

ORIGINAL

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Certiorari to York County
Court of Common Pleas

The Honorable Alison R. Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2016-001553

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SC Court of Appeals

TREY A. WILLIAMS,

RESPONDENT,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

PETITIONER.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

ALAN WILSON
Attorney General

J. BENJAMIN APLIN
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General
SC Bar No. 8729

Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 734-3727

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	ii
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL.....	1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....	2
STATEMENT OF FACTS	3
ARGUMENT	4
I. The post-conviction relief judge erred in finding Respondent satisfied his burden of proving that he did not properly waive his right to counsel.....	4
II. The post-conviction relief judge erred in finding Respondent satisfied his burden of proving that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that his waiver of counsel was invalid where the issue had no reasonable likelihood of securing reversal on direct appeal.....	12
CONCLUSION.....	14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases:

<u>Faretta v. California</u> , 422 U.S. 806 (1975)	8
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State Cases:

<u>Bridwell v. State</u> , 306 S.C. 518, 413 S.E.2d 30 (1992)	8, 10
---	-------

<u>Prince v. State</u> , 301 S.C. 422, 392 S.E.2d 462 (1990)	8
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<u>State v. Brewer</u> , 328 S.C. 117, 492 S.E.2d 97 (1997)	8
---	---

<u>State v. Cash</u> , 309 S.C. 40, 419 S.E.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1992)	9
--	---

<u>State v. McLauren</u> , 349 S.C. 488, 563 S.E.2d 346 (Ct. App. 2002)	8, 9
---	------

<u>Watts v. State</u> , 347 S.C. 399, 556 S.E.2d 368 (2001)	11
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<u>Wroten v. State</u> , 301 S.C. 293, 391 S.E.2d 575 (1990)	8
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

I.

The post-conviction relief judge erred in finding Respondent satisfied his burden of proving that he did not properly waive his right to counsel.

II.

The post-conviction relief judge erred in finding Respondent satisfied his burden of proving that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that his waiver of counsel was invalid where the issue had no reasonable likelihood of securing reversal on direct appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural History

Respondent was indicted at the May 2010 term of the York County Grand Jury for criminal sexual conduct with a minor, first degree (2009-GS-46-2646). Erik Delaney, Esquire represented Respondent. On April 15-16, 2010, Respondent appeared before the Honorable John C. Hayes, III, for a pretrial hearing. During that hearing, Respondent informed Judge Hayes that he wanted to proceed to trial *pro se*. After a colloquy, Judge Hayes granted Respondent's request but appointed Mr. Delaney to serve as standby counsel. Respondent requested a bench trial, after Judge Hayes explained his right to a jury trial. On May 26, 2010, the day of trial, Respondent told Judge Hayes that he changed his mind and wanted a trial by jury. App. 23-24. However, Judge Hayes denied Respondent's motion to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial. App. 24. Respondent, appearing *pro se*, proceeded to a bench trial before Judge Hayes. Judge Hayes found Respondent guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment for thirty years.

Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the South Carolina Court of Appeals. Lanelle C. Durant, Esquire, of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense perfected the appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed Respondent's conviction and sentence. State v. Williams, Op. No. 2013-UP-102 (S.C. Ct. App. filed March 13, 2013). The Remittitur was issued on April 3, 2013.

Respondent filed an Application for post-conviction relief on June 12, 2013. Respondent filed a return on or about September 13, 2013. The Honorable Alison R. Lee convened an evidentiary hearing on the application at the Moss Justice Center in York, South Carolina on November 18, 2014. Respondent was present and represented by Charles T. Brooks, III, Esquire. Petitioner was represented by Assistant Attorney General J. Rutledge Johnson, Esquire. By an Order signed July 14, 2016, and filed July 18, 2016, the PCR Court granted relief on the grounds

that Respondent did not waive his right to counsel and that Respondent's appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of whether Respondent validly waived his right to counsel. The State timely filed a Notice of Appeal and submitted its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on February 10, 2017. On March 7, 2017, Respondent filed its Return. This Court granted certiorari on November 26, 2018. This Brief of Petitioner follows.

Factual History

In February of 2009, Respondent had sexual intercourse with his six-year-old cousin ("Victim"). App. pp. 38, 40, 43, 44, 71-72, 86. At trial, Victim testified Respondent came behind her and put his penis into her vagina on multiple occasions. App. p. 38-40. Respondent would rub Victim's private parts with a white towel. App. p. 44.

Soon thereafter, Victim's mother noticed Victim was walking funny and was messing with her private parts. App. p. 89. Victim informed her mother that her, "private was burning." App. p. 38; App. p. 88. Victim's mother examined Victim's vaginal area and noticed a "heavy discharge." App. p. 89. When Victim was questioned by her mother, Victim told her about her sexual assault. App. p. 89.

On February 23, 2009, Victim's mother took her to the emergency room. App. pp. 49-50. Dr. Thomas Wilkins treated Victim. According to Dr. Wilkins, Victim's vaginal area was red and there was a small amount of blood present. App. p. 50. In Dr. Wilkins' experience, the presence of blood in the vaginal area of a child was consistent with sexual assault. App. p. 52.

In his defense, Respondent testified he was not guilty of first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, and he claimed he never committed a crime or anything related to a sexual act against anyone. App. p. 111.

ARGUMENT

I. The post-conviction relief judge erred in finding Respondent satisfied his burden of proving that he did not properly waive his right to counsel.

Relevant Facts

Prior to Respondent's trial, a hearing was held before Judge Hayes on April 15-16, 2010. Respondent was represented at the time by Eric Delaney (hereinafter "Counsel"). At this hearing, Respondent informed the trial court that he wished to have Counsel relieved, asking the trial court "Could I represent myself today? Could I be able to represent myself throughout my case today?" App. 5, ll. 22-23. Judge Hayes then had the following discussion with Respondent:

Trial Court: Well I would have to relieve Mr. Delaney and if you want to proceed by yourself and represent yourself you can't do half and half. You either have an attorney or you don't.

Respondent: Yes, sir.

Trial Court: And if I relieve your attorney then you don't have one. And that's dangerous because you're not an attorney and an attorney could be of a benefit to you. And of course you've got an attorney appointed to you at no expense to you. But you have a right to hire an attorney and you also have a right to waive your right to counsel and proceed on your own if you wish. What do you wish to do?

App. 5, l. 24 – 6 l. 11.

Judge Hayes continued the matter until the following day to give Respondent ample time to discuss matters with Counsel. The following day Counsel informed the trial court that Respondent still wished to proceed *pro se*. After discussing Respondent's right to an attorney, Judge Hayes asks Respondent if he would like to proceed *pro se*. App. 13, l. 4. After Respondent answered that he would like to proceed *pro se*, Judge Hayes appointed Counsel to serve as standby counsel during the trial. App. 13, ll. 6-8. Judge Hayes informed Respondent that Counsel

will sit behind him during the trial and Respondent can turn to him for questions on procedure as a resource. App. 13, ll. 9-16.

On May 26, 2010, Respondent proceeded to trial before Judge Hayes, who again asked Respondent if he wished to proceed *pro se*. App. 20, ll. 11-13. Judge Hayes then had the following discussion with Respondent:

Trial Court: You know you have a right to an attorney. I think I explained to you that before. An attorney could be of benefit to you and even though I have relieved and there is a danger in your representing yourself since you are not an attorney. You have waived your right to an attorney on the record before. But you are still between now and Wednesday if you wish to hire an attorney you of course could do that. You understand that?

Respondent: Yes, sir.

Trial Court: And do you understand you have a right to a trial by jury? That is you have a right to have twelve jurors picked impartially and have them seated and have them hear the case, have the case submitted to them; make an argument to them yourself. The State would have the right to make an argument. And then I will charge them on the law and they will then deliberate and determine whether or not the evidence was sufficient for them to find you guilty of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand you have all those rights?

Respondent: Yes, sir.

Trial Court: Do you have any questions about them?

Respondent: Yes, sir. So if I wanted, if I wanted an attorney I could get an attorney now?

Trial Court: You waived your right to have an appointed attorney. You can hire an attorney if you wish but I will tell you that you're going to trial, noticed for trial on Wednesday, so we have a jury downstairs, so you could be tried by a jury or without a jury. I'm told by Ms. Colton you talked about going forward on a bench trial without a jury but you are going to trial on Wednesday. But if you were to hire an attorney that attorney if they were willing to take the case that's fine, but you are going to trial either with or without an attorney.

App. 20, l. 14 – 21 l. 21.

Respondent informed the trial court that he wished to proceed with a bench trial. Respondent agreed that he understood that he had the right to argue his case, the right to confront the witnesses, the right to testify or remain silent, and to call his own witnesses. App. 22, ll. 6-10. During the trial, Respondent cross examined four of the State's five witnesses, called one witness of his own, and testified on his own behalf. After the bench trial, Respondent was found guilty as indicted.

At the PCR hearing, Respondent alleged that Counsel's performance was so ineffective that it caused him to proceed *pro se*. App. 192, ll. 21-24. Respondent testified that Counsel prevented him from making objections and advised him that he could not object to any testimony. App. 194, ll. 3-7. He further testified that he was never advised of any rules or procedures. App. 194, l. 22. Respondent then explained that disagreements with the allegations on his indictments caused him to relieve Counsel. Respondent agreed that Judge Hayes told him of the dangers of self-representation and he still chose to represent himself. App. 221, ll. 3-15. Respondent also agreed that he did not object to Judge Hayes allowing him to represent himself. App. 222, ll. 22-24.

During the PCR hearing, Counsel testified that when he was relieved, he sat with Respondent as standby counsel throughout the trial. App. 227, ll. 14-18. He testified that he did not raise any issue about Respondent's competency to go forward and represent himself. App. 227, ll. 19-21. He testified that before he was relieved, he "advised him to have a lawyer on these charges," "went over with him the danger of representing himself," and had these discussions in the holding cell. App. 228, ll. 3-5.

In response to an inquiry about whether Respondent understood the rules and the trial procedures, Counsel testified that Respondent did not seem to have many questions and "was

very meticulous about writing a lot of notes, questions he was going to ask in anticipation of these witnesses," App. 229, ll. 9-11. Counsel testified that at some point during the middle of the trial, Respondent voluntarily "just gave up and said he was not interested." App. 229, ll. 14-15.

Counsel reiterated on cross-examination that he did not see any competency issues with Respondent. App. 230, ll. 9-10. Again, he testified that he advised Respondent of the dangers of self-representation, including the potential penalties he was facing and certain trial issues such as the difficulty of cross examining doctors. App. 230, ll. 12-21. Counsel also testified that he advised Respondent against moving to relieve and told him on several occasions that it was not in his best interest to represent himself. App. 230, l. 24 – 231, l. 1; App. 233, ll. 4-5.

During the State's closing argument at the PCR hearing, the State argued that there was no objection made during trial concerning Respondent's competency and nothing presented at the PCR hearing regarding his competency other than speculation. App. 235, l. 22 – 236, l. 5. The State also argued that any issue regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel should fail because nothing was preserved at trial for appellate review. App. 237, ll. 4-8.

The PCR Court found that the Trial Court did not specifically address the disadvantages of Respondent proceeding *pro se* and that Respondent did not have a sufficient background to understand these dangers. The PCR Court also found appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise the issue of Respondent's waiver of counsel on direct appeal.

Discussion

The PCR Court erred in finding that Respondent satisfied his burden of proving that he did not properly waive his right to counsel when he relieved Counsel and proceeded *pro se*. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner would assert that there was no evidence to support the PCR Court's conclusion that Respondent did not properly waived his right to counsel as he was

informed of the dangers of self-representation by the judge and by Counsel and because there was no evidence presented that Respondent did not have sufficient background to understand the disadvantages of self-representation.

To establish a valid waiver of counsel, [an accused must] be (1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation. Bridwell v. State, 306 S.C. 518, 413 S.E.2d 30 (1992) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).

"The ultimate test of whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is not the trial judge's advice, but the defendant's understanding." State v. McLauren, 349 S.C. 488, 493, 563 S.E.2d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Brewer, 328 S.C. 117, 119, 492 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1997)). If the trial judge fails to make a "specific inquiry . . . addressing the disadvantages of proceeding *pro se*, this Court will look to the record to determine whether petitioner had sufficient background or was apprised of his rights by some other source." Bridwell, 306 S.C. 518, 413 S.E.2d 30 (citing Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 392 S.E.2d 462 (1990); Wroten v. State, 301 S.C. 293, 391 S.E.2d 575 (1990)).

In McLauren, the South Carolina Court of Appeals noted that courts have considered a list of factors "in determining if an accused had sufficient background to understand the disadvantages of self-representation[.]" 349 S.C. 488, 563 S.E.2d 346. These factors include:

1. The accused's age, educational background, and physical and mental health;
2. Whether the accused was previously involved in criminal trials;
3. Whether he knew of the nature of the charge and of the possible penalties;
4. Whether he was represented by counsel before trial or whether an attorney indicated to him the difficulty of self-representation in his particular case;
5. Whether he was attempting to delay or manipulate the proceedings;
6. Whether the court appointed stand-by counsel;
7. Whether the accused knew he would be required to comply with the rules of procedure at trial;
8. Whether he knew of legal challenges he could raise in defense to the charges against him;

9. Whether the exchange between the accused and the court consisted merely of *pro forma* answers to *pro forma* questions; and
10. Whether the accused's waiver resulted from either coercion or mistreatment.

McLauren, 349 S.C. 488, 494-95, 563 S.E.2d 346, 349 (citing State v. Cash, 309 S.C. 40, 43, 419 S.E.2d 811, 813 (Ct. App. 1992)).

In this case, the entire record supports the conclusion that Respondent made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Respondent moved to have Counsel relieved and Judge Hayes explained that he had the right to counsel and that it would be dangerous to proceed *pro se* because Respondent was not an attorney. He explained that it would benefit him to have an attorney but he could proceed *pro se* if he so desired. Judge Hayes then continued the case to the following day to allow Respondent sufficient time to discuss his decision to proceed *pro se* with Counsel. The following day, Judge Hayes again went over Respondent's right to counsel and that having an attorney would benefit him and proceeding without an attorney would be dangerous since Respondent is not an attorney. Finally, at Respondent's insistence, Judge Hayes granted Respondent's request to relieve Counsel and appointed Counsel to sit as standby counsel.

Immediately prior to trial, Judge Hayes again inquired about Respondent's decision to proceed *pro se*. Judge Hayes again went over his right to counsel and explained that having an attorney would benefit him and proceeding without an attorney would be dangerous since Respondent is not an attorney.

Respondent was also made aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation through his discussions with Counsel. Counsel explained at the pre-trial hearing that he explained to Respondent his concerns about Respondent representing himself at trial. Counsel also testified at the PCR hearing that he did not have any concerns about Respondent's

competency, advised Respondent about his right to counsel, and discussed the dangers of self-representation.

Accordingly, it is clear that Respondent was made aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation through the trial judge's many inquiries and, more importantly, through his discussions with Counsel. While the judge's inquiries may have been brief, he made these inquiries at least three times prior to trial. Petitioner contends that the PCR Court erred because there was probative evidence that Respondent was "apprised of his rights by some other source" through his discussions with Counsel. See Bridwell v. State, 306 S.C. 518, 413 S.E.2d 30 (1992).

Additionally, there was no evidence in the record to suggest that Respondent was not competent to understand his rights and proceed *pro se*, as Counsel specifically testified that he never had an issue with Respondent's competency. The PCR Court erred in finding that "[d]uring the PCR hearing, [Respondent] exhibited little understanding of criminal proceedings," as Respondent's understanding at the PCR hearing had no bearing whatsoever on whether Respondent had sufficient background to understand the dangers of self-representation at the time of trial. The PCR Court also erred by giving any consideration to the fact that Respondent testified he was mentally challenged or had an intellectual disability at the time of trial. The PCR Court considered this fact but also acknowledged that the only evidence to support this contention was Respondent's self-serving testimony. Thus, there was no evidence presented outside of the self-serving testimony that Respondent was not competent to understand his rights and proceed *pro se*, and any consideration of this fact would be speculation. Additionally, any finding that Respondent did not understand the criminal procedure because he did not cross

examine witnesses is refuted by the fact that Counsel testified Respondent was preparing cross-examination questions for witnesses but voluntarily "gave up" in the middle of trial.

The PCR Court also erred by misapplying Watts v. State, 347 S.C. 399, 556 S.E.2d 368 (2001). The PCR Court cited Watts, which held a solicitor's testimony that the trial judge "would have warned" the PCR applicant about the dangers of self-representation was insufficient to satisfy the Faretta requirements. The PCR Court appeared to find that this was similar to Counsel's testimony that he would have informed Respondent of the dangers of self-representation. It is clear from the record that Counsel's explanation is not speculative as he testified that he discussed the dangers of self-representation, the possible penalties, trial issues, and issues concerning cross examining the doctors. See App. 230. This is in no way analogous to a solicitor speculating what a judge would have explained to a defendant.

The PCR Court also erred in finding Respondent was not apprised of the dangers of self-representation by some other source. The PCR Court misapplied Bridwell, which held that if the trial judge fails to make a "specific inquiry . . . addressing the disadvantages of proceeding *pro se*, this Court will look to the record to determine whether petitioner had sufficient background or was apprised of his rights by some other source." The PCR Court erred in holding that the record "did not reflect that [Respondent] was made aware of the dangers of self-representation by a source outside [Counsel] or the Trial Judge." App. 257. Petitioner submits the "some other source" described in Bridwell means a source other than the trial judge and does not mean, as the PCR Court found, that it must be a source other than the trial judge and defense counsel. In this case, there is evidence in the record, specifically from Counsel's testimony, that he explained the dangers of self-representation, and the PCR Court erred in finding there must be evidence from "some other source" aside from Counsel's testimony. For the above reasons, there is no evidence

to support the PCR Court's finding that Respondent did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. This Court should reverse the PCR Court and affirm Respondent's conviction and sentence.

II. The post-conviction relief judge erred in finding Respondent satisfied his burden of proving that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that his waiver of counsel was invalid where the issue had no reasonable likelihood of securing reversal on direct appeal.

Relevant Facts

At the PCR hearing, Respondent, reading from notations he made, alleged, "that trial counsel pretrial failure to object and preserve for appeal the following errors: waiver of objection of Denno hearing, waiver of jury trial, waiver of counsel, the amended Indictment and the guilty verdict after trial, and failure of the trial court to properly provide a Faretta inquiry into allegations of conflict of interest claims." App. p. 193. Respondent explained he believed appellate counsel should have raised issues regarding his waiver of counsel and waiver of his right to a jury trial. App. p. 206. Respondent alleged the waivers were invalid. App. p. 207. Respondent claimed he spoke to his appellate counsel and she told him to file his own brief with the issues he wanted raised. App. p. 211. Respondent stated appellate counsel sent him a letter indicating she received the issues and would consider them when she prepared the brief in the case. App. p. 211. After appellate counsel filed a brief that did not contain the issues identified by Respondent as meritorious, Respondent lodged a complaint and claimed appellate counsel told him she never received the issues he sent. App. p. 211-12. Respondent states his waiver of counsel was invalid because the solicitor introduced an amended indictment after Respondent waived his counsel. App. p. 213.

On cross-examination, Respondent conceded he did not make an objection on the grounds of his waiver of counsel being voluntary. App. p. 223. By comparison, appellate counsel

raised an issue regarding Respondent's request for a jury trial because Respondent actually raised the issue below. App. p. 223.

Discussion

The PCR Court erred in finding that Respondent satisfied his burden of proving that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that his waiver of counsel was invalid. For all the reasons addressed in Issue I above, the PCR Court erred in finding that this issue would likely have been meritorious on appeal. Respondent was aware of the dangers of self-representation. Accordingly, there was no evidence to support the PCR Court granting relief on this basis. Appellate counsel would simply not have been successful in pursuing a claim that Respondent's waiver of counsel at trial was invalid where, as explained in detail above, the waiver was knowing and intelligent and made with an understanding of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. This Court should reverse the PCR Court and affirm Respondent's conviction and sentence.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the post-conviction relief court be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

ALAN WILSON
Attorney General

J. BENJAMIN APLIN
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General



J. BENJAMIN APLIN
S.C. Bar No. 8729

Office of the Attorney General
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211
(803) 734-3737

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
PETITIONER.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the **Brief of Petitioner**, has been served upon Respondent by mailing two (2) copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid:

**Trey A. Williams, #341036, B-0069-A
McCormick Correctional Institution
386 Redemption Way
McCormick, South Carolina 29899**

This 20th day of February, 2019



J. BENJAMIN APLIN
S.C. Bar No. 8729

Office of the Attorney General
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211
(803) 734-3737

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER



ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 20, 2019

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SC Court of Appeals

The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings
Clerk, South Carolina Court of Appeals
Post Office Box 11629
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Re: Trey A. Williams v. State of South Carolina
Lower Court Case No. 2013-CP-46-1797
Appellate Case No. 2016-001553

Dear Ms. Kitchings

Attached are the original and fifteen (15) copies of the Brief of Petitioner in the above referenced case for filing in your office. Also, per Rule 243(j) included are thirteen (13) additional copies of the Appendix.

In addition, please add the undersigned as counsel of record and remove Janell H. Gregory, Esquire, as counsel of record.

Sincerely,

J. Benjamin Aplin
Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General
SC Bar #8729

JBA/cc

cc: Trey A. Williams, *Pro Se* Respondent
Victim Advocacy Division (letter only)