action."

In this case every single aspect of the conversion precedents specifically applies to this case. 1) The skis were wrongfully impounded. 2) Lynd had an immediate right to the skis in question, 3) the skis are clearly titled to Lynd. IOP's failures to notify and destruction without any of the required documentation done are notification to Lynd is a clear 'willful, reckless, and/or committed with conscious indifference to the rights of' Lynd

**This is also a clear material fact left unanswered that negates a Summary judgment it is also a question for the jury, which negates Summary Judgment and also negates a 2year SOL calculation.**

**SECTION 56-5-5945.** Duties of demolishers; disposal of vehicle; title requirements; records; penalties.

**(B)(1) Except as provided by subsections (C), (D), and (E), a person or entity may not dispose of a vehicle to a demolisher or secondary metals recycler without a valid title certificate for the vehicle in the person or entity's name. The person or entity shall provide the vehicle's title certificate to the demolisher or secondary metals recycler.**

**(C)(1) A person or entity may dispose of a vehicle to a demolisher or secondary metals recycler with a valid magistrate's order of sale in lieu of a title certificate, if the person or entity purchases the vehicle at a public auction pursuant to Section 56-5-5640. The person or entity shall provide the magistrate's order of sale to the demolisher or secondary metals recycler.**

**(D)(1) A person or entity may dispose of a vehicle to a demolisher or secondary metals recycler with a valid sheriff's disposal authority certificate in lieu of a title certificate, if the vehicle is abandoned upon the person or entity's property or into the person or entity's possession and the vehicle does not meet the requirements of subsection (E)(1). The person or entity shall provide the sheriff's disposal authority certificate to the demolisher or secondary metals recycler.**

**(2) The person or entity shall apply to the sheriff of the jurisdiction in which the vehicle is located for a disposal authority certificate to dispose of the vehicle to a demolisher or secondary metals recycler. The application must provide, at a minimum, the person or entity's name and address, the year, make, model, and identification number of the vehicle, if ascertainable, along with any other identifying features, and must contain a concise statement of the facts surrounding the abandonment. The person or entity shall execute an affidavit stating that the facts alleged are true and that no material fact has been withheld. If the sheriff determines that the application is executed in proper form, and the application demonstrates that the vehicle has been abandoned upon the person or entity's property or into the person or entity's possession, the notification procedures set forth in Section 56-5-5630 must be followed. If the vehicle is not reclaimed pursuant to Section 56-5-5630, the sheriff shall give the applicant a certificate of authority to dispose of the vehicle to a demolisher or secondary metals recycler. A disposal authority certificate may contain multiple listings.**

**(4) The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division shall design a uniform sheriff's disposal authority certificate for purposes of this subsection and shall make the certificate available for distribution to the sheriffs. The Department of Motor Vehicles shall issue forms and regulations governing the surrender of sheriffs' disposal authority certificates as appropriate.**

IOP altered the file to claim the jets skis were destroyed by a salvage yard, even if that was true the salvage yard was required to notify and and those records should be in the file as well, or exist in some form in South Carolina. IOP as the Gov. Entity was required to provide all of these required documents, and none exist in the file. AT NO TIME did IOP even make an attempt according to all available records. All told there are numerous statute requirements that were REQUIRED to be met and none were. These requirements would have generated dozens of official records and documents and none can be found. To try and defend the lack of all these records ,and then try and claim an email response is the end-all be-all on the SOL is ridiculous and not what the SOL statutes are intended.

**Transcript error that led to the granting of the order;**

The trial court judge/and Attys in the first order misunderstands the letters being discussed. Greenberg is referencing the letter Caldwell added to the file and not the letters from Lynd, the court is asking for verification that Lynd wrote the letter IOP was referencing to the Chief . Then the hearing just ends, without any form of explanation with an odd statement by the judge on the last page “this is a case if they want to modify it they can”. The motion is granted” No one can seem to understand what was, or is going on at the end of this hearing, and what that statement means, to even explain how to approach it on appeal.

IOP’s counsel Domin, *the same that did the intentional act of stalling of Lynd*, argues that these letters and dates of Lynd's contact with IOP starts the SOL running. That in no way is correct. Knowing in your heart something wrong was done too you is different, than knowing factually. So therefore not doing your due diligence is filing of a frivolous suit. If according to Domin and IOP, Lynd had filed prior to any of the record requests, they then could have asked for a dismissal or SJ on that, claiming Lynd could not prove an element of the case, and Lynd would have had no facts to base an argument on the fight the dismissal, or facts to base a brief on to file the original suit. The law cannot be determined both ways the code allows a 3yr statute of limitations on verified claims to avoid suits. Lynd made every attempt to do so.

There is under the law and statue a fine line of when a person “knows or should have known” of a tort, not when a person has a “gut feeling” a tort has been

done. The fact finding and FIOA request, and numerous emails gathering documents is all done to have a full and complete understanding of the facts and what transpired to file an accurate brief. This is also needed to avoid a frivolous filing when all opposing parties are claiming such a suit would be frivolous. And to avoid possible dismissal, by being unprepared to defend in SJ on 'proving and element.'

IOP claims non-movant Lynd should have filed off a gut feeling not waiting on facts, all the while Domin is making claims to Lynd he has no case, IOP through the Chief are making claims SLED investigated it and found no wrong doing, and he has no case.. All this are facts that dictate the SOL start date. If IOP's SLED investigation claims were accurate, and correct, Lynd would have filed a frivolous suit if filed prematurely. Lynd feels the entire date revolves around the SLED file being sent under the FIOA which disproved all the claims of 'no wrong doing' the parties were stating through the document gathering period, April-2014.

There is a fine line between inaction due to laziness, and delay awaiting documentation to disprove the claims of IOP and Domin. Lynd could have jumped the gun and filed earlier being the facts of a tort did turned ultimately in his favor, but it could have turned out that the SLED 'no wrong doing' claim was correct and therefore Lynd's suit if filed earlier would have been a frivolous suit. Again something IOP could complain about. Lynd on the other hand felt they were lying and went to great length to gather the facts to support it before filing of the suit to

1) Avoid a frivolous suit, and

2) To do the due diligence and proper gathering of facts to support the filing of the suit. All of this cumulated with the SLED file being sent in April 2014, NOT this 'magic date' IOP's Domin refers to in the transcripts of 5-18-13.

IOP has taken the file date of the lawsuit, and gone back 2 years and nicked a 'Magic date' and is now trying to claim, any and all contact prior to that date constitutes enough knowledge to start the SOL running. That is not the statute, or the intent of the statute.

The fact is the filing date Domin thinks should exist is based on his knowledge of facts, but those were not disclosed to Lynd. That is based on IOP's and Domin's knowledge, **they all knew back then**, and were counting days, **Lynd did not KNOW then**. They were well aware they had committed a tort and were watching the calendar to get to some 'magic date'. Lynd did not know then and was given numerous claims of no case and doubts which had to be factually checked under due diligence. This calculation date is based on facts in Domin's head known to him, not facts in Lynd's head that he knows.

start date the SOL, it becomes open season on the littlest of things to claim knowledge on. Every defense Atty would be doing it on a daily basis. Lynd knew something seemed not right and strange about their claims, **but knowledge of tort didn't exist till 2014 when the sled file was turned over and arrived**. In it were **Caldwell's sworn affidavits** admitting to the wrongdoing and errors, plus letters to the Chief admitting to it as well. That was when full knowledge happened, all the rest prior to that is gut feeling with no facts to back it up or use to base and support filing a suit on.

The courts have always walked the fine line of 'frivolous suit', vs 'due diligence', vs particular cases set of facts. These facts are clear, Lynd was told "no case" and "frivolous suit" did his due diligence to check and verify those stated facts, and obtained full knowledge in 2014 to file suit in good faith. No dispute, **and all the while of doing due diligence had filed a verified claim on the gut feeling he had**. All of which nullifies this magic date and verified claim argument as to material facts in favor of non-movant.

Now IOP could have confessed to the acts up front to Lynd, and then the SOL would have started, **but they didn't they denied any wrong doing**, made intentional acts to falsify the records and cover it up, claimed SLED had found no wrong doing, and had an *officer of the court*, Domin claim it is all without merit. **But to get a SJ granted**, they then turn around and state, **using the same time period in which they are stating 'no wrong doing', that Lynd should have known then and there and filed**, all while they are clearly denying everything Lynd is asking about. **You can't have it both ways**, but the court ruled this is the SOL start time with

enough evidence that no material fact exist to grant it, ridiculous. IT is clear by the transcripts and the ending mentioned earlier that the Atty were discussing one thing and the court focused on another and neither understood the other. There is no other explanation of the granting of a summary judgment based on an email response, nor when the transcripts show confusion of the parties understanding of the discussion.

Secondly the statues clearly state the conduct and actions required on titled property, none of these were meet, **till they are meet the SOL has not started according to those statutes in question.** **The conversion of the titled property starts a different SOL under the criminal code, and civil code for IOP failure to notify Lynd.** The court did not answer or determine what those statutes do to the SOL in granting IOP's Summary Judgment, **all of which leave several material facts in question, and several or matters for the jury to decide.**

Even if the court ignores the verified claim, or some ground exists where the verified claim to IOP that was turn over to its Insurance Co, and then to SLED for investigation, is somehow ruled not a claim under the law to invoke the 3 year statute of limitations, then the court must decide IOP's, IOP's counsel Domin, and SLED's conduct to delay due diligence by Lynd in discovery of a tort.

**Anonymous Taxpayer v. Dept. of Revenue, 661 SE 2d 73 - SC: Supreme Court 2008**

"Statutes of limitations embody important public policy considerations in that they stimulate activity, punish negligence, and promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs." Moates v. Bobb, 322 S.C. 172, 176, 470 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1996).

The limitations period begins to run when a party knows or should know, **through the exercise of due diligence,** that a cause of action might exist. RWE NUKEM Corp. v. ENSR Corp., 373 S.C. 190, 196, 644 S.E.2d 730, 733 (2007)

Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 376, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2005) ("Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the injured party either knows or should know, **by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that a cause of action exists for the wrongful conduct.**").

It is a standard in South Carolina law that the SOL starts to run when party knows or should know , **but it also states that knowledge comes after due and reasonable diligence.** In this case *Lynd v IOP*, Lynd did and was at the time of filing, doing due diligence. IOP on the other hand had turned it over to its INS. Co. & SLED, all of which would have actions influencing Lynd's diligence. The pending INS. Claim as IOP has disclosed would equably toll the statute of limitations, and the verified claim to the Ins. Co., invokes the 3year statute of limitations. IOP and IOP ins. Programs Council, Tim Domin repeatedly stalled and delayed Lynd, as well as being *an officer of the Court* misinformed Lynd of the facts and results of the pending Ins. claim, and his rights to file.

That conduct creates an estoppel to the SOL claims of IOP. That conduct also forced Lynd into more, and lengthy due diligence, to discover and disprove the facts claimed and stated by IOP. IOP and Domin both stated for the record that the SOL expired in 2004 and that SLED had investigated and found no wrong doing that is an estoppel barring the SOL defense when it falsely creates doubt of the claims of Lynd that require more and lengthy due diligence to avoid a frivolous filing.

The claims of SLED finding 'no wrong doing' specifically intervene into the time statutes. At that time that particular claim *Rv IOP and Domin* SLED was a mere acronym to Lynd, and no investigation or facts of their existence was even known. As well as Lynd had no idea when, date wise, this alleged investigation even took place. *Be aware SLED should, under its own due diligence, contacted Lynd for an interview, and at that time Lynd would have known, it chose not to.* IOP should have disclosed to Lynd the fact it had fwd. the investigation to SLED, instead they chose to keep it a secret. The surprise bombshell of that well into Lynd's due diligence research was intended to delay Lynd longer. In doing proper due diligence and research Lynd in good conscience had to find out what that investigation was, and what the true outcome was to avoid filing of a frivolous suit. That meant FIOA request to SLED.

A point to remember is Lynd is doing this long distance, from Texas, no option to walk into an agency and browse or collect documents and records.

It turns out the SLED investigation was a farce and just a mere cover-up for IOP between Neil and Buchanan, to project an appearance of investigation. But the result of that statement to

Lynd, forced Lynd's hand in following up as a matter of due diligence, if SLED has truly done an exhaustive investigation and had discovered facts leading to the no wrong doing found, then Lynd would have filed a frivolous suit if filed in the interim.

The courts frown on frivolous suits, and also frown on time barred suits, in this case we have a perfect example of all the main precedents controlling these matters, and they become intertwined, verified claim 2yr or 3yr SOL, tolling, estoppel, and due diligence, as well as liability created by a statute, conversion, and a statutory failing of that by IOP. Any dispute of the 2 or 3 yr. Statute of Limitations under the law has to be given to the longer of the 2 periods, not to mention the conversion SOL, and ruled in favor of the non-movant.

**State v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 175 SE 2d 203 - SC: Supreme Court 1970**

Additionally, it is established in this State that where there is any doubt as to which of two statutes of limitation applies, **the doubt must be resolved in favor of the longer period.** We quote the following from *Scrivell v. Johnson*, 190 S.C. 457, 3 S.E. (2d) 543 (1939):

"Strictly speaking, a statute of limitation when applicable is not a defense to an action, but when pleaded, which it must be in order for a defendant to benefit therefrom, is a bar to the action. A limitation statute is a statute of grace, permitting the avoidance and evasion of the liability; and while given recognition when pleaded, it has never been favored by the Courts.

**"If there is any doubt as to which of two statutes applies, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the longest period, according to the great weight of authority.**

**Hooper v. Ebenezer Senior Services, 659 SE 2d 213 - SC: Court of Appeals 2008**

If a statute's terms are clear, the court must apply the terms according to their literal meaning. *Brown v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control*, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002). "An appellate court cannot construe a statute without regard to its plain meaning and may not resort to a liberal interpretation in an attempt to expand or limit the scope of a statute.

In *Hopkins v. Floyd's Wholesale*, 299 S.C. 127, 382 S.E.2d 907 (1989), our Supreme Court determined the statute of limitations is tolled for a workers' compensation claim during a reliance period in **"which an employee is induced by the employer to believe his claim is compensable and will be taken care of without the employee filing a claim."** *Id.* at 129, 382 S.E.2d at 908. The Court announced:

We believe the rule ... which tolls the statute of limitations during the reliance period is the better rule. **The fact finder in these types of cases must necessarily determine that a reliance period existed and that the claim is otherwise compensable.** To hold that claims must be filed within a reasonable time following the end of the reliance period would add yet another layer of fact finding resulting in greater uncertainty as to which claims are compensable.

In this case it is clear IOP filed the claim with its Ins. Co. of which never an outcome has been made, that not only tolls the 2yr statute but impose the 3yr statue due to a verified claim. And during this time Domin **an officer of the court is lying, plain and simple to Lynd**, creating a form of reliance. As it continues below as "to a diligent plaintiff" no one can dispute Lynd's diligence and perseverance in discovering the facts. In this instance Lynd was diligent, and IOP delayed, IOP's counsel lied, and both IOP and SLED delayed in forwarding of the files under FIOA request, it does not get more rare and exceptional that 2 separate Gov., entities conspiring to stall.

The doctrine of equitable tolling is articulated with exactitude:

The time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to equitable tolling if such tolling is necessary to prevent unfairness to a diligent plaintiff. However, equitable tolling, which allows a plaintiff to initiate an action beyond the statute of limitations deadline, is typically available only if the claimant was prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his or her rights, or, in other words, if the relevant facts present sufficiently rare and exceptional circumstances that would warrant application of the doctrine.

Equitable tolling has been deemed available where—

—extraordinary circumstances prevented the plaintiff from filing despite his or her diligence.

—the plaintiff actively pursued his or her judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory **period or the claimant has been induced or tricked by the defendant's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.**

**—the plaintiff, despite all due diligence, is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his or her claim.**

It has been held that equitable tolling applies principally if the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his or her rights. **However, it has also been held that the equitable tolling doctrine does not require wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, such as fraud or misrepresentation.**

In this case not only has misrepresentation been done by defendants, but multiple and ongoing acts. The introduction of the SLED investigation at such a late date after it was started

and completed cause a restart by Lynd of due diligence with another gov. agency separate from whom he is already dealing. **“—the plaintiff, despite all due diligence, is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his or her claim.”**

Lynd still has not received the original file from IOP, only the altered file, Lynd has not been giving the outcome of the INS. claim. Lynd has not been giving the file of the criminal complaint against Caldwell. Lynd has not been given the name and location of the impound lot, salvage co, or how the skis in question were destroyed. So it is clear Lynd's due diligence suffices and the defendant's interference and delay hindered the suit, exactly as the precedent states that equitable tolling applies.

For example, Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson [931 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.1991), *rev'd on other grounds*, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992)] stated that equitable tolling may be applied when plaintiffs are "prevented from asserting their claims by some kind of wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant." But it is only equitable estoppel that requires wrongful conduct. The equitable tolling doctrine, on the other hand, does not require any conduct by the defendant.

Abbott v. State, 979 P.2d 994, 997-998 (Alaska 1999) (footnotes omitted).

The United States Supreme Court elucidated: Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly. We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, **or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.** We have generally been much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.

Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990)

**Courts often apply equitable tolling when a plaintiff has timely pursued his rights through an administrative body** or where a plaintiff was enjoined or otherwise legally prohibited from bringing his claims in a timely manner.

The Supreme Court enunciated:

Equitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine which operates independently of the literal wording of the Code of Civil Procedure to suspend **or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.** This court has applied equitable tolling in carefully considered situations to prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of causes of action, where the defendant would suffer no prejudice.

The doctrine of equitable tolling was developed to permit under certain circumstances the filing of a lawsuit that otherwise would be barred by a limitations period. *See Bailey v. Glover*, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1874). **a plaintiffs right to assert a meritorious claim when equitable circumstances have prevented a timely filing.** Equitable tolling is a type of equitable modification which focuses on the plaintiff's excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on [the] lack of prejudice to the defendant." *Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co.*, 817 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir.1987) (quoting *Naton v. Bank of California*, 649 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir.1981)). Contrary to the analysis of the majority below, equitable tolling, unlike estoppel, does not require active deception or employer misconduct, but focuses rather on the employee with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights. *Machules v. Dep't of Admin.*, 523 So.2d 1132, 1133-1134 (Fla.1988)

**The doctrine of equitable estoppel is distinct from the doctrine of equitable tolling.** In cases of equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations has expired and the defendant asserts the running of the statute of limitations as a defense. **The defendant, however, is estopped from benefitting from the statute of limitations as a defense because the defendant has acted in such a way as to cause the claimant to forego filing a timely cause of action.** *See Vacuum Sys., Inc. v. 240\*240 Bridge Constr. Co.*, 632 A.2d 442, 444 (Me.1993); *Hanusek v. Southern Me. Medical Ctr.*, 584 A.2d 634, 637 (Me.1990). **In contrast, in cases involving the doctrine of equitable tolling, the defendant does not have the statute of limitations as a valid defense because it has not yet run. Rather, the statute of limitations is tolled when strict application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable.** *Lambert v. United States*, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir.1995).

This Court previously expounded upon equitable estoppel in *Dillon County School Dist. No. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc.*, 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d 555 (Ct.App.1985), *overruled on other grounds, Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat. Vendors Div. of Unidynamics Corp.*, 319 S.C. 556, 462 S.E.2d 858 (1995).

In a proper case, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may prevent resort to the statute of limitations. *Servormation Corporation v. Hickory Construction Co.*, 70 N.C.App. 309, 318 S.E.2d 904 (1984), *remanded*, 312 N.C. 794, 325 S.E.2d 632 (1985); *City of Bedford v. James Leffel & Co.*, 558 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.1977); 51 Am.Jur.2d *Limitation of Actions* § 431 at 900 (1970); *see Clements v. Greenville County*, 246 S.C. 20, 142 S.E.2d 212 (1965). **A defendant will be estopped to assert the statute of limitations in bar of a plaintiffs claim when the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute has been induced by the defendant's conduct.** 53 C.J.S. *Limitations of Actions* § 25 at 962-64 (1948).

Our Supreme Court defined the essential elements of equitable estoppel:

Elements of equitable estoppel as to the party estopped are: **(1) conduct by the party estopped which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) the intention that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; and (3)**

knowledge, actual or constructive, of the true facts. Ingram v. Kasey's Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 531 S.E.2d 287 n. 2 (2000). Essential elements of estoppel as related to the party claiming the estoppel are: (1) lack of knowledge and of means of knowledge of truth as to facts in question; (2) reliance upon conduct of the party estopped; and (3) prejudicial change in position. Maves v. Paxton, 313 S.C. 109, 437 S.E.2d 66 (1993). "Estoppel cannot exist if the knowledge of both parties is equal and nothing is done by one to mislead the other." Evins v. Richland County Historic Pres. Comm'n, 341 S.C. 15, 532 S.E.2d 876, 878 (2000).

In the case before the court all 3 grounds exist,

- 1) IOP and Domin, falsely stated numerous times that the claim was barred, and that it had been investigated and 'no wrong doing' found (Lynd acted on those facts)
- 2) Lynd acted on those while both IOPP and Domin were counting on that as a stall tactic.
- 3) IOP and Domin both knew those claims to be false and misleading

Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 589, 553 S.E.2d 110, 114 (2001).

**Under South Carolina law, a defendant may be estopped from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense if the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute had been induced by the defendant's conduct.** Such inducement may consist of an express representation that the claim will be settled without litigation **or conduct that suggests a lawsuit is not necessary.** The defendant's conduct may also involve inducing the plaintiff either to believe that an amicable adjustment of the claim will be made without **suit or to forbear exercising the right to sue.**

Finally, the general doctrine of equitable estoppel has been applied to affect the running of the statute of limitations in other situations besides those of unconsummated settlement. Equitable estoppel operates to deny a party "the right to plead or prove an otherwise important fact." Parker v. Parker, 313 S.C. 482, 487, 443 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1994).

The other main precedents the court normally routinely rely on is the ground that a plaintiff 'slept on his rights' or 'sitting on his rights', in this case before the court that is clearly not the facts. Lynd was adamant, diligent, and doggedly pursued the true facts, and made ever attempt to find the true facts when records were claimed lost or denied and those such supplied showed to be false and/or altered.

It would be an injustice to the non-movant Lynd **not to weight** the evidence in light most favorable to **Lynd as the non-movant. Especially being movant had statutory duties as the impounding police agency, and as a regular course of duties should have known those statutes.** This is not a novel idea, IOP impounds titled property weekly if not daily, and had for years prior to this instance, and known or should have known the procedures to follow and the statues governing those polices. For IOP to even try and claim these statute errors, all of them was just a mere clerical error that should be excused, well is a slap in the face to the court or a justice expected to believe it. And then once exposed to its errors involving what it routinely should have known, commits a massive case of misrepresentation to imply or cover-up its liability.

These actions are the exact cause of the 100's of anti-police anti-court riots and rallies, just like this case, the police error egregiously, lied about it, stalled any admission of it to avoid liability, denied culpability, and then the courts knowingly or unknowingly covered for them based on their misrepresentation of the facts..

The facts in this case are clear, IOP failed, **they and their counsel lied about it**, SLED as a favor faked an investigation to help cover it up, and then the court refused to hear any proof or argument, and held a 4 minute hearing, on all of these facts, it is inexcusable.

**Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 334 S.C. 150, 163-64, 511 S.E.2d 699, 706 (Ct.App.1999), aff'd, 341 S.C. 320, 534 S.E.2d 672 (2000).**

One purpose of a statute of limitations is to relieve the courts of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff **has slept on his rights.**

**Moates v. Bobb, 322 S.C. 172, 176, 470 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1996)**

limitations are, indeed, fundamental to our judicial system.

Bobb pled the statute of limitations as a bar to the action. After a hearing in which it was stipulated that the statute of limitations had expired as to the Moateses' claim, the trial court held Bobb was equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. The trial court based its decision on St. Paul's \$24,225 "advance towards settlement," **which it found constituted an admission of liability, and on St. Paul's repeated references to "settlement" in its correspondence with Huggins.**

A defendant may be estopped from claiming a statute of limitations **defense if the defendant's conduct has induced the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute.** Vines v. Self Memorial Hosp., 314 S.C. 305, 443 S.E.2d 909 (1994). This conduct may be either an express representation that the claim will be settled **without litigation or actions suggesting a lawsuit is unnecessary.** *Id.* Settlement negotiations commenced but not finalized, however, will not bar a defendant's assertion of the statute of limitations. Gadsden v. Southern R.R., 262 S.C. 590, 206 S.E.2d 882 (1974).

In This case IOP. Domin. stated as claim of fact that the case had “no merit”. “was time barred” and had been investigated by “SLED which found no wrong doing”. These actions and claims by the Government Agency, an Officer of The Court, are a fraudulent inducement of Lynd under the precedents. Therefore estoppel clearly applies

As to IOP's motion for Summary Judgment, numerous issues exist that denies granting under the Law. Numerous material facts, numerous fact issues for the jury, verified claim, estoppel due to conduct, yet they claim Lynd as the non-movant is at fault somehow.

The only time IOP even acknowledged the destruction as fact was in the only certified letter ever sent in 2013. That does not start a SOL date.

This APPEALS COURT and the SC SUPREME COURT both held in Lanham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 563 SE 2d 331 - SC: Supreme Court 2002 opinions that directly coincides with this case in the case now before the court Lynd was in the discovery stages, even though it was not discovery in a pending case,

The deciding issue is whether IOP lied, and failed to properly notify Lynd before destruction, and if IOP and defendants through the use of multiple parties delayed discovery of the facts. A material fact is any fact that is not decided as a matter of law. This case has numerous issue that are jury questions, starting with the statue stating failure to properly notify Lynd by certified mail is conversion under the statute. That is a jury question as to if they committed conversion. There is numerous material facts unanswered, including Domin's lies, the intentional stalling of the Ins. Claim, the sworn admissions by Caldwell, etc.

A material fact, no agency or body has bothered to address: The statute states if the procedures for notification are not followed it constitutes conversion under the statute.

---

**the Law, it is an admission that conversion happened, that is a clear material fact left unanswered, and Summary judgment cannot address it. So as in *Latham* it's a jury question. As well as the material fact of her admission of conversion.**

The Summary Judgment evidence was contrary to New Mexico law. The admissions plus the conversion statute present evidence that a no material fact exists for IOP, and Summary Judgment evidence would be in Lynd's favor not IOP, if anything, Summary Judgment should have been granted in Lynd's favor on the conversion and admissions if filed. Clear ineffective assistance of counsel on Lynd's attorney Greenberg.

***Lanham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 563 SE 2d 331 - SC: Supreme Court 2002***

During the hearing on Blue Cross's motion for summary judgment, Blue Cross relied heavily on an unpublished opinion by this court. Blue Cross also presented an affidavit from an employee who stated the insurer would not have issued Lanham's policy had it known of Lanham's liver problems. Lanham argued he had not been allowed adequate discovery and the question of Lanham's discovery motion, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Blue Cross.

**338 S.C. at 345-346, 526 S.E.2d at 254-255. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, finding a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Lanham made a false statement with the actual intent to deceive; it also held that whether Lanham's application answers were material was a matter for the jury.** Finally, the Court of Appeals remanded the issue of Lanham's motion to compel to the trial court.

**STANDARD OF REVIEW**

An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), *Baughman v. American Farm and Ranch Supply, Inc., 101, 410 S.E.2d 537 (1991)*. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Id.* Under Rule 56(c), the party seeking summary judgment **has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.** *Baughman, 306 S.C. at 115, 410 S.E.2d at 545.* With respect to an issue upon which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, this initial responsibility may be discharged by pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. *Id.* **In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.**

*Sumner v. Carpenter*, 328 S.C. 36, 492 S.E.2d 55 (1997). Summary judgment is not appropriate where further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of the law. *Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp.*, 341 S.C. 372, 534 S.E.2d 688 (2000). Summary judgment should not be granted even when there is no dispute as to evidentiary facts if there is disagreement concerning the conclusion to be drawn from those facts. *Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God*, 341 S.C. 320, 534 S.E.2d 672 (2000). On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences

*Williams v. Chesterfield Lumber Co.*, 267 S.C. 607, 230 S.E.2d 447 (1976).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lanham, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that he made a false statement in his application with the actual intent to deceive. Given the fact that he was repeatedly told that there were only slight elevations, when coupled with the ambiguous language of Question 17D, **we find the issue of whether he made a false**

*v. Woodmen of the 366\*366 World Life Ins.*, 249 S.C. 461, 154 S.E.2d 834 (1967)(jury question as to whether life insurance applicant misrepresented his health with intent to deceive insurer notwithstanding insured's answering "no" to numerous questions regarding hospital treatment and medications, when insured had in fact been hospitalized for six days the year prior to his application).

In order to be entitled to summary judgment, Blue Cross would have to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Lanham made a false statement with the actual intent to deceive and that the statement materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed. **Given our holding that whether Lanham made a false representation with the intent to deceive is a matter for the jury in this case, Blue Cross was not entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the reversal of summary judgment.**

#### Sled & Caldwell summary judgment

Sled and Caldwell moved for Summary judgment months later and argued to the court parties was filed is different and has a different inception date that IOP.

Lynd filed a FIOA request for the alleged investigation file on 4-14-2014, so there is no way Sled could even claim SOL of 5-18-2015 the same date IOP used, SLED replied to the

FIOA request on 4-23-2017 with a bill for the printing of the file. At that time the file is not even in Lynd's hands yet so no SOL can be started or **calculated from a date a year before**. Even if the court wants to be as generous as possible to SLED and follows the 2yr guideline going back to the Magic date IOP refers too in the transcripts of 5-18-2013 2year prior to the suit filing date, in no way can SLED use that date when the cause of action is separate from IOP's cause of action and inception.

This is very simple and the court should never have granted it, SLED was not even entitled as well.

Caldwell's admission of failing to follow procedure was admitted to in a sworn statement to SLED, which starts Caldwell's SOL date, which too was in the SLED file in April 2014

Statutes, and SLED's involvement in 2014 and its claim of the same time statute calculation date. The SLED motion for SJ was granted based on IOP's prior SJ, these 2 entities became involved years apart, and in no form of justice can their SOL start date be the same. **2ndly the court entered no order on SLED SJ motion to even reference for factual reasons for granting SJ. Lynd is left speculating on the grounds used for granting. There is no Order on file, and at this time to attempt to have one generated and signed would be fraud on the court.**

In both matters counsel for Lynd was paid and failed to do research, discovery, investigate the statutes or appear at the hearings. this is all clear ineffective assistance of counsel.

### **CONCLUSION.**

The granting of Summary judgement for IOP was error, Lynd was the non-movant and all doubt on the verified claim or the start date of the SOL must be resolved in favor of the longer period. The verified claim invokes the 3yr SOL, and the contact with IOP's counsel, the SLED investigation, and the Ins. Claim all meet the standard of a verified claim. The SOL are tolled due to IOP and IOP's counsel fraudulent inducement, which also creates an equitable estoppel to the motion for summary Judgment, due to IOP's unclean hands and inducement to delay.

Lynd's due diligence and inquiries to IOP does not constitute sufficient knowledge of facts to start SOL. The numerous statutes involving notification and IOP's failure to follow them the conversion, the verified claim, the due diligence, the files and documents withheld all create numerous material facts and questions for the jury. IOP's argument of the 'magic date' arrived at by counting backwards from the date of filing is not how SOL is/or calculated. IOP had the burden of proof to show Lynd knew or should have known and that he had no verified claim, and no material facts existed. They failed in doing so, Lynd the non-movant did not have the burden of proof.


Repeatedly IOP and Domin, IOP's counsel referenced this SLED 'no wrong doing' finding, if true would nullify any suit filed by Lynd, at the mere mention of it, much less the repeated reliance on it, Lynd had a due diligence duty to verify it, or un-verify it, but could not in good faith move fwd. without one or the other.

The notification statutes IOP failed to follow before the disappearance of Lynd's skis, all have separate remedies besides a tort, including conversion or theft, and this cannot be dismissed by a SOL argument on a plain tort. And the missing records, requirements, and conversion are all matters for the jury, and clear and convincing material fact questions which nullify summary judgment.

All mean the SJ must be granted in favor of the non-movant Lynd as they each equal more the a scintilla of evidence, as a whole they are more than a preponderance of evidence. Notwithstanding Lynd's counsel ineffectiveness, failure to do research, investigate, file discovery, and appear at the hearings, the transcripts shows the one appearance he did not even understand what the court was asking him.

The granting of SJ for SLED and Caldwell is simple, the SLED involvement and actions was known to Lynd in April 2014 when the file was turned over, as the evidence shows prior to that Lynd had no knowledge of SLED other than IOPs reference too it. Lynd's replies to that show he called and was told no SLED investigation existed. Till the FIOA request was answered, Lynd knew only of the no wrong doing claim, no facts or records. The verified claim Lynd has also applies as SLED investigated the claim, in such knew of it official existence.

In that FIOA was Caldwell sworn statement to the conversion, and admission, way different than all the prior claims of having done nothing wrong. That SOL time also started in April 2014, and the verified claim covers that as well.



---

David scot Lynd

2605 Rustown

Mesquite TX 75150

469-323-1751

dscotlv@yahoo.com

**WRIT OF CERTIFICATION IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA  
SUPREME COURT**

**In The Court of Appeals**

**Case#: 2016-002024**

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY**

**Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge  
Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lvnd**

**VS**


**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,  
Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police  
Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that the above named parties were served this Initial Appeal Brief by **U.S.P.S.**  
**mail on 12-20-2018** to the address on file with the court shown below.



---

David Lynd

Timothy Domin  
126 Seven Farms Dr.,  
Ste. 200  
Charleston SC 29492

Dorsel, Christopher Thomas  
3 Wesley Drive  
Charleston SC 29407

Morrison, David Leon  
7453 Irmo Dr.,  
Ste. B  
Columbia SC 29212



# CUSTOMER'S RECEIPT

SEE BACK OF THIS RECEIPT  
FOR IMPORTANT CLAIM  
INFORMATION

NOT  
NEGOTIABLE

Pay to

Address

Serial Number  
23886732396

Year, Month, Day  
2018-08-09

Post Office  
750070

Amount  
\$100.00

Clerk  
16

KEEP THIS  
RECEIPT FOR  
YOUR RECORDS



# CUSTOMER'S RECEIPT

KEEP THIS  
RECEIPT FOR  
YOUR RECORDS

Pay to  
Address

SEE BACK OF THIS RECEIPT  
FOR IMPORTANT CLAIM  
INFORMATION

NOT  
NEGOTIABLE

Serial Number

5506E04E752

Year, Month, Day  
2018-08-10

Post Office  
752021

Amount  
\$100.00

Clerk  
10



# CUSTOMER'S RECEIPT

SEE BACK OF THIS RECEIPT  
FOR IMPORTANT CLAIM  
INFORMATION

NOT  
NEGOTIABLE

Pay to

Address

Serial Number  
23886720628

Year, Month, Day  
2018-04-30

Post Office  
750070

Amount  
\$100.00

Clerk  
06

KEEP THIS  
RECEIPT FOR  
YOUR RECORDS

Product  
Description

PM 2-Day  
Flat Rate Env  
(Domestic)  
(COLUMBIA, SC)  
(Flat Rate)  
(Expected Del  
(Wednesday 05  
(USPS Tracking  
(9505 5104 12  
Insurance  
(Up to \$50.00

PM 2-Day  
Flat Rate Env  
(Domestic)  
(COLUMBIA, SC)  
(Flat Rate)  
(Expected Del  
(Wednesday 05  
(USPS Tracking  
(9505 5104 12  
Insurance  
(Up to \$50.00

Total

Cash  
Change

Includes up to \$50.00 insurance

In a hurry? Self-service kiosks offer  
quick and easy check-out. Any Retail  
Associate can show you how.

Text your tracking number to 28777  
(2USPS) to get the latest status.  
Standard Message and Data rates apply.

*Let's check it out*

# The Supreme Court of South Carolina

David Scot Lynd, Petitioner,

v.

Dawn Caldwell, individually and in her capacity as an officer of the Isle of Palms Police Department, and South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, Defendants,

Of Whom Dawn Caldwell, individually, and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division are Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001754

---

## ORDER

---

In March 2018, the Court of Appeals dismissed Isle of Palms and Dawn Caldwell, in her capacity as an officer of the Isle of Palms Police Department, as parties in this appeal, and a petition for a writ of certiorari to review that decision is pending before this Court in *David Scot Lynd v. Isle of Palms*, Appellate Court Case Number 2018-001485.

On August 24, 2018, the Court of Appeals dismissed the remaining part of the appeal based on petitioner's failure to file an amended brief. While petitioner has attempted to file what appears to be a petition for rehearing or reinstatement regarding the August 24, 2018 order, the Court of Appeals has not ruled on that petition, but instead has identified a deficiency that must be corrected.<sup>1</sup>


Under Rule 242(a) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR), this Court will only review a final decision of the Court of Appeals, and a decision is not final for the purposes of review until a petition for rehearing or reinstatement has been acted on by the Court of Appeals. Rule 242(c), SCACR. Since no petition for rehearing or reinstatement has been ruled on by the Court of Appeals

---

<sup>1</sup> Before the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Court Case Number is 2016-002024.

regarding the order of August 24, 2018, there is no final decision for this Court to review.

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case is dismissed without prejudice to petitioner's ability to timely serve and file a petition for a writ of certiorari if a proper petition for rehearing or reinstatement is ruled on by the Court of Appeals.

  
FOR THE COURT

C.J.

Columbia, South Carolina  
October 9, 2018

cc: James Jordan Johnson, Esquire  
David Leon Morrison, Esquire  
Timothy Alan Domin, Esquire  
Christopher Thomas Dorsel, Esquire  
Sandra J. Senn, Esquire  
Mr. David Scot Lynd  
The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings

**CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**In The Supreme Court of South Carolina  
From the Court of Appeals**

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY**

**Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge  
Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd**

**VS**

**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,  
Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police  
Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**Appelate case # 2016-002024**

**CERTIORARI TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT**

Important points of the case that are undisputed and unconsted

- At no time, in no document, or filing has I.O.P. or S.L.E.D. disputed, explained, or justified the actions taken, or the wrongs committed against plaintiff Lynd and his property. Each defendant has only complained of technicalities to avoid having to face the facts!!! This is exactly why persons are rioting in the streets over the police conduct, and the Courts condone of it, or failures to act upon it. Be informed; I have turned the documents over to the ACLU for guidance or action they deem appropriate.
- Plaintiff Lynd was a crime victim whose property was recovered by I.O.P. but Lynd was never notified in any form of the recovery to retrieve them.
- Lynd filed a verified claim with IOP whom in turn turned it over to SLED for investigation; thereby any S.O.Limitation if applicable would be the 3 year for a verified claim
- IOP's failure to notify Lynd to retrieve the property and the subsequent disappearance of the property is conversion under South Carolina statutes, of which over a dozen apply.
- There is no S.O.L. of conversion/theft under South Carolina law.
- Lynd hired counsel; in S.C. paid a retainer of 25,000 and the funds were not returned, and counsel failed to fulfill the contract and the COA allowed them to withdraw without filing a single document.
- The trial court erred original by
- Applying the a sol time limit,
- in doing so used the wrong standard, (2 year)
- Miscalculated the start date to the 2 year standard it wrongfully applied
- the 2 year date fell on a sat, the case filed the following Monday
- The trial court held the hearings over 1 year apart,
- Lynd tried to appeal the first ruling, the COA clerk would not accept it,
  - because there was an attorney of record,

- the case was still ongoing and they would not accept appeal till a final ruling on all parties
- COA clerk Kitchens interfered with plaintiffs filings in an attempt to impede the appeal so as to favor IOP and SLED, failed to set motions for hearings, failed to investigate facts of non-notice, intentionally returned motion and filing fees refusing to accept payments to make filings late,
- Chief Justice of the COA meet exparte with IOP's counsel then tried to limit plaintiff Lynd's scope of appeal by declaring Lynd could not file certain points in the brief, denying Lynd's right to preserve grounds.
- COA justice demanded a new brief, Lynd filed a new amended brief, and clerk again refused paymneent, the Chief justice declared it was not adequate and dismissed appeal, Lynd filed a rehearing, the clerk refused to set it
- Lynd made a formal civil rights complaint to the COA, it was filed, and the COA has failed or refused to act on the complaint
- Lynd has made numerous filings with the Supreme Court of the coa clerk's errors only to have the Supreme Court clerk contact the COA clerk and have them correct it, but the S.C. clerk then refuses the filing Lynd made but keeps the \$100 dollar filing fee. Lynd has paid the Sup CT clerk 900 dollars and hasn't had a hearing yet.

NOW COMES DAVID Lynd who hereby files this Writ of Certification to appeal the order filed and entered, and filed on 8-24-18. This ordered entered is an alleged final order. The rehearing was finally heard after order from the Supreme Court and denied on 7-10-18. That denial of the motion to rehear order was appealed by Writ of Certification to the South Carolina Supreme Court on 8-8-18 and fees paid, it was not filed till 8-14-18, The COA continued on and dismissed the appeal in its entirety by order dated 8-24-18. Claiming grounds that Lynd did not file the amended brief ordered in the 7-10-18 order currently before this court. Lynd filed a

motion to rehear that dismissal, the COA clerks refused to file it, stating it was not available to be reheard. The C.O.A. has issued the remitter without the filed rehearing being ruled on.

David Lynd hereby files this notice of Writ of Certification to the South Carolina Supreme Court, on the grounds.

(1) Where there are novel questions of law.

State statute says failure to give proper notice on titled property before destruction, is an act of conversion, Conversion is theft and no statute of limitations exists in S.C. for that.  
But the civil courts hear such complaints and try to imply a civil S.O.L. time table.

The time table applied is incorrect as well, as the 3yr SOL would apply due to I.O.P. filing the claim with its insurance company, and hiring counsel to represent it in that insurance claim. That clearly makes it a verified claim,. I.O.P. ACTED ON THE CLAIM FILED by acts and admission verified the claim.

(2) Where there is a dissent in the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In this instance there are several dissents and misapplications of the precedents. This court in Elam v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp., 602 SE 2d 772 - SC: Supreme Court 2004 tried to reconcile those in its ruling but the courts fail to adhere to that opinion, and the COA refuse to adhere to it concerning the filing of post judgment motions.

(3) Where the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court.

Same as above the Court of Appeals has seen and been provided that ruling but have ruled against it in its order despite numerous case law, this is done in a case against the City Police and SLED's failure to act. Trying to claim notice of appeals should have been filed when the clerks refused to accept it till the case had ended.

This goes on to be proven by a new order 19 months later that the clerks again refused to accept notice of appeal on.

(4) Where substantial constitutional issues are directly involved.

The failure to act and follow the statutes governing destruction of titled property is a direct an unequivocal equal protection and due process violation.

The case is Lengthy spans years of conduct involves numerous state and city agencies, multiple parties, multiple counsels, and multiple fillings and conflicting orders. The length of the petition mirrors that, due to cause and effect of the lengthy proceeding.

Now comes David Lynd whom hereby files this writ of certification to the South Carolina Supreme Court on the dismissal in-part order dated 3-22-18 of the above named appeal, and the

subsequent remitter sent to the trial court while rehearing's were filed, that went unheard. The Writ should be heard due to the nature of the case, and the ongoing Federal Civil rights cases involving the respondents and their actions.

The Supreme Court needs to hear the case now, no longer can the COA refuse to act, then upon filing with this court make the COA act sending plaintiff back down to the COA, only to harassed again, defrauded out of more fees, when no attempt to hear the appeal is ever going to happen.

**See the attached motion below : to remove the case to this Supreme Court.**

This involves S.C. statues that were not followed, that were ignored, and even lied about their requirements and wording, and the resulting required by law and legal remedy directly outlined in the statue was ignored. This is a theft/conversion by S.C. city and state, government agencies as outlined in the statutes.

The court seems to be applying some hidden standard as if appellant Lynd is a criminal which had his property impounded and destroyed due to arrest. **Appellant Lynd is not that! Lynd was a Crime victim that had his property stolen in Texas, and subsequently recovered in S.C. but was never notified it was in South Carolina to retrieve it.**

**Appellant Lynd is a victim! And has victim rights under federal law under both due process that's been denied here, and equal protection that has been denied here.**

So this appeal is a cross complaint under both civil and criminal law. Writ of cert is needed to determine what is the correct path, that the lower courts must follow, **when a S.C. statute was not followed, and the statutory remedy was not applied.**

Does the conversion fall under a civil statute if a mandamus type request for enforcement of the statute be needed in a civil court? or does it fall under the criminal statute which has no statute of limitations? **S.C. has long held no S.O.L. under the criminal code and can seek prosecution and restitution years later.**

In this instance the respondents have being trying to apply civil time limit statues to what was a criminal act under the S.C. statute as conversion.

This in-part dismissal of this appeal based on a parties motions is in contradiction to the standing and most current precedents set by the South Carolina Supreme Court, **Elam v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp., 602 SE 2d 772 - SC: Supreme Court**, and the case will be moving on to the S.C. Supreme Court and Federal Court, both in the future and some current ongoing. For these reasons **it is in all parties' best interest to have a decision on the applications of the precedents in question, and the conflict of those being presented.**

In this instance Lynd while represented by a licensed S.C. Law firm answered the motion, lost and filed (by counsel) what was ruled as a post judgement remedies rule 59/60 motion. **This was done by counsel not pro-se Lynd, any errors in procedure fall on the licensed S.C. lawyer, pro-se Lynd could not have been at fault.**

Nor could an appeal be untimely after Lynd instructed counsel to file the appeal under ever existing SC precedent.

Both counsel and The C.O.A. clerk Jenny Kitchens Stated that a interlocutory or piecemeal appeal was not allowed, that the appeal could only be filed after the case was over. Subsequently when Lynd did try and appeal pro-se the clerk of the C.O.A. would not accept the appeal due to Lynd (again) being represented by licensed counsel. The COA clerks even sent

counsel numerous letters demanding he respond, then allowed counsel to withdraw from the case without notice to pro-se Lynd or him being allowed to file an answer.

This matter involves the time limit for a post judgment remedy, and new trial, and the exact precedents of this court : see below

***RULE 54, (b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.***

*In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, **which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties***

**Hagood v. Sommerville, 607 SE 2d 707 - SC: Supreme Court 2005**

*An order which does not finally end a case or prevent a final judgment from which a party may seek appellate review usually **is considered an interlocutory order from which no immediate appeal is allowed.** Tatnall v. Gardner, 350 S.C. 135, 138, 564 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ct.App.2002)*

The issue in this matter involves 3 parties all filing the same summary judgement motion, but getting 3 separate hearings and 3 separate rulings. Lynd asked counsel and the chief clerk at the COA if each had to be appealed separately and was emphatically told NO!

Herein lies the 1<sup>st</sup> part of the Writ, the either correct or misapplication of the precedents, when it was CRYSTAL CLEAR pro-se Lynd was making a good faith effort to file a timely appeal, and was denied that by an error by a licensed S.C. Attorney. Which is clearly covered in the case law below.

**Elam v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp., 602 SE 2d 772 - SC: Supreme Court 2004**

(Quoted below)

These conflicts also are in contradiction of C.O.A opinions, and are not consistent. And are in direct contradiction to the clerk's office procedure of acceptance and filings of appeals, on motions and multiple orders. The chief Justice signed an order dismissing in part all the relevant parts of the appeal in a guise to protect the Government entities named in the cause. This dismissal is not based on fact, nor on precedent. Matter of fact the order actual states one of the

cases that stands in appellants favor, as a ground for non-dismissal. The order itself contradicts the orders own result. The order clearly states under

*SC code 14-3-330(1) and Lancaster v fields 305sc if there is a final judgement and the party timely files his notice of intent to appeal from that judgement under sec 14-3-330(1) this court can review an intermediate order or decree necessarily affecting the judgment not before appealed from.*

**It is evident Lynd appealed the case, the motion to dismiss was filed by Isle of Palms stating that the order of 2015 was not appealed, and thereby should be dismissed, as the justice stated in this order, that can be appealed after the final judgment.**

It boils down to a loop hole the court can use to dismiss what it chooses, and hear what it chooses. This appeal was dismissed in part stating it was not timely filed with a notice of appeal, even though the appellant's attorneys involved, and the clerks of both the trial court and Mrs Kitchens of the C.O.A stated it was not an interlocutory appeal and appellant must wait till the case was final before appealing any part of it. This was also verified by the Coordinator Mrs. Frierson herself. All of this is covered in Rule 54. And the precedents covering it.

***RULE 54, (b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.***

*In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties*

**Hagood v. Sommerville, 607 SE 2d 707 - SC: Supreme Court 2005**

*An order which does not finally end a case or prevent a final judgment from which a party may seek appellate review usually is considered an interlocutory order from which no immediate appeal is allowed. Tatnall v. Gardner, 350 S.C. 135, 138, 564 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ct.App.2002).*

*Piecemeal appeals should be avoided and most errors can be corrected by the remedy of a new trial.*

Now as well as those attempts to appeal it; and being told to wait, appellant also was informed of the Supreme Court precedents that clearly state the appeal must wait till all matters are decided on all parties, and all post-trial motions have been heard and ruled on,

**Elam v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp., 602 SE 2d 772 - SC: Supreme Court 2004**

After studied review, we reject the rationale and result reached by the Court of Appeals in the present case and in *Matthews*. We conclude a party usually is free to file an initial Rule 59(e) motion, regardless of whether the previous JNOV/new trial motions were made orally or in writing, without unnecessary concern the repetition of an issue or argument made in a previous motion will result in a subsequent appeal being dismissed as untimely. In essence, we view the use of oral or written JNOV/new trial motions, followed by an initial Rule 59(e) motion, as **part and parcel of a party's "single bite at the apple" in presenting his case to the trial court.**

Fourth, South Carolina appellate courts do not recognize the "plain error rule," under which a court in certain circumstances is allowed to consider and rectify an error not raised below by the party. *Dykema v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.C.*, 348 S.C. 549, 554, 560 S.E.2d 894, 896 (2002); *Kennedy v. South Carolina Retirement System*, 349 S.C. 531, 25\*25 564 S.E.2d 322 (2001). **Our mandatory preservation requirements make it doubly important that litigants generally be freely allowed to file a first, written Rule 59(e) motion without concern a later appeal will be deemed untimely.**

**Fifth, civil procedure and appellate rules should not be written or interpreted to create a trap for the unwary lawyer or party, but a careful consideration of this issue has led us to conclude that is precisely the effect of an unwarranted expansion of *Quality Trailer*. Cf. *Gamble v. State*, 298 S.C. 176, 379 S.E.2d 118 (1989)**

If a party is unsure whether he properly raised all issues and obtained a ruling, he must file a Rule 59(e) motion or an appellate court may later determine the issue or argument is not preserved for review. But in filing the motion, he may unwittingly forfeit the right to an appeal if an appellate court later determines the Rule 59(e) motion was unnecessary because he already had raised the issue and obtained a ruling. **We strive to avoid an interpretation of procedural rules which routinely would place a party between the proverbial rock and a hard place.**<sup>[5]</sup>

We reaffirm the principles set forth in *Coward Hund*, 336 S.C. 1, 518 S.E.2d 56; *Quality Trailer*, 349 S.C. 216, 562 S.E.2d 615; and *Collins Music*, 353 S.C. 559, 579 S.E.2d 524. We reverse the Court of Appeals' order in the present case and overrule the Court of Appeals' opinion in *Matthews*, 357 S.C. 594, 594 S.E.2d 177. We conclude SCDOT timely served its notice of appeal after receipt of written notice of entry of the order denying its Rule 59(e) motion.

it appropriate for a party to make a "motion for reconsideration" under Rule 59(e) even though the rule mentions only a "motion to alter or amend a judgment." **This view holds true even when a party mislabels a post-trial motion.** See Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir.1999) (Rule 4(a)(4), FRAP, restates long-accepted practice of considering motions for reconsideration, a practice independent of any appellate rule);

So the order in question seems to state the appellant Lynd should have filed a notice of appeal on each individual order, even though a post-trial motion was filed. **The SC Supreme Court is clear that is not the case.**

*doubly important that litigants generally be freely allowed to file a first, written motion **without concern a later appeal will be deemed untimely.** And, civil procedure and appellate rules should **not be written or interpreted to create a trap for the unwary lawyer or party, but a careful consideration of this issue has led us to conclude that is precisely the effect of an unwarranted expansion of Quality Trailer**,*

this also holds for the Motion appellants attorney filed and mislabeled, that error is not grounds to dismiss an appeal, nor applicable as an error on pro-se appellant Lynd.

Appellant Lynd is clearly and indisputably in the "trap" the Supreme Court speaks of in its numerous precedents. **All the while CLEARLY AND UNECOVICALLY MAKING A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO PURSUE JUSTICE AND PERFECT AN APPEAL.** And the final order closing the case was not entered till 3-22-18. That final order is entered after IOP had already filed the motion to dismiss.

How can a motion to dismiss be filed before the final order is even issued, MUCH LESS BE GRANTED on the grounds the appeal was filed late!!!!!!

**Be advised under their interpretation and the order dismissing the appeal, then the final order, an entirely new appeal would have to be started on the final order date of 3-22-2018. Lynd in protection mode filed a notice of appeal on that order, the COA refused to**

**accept it. Therefore creating another round of appeals to the Supreme Court.**

This is clearly what is happening here. The court must also remember appellant Lynd is pro-se now, BUT!! at the times being discussed (the 2015 and 2016 orders) Lynd was represented by counsel. NOT ONLY REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, but refused by the COA clerk's office to file any documents **because he was represented by counsel.**

This is a matter of record in this appeal, where the clerk sent pro-se Lynd letters claiming he COULD NOT FILE DOCUMENTS OR NOTICES because he has a counsel of record. (see appendix) At the same time the clerk was sending demand letters to the counsel of record demanding they respond. Unknowingly the Law firm had gone under and was disbanded!

THIS IS A MATTER OF THIS APPEAL COURT RECORD. EASILY VERIFIED!!!  
You cannot have your cake and eat it too scenario, the clerk of the COA cannot tell Lynd not to file, and then the court dismiss due to not filing, that is just ridiculous on its face.

This exact contradiction in one opinion to another, *so the ruling 'desired'* can be entered **is why the public is protesting in the streets.** This case it is clear, Lynd is correct, and Isle of Palms and SLED are at fault and liable for damages, and massive civil rights violations of both due process and equal protection. **It is also clear this is not the desired outcome the courts want** and are deeply seeking any form of technicality that it can apply to make it go away.

This is so simple! The conversion committed by Isle of Palms and SLED is a criminal matter, THERE IS NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN SCOUTH CAROLINA ON THAT CRIME. No amount of digging and word play can make some defunct civil precedent apply to dismiss the case **and the criminal theft/conversion.** REMEMBER THIS IS NOT

APPELLANTS OPINION THAT IT HAPPENED BUT FACT, ADMITTED TO FACT, IN BOTH ORAL AND WRITTEN DEPOSITIONS!

The act complained of and remedy sought is conversion/theft according to S.C. statute, and this act is admitted to by the officer in question in 3 separate statement's 2 under oath. Those acts have NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOR A FILING DEADLINE.

Appellant Lynd as stated earlier was represented by counsel thru both the 2015 order, the 2016 order, and the post trial motion and order. Even up too and thru the initial notice of appeal to the COA clerk's office. THIS APPEALS COURT granted the motion to allow counsel withdraw itself.

Under no precedent can the C.O.A. after its own clerks numerous times made request to the attorney of record without a response, can the hold a pro-se appellant making a good faith appeal, to alleged errors and time limits errors that Counsel of Record (*an officer of the courts*) might have made. Even if the court disregards every single argument on the post-trial motions, or interlocutory appeal filings, these failings were done by counsel, **NOT! pro-se appellant Lynd.** Every precedent that exists in South Carolina, clearly state that an attorney that fails to file a timely notice of appeal if not the fault of the client or now pro-se applicant.

There is no justification of this dismissal if the error was made by counsel, when pro-se Lynd was clearly wanting and seeking to appeal. Appellant Lynd even when represented by counsel called clerks and administrators to verify what his counsel was stating that the appeal had to wait for a final judgment. Now the court wants to counter the precedents and state Lynd fails in his attempt to appeal, on counsel of record's alleged error, even though the clerks would not file, and even refused Lynd's first filing attempts.

**Butler v. State, 334 SE 2d 813 - SC: Supreme Court 1985**

The United States Supreme Court's decision in *Strickland, supra*, is clearly the preeminent authority for all other courts, state and federal, in determination of appeals arising out of allegations of lawyer incompetence.

*Writing for the majority of the court, Justice O'Connor defines the standard for judging ineffectiveness, **then cautions against hindsight and second-guessing review by appellate tribunals:***

*The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.*

In this instance it is clear, counsel failed to file a notice of appeal on the 2015 order, and thereby defendants claim, forfeited appellants Lynd's right to appeal, and was specifically instructed too, not only did counsel not file it but gave a lengthy explanation as to why it was not due to be filed. **Appellant Lynd relied on that, and believed a licensed office of the court.** So at no time did appellant Lynd fail to timely file a notice of appeal. Appellant Lynd even did his own inquires with the clerks to verify those statements. To all parties it was not due till the case was closed. **Here failure to proper file a notice to preserve a parties right to appeal fails the standard in Strickland, doubly so when specifically asked or inquired by client.**

**The effect of counsel's failure to appeal was that Becton lost his ability to protect his "vital interests at stake."**

This doubled the injustice when you count in the court claiming the post-conviction motion also filed by counsel is claimed to be untimely as well. Again an error by counsel that swore to his client it was not time to file it. **These are not errors by appellant Lynd but counsel a SC bar licensed attorney and attorney of record on the case.**

The C.O.A. is confusing the motions and filings at the trial level done by counsel with Pro-se Lynd's filings to appeal.

**US v. Peak, 992 F. 2d 39 - Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 1993**

**However effective or ineffective Peak's counsel was before the judgment of conviction, his failure to file the requested appeal deprived Peak of the assistance of counsel on direct appeal altogether**

*We touched on this issue in Becton v. Barnett, 920 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir.1990). In remanding a dismissed ineffectiveness claim based, in part, on a failure to file a notice of appeal, we said (920 F.2d at 1195):*

**The effect of counsel's failure to appeal was that Becton lost his ability to protect his "vital interests at stake."**

**Becton v. Barnett, 920 F. 2d 1190 - Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 1990**

**. He alleged further that counsel assured him that there was still time to appeal as the ten day period for appeal had not yet run. However, no appeal was ever filed.**

**In order for the appeal as of right to be adjudicated in accord with due process of law, the appellant must have the effective assistance of counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985)**

**US v. Poindexter, 492 F. 3d 263 - Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 2007**

**In preparation for the appellate phase of the case, an attorney in an appeal waiver case still owes important duties to the defendant. First and foremost, the attorney, as recognized in Flores-Ortega, has the duty to respect the appellate wishes of his client by filing a timely notice of appeal if he is unequivocally instructed to do so.**

**Skinner v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 668 SE 2d 795 - SC: Supreme Court 2008**

The issue and complaints of respondent all and always make this false claims that appellant Lynd is somehow at fault and failed to do this or that, when in reality they all 3 know it was **Lynd's attorney not appellant Lynd** that might have failed in what they are using for grounds in their motions. **Even though clerks and others all claim it was filed the correct and proper way to have filed the appeal.** They rehash this lame claim of technical issues, instead of stating the facts and admitting to the original errors and conversion.

**NEVER IN THIS MOUNTAIN OF FILINGS has I.O.P.** stated why they are not liable for the conversion of the property in question, why they didn't send the required certified letters, nor the truthful disposition of the property.

Never once have the offered the statutory restitution or compensation. Never once have they even so much as apologized for their error and loss it caused.

**Yet everyone in the justice system wants to claim the public outcry and riots in the streets, over the police and courts misconduct, and failures to act on such misconducts, is hogwash, exaggerated, and non-existent. But right here is the proof.**

Sled administratively closed the investigation of IOP's actions, for what was to be a brief time period, to secretly watch and investigate Det. Caldwell.; **This ENTIRE MATTER falls in SLED's lap!!! All they had to have done** was reopen the Investigation enter a finding of conversion based on Det. Caldwell's admission under oath, and order the restitution and Interest. **That was the law, the statute, S.C. procedure, and the right and just thing to do.** Everyone could have gone their separate ways and no case would have ensued.

This entire case, appeal, and years of filings is due to SLED's single employee, that closed and refused to reopen the investigation!! It is that simple and cut and dried! Even at this stage of the **case SLED still has that duty to fulfill**, and could end the entire matter, they know it, their counsel knows it, the courts know it, but everyone's refuses to admit it. The preverbal elephant in the room. This court has a mandamus duty, and the jurisdiction to order that action, a mandamus action ordering the statutory remedy be applied and followed.

**This is one of the main reasons this should be heard** every justice on the court will be summarily held or tied to this ruling, that once again lets a corrupt police officer and a corrupt Police dept off the hook, without justice to the public, and therefore should hear the facts and enter a consent or dissent on the outcome.

The individual notices of Appeal on each and every order is not the procedure the C.O.A. clerks follow, this case is an example thru this process every party has complained that a separate appeal on the 2015 order was required. As example the 2-26-18 order, issued after this appeal has already started and proceeded would also require its own separate notice of appeal.

**Appellant Lynd did file that separate notice of appeal on the 2-26-18 order mailed 3-6-18,** the clerk's office refused to file or accept it an issue a

separate appeal case number and just list it as a generic filing in the current case, shown on the docket as filed 3-8-18 “notice of appeal”. But according to the chief Justices order in question here, every order by the trial court requires its own separate appeal.

Appellant Even going so far as to have Mrs Kitchens, call, The head clerk of the COA in a phone call; 4-4-18 at 4:57 p.m. EST from ph# 803-734-1891 stated I did not get a separate appeal on the filing or every order filed, nor an appellate case number on that filing to even proceed on, and don't show it as a notice of appeal.

The Appeals Court's order and implication of how it should have been done, is in conflict to how the clerk's office operates, a hypothetical is this;

if appellants Lynd's counsel at the time of the 2015 order, had actually filed a notice of appeal, then subsequently the following two parties each receiving separate orders over a year later would have been required to have a separate notice of appeal filed. All based on the exact same fact, *(with motions actually copied from each other)* So while the appeal on the 2015 is progressing, new appeals of the 2016 would have to have been started.

So under either scenario,

one the 2016 would be added to the ongoing 2015 appeal,

or the 2015 would be added to the new and current 2016 appeals.

None are outlined in the rules but truthfully **Neither exists it would be based on ‘how’ the clerk of the court accepted and filed them.** So the entire argument of filing dates and separate appeals is moot when the clerk's office will not and does not file them that way. Clearly evident by the 2<sup>nd</sup> notice of appeal, not being accepted and filed separately from the current case.

That is exactly what Appellant Lynd encountered when discussing it with counsel at the time of the 2015 order, and with the clerk and administrator the following day. Mrs. Frierson can corroborate this entire matter as she was c.c. on most of it. All stated you do not file individual appeals on each order, only on the final order, which was never entered.

That final order was entered only after Lynd's initial brief outlined that it was never entered by the court. A sever breach of ethics.

So the dismissal of the trial case parts against I.O.P. , S.L.E.D. and Dawna Caldwell leaving only the post judgment motion to appeal is incorrect and not the normal procedure, and flies in the face of court precedent, it is a clear due process violation, and clearly even if deemed correct not the fault of Lynd but ineffective assistance of counsel. lost his ability to protect his "vital interests at stake."

These repeated filing deadlines that are alleged missed are the fault of counsel, if the court uses them, saying as appellant they were missed file dates, that falls on counsel, and Lynd now Pro-se is not subject to suffer that counsels errors, it is the courts own created catch 22. If the court claims they are filing errors they are the fault of counsel of record, and are acts committed by counsel that denied the client his right to appeal. That without question meets the ineffective assistance of counsel standard in strickland, and does so allegedly on several different occasions of missed dates. **It cannot be both;** it cannot be errors on filing but not be an error by paid counsel, an error of the most basic, timely filing of documents.

It is also quiet insulting to appellant, and the public that everyone up to the Chief justice is dictating statues and laws, and this so called strict adherence to it, but somehow there is no adherence strict or otherwise to the statues violated that caused this case in the first place.

Statue that still have jurisdiction even as this appeal proceeds!!

That is why an Supreme Court decision is needed to determine who, whom, and what entity failed in enforcing the conversion after it was confessed too: this falls upon all the justices of the court, and all should have a say and an opinion on the record.

**SECTION 56-5-5940. Seizure, sale or disposal of vehicle in violation of article constitutes conversion.**

**(a) Seizure, sale, or disposal of an abandoned or derelict motor vehicle in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of this article shall constitute conversion for which the owner shall have redress in any court of competent jurisdiction.**

**There is no time limit under this statute** and the ones that follow; that issue being what the original trial order being claimed was not timely appealed was based on. It makes the filing time statute the respondents argued a moot point. **They filed a summary judgment motion on a time limit that didn't exist and had a sympathetic judge grant it based on civil statute of Limitations standard not the conversion statute.** that does not exist on this act.

Thereby putting appellant Lynd in a system loop of appeals, filings, and technicalities, claiming time limit failures, on a matter that had **no time limit to begin with.**

**ODD!! Out of all the these rulings, and determining all these technical issues; nobody seems to see the most relevant one!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!**

**A technical point that makes all the others a moot point.**

It is also quiet insulting to appellant, and the public that everyone up to the Chief justice is dictating statues and laws, and this so called **strict adherence** to it, **but somehow there is no adherence strict or otherwise to the statues violated that caused this case in the first place.** Statue that still have jurisdiction even as this appeal proceeds!! **And have no STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS!!!**

**SECTION 56-5-5660. Repealed by 2012 Act No. 242, Section 7, eff December 15, 2012.**

Former Section 56-5-5660 was entitled "Application for and issuance of disposal authority

certificates" and was derived from 1962 Code Section 46-490.16; 1972 (57) 2459; 2004 Act No. 269, Section 6.

**South Carolina Code 56-5-5660. Application for and issuance of disposal authority certificates**

(A) Any person or unit of government upon whose property or in whose possession is found an abandoned vehicle, or any person who is the owner of a vehicle whose title certificate is faulty, lost, or destroyed, may apply to the sheriff or chief of police of the jurisdiction in which the vehicle is located for authority to sell or give the vehicle to a demolisher.

(B) The application must give the name and address of the applicant, the year, make, model, and identification number of the vehicle, if ascertainable, along with any other identifying features, and must contain a concise statement of the facts surrounding the abandonment, or that the title of the vehicle is lost or destroyed, or the reasons for the defect of title in the owner. The applicant must execute an affidavit stating that the facts alleged are true and that no material fact has been withheld.

(C) If the sheriff or chief of police determines that the application is executed in proper form, and demonstrates that the vehicle has been abandoned upon the property of the applicant, the notification procedures set forth in Section 56-5-5630 must be followed. If the vehicle is not reclaimed in accordance with Section 56-5-5630, the sheriff or chief of police must follow the procedure set forth in Section 56-5-5660(D) for issuance of disposal authority certificates.

(D) If the application demonstrates that the vehicle is not abandoned but that the applicant appears to be the rightful owner, the sheriff or chief of police must give the applicant a certificate of authority to sell or give the vehicle to any demolisher for demolition, wrecking, or dismantling. A disposal authority certificate may contain multiple listings. The demolisher must accept such certificate in lieu of the certificate of title to the vehicle.

*Conversion*

*n. a civil wrong (tort) in which one converts another's property to his/her own use, which is a fancy way of saying "steals." Conversion includes treating another's goods as one's own, holding onto such property which accidentally comes into the convertor's (taker's) hands, or purposely giving the impression the assets belong to him/her. This gives the true owner the right to sue for his/her own property or the value and loss of use of it, as well as going to law enforcement authorities since conversion usually includes the crime of theft.*

Conversion is a wrongful act and has been defined as the unauthorized assumption in the exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner's rights. **Owens v. Andrews Bank & Trust Co., 265 S.C. 490, 220 S.E. (2d) 116 (1975). Powell v. A.K. Brown Motor Co., 200 S. C. 75, 20 S.E.2d 636 (1942).** Conversion may arise by some illegal use or misuse, or by illegal detention of another's chattel. Id. Money may be the subject of conversion when it is

capable of being identified and there may be conversion of determinate sums even though the specific coins and bills are not identified. Id; 89 C.J.S. Trover and Conversion § 23 (1955). To establish the tort of conversion, it is essential that the plaintiff establish either title to or right to the possession of the personal property. Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Burgess, 303 S.C. 534, 402 S.E.2d 480 (1991). A claim for conversion can be based on an unauthorized detention of property, after demand. Castell v. Stephenson Finance Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E. (2d) 311 (1964). Punitive damages are recoverable in conversion cases in the event it is determined the defendant's acts have been willful, reckless, and/or committed with conscious indifference to the rights of others. Hunt v. Jordan, 286 S.C. 340, 333 S.E. (2d) 569 (Ct. App. 1985).

Conversion has been defined in our case law as an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights. Ray v. Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co., 206 S.C. 344, 34 S.E. (2d) 218, 34 S.E. (2d) 218 (1945). Conversion may arise by some illegal use or misuse, or by illegal detention of another's chattel. Castell v. Stephenson Finance Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E. (2d) 311 (1964).

Conversion § 84 (1985); McPherson v. Neuffer & Hendrix, 45 S.C.L. (11 Rich.) 267, 281 (1858) (if a party wrongfully assumes property belonging to another or wrongfully uses it, it amounts to a direct conversion and a demand and refusal are not necessary before bringing an action).

**"An action for conversion may be maintained by persons having the immediate right to possession of the article converted. Indeed, ordinarily, an immediate right to possession at the time of conversion is all that is required in the way of title or possession to enable the plaintiff to maintain his action."**

The words maintain his action somehow seems to escape everyone involved in this. As of this filing Lynd still has the right to possession of his property, at no time does that expire, or run some imaginary SOL. It is Lynd's property and must be returned or compensated for.

**SECTION 56-5-5635. Law enforcement towing and storage procedures; notification of registered owner; disposition of vehicle and personal property.**

**(B) Within ten days following a law enforcement's towing request, the proprietor, owner, or operator of any towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must provide to the sheriff or chief of police a list describing the vehicles remaining in the possession of the proprietor, owner, or operator of any towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop. A person who fails to provide the law enforcement agency with this list forfeits recovery of any storage fees that have accrued from the date of towing until the day after the mailing of the notification to the owner and all lienholders by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, pursuant to Section 29-15-10. Within ten days of receipt of this list, the sheriff or chief of police must provide to the towing company or storage facility, the current owner's name, address, and a record of all lienholders along with the make, model, and identification number or a description of the vehicle at no cost to the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop. The proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop having towed or received the vehicle must notify by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, the last known registered owner and all lienholders of record that the vehicle has been taken into custody.**

**(C) If the identity of the last registered owner cannot be determined, or if the registration contains no address for the owner, or if it is impossible to determine with reasonable certainty the identity and addresses of all lienholders, the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must provide notice by one publication in one newspaper of general circulation in the area from which the vehicle was abandoned which is sufficient to meet all requirements of notice pursuant to this article. The notice by publication may contain multiple listings of abandoned vehicles.**

**(D) Before a vehicle is sold, the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must apply to the appropriate titling facility including, but not limited to, the Department of Motor Vehicles or the Department of Natural Resources for the name and address of any owner or lienholder. For nontitled vehicles, where the owner's name is known, a search must be conducted through the Secretary of State's Office to determine any lienholders. The application must be on prescribed forms as required by the appropriate titling facility or the Secretary of State. If the vehicle has an out-of-state registration, an application must be made to that state's appropriate titling facility. When the vehicle is not titled in this State and does not have a registration from another state, the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop may apply to the sheriff or chief of police in the jurisdiction where the vehicle is stored to determine the state where the vehicle is registered. The sheriff or chief of police shall conduct a records search. This search must include, but is not limited to, a search on the National Crime Information Center and any other appropriate search that may be conducted with the vehicle's identification number. The sheriff or chief of police must supply, at no cost to the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop, the name of the state in which the vehicle is titled.**

**(E) The proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair**

*shop that has towed and stored a vehicle has a lien against the vehicle and may have the vehicle sold at public auction pursuant to Section 29-15-10. The proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop may hold the license tag of any vehicle until all towing and storage costs have been paid, or if the vehicle is not reclaimed, until it is declared abandoned and sold. Storage costs may be charged that have accrued before the notification of the owner and lienholder, by certified or registered mail, of the location of the vehicle. Notification to the owner and lienholder by the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must occur within five days, after receiving the owner's and lienholders' identities from the appropriate law enforcement agency. If the notice is not mailed within this period, storage costs after the five-day period must not be charged until the notice is mailed. If the vehicle is not reclaimed within thirty days after the day the notice is mailed, return receipt requested, the vehicle is considered abandoned and may be sold by the magistrate pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 29-15-10.*

*(F) After the vehicle is in the possession of the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop, the owner of the vehicle as demonstrated by providing a certificate of registration has one opportunity to remove from the vehicle any personal property not attached to the vehicle. The proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage, or repair shop must release any personal property that does not belong to the owner of the vehicle to the owner of the personal property.*

*(G) When a law enforcement agency stores a vehicle at a law enforcement facility, the agency must follow the notification procedures contained in this section and submit vehicle information to a magistrate in the county where the vehicle is stored to provide for the sale of the vehicle at public auction. A law enforcement agency is exempt from paying filing fees in any matter related to the towing and storing of a vehicle.*

The order goes on to list a footnote (1) *claiming “ although appellant was unable to inform this court”* again clearly showing the court is aware that now the appellant Lynd, was at the time represented by counsel, and counsel would have received the notice not Lynd. And that counsel refused to forward Lynd his case file, notes or the original documents supplied to counsel.

IOP claims the 2ys Sol had expired prior to Lynd filing suit. That is inaccurate to the facts Lynd had filed a verified claim with the Government entity that claim was forwarded to the insurance company and never action taken on it, nor denied. That verified claim also claimed an act of malfeasance by IOP so was forwarded to SLED for investigation.

When the 'claim' was sent to both the Ins. Co. who hired counsel to defend it, and Sled whom started an official investigation it is clearly a verified claim under the rules. That claim is still un-denied or disallowed. The only time it was even mentioned as to any form of denial was Domin email statement that it was without merit in Feb 2014.

The Sol argument made by IOP references no known date, or instance. (*See transcripts 9-2-15 pg. 4, line13*) IOP references a 'magic date' by going back 2 yrs. from the dater of filing, but IOP does not reference any known notice or certified mail giving notice to Lynd that would start the SOL, as required in the statutes listed below on the impoundment, and destruction of the skis in question. IOP has basically picked a date out of the air stating that any contact prior to that date starts the SOL. That is a jury question and a material fact question that nullifies a Summary judgment in favor of the non-movant.

The SOL limits starts when IOP noticed Lynd according to the statue, and/or notice Lynd of the upcoming destruction, and/or noticed by the salvage/destruction facility they were turned over too. All of these notices are required by South Carolina Statute, IOP did none of them, **and IOP can't claim a statutory argument** when it failed to follow the statutes required in the first place. You cannot ignore dozens of statutes and then try and excuse yourself from those errors by claiming you are protected by another statute, a statute that you are manipulating for your own benefit. Especially when the prior statutes, are what invoke the statue you are relying on. This is the exact reason why the public is protesting in the street, (*a Police dept. ignores the rule of law under dozens of statutes, then claims it's not at fault, and manufactures a fault to place on the victim for an excuse and way out, and a court rubber stamps with no evidence.*)

As well as the statutes named below involving the destruction, **not only can IOP not produce those documents required, it cannot even produce an existing salvage company that allegedly destroyed them.** This goes to the original IOP PD file that has yet to be produced; only the altered file has been fwd. to Lynd. The Tracy Waldron memo (*see Lynd's response to IOP's motion for summary Judgment*) clearly references the prior file, but Caldwell altered it, and that altered version is what was fwd. to Lynd.

A summary judgment is granted when no material fact exist, 1) the fact the statues were not followed, 2) no certified letters sent, 3) no impounded documents and 4) title search done, 5) no destruction documents or 6) court order for abandonment 7) nor notices from the alleged salvage yard exist. **The statute calls IOP's failures conversion or theft, and that statute by law does not involve Lynd's filing date.** All of these are material facts and questions for the jury! And must be ruled in favor of the non-movant by law.

The court must weight Non-movant Lynd's extensive due diligence against the time Statutes, and IOP lack of any form of diligence against numerous statutes that as the Governmental Police Dept. must and should know by heart!

The court must weight Non-movant Lynd's extensive due diligence against the time Statutes, and the knowledge by IOP of the verified claim, that was both turned over to SLED for investigation and the Insurance co for processing, that is a verified claim under every precedent listed.

The statue and precedents are clear as to the **Suit is barred from being filed!!!!** Till one of the 3 prongs is meet. And this invokes the 3 year SOL.

So in any argument the 3 yr. statute prevails.

This after the court ILLEGALLY, gave the respondents time to go back to the trial court and get a new order signed over a year after the appeal was started, **and after**

**Lynd's brief was already filed !!!** And they had been served a copy of Lynd's brief and were able to carefully word the new order to counter that brief. **Oh! so fair and just!** Inexcusable! No cloud over that act.

But the Court can do that, but can't call in the counsel of record to find out why he didn't file the notice of appeal to preserve Lynd's rights, why he allegedly filed the post relief motion late, **or when he received the notice in question.**

The clerks and court canNOT create, out of air, a new order stating facts not presented in the SJ motions nor in the transcripts of the hearing for the appeal. If the facts in the new order were never presented to the court to determine, **HOW??? Did they end up in the signed order???**

The Dismissal order goes on to state the only order left before the court is the post judgment motion order. And that being so a new brief is required, the court clearly failed to view those motions, **in them is every argument listed in the initial brief on file, there is no need to do a new brief**, those arguments are what is in the post judgment motion, even the respondent's response make that claim. So the initial brief covering the basis for the summary judgment is correct because that is the arguments in the post judgment brief, and is need to preserve appeal to the Supreme Court, and is evidence in the federal Civil rights violation.

It appears to be the court, thru that part of the order, is trying to make an excuse or alleviate the parties from having to answer on

- 1.the conversion,
- 2.the closing of the SLED investigation, and the
- 3.certified letter never sent.

Filed objection inserted: full copy in appendix;

**OBJECTION TO TRIAL COURTS 'NEW' ORDER OF**

**2-26-18 FILED 3-2-18**

Now comes Appellant Lynd who objects to the late and untimely filing of the trial Courts order.

**To allow the defendants to present an order to be signed 22 MONTHS LATER, without a hearing AND AFTER BEING SERVED A COPY OF LYND'S APPEAL BRIEF !!!, or Lynd's input** to an agreed order as required is a clear

and concise due process and equal protection violation. This smacks of ex-parte communication and a clear conspiracy to file an order that conveniently matches the respondent's claims. Claims which Lynd had proven to be false in his brief and in the replies to respondent's motions to dismiss the appeal. Claims which are not mentioned or discussed in the transcripts!

Counsel for Caldwell who was the one caught making false claims and referencing false orders was the person who generated this 'order' for the court to sign, presented it ex-parte, and got it signed 22 months later, just conveniently matching what he lied about, but not the transcripts or record. And HE FAILED to inform the trial court Judge of those facts upon presenting the order to be signed.

Lynd proved in his responses that DEFENDANTS WERE LYING AND CLAIMING FALSE RECORDS, and rulings that did not exist, and the lack of the order proved it! Respondents falsely claimed (*in their motions to dismiss*) that the court ruled that the motion was untimely in its order. WHEN IN FACT no order was issued, that 'untimely' issue was not in the record or transcripts, Lynd DISPROVED THAT FALSE CLAIM (lie!), only for the appeals court (somehow) to allow them to now generate an order stating that!!!!!!!!!! To allow them 22 months later to go back to the court ex-parte, and get an order 'worded' the way they need it 'worded' is beyond outrageous, and is clear due process and equal protection violation. And reeks of a conspiracy,

And if neither the appeal nor motion has been heard by the court yet, who generated this request to the court for an untimely order???? after the briefs, facts and arguments have been seen by respondents, and the loss of the appeal made so apparent. Were the clerks allowed to do this?

THIS IS A CLEAR FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION!!

For Christ sake the appeal brief has been filed, and respondents could not defeat it under the law, they tried a lame time issue dismissal, Lynd disproved that, and PROVED THE REPONDENTS were make false perjured claims in their motions. The appeal HAS STARTED, and now under this action the record has been alrtered or changed and is now different then what Lynd's brief is based on. Come on!

The court instead of admonishing or taking so form of action on the perjury, apparently (by the record) made a request to the trial court to fix the errors pointed too in Lynd's brief that wins Lynd's appeal, thereby altering the Record after Lynd's brief had been filed. Is this the normal way the court handles appeals involving the State of South Carolina, sees the perjury and allows ex-parte/ back hallway discussions to correct so they don't have to rule against them? As simplistic as this request and new order seems, it alters the entire appeal, and violates Lynd's equal protection and due process rights and protection guarantees.

First the form 4 states it does not End the Case, the appeals court stated that the form 4 clearly stated it does not end the case in its on request to the trial court, ODD NOW the 'new' order does?

2<sup>nd</sup> the form 4 did not mention untimely, nor does the record or transcripts, ODD Now the 'new' order does?

The form 4, nor record address the rule 59/60 precedents that Lynd points out in his appeal argument, and responses, for the timely filing of those, **the 'new' order does!** How does the trial court, or the new order address that when it had nothing to do with the argument prior, only after Lynd responses?

Does no Justice on the Court of Appeals find this ODD and convenient??

All this is smoke screen, and a feeble attempt to hope for the COA to take pity on them and find some technicality to cover that they impounded the skies, DID NOT send the required (by S.C. law) certified notice of which over a dozen were required, allegedly destroyed them with a fictitious salvage yard, COMMITTED CONVERSION (THEFT) under S.C. own statutes and are trying to dodge their responsibility claiming a time statute that does not apply to CONVERSION!!!!!!!! There is no statute of limitation on theft/conversion in South Carolina, for the courts to apply that to individuals who commit theft,,, but not the government itself is selective prosecution/adjudication.

As Lynd has stated this is respondents attempts to keep throwing paper at a losing cause in hopes pro-se Lynd (pro-se because this court allowed the attys to keep the funds for an appeal and withdraw) will

make some error or miss, or misfile a response or document.

This is beyond contemptable.

#### NEW ORDER ENTRY

If the court accepts this new order dated 2-26-2018, all respondents motions to dismiss and arguments of untimely filings most be denied.

This New Order states it ends the case, the prior form 4 clearly states it does not. The court addressed that in its request for an order. Therefore this New order dated 2-26-2018 and filed 3-2-2018 would be the final order of the case, that starts the statute of limitations for filing a timely appeal. No prior order ended the case, as the court of appeals acknowledged, and as laid-out in Lynd's briefs and replies to the respondent's motions to dismiss. The case law and precedents support that, without any waiver on that legal position. The final order is the appealable order for all parties. The order dated 2-26-18 ended the case and is an appealable order. By both rule and precedent, regardless of any determination of the motion being a rule 59 or rule 60 motion, the filed order ended the case. The court can accept Lynd's current appeal as timely and move fwd, or Lynd can send a new notice of appeal based on this 'new' order and start the appeal from scratch.

Relevant code: That has no statute of limitations

**SECTION 16-5-60.** Suits against county for damages to person or property resulting from violation of person's civil rights.

Any citizen who shall be hindered, prevented or obstructed in the exercise of the rights and privileges secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States or by the Constitution and laws of this State or shall be injured in his person or property because of his exercise

of the same may claim and prosecute the county in which the offense shall be committed for any damages he shall sustain thereby, and the county shall be responsible for the payment of such damages as the court may award, which shall be paid by the county treasurer of such county on a warrant drawn by the governing body thereof. Such warrant shall be drawn by the governing body as soon as a certified copy of the judgment roll is delivered to them for file in their office.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 16-106; 1952 Code Section 16-106; 1942 Code Section 1384; 1932 Code Section 1384; Cr. C. '22 Section 314; Cr. C. '12 Section 324; Cr. C. '02 Section 237; G. S. 2571; R. S. 202; 1871 (14) 561.

**SECTION 16-9-10.** Perjury and subornation of perjury.

(A) (1) It is unlawful for a person to wilfully give false, misleading, or incomplete testimony under oath in any court of record, judicial, administrative, or regulatory proceeding in this State.

(2) It is unlawful for a person to wilfully give false, misleading, or incomplete information on a document, record, report, or form required by the laws of this State.

If those parts are removed from the brief, they cannot be argued on further appeal. But being that is the gist of the case, and if removed from the brief will not be allowed to be argued before the U.S. Supreme Court as a ground, and the upcoming Federal Court, they cannot be removed from the brief. So the need for a new initial brief is moot, the brief on file is needed as is to preserve the grounds argued in that brief, and are directly correlated to the post judgment motion on file and the grounds in it that this court order is referring too.

Most attorneys familiar with appeals and writs in South Carolina state this should have been removed to the Supreme Court long ago. It is dealing with theft and collusion of two different state sponsored police agencies. Maybe this court should consider doing so, in the

name of equity and speediness. To pursue this matter thru a court of appeals that is being frivolous with the law and precedents and wasting valuable time, conspiring and having numerous ex-parte meetings with the chief justice is a travesty and what most protest are about.

### Prayer

It is clear fact that the conversion happened.

It is clear fact Lynd was represented by counsel up till the appeal

It is clear fact all errors claimed to base the dismissals on was by counsel, not Lynd.

It is clear fact all state and federal precedents declare Lynd not liable for those errors.

It is clear fact even with the errors Lynd made dozens of attempts to file an appeal, and made a good faith effort to do so.

It is clear fact that the interlocutory appeal was not supposed to be filed by this court prior precedent, and dismissal on that point is error.

It is clear fact the statues outlining conversion do not have a SOL to file a civil suit.

It is Clear fact the statue provide any court or justice can enter a declaratory judgment on the conversion, ordering IOP to pay the damages and the case ends.

### **APPENDIX**

a brief appendix is attached, the COA refuses to send the copies to me and prior counsel is whereabouts unknown and refuses to return my file.

**4<sup>th</sup> Notice of appeal filed on final order of 2018**

**Clerk letter deny filing of a separate appeal on separate order PROVE MY point, case  
been routinely dismissed due to not filing separate appeals, CLERKS DO NOT ALLOW THAT**

COA clerk letter refusing to accept filings

COA letter instructing Atty of record to respond

COA clerk letter assigning case number off notice of appeal, sending it to atty of record

**Order of withdraw of counsel 1-20-2017**

Form 4 order dated 7-28-2016

Court orders allowing new order 2-7-2018

New order dated 3-22-2018 20 months after the fact!!!!!!!!!!!!

**COA clerk letter refusing to accept motion to rehear.**

IOP motions

Lynd's pro-se response

**FORMAL REQUEST TO REMOVE THE CASE TO THE**  
**SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT**

The South Carolina Supreme Court needs to take **command and control and jurisdiction of the case** for a once and for all final determination. No matter the outcome from lower courts one or more of the parties will eventually bring the matter before the South Carolina Supreme Court again and again. The matter involves malfeasance by 2 different law enforcement agencies of this state. Involves rulings that fly directly in the face of this court's precedents, by COA justices that claim they do not have to follow precedents that do not agree with. It involves law enforcement agencies cover-ups, records altering, conspiracy, and clear and concise civil rights violations. Ongoing Civil Rights litigation, failures to recuse, ex-parte communication and concise scheme to avoid a permeant record of those agencies response to the facts and claims.

The act of conversion by IOP has no set statute of Limitations, and the final determination of conversion must be made by this court.

The conversion statutes clear state any Justice in the state of South Carolina, can enter a finding of conversion against I.O.P. and they matter is ended. The value is already determined by I.O.P., it would be the value plus interest, and all parties can part ways. **Lynd requests the South Carolina Supreme Court issue that conversion ruling.**

The minute technical issues, that factual do not exist, CANNOT outweigh the gross negligent technical issues committed by I.O.P., failure to notify, conversion, statutory duties under the law, fraud, all of which I.O.P. ignored. S.L.E.D.'s failure to complete the investigation, administrative closure, conspiracy with I.O.P. to transfer Caldwell, all issues that are clear and concise acts, not some made up technical issue they claim Lynd has made.

Those 'technical' issues everyone seems to want to pretend never happened, they are not going to go away. It is what the public outcry country wide is about.


## **APPENDIX**

1. 8-24-18 dismissal order
2. Motion to rehear order

3. pg 6 transcripts
4. Screenshot of COA docket showing knowledge of writ filing
5. Appeal brief

Thank you.

David S. Lynd  
Plaintiff  
2605 Rustown Dr.  
Mesquite TX 75150



---

**Parties**

**Appellant**

David S. Lynd  
Plaintiff  
2605 Rustown Dr.  
Mesquite TX 75150

**Counsel for respondents**

Timothy Domin  
126 Seven Farms Dr.,  
Ste. 200  
Charleston SC 29492

Dorsel, Christopher Thomas  
3 Wesley Drive  
Charleston SC 29407

Morrison, David Leon  
7453 Irmo Dr.,  
Ste. B  
Columbia SC 29212

**CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**In The Supreme Court of South Carolina  
From the Court of Appeals**

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY  
Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge  
Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd**

**VS**


**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,  
Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police  
Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that the above named parties were served this reply by U.S.P.S. mail on 9-22-2018 to the address on file with the court shown below.



---

David Lynd

Timothy Domin  
126 Seven Farms Dr.,  
Ste. 200  
Charleston SC 29492

Dorsel, Christopher Thomas  
3 Wesley Drive  
Charleston SC 29407

Morrison, David Leon  
7453 Irmo Dr.,  
Ste. B  
Columbia SC 29212



## The South Carolina Court

JENNY ABBOTT KITCHINGS  
CLERK

V. CLAIRE ALLEN  
DEPUTY CLERK

October 26, 2016

David Scot Lynd  
2605 Rustown Dr.  
Mesquite TX 75150

Re: David Scot Lynd v. Dawn Caldwell  
Appellate Case No. 2016-002024

Dear Mr. Lynd:

Regarding your letters dated October 18, 2016, pursuant to Rule 264 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, you are represented by counsel until such time as your counsel files a motion to be relieved as counsel of record and is relieved as counsel of record by an order of this court. We will not accept filings from a party who is currently represented by counsel.

We received two copies of this correspondence - one addressed to the Chief Judge of the South Carolina Court of Appeals. All correspondence regarding your case must instead be addressed to the Clerk of Court, Jenny Abbott Kitchings.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jy a. kitchings".

CLERK

COA  
Refusal  
Because  
S.C. Atty of  
Record



## The South Carolina Court of Appeals

JENNY ABBOTT KITCHINGS  
CLERK

V. CLAIRE ALLEN  
DEPUTY CLERK

April 06, 2018

*One letter  
Showing refusal  
to file multi-  
separate Appeals  
Rolled it into  
Same Case*

David Scot Lynd  
2605 Rustown Dr.  
Mesquite TX 75150

**RECEIVED**

AUG 14 2018

Re: David Scot Lynd v. Dawn Caldwell  
Appellate Case No. 2016-002024

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Dear Mr. Lynd:

Pursuant to your phone conversations with Clerk's office staff, we clarify that the notice of appeal filed March 8, 2018, has been filed as a second subsequent notice of appeal under appellate case number 2016-002024. Any future filings regarding this appeal should include this appellate case number.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jenny A. Kitchings".

CLERK


cc: James Jordan Johnson, Esquire  
Timothy Alan Domin, Esquire  
Christopher Thomas Dorsel, Esquire  
David Leon Morrison, Esquire  
Sandra J. Senn, Esquire

Dear Counsel and Mr. Lynd:

The Court is reviewing respondents' motions to dismiss. The appellant must provide the date the appellant's trial counsel received written notice of the entry of the circuit court's May 11, 2016 order within fifteen days of the date of this letter, or the Court will proceed with its consideration of the respondents' motion to dismiss.

Additionally, the Court asks the parties to provide an update regarding the status of the appellant's Rule 60(b), SCRCPP motion. The August 3, 2017 Form 4 order indicates a formal order is to follow. Within fifteen days of the date of this letter, the Court asks the parties to notify the Court whether a formal order has been issued.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jay A. Karp".

CLERK



## The South Carolina Court of Appeals

JENNY ABBOTT KITCHINGS  
CLERK

V. CLAIRE ALLEN  
DEPUTY CLERK

POST OFFICE BOX 11629  
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211  
1220 SENATE STREET  
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29201  
TELEPHONE: (803) 734-1890  
FAX: (803) 734-1839  
[www.sccourts.org](http://www.sccourts.org)

October 26, 2016

Mr. Brent Biagio Greenberg, Esquire  
PO Box 2061  
Charleston SC 29465

Re: David Scot Lynd v. Dawn Caldwell  
Appellate Case No. 2016-002024

Dear Counsel:

Pursuant to Rule 264, SCACR, you remain the attorney of record for Mr. Lynd. If you no longer wish to represent Mr. Lynd you must file a motion to be relieved as counsel of record with this Court within 10 days. We cannot accept pro se filings from a represented party.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. A. Kitchings".

CLERK

cc: David Scot Lynd  
Sandra J. Senn, Esquire  
James Jordan Johnson, Esquire  
Timothy Alan Domin, Esquire  
David Leon Morrison, Esquire  
Christopher Thomas Dorsel, Esquire



## The South Carolina Court of Appeals

JENNY ABBOTT KITCHINGS  
CLERK

V. CLAIRE ALLEN  
DEPUTY CLERK

POST OFFICE BOX 11629  
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211  
1220 SENATE STREET  
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29201  
TELEPHONE: (803) 734-1890  
FAX: (803) 734-1839  
[www.sccourts.org](http://www.sccourts.org)

September 28, 2016

Mr. Brent Biagio Greenberg, Esquire  
PO Box 2061  
Charleston SC 29465

David Scot Lynd  
2605 Rustown Dr.  
Mesquite TX 75150

Re: David Scot Lynd v. Dawn Caldwell  
Appellate Case No. 2016-002024

Date  
Case #  
Assign

Dear Counsel and Mr. Lynd:

This Court has received your notice of appeal, and the case has been assigned the appellate case number that appears above. Please use this number on all future correspondence relating to this matter.

All parties to this matter are advised that all filings must comply with the requirements of Rule 267 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR). The SCACR are available online at [www.sccourts.org/courtreg](http://www.sccourts.org/courtreg). Additionally, any filings submitted by counsel admitted in South Carolina must include counsel's bar number.

The attention of the parties is directed to the order relating to the inclusion of personal data identifiers and other sensitive information in documents filed with the Supreme Court of South Carolina and the South Carolina Court of Appeals.

# The South Carolina Court of Appeals

David Scot Lynd, Appellant,

v.

Isle of Palms, Dawn Caldwell, Individually and  
capacity as an officer of the Isle of Palms Police  
Department, and South Carolina Law Enforcement  
Division, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002024

## ORDER

On November 3, 2016, Brent B. Greenberg, Esquire, filed a motion to be relieved as counsel for Appellant and served Appellant with the motion. On November 8, 2016, this court sent Appellant a letter, giving him ten days from the date of the letter to file any return to the motion. On November 23, 2016, this court had received no return, and granted Mr. Greenberg's motion to be relieved. This court has now received Appellant's "Objection to Motion to Withdraw [and] Request to Rehear Motion to Withdraw." First, pursuant to Rule 240(i) of the South Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, this court does not act on "petitions for rehearing on a motion or petition unless the action of the court on the motion or petition has the effect of dismissing or finally deciding a party's appeal." Second, to the extent Appellant is seeking this court to appoint counsel to represent Appellant on appeal, that request is denied. *Ex parte Dibble*, 279 S.C. 592, 310 S.E.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases). This case will be held in abeyance for thirty days to allow Appellant time to obtain counsel. Appellant must notify this court and opposing counsel of the name and contact information for the new attorney within thirty days of the date of this order or this court will presume Appellant is proceeding pro se.

FOR THE COURT

FILED

November 20, 2016

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF Charleston  
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

FORM 4

JUD

CASE

Daw

office

South

DEF

David Scot Lynd,

PLAINTIFF(S)

Submitted by:

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK)

- ☐ **JURY VERDICT.** This action came before the court have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- ☒ **DECISION BY THE COURT.** This action came to The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ☐ **ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRPC; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Nonsuit); ☐ Rule 43(k), SCRPC (Settled); ☐ Other
- ☐ **ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** ☐ Rule 40(j), SCRPC; ☐ Bankruptcy ☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; ☐ Other
- ☐ **DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**  
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded; ☐ Other

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

**IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:** ☒ See attached order (formal order to follow) ☐ Statement of Judgment by the Court: The Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Orders Granting Summary Judgment to Defendants South Carolina Law Enforcement and Dawn Caldwell is denied as untimely filed.

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ☐ ends ☒ does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk :

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

| Judgment in Favor of<br>(List name(s) below) | Judgment Against<br>(List name(s) below) | Judgment Amount To be Enrolled<br>(List amount(s) below) |
|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| n/a                                          |                                          | \$                                                       |
|                                              |                                          | \$                                                       |
|                                              |                                          | \$                                                       |

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order:

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

Circuit Court Judge

2151  
Judge Code

July 28, 2016  
Date

# The South Carolina Court of Appeals

David Scot Lynd, Appellant,

v.

Isle of Palms, Dawn Caldwell, Individually  
capacity as an officer of the Isle of Palms P  
Department, and South Carolina Law Enfoi  
Division, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002024

*After heard files  
Brief. Court of A  
allows new order  
Based on Brief  
not motions  
and arguments*

## ORDER

Appellant has appealed from the circuit court's August 3, 2016 order, which indicates a formal order is to follow. The form order further provides the order "does not end the case." Accordingly, we hold this appeal in abeyance and remand the matter in part for the circuit court to issue its final order. The parties shall provide this court with a status update within thirty days.

*James C. Beck*  
FOR THE COURT

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:

The Honorable Kristi Lea Harrington

The Honorable Julie J. Armstrong

David Scot Lynd

James Jordan Johnson, Esquire

Timothy Alan Domin, Esquire

Christopher Thomas Dorsel, Esquire

**FILED**

Feb. 7, 2018



The South Carolina Court

David Scot Lynd, Appellant,

v.

Isle of Palms, Dawn Caldwell, Individual  
capacity as an officer of the Isle of Palms  
Department, and South Carolina Law Enforcement  
Division, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002024

ORDER

In May 2015, Appellant filed this action against Respondents relating to the loss of his jet skis. On September 29, 2015, the circuit court granted summary judgment to Isle of Palms and Dawn Caldwell, in her official capacity, disposing of all claims against them. On May 11, 2016, the circuit court granted summary judgment to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and Dawn Caldwell, in her individual capacity, disposing of all claims against them. On June 23, 2016, Appellant filed a post-judgment motion for relief, which the circuit court denied. Appellant thereafter served and filed a notice of appeal from the September 2015 summary judgment order and the denial of his post-judgment motion.

Respondents SLED and Dawn Caldwell, in her individual capacity, have filed motions to dismiss, or alternatively, for extensions of time to file their initial briefs, arguing Appellant did not timely appeal the May 2016 order or file a Rule 59(e) motion requesting reconsideration of the order. They also argue Appellant either improperly filed his post-judgment motion instead of appealing or improperly captioned his motion as one under Rule 60(b) instead of one under Rule 59(e). Respondent Isle of Palms also filed a motion to be dismissed as a party to this appeal, arguing Appellant failed to properly appeal the September 2015 order. The motions to dismiss are granted in part.

New Order  
By Court  
Counters point  
In Brief  
Not Answered  
Motions

Appellant's post-judgment motion, whether construed as an untimely motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e), SCRCP, or a timely motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), SCRCP, did not toll the time to appeal the circuit court's May 2016 order. *See* Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR (providing a *timely* motion to alter or amend under Rule 59 shall stay the time for appeal); Rule 59(e), SCRCP ("A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after receipt of written notice of the entry of the order."); *Coward Hund Const. Co. v. Ball Corp.*, 336 S.C. 1, 5-6, 518 S.E.2d 56, 59 (Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing Rule 60 motions do not have any tolling effect on the right to appeal). As a result, the time to appeal the May 2016 order expired before Appellant served his notice of appeal. *See* Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR ("A notice of appeal shall be served on all respondents within thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice of entry of the order or judgment.").<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, Appellant's appeal of the denial of his post-judgment motion does not allow this court to review the merits of the May 2016 order. *See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.*, 361 S.C. 9, 14-15, 602 S.E.2d 772, 775 (2004) ("The requirement of service of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, *i.e.*, if a party misses the deadline, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal and has no authority or discretion to 'rescue' the delinquent party by extending or ignoring the deadline for service of the notice."); *Raby Const., L.L.P. v. Orr*, 358 S.C. 10, 23, 594 S.E.2d 478, 485 (2004) (stating a Rule 60(b) order is separate and distinct from the underlying judgment).

To the extent Appellant attempted to appeal the May 2016 order, that appeal is dismissed as untimely. Additionally, because Appellant did not timely appeal the May 2016 or September 2015 order, Isle of Palms's motion to dismiss is granted. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330(1) (2017) (providing this court may review an intermediate judgment involving the merits after final judgment is entered); *Lancaster v. Fielder*, 305 S.C. 418, 421, 409 S.E.2d 375, 377 (1991) ("[I]f there is a final judgment, *and the party timely files his notice of intent to appeal from that judgment*, under [s]ection 14-3-330(1) this [c]ourt can review any intermediate order or decree necessarily affecting the judgment not before appealed from." (emphasis added)). However, because Appellant timely appealed the circuit court's denial of his post-judgment motion, the motions to dismiss that appeal by SLED and Dawn Caldwell, in her individual capacity, are denied.


✓  
Final  
Entry

<sup>1</sup> Although Appellant was unable to inform this court when he received written notice of the May 2016 order, it must have been prior to his filing of the June 23, 2016 post-judgment motion, which was more than thirty days before Appellant served his notice of appeal.

Not  
Applicable  
Not A

The only order remaining before this court is the denial of Appellant's post-judgment motion, which relates only to SLED and Dawn Caldwell, in her individual capacity. Accordingly, Isle of Palms and Dawn Caldwell, in her official capacity, are dismissed as parties to this appeal. Additionally, because Appellant's initial brief raises arguments relating to the circuit court's summary judgment orders, the brief is stricken. Appellant shall serve and file an amended initial brief, addressing only the circuit court's denial of his post-judgment motion, within thirty days of this order. The remaining Respondents—SLED and Dawn Caldwell, in her individual capacity—shall serve and file their initial briefs within thirty days of receipt of Appellant's amended brief.

Finally, Appellant filed a motion requesting electronic notification of all filings in this case. This motion is denied.

  
FOR THE COURT

Columbia, South Carolina

cc: David Scot Lynd  
James Jordan Johnson, Esquire  
Timothy Alan Domin, Esquire  
Christopher Thomas Dorsel, Esquire  
David Leon Morrison, Esquire  
Sandra J. Senn, Esquire  
Julie J. Armstrong  
The Honorable Kristi Lea Harrington

**FILED**

March 22, 2018



# The South Carolina Cour

**JENNY ABBOTT KITCHINGS**  
**CLERK**

V. CLAIRE ALLEN  
DEPUTY CLERK

April 11, 2018

David Scot Lynd  
2605 Rustown Dr.  
Mesquite TX 75150

Re: David Scot Lynd v. Dawn Caldwell  
Appellate Case No. 2016-002024

Dear Mr. Lynd:

Upon reviewing your petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, the deficiency has been noted under the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR), and must be corrected within ten (10) days of the date of this order. If your petition may not be considered:

- The money order provided with required filing fee completely filled out and is not accepted. We are

Very truly yours,

V. Clair-Al.

CI

cc: James Jordan Johnson, Esquire  
Timothy Alan Domin, Esquire  
Christopher Thomas Dorsey  
David Leon Morrison, Esquire  
Sandra J. Senn, Esquire

$\bar{L}x \cos c$

USEN

NOT

to file

# Rehearing

**JULIE J. ARMSTRONG**  
CLERK OF COURT, C.P. & G.S.  
100 BROAD STREET, SUITE 106  
CHARLESTON, SC 29401-2258  
**RETURN SERVICE REQUESTED**



clerkofcourt.charlestoncounty.org

46



**TIMOTHY ALAN DOMIN**  
126 SEVEN FARMS DR STE 200  
DANIEL ISLAND SC 29492-8144

**NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT/ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 77 SCRPC**


**Order/Granting Defnt Isle of Palms' mot for sum judg**

**CASE NO: 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd VS Isle of Palms Police Department**

This judgment was entered on the 29th day of September, 2015, and notice mailed first class on Wednesday, September 30, 2015, to all counsel of record and/or all parties entitled to receive notice.

You may view and download this document at <http://clerkofcourt.charlestoncounty.org> or obtain a copy in person at the Clerk of Court's Office during regular Charleston County business hours.



*Police Appeal  
Filed on Final  
Order. Separate  
From other  
Interlocutory Appeal  
Clerk Blawie*

APPEAL IN A CIVIL CASE

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

AL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY

Court of Common Pleas

Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge

Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2015CP1002824

David Scot Lynd

VS

Isle of Palms

Dawn Caldwell,

Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police  
Department

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division

**RECEIVED**

MAR 08 2018

SC Court of Appeals

**NOTICE OF APPEAL**

NOW COMES DAVID Lynd who hereby appeals the order dated 2-26-2018, and filed  
on 3-2-18. This ordered entered; states it ends the case as of the date filed.

**Parties**

**Appellant**


David S. Lynd  
Plaintiff  
2605 Rustown Dr.  
Mesquite TX 75150

**Counsel for respondents**

Timothy Domin  
126 Seven Farms Dr.,  
Ste. 200  
Charleston SC 29492

Dorsel, Christopher Thomas  
3 Wesley Drive  
Charleston SC 29407

Morrison, David Leon  
7453 Irmo Dr.,  
Ste. B  
Columbia SC 29212

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David Scot Lynd", is written over a horizontal line.

David scot Lynd  
2605 Rustown  
Mesquite TX 75150  
469-323-1751  
[dscotly@yahoo.com](mailto:dscotly@yahoo.com)

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**In The Court of Appeals**

**Case#: 2016-002024**

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY**

**Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge  
Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd**

**VS**

**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,  
Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police  
Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that the above named parties were served this reply by **U.S.P.S. mail on 3-6-2018** to the address on file with the court shown below.

**RECEIVED**  
**MAR 08 2018**  
**SC Court of Appeals**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D Lynd', is written over a horizontal line.

David Lynd

Timothy Domin  
126 Seven Farms Dr.,  
Ste. 200  
Charleston SC 29492

Dorsel, Christopher Thomas  
3 Wesley Drive  
Charleston SC 29407


Morrison, David Leon  
7453 Irmo Dr.,  
Ste. B  
Columbia SC 29212

PRESS FIRMLY TO SEAL

PRESS FIRMLY TO SEAL



1006



29211

U.S. POSTAGE  
PAID  
CARROLLTON, TX  
75007  
MAR 08, 18  
AMOUNT  
**\$6.70**  
R2304M114981-11

# PRIORITY® ★ MAIL ★



DATE OF DELIVERY SPECIFIED\*



USPS TRACKING™ INCLUDED\*



INSURANCE INCLUDED\*



PICKUP AVAILABLE

\* Domestic only

WHEN USED INTERNATIONALLY,  
A CUSTOMS DECLARATION  
LABEL MAY BE REQUIRED.

FROM:



PRIORITY®  
MAIL

For Domestic  
and International Use

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

RECEIVED



From ?  
MAR 08 2018  
SC Court of Appeals  
1220 Senate St  
P.O. Box 11629  
Columbia S.C. 29211

Expected Delivery Day: 03/08/2018

USPS TRACKING NUMBER



9505 5104 1215 8065 2795 08

VISIT US AT [USPS.COM](http://USPS.COM)®  
ORDER FREE SUPPLIES ONLINE



UNITED STATES  
POSTAL SERVICE

84921

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

Appeal from Charleston County  
Court of Common Pleas

Kristi Lea Harrington, Presiding Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2016-002024

RECEIVED  
OCT 23 2017  
SC Court of Appeals

David Scot Lynd,

Appellant

v.

Isle of Palms, Dawn Caldwell, Individually and in her capacity  
as an officer of the Isle of Palms Police Department, and South  
Carolina Law Enforcement Division,

Respondents

---

**MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AS TO THE ISLE OF PALMS  
AND TO STAY THE DEADLINE FOR FILING OF  
ISLE OF PALMS' RESPONDENT'S BRIEF  
AND DESIGNATION OF MATTER**

---

Isle of Palms, a municipality, hereby requests this Court dismiss the appeal as to it and to hold in abeyance the deadline for filing the Isle of Palms' responsive brief and designation of matter pending the outcome of this motion. (Technically, the parties are currently awaiting Lynd to fix procedural deficiencies in his brief, but he will presumably fix those defects while this motion is pending.) Mr. Lynd's appeal was not timely as to the Isle of Palms and this is a jurisdictional defect as to the Isle of Palms requiring dismissal.

The Isle of Palms was granted summary judgment by an order of dated September 28, 2015 on the basis of the statute of limitations. (See attached Exhibit A). No appeal was filed within 30 days. On May 11, 2016, summary judgment was granted as to the remaining two defendants---Dawn Caldwell and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED). (Exhibit B and C) Lynd did not file a Rule 59 or other motion to reconsider nor did he file an appeal within 30 days of notice of May 11, 2016 orders. On June 22, 2016, the plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b) (3) motion for relief from the orders granting summary judgment to Dawn Caldwell and SLED. (Exhibit D, without voluminous attached supporting documents). That motion was denied on August 3, 2016. (During this entire time, Lynd was represented by counsel and notice to his counsel of the orders was provided to all counsel of record by the Clerk of Court. No appellate time limits are based on when Lynd himself received notice of an Order.)

The plaintiff had a right to file an appeal as to the Isle of Palms within 30 days of notice of the September 28, 2015. The decision was immediately appealable pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330. As a matter of logic and policy, once one party is granted summary judgment, they are no longer participating in discovery or hearings and an appeal should have to be initiated immediately as to that party.

However, under Rule 54 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, there is some basis for Lynd to argue the September 28, 2015 order in favor of Isle of Palms could have been appealed within 30 days of summary judgment being granted to all remaining defendants. However, Lynd did not do that either.

Instead, Mr. Lynd waited over 30 days and then filed a Rule 60(b)(3) motion. Mr. Lynd's 60(b)(3) motion does not and did not extent the time for filing an appeal. Only a timely Rule 59 motion or motion for reconsideration within 10 days would stay the time for filing an appeal. Elam v. S.C. DOT, 361 S.C. 9, 602 S.E.2d 772 (2004)

And more importantly, Lynd's Rule 60 motion was only directed to Defendants Caldwell and SLED and as to the summary judgment granted to Caldwell and SLED. (This is potentially because the order in favor of the Isle of Palms was now more than a year old which is an absolute time limit for most Rule 60 motions.) Lynd cannot bootstrap an appeal of the September 28, 2015 order granting the Isle of Palms summary judgment via a Rule 60 motion filed against two parties other than the Isle of Palms. And there can be no appeal as to the Isle of Palms from the decision of August 3, 2016 because the motion was not directed to the Isle of Palms.

To accept Lynd's appeal as timely would allow anyone to file a Rule 60 motion within a year of the final judgment then bootstrap an appeal of an otherwise unappealed final order.

The Isle of Palms requests Lynd's appeal as to it be dismissed as untimely and that the portion of the appeal relating to the order of September 28, 2015 be dismissed as untimely. The requirement to timely appeal is a jurisdictional matter which cannot be extended by estoppel or agreement or other arguments. (See Exhibit D) The Rule 60 motion was only directed at Dawn Caldwell and SLED.

CLAWSON and STAUBES, LLC



---

Timothy A. Domin  
Bar No: 65264  
126 Seven Farms Drive, Suite 200  
Charleston, South Carolina 29492-8144  
Phone: (843) 577-2026  
Fax: (843) 722-2867  
Email: tdomin@clawsonandstaubes.com  
Attorney for Respondent, Isle of Palms

Charleston, South Carolina

October 20, 2017

**APPEAL IN A CIVIL CASE  
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**In The Court of Appeals**

**Case#: 2016-002024**

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY**

**Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge  
Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd**

**VS**

**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,  
Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police  
Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**Appellants Response to I.O.P.'S Motion To Dismiss.**

First IOP thru its counsel Domin argues a time barred appeal, but then goes on to state that under some grounds it is not time barred, as well as misstates the facts and filings. IOP is

seeking a favor on a filing it admits is timely filed. IOP is asking the court to seek some extreme interpretation to benefit IOP when it is evident in all the filings, and IOPP's own motion that the appeal is timely. IOP is seeking to avoid an Issue it can't defeat on a made up technicality but fails to mention that the motion to dismiss it filed is the one untimely.

IOP goes on to state that under rule 54 that the appeal filed after the final ruling is the correct time to file the appeal. This is also echoed by the COA clerk's office when asked, and the trial court's court administrators office of Rosalyn W. Frierson, that is to avoid numerous and lengthy appeals, that the appeal is taking after the final ruling dismissing the case.

IOP goes on to even caption the motion 'Judge Kristy Harrington' in its motions caption, as the trial judge which is correct and is who issued the final order and ruling, in its motions caption, when it is trying to claim a prior motion ruling by a different Judge is the basis. The ruling it is trying to use to start the appeal clock was not the final ruling. And as stated rule 54 (b) clearly states it was not a final ruling.

***RULE 54, (b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.***

*In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties*

**Hagood v. Sommerville, 607 SE 2d 707 - SC: Supreme Court 2005**

*An appeal ordinarily may be pursued only after a party has obtained a final judgment. Mid-State Distributors, Inc. v. 195\*195 Century Importers, Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 335, 426 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1993); S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-330(1) (1976); Rule 72, SCRPC; Rule 201(a), SCACR.*

*An order which does not finally end a case or prevent a final judgment from which a party may seek appellate review usually is considered an interlocutory order from which no immediate appeal is allowed. Tatnall v. Gardner, 350 S.C. 135, 138, 564 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ct.App.2002).*

*Piecemeal appeals should be avoided and most errors can be corrected by the remedy of a new trial.*

This is IOP, same as the trial level, crying and attempting to create a time issues, because **it cannot face or beat the facts of the case**, those being that IOP destroyed Lynd's property without notice, and in doing so committed conversion under the statute. Unable to deny or defeat that it has embarked on a campaign of ***technical issues creation*** to avoid facing the issue. That is the exact cause of riots in the streets these days, police depts. at fault, and lying to cover it up.

IOP tries to imply this was a final judgement in the case and Lynd is bootstrapping an appeal to a separate case. That is not the facts, this was a motion filed along with other motions filed that was ruled on and the rule 59 and 60 motion filed on the final ruling.

IOP fails to name the motions to rehear that were filed and ruled on by another judge, knowing full well that defeats its argument.

The courts and defendants stretching out of Summary judgement motions and hearings over a year, cannot in any way effect Lynd's right to appeal a final dismissal of a case. As a note, the motion to reconsider was filed after awaiting a signed order that was never entered. AS of this date the final order has never been entered, only a form 4 entry with an attached order to come later, of which never materialized. That caused Lynd's attorney at the time problems that it could only file a motion to rehear or reconsider on what was heard in court, not on facts or opinions found in a written order to reference. The rule 59/60 motion was correct.

Remember the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> summary judgements were based on the ruling of the first, and the issuance of that ruling, and followed that ruling to the letter, **so an appeal of one on the facts would apply to all three, since they are all granted and based on the same date and occurrence, and the transcripts show and discuss that.**

The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the motion Lynd filed does apply to start/toll the appeal time limit and the motion in 2015 was not required to be a separate appeal. The Court also outlines the times and cause of order entry's to file the rule 59/60 motions as well as the application of all the previous motions in a particular case. This is the standard precedent the court has set to correlate all the prior precedents.

**Elam v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp., 602 SE 2d 772 - SC: Supreme Court 2004**

**APPEAL IN A CIVIL CASE**  
**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**In The Court of Appeals**

**Case#: 2016-002024**

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY**

**Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge**  
**Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd**

**VS**

**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,**  
**Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police**  
**Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**Request by Lynd, for the Court of Appeals (not the clerk) Determination**

Appellant Lynd request the Court make a determination if the order signed on 2-26-2018 and entered on 3-2-2018, requires a new notice of appeal as it is the final order

in the case. The order is the only order that states it ends the case, and is an appealable order under the rules.

Being the prior appeal has had numerous back and forth arguments on that point, and the lack of a final order was part of the brief and arguments, and the fact that the Court of Appeals requested the order from the trial court, leaves another procedural misstep without the COA whom requested the order, determination on the time to file the notice of appeal.

---

David scot Lynd

2605 Rustown

Mesquite TX 75150

469-323-1751

[dscotly@yahoo.com](mailto:dscotly@yahoo.com)

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**In The Court of Appeals**

**Case#: 2016-002024**

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY**

**Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge  
Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd**

**VS**

**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,  
Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police  
Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that the above named parties were served this reply by **U.S.P.S. mail on 3-6-2018** to the address on file with the court shown below.

---

David Lynd

Timothy Domin  
126 Seven Farms Dr.,  
Ste. 200  
Charleston SC 29492

Dorsel, Christopher Thomas  
3 Wesley Drive  
Charleston SC 29407

Morrison, David Leon  
7453 Irmo Dr.,  
Ste. B  
Columbia SC 29212

**APPEAL IN A CIVIL CASE**  
**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**In The Court of Appeals**

**Case#: 2016-002024**

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY**

**Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge**  
**Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd**

**VS**

**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,**  
**Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police**  
**Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**OBJECTION TO TRIAL COURTS 'NEW' ORDER OF**

**2-26-18 FILED 3-2-18**

Now comes Appellant Lynd who objects to the late and untimely filing of the trial Courts order.

**To allow the defendants to present an order to be signed 22 MONTHS LATER, without a hearing AND AFTER BEING SERVED A COPY OF LYND'S APPEAL BRIEF !!!, or Lynd's input** to an agreed order as required is a clear and concise **due process and equal protection violation**. This smacks of ex-parte communication and a clear conspiracy to file an order that conveniently matches the respondent's claims. Claims which Lynd had proven to be false in his brief and in the replies to respondent's motions to dismiss the appeal. Claims which are not mentioned or discussed in the transcripts!

Counsel for Caldwell who was the one caught making false claims and referencing false orders was the person who generated this 'order' for the court to sign, presented it ex-parte, and got it signed 22 months later, just conveniently matching what he lied about, but not the transcripts or record. And HE FAILED to inform the trial court Judge of those facts upon presenting the order to be signed.

Lynd proved in his responses that **DEFENDANTS WERE LYING AND CLAIMING FALSE RECORDS**, and rulings that did not exist, and the lack of the order proved it! Respondents falsely claimed (*in their motions to dismiss*) that the court ruled that the motion was untimely in its order. WHEN IN FACT no order was issued, that 'untimely' issue was not in the record or transcripts, Lynd DISPROVED THAT FALSE CLAIM (lie!), only for the appeals court (somehow) to allow them to now generate an order stating that!!!!!!! To allow them 22 months later to go back to the court **ex-parte**, and get an order '**worded**' the way they need it

**'worded'** is beyond outrageous, and is clear due process and equal protection violation. And reeks of a conspiracy,

And if neither the appeal nor motion has been heard by the court yet, who generated this request to the court for an untimely order????? after the briefs, facts and arguments have been seen by respondents, and the loss of the appeal made so apparent. Were the clerks allowed to do this?

THIS IS A CLEAR FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION!!

For Christ sake the appeal brief has been filed, and respondents could not defeat it under the law, they tried a lame time issue dismissal, Lynd disproved that, and **PROVED THE REPONDENTS were make false perjured claims in their motions.** The appeal HAS STARTED, and now under this action **the record has been alrtered** or changed and is now different then what Lynd's brief is based on. Come on!

The court instead of admonishing or taking so form of action on the perjury, apparently (by the record) made a request to the trial court to fix the errors pointed too in Lynd's brief that wins Lynd's appeal, thereby altering the Record after Lynd's brief had been filed. Is this the normal way the court handles appeals involving the State of South Carolina, sees the perjury and allows ex-parte/ back hallway discussions to correct so they don't have to rule against them? As simplistic as this request and new order seems, it alters the entire appeal, and violates Lynd's equal protection and due process rights and protection guarantees.

First the form 4 states it does not **End the Case**, the appeals court stated that the form 4 clearly stated it does not end the case in its on request to the trial court, ODD NOW the 'new' order does?

2<sup>nd</sup> the form 4 did not mention untimely, nor does the record or transcripts, ODD Now the 'new' order does?

The form 4, nor record address the rule 59/60 precedents that Lynd points out in his appeal argument, and responses, for the timely filing of those, **the 'new' order does!** How does the trial court, or the new order address that when it had nothing to do with the argument prior, only after Lynd responses?

Does no Justice on the Court of Appeals find this ODD and convenient??

All this is smoke screen, and a feeble attempt to hope for the COA to take pity on them and find some technicality to cover that they impounded the skies, DID NOT send the required *(by S.C. law)* certified notice of which over a dozen were required, allegedly destroyed them with a fictitious salvage yard, COMMITTED CONVERSION (THEFT) under S.C. own statutes and are trying to dodge their responsibility claiming a time statute that does not apply to **CONVERSION!!!!!!!! There is no statute of limitation on theft/conversion in South Carolina**, for the courts to apply that to individuals who commit theft,, but not the government itself is selective prosecution/adjudication.

As Lynd has stated this is respondents attempts to keep throwing paper at a losing cause in hopes pro-se Lynd *(pro-se because this court allowed the attys to keep the funds for an appeal and withdraw)* will make some error or miss, or misfile a response or document.

This is beyond contemptable.

### **NEW ORDER ENTRY**

If the court accepts this new order dated 2-26-2018, all respondents motions to dismiss and arguments of untimely filings **most be denied**.

**This New Order states it ends the case**, the prior form 4 clearly states it does not. The court addressed that in its request for an order. Therefore this New order dated 2-26-2018 and filed 3-2-2018 would be the final order of the case, **that starts the statute of limitations for filing a timely appeal**. No prior order ended the case, as the court of appeals acknowledged, and as laid-out in Lynd's briefs and replies to the respondent's motions to dismiss. The case law and precedents support that, without any waiver on that legal position. The final order is the appealable order for all parties. The order dated 2-26-18 ended the case and is an appealable order. By both rule and precedent, regardless of any determination of the motion being a rule 59 or rule 60 motion, the filed order ended the case. The court can accept Lynd's current appeal as timely and move fwd, or Lynd can send a new notice of appeal based on this 'new' order and start the appeal from scratch.

Relevant code: That has no statute of limitations

**SECTION 16-5-60.** Suits against county for damages to person or property resulting from violation of person's civil rights.

Any citizen who shall be hindered, prevented or obstructed in the exercise of the rights and privileges secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States or by the Constitution and laws of this State or shall be injured in his person or property because of his exercise of the same may claim and prosecute the county in which the offense shall be committed for any damages he shall sustain thereby, and the county shall be responsible for the payment of such damages as the court may award, which shall be paid by the county treasurer of such county on a warrant drawn by the governing body thereof. Such warrant shall be drawn by the governing body as soon as a certified copy of the judgment roll is delivered to them for file in their office.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 16-106; 1952 Code Section 16-106; 1942 Code Section 1384; 1932 Code Section 1384; Cr. C. '22 Section 314; Cr. C. '12 Section 324; Cr. C. '02 Section 237; G. S. 2571; R. S. 202; 1871 (14) 561.

**SECTION 16-9-10.** Perjury and subornation of perjury.

(A)(1) It is unlawful for a person to wilfully give false, misleading, or incomplete testimony under oath in any court of record, judicial, administrative, or regulatory proceeding in this State.

(2) It is unlawful for a person to wilfully give false, misleading, or incomplete information on a document, record, report, or form required by the laws of this State.

---

David scot Lynd

2605 Rustown

Mesquite TX 75150

469-323-1751

[dscotly@yahoo.com](mailto:dscotly@yahoo.com)

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA**

**In The Court of Appeals**

**Case#: 2016-002024**

**APPEAL FROM CHARELSTON COUNTY**

**Court of Common Pleas**

**Kristi Harrington, Circuit Court Judge  
Dennis Markley, Circuit Court Judge**

**Case No. 2015CP1002824**

**David Scot Lynd**

**VS**

**Isle of Palms**

**Dawn Caldwell,  
Individually and in her capacity as an Officer of the Isle of Palms Police  
Department**

**South Carolina Law Enforcement Division**

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that the above named parties were served this reply by **U.S.P.S. mail on 3-6-2018** to the address on file with the court shown below.

---

David Lynd

Timothy Domin  
126 Seven Farms Dr.,  
Ste. 200  
Charleston SC 29492

Dorsel, Christopher Thomas  
3 Wesley Drive  
Charleston SC 29407

Morrison, David Leon  
7453 Irmo Dr.,  
Ste. B  
Columbia SC 29212

PRESS



Retail

P

US POSTAGE PAID

\$6.70

Origin: 75056  
12/28/18  
4851320056-02

PRIORITY MAIL 2-Day®

1 Lb 8.70 Oz

EXPECTED DELIVERY DAY: 12/29/18 1006

SHIP

TO:

PO BOX 11330  
COLUMBIA SC 29211-1330

B099

USPS TRACKING NUMBER



9505 5128 8577 8360 3078 10

PRESS FIRMLY TO SEAL

PO

TRACKED  
INSURED  
\*\*\*

PRIORITY MAIL



PRIORITY®  
MAIL

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

For Domestic  
and International Use



From: *Danley*  
*2605 Rosh*  
*Wesley St*  
*75150*

TO

*South Carolina*  
*Supreme Court*  
*P.O. Box 11330*  
*Columbia SC 29211*

Label 228, January 2008



This envelope is made from post-consumer waste. Please recycle - again.



PS00001000014

EP14F July 2013  
OD: 12.5 x 9.5

VISIT US AT USPS.COM®  
ORDER FREE SUPPLIES ONLINE

