

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

---

**ORIGINAL**

Certiorari to York County

Honorable Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

---

**RECEIVED**

JAN 09 2019

SC Court of Appeals

ERIC ANTONIA SPRATT,

PETITIONER

V.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

RESPONDENT

APPELLATE CASE NO 2016-001346

---

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

---

TAYLOR D. GILLIAM  
Appellate Defender

South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense  
Division of Appellate Defense  
PO Box 11589  
Columbia, SC 29211-1589  
(803) 734-1330

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

TABLE OF CONTENTS..... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..... ii

ISSUE PRESENTED.....1

STATEMENT.....2

STANDARD OF REVIEW .....12

ARGUMENT

The PCR court erred in ruling that defense counsel was not ineffective where counsel failed to argue to the sentencing court on remand that, in 1998, South Carolina did not recognize the right of an accused to be represented by appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases that did not result in the immediate deprivation of a person’s liberty and therefore, any Farretta warnings regarding the disadvantages of self-representations given during Petitioner’s 1998 guilty plea to misdemeanor possession of marijuana would not have informed Petitioner that he could have counsel appointed at the expense of the State.....13

CONCLUSION.....21

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### Cases

<u>Alabama v. Shelton</u> 535 U.S. 654, 122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002).....	8, 10, 14, 18
<u>Argersinger v. Hamlin</u> 407 U.S. 25, 40, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (1972).....	8, 14
<u>Butler v. State</u> , 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985).....	16, 19
<u>Cherry v. State</u> , 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989).....	16, 20
<u>Faretta v. California</u> , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975).....	passim
<u>Gideon v. Wainwright</u> 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963).....	14
<u>Jamison v. State</u> , 410 S.C. 456, 765 S.E.2d 123 (2014).....	12
<u>Jordan v. State</u> , 406 S.C. 443, 752 S.E.2d 538 (2013).....	12
<u>Pringle v. State</u> , 287 S.C. 409, 339 S.E.2d 127 (1986).....	20
<u>Scott v. Illinois</u> 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, (1979).....	8
<u>Scott v. Illinois</u> , 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158 (1979).....	14
<u>Sellner v. State</u> , 416 S.C. 606, 787 S.E.2d 525 (2016).....	12
<u>Southerland v. State</u> , 337 S.C. 610, 524 S.E.2d 833 (1999).....	17
<u>State v. Orr</u> , 375 N.W.2d 171, 174 (1985).....	15
<u>State v. Samuel</u> , 422 S.C. 596, 813 S.E.2d 487 (2018).....	12
<u>State v. Spratt</u> , 383 S.C. 212, 678 S.E.2d 266 (Ct. App. 2009).....	passim
<u>Strickland v. Washington</u> , 466 U.S. 668 (1984).....	15
<u>Talley v. State</u> 535 U.S. 654, 122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002).....	7, 9, 15

### Rules

Rule 607, SCACR.....	3
----------------------	---

### **ISSUE PRESENTED**

The PCR court erred in ruling that counsel was not ineffective where counsel failed to argue to the sentencing court on remand that, in 1998, South Carolina did not recognize the right of an accused to be represented by appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases that did not result in the immediate deprivation of a person's liberty and therefore, any Farretta<sup>1</sup> warnings regarding the disadvantages of self-representations given during Petitioner's 1998 guilty plea to misdemeanor possession of marijuana would not have informed Petitioner that he could have counsel appointed at the expense of the State.

---

<sup>1</sup> Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975).

## STATEMENT

### **Procedural History**

A York County Grand Jury indicted Eric Antonio Spratt on the charge of trafficking in more than ten grams of crack in May 2006. App. 162 - 163. On June 9, 2006, Spratt was tried *in absentia* before the Honorable Derham Cole and a jury. App. 4, l. 3 - 7, l. 14. He was found guilty and Judge Cole sealed the sentence. On May 25, 2007, Spratt appeared before the Honorable Clifton Newman for sentencing. Spratt was represented by Melisa Inzerillo, and the State was represented Assistant Solicitor Erin Joyner. Id. The sealed sentence issued by Judge Cole was thirty years and a \$50,000 fine. Id.

Judge Newman granted Spratt's motion to reconsider the sentence and reduced the sentence to ten years for a trafficking less than 100 grams second offense. Id. Judge Newman ruled that Spratt had been incorrectly sentenced as a third offense. Specifically, Judge Newman found that Spratt's prior un-counseled 1998 guilty plea before Judge Hayes, which resulted in incarceration due to a subsequent violation of probation when he pled guilty to PWID crack in 1999, should not have been used to enhance his present trafficking in crack cocaine conviction to a third offense. Id.

The State appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a hearing for the trial court to re-evaluate Spratt's sentence after considering evidence regarding whether Spratt waived his right to counsel during his prior 1998 un-counseled guilty plea. State v. Spratt, 383 S.C. 212, 678 S.E.2d 266 (Ct. App. 2009).

### **Re-Sentencing Hearing on Remand**

On June 6 -7, 2011, Spratt appeared before the Honorable Lee S. Alford for a remand hearing on the constitutionality of his un-counseled 1998 guilty plea regarding if he waived his right to counsel. App. 1 - 75. He was represented by Melissa Inzerillo, and the State was represented by

Assistant Solicitor Erin Joyner. Spratt and Assistant Solicitor E.B. Springs both testified at the hearing.

At the start of the hearing, defense counsel moved for Spratt's sentence to remain at ten years as Spratt was alleging that the 1998 conviction was not effective and could therefore not be used to enhance the sentence. Counsel also requested that the case be heard before Judge Newman. App. 6, ll. 5 – 23. Judge Alford ruled that the appellate court sent the case back to the trial court for any judge to hear as the court did not designate any specific judge. App. 10, ll. 20 – 25; App. 11, ll. 1 – 5.

Counsel continued to argue that Spratt received a five year sentence suspended to probation at the 1998 guilty plea. That probation was revoked for six months when he pled guilty in 1999. Therefore, Spratt was sentenced to incarceration for an un-counseled plea. App. 12, ll. 8 – 25; App. 13, ll. 1 – 25; App. 14, ll. 1 – 7. Spratt recalled receiving a probationary sentence. App. 16 ll. 21 – 22.

Counsel then informed the court that there was no transcript available from the 1998 plea as Court Administration told her they kept the tapes only five years pursuant to Rule 607, SCACR. Counsel also explained that there was nothing on the sentencing sheet to indicate if any warnings were given to Spratt or if he waived his right to counsel. Spratt's testimony was the only recollection of the events from the 1998 plea. App. 14, ll. 4 – 25; App. 15, ll. 1 – 5.

#### Sentencing Hearing Testimony of Petitioner Eric Spratt

Spratt testified that he was seventeen at the time of the 1998 guilty plea before Judge John Hayes, and it was his first time in General Sessions Court. App. 18, ll. 8 – 12. He remembered standing before Judge Hayes and recalled he did not have an attorney. App. 16, ll. 1 – 25; App. 17, ll. 1 -24. He told the court: “[m]y right hand to God, I never waived my rights to counsel.....I

never waived my right for counsel.” App. 17, ll. 15 – 16; App. 17, ll. 24. This statement included a denial of a written waiver as well. Id.

Spratt did not recall Judge Hayes explaining to him he had the right to an attorney, because he would have accepted it if he had been made aware of the opportunity. He would never turn down help from counsel. App. 17, ll. 25; App. 18, ll. 1 – 7; App. 26 l. 18 – App. 27 l. 6.

Spratt said he did not know he could have someone zealously advocate for him as his attorney; he admitted that he knew “nothing about [the] law.” App. 18, l. 3 – App. 19 l. 1. A lady came to the holding cell just before his 1998 guilty plea who he thought was the solicitor. App. 19, ll. 2 – 14. This woman told him she was recommending probation to Judge Hayes for Spratt. And he received probation. App. 26, ll. 18 – 25; App. 27, ll. 1 – 6.

On cross examination, Spratt indicated that he had been in Family Court for criminal charges as a juvenile. App. 19, ll. 16 – 25. He was represented by an attorney, but his mother always handled that. He “never had to deal with anything.” App. 20 l. 1 – App. 21 l. 25. The last time he was in Family Court was in July 1998, just a few months before he was arrested for the 1998 possession of crack. App. 22, ll. 1 – 25.

Spratt explained that every time he arrived at court for his prior Family Court matters, his attorney was already present and waiting for him; he never had to ask for an attorney. App. 29 ll. 18 – 24. He never recalled asking for one. App. 29 l. 25 – App. 30 l. 5.

At the uncounseled 1998 plea, Spratt did not recall much, only that he received probation. App. 34 ll. 3 – 16. He vehemently advised the court during the sentencing hearing that he would not have declined an opportunity to have representation:

I recall understanding this for a fact. I would never turn down a defender, someone gives me someone to help me. I mean, that’s never happened. I mean, it never happened. Until then I come here and I was without it. I would have never turned it down and I never waived my right to it.

Id. Spratt reiterated this point when questioned by the court. App. 36 l. 8 – App. 37 l. 21.

#### Sentencing Hearing Testimony of Assistant Solicitor E.B. Springs

Assistant Solicitor E.B. Springs testified for the State. App. 50, ll. 1 – 11. Since 1998, he had handled guilty pleas before Judge Hayes, and had observed him conduct many pleas including *pro se* pleas. App. 50, ll. 12 – 25; App. 51, ll. 1 – 3. He said Judge Hayes had a routine that he followed in conducting *pro se* pleas.

He would go through the rights colloquy, as well as Faretta warnings regarding the dangers of self-representation. He discussed the right to a jury trial, and the companion rights. App. 51, ll. 4 – 22. He did not remember if he were present for Spratt's plea in 1998. On cross examination, he said he did not remember being at Spratt's plea. App. 51, ll. 23 – 25; App. 52, ll. 6 – 18.

At the close of the defense evidence, the judge asked who had the burden of proof in a sentence enhancement issue. Defense counsel said that the State had the burden to present prior convictions that might enhance the sentence. Then the burden shifted to the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of these convictions was defective. App. 43, ll. 1 – 25; App. 44, ll. 13.

After the evidence was presented, defense counsel argued that Spratt had met his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not receive the rights normally given in a *pro se* plea, and did not give up his right to an attorney. **Spratt was the only person in the court who was present at the guilty plea.**

Mr. Springs could comment on Judge Hayes' pattern of conducting pleas, but he still did not know about Spratt's plea. Defense counsel asked that the 1998 conviction not be considered, and asked the court to find that the trafficking was a second offense. App. 54, ll. 1 – 25; App. 55, ll. 1 – 25; App. 56, ll. 1 – 22.

The State argued that Spratt had not met his burden of proof because he conveniently had no memory of some things. The State argued that he did know about attorneys as he had one in Family Court. The State argued that Spratt was not credible. App. 56, ll. 23 – 25; App. 57, ll. 1 – 25; App. 58, ll. 1 – 25; App. 59, ll. 1 – 25; App. 60, ll. 1 – 6.

The judge ruled that Spratt had not met his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. App. 63, ll. 3 – 8; App. 68, ll. 20 – 23. The judge cited the basis of his ruling was the testimony from Mr. Springs of the regular practice of Judge Hayes to give the rights during a plea. App. 63, ll. 9 – 25. The judge said in his own experience of reviewing Judge Hayes' PCR records, he had never seen Judge Hayes not advise defendants of their rights. App. 64, ll. 1 – 25; App. 65, ll. 1 – 15.

The judge found that Spratt's testimony was not credible, and he had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not advised of his right to an attorney, and he chose to plead guilty on a *pro se* basis. The judge ruled that the trafficking was third offense, and sentenced Spratt to twenty- five years. App. 65, ll.16 – 24; App. 68, ll. 10 – 24; App. 74, ll. 22 – 25; App. 75, ll. 1 – 16.

Spratt appealed Judge Alford's ruling and sentence. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in an unpublished decision. State v. Spratt, 2013 WL8508295, (Ct. App. May 8, 2013).

### **Post-Conviction Relief Application**

On March 19, 2014, Spratt filed an application for post-conviction relief alleging that defense counsel was ineffective and that his 1998 un-counseled guilty plea was involuntary. App. 76 - 83. On June 24, 2014, the State filed a Return. App. 84 - 89.

On November 20, 2014, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable Alison R. Lee. App. 90 - 149. Tommy A. Thomas represented Spratt. Assistant Attorney General J. Rutledge Johnson represented the State. Spratt and defense counsel both testified.

Evidentiary Hearing Testimony of Petitioner Eric Spratt

Spratt testified that, at the time of his 1998 guilty plea and conviction, he did not possess the right to counsel. He stated that under the controlling precedent of that time, Scott v. Illinois, “[t]he only people possess the right of counsel were [when] actual imprisonment was being imposed.” App. 101, l. 1 - 103, l. 7.

Since Spratt was only sentenced to probation during the 1998 guilty plea, he averred that he was never offered the chance to be represented by appointed counsel. Id. “I had no possession of the right to counsel in 1998. I plead guilty in the plea bargain in exchange for probation without the knowledge of . . . the right to counsel and by law at that time the right to counsel wasn’t required.” App. 106, ll. 3-14.

Citing to Alabama v. Shelton<sup>2</sup> and Talley v. State<sup>3</sup>, Spratt said that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to bring to the judge’s attention that he did not have the right to counsel in 1998 when he pled guilty and received probation. Had defense counsel argued this to Judge Alford, it would have rebutted the presumption of regularity that the defense had to overcome when challenging the applicability of a prior sentence for enhancement purposes. App. 107, l. 2 - 109, l. 18.

According to Spratt, Judge Alford assumed, based on Assistant Solicitor Springs’ testimony and his own knowledge of Judge Hayes’ plea colloquy, that Judge Hayes would have given Farretta warnings and offered to have a public defender appointed to Spratt’s case. App. 106, l. 3 - 107, l. 18.

---

<sup>2</sup> 535 U.S. 654, 122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002).

<sup>3</sup> 371 S.C. 535, 640 S.E.2d 878 (2007).

Defense counsel failed to argue that prior to Alabama v. Shelton the controlling case on an indigent defendant's right to appointed counsel were Argersinger v. Hamlin<sup>4</sup> and Scott v. Illinois<sup>5</sup>.

Spratt testified that those cases limited an indigent defendant's right to appointed counsel to misdemeanor cases that "actually lead to imprisonment." Id. As Spratt had his probation revoked some months later, his un-counseled guilty plea had led to "actual imprisonment." App. 117, l. 1 - 118, l. 16. Spratt further stated that he had never been provided the option of representation by a public defender or appointed counsel at the 1998 guilty plea.

Spratt recalled that defense counsel failed to adequately argue this point. Instead, defense counsel erroneously argued to Judge Alford that Judge Hayes had not provided Spratt with Farretta warnings regarding the risk of self-representation. Id.; App. 55, l. 5 - 56, l. 21. Spratt stated that defense counsel never argued that any Farretta warnings that he received in 1998 would not have included informing him that he had the right to appointed counsel because, at that time, he did not have the right to appointed counsel for a misdemeanor conviction resulting in a suspended sentence and probation. App. 111, l. 3 - 117, l. 21.

#### Hearing Testimony of Defense Counsel

Defense counsel testified that her main argument was that Spratt's 1998 conviction was un-counseled and led to his actual imprisonment following a probation violation. App. 126, l. 8 - 127, l. 18. Therefore the 1998 conviction could not be used to enhance the punishment on his 2007 trafficking conviction. She stated that Judge Newman agreed with her, but that the Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if Spratt validly waived his right to counsel. Id.

---

<sup>4</sup> 407 U.S. 25, 40, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (1972).

<sup>5</sup> 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, (1979).

She recalled emphasizing at the remand hearing in front of Judge Alford that Spratt was the only witness who was present at the guilty plea hearing in 1998. App. 128, ll. 16-25. Defense counsel then explained her understanding of Shelton and its role in Spratt's case:

Alabama versus Shelton is a case that allows us in so many words and it is progeny allows us to access whether a prior conviction is enhanceable or not. It does not go back and undo any prior conviction.

Essentially a defendant, anyone in this country has a right to counsel through the 6th and 14th Amendment. At any point that they are involved in criminal matters and substantial stages of criminal matters and then there has been a lot of cases that have been sort of figuring out what that means over the last two hundred years. . . .

So Alabama versus Shelton and [State v. Talley] in those lines of cases gives us guidelines as to whether a person's prior conviction as it stands could be used to enhance and the parameters in which those cases can be used to enhance. The actual imprisonment sort of prong -- underlying component of those cases come in to play when as in Mr. Spratt's case he was sentenced to probation which normally without benefit of counsel that would be used to enhance. Because he was actually revoked on that and there was actual imprisonment component then because of those progeny of cases we can then go back and use that to argue that he did serve actual imprisonment and that should not be allowed to use to enhance the current charge that he has.

So it's a way to use looking at the context of the charge he has now, which in Mr. Spratt's case a trafficking third, to see whether it should be a third offense based on his prior record. But it does not go back and undo anything the prior charge. That's where the State v Payne presumption of regularity phraseology comes in that the Court relies on in State v Spratt which is the idea that the prior convictions are essentially okay as they stand unless the defense can prove a problem with it and that is what we intended to do in this hearing. By putting Mr. Spratt on the stand he explained under oath he did not get his Faretta warnings and had he gotten those Faretta warnings he would have requested an attorney. That is why we put up that testimony because we had to show there was some sort of constitutional defect in that prior in that prior charge that he had on his record and in order to do that that's how we can only show that it shouldn't have been enhanced because he did serve --

he did serve the actual imprisonment and that's what *State v Spratt* and the Court of Appeals told us to do for the second prong.

App. 129, l. 16 - 131, l. 15. Defense counsel recollected that Judge Alford simply did not believe Spratt's claim that Judge Hayes failed to provide Farretta warnings. App. 131 l. 16 - 132, l. 23.

Defense counsel disagreed with Spratt's claim that he did not have the right to Farretta warnings in 1988. Id. She also disagreed with Spratt's contention that prior to Alabama v. Shelton, he would not have had the right to appointed counsel in South Carolina for his 1998 misdemeanor drug possession charge. "Alabama versus Shelton doesn't give you right to counsel. Alabama v. Shelton gives the ability to determine whether a prior uncounseled plea . . . can be used in your current case to enhance" the sentence. App. 133, ll. 20-23.

On cross-examination, defense counsel admitted that this Court's interpretation of Shelton "required counsel to be appointed when an indigent defendant received a sentence that . . . may end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty." App. 136, ll. 10-21. Counsel reluctantly conceded that, under South Carolina's pre-Shelton case law, an indigent criminal defendant was only eligible for appointed counsel if his conviction resulted in the "actual deprivation of a person's liberty." App. 137, ll. 6-22. When pressed, counsel rejoined that Spratt had a right to counsel under the constitution. Id.

### **Order of Dismissal**

On April 22, 2016, Judge Lee denied Spratt's application for post-conviction relief in a written order of dismissal. App. 150 - 157. The court found that Judge Alford made an "affirmative finding" that Judge Hayes advised Spratt of his right to counsel in the 1998 guilty plea and that Judge Alford's decision was not based on the "normal presumption of regularity" but on his specific knowledge of Judge Hayes' practices. App. 154 (emphasis original).

The PCR court held that Judge Hayes likely advised Spratt of his right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation under Farretta. “The fact that the law at the time may not have required such a warning is irrelevant to a finding that such a warning was, nonetheless, routinely given.” Id. The Court also dismissed Spratt’s argument that he would not have been advised of his right to appointed counsel because he did not the right under South Carolina in 1998:

Applicant’s assertion that he did not possess the right to counsel and therefore, could not waive a right he did not possess was erroneous. While appointed counsel may not have been required under the law at that time, there was no prohibition to appointing counsel for a defendant who could not afford one and desired to have the benefits of attorney representation.

App. 155. Siding with defense counsel, the court reasoned that Spratt would have had the right to counsel at the time of the 1998 guilty plea. Id. Accordingly, the PCR court found that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that Spratt’s 1998 guilty plea was defective because Spratt had no constitutional right to appointed counsel.

## STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in PCR cases depends on the specific issue. Courts defer to a PCR court's findings of fact and will uphold them if there is evidence in the record to support them. Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (citing Jordan v. State, 406 S.C. 443, 448, 752 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2013)). Courts review questions of law de novo, with no deference to trial courts. Sellner, 416 S.C. at 610, 787 S.E.2d at 527 (citing Jamison v. State, 410 S.C. 456, 465, 765 S.E.2d 123, 127 (2014)).

“Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo.” State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018). Appellate courts review “a circuit judge’s findings of historical fact for clear error,” but “review the denial of the right of self-representation based upon those findings of fact de novo.” Id. “In doing so, [the appellate] Court must consider the defendant’s testimony, history, and the circumstances of his decision, as presented to the circuit judge at the time the defendant made his request.” Id.

## ARGUMENT

The PCR court erred in ruling that defense counsel was not ineffective where counsel failed to argue to the sentencing court on remand that, in 1998, South Carolina did not recognize the right of an accused to be represented by appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases that did not result in the immediate deprivation of a person's liberty and therefore, any Farretta warnings regarding the disadvantages of self-representations given during Petitioner's 1998 guilty plea to misdemeanor possession of marijuana would not have informed Petitioner that he could have counsel appointed at the expense of the State.

Whether Petitioner's uncounseled 1998 guilty plea to misdemeanor possession of marijuana could be used to enhance the sentence for his 2007 conviction for trafficking turned on whether Petitioner knowingly waived his right to appointed counsel during the 1998 guilty plea. Defense counsel argued that, based on Petitioner's testimony at the sentencing hearing, there was no evidence that Petitioner's was given Farretta warnings during the 1998 guilty plea.

The State countered that Judge Hayes' usual practice was to provide Farretta warnings to pro-se defendants prior to accepting a guilty plea. The sentencing court agreed with the State and ruled that Petitioner had been given Farretta warnings prior to pleading guilty.

Defense counsel failed to argue that, even if Petitioner was given Farretta warnings, he could not have waived his right to appointed counsel because under then-existing South Carolina law he did not have the right to appointed counsel because he received a suspended sentence upon pleading guilty and South Carolina only required state-sponsored representation on misdemeanors that resulted in an active sentence of incarceration upon conviction.

### **Indigent Defendant's Right to Appointed Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases.**

In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-345, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to state-appointed counsel applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court clarified the scope of the right to state-appointed counsel in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (1972), holding that an indigent defendant must be offered counsel in any misdemeanor case “that actually leads to imprisonment.”

In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158 (1979) the Court confirmed Argersinger's limitation on the mandate for States to provide appointed representation in misdemeanor cases. The governing statute in Scott authorized a jail sentence of up to one year. Id., at 368, 99 S.Ct. 1158. Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant had no right to state-appointed counsel because the sole sentence actually imposed on him was a \$50 fine. Id., at 373, 99 S.Ct. 1158.

Finally, in Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), the Supreme Court held that there can be no activation of a suspended sentence upon the violation of probation if no attorney was present during the offense for which he could be imprisoned. Shelton was convicted of third-degree assault following a bench trial where he represented himself. Id. at 658, 122 S.Ct. at 1767. Third degree assault is a misdemeanor carrying up to a year imprisonment and a \$2,000 fine. Id. Shelton was sentenced to thirty-days imprisonment suspended on the service of two years of probation.

Shelton exercised his right under Alabama law to a new jury trial. He again appeared without counsel and was convicted. “The court repeatedly warned Shelton about the problems self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense.” Id. at 658, 122 S.Ct. at 1768 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that that the Sixth

and Fourteenth amendments prohibited a prior un-counseled conviction that resulted in a sentence of imprisonment from being used to enhance punishment of a subsequent conviction. *Id.*

At the time Alabama v. Shelton was decided, South Carolina was one of only sixteen states that did not provide counsel to indigent defendants in Shelton's circumstances. *Id.* at 669, 122 S.Ct. at 1774. Under our case law at the time, an indigent defendant in South Carolina only had the right to appointed representation if he was sentenced to a term of actual imprisonment. Talley v. State, 371 S.C. 535, 543, 640 S.E.2d 878, 881-82 (2007).

The Court of Appeals addressed how to apply Shelton's mandate, limiting the use of prior uncounseled guilty pleas to enhance sentences, in State v. Spratt, Petitioner's first direct appeal. 383 S.C. 212, 678 S.E.2d 266. The Court ruled that a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not validly waive his right to counsel before entering into the earlier uncounseled guilty plea that the State is seeking to use as a sentencing enhancement. *Id.* at 214, 678 S.E.2d at 267.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that presuming that an individual waived the right to counsel when the record did not affirmatively indicate such was error. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 174 (1985). "Such a presumption is impermissible because waiver has particularly far-reaching effects in the context of guilty pleas." *Id.* In State v. Friedrich, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota held that using an uncounseled plea to enhance a charge was not permitted. 436 N.W.2d 475 (1989).

### **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). "First, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Under this prong, [t]he proper measure of attorney

performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989) (internal citations omitted).

“The second prong of the Strickland test requires a showing that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The defendant is required to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective in order to receive relief.” Id. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (internal citations omitted).

Thus, where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged as a ground for PCR relief, the applicant must prove that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692).

### **Deficient Performance**

Here, defense counsel’s performance was deficient. However, as an initial matter, the PCR court’s findings in the order of dismissal rest on two errors of law that caused the court to incorrectly evaluate defense counsel’s performance.

First, the PCR court’s determination that “there was no prohibition to appointing counsel for a defendant who could not afford one” was an error of law. At the time of Petitioner’s 1998 guilty plea, South Carolina did provide indigent defendants appointed counsel in misdemeanors that did not result in immediate, actual imprisonment, i.e. an active jail term upon being convicted. Talley, 371 S.C. at 545, 640 S.E.2d at 883; see also Shelton, 535 U.S. at 669, 122 S.Ct. at 1774.

Petitioner pled guilty in exchange for receiving probation only days after he was arrested. His 1998 misdemeanor possession of marijuana would not have triggered the appointment of state-sponsored counsel. See Talley, 371 S.C. at 544, 640 S.E.2d at 882 (holding that Talley’s prior

uncounseled conviction was valid as he did not have a constitutional right to counsel in prior conviction because his suspended sentence stemming from the conviction was never activated.). This explains why the advisement of rights form produced at the sentencing hearing only informed Petitioner of his right to an attorney, but did not offer to have one appointed to represent him if he could afford to retain a private attorney. App. 30, l. 2 - 33, l. 9.

Second, the PCR court also committed an error of law when ruling that “[t]he fact that the law at the time may not have required [a Farretta] warning is irrelevant to a finding that such a warning was, nonetheless, routinely given.” App. 154. Farretta was decided in 1975 so warnings about the dangers of self-representation were already required by law.

Determining whether or not Petitioner’s uncounseled 1998 guilty plea could be used to enhance his 2007 sentence for trafficking turned - not whether Judge Hayes gave Farretta warnings - but on whether Judge Hayes’ Farretta warning included **offering Petitioner “assistance of counsel at state expense.”** Shelton at 658, 122 S.Ct. at 1768 (emphasis added).

This is where counsel’s performance at the sentencing hearing fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel never argued to Judge Alford that any Farretta warnings given by Judge Hayes in 1998 would not include explaining to Petitioner that he had the right to have counsel appointed to represent him if he could not afford a private attorney. Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 616 524 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1999) (holding that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a meritorious issue).

Petitioner’s case is on almost identical to Shelton. Shelton was given Farretta warnings at both his bench and jury trial. Shelton was not told that he could have the assistance of counsel at state expense. Shelton at 658, 122 S.Ct. at 1768. The failure to inform Shelton that he could have the assistance of a public defender or appointed counsel is the heart of the Sixth Amendment

violation that the Supreme Court found precluded the state from activating Shelton's suspended sentence. Id.

The major difference between Shelton and Petitioner's case is that defense counsel failed to argue that Petitioner did not have the right to representation by appointed counsel or public defender during the 1998 guilty plea at the sentencing hearing. She failed to raise this issue because, as her testimony at the PCR hearing revealed, she did not understand how the Supreme Court's ruling in Shelton impacted the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants in South Carolina. Talley, 371 S.C. at 542, 640 S.E.2d at 880 (holding that "the new rule announced by Shelton is a watershed rule of criminal proceeding because the right to counsel undeniably implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the proceeding.").

Rather, defense counsel erroneously believed that in 1998 Petitioner had the right to representation by state-sponsored counsel during his guilty plea and that Judge Hayes had simply failed to advise him; "Alabama versus Shelton doesn't give you right to counsel. Alabama v. Shelton gives the ability to determine whether a prior uncounseled plea . . . can be used in your current case to enhance" the sentence. App. 133, ll. 20-23.

Defense counsel improperly conflated the holding in Talley, addressing the retroactive application of Shelton to collateral review, with the "watershed" holding in Shelton that a suspended sentence that may end up in actual deprivation of person's liberty may not be imposed unless defendant was "accorded the guiding hand of counsel in the prosecution of the crime charged." Talley, 371 S.C. at 542, 640 S.E.2d at 880; Shelton, 535 U.S. at 654, 122 S. Ct. at 1765.

The PCR court committed errors of law in ruling that there was no prohibition to appointing counsel in Petitioner's 1998 case and that Farretta warnings were not required in 1998. Both the PCR court and defense counsel failed to recognize that in 1998, prior to Shelton, Petitioner would

not have had the right to state-sponsored counsel and so, any warnings or advisements of rights that Petitioner received from the Court would have produced a knowing waiver of his then non-existent right to counsel.

Defense counsel's failure to properly understand the scope of the Supreme Court's holding in Shelton and how it applied to criminal defendants in South Carolina rendered her performance at Petitioner's sentencing hearing constitutionally deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. See Roseboro, 317 S.C. at 294, 454 S.E.2d at 313.

### **Prejudice**

Petitioner was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to properly argue that, in 1998 South Carolina did not recognize the right of an accused to be represented by appointed counsel in misdemeanors that did not result in the immediate deprivation of a person's liberty. Butler, 286 S.C. at 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814 (holding that the test for prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is whether counsel's deficient performance "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.") quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.

Had defense counsel properly understood the scope of Shelton's holding and its impact on South Carolina's jurisprudence there is a reasonable probability that Judge Alford would have concluded that Petitioner's 1998 uncounseled conviction could not have been used to enhance his trafficking sentence. Talley, 371 S.C. at 542, 640 S.E.2d at 880; Shelton, 535 U.S. at 654, 122 S. Ct. at 1765.

First, the presumption of regularity that attaches to court proceedings would have worked in favor of Petitioner. In the regular functioning of the court system in 1998 Petitioner would not have


had the right to appointed counsel, and so was unlikely to be advised of it. Pringle v. State, 287 S.C. 409, 411, 339 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1986).

Second, defense counsel would have been able to effectively counter the State's claim that Judge Hayes' consistently provide Farretta warnings to *pro-se* defendants. App. 151 - 152. Rather than having to argue the existence of a negative - that Judge Hayes failed in Petitioner's case to give his standard warnings - the defense would have been able to argue that Judge Hayes' standard warnings in 1998 did not include offering Petitioner the "assistance of counsel at state expense."

Therefore, the PCR court erred in finding trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel because "there is a reasonable probability that, but for [trial] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." App. 150 - 156; Cherry, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (internal citations omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.

**CONCLUSION**

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court reverse the PCR court and remand for a sentencing hearing with instructions that the 1998 uncounseled guilty plea not be allowed to enhance his sentence.



---

Taylor D Gilliam  
Appellate Defender

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

This 9th day of January, 2019.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

**RECEIVED**  
JAN 09 2019  
SC Court of Appeals

Appeal from York County

Honorable Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

ERIC ANTONIA SPRATT,

PETITIONER


V.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

RESPONDENT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the Brief of Petitioner in the above referenced case has been served upon Janell Gregory, Esquire, at the Rembert Dennis Building, 1000 Assembly Street, Room 519, Columbia, SC 29201; and a copy of the Brief of Petitioner have been served on Eric Spratt, #257899, at Tyger River Correctional Institution, 200 Prison Road, Upper Yard, Enoree, SC 29335-9308, this 9th day of January, 2019.



Taylor D Gilliam  
Appellate Defender  
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me  
this 9th day of January, 2019.

Mary Allgier (L.S)  
Notary Public for South Carolina  
My Commission Expires: May 12, 2027.