

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM BERKELEY COUNTY

Robert E. Watson, Circuit Court Judge

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Appellate Case No. 2013-000394

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

SC Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Transportation.....Appellant,

vs.

RI CS5, LLCRespondent,

and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
County Treasurer's Office, Lienholder.....Other Condemnees.

RECORD ON APPEAL

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
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The undersigned hereby certifies that the Record on Appeal contains all material
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August 1, 2013

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

COUNTY OF BERKELEY

Road/Route U.S. Route 71A
File 8.165B
Item
Project STP-UR08(007)
PCN 32502

South Carolina Department of Transportation,

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

Condemnor,

vs.

RI CS5, LLC,

Landowner(s).

and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North
Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
County Treasurer's Office, Lien Holder,

Other Condemnee(s).

ORDER GRANTING LANDOWNER'S
APPLICATION FOR AWARD
OF REASONABLE LITIGATION
EXPENSES

FILED
2013 FEB 24 PM 1:18
MARY P. BROWN
CLERK OF COURT
BERKELEY COUNTY, SC

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on an Application for Award of Reasonable Litigation Expenses filed by Landowner, RI CS5, LLC (hereinafter "Landowner"). The Court conducted a hearing on October 2, 2012, which was attended by counsel for all parties, to determine if the prevailing party, Landowner, is entitled to reasonable litigation expenses, pursuant to S.C. Code § 28-2-510, associated with certain real property in Berkeley County, South Carolina located at 1445 South Live Oak Drive, Moncks Corner, South Carolina (the "Property"), condemned by the South Carolina Department of Transportation (the "Condemnor") on December 1, 2009. The Court, having fully considered the record and

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submissions by the parties, finds that Landowner is entitled to an award of reasonable litigation expenses. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the Court awards Landowner reasonable litigation expenses of one hundred and twenty-six thousand, seven hundred and thirty dollars and eighty-two cents (\$126,730.82).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Final Order and Judgment (hereinafter "Final Order") of the Court in this matter was entered on May 15, 2012. The Final Order contained Stipulations of Fact, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Final Order is hereby incorporated herein as a part of this Order Granting Landowner's Application for Award of Reasonable Litigation Expenses.

In addition to the Findings of Fact contained in the Final Order, the Court makes the following additional Findings of Fact. The Final Order awarded the Landowner nine hundred thousand dollars (\$900,000.00) as just compensation for its property. Such amount is closer to the highest valuation of the property that was attested to at trial on behalf of the Landowner, one million, one hundred and fifty thousand dollars (\$1,150,000.00), than it is to the highest valuation of the property that was attested to at trial on behalf of the Condemnor, three hundred and fifty-one thousand dollars (\$351,000.00).

The Affidavit of Richard D. Bybee, along with the Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey S. Tibbals were offered in support of Landowner's Application for Award of Reasonable Litigation Expenses. These Affidavits and the exhibits hereto, are adopted by the Court as Factual Findings in this case. Among other things, these Affidavits establish that this case involved a relatively novel issue of law in South Carolina and involved complex transactions and difficult valuation issues, requiring an analysis beyond a simple sales comparison approach to determine market value. In addition, the case was vigorously contested

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by Condemnor's counsel, involved multiple expert witnesses and was document intensive, necessitating the Landowner's lawyers and paralegals to spend over three hundred twenty-nine hours on the matter over a time period of approximately three years. Co-lead counsel Paul A. Dominick and Jeffrey S. Tibbals enjoy a high professional standing, are well respected within the South Carolina Bar, have thirty-three years and thirteen years of experience, respectively, are well-versed in real estate matters, and practice with, Nexsen Pruet, LLC, a well-established and distinguished law firm. The hourly rates charged by Nexsen Pruet, LLC's attorneys and staff are consistent with rates charged by attorneys in the Tri-County area, including Berkeley County, for similar services. Mr. Dominick's combined hourly rate was three hundred and eighty-three dollars (\$383.00) an hour and Mr. Tibbals combined hourly rate was three hundred and ten dollars (\$310.00) an hour, for an average of three hundred and forty-six dollars (\$346.00) an hour. In addition, Nexsen Pruet, LLC obtained beneficial results for the landowner. In defending the prosecution of this matter the Landowner incurred one hundred and twenty-six thousand, seven hundred and thirty dollars and eighty-two cents (\$126,730.82) in attorneys' fees and costs, including expert witness fees.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the record presented, the Court finds that the Landowner, having prevailed in the above-captioned action, is entitled to an award of reasonable litigation expenses, including attorneys' fees and other costs of litigation expended course of litigation pursuant to S.C. Code § 28-2-510 (B)(1)(Rev. 2007).

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1. Under South Carolina law, reasonable litigation expenses should be awarded to prevailing parties in condemnation cases

In South Carolina, S.C. Code § 28-2-510 (B)(1)(Rev. 2007) governs fee awards and litigation expenses for a prevailing party in condemnation actions. A party is considered to prevail under the statute when "the compensation awarded for the property, exclusive of interest, is at least as close to the highest valuation of the property that is attested to at trial on behalf of the landowner as it is to the highest valuation of the property that is attested to at trial on behalf of the condemnor." S.C. Code § 28-2-510 (B)(2)(Rev. 2007). This allows landowners who are successful in condemnation actions not to have their awards depleted by legal fees necessary to obtain the awards. Although there is no dispute that Landowner was the "prevailing party" in this case, the amount of the award relative to the highest valuations presented by the Condemnor and Landowner establish Landowner as the prevailing party.

Condemnor has argued that its legal position was substantially justified and, thus, Landowner should be precluded from recovering its litigation expenses. With respect to the South Carolina statute at issue, whether the Condemnor's position was "substantially justified" is only a factor that may be applied by the trial court, "in its discretion," to reduce an award of litigation expenses. The "substantially justified" provision is not a bar to the recovery of litigation expenses under S.C. Code § 28-2-510 (B)(1)(Rev. 2007), rather, it is one of many factors relating to the amount of the award that the court may consider.

While the South Carolina appellate courts have not yet interpreted the meaning of "substantially justified" under S.C. Code § 28-2-510, there are numerous South Carolina appellate cases that discuss the landowner's right to attorneys' fees when the landowner is the prevailing party. South Carolina case law has consistently allowed attorneys' fees to the

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prevailing party in condemnation actions. The S.C. Court of Appeals, in the recent decision of *South Carolina Department of Transportation v. Janell P. Revels, et. al.* S.C. Court of appeals Opinion No. 5010, filed July 25, 2012, found that S.C. Code § 28-2-510 shifts the source of the prevailing party's attorneys' fees to the losing party. Considering both South Carolina statutory and case law, this Court finds that the Landowner, as the prevailing party, is entitled to reasonable litigation expenses.

2. *The Condemnor's litigating position was not substantially justified*

The litigating position of the Condemnor was not substantially justified because none of the final opinions of value proffered by Condemnor took the existing lease and rental income into consideration. The Condemnor based its litigating position on no fewer than three appraisals, two by Charles Crider, and one by David Graydon. The findings of this Court directly contradict the Condemnor's assertion that its position was "substantially justified." This Court, in its Final Order dated May 15, 2012, determined that the testimony of Charles Crider was "unreliable" and of "little, if any, value" because it was based on the "erroneous assumption that the Landowner and the tenant, Worsley Operation Corporation, were related entities." (Final Order and Judgment dated May 15, 2012, p. 7, 8). This Court further noted that there "is no evidence to support Mr. Crider's position that the Landowner and Worsley Operating Corporation were the same entity." *Id.* at 8. The opinions of Mr. Graydon were also flawed because they were based upon the replacement cost approach and not the income capitalization approach. Mr. Graydon "admitted on cross-examination that where real property is purchased for investment for a stream of income, the most appropriate appraisal method is the income capitalization approach. Tr. At p. 218, l. 19-24" *Id.* at 9.

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Condemnor's refusal to acknowledge the value of the lease stood in contradiction to both Condemnor's own appraisal policies and existing law. Condemnor's own Right of Way Appraisal Manual states that the income capitalization approach must be demonstrated when appraising investment property. Condemnor's refusal to include the value of the lease in its just compensation analysis flew in the face of S.C. Code § 28-2-340(5), which provides for the admissibility of information regarding leases and rents in determining just compensation. Condemnor's reliance on unreliable and unsubstantiated appraisals, their failure to comply with their own guidelines and their failure to comply with South Carolina law leads this Court to form the opinion that their litigating position was not reasonable in fact or in law and, thus, could not be "substantially justified." Notwithstanding the mounting evidence favoring the position that the lease was relevant to just compensation, the Condemnor refused to acknowledge that the lease had any value throughout the case, and during the trial. By the time that Condemnor conceded that the lease held compensable value, the vast majority of attorneys' fees and costs had been spent.

3. The submitted evidence supports that the fees and costs, including expert witness fees were reasonable in defending the prosecution of this action

In *Jackson v. Speed*, 326 S.C. 289, 486 S.E.2d 750 (1997), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the following six factors should be considered when determining a reasonable attorneys' fee: "(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees for similar services." *Id.* at 308, 486 S.E.2d at 760.

This Court believes that the amount of litigation expenses requested by Landowner is reasonable when considering the *Jackson* factors. The Court finds that this was a complex

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case that was further complicated by the Condemnor's aggressive course of litigation and involved discovery, mediation and trial. Further, the Condemnor's unjustified legal position, in combination with Condemnor's multiple appraisals, increased the work required of Landowner's counsel. Landowner's counsel, Mr. Dominick and Mr. Tibbals, enjoy excellent reputations among the legal community in South Carolina as well as the law firm of Nexsen Pruet, LLC. In addition, the aforementioned attorneys were successful in achieving an excellent result. While Nexsen Pruet, LLC is a statewide law firm, the hourly rates of its attorneys and staff are consistent with the customarily charged rates with the Tri-County area which includes Berkeley County. Based on the submissions of the parties, this Court believes that three hundred and fifty dollars (\$350.00) an hour is a reasonable and customary rate for handling a matter of this type and complexity within the Charleston tri-county area, including Berkeley County. Condemnor's counsel has not submitted an independent affidavit to the contrary. After a review of the detailed billing records provided by Landowner's counsel, the Court finds that the legal work was divided between Landowner's counsel in a reasonable manner. Although Mr. Dominick's combined hourly rate was three hundred and eighty-three dollars (\$383.00) an hour, this is offset by Mr. Tibbals combined hourly rate of three hundred and ten dollars (\$310.00) an hour, for an average of three hundred and forty-six dollars (\$346.00) an hour. The substantial amount at stake in this case reasonably warrants having two experienced attorneys, a senior partner and a junior partner, at trial. Considering all of the foregoing facts in light of the *Jackson* factors, the litigation expenses requested by Landowner are reasonable.

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CONCLUSION

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT

The Condemnor shall pay to the Landowner an amount of one hundred and twenty-six thousand, seven hundred and thirty dollars and eighty-two cents (\$126,730.82), comprising reasonable litigation expenses including fees, costs and expert witnesses in defending the prosecution of this action in accordance with S.C. Code § 28-2-510.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

Robert E. Watson
The Honorable Robert E. Watson

February 4, 2013
Murphy County, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF BERKELEY

Road/Route U.S. Route 71A
File 8.165B
Item
Project STP-UR08(007)
PCN 32502

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

South Carolina Department of Transportation,
Condemnor,

vs.

RI CS5, LLC,

Landowner(s).

and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North
Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
County Treasurer's Office, Lien Holder,

Other Condemnee(s).

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

MARY P. BROWN
CLERK OF COURT
BERKELEY COUNTY, SC

2012 MAY 17 PM 2:09

FILED

JUDGE:

DATE OF TRIAL:

ATTORNEYS FOR CONDEMNOR:

ATTORNEY FOR LANDOWNER:

The Honorable Robert E. Watson

December 14, 2011

John S. West

Paul A. Dominick

Jeffrey S. Tibbals

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THIS MATTER came before the Court on December 14, 2011 for a final hearing on the merits to determine just compensation to RI CS5, LLC for certain real property in Berkeley County, South Carolina located at 1445 South Live Oak Drive, Moncks Corner, South Carolina (the "Property"), condemned by the South Carolina Department of Transportation (the

“Condemnor”) on December 1, 2009 pursuant to The South Carolina Eminent Domain Procedure Act, SC Code § 28-2-10 *et seq.*

STIPULATIONS OF FACT

Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to the following facts, which now form part of the record of the case:

1. South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) is an agency of the State of South Carolina.
2. SCDOT is responsible for planning, construction, maintenance and operation of the state highway system. It coordinates all state and federal programs relating to highways in this state.
3. The US Highway 17-A widening project (“Project”) in Berkeley County is being administered by SCDOT.
4. Tract No. 244 is a site designated in the Project.
5. Tract No. 244 was owned by RI CS5, LLC on December 1, 2009.
6. SCDOT initiated this case by the filing of a Condemnation Notice and Tender of Payment and related documents on December 1, 2009.
7. The tender amount was \$201,000.00 which was not accepted by RI CS5, LLC.
8. At the request of RI CS5, LLC, SCDOT agreed to a 100% draw down of the tender amount and the same was paid over to RI CS5, LLC.
9. All documents produced by the parties in the course of discovery shall be deemed authentic. All relevant instruments of record are deemed authentic and admissible.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Landowner RI CS5, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Realty Income, a publicly owned Real Estate Investment Trust based in Escondido, California (the “Landowner”). Tr. at p. 22, l. 11-17; p. 6, l. 19-21; p. 9, l. 15-25. Realty Income acquires real property for long-term investment, leased to national or regional corporate tenants. Tr. at p. 8, l. 12 – p. 9, l. 25. The income generated from the leases is used to pay a monthly dividend to approximately 90,000

public shareholders. *Id.* Known as "The Monthly Dividend Company," Realty Income has paid dividends to shareholders every month since 1969. *Id.* The dividends paid have consistently increased over time, even during the real estate and financial market turmoil of 2008-2009. Tr. at p. 17, l. 23 – p. 18, l. 9.

Michael R. Pfeiffer testified at trial on behalf of the Landowner. Mr. Pfeiffer is Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary of Realty Income, the Landowner's parent corporation. Tr. at p. 7, l. 4-7. Mr. Pfeiffer is an attorney licensed to practice in California and Florida (inactive status) and holds a real estate brokerage license in California. Tr. at p. 7, l. 12-21. Among other duties and responsibilities, Mr. Pfeiffer oversees all real property acquisitions made by Realty Income. Tr. at p. 7, l. 22 - p. 8, l. 11. Final determinations on the suitability of real property investment opportunities are made by Realty Income's Investment Committee, which consists of five individuals, including Mr. Pfeiffer. Tr. at p. 11, l. 5-12.

Realty Income bases real property acquisition decisions upon three underlying criteria, which Mr. Pfeiffer referred to as a "three-legged stool". Tr. at p. 11, l. 13 – p. 12, l. 8. The first criterion is the creditworthiness of the tenant, because the stable receipt of rents is vital to Realty Income's business. Tr. at p. 12, l. 9-17. The second factor is the real estate attributes of the real property, which include demographics, traffic, neighboring properties, nearby property listings for sale, rent comparables, and environmental conditions. Tr. at p. 12, l. 18 - p. 13, l. 24. In connection with Realty Income's due diligence regarding real estate attributes, a representative of Realty Income physically inspects every potential acquisition in person, on site. *Id.* The third element of Realty Income's analysis is the profitability of the tenant's business at the property. Tr. at p. 15, l. 8-23. Cash flow of the underlying business is important to ensure that even if a

tenant faces financial distress or bankruptcy, the tenant will elect to affirm and retain the lease on a profitable location. *Id.*

Realty Income purchased the Property on March 27, 2008 for a purchase price of \$1,150,000, Tr. at p. 30, l. 19-25, as part of a \$65,535,000 transaction involving a portfolio of convenience store properties formerly owned by Worsley Companies, Inc. and its affiliates. Tr. at p. 23, l. 5 – p. 24, l. 17.; Tr. at p. 29, l. 11-17. A private equity firm named Sun Capital Partners, Inc. (“Sun Capital”) based in Boca Raton, Florida had proposed to purchase certain convenience stores owned by Worsley, and to sell the associated real property convenience store sites to Realty Income, which would then lease the properties back to the operating company, Worsley Operating Corporation, then owned by Sun Capital through its subsidiary Village Pantries Holding Corp. Tr. at p. 23, l. 5 – p. 24, l. 17; Condemnor’s Exhibit 10 at p. 1-3:

Realty Income performed its standard due diligence on the Property prior to purchase, and determined that the Property satisfied its acquisition criteria. Tr. at p. 26, l. 11 – p. 28, l. 12; Landowner’s Exhibit 2. The purchase transaction was consummated in the following manner. On March 27, 2008, Realty Income paid a purchase price of \$65,350,000 for the entire Worsley real estate portfolio. Tr. at p. 29, l. 2-20; Landowner’s Exhibit 10. The purchase price for the Property paid by Realty Income was \$1,150,000. Tr. at p. 30, l. 7-25; Landowner’s Exhibit 1. This \$1,150,000 purchase price was determined on a property-specific basis. Tr. at p. 31, l. 19 – p. 33, l. 3. Furthermore, the purchase and sale of the Property constituted an arms-length transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Tr. p. 33, l. 4-7. Mr. Pfeiffer testified that the Landowner’s opinion of value of the Property as of December 1, 2009 was \$1,150,000. Tr. at p. 34, l. 6-9.

The real property in the Worsley portfolio was held by seven separate limited liability companies at the time of the March 27, 2008 closing. Tr. at p. 34, l. 10 – p. 35, l. 6. The individual limited liability company that owned the Property prior to the closing was WF Intermediate Real Estate, LLC, having taken title from the Walter Cecil Worsley, Jr. Revocable Trust, by its Successor Trustees Walter Cecil Worsley, III and James W. Narron by Special Warranty Deed on March 20, 2008. See Landowner's Exhibit 6 at Addendum. Realty Income assumed the membership interests in each of the seven limited liability companies, including WF Intermediate Real Estate, LLC, and consolidated them into one limited liability company, the Landowner. Tr. at p. 34, l. 10 – p. 35, l. 6; Landowner's Exhibits 3, 4, and 5. Neither Realty Income nor the Landowner acquired any interest in the business operations of the convenience stores – only the real property. *Id.* In fact, the Landowner provided undisputed testimony that, as a Real Estate Investment Trust, Realty Income is prohibited from having an ownership interest in any operating company. Tr. at p. 35, l. 7-21.

After the closing, the Landowner leased the Property to Worsley Operating Corporation (then owned by Sun Capital and its subsidiaries) pursuant to that certain Land and Building Lease Agreement dated March 27, 2008 (the "Lease"). Tr. at p. 40, l. 22 – p. 41, l. 8; Landowner's Exhibit 7. Base monthly rent under the Lease was \$8,517.67, which increased annually based upon CPI, the Consumer Price Index. Tr. at p. 41, l. 16-25; Landowner's Exhibit 7. The rent under the Lease was not dependent upon the income generated by store operations, and the Lease was freely assignable by the Landowner. Tr. at p. 42, l. 4-19; Landowner's Exhibit 7. The tenant's obligations under the Lease were guaranteed by Village Pantries Holding Corp., which promised to pay regardless of the profitability of the convenience store. Tr. at p.

45, l. -- p. 46, l. 3; Landowner's Exhibit 9. There has been no default for failure to pay rent on any of the properties in the Worsley portfolio. Tr. p. 45, l. 18 -- p. 46, l. 4.

Thomas F. Hartnett testified as an expert witness for the Landowner. Mr. Hartnett, a real estate appraiser with more than fifty years of experience, testified as to his determination of fair market value for the Property. The final opinion of value provided by Mr. Hartnett was \$900,000. Tr. at p. 108, l. 6 -- p. 109, l. 12; Landowner's Exhibit 6. Mr. Hartnett conducted an analysis of fair market value upon three separate approaches. First, Mr. Hartnett used a sales comparison approach resulting in a value of \$444,500. Second, Mr. Hartnett utilized the direct capitalization approach, considering the Lease, which resulted in a value of \$1,067,000. Third, Mr. Hartnett performed a going concern analysis, resulting in a value of \$1,185,000. See Landowner's Exhibit 6.

Mr. Hartnett testified that he discounted the sales comparison approach because most convenience stores are bought and sold on the basis of going concern value. Tr. at p. 146, l. 1-20. However, Mr. Hartnett testified that because this case involved separate owners of the business and the realty, he placed the most weight on the income capitalization approach, because the Property would be bought and sold in the market on the basis of the income from the Lease. Tr. at p. 146, l. 21 - p. 47, l. 8; Tr. at p. 119, l. 10 -- p. 120, l. 5. Mr. Hartnett testified that because in this case, the Landowner has no interest in the business operations, he used the going concern approach "merely as an indicator of value to see how closely it would check and support the value indicated by the capitalization approach." Tr. at p. 112, l. 2-11. Mr. Hartnett testified that based upon his research, convenience store rent is highly variable depending upon the location and creditworthiness of an operator. He testified that the rent under the Lease is not "out of line" with market rent. Tr. p. 117, l. 6 -- p. 119, l. 1.

Charles F. Crider, a real estate appraiser, testified as an expert witness for the Condemnor. Mr. Crider proffered an opinion of fair market value for the Property of \$201,000.¹ Mr. Crider opined that the Lease provided no indication of the fair market value of the Property "due to the incestuous nature of the entities." Condemnor's Exhibit 12 at p. 39. Mr. Crider testified that the Landowner and Worsley Operating Corporation, the tenant, "are the same entity, for purposes of the sale and merger and creation of the Lease. There's no distinction between those two." Tr. at p. 175, l. 1 – p. 176, l. 6.

I find Mr. Crider's testimony to be of little, if any, value for a number of reasons. First, Mr. Crider based his opinions regarding the relevance of the Lease upon the erroneous assumption that the Landowner and the tenant, Worsley Operating Corporation, were related entities. This assumption has no support in the record and, in fact, is thoroughly refuted by the evidence. The chain of title presented in the record plainly demonstrates that Worsley Operating Corporation never owned the Property. Title transferred from the Walter Cecil Worsley, Jr. Revocable Trust to WF Intermediate Realty, LLC. The Landowner then acquired all membership interest in WF Intermediate Realty, LLC, and the latter merged into the Landowner. See Landowner's Exhibit 3. Mr. Crider's confusion was evident when he testified, "Worsley would not have been merged into and agreed to the Lease were it not for the fact that they received over \$1 million." Tr. p.175, l.2 – p.176, l.6. The evidence shows no merger of Worsley Operating Corporation with the Landowner. Rather, only those seven limited liability companies

¹ Both Mr. Crider's original appraisal report and updated report, Condemnor's Exhibits 11 and 12, respectively, set forth a value of \$197,703 for the taking, reflecting a small remainder interest of the Landowner. However, the decision by Condemnor to make a total acquisition was made on or before December 1, 2009, a fact overlooked by Crider in his updated November 22, 2011 report nearly two years later.

which owned real property, Worsley Operating Corporation not among them, merged with the Landowner. Landowner's Exhibit 3; Tr. at p. 196, l. 16 – p. 197, l. 3.

There is no evidence to support Mr. Crider's contention that the Landowner and Worsley Operating Corporation were the same entity. Mr. Crider appeared to overlook the fact that Sun Capital through its subsidiaries purchased the convenience store operations and became the owners of Worsley Operating Corporation. The Condemnor offered no evidence of any common ownership between the Landowner, Sun Capital, or Worsley Operating Corporation. In fact, Mr. Pfeiffer offered unrefuted testimony to the contrary. Tr. at p. 25, l. 20 – p. 26, l. 10; p. 226, l. 9 – 228, l. 4. The only document advanced by Mr. Crider to assert that the Lease was between related parties was part of an Offering Memorandum created prior to the Landowner's purchase of the Property. Tr. at p. 228, l. 11 – p. 229, l. 22.

Mr. Crider's mistaken assumptions regarding the nature of the transaction render his opinions unreliable. For example, his faulty premise that the landlord and tenant were the same entity served as his justification to exclude the Lease from his analysis of the fair market value of the Property. As discussed in further detail below, I find that the Lease must be considered in determining the fair market value of the Property. In addition, Mr. Crider's erroneous factual analysis led him to wholly ignore the distinction between the Landowner and the owner of the business operations. Mr. Crider expounded upon his preferred methodology for valuation of convenience stores, which involves a multiple of the store's gross profits. Tr. p. 168, l.18 - p.169, l.21. However, this approach overlooks the fact that the owner of the real property and the operator of the store in this case are separate and distinct entities. The Landowner had no convenience store "going concern" to sell, only the real property accompanied by the Lease.

Mr. Crider provided additional ill-founded opinions. For example, Mr. Crider testified that the Lease was actually a mortgage, and therefore not reflective of market rent. Tr. at p. 177, l. 4—p. 178, l. 20. However, Mr. Crider admitted on cross-examination that that he performed no analysis of market rent. Tr. at p. 183, 15-24. Finally, Mr. Crider also erroneously testified that personal property was bought by the Landowner and leased from the Landowner to the tenant, Tr. at p. 177, l. 17-24; p. 190, l. 17-24, when the record and the Lease prove the contrary. See Landowner's Exhibit 7 at p. 1, defining the "Premises" as the "Land and Improvements" defined in Exhibit "A" to the Lease, together with the Storage Tank System.

David Graydon also testified as an expert appraisal witness for the Condemnor. Unlike Mr. Crider, Mr. Graydon made a determination of the value of the Leased Fee Estate, or the value of the Lease to the landlord/owner, in the amount of \$924,000. Mr. Graydon testified that his opinion of the fair market value of the Property as of December 1, 2009, the date of the taking, was \$351,000 for the real property, \$190,000 for the personal property, and a business value of \$559,000 for a total "going concern" value of \$1,100,000. Mr. Graydon's final opinion of fair market value was \$351,000, an amount that does not include or take into consideration his opinion of \$924,000 in value for the Leased Fee Estate. Mr. Graydon's final opinion of value is based upon the replacement cost approach, but he admitted on cross-examination that where real property is purchased for investment for a stream of income, the most appropriate appraisal method is the income capitalization approach. Tr. at p. 218, l. 19-24.

Mr. Graydon gave no justification for excluding the value of the Leased Fee Estate, other than his opinion that the Lease contained a higher than typical market rental rate, and therefore it appeared to him that the rent "may contain the going concern or the business value". Tr. at p. 212, l. 17 – p. 213, l. 13. However, Mr. Graydon admitted on cross-examination that his stated

value of \$924,000 for the Leased Fee Estate took into consideration his opinion that the rent seemed high, and any sale-leaseback concerns. Tr. at p. 216, l. 2 – p. 217, l. 14. Further, Mr. Graydon admitted that he performed no analysis regarding the creditworthiness of the tenant or guarantor, factors that could increase the value of the Leased Fee Estate. Tr. at p. 219, l. 4 – p. 220, l. 14.

Mr. Graydon testified that he had a copy of the Lease and was familiar with its terms when he performed his appraisal. Tr. at p. 215 l.15 – 25. The Lease is in the record as Landowner's Exhibit 7, and its terms speak for themselves. The Lease conveys a leasehold interest in the real property and improvements only. Notably, the Lease does not include assets belonging to the convenience store business, such as personal property, equipment, inventory, and goodwill. See Landowner's Exhibit 7. Of course, this is because the Landowner did not own these elements of the business – they were owned by the tenant Worsley Operating Corporation and its parent companies, Village Pantries Holding Corp. and Sun Capital. Therefore, any suggestion by Mr. Graydon that the rent includes payment for business assets such as those identified above runs contrary to the express terms of the Lease, and the realities of the split ownership of real property and operations.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The primary legal issue to be decided is whether to take the value of the Lease into consideration in determining the fair market value of the Property, and consequently the just compensation to be awarded to the Landowner.

1. *The Value of the Lease Must Be Considered in Determining the Fair Market Value of the Property*

South Carolina law requires consideration of rental income in determining the fair market value of the real property condemned. The South Carolina eminent domain statute squarely

addresses the issue. The statute, at S.C. Code § 28-2-340(5), permits as admissible "evidence of the price and other terms upon any sale or the rent reserved and other terms of any lease or tenancy relating to the property . . ." Information regarding leases and rents is admissible because it is fundamentally relevant to the market value of real property, especially investment property.

Condemnor has made two primary arguments as to why the Lease should not be considered. First, the Condemnor takes the position that considering the income generated from the Lease is tantamount to including the going concern value of the convenience store operations. Second, the Condemnor characterizes the Lease as a related-party transaction that strips it of any relevance in determining the fair market value of the Property. I address each argument in turn.

a. Compensation for "Going Concern" Value Is Not an Issue in this Case

The Condemnor cites South Carolina jurisprudence holding that the going concern value of the business must not be considered in determining just compensation. *See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Bolt*, 242 S.C. 411, 131 S.E.2d 264 (1963). The Condemnor's reliance upon *Bolt* and its progeny is misplaced in this case. The undisputed facts establish that the Landowner does not have any ownership interest in the operations of the convenience store located on the Property. The Landowner owned only the real estate, while the business operations were owned by Worsley Operating Corporation. Thus, the Condemnor did not take any "going concern" from the Landowner – the Landowner owned no "going concern" business to lose. The separation of the real property and the business operations distinguishes this case from *Bolt*, and other South Carolina cases excluding the going concern value, where the owner of the real property and the business were one and the same.

The Court of Appeals in *Gray v. South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation*, 311 S.C. 144, 427 S.E.2d 899 (Ct.App. 1992),² correctly affirmed the generally accepted rule and stated as follows:

The general rule is that the value of a business being conducted upon property condemned may not be a component of the market value of the property. *Bolt, supra*. However, the fact that a business is being conducted on the property should be considered in determining the value of the real estate, if in fact the business enhances the property's value. *Id.* Thus, while it is permissible to utilize the capitalization of earning method, it is the earnings from the property that must be capitalized, not the earnings from the business. See, *J. Sackman, 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain*, § 19.01, p. 19-8 (under the income approach, an appraiser calculates the economic rent the property will command in the open market, deducts normal operating expenses to arrive at net operating income and then capitalizes the net operating income by a rate of return to arrive at an opinion of fair market value).

Gray, 311 S.C. at 153, 427 S.E.2d at 904 (emphasis added).

In a recent case decided by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the parties took positions similar to those at issue here. In *City of Charlotte v. Hurlahe*, 178 N.C.App. 144 (2006), the condemning City argued that it was improper for a jury to consider the landowner's loss of income generated through use of the property as a parking lot. The North Carolina Court of Appeals acknowledged that lost business profits are generally not compensable, however the Court took care to distinguish profits generated from the property itself as opposed to profits generated from a business operated on the property.

Plaintiff correctly states that "[l]oss of profits are not elements of recoverable damages in an award for a taking under the power of eminent domain." *Dept. of Trans. v. Byrum*, 82 N.C.App. 96, 99, 345 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1986) (citation omitted). Thus, for example, if identical adjoining stores were taken in the condemnation of a shopping center, the owners of these two stores should be entitled to the same amount in damages, even if one owner ran a profitable fine jewelry business, while the other operated a failing shoe repair shop.

² Overruled by, *Hardin v. South Carolina Dep't of Transp.*, 371 S.C. 598, 607-08, 641 S.E.2d 437, 442-44 (2007), in its holding that the closing of an abutting road to a property constitutes some degree of compensable taking, but not on any valuation issue.

...
However, "rental income ... has long been an accepted consideration in arriving at fair market value of the property at the time of the taking." *Byrum*, 82 N.C.App. at 100, 345 S.E.2d at 419 (distinguishing the income from rental of campground spaces from the profits of a restaurant and game room located in the campground). Thus, "[w]hen rental property is condemned the owner may not recover for lost rents, but rental value of property is competent upon the question of the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking." *Kirkman v. Highway Commission*, 257 N.C. 428, 432, 126 S.E.2d 107, 110 (1962) (citation omitted).

City of Charlotte v. Hurlahe, 178 N.C. App. 144, 149-50, 631 S.E.2d 28, 31-32 (2006).

Jurisprudence from other jurisdictions is in accord with the view that rental income must be factored into the value of real property taken by power of eminent domain. *See, e.g., Lamar Advantage Holding Co., Inc. v. Arkansas State Highway Com'n*, 369 Ark. 295, 253 S.W.3d 914 (2007) (quoting *North Little Rock Urban Renewal Agency v. Van Bibber*, 252 Ark. 1248, 483 S.W.2d 223 (1972) ("Capitalization of income is a recognized method of arriving at the fair market value of real estate used to produce rental income, in determining just compensation in eminent domain cases. We have long held evidence of rental value to be admissible as a factor to be considered in determining just compensation."); *People v. Dunn*, 46 Cal.2d 639, 297 P.2d 964 (1956) ("it is the general rule that income from property in the way of rents is a proper element to be considered in arriving at the measure of compensation to be paid for the taking of property."); *Gray & Gregory v. GTE South Inc.*, 261 Va. 67, 540 S.E.2d 498 (2001) ("Evidence of the amount of rental income generated by real property subject to a taking is a relevant factor that the commissioners are entitled to consider when establishing the fair market value of that property.")

The *Gray* decision directly resolves the issue before me, and I am bound to follow the decisions of the South Carolina Court of Appeals. The *Gray* decision establishes that South Carolina adheres to the generally accepted view that rental income from a lease should be

considered in determining fair market value, and thus, just compensation to a landowner, in an eminent domain proceeding. The Landowner in this case has lost the income generated by the Property, the sole purpose for which the Landowner acquired it. The Landowner had no interest in the convenience store business, and the rental payments were not contingent upon any amount of income generated by the store. Therefore, because the income to the Landowner derived from the Property itself, rather than any business, the going concern exception is inapplicable, and the Lease must factor heavily in the just compensation analysis.

b. The Evidence Does Not Support the Condemnor's Position that the Lease Is a Related-Party Sham

The second argument advanced by the Condemnor urging that this Court ignore the Lease generating income for the Property as an indicator of value is an alleged "incestuous" relationship between the Landowner and the tenant, Worsley Operating Corporation. The Condemnor asserts that the Lease is a sham, or alternatively, that the Lease is only a mortgage in disguise. I find that neither contention has merit.

First, as discussed extensively above, I find no evidence of any common ownership between the Landowner and the tenant Worsley Operating Corporation. A visual depiction of the transaction and chain of title, attached as Appendix A to this Final Order and Judgment, makes this point clear. Second, I conclude that the Lease is not a mortgage. As elicited during the cross-examination of Mr. Crider, at the end of the term of a mortgage, title remains in the name of the party in possession, the owner, and the mortgagee's interest in the property vanishes. Tr. at p. 188, l. 3 – 21. At the end of the term of a lease, it is the party in possession whose property rights are extinguished, and the landlord retains the remainder interest, to use or to lease again as it sees fit. *Id.*

Finally, even if the Lease is a product of a sale-leaseback arrangement, such a finding does not render the Lease immaterial in determining the fair market value of the Property. Rather, it is a factor to be considered in determining whether or not the rent is a fair market rent. *See, e.g.*, Condemnor Exhibit No. 14 at p. 102 (“The subject’s rental history is analyzed and the rental data of six similar convenience stores in South Carolina is analyzed to establish the relation of contract rent to market rent . . . The value of the leased fee state is \$924,000.”) Mr. Graydon opined that the rent paid under the Lease is above-market, but he testified that he considered this factor, and the sale-leaseback arrangement, in making a final determination of the value of the Leased Fee Estate in the amount of \$924,000. Therefore, even accepting the Condemnor’s premise as valid, and discounting the value of the income stream accordingly, the Condemnor’s own expert appraiser has presented evidence that the value of the Lease to the Landowner is no less than \$924,000. This income stream is precisely what the Landowner has lost as a result of the condemnation.

Therefore, this Court holds that the Lease must be considered in the valuation of the Property.

FINAL DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION

Having determined that the Lease must be considered, I find that the only opinions of the value of the Property in evidence which incorporate the income generated from the Lease are as follows:

1. The Landowner’s testimony and opinion of value in the amount of \$1,150,000, the March 27, 2008 purchase price.
2. Mr. Hartnett’s testimony and opinion of value in the amount of \$900,000.

3. Mr. Graydon's testimony and opinion of value of the Leased Fee Estate in the amount of \$924,000.00.

The Condemnor did not challenge Mr. Hartnett's calculations under the income capitalization approach. In fact, the Condemnor's own expert, David Graydon, used an income capitalization approach to value the Leased Fee Estate at \$924,000. Further, Mr. Graydon testified that his \$924,000 valuation took into account that the lease arrangement appeared to be a sale-leaseback and that the rent appeared to be above-market to Graydon. Tr. At p. 216, 1.2 – p. 217, 1.14. The Condemnor presented no evidence of the fair market value of the Property if the income from the Lease is to be included in the valuation. The Condemnor's proffered opinions of value, \$201,000 and \$351,000, reflect only the raw land, without factoring in the existence of the business on the Property, much less the valuable Lease and the rental income it produced.

Having carefully considered all of the evidence, I find that the fair market value of the Property, and the amount of just compensation due to the Landowner, is \$900,000.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT

The Condemnor shall pay to the Landowner an amount of \$900,000, comprising the total amount of just compensation less the drawdown of \$201,000 paid to the Landowner previously; and

The Condemnor shall pay interest on the award of just compensation, less the drawdown, at a rate of eight percent per year from December 1, 2009 in accordance with SC Code § 28-2-420; and

An application for attorneys' fees may be made by either party within fifteen days of the entry of this Final Judgment and Order in accordance with SC Code § 28-2-510;

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

Robert E. Watson
The Honorable Robert E. Watson

5/15, 2012

Mandeville, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF BERKELEY

Road/Route U.S. Route 71A
File 8.165B
Item
Project STP-UR08(007)
PCN 32502

South Carolina Department of Transportation,

Condemnor,

vs.

RI CS5, LLC,

Landowner(s).

and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North
Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
County Treasurer's Office, Lien Holder,

Other Condemnee(s).


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

**LANDOWNER'S APPLICATION FOR
AWARD OF REASONABLE
LITIGATION EXPENSES**

Having prevailed in the above-captioned action, the Landowner, RI CS5, LLC petitions the Court, pursuant to S.C. Code § 28-2-510, for an award of reasonable litigation expenses, including attorneys' fees and other costs of litigation expended in the course of the above-captioned action. The Landowner is entitled to such an award based on its recovery of \$900,000 as just compensation for its property. Such amount is closer to the highest valuation of the property that was attested to at trial on behalf of the Landowner (\$1,150,000) than it is to the highest valuation of the property that was attested to at trial on behalf of the Condemnor (\$351,000). The Landowner incurred \$114,068.82 in attorneys' fees and costs, including expert witness fees, in the prosecution of this action and seeks recovery of same. This Application is

based on the record of the proceeding, the applicable law, and the itemized statements of litigation expenses including fees and costs attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, and C to the accompanying Affidavit of Jeffrey S. Tibbals, which are incorporated herein. This Application is made within fifteen (15) days after entry of the Final Order and Judgment on May 17, 2012, in accordance with S.C. Code § 28-2-510.



Paul G. Dominick, Esquire
Jeffrey S. Tibbals, Esquire
NEXSEN PRUET, LLC
205 King Street, Suite 400 (29401)
PO Box 486
Charleston, South Carolina (29402)
843-577-9440

ATTORNEYS FOR LANDOWNER RI CS5, LLC

June 1, 2012
Charleston, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF BERKELEY

Road/Route U.S. Route 71A
File 8.165B
Item
Project STP-UR08(007)
PCN 32502

South Carolina Department of Transportation,

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Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
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Other Condemnee(s).

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

**AFFIDAVIT OF
JEFFREY S. TIBBALS**

PERSONALLY APPEARED before me, Jeffrey S. Tibbals, who being first duly sworn does state as follows:

1. I am one of the attorneys for the Landowner, RI CS5, LLC and its sole member Realty Income Corporation ("Landowner"), in the above-captioned action practicing with the firm of Nexsen Pruet, LLC ("Nexsen Pruet").

2. Landowner retained Nexsen Pruet as counsel with respect to the condemnation of the subject property on or around April 28, 2009.

3. Undersigned counsel is informed and believes that this Court must consider six factors in determining what constitutes reasonable attorneys' fees: (i) the nature, extent and difficulty of services rendered; (ii) the time and labor necessarily devoted to the case; (iii) the professional standing of counsel; (iv) the contingency of compensation; (v) the fee customarily charged in the locality of similar legal services; and (vi) the beneficial results obtained.

4. With respect to the first factor, the nature, extent and difficulty of services rendered, this case involved a relatively novel issue of law in South Carolina jurisprudence regarding the effect of a lease upon real property in the determination of just compensation. The

case involved complex transactions and difficult valuation issues, requiring an analysis far beyond a simple sales comparison approach to determine market value. The case was vigorously contested by able and esteemed counsel on behalf of Condemnor. Condemnor relied upon two separate appraisers as expert witnesses, with two separate appraisals. The case was also document intensive with Landowner producing over 1400 pages of documents. The amount in dispute was significant, totaling several hundred thousand dollars.

5. With respect to the time and labor necessarily devoted to the case, Landowner's lawyers and paralegals spent three hundred twenty-nine hours on the matter over a time period of approximately three years. The time spent and tasks performed were necessary and appropriate for the complexity of issues involved and the size of the amount in dispute.

6. With respect to the third factor, co-lead counsel Paul A. Dominick and Jeffrey S. Tibbals enjoy a high professional standing, are well respected within the South Carolina Bar, have 33 and 13 years of experience, respectively, are well-versed in real estate matters, and practice with a well-established and distinguished law firm.

7. The fourth factor is not an issue, because the compensation was not contingent, but rather, earned, billed and collected on an hourly basis.

8. Regarding the fifth factor, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, undersigned counsel is informed and believes that many attorneys in the area represent landowners in condemnation cases on a contingency fee basis, with the fee measured as a percentage of the difference between the amount originally offered by the condemnor and the amount ultimately received as just compensation. Had Nexsen Pruet negotiated a contingency fee arrangement in this case, the fee would have been approximately \$233,000, representing one-third of the difference between \$900,000 and \$201,000. Nexsen Pruet's fees are less than half of this customary fee. Additionally, the hourly rates charged by Nexsen Pruet's attorneys and staff are consistent with the rates charged by attorneys in the Tri-County area for similar services.

9. With respect to the sixth and final factor, Nexsen Pruet obtained beneficial results for the Landowner in this case. Although the Landowner did not receive the full value to which it believed it was entitled, the award of \$900,000 significantly exceeds the offer of \$201,000 tendered by Condemnor prior to Nexsen Pruet's involvement.

10. I have personal knowledge of and access to the records kept by Nexsen Pruet regarding the fees and expenses incurred on behalf of the Landowner in the above captioned condemnation action.

11. As of May 18, 2012 attorneys' fees in the total sum of one hundred two thousand nineteen and 50/100 (\$102,019.50) Dollars have been charged to Landowner per the detailed statements attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein. Landowner has actually paid \$101,451.90, with the remainder only recently or not yet billed.

12. As of May 18, 2012 other litigation expenditures in the total sum of twelve thousand forty-nine and 32/100 (\$12,049.32) dollars have been charged to and paid by Landowner as indicated in Exhibit "B" and Exhibit "C" hereto. The bulk of these expenses are expert fees of Thomas F. Hartnett, totaling \$7,855.00 for an appraisal and time spent preparing

for and providing testimony at the trial of this matter. As shown in Exhibit "C", a \$5,200.00 invoice from Mr. Hartnett was paid directly by Landowner, and a second invoice in the amount of \$2,655.00 was paid by Nexsen Pruet and charged to and paid by Landowner. The remainder of the costs, shown in Exhibit "B", were paid by Nexsen Pruet as advanced expenses, then charged to and paid by Landowner.

13. For the reasons set forth in this Affidavit, the sums set forth above, as detailed in Exhibit "A," are reasonable litigation expenses to which Landowner is entitled pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510 (1976 as amended).


14. The reasonable litigation expenses in this matter have been computed as of May 18, 2012, and total \$114,068.82.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.



Jeffrey S. Tibbals

SWORN TO and subscribed before me
this 1st day of June, 2012.



NOTARY PUBLIC FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
My Commission Expires: 02-24-13

EXHIBIT "A"

<u>Date</u>	<u>Initials</u>	<u>Name / Invoice Number</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Amount</u>
4/20/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW DOCUMENTS.	0.7	252.00
5/28/2009		Invoice=53309207		0.7	252.00
4/21/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW DOCUMENTS; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH	4.1	1,476.00
5/28/2009		Invoice=53309207	MS. KING CONCERNING FACTS AND STRATEGY.	4.1	1,476.00
4/24/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON CONDEMNATION ISSUES.	1	360.00
5/28/2009		Invoice=53309207		1	360.00
4/28/2009	486	SARA JOYNER	PREPARATION OF AFFIDAVIT OF NAME CHANGE FOR	0.4	68.00
5/28/2009		Invoice=53309207	PAUL DOMINICK.	0.4	68.00
4/30/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON MERGER FILING.	0.6	216.00
5/28/2009		Invoice=53309207		0.6	216.00
5/8/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	UPDATE CLIENT ON STATUS; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE	0.7	252.00
5/28/2009		Invoice=53309207	WITH MR. HARTNETT CONCERNING APPRAISAL.	0.7	252.00
5/12/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT APPRAISER.	0.3	108.00
5/28/2009		Invoice=53309207		0.3	108.00
5/13/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	UPDATE TO CLIENT.	0.3	108.00
5/28/2009		Invoice=53309207		0.3	108.00
6/18/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	UPDATE STATUS; CONTACT WITH RIGHT OF WAY	0.6	216.00
7/29/2009		Invoice=53318933	AGENT.	0.6	216.00
6/23/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CALL WITH RIGHT-OF-WAY AGENT	0.3	108.00
7/29/2009		Invoice=53318933	CONCERNING APPRAISAL AND STATUS.	0.3	108.00
6/26/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CALL WITH MR. HARTNETT CONCERNING	0.3	108.00
7/29/2009		Invoice=53318933	APPRAISAL.	0.3	108.00
6/30/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW APPRAISAL; COMMUNICATIONS WITH CLIENT	1.2	432.00
7/29/2009		Invoice=53318933	CONCERNING THE SAME.	1.2	432.00
7/1/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW APPRAISALS AND PREPARE FOR CONFERENCE	1.3	468.00
7/29/2009		Invoice=53318933	CALL; CONFERENCE CALL WITH CLIENT.	1.3	468.00
7/16/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW NEW OFFER; FORWARD TO CLIENT;	0.9	324.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
7/29/2009		Invoice=53318933	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MR. HARTNETT CONCERNING APPRAISAL.	0.9	324.00
7/27/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW LEASE AND CORRESPONDENCE FROM MR. WESTBURY.	0.7	252.00
8/28/2009		Invoice=53323436		0.7	252.00
7/28/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CALLS TO MR. WESTBURY.	0.3	108.00
8/28/2009		Invoice=53323436		0.3	108.00
7/30/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON VALUATION ISSUES; EXCHANGE MESSAGES WITH MR. WESTBURY CONCERNING WORSLEY RELOCATION EXPENSES.	0.7	252.00
8/28/2009		Invoice=53323436		0.7	252.00
8/7/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MS. ONATE CONCERNING STATUS; REVIEW DOCUMENTS.	0.8	288.00
8/28/2009		Invoice=53323436		0.8	288.00
8/18/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. WESTBURY CONCERNING MEETING.	0.4	144.00
8/28/2009		Invoice=53323436		0.4	144.00
9/3/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW CORRESPONDENCE FROM MR. WESTBURY; RESPOND TO THE SAME.	0.6	216.00
9/25/2009		Invoice=53328033		0.6	216.00
9/11/2009	451	KIMBERLY TAYLOR	MEETING WITH ATTORNEY DOMINICK RE INVESTIGATION TO BE PERFORMED WITH REGARD TO KNOWLEDGE OF CONDEMNATION BY MR. WORSLEY.	0.3	46.50
9/25/2009		Invoice=53328033		0.3	46.50
9/11/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE WITH MS. TAYLOR CONCERNING SCDOT TIMELINE.	0.3	108.00
9/25/2009		Invoice=53328033		0.3	108.00
9/14/2009	451	KIMBERLY TAYLOR	ANALYZE FILE RE FAMILIARITY WITH THE FACTS; PREPARE TIMELINE OF EVENTS; CORRESPONDENCE TO SUSIE ONATE RE PERTINENT DATES.	2.3	356.50
9/25/2009		Invoice=53328033		2.3	356.50
9/15/2009	451	KIMBERLY TAYLOR	NUMEROUS TELEPHONE CALLS TO SC DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND RESEARCH ONLINE RE OBTAINING LIST OF OFFICERS FILED WITH ANNUAL REPORT OF WF INTERMEDIATE REAL ESTATE TO SEE IF ANY ONE OF THEM ATTENDED PUBLIC INFORMATION MEETING; RESEARCH INTERNET RE ANY INFORMATION ON WF INTERMEDIATE REAL ESTATE TRYING TO FIND LIST	2.8	434.00
9/25/2009		Invoice=53328033		2.8	434.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
			OF EMPLOYEES; RESEARCH POST AND COURIER AND BERKELEY INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS RE PUBLIC NOTICES POSTED BY SCDOT RE PUBLIC INFORMATION MEETING; TELEPHONE CALL TO POST AND COURIER RE SAME; SEVERAL E-MAILS TO AND FROM SUSIE ONATE RE PERTINENT DATES AND DOCUMENTS SHE OBTAINED FROM SC DOT; RECEIPT AND REVIEW OF NUMEROUS DOCUMENTS SENT BY MS. ORNATE; FINALIZE TIMELINE.		
9/16/2009	451	KIMBERLY TAYLOR	MEMO TO ATTORNEY DOMINICK RE EVENTS LEADING UP TO FIRST CONTACT WITH MR. WORSLEY RE WIDENING HIGHWAY 17.	0.3	46.50
9/25/2009		Invoice=53328033		0.3	46.50
9/16/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON APPRAISAL ISSUES; WORK ON TIMELINE; E-MAILS TO SCDOT.	1	360.00
9/25/2009		Invoice=53328033		1	360.00
9/17/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE CALL WITH MS. KING AND MS. ONATE CONCERNING STATUS AND STRATEGY; REVIEW TIMELINE AND CONTACT SCDOT.	1.3	468.00
9/25/2009		Invoice=53328033		1.3	468.00
9/18/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	COMMUNICATIONS WITH SCDOT AND CLIENT.	0.6	216.00
9/25/2009		Invoice=53328033		0.6	216.00
9/23/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW CAP RATE INFORMATION AND PROPOSED COMPARABLES; CONFERENCE WITH MS. KING AND MS. ONATE CONCERNING STATUS AND STRATEGY.	0.8	288.00
10/29/2009		Invoice=53334132		0.8	288.00
9/28/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON DRAW DOWN.	0.3	108.00
10/29/2009		Invoice=53334132		0.3	108.00
9/30/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENT ISSUE; SET UP MEETING WITH SCDOT.	0.6	216.00
10/29/2009		Invoice=53334132		0.6	216.00
10/1/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON APPRAISAL ISSUES.	0.4	144.00
10/29/2009		Invoice=53334132		0.4	144.00
10/6/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	MEETING WITH MARK WESTBURY CONCERNING MOVING EXPENSES; REVIEW FILE MATERIALS RELATING TO ITEMS TO MOVE.	1.1	396.00
10/29/2009		Invoice=53334132		1.1	396.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
10/14/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT CONCERNING	0.8	288.00
10/29/2009		Invoice=53334132	APPRAISAL ISSUES; WORK ON VALUATION ISSUES.	0.8	288.00
10/19/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON APPRAISAL AND RELOCATION ISSUES.	0.7	252.00
11/24/2009		Invoice=53337740		0.7	252.00
10/28/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MS. KING CONCERNING	0.4	144.00
11/24/2009		Invoice=53337740	APPRAISAL AND STATUS; REVIEW APPRAISAL.	0.4	144.00
11/4/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON APPRAISAL ISSUES.	1.5	540.00
11/24/2009		Invoice=53337740		1.5	540.00
11/5/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW APPRAISAL; MEETING WITH MR. HARTNETT	1.5	540.00
11/24/2009		Invoice=53337740	TO DISCUSS THE SAME; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MS. KING AND MS. ONATE CONCERNING STATUS.	1.5	540.00
11/20/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CALL TO MR. HARTNETT; COMMUNICATE WITH CLIENT	0.4	144.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688	CONCERNING APPRAISAL.	0.4	144.00
11/23/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON CONDEMNATION DAMAGES ISSUES; CALL TO	0.7	252.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688	APPRAISER.	0.7	252.00
11/24/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON CONDEMNATION ISSUES; TELEPHONE	2.5	900.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688	CONFERENCE WITH WORSLEY REPRESENTATIVE; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH APPRAISER; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MS. ONATE.	2.5	900.00
11/25/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK WITH WORSLEY AND CLIENT ON RELOCATION	0.5	180.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688	ISSUES.	0.5	180.00
11/30/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON RELOCATION ISSUES.	0.5	180.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688		0.5	180.00
12/2/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.3	108.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688	CONCERNING STATUS AND ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE.	0.3	108.00
12/3/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW CORRESPONDENCE FROM OPPOSING COUNSEL.	0.3	108.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688		0.3	108.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
12/4/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON CONDEMNATION AND RELOCATION ISSUES.	1	360.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688		1	360.00
12/7/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MS. ONATE	1	360.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688	CONCERNING STATUS; REVIEW DOCUMENTS; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MR. WEST CONCERNING CHECK AND ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE.	1	360.00
12/10/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON RELOCATION ISSUES AND REISSUE OF	0.7	252.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688	CHECK.	0.7	252.00
12/15/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON RELOCATION ISSUES; TELEPHONE	0.8	288.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688	CONFERENCE WITH MS. ONATE CONCERNING THE SAME.	0.8	288.00
12/16/2009	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MR. WEST CONCERNING	1.2	432.00
12/30/2009		Invoice=53342688	RELOCATION EXPENSES; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MR. ONATE CONCERNING THE SAME; FAX INFORMATION TO MR. WEST.	1.2	432.00
1/4/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	E-MAILS TO MS. ONATE AND MARK WESTBURY.	0.4	148.00
1/22/2010		Invoice=53346396		0.4	148.00
1/5/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MR. WESTBURY	0.4	148.00
1/22/2010		Invoice=53346396	CONCERNING RELOCATION EXPENSES; E-MAIL TO CLIENT CONCERNING THE SAME.	0.4	148.00
1/6/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MS. ONATE	1.7	629.00
1/22/2010		Invoice=53346396	CONCERNING STATUS; CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL; DRAFT RESPONSE TO CONDEMNATION NOTICE; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH COUNSEL FOR WORSLEY.	1.7	629.00
1/13/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON RELOCATION ISSUES.	1	370.00
1/22/2010		Invoice=53346396		1	370.00
1/14/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON CONDEMNATION ISSUES.	1.5	555.00
1/22/2010		Invoice=53346396		1.5	555.00
1/15/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON RELOCATION ISSUES.	0.8	296.00
1/22/2010		Invoice=53346396		0.8	296.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
1/19/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW AND FORWARD E-MAIL TO MS. ONATE.	0.3	111.00
2/26/2010		Invoice=53352473		0.3	111.00
1/20/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON RELOCATION ISSUES.	0.5	185.00
2/26/2010		Invoice=53352473		0.5	185.00
1/29/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON INSURANCE ISSUE; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE	0.8	296.00
2/26/2010		Invoice=53352473	WITH MS. ONATE CONCERNING THE SAME; CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL; E-MAIL TO CLIENT; CALL FROM MR. WEST CONCERNING RELEASE OF CHECK; CONTACT CLIENT CONCERNING THE SAME.	0.8	296.00
3/5/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR NEW	0.5	185.00
5/28/2010		Invoice=53367597	APPRAISAL; COMMUNICATE WITH CLIENT CONCERNING THE SAME.	0.5	185.00
3/10/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON CONDEMNATION ISSUES.	0.4	148.00
5/28/2010		Invoice=53367597		0.4	148.00
3/12/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON ISSUES RELATING TO APPROVAL TO TAKE	0.5	185.00
5/28/2010		Invoice=53367597	DOWN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDS.	0.5	185.00
4/14/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	E-MAIL TO MARK WESTBURY CONCERNING PAYMENT	0.3	111.00
5/28/2010		Invoice=53367597	FOR THE TANKS.	0.3	111.00
4/19/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MR. WEST CONCERNING	0.7	259.00
5/28/2010		Invoice=53367597	CHECK; CONFERENCE CALL WITH CLIENTS CONCERNING STATUS.	0.7	259.00
4/21/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	DRAFT CORRESPONDENCE TO CLIENT CONCERNING	1	370.00
5/28/2010		Invoice=53367597	CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE CASE; ANSWER E-MAIL QUESTIONS.	1	370.00
4/22/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON LETTER FOR CLIENT; E-MAILS CONCERNING	1	370.00
5/28/2010		Invoice=53367597	THE SAME.	1	370.00
4/26/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CALL TO MR. PHINNEY CONCERNING DRAWDOWN.	0.2	74.00
5/28/2010		Invoice=53367597		0.2	74.00
5/7/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW DISCOVERY; OBTAIN EXTENSION; FORWARD	0.7	266.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
5/28/2010		Invoice=53367597	DISCOVERY TO MS. ONATE.	0.7	259.00
6/11/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON ISSUE CONCERNING COMPENSATION FOR	0.3	114.00
9/9/2010		Invoice=53383187	TANKS.	0.3	114.00
7/9/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON TANK TRANSFER ISSUES; E-MAILS TO DOT	0.7	266.00
9/9/2010		Invoice=53383187	AND CLIENT.	0.7	266.00
7/30/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING COMPENSATION FOR	0.4	152.00
9/9/2010		Invoice=53383187	UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS.	0.4	152.00
9/3/2010	483	NEYLE JERVEY	RECEIVE/REVIEW MEMO FROM PAUL DOMINICK;	0.4	60.00
10/29/2010		Invoice=53390892	RESEARCH DEED ON BERKELEY COUNTY WEB-SITE AND FORWARD COPY TO PAUL DOMINICK.	0.4	60.00
9/7/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MR. WEST CONCERNING	0.5	190.00
10/29/2010		Invoice=53390892	VALUATION AND MEDIATION ISSUES.	0.5	190.00
10/4/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW AND FORWARD INFORMATION TO MR. WEST.	0.3	114.00
10/29/2010		Invoice=53390892		0.3	114.00
10/5/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.8	304.00
10/29/2010		Invoice=53390892	CONCERNING FINANCIAL INFORMATION; FORWARD LEASE AND APPRAISALS TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	0.8	304.00
10/18/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW INFORMATION CONCERNING MEDIATION;	0.6	228.00
10/29/2010		Invoice=53390892	REVIEW SALE OF NEARBY PROPERTY.	0.6	228.00
10/27/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON MEDIATION ISSUES.	0.7	266.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470		0.7	266.00
10/28/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON MEDIATION AND TAX ISSUES.	1.5	570.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	CORRESPONDENCE TO MEDIATOR; DISCUSSIONS WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL.	1.5	570.00
11/1/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE CALL WITH MS. KING AND MS. ONATE	1.5	570.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	CONCERNING MEDICATION; E-MAIL TO MR. PAYNE CONCERNING COMPARABLE SALE; REVIEW MATERIALS FOR MEDIATION.	1.5	570.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
11/5/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW NEW APPRAISAL; COMMUNICATIONS WITH	2.5	950.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	CLIENTS CONCERNING THE SAME; PREPARE FOR MEDIATION.	2.5	950.00
11/8/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	PREPARE FOR AND ATTEND MEDIATION; E-MAIL TO	6	2,280.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	CLIENT CONCERNING STATUS.	6	2,280.00
11/9/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MS. KING CONCERNING	1.5	570.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	STATUS AND STRATEGY; REVIEW CASE LAW ON LEASE VALUATIONS; EMAIL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL AND MEDIATOR CONCERNING CASE LAW AND STATUS.	1.5	570.00
12/8/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONFERENCE WITH PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING	0.5	140.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	OVERVIEW OF CONDEMNATION MATTER.	0.5	155.00
12/8/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW PAUL DOMINICK ANALYSIS OF INCOME/CAP	0.6	168.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	RATE VALUATION AND REVIEW AND CONSIDER BOLT AND GRAY CASE OPINIONS.	0.6	186.00
12/8/2010	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING	0.6	228.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	DISCOVERY AND TRIAL PREPARATION; E-MAIL TO MS. ONATE CONCERNING THE SAME. DEFAULT	0.6	228.00
12/9/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER ENTIRE FILE INCLUDING	3.4	952.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	CORRESPONDENCE, LEASE, DOT AND HARTNETT APPRAISALS, PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY REQUESTS FROM PLAINTIFF CONDEMNOR.	3.4	1,054.00
12/9/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR	1.3	364.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.	1.3	403.00
12/9/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	28.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REGARDING DISCOVERY ISSUES.	0.1	31.00
12/9/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.2	56.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	DISCOVERY ISSUES, SCHEDULING.	0.2	62.00
12/10/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS TO	2.1	588.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	INTERROGATORIES.	2.1	651.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
12/10/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO REQUESTS	0.7	196.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	FOR PRODUCTION.	0.7	217.00
12/10/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND INTERROGATORIES.	0.4	112.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470		0.4	124.00
12/10/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.5	140.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REGARDING RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY REQUESTS.	0.5	155.00
12/10/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER DISCOVERY STRATEGY, WITNESSES AND	0.5	140.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	DEPOSITIONS.	0.5	155.00
12/10/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION.	0.3	84.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470		0.3	93.00
12/10/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO JOHN WEST SERVING DISCOVERY	0.2	56.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REQUESTS.	0.2	62.00
12/10/2010	413	DENISE LECLERC	PARTICIPATE IN CONFERENCE CALL WITH ATTORNEY	0.8	128.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	TIBBALS AND SUSIE ONATE REGARDING DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO OPPOSING COUNSEL AND ITEMS NEEDED FOR DOCUMENT PRODUCTION; MEET AND BRIEFLY ADDRESS CASE WITH ATTORNEY TIBBALS PRIOR TO CONFERENCE CALL.	0.8	136.00
12/16/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW REVISED ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES	0.3	84.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	FROM SUSIE ONATE.	0.3	93.00
12/17/2010	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW E-MAIL FROM COUNSEL REGARDING	0.1	16.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	0.1	17.00
12/17/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE0.1		28.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REGARDING REVISION TO INTERROGATORIES	0.1	31.00
12/17/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW REVISED INTERROGATORY ANSWER	0.3	84.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470		0.3	93.00
12/21/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL WITH LAURA KING, SUSIE ONATE	0.2	62.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REGARDING DISCOVERY ISSUES	0.2	62.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
12/21/2010	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND INTERROGATORY ANSWERS	0.3	93.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470		0.3	93.00
1/4/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	IDENTIFY, OBTAIN AND PREPARE DISCOVERY	1.9	323.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL AND E-MAILS TO COUNSEL REGARDING SAME.	1.9	323.00
1/5/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	WORK ON ELECTRONICALLY INDEXING AND	4.8	816.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	4.8	816.00
1/6/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW AND RESPOND TO E-MAIL WITH COUNSEL	0.1	17.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REGARDING STATUS OF DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	0.1	17.00
1/6/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	BRIEFLY ADDRESS STATUS OF CLIENT DOCUMENTS	0.2	34.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	FOR PRODUCTION WITH ATTORNEY TIBBALS.	0.2	34.00
1/6/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	CONTINUE TO WORK ON CLIENT DISCOVERY	2.2	374.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL INCLUDING REDACTING AND IDENTIFY PRIVILEGE DOCUMENTS.	2.2	374.00
1/6/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	BEGIN INITIAL REVIEW OF PRODUCTION DOCUMENTS;	4.2	1,302.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	CONSIDER PRIVILEGE ISSUES.	4.2	1,302.00
1/6/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REGARDING STATUS OF DOCUMENT REVIEW.	0.1	31.00
1/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONTINUE REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS TO BE PRODUCED	2.7	837.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	AND CONSIDER PRIVILEGE ISSUES	2.7	837.00
1/10/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REGARDING STATUS OF DOCUMENTS.	0.1	31.00
1/12/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	FURTHER REVISE AND AMEND INTERROGATORY	0.7	217.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	RESPONSES.	0.7	217.00
1/12/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW LIST OF PRIVILEGE ISSUES/DOCUMENT	0.4	124.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	QUESTIONS.	0.4	124.00
1/12/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	CONTINUE TO IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS RECEIVED IN	2.2	374.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	PRODUCTION FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL AND WORK ON PRIVILEGE LOG OF DOCUMENTS.	2.2	374.00
1/13/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	CONTINUE TO ELECTRONICALLY PREPARE AND INDEX	1.7	289.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	1.7	289.00
1/13/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW AND RESPOND TO E-MAILS WITH COUNSEL	0.2	34.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING STATUS OF DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	0.2	34.00
1/13/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.2	62.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REGARDING DOCUMENT PRODUCTION ISSUES, BEN FOX DOCUMENTS.	0.2	62.00
1/14/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM SUSIE ONATE	0.3	93.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	REGARDING BEN FOX DOCUMENTS.	0.3	93.00
1/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH LAURA KING, SUSIE	1.2	372.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	ONATE REGARDING DISCOVERY AND PRIVILEGE ISSUES.	1.2	372.00
1/18/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	OBTAIN AND PREPARE SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS	0.7	119.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	PRODUCED BY CLIENT FOR FUTURE DISCOVERY PRODUCTION AND IN PREPARATION FOR CONFERENCE CALL WITH CLIENT.	0.7	119.00
1/18/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	CONFERENCE CALL WITH JEFF TIBBALS, LAURA KING	1.5	255.00
1/31/2011		Invoice=53404470	AND SUSIE ONATE REGARDING DISCOVERY DOCUMENT PRODUCTION AND PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS.	1.5	255.00
1/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER WORSLEY OFFERING MEMO;	0.9	279.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	CONSIDER PRIVILEGE/CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES.	0.9	279.00
1/20/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	CONTINUE TO IDENTIFY AND PREPARE DISCOVERY	0.9	153.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	DOCUMENTS FOR DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	0.9	153.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
1/24/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	CONTINUE TO IDENTIFY DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS FOR	1.2	204.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	1.2	204.00
1/25/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.1	31.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	DISCOVERY ISSUES.	0.1	31.00
1/25/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH LAURA KING	0.1	31.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING STATUS.	0.1	31.00
1/26/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	DRAFT CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER AND CONTINUE TO	1.6	272.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	PREPARE CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION.	1.6	272.00
2/2/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM COUNSEL	0.2	34.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING STATUS OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION.	0.2	34.00
2/2/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	CONTINUE TO WORK ON IDENTIFYING DISCOVERY	5.4	918.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS AND REDACTION THEREOF; CONFIRMING PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS AND FINALIZING PRIVILEGE LOG; FINALIZING RI CSS'S ANSWERS TO SCOT'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO LANDOWNER AND RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION; CONTINUE TO ELECTRONICALLY INDEX SAME FOR PRODUCTION THEREOF.	5.4	918.00
2/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING SCHEDULING ORDER, CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER.	0.2	62.00
2/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING OFFERING MEMORANDUM.	0.1	31.00
2/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL TO JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.1	31.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	UPCOMING STATUS CONFERENCE, SCHEDULING ORDER.	0.1	31.00
2/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT CONSENT AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER.	0.4	124.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578		0.4	124.00

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Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
2/3/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	CONTINUE AND FINISH WORKING ON IDENTIFYING	5.6	952.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS AND REDACTION THEREOF; CONFIRMING. PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS AND FINALIZING PRIVILEGE LOG; FINALIZING RI CSS'S ANSWERS TO SCDOT'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO LANDOWNER AND RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION; FINALIZE CONFIDENTIAL LOG FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL; CONTINUE AND FINISH ELECTRONICALLY INDEXING SAME FOR PRODUCTION THEREOF.	5.6	952.00
2/3/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING SCHEDULING ORDER.	0.2	62.00
2/3/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.1	31.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	STATUS.	0.1	31.00
2/4/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM COUNSEL	0.1	17.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING DISCOVERY RESPONSES FOR SERVICE ON SCDOT.	0.1	17.00
2/4/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING CONSENT AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER.	0.1	31.00
2/4/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	FINAL REVIEW AND REVISIONS TO ANSWERS TO	0.8	248.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	INTERROGATORIES AND RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION.	0.8	248.00
2/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JEFF PAYNE	0.1	31.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING CONSENT ORDERS.	0.1	31.00
2/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JEFF PAYNE, JOHN	0.1	31.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	WEST REGARDING CONSENT ORDERS.	0.1	31.00
2/8/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM COUNSEL	0.1	17.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING PROPOSED SCHEDULING ORDER AND CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER.	0.1	17.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
2/10/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM COUNSEL	0.1	17.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	REGARDING STATUS OF CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER SUBMITTED TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	0.1	17.00
2/10/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	ELECTRONICALLY PREPARE CD OF CONFIDENTIAL	0.2	34.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	DOCUMENTS FOR PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	0.2	34.00
2/11/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO JUDGE HARRINGTON REGARDING	0.1	31.00
3/14/2011		Invoice=53412578	CONSENT SCHEDULING ORDER.	0.1	31.00
2/22/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	VARIOUS DISCOVERY ISSUES, REFERENCE TO MASTER.	0.2	62.00
2/22/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER TRIAL STRATEGY.	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697		0.2	62.00
2/23/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REGARDING CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER.	0.1	31.00
2/23/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT E-MAIL MEMO TO LAURA KING REGARDING	0.4	124.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	BENCH TRIAL, ORDER OF REFERENCE, JUDGE WATSON.	0.4	124.00
2/23/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON CASE STRATEGY; REVIEW MEMO ON	0.6	240.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REFERENCE TO THE MASTER IN EQUITY.	0.6	240.00
2/24/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REGARDING REFERENCE TO MASTER.	0.1	31.00
2/24/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REGARDING REFERENCE TO MASTER.	0.2	62.00
2/25/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER TRIAL STRATEGY, DISCOVERY,	0.6	186.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	DEPOSITIONS.	0.6	186.00
3/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REGARDING CONSENT ORDER OF REFERENCE.	0.1	31.00
3/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JEFF PAYNE	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REGARDING CONSENT ORDER OF REFERENCE.	0.2	62.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
3/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REGARDING CONSENT ORDER OF REFERENCE.	0.2	62.00
3/3/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER OF REFERENCE.	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697		0.2	62.00
3/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER ORDER OF REFERENCE/DIRECT APPEAL TO	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT.	0.2	62.00
3/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.5	155.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REGARDING MASTER APPEALS ISSUES; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING APPEALS ISSUES; CONSIDER STRATEGY.	0.5	155.00
3/9/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	FURTHER CONSIDER DIRECT APPEAL ISSUE; CONDUCT	1.6	496.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	LEGAL RESEARCH REGARDING SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION; E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST; REVISE AND AMEND CONSENT ORDER OF REFERENCE.	1.6	496.00
3/9/2011	127	STEPHEN GROVES	READ AND REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM	0.2	76.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	ATTORNEY TIBBALS RE: CONCERNS WITH OPPOSITION'S REQUEST FOR ANY APPEAL FROM MASTER-IN-EQUITY BE DIRECTLY TO SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT	0.2	76.00
3/9/2011	127	STEPHEN GROVES	RESEARCHING APPELLATE ISSUES VIS-A-VIS	0.7	266.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REQUEST FOR ANY APPEAL FROM MASTER-IN-EQUITY BE DIRECTLY TO SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT	0.7	266.00
3/9/2011	127	STEPHEN GROVES	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE TO ATTORNEY TIBBALS RE:	0.7	266.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	CONFIRMATION THAT ANY APPEAL FROM MASTER-IN-EQUITY WILL NORMALLY BE DIRECTLY TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS INSTEAD OF TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT	0.7	266.00
3/10/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST, JEFF	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	PAYNE REGARDING CONSENT ORDER OF REFERENCE.	0.1	31.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
3/10/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	PREPARE MOTION COVER SHEET AND DRAFT LETTER	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	TO JUDGE HARRINGTON REGARDING CONSENT CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER	0.2	62.00
3/11/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO JOHN WEST ENCLOSING SIGNED	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	CONSENT ORDER OF REFERENCE.	0.1	31.00
3/17/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	BRIEFLY ADDRESS STATUS OF CASE WITH ATTORNEY	0.1	17.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	TIBBALS.	0.1	17.00
3/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL TO JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	SCHEDULING ORDER ISSUES.	0.1	31.00
3/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL TO JOHN WEST REGARDING STATUS,	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	SCHEDULING ORDER.	0.1	31.00
3/22/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO CLERK OF COURT FILING CONSENT	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER.	0.1	31.00
3/22/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW EXECUTED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER.	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697		0.1	31.00
3/24/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO JUDGE HARRINGTON REGARDING	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	CONSENT ORDER CONFIDENTIALITY,.	0.2	62.00
3/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT STATUS REPORT TO SUSIE ONATE.	0.5	155.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697		0.5	155.00
3/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW CONSENT ORDER OF REFERENCE AND LETTER	0.2	62.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	FROM JOHN WEST.	0.2	62.00
3/29/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	REGARDING MIKE PFEIFFER TRIAL AVAILABLE SCHEDULE.	0.1	31.00
3/29/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW FILED CONSENT CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER.	0.1	31.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697		0.1	31.00
4/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	WORK ON DISCOVERY PLANNING, STRATEGY	0.5	155.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697		0.5	155.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
4/12/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	BRIEFLY DISCUSS CASE ISSUES AND DOCUMENTS	0.2	34.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	PRODUCTION WITH ATTORNEY TIBBALS.	0.2	34.00
4/12/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	CHECK ON STATUS OF CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT	0.3	51.00
5/4/2011		Invoice=53419697	PRODUCTION TO OPPOSING COUNSEL AND CONFIRM ALL CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS AND LOG PRODUCED IN THEIR ENTIRETY.	0.3	51.00
4/26/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	REGARDING STATUS.	0.1	31.00
4/26/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	WORK ON DISCOVERY ISSUES AND STATUS	0.2	62.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	CONFERENCE WITH JUDGE WATSON.	0.2	62.00
4/26/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST, AMANDA	0.2	62.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	WILLIAMSON REGARDING STATUS CONFERENCE.	0.2	62.00
4/26/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	TWO TELEPHONE CALLS WITH JOHN WEST, ESQUIRE	0.2	34.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	REGARDING STATUS OF PROPOSED STATUS CONFERENCE WITH JUDGE WATSON AND OVERDUE DISCOVERY RESPONSES.	0.2	34.00
4/26/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	TWO TELEPHONE CALLS WITH AMANDA AT JUDGE	0.2	34.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	WATSON'S OFFICE REGARDING PROPOSED DATES FOR STATUS CONFERENCE AND FINAL ARRANGEMENTS CONFIRMING SAME.	0.2	34.00
4/26/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	TELEPHONE CALL WITH JEFFREY PAYNE'S ASSISTANT	0.2	34.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	REGARDING PROPOSED DATES FOR STATUS CONFERENCE WITH JUDGE WATSON.	0.2	34.00
4/26/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW AND RESPOND TO E-MAILS WITH COUNSEL	0.2	34.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	REGARDING STATUS OF STATUS CONFERENCE AND OVERDUE DISCOVERY RESPONSES FROM COUNSEL FOR SCDOT.	0.2	34.00
4/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW ROSTER NOTICE.	0.1	31.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659		0.1	31.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
4/29/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW AND RECEIPT OF BERKELEY COUNTY	0.1	17.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	FORECLOSURE ROSTER REGARDING STATUS OF HEARING IN CASE SCHEDULED ON 5/3/11.	0.1	17.00.
5/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	PREPARE FOR STATUS CONFERENCE WITH JUDGE	0.5	155.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	WATSON.	0.5	155.00
5/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JEFF PAYNE	0.1	31.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	REGARDING WORSLEY.	0.1	31.00
5/3/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	REGARDING STATUS CONFERENCE.	0.1	31.00
5/3/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	STATUS CONFERENCE WITH JUDGE WATSON, JOHN	0.3	93.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	WEST, JEFF PAYNE.	0.3	93.00
5/3/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.2	62.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	DISCOVERY, WITNESS ISSUES.	0.2	62.00
5/3/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	REGARDING STATUS CONFERENCE.	0.1	31.00
5/9/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES	0.8	248.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	AND RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION; CONSIDER ADDITIONAL REQUESTS.	0.8	248.00
5/12/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.4	124.00
5/31/2011		Invoice=53423659	REGARDING DISCOVERY RESPONSES FROM SCDOT; CONSIDER DISCOVERY STRATEGY	0.4	124.00
5/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.3	93.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING TRIAL DATE, STATUS OF VARIOUS ISSUES.	0.3	93.00
5/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	TRIAL DATE.	0.1	31.00
5/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING TRIAL DATE.	0.1	31.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
5/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING TRIAL DATE.	0.1	31.00
5/20/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING TRIAL DATE.	0.1	31.00
5/24/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.2	62.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	TRIAL DATE, DISCOVERY ISSUES.	0.2	62.00
5/24/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING TRIAL DATE.	0.1	31.00
6/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	WORK ON SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY REQUESTS.	0.3	93.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760		0.3	93.00
6/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER OF	0.2	62.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	HARTNETT REALTY REGARDING HARTNETT SURGERY, GRAYDON APPRAISAL.	0.2	62.00
6/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONDUCT LEGAL RESEARCH REGARDING PREJUDGMENT	0.8	248.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	INTEREST IN CONDEMNATION CASES; REVIEW AND CONSIDER FAULKENBERRY CASE, RELEVANT STATUTE.	0.8	248.00
6/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONDUCT LEGAL RESEARCH REGARDING ATTORNEYS	0.7	217.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	FEE AWARDS IN CONDEMNATION CASES.	0.7	217.00
6/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL TO SUSIE ONATE REGARDING	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	STATUS.	0.1	31.00
6/1/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING STATUS	0.3	120.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	AND TRIAL.	0.3	120.00
6/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING GRAYDON APPRAISAL.	0.1	31.00
6/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL TO SUSIE ONATE REGARDING	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	STATUS.	0.1	31.00
6/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL INTERROGATORIES AND	0.3	93.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION.	0.3	93.00

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Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
6/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.3	93.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING VARIOUS DISCOVERY AND CASE STRATEGY ISSUES.	0.3	93.00
6/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM SUSIE ONATE	0.2	62.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY ISSUES.	0.2	62.00
6/15/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING CASE STATUS.	0.1	31.00
6/15/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING TOMMY HARTNETT STATUS.	0.1	31.00
6/15/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.2	62.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	TOMMY HARTNETT SURGERY, TRIAL DATES.	0.2	62.00
6/15/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	FURTHER E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST,	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	AMANDA WILLIAMSON REGARDING STATUS.	0.1	31.00
6/16/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH AMANDA WILLIAMSON	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING TRIAL SCHEDULING.	0.1	31.00
6/16/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING TRIAL SCHEDULING.	0.1	31.00
6/16/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING TRIAL SCHEDULING.	0.1	31.00
6/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.1	31.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	REGARDING SEPTEMBER TRIAL DATES.	0.1	31.00
6/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST, AMANDA	0.2	62.00
7/15/2011		Invoice=53431760	WILLIAMSON REGARDING SEPTEMBER TRIAL DATES.	0.2	62.00
6/20/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER,	0.2	62.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	SUSIE ONATE REGARDING TRIAL AVAILABILITY.	0.2	62.00
6/27/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH AMANDA WILLIAMSON,	0.1	31.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	JOHN WEST REGARDING SEPTEMBER, OCTOBER TRIAL	0.1	31.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
6/27/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DATE.		
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE REGARDING POTENTIAL NOVEMBER TRIAL DATE.	0.1 0.1	31.00 31.00
6/27/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.1	31.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	REGARDING POTENTIAL NOVEMBER TRIAL DATE.	0.1	31.00
6/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	REGARDING TRIAL DATE.	0.1	31.00
6/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER TRIAL SCHEDULING.	0.1	31.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819		0.1	31.00
6/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH PAUL DOMINICK	0.2	62.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	REGARDING TRIAL STRATEGY.	0.2	62.00
6/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH AMANDA WILLIAMSON,	0.1	31.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	JOHN WEST REGARDING TRIAL.	0.1	31.00
6/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	REGARDING TRIAL	0.1	31.00
6/29/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	VARIOUS E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST,	0.5	155.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	AMANDA WILLIAMSON, SUSIE ONATE, JANET RUGHEIMER REGARDING TRIAL DATE.	0.5	155.00
7/11/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST, AMANDA	0.3	93.00
8/3/2011		Invoice=53433819	WILLIAMSON, JANET RUGHEIMER, SUSIE ONATE REGARDING TRIAL DATES.	0.3	93.00
7/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	REGARDING TRIAL DATES	0.1	31.00
7/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE, JOHN	0.2	62.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	WEST, AMANDA WILLIAMSON, JANET RUGHEIMER REGARDING TRIAL DATES.	0.2	62.00
9/1/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING LEGAL	0.8	320.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	ISSUES AND TRIAL STRATEGY; REVIEW DISCOVERY	0.8	320.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
			AND CORRESPONDENCE TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.		
9/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER ISSUE OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS	0.2	62.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	REGARDING GRAYDON APPRAISAL.	0.2	62.00
9/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER GRAYDON APPRAISAL.	0.7	217.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580		0.7	217.00
9/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND SECOND SET OF	0.3	93.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	INTERROGATORIES.	0.3	93.00
9/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER ISSUES RELATING TO PREJUDGMENT	0.9	279.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	INTEREST AND ATTORNEYS FEES; REVIEW CASES REGARDING PLEADING REQUIREMENTS.	0.9	279.00
9/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO JOHN WEST REGARDING SECOND	0.4	124.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	INTERROGATORIES, DISCOVERY ISSUES, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND FEES.	0.4	124.00
9/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT E-MAIL MEMO TO SUSIE ONATE REGARDING	0.2	62.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	DISCOVERY ISSUES.	0.2	62.00
9/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER CHARLES CRIDER APPRAISAL, POTENTIAL	0.2	62.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	EXPERT TESTIMONY.	0.2	62.00
9/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	MEET WITH PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING STRATEGY.	0.3	93.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580		0.3	93.00
9/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.3	93.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, SETTLEMENT ISSUES.	0.3	93.00
9/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	REGARDING SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DOCUMENT PRODUCTION.	0.1	31.00
9/9/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON TRIAL ISSUES.	0.6	240.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580		0.6	240.00
9/21/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DISCOVERY PLANNING AND STRATEGY.	0.5	155.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580		0.5	155.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
9/22/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	REGARDING DOCUMENT PRODUCTION.	0.2	62.00
9/23/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	REGARDING DOCUMENT REVIEW.	0.2	62.00
9/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	REGARDING DOCUMENT REVIEW.	0.1	31.00
10/4/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	REGARDING SCDOT DOCUMENT REVIEW.	0.1	31.00
10/4/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.1	31.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	DOCUMENT REVIEW.	0.1	31.00
10/5/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TRAVEL TO AND FROM COLUMBIA, SC AND MEET WITH	4.5	1,395.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	JOHN WEST REGARDING DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY SCDOT.	4.5	1,395.00
10/10/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	REGARDING DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, DEPOSITIONS.	0.1	31.00
10/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
10/31/2011		Invoice=53447580	REGARDING SCDOT EXPERT DEPOSITION DATES.	0.1	31.00
10/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH TOMMY HARTNETT	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING EXPERT ISSUES.	0.2	62.00
10/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING MEETING, HARTNETT DEPOSITION.	0.1	31.00
10/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING MEETING TO PREPARE FOR DEPOSITIONS.	0.1	31.00
10/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	DEPOSITIONS, DISCOVERY.	0.2	62.00
10/20/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONFERENCE WITH PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	HARTNETT MEETING, EXPERT ISSUES, TRIAL	0.2	62.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
			STRATEGY.		
10/26/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER EXPERT ISSUES, TRIAL STRATEGY.	0.3	93.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.3	93.00
10/31/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER DISCOVERY AND DEPOSITION ISSUES.	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.2	62.00
10/31/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.3	93.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING MEETING WITH HARTNETT.	0.3	93.00
10/31/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING DEPOSITION DATES.	0.2	62.00
10/31/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND DEPOSITION NOTICES AND	0.6	186.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	SUBPOENAS; DRAFT DOCUMENT REQUESTS TO EXPERTS.	0.6	186.00
10/31/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO JOHN WEST REGARDING NOTICE OF	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	DEPOSITIONS.	0.1	31.00
10/31/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO CHARLES CRIDER.	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.1	31.00
10/31/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO DAVE GRAYDON.	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.1	31.00
11/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING NOVEMBER 15 HARTNETT DEPOSITION.	0.1	31.00
11/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING NOVEMBER 15 HARTNETT DEPOSITION.	0.1	31.00
11/2/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING SCDOT DOCUMENTS.	0.2	62.00
11/3/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	MEET WITH TOMMY HARTNETT REGARDING	1	310.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	PREPARATION FOR DEPOSITION AND PREPARATION	1	310.00
			FRO CRIDER AND GRAYDON DEPOSITIONS.		
11/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING TRIAL DATE.	0.1	31.00
11/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING HARTNETT FILES.	0.1	31.00
11/7/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	TELEPHONE CALL WITH JUDGE WATSON'S OFFICE	0.2	34.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING STATUS OF PROPOSED TRIAL DATES AND CONFIRM OF SAME.	0.2	34.00
11/7/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH COUNSEL REGARDING	0.1	17.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	CONFIRMATION OF TRIAL DATES OF 12/14/11 THROUGH 12/15/11 WITH JUDGE WATSON.	0.1	17.00
11/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING EXPERT DOCUMENTS.	0.1	31.00
11/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER SCDOT DOCUMENT PRODUCTION.	1.6	496.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		1.6	496.00
11/9/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING EXPERT FILES.	0.1	31.00
11/11/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING CRIDER AND GRAYDON FILES.	0.2	62.00
11/14/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY	1.3	403.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	CHARLES CRIDER.	1.3	403.00
11/14/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	PREPARE FOR TOMMY HARTNETT DEPOSITION.	0.8	248.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.8	248.00
11/14/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING CRIDER FILE.	0.2	62.00
11/15/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS AND MR. HARTNETT	0.6	240.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	CONCERNING DEPOSITION AND TRIAL TESTIMONY.	0.6	240.00
11/15/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	APPEAR FOR AND DEFEND DEPOSITION OF TOMMY	1	310.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	HARTNETT.	1	310.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
11/15/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	MEET WITH PAUL DOMINICK AND TOMMY HARTNETT TO	0.5	155.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	DISCUSS DEPOSITION AND STRATEGY.	0.6	186.00
11/15/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING GRAYDON FILE.	0.2	62.00
11/16/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER ROUGH DRAFTS OF HARTNETT	0.7	217.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT.	0.7	217.00
11/16/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER TRIAL STRATEGY.	0.3	93.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.3	93.00
11/16/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING GRAYDON FILE.	0.1	31.00
11/16/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING EXPERT DEPOSITIONS.	0.1	31.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TWO TELEPHONE CONFERENCES WITH JANET	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	RUGHEIMER REGARDING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION MANUAL, USPAP.	0.2	62.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	REGARDING GRAYDON FILES.	0.2	62.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONFERENCE WITH PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING TRIAL	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	STRATEGY.	0.2	62.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	RESEARCH REGARDING SCDOT APPRAISER MANUAL.	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.2	62.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW INTERROGATORY ANSWERS, NOTES,	1.7	527.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	CORRESPONDENCE AND SELECTED APPELLATE OPINIONS IN PREPARATION FOR CRIDER AND GRAYDON DEPOSITIONS.	1.7	527.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	VISIT TO TOMMY HARTNETT TO PICK UP USPAP.	0.3	93.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.3	93.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TRAVEL TO GREENVILLE FOR CRIDER AND GRAYDON	3.4	1,054.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	DEPOSITIONS.	3.4	1,054.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.4	0.00
12/8/2011		invoice=53452251	REGARDING HARTNETT DEPOSITION, TRIAL STRATEGY.: NO CHARGE	0.4	0.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER USPAP.	1.1	341.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		1.1	341.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER SCDOT APPRAISER MANUAL.	0.8	248.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.8	248.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY	0.7	217.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	GRAYDON.	0.7	217.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF GRAYDON APPRAISAL.	1.2	372.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		1.2	372.00
11/17/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	WORK ON DEPOSITION QUESTIONS FOR CRIDER AND	1.3	403.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	GRAYDON.	1.3	403.00
11/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CRIDER APPRAISAL.	0.9	279.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.9	279.00
11/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY CRIDER.	0.5	155.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.5	155.00
11/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	OUTLINE QUESTIONS FOR CRIDER.	0.6	186.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.6	186.00
11/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	MEET WITH JOHN WEST PRIOR TO DEPOSITION.	0.2	62.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.2	62.00
11/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TAKE CRIDER DEPOSITION.	1.8	558.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		1.8	558.00
11/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	FURTHER PREPARE FOR GRAYDON DEPOSITION.	0.7	217.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		0.7	217.00
11/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TAKE GRAYDON DEPOSITION.	1.2	372.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		1.2	372.00
11/18/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	RETURN TRAVEL FROM GREENVILLE TO CHARLESTON.	3.4	1,054.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251		3.4	1,054.00
11/18/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING	0.7	280.00
12/8/2011		Invoice=53452251	DEPOSITION.	0.7	280.00
11/21/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING STATUS	0.4	160.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	AND TRIAL STRATEGY.	0.4	160.00
11/21/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER ROUGH DEPOSITION	1.2	372.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	TRANSCRIPTS.	1.2	372.00
11/22/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING CHARLES CRIDER SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT	0.1	31.00
			AND DEPOSITION.		
11/22/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONFERENCE WITH PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING	0.3	93.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	DEPOSITIONS, TRIAL STRATEGY.	0.3	93.00
11/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING STATUS CALL, DEPOSITION OF CRIDER	0.1	31.00
			AND GRAYDON.		
11/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING ROUGH TRANSCRIPTS OF DEPOSITIONS.	0.1	31.00
11/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	PREPARE FOR AND PARTICIPATE IN STATUS	0.7	217.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	CONFERENCE CALL WITH CLIENT REPRESENTATIVES.	0.7	217.00
11/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER TESTIMONY SUBJECTS FOR MIKE PFEIFFER.	0.3	93.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.3	93.00
11/28/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM BILL	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	ROBERTS AND DEPOSITION EXHIBITS.	0.2	62.00
11/28/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH COUNSEL REGARDING	0.1	17.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	ELECTRONIC DEPOSITION EXHIBITS FOR GRAYDON	0.1	17.00
			AND CRIDER'S DEPOSITIONS.		

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
11/29/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING SCDOT APPRAISAL MANUAL.	0.1	31.00
11/29/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND IDENTIFY RELEVANT PORTIONS OF SCDOT	0.3	93.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	APPRAISAL MANUAL; E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE REGARDING SAME.	0.3	93.00
11/29/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL FROM JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	CRIDER DEPOSITION.	0.1	31.00
11/29/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW PRODUCED DOCUMENTS AND WORK ON DIRECT	1.4	434.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	EXAMINATION QUESTIONS FOR MIKE PFEIFFER.	1.4	434.00
11/30/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	CRIDER UPDATED APPRAISAL.	0.1	31.00
12/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER CHARLES CRIDER UPDATED	1.6	496.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	APPRAISAL REPORT.	1.6	496.00
12/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL TO JOHN WEST REGARDING CRIDER	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	UPDATED REPORT.	0.1	31.00
12/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONTINUE REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS AND WORK ON	1.8	558.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	TESTIMONY OUTLINE FOR MIKE PFEIFFER.	1.8	558.00
12/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER STRATEGY ON CRIDER UPDATED APPRAISAL.	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.2	62.00
12/1/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	CRIDER, TRIAL ISSUES.	0.2	62.00
12/5/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER,	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	TOMMY HARTNETT REGARDING TRIAL PREPARATIONS.	0.2	62.00
12/5/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JANET RUGHEIMER	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING CHARLES CRIDER UPDATED APPRAISAL.	0.1	31.00
12/5/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING CRIDER UPDATED APPRAISAL.	0.2	62.00

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Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
12/5/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY REQUESTS.	0.1	31.00
12/5/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.3	93.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	TRIAL ISSUES, POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT.	0.3	93.00
12/5/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING SETTLEMENT OFFER.	0.1	31.00
12/5/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER SETTLEMENT STRATEGY.	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.2	62.00
12/5/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING APPRAISAL OF MT. PLEASANT CONVENIENCE STORE.	0.2	62.00
12/6/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW FINAL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS FOR	1.2	372.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	CRIDER AND GRAYDON.	1.2	372.00
12/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW SCDOT RESPONSES TO SUPPLEMENTAL	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	DISCOVERY REQUESTS.	0.2	62.00
12/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER POTENTIAL WORSLEY TESTIMONY.	0.3	93.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.3	93.00
12/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER APPRAISAL OF MT. PLEASANT	0.4	124.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	CONVENIENCE STORE.	0.4	124.00
12/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING REJECTION OF SCDOT SETTLEMENT OFFER.	0.2	62.00
12/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING WORSLEY NOT PARTICIPATING.	0.1	31.00
12/7/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM JOHN WEST,	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	JEFF PAYNE REGARDING WORSLEY.	0.1	31.00
12/8/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TRIAL PREPARATION; PHONE CONFERENCE WITH	2	800.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	CLIENT AND REPRESENTATIVES.	2	800.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
12/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS PRODUCED IN PREPARATION FOR CONFERENCE CALL WITH MIKE PFEIFFER AND LAURA KING AND SUSIE ONATE.	1.8	558.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		1.8	558.00
12/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER PROPOSED STIPULATIONS FROM JOHN WEST.	0.5	155.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.5	155.00
12/8/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER, LAURA KING, SUSIE ONATE, PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING PFEIFFER TRIAL TESTIMONY.	1.2	372.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		1.2	372.00
12/9/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW REVISED STIPULATIONS.	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.2	62.00
12/9/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW GUARANTOR UNDERWRITING REPORT REGARDING CREDIT WORTHINESS OF VILLAGE PANTRY.	0.4	124.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.4	124.00
12/9/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH CLIENTS REGARDING ANALYSIS OF STIPULATIONS.	0.1	31.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.1	31.00
12/9/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING STIPULATIONS, TRIAL ISSUES.	0.5	155.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.5	155.00
12/9/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE REGARDING MT. PLEASANT STORE APPRAISAL.	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.2	62.00
12/11/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	PREPARE FOR TRIAL.	2.8	1,120.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		2.8	1,120.00
12/11/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	PREPARE FOR TRIAL; REVIEW ALL DOCUMENTS PRODUCED; CONSIDER EXHIBITS; REVIEW DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS; CONSIDER TRIAL THEMES.	4.2	1,302.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		4.2	1,302.00
12/12/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONTINUE TRIAL PREPARATION WORK; CONDUCT RESEARCH REGARDING OTHER SCDOT CASES INVOLVING LEASES; CONDUCT RESEARCH REGARDING CHARLES CRIDER, DAVE GRAYDON; REVISE AND AMEND MIKE PFEIFFER DIRECT EXAMINATION OUTLINE; WORK ON	7.3	2,263.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		7.3	2,263.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
			GRAYDON CROSS-EXAMINATION QUESTIONS; WORK ON STRATEGY FOR CRIDER; REVIEW AND CONSIDER EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTORY PROVISIONS; REVIEW ALL DOCUMENTS IN NOTEBOOKS SENT BY SUSIE ONATE; FURTHER WORK ON EXHIBIT SELECTION; E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING REVISED DIRECT EXAMINATION OUTLINE; CONDUCT LEGAL RESEARCH REGARDING CASES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS, CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE LEASE IS CONSIDERED IN JUST COMPENSATION.		
12/12/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	MEET WITH MR. HARTNETT; TRIAL PREPARATION.	3	1,200.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		3	1,200.00
12/13/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY REALTY INCOME TO OPPOSING COUNSEL TO DATE TO CONFIRM NO ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS NEED TO BE PRODUCED BEFORE IDENTIFYING TRIAL EXHIBITS TO COURT.	0.9	153.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		0.9	153.00
12/13/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	ASSIST ATTORNEY TIBBALS WITH TRIAL PREPARATION; IDENTIFY AND PREPARE EXHIBITS FOR TRIAL INCLUDING PREPARING WITNESS LIST AND DISCUSSING FINAL TRIAL EXHIBITS WITH ATTORNEY TIBBALS.	3.7	629.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		3.7	629.00
12/13/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM; REVISE AND AMEND PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM; WORK ON EXHIBITS; WORK ON GRAYDON CROSS-EXAMINATION; WORK ON PFEIFFER DIRECT EXAMINATION; OUTLINE OPENING STATEMENT; CONSIDER AMENDMENT TO LEASE AND CONDEMNATION AGREEMENT; REVIEW AND CONSIDER CONDEMNOR'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM AND ATTACHED CASES; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH, E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING LEASE AMENDMENT; WORK ON TOMMY HARTNETT ISSUES; CONSIDER MARKET RENT ISSUE; REVIEW SECTIONS FROM TREATISE ON CONDEMNATION REGARDING INCOME FROM PROPERTY VS. INCOME FROM BUSINESS; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING TRIAL, EVIDENCE, EXHIBIT ISSUES.	8.7	2,697.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		8.7	2,697.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
12/13/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	TRIAL PREPARATION.	7.5	3,000.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		7.5	3,000.00
12/14/2011	149	PAUL DOMINICK	PREPARE FOR AND ATTEND TRIAL.	10	4,000.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383		10	4,000.00
12/14/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	COMMUNICATIONS WITH ATTORNEY TIBBALS	0.2	34.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY REALTY INCOME TO OPPOSING COUNSEL.	0.2	34.00
12/14/2011	413	DENISE LECLERC	REVIEW REALTY INCOME'S ORIGINAL DOCUMENT	0.9	153.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	PRODUCTION TO OBTAIN KEY DOCUMENTS DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO PUBLIC MEETING BY BERKELEY COUNTY CONCERNING THE PROPOSED WIDENING OF HWY 17A IN BERKELEY COUNTY AS REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY TIBBALS AND PROVIDE DIRECTION FOR HAND DELIVERY OF DOCUMENTS AT TRIAL.	0.9	153.00
12/14/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	PRACTICE AND REFINE OPENING ARGUMENT; TRAVEL	10.1	3,131.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	FROM CHARLESTON TO MONCK'S CORNER FOR TRIAL; TRY CASE; TRAVEL FROM MONCK'S CORNER TO CHARLESTON.	10.1	3,131.00
12/15/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING TRIAL, POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT.	0.2	62.00
12/15/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.2	62.00
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING INTEREST ACCRUAL AND TRIAL RESULTS.	0.2	62.00
12/19/2011	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH TOMMY HARTNETT	0.1	31.50
1/5/2012		Invoice=53456383	REGARDING TRIAL	0.1	31.50
1/3/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	INITIAL REVIEW OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT.	0.8	252.00
1/30/2012		Invoice=53459979		0.8	252.00
1/3/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER,	0.2	63.00
1/30/2012		Invoice=53459979	LAURA KING, SUSI ONATE REGARDING POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT DEMAND.	0.2	63.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT WITH SCDOT.	0.2	63.00
1/19/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT STATUS E-MAIL MEMO TO CLIENT.	0.4	126.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038		0.4	126.00
1/20/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM MIKE	0.3	94.50
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	PFEIFFER AND CONSIDER SETTLEMENT STRATEGY; FURTHER E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING SAME.	0.3	94.50
1/24/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL TO JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.1	31.50
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	SETTLEMENT STATUS.	0.1	31.50
1/24/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING	0.2	63.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	SETTLEMENT ISSUES.	0.2	63.00
1/24/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT E-MAIL MEMO TO MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING	0.2	63.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	STATUS OF SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS.	0.2	63.00
1/24/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER	0.2	63.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	REGARDING STRATEGY.	0.2	63.00
1/31/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.50
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	REGARDING STATUS.	0.1	31.50
2/1/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, BEGIN	2.1	661.50
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	OUTLINING KEY ISSUES FOR PROPOSED FINAL ORDER	2.1	661.50
2/9/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	RESEARCH STANDARD OF REVIEW AT TRIAL COURT	1.4	441.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	LEVEL AND ON APPEAL IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES.	1.4	441.00
2/13/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SUSIE ONATE	0.2	63.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	REGARDING CASE STATUS.	0.2	63.00
2/15/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	BEGIN DRAFTING PROPOSED ORDER.	3.1	976.50
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038		3.1	976.50
2/15/2012	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING	0.3	126.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	PROPOSED ORDER.	0.3	126.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
2/16/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER ALL SOUTH CAROLINA	1.3	409.50
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	EMINENT DOMAIN/JUST COMPENSATION CASES PRESENTED TO JUDGE WATSON BY CONDEMNOR IN ITS PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM	1.3	409.50
2/16/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONTINUE DRAFTING PROPOSED FINAL ORDER AND	2.1	661.50
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	JUDGMENT	2.1	661.50
2/16/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	MAKE VARIOUS CALCULATIONS REGARDING MIDPOINT	0.8	252.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	AND POTENTIAL AWARD, AND HOW IT MIGHT AFFECT DRAFTING OF PROPOSED ORDER, CONFER WITH PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING SAME	0.8	252.00
2/17/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND PROPOSED ORDER	2.8	882.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038		2.8	882.00
2/17/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONDUCT LEGAL RESEARCH REGARDING OTHER	3.7	1,165.50
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	JURISDICTIONS' TREATMENT OF EXISTING LEASE VALUE TO LANDLORD IN CONDEMNATION; REVIEW NUMEROUS CASES.	3.7	1,165.50
2/17/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER TREATISE ON LEASE	0.6	189.00
2/29/2012		Invoice=53465038	VALUATION ISSUES	0.6	189.00
2/20/2012	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON DRAFT PROPOSED ORDER; CONFERENCE WITH	1.2	504.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611	MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING THE SAME.	1.2	504.00
2/21/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	63.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611	REGARDING PROPOSED ORDERS, ORIGINAL EXHIBITS.	0.2	63.00
2/22/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW MIKE PFEIFFER REVISIONS TO PROPOSED	0.2	63.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611	ORDER; E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER AND LAURA KING REGARDING SAME.	0.2	63.00
2/27/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND PROPOSED ORDER IN ACCORDANCE	1.3	409.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611	WITH COMMENTS FROM PAUL DOMINICK AND MIKE PFEIFFER.	1.3	409.50
2/28/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONTINUE WORK ON PROPOSED ORDER; REVISE,	6.7	2,110.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611	AMEND, AND RESTRUCTURE; REVIEW TRIAL	6.7	2,110.50

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
			EXHIBITS, ESPECIALLY THOSE RELATING TO TRANSACTION AND GRAYDON OPINIONS; MEET WITH PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING VARIOUS ISSUES ON ORDER; SKETCH NEW FLOW CHART; E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH CLIENTS REGARDING REVISED DRAFT.		
2/29/2012	450	ERIC JAMES	PREPARE FLOW CHART EXHIBIT	0.6	102.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.6	102.00
2/29/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	WORK ON FLOW CHART.	1.2	378.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		1.2	378.00
2/29/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER CONFIDENTIALITY OF CERTAIN TRIAL EXHIBITS; REVIEW AND CONSIDER CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER; E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH LAURA KING REGARDING CONFIDENTIALITY OF DOCUMENTS.	0.7	220.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.7	220.50
2/29/2012	149	PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON PROPOSED ORDER AND CHART.	0.6	252.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.6	252.00
3/1/2012	450	ERIC JAMES	REVISE AND PREPARE FLOW CHART EXHIBIT.	0.6	102.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.6	102.00
3/1/2012	149	PAUL DOMINICK	CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING PROPOSED ORDER.	0.3	126.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.3	126.00
3/1/2012	413	DENISE LECLERC	COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT REGARDING PROCEDURES AND DIRECTION FOR SEALING TRIAL EXHIBITS.	0.3	54.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.3	54.00
3/1/2012	413	DENISE LECLERC	COMMUNICATIONS WITH COUNSEL REGARDING PROCEDURES FOR FILING TRIAL EXHIBITS.	0.2	36.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.2	36.00
3/1/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND FLOW CHART.	0.6	189.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.6	189.00
3/1/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER AND LAURA KING REGARDING FLOW CHART.	0.2	63.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.2	63.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
3/1/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER ISSUE OF DATING TRANSACTIONS.	0.1	31.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.1	31.50
3/1/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH LAURA KING AND MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING VILLAGE PANTRY TRANSACTION.	0.4	126.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.4	126.00
3/1/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CALL TO JOHN WEST REGARDING PROPOSED ORDERS.	0.1	31.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.1	31.50
3/2/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER AND LAURA KING REGARDING STATUS CONFERENCE WITH JUDGE.	0.1	31.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.1	31.50
3/2/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING STATUS CONFERENCE WITH JUDGE WATSON.	0.1	31.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.1	31.50
3/2/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER ISSUES REGARDING CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER, FILING DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL; REVIEW AND CONSIDER EXECUTED CONSENT CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER.	0.6	189.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.6	189.00
3/2/2012	413	DENISE LECLERC	COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURT REGARDING FOLLOW UP TO SEALING TRIAL EXHIBITS AND STATUS CONFERENCE CALL WITH JUDGE WATSON; COMMUNICATIONS WITH COUNSEL REGARDING	0.6	108.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.6	108.00
3/5/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	PREPARE FOR CONFERENCE CALL WITH JUDGE WATSON.	0.2	63.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.2	63.00
3/5/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER SOUTH CAROLINA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 41.1 REGARDING FILING DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL.	0.3	94.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.3	94.50
3/5/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING STATUS CONFERENCE.	0.1	31.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.1	31.50
3/5/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH CLIENTS REGARDING RULE 41.1 AND RESULTS OF STATUS CONFERENCE.	0.2	63.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.2	63.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
3/5/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	PARTICIPATE IN STATUS CONFERENCE WITH JUDGE WATSON.	0.1	31.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.1	31.50
3/5/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	FINAL REVIEW AND EDITS TO PROPOSED ORDER.	0.7	220.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.7	220.50
3/5/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER SCDOT'S PROPOSED ORDER.	0.9	283.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.9	283.50
3/5/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER STRATEGY.	0.3	94.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.3	94.50
3/6/2012	149	PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW SCDOT PROPOSED ORDER; EMAIL TO CLIENT.	0.6	252.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.6	252.00
3/6/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING STRATEGY REGARDING PROPOSED ORDERS; REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING SAME.	0.6	189.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.6	189.00
3/6/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW ISSUE OF PREVAILING PARTY ATTORNEY'S FEES.	0.3	94.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.3	94.50
3/7/2012	413	DENISE LECLERC	DRAFT CONSENT ORDER TO SEAL RECORD FOR SUBMITTING TO COURT; COMMUNICATIONS WITH COUNSEL REGARDING SAME.	1.4	252.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		1.4	252.00
3/9/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	WORK ON CONSENT ORDER TO FILE EXHIBITS UNDER SEAL; CONSIDER RULE 41.1 FACTORS AND REVIEW CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS; E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH LAURA KING REGARDING RULE 41.1 FACTORS.	1.2	378.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		1.2	378.00
3/12/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH LAURA KING REGARDING FACTORS RELATING TO SEALING TRIAL EXHIBITS.	0.2	63.00
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.2	63.00
3/15/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONTINUE TO DRAFT, REVISE AND AMEND CONSENT ORDER SEALING EXHIBITS.	0.7	220.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611		0.7	220.50

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
3/16/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND CONSENT ORDER SEALING TRIAL	0.5	157.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611	EXHIBITS.	0.5	157.50
3/16/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH LAURA KING	0.1	31.50
3/30/2012		Invoice=53469611	REGARDING SAME.	0.1	31.50
3/26/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.2	63.00
			REGARDING CONSENT ORDER SEALING DOCUMENTS.		
3/30/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW CORRESPONDENCE FROM JOHN WEST WITH	0.1	31.50
			ENCLOSED SIGNED CONSENT ORDER FILING EXHIBITS		
			UNDER SEAL.		
3/30/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO JUDGE WATSON REGARDING	0.1	31.50
			CONSENT ORDER.		
4/16/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONDUCT LEGAL RESEARCH REGARDING RECENT EMINENT	1.3	409.50
			DOMAIN CASES POTENTIALLY ON POINT REGARDING		
			LEASE ISSUE.		
5/1/2012	306	JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER	0.1	31.50
			REGARDING STATUS OF FINAL ORDER.		
		UNBILLED TOTALS: WORK:	5 records	1.8	567.00
		UNBILLED TOTALS: BILL:		1.8	567.00
		BILLED TOTALS: WORK:	447 records	327.3	101,136.50
		BILLED TOTALS: BILL:		327.2	101,452.50
		GRAND TOTALS: WORK:	452 records	329.1	101,703.50
		GRAND TOTALS: BILL:		329	102,019.50

EXHIBIT "B"

CostCode	LedgerCode	Worked Amount	Billed Amount	Description
H005	HCOST	\$13.00	\$13.00	RECORDING FEES
Subtotal H005		\$13.00	\$13.00	RECORDING FEES
H006	HCOST	\$50.00	\$50.00	FILING FEES
Subtotal H006		\$50.00	\$50.00	FILING FEES
H009	HCOST2	\$499.90	\$499.90	TRAVEL EXPENSE
Subtotal H009		\$499.90	\$499.90	TRAVEL EXPENSE
H010	HCOST2	\$83.85	\$83.85	DEPOSITION EXPENSES
Subtotal H010		\$83.85	\$83.85	DEPOSITION EXPENSES
H025	HCOST2	\$525.00	\$525.00	CONDEMNOR EXPERT FEES
Subtotal H025		\$525.00	\$525.00	CONDEMNOR EXPERT FEES
H030	HCOST2	\$57.46	\$57.46	MEETING EXPENSES
Subtotal H030		\$57.46	\$57.46	MEETING EXPENSES
H036	HCOST2	\$1,302.45	\$1,302.45	COURT TRANSCRIPTS
Subtotal H036		\$1,302.45	\$1,302.45	COURT TRANSCRIPTS
H037	HCOST	\$2,655.00	\$2,655.00	EXPERT WITNESS FEE
Subtotal H037		\$2,655.00	\$2,655.00	EXPERT WITNESS FEE
H048	HCOST2	\$894.21	\$894.21	MEDIATION
Subtotal H048		\$894.21	\$894.21	MEDIATION
S001	SCOST	\$10.08	\$10.08	COMMUNICATION CHARGES
Subtotal S001		\$10.08	\$10.08	COMMUNICATION CHARGES
S002	SCOST	\$44.20	\$44.20	POSTAGE
Subtotal S002		\$44.20	\$44.20	POSTAGE
S003	SCOST	\$481.60	\$481.60	COPIES
Subtotal S003		\$481.60	\$481.60	COPIES
S022	SCOST	\$56.50	\$56.50	COURIER SERVICES
Subtotal S022		\$56.50	\$56.50	COURIER SERVICES
S028	SCOST	\$143.90	\$143.90	WESTLAW RESEARCH
Subtotal S028		\$143.90	\$143.90	WESTLAW RESEARCH
S040	SCOST	\$0.70	\$0.70	COLOR COPIES
Subtotal S040		\$0.70	\$0.70	COLOR COPIES

S056	SCOST	\$31.47	\$31.47	EXPRESS PACKAGE DELIVERY
Subtotal S056		\$31.47	\$31.47	EXPRESS PACKAGE DELIVERY

TOTAL		\$6,849.32	\$6,849.32	
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EXHIBIT "C"

Invoice Number	Date	Reference	Gross Amount	Discount	Net
YFH2009094	10/14/2009	APPROX FEES TAKING	5,200.00	0.00	5,200.00
Payer: REALTY INCOME CORPORATION		Date	Check No.	Check Amount	
Payee: HARTNETT REALTY COMPANY, INC.		10/14/2009	043666	\$5,200.00	

Retain this statement for your records

REALTY INCOME CORPORATION
600 LA TERRAZA BLVD
ESCONDIDO, CA 92025

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
SAN FRANCISCO, CA

11-24
1210

Date: 10/14/2009 Check No.: 043666 Check Amount: \$5,200.00

~~Five Thousand Two Hundred AND 00/100 Dollars~~

Pay to the order of:

HARTNETT REALTY COMPANY, INC.

134 MEETING ST #101
CHARLESTON, SC 29401

Paul M. Mauer

Requires 2 signatures if over \$10,000.00

⑆0 3661⑆ ⑆122000248⑆ 4945008738⑆

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

County of Berkeley

Road/Route U.S. Route 71A
File 8.165B
Item
Project STP-UR08(007)
PCN 32502

South Carolina Department of Transportation,

Condemnor,

v.

RICS5, LLC,

Landowner(s)

and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North
Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
County Treasurer's Office, Lien Holder,

Other Condemnee(s).

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

Condemnor's Return to Landowner's
Application for Award of Reasonable
Litigation Expenses

The condemnor, the South Carolina Department of Transportation ("SCDOT" or the "Department") respectfully submits this return to the Landowner's petition for costs. The Landowner requested that the Court award it fees for two attorneys, paralegal time other costs and expert witness fees totaling \$114,068.82.

The Department requests that the Court deny the same on the grounds that the litigating position of the Department was substantially justified. In the alternative, the condemnor asks that, should the Court determine that fees costs should be taxed against the State, that it reduce the award on the grounds that the Landowner's request is excessive.

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- I. No costs should be awarded because the litigating position of SCDOT was substantial justified within the meaning of that term in S.C. Code §28-2-510.

The law governing fee awards in condemnations is contained in S.C. Code Ann. §28-2-510 (B)(1)(Rev. 2007). That Code section is part of the S.C. Eminent Domain Procedure Act enacted in 1987. The section provides that the court on application from a prevailing party may award fees and costs as part of the condemnation judgment. "Prevails" is defined as compensation awarded that is at least as close to the highest valuation testified to on behalf of the landowner as the highest amount testified to on behalf of the condemnor. The section goes on to say that,

The court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this section, or deny the award, to the extent that the landowner, during the course of the action, engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action *or to the extent the court finds that the position of the condemnor was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.* (emphasis added).

The "substantially justified" language above mirrors that in the main federal fee-shifting statute involving the government, the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412.¹ That statute, enacted in 1980, provides in part,

(d)(1) ...a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and expenses...unless the court finds the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make and award unjust.

There is no appellate case law in South Carolina defining the meaning of "substantially justified." However, there is an abundance of legislative history and case law interpretations of

¹ Both the federal and the South Carolina statutes negate the "American Rule" that each party to a lawsuit bear its own costs. Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., Inc., 340 S.C. 626, 532 S.E.2d 856 (2000). Further, statutes waiving the state's immunity from suit being in derogation of sovereignty must be strictly construed and the State can be sued only in the manner and upon the terms and conditions prescribed by the statute.

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the federal statute. In lieu of a lengthy string cite, we refer the Court to the annotation at 69 A.L.R. Fed. 130 ("What constitutes substantial justification of government's position so as to prohibit awards of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, (28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A).")

With regard to the legislative history, the annotation refers to the House Judiciary Committee Report which states that the substantial justification test is essentially one of reasonableness. Thus, no award is intended where the government can show that its case had a reasonable basis in both law and in fact. The Report explains that the substantial justification standard should not be read to raise the presumption that the government was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case, and indicates that the standard does not require the government to establish that its decision to litigate was based on a substantial probability of prevailing. 69 A.L.R. Fed 130.

Regarding the federal case law, Am. Jur. Fed. has a good summary:

To be substantially justified means, of course, more than merely undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness. However, a position can be justified even though it is not correct and can be substantially (that is, for the most part) justified if a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact. It must have enough foundation in law and fact that a reasonable person could think it correct; in other words, such position must be sufficiently colorable to engender "genuine dispute." 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts, §260.

Trial of this case, as most condemnation cases, involved the testimony of expert appraisal witnesses as to their opinions of the value of the property condemned. Mr. Thomas F. Hartnett testified for the landowner. Messrs. Charles F. Crider and David Ray Graydon, Jr. testified for the condemnor. Each was qualified as an expert to testify as to their opinion on the real estate valuation. The law and rules governing such testimony are contained in case law and in certain

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published appraisal standards of the appraisal industry, primarily the publication Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and Advisory Opinions, the Appraisal Foundation (2005) ("USPAP"). With regard to the case law,

It must be remembered that in condemnation cases valuation is not a matter of mere mathematical calculation, but involves the exercise of judgment.

4 Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, §12.01, p. 12-31; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Southern Pac. Co., 268 U.S. 146, 156, 45 S.Ct. 465, 467, 69 L.Ed. 890 (1925).

Nichols states,

All elements of value inherent in the property merit consideration in the valuation process. Every element which affects value and which would influence a prudent purchaser should be considered. No single element, standing alone, is decisive and, of course, illegal considerations should be ignored. No general rule can be inflexibly adhered to. Each case necessarily differs from all others insofar as its factual situation is concerned, and exceptional circumstances render imperative a fair degree of elasticity in application of the fundamental rule.

Irrespective of the method adopted for the ascertainment of such value, it is incumbent on the condemnor to endeavor to reach a result that is truly "just compensation," that is, fair to the public as well as to the owner of the property taken. 4 Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, §12.01, pp. 12-1 - 12-7.

USPAP recognizes a number of valid approaches to determining value. The most relevant with regard to commercial real property are the cost approach, the sales comparables approach, and the income approach. After analyzing each, the appraiser then applies his judgment as to which approach to accord the greater weight and which approaches to discount or disregard. See, generally, USPAP, Standard 1.

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Mr. Hartnett testified that his analysis indicated a value for the property under the sales comparable approach as \$444,500. However, in his reconciliation of the values, he gave greater weight to the capitalization of income approach using the existing lease and discounting the capitalized rent for certain reasons. His opinion was that the property was worth \$900,000. Tr. p. 110.

On the other hand, Messrs. Crider and Graydon, also using their respective professional judgments gave their testimony for the condemnor, discounted the income approach relying more heavily instead the sales comparable approach. Their stated reasons for doing so included their view that the actual rent was not arrived at in a true arms-length transaction and was much higher than the comparable rents for convenience stores locally. The condemnor's appraisers believed that the lease rent was above market. Mr. Hartnett acknowledged on cross examination that he did not do an analysis of market rent in conducting his appraisal. The opinions of the condemnor's appraisers have ample support in the record.

Michael Robert Pfeiffer, executive vice president of the landowner's parent company, Realty Income Corporation, testified at trial as to the background of his company's acquisition of the real estate and the process followed for valuing it and determining rental rates. At some point in 2008, a company, Sun Capital, approached Realty Income concerning its desire to purchase 75 convenience stores owned and operated the Worsley Companies. Not desiring to own the real estate but only the operating business, Sun asked Realty Income to purchase the land and improvements and lease it back to them. Tr. p. 24-29. Realty Income then closed on a purchase of all the properties of Worsley for \$65,350,000. Then Realty Income allocated the total purchase price among the properties with the result that it valued the Moncks Corner store at \$1.15 million. Tr. p. 32-33. Realty Income then determined that it required a rate of return of

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8.9% and applied that percentage to the allocated values of each of the stores. Tr. p. 41 and 69. The result was that the rent set for the store at issue was \$8,517.67 per month to be increased periodically per the CPI. Tr. p. 41.

The point of the foregoing is that, although the global purchase price of all the Worsley properties was reached between the buyer and seller in an arms-length transaction, and Worsley/Sun assented to the overall rental rate of return on all of the properties, the actual rental for the Moncks corner store was set unilaterally and arbitrarily by the owner, landowner, Realty Income for their subsidiary RI CS 5. Moreover, Worsley or Sun had no incentive or reason to protest the rental rate on the Moncks Corner store because a high rental there would necessarily result in a lower rental for another property. In other words, the individual store rents were not a concern of the lessee companies because their focus was on the overall rent on all of the properties based upon the global purchase price.

Given the foregoing, the condemnor's appraisers were substantially justified in discounting or even disregarding the actual rent for the Moncks Corner store. Clearly a reasonable person could think that this view is correct. The landowner should not be awarded its attorneys' fees and costs solely because the Court agreed with its theory of the case and not with the State's.

II. Should the Court find an award of fees warranted, Petitioner's request should be reduce in that it far exceeds a reasonable lodestar amount under the law and guidelines regarding fee shifting in litigation.

In its petition and the supporting affidavit of Jeffrey S. Tibbals, petitioner seeks \$114,068.82 in attorneys' fees and costs from the Department. As justification, Mr. Tibbals avers, *inter alia*, that the case involved a relatively novel issue of law in South Carolina; that a

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large amount of time (329 hours) was spent on the case; that the two attorneys representing the landowner have 33 and 13 years of experience respectively and are entitled to recover their billing rates of \$400 and \$310 per hour plus \$155 per hour for a paralegal and \$7,855 for their appraiser, Mr. Hartnett; and that the fees requested are typical for the Tri-county area.

The amounts actually billed and paid by parties prevailing against the State do not determine a reasonable fee for awards under fee-shifting statutes. Rather, courts use a "lodestar" approach, i.e. a reasonable rate times a reasonable number of hours.

When determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees under a statute mandating the award of attorney fees, the contract between the client and his counsel does not control the determination of a reasonable hourly rate. See Rice v. Multimedia, Inc., 318 S.C. 95, 456 S.E.2d 381 (1995) (this Court affirmed a trial court's award of an amount greater than that due the plaintiffs [sic] attorney under a contingency fee contract); Columbia (S.C.) Teachers Federal Credit Union v. Newsome, 303 S.C. 162, 399 S.E.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming an award of attorney's fees based upon an hourly rate even though agreement with client was contingency-based); see also, Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) (the court should not automatically adopt the contingent fee or contractual arrangement' instead, the fee awarded may be more or less than that provided by the lawyer-client contract); Lanier v. Moore-Handley, Inc., 575 So.2d 83 (Ala. 1991) (a fee arrangement between the client and his attorney is not conclusive evidence of a reasonable attorney fee; therefore, the court affirmed an award which exceeded the agreed upon hourly rate). Instead, the court should consider the following six factors when determining a reasonable attorney's fee: (1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) the professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees for similar services. Blumberg, supra. Further, on appeal, an award for attorneys will be affirmed so long as sufficient evidence in the record supports each factor. Id. Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 308, 486 S.E. 2d 750, 759-60 (1997).

As the United States Supreme Court said in a lead case on this issue:

A strong presumption that the lodestar figure--the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate--represents a "reasonable" fee is wholly consistent with the rationale behind the usual fee-shifting statute, including the one in the present case. These statutes were not designed as a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys, nor were they intended to replicate exactly the fee an attorney could earn through a private fee arrangement with his client. Instead, the

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aim of such statutes was to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific federal laws. Hence, if plaintiffs, such as Delaware Valley, find it possible to engage a lawyer based on the statutory assurance that he will be paid a "reasonable fee," the purpose behind the fee-shifting statute has been satisfied.

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) (Delaware Valley I). Thus, while Realty Income, a NYSE-listed corporation may have the wherewithal and deem it prudent to retain two experienced attorneys and agree to pay as much as \$400.00 per hour to one of them, clearly such an arrangement is not necessary for the typical condemnee in Berkeley County to obtain counsel. See affidavit of trial counsel John S. West.


Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the issues in this suit were not novel or complex. Rather, the case was a routine condemnation case involving well settled valuation approaches. All appraisals of retail, whether for condemnations, bank loans, or other purposes analyze the income approach to value.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny petitioners request for fees and expenses. To the extent the Court deems an award justified, it should reduce the amount requested to an award at a rate and number of hours that is the least amount necessary to enable a landowner to hire counsel in Berkeley County.

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Respectfully submitted,



John S. West
P.O. Box 1869
Moncks Corner, South Carolina 29461
(843) 761-5626
(843-761-5627 (fax)
Jwestlaw@Homesc.com
Attorney for Respondent, SCDOT

June 25th, 2012
Moncks Corner, SC



AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN S. WEST

Personally appeared before me John S. West, who being duly sworn deposes and says:

1. I am a practicing attorney in Moncks Corner, Berkeley County, South Carolina. My firm name is John S. West, LLC. I was admitted to practice in this State in 1982.
2. I am the attorney of record for the South Carolina Department of Transportation ("SCDOT") in an action captioned South Carolina Department of Transportation, Condemnor, versus RI CS5, LLC, Landowner et al, Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890.
3. Since 2005 I have been an associate counsel for SCDOT concentrating on condemnation work in Berkeley, Dorchester, Georgetown and Horry counties.
4. I am also City Attorney for Moncks Corner.
5. From 1990 to 2004 I was employed by the South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper) in various positions in the Legal Department, including my last position prior to retiring from state service as Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer.
6. Santee Cooper is a major public corporation with the power of eminent domain which it exercises principally in connection with the acquisition of rights of way for its electric and water facilities.
7. From 1990 to 2004 I was in charge of rights of way acquisitions by condemnation for Santee Cooper.
8. Prior to 1990 I was engaged in the private practice of law in Moncks Corner. My practice included condemnation work for public bodies and landowners.
9. Over the past thirty years I would estimate that I have been directly involved in over 300 condemnation suits.
10. For private legal work I currently charge \$250.00 per hour. For SCDOT work I charge \$150.00 per hour based on a directive of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office dated June 13, 2011, copy attached and marked Exhibit "A".
11. I am familiar with the rates charged by lawyers in Berkeley County. Fees average between \$150.00 and \$250.00 per hour.

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12. In the present litigation I expended approximately 100 hours to the case. I did not charge paralegal time or associate time.
13. I prepared pleadings, engaged in all aspects of discovery, participated in mediation, researched the law on matters relevant to the case, negotiated a possible settlement and tried the case.
14. Based on my experience, the total fees sought by counsel for the Landowner, portions of which were calculated on a combined hourly rate of \$710.00 per hour, are not reasonable and justified in a Berkeley County condemnation case.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT

J. West

JOHN S. WEST


Sworn to and subscribed before me
This 25th day of June, 2012

Priscilla C. West
Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission expires 6-22-15



2 of 2/jw

EXHIBIT "A"



ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 13, 2011

Ms. Linda C. McDonald, Chief Counsel
South Carolina Department
of Transportation
P.O. Box 191
Columbia, South Carolina 29202

RE: Form 1 – Request for Authorization to Employ Associate Counsel

Dear Ms. McDonald:

For attorneys hired after July 1, 2008, the following billable hourly rate are applicable to engagement of counsel on and after that date:

Attorneys with 10 or more years of experience	up to \$150.00 per hour
Attorneys with 6 – 9 years of experience	up to \$110.00 per hour
Attorneys with 3 – 5 years of experience	up to \$90.00 per hour
Attorneys with up to 3 years of experience	up to \$80.00 per hour

I am enclosing a copy of a revised Form 1 which can be used to facilitate the approval of attorneys' fees under the rate structure adopted by the Attorney General's Office. As you know, the Comptroller's Office will not authorize the payment of attorneys' fees on any matter unless a Form 1 has been approved by the Attorney General's Office. It is the responsibility of the agency seeking the approval of rates to certify the years of experience of each attorney for whom approval of a rate is requested. Years of experience are to be indicated as of the date of submission of the Form 1.

Please pass this information on to any others at your agency who may have a need to know. Should you have any questions about rates or the revised Form 1, please contact me at 803.734.3705.

Sincerely yours,

T. Stephen Lynch
Deputy Attorney General

TSL/jre
Enclosure

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Priscilla C. West, an employee with the law firm of John S. West, LLC, do hereby certify that I have mailed a copy of Condemnor's Return To Landowner's Application for Award of Reasonable Litigation Expenses and our Certificate of Mailing in the foregoing action upon the recipient, below this 25th day of June, 2012, by placing a copy of same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid and return address clearly indicated, addressed as follows:

Jeffrey S. Tibbals, Esq.
Nexsen Pruet, LLC
PO Box 486
Charleston, SC 29402

Priscilla C. West
Priscilla C. West

Moncks Corner, South Carolina
June 25, 2012

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF BERKELEY

Road/Route U.S. Route 71A
File 8.165B
Item
Project STP-UR08(007)
PCN 32502

South Carolina Department of Transportation,

Condemnor,

vs.

RI-CS5, LLC,

Landowner(s).

and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North
Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
County Treasurer's Office, Lien Holder,

Other Condemnee(s).

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

**REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER
SUPPORT OF LANDOWNER'S
APPLICATION FOR REASONABLE
LITIGATION EXPENSES**

INTRODUCTION

Landowner RI-CS5, LLC ("Landowner") files this Reply Brief in Further Support of Landowner's Application for Reasonable Litigation Expenses to respond to the objections stated in South Carolina Department of Transportation's ("Condemnor") Return to the Application.

In its Return, Condemnor first asserts that this Court should award no fees or costs to Landowner, the prevailing party in this case pursuant to S.C. Code § 28-2-510, because, Condemnor argues, its position was "substantially justified". Condemnor also takes issue with the staffing and hourly rates of Landowner's counsel. Neither argument has merit, and this Court should grant the Application in full.

ARGUMENT

I. CONDEMNOR'S RELIANCE ON THE FEDERAL EQUAL ACCESS TO JUDGMENT ACT IS MISPLACED.

Condemnor argues that this Court should wholly reject Landowner's fee application on the basis that Condemnor's position was "substantially justified". However, Condemnor bases this position on legal interpretation of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Landowner is seeking fees under S.C. Code § 28-2-510, not the Equal Access to Justice Act. In South Carolina, just compensation for a prevailing party includes litigation expenses. This allows landowners who are successful in condemnation actions to not have their awards depleted by the legal fees necessary to obtain the awards. A federal act with some similar language is no reason to deny this Landowner just compensation where the State has taken Landowner's property. Under Condemnor's interpretation of the South Carolina statute, all the SCDOT has to do to avoid paying legal fees is to submit a reasonable appraisal. This would render meaningless the definition of a prevailing party. There is no legal precedent in South Carolina for the adoption of such an extreme position.

Condemnor fails to examine the context of the federal statute as compared to S.C. Code § 28-2-510. The federal Equal Access to Justice Act (the "EAJA") permits the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified . . ." Thus, an award of attorneys' fees under the EAJA depends entirely upon whether the federal government can show substantial justification. Much of the federal case law discussing "substantial justification" does not address the issue within the context of a condemnation proceeding, and pre-dates the 1985 amendment of the statute that added the definition of a prevailing party in condemnation cases.

With respect to the South Carolina statute at issue, whether the Condemnor's position was "substantially justified" is only a factor that may be applied by the trial court, "in its discretion", to reduce an award of litigation expenses. Viewing the statutes in their proper context, it is clear that the "substantially justified" provision is not a bar to the recovery of litigation expenses under S.C. Code § 28-2-510, as it would be under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Rather, this Court may consider whether Condemnor's position was "substantially justified" as one of a number of factors relating to the amount of the award.

In addition, the South Carolina appellate courts have not yet interpreted the meaning of "substantially justified" under S.C. Code § 28-2-510. Nevertheless, there are numerous South Carolina appellate cases discussing the landowner's right to attorneys' fees when landowner is the prevailing party. In the very recent decision of *South Carolina Department of Transportation v. Janell P. Revels, et al.*, S.C. Court of Appeals Opinion No. 5010, filed July 25, 2012, the South Carolina Court of Appeals found that S.C. Code § 28-2-510 shifts the source of the prevailing party's attorneys' fees to the losing party. (A copy of *Revels* is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.) In *Revels*, the Court of Appeals found that while SCDOT offered \$40,300 for the property, the jury awarded \$125,000 to the Landowner. Thus, in a case where the offer and final judgment were much closer than in the case before this Court, the Landowner prevailed and was entitled to reasonable litigation expenses. Therefore, the main thrust of Condemnor's argument consists of speculation as to how the provision might be applied by the South Carolina Supreme Court when South Carolina case law has consistently allowed attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in condemnation actions. Regardless, in this case, Condemnor's position was not substantially justified.

II. ASSUMING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION IS AN ISSUE IN THIS NON-JURY CASE, THE CONDEMNOR'S POSITION WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED

In this case, Condemnor presented no fewer than three appraisals, two by Charles Crider, and one by David Graydon. None of the final opinions of value proffered by Condemnor took the existing lease and rental income into consideration. This is not a case of a runaway jury, or a finding without reason. This was a non-jury action where this Court made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its Final Order And Judgment, this Court found that the final opinions of value in these appraisals were not justified. Below are examples of findings by the Court that are directly contrary to Condemnor's argument that its position was substantially justified:

"I find Mr. Crider's testimony to be little, if any, value for a number of reasons. First, Mr. Crider based his opinions regarding the relevance of the Lease upon the erroneous assumption that the Landowner and the tenant, Worsley Operation Corporation, were related entities. This assumption has no support in the record and, in fact, is thoroughly refuted by the evidence." (Final Order And Judgment dated May 15, 2012, p. 7)

"There is no evidence to support Mr. Crider's contention that the Landowner and Worsley Operating Corporation were the same entity." *Id.* At 8

"Mr. Crider's mistaken assumptions regarding the nature of the transaction render his opinions unreliable. For example, his faulty premise that the landlord and tenant were the same entity served as his justification to exclude the Lease from his analysis of the fair market value of the Property. As discussed in further detail below, I find that the Lease must be considered in determining the fair market value of the Property. In addition, Mr. Crider's erroneous factual analysis led him to wholly ignore the distinction between the Landowner and the owner of the business operations." *Id.*

"Mr. Crider provided additional ill-founded opinions. For example, Mr. Crider testified that the Lease was actually a mortgage, and therefore not reflective of market rent. Tr. at p. 177, 1. 4-p. 178, 1. 20. However, Mr. Crider admitted on cross-examination that he performed no analysis of market rent. Tr. at p. 183, 15-24. Finally, Mr. Crider also erroneously testified that personal property was bought by the Landowner and leased from the Landowner to the tenant, Tr. at p. 177, 1. 17-24; p. 190, 1. 17-24, when the record and the Lease prove the contrary. See Landowner's Exhibit 7 at p. 1, defining the "Premises" as the "Land and Improvements" defined in Exhibit "A" to the Lease, together with the Storage Tank System." *Id.* At 9

“Mr. Graydon’s final opinion of value is based upon the replacement cost approach, but he admitted on cross-examination that where real property is purchased for investment for a stream of income, the most appropriate appraisal method is the income capitalization approach. Tr. at p. 218, l. 19-24.” *Id.*

Mr. Graydon gave no justification for excluding the value of the Leased Fee Estate, other than his opinion that the Lease contained a higher than typical market rental rate, and therefore it appeared to him that the rent “may contain the going concern or the business value.” *Id.*

“The primary legal issue to be decided is whether to take the value of the Lease into consideration in determining the fair market value of the Property, and consequently the just compensation to be awarded to the Landowner.” *Id.* At 10 ...The Condemnor’s reliance upon *Bolt* and its progeny is misplaced in this case. The undisputed facts establish that the Landowner does not have any ownership interest in the operations of the convenience store located on the Property. The Landowner owned only the real estate, while the business operations were owned by Worsley Operating Corporation. Thus, the Condemnor did not take any “going concern” from the Landowner – the Landowner owned no “going concern” business to lose. The separation of the real property and the business operations distinguishes this case from *Bolt*, and other South Carolina cases excluding the going concern value, where the owner of the real property and the business were one and the same. *Id.* at 11

Condemnor’s refusal to acknowledge the value of the lease stood in defiant contradiction to both Condemnor’s own appraisal policies and existing law. Condemnor’s own Right of Way Appraisal Manual states that the income capitalization approach must be demonstrated when appraising investment property. Condemnor blatantly flouted its own guidelines in this case by choosing to ignore the value provided by the lease. Moreover, Condemnor’s refusal to include the value of the lease in its just compensation analysis flew in the face of S.C. Code § 28-2-340(5), which provides for the admissibility of information regarding leases and rents in determining just compensation. Thus, even under Condemnor’s proposed standard, its position was not reasonable in fact or in law, and this Court has so ruled.

Additionally, Condemnor stubbornly refused to acknowledge that the lease had any value throughout the case, and during trial. The first time that Condemnor finally admitted that the

lease increased the value of the real estate came when Condemnor submitted its proposed order. Condemnor's proposed order, at paragraph 17 of the Conclusions of Law section, stated "I consider the lease to have some bearing on the value of the subject property." Until that point, Condemnor had steadfastly denied that the lease was relevant to just compensation. More importantly, by the time that Condemnor finally recognized that the lease held compensable value, the vast majority of attorneys' fees and costs had been spent. Over a hundred thousand dollars in fees and costs was necessary to finally convince Condemnor that its position was ill-founded. Because it was not reasonable to refuse to consider the lease, Condemnor's position was not substantially justified, even under its chosen standard.

III. LANDOWNER'S REQUESTED FEES ARE REASONABLE.


In *Jackson v. Speed*, 326 S.C. 289, 486 S.E.2d 750 (1997), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the following six factors should be considered when determining a reasonable attorney's fee: "(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees for similar services;: *Id.* At 308, 486 S.E.2d at 760.

As detailed in the Affidavit of Richard S. Bybee, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and submitted to the Court in support of Landowner's Application For Reasonable Litigation Expenses, the *Jackson* factors have been satisfied. Additionally, the Affidavit of Jeffrey S. Tibbals submitted with Landowner's Application for Reasonable Litigation Expenses and Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey S. Tibbals, attached hereto as Exhibit 3, support Landowner's claim for litigation expenses. Therefore, this Court should overrule these objections relating to the amount of the fee paid by the Landowner.

CONCLUSION

Landowner did not ask the Condemnor to purchase its property. The property was taken by condemnation. The highest value Condemnor placed on the property was substantially lower than what Landowner paid for the property about one year before the condemnation, and was substantially lower than the award of this Court. Landowner's long, hard legal battle for just compensation was costly, but successful. Without an appropriate award of legal fees and costs, Landowner's award for the value of the property taken will be greatly diminished and not the "just compensation" a prevailing party is allowed to recover under South Carolina law.

For the foregoing reasons, Landowner's Application for Reasonable Litigation Expenses should be granted in full. As indicated by affidavits of Landowner's counsel, the total fees equal \$114,681.50 and the costs of litigation equal \$12,049.32, for a total of \$126,730.82 in reasonable litigation expenses.



Paul A. Dominick, Esquire
Jeffrey S. Tibbals, Esquire
NEXSEN PRUET, LLC
205 King Street, Suite 400 (29401)
PO Box 486
Charleston, South Carolina (29402)
843-577-9440

ATTORNEYS FOR LANDOWNER RI CS5, LLC

August 3, 2012
Charleston, South Carolina

EXHIBIT 1

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals**

South Carolina Department of Transportation,
Respondent,

v.

Janell P. Revels and R.J. Poston, Jr., Landowners, and
John Doe and Mary Roe, representing all unknown
persons having or claiming to have any right, title or
interest in or to, or lien on the lands described herein,
including all unknown heirs of Reamer J. Poston, Sr.
a/k/a/ R.J. Poston Sr., deceased, Unknown Claimants,

Of whom Janell P. Revels and R. J. Poston are,
Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2010-158646

Appeal From Marion County
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5010
Heard March 14, 2012 – Filed July 25, 2012

AFFIRMED

Gene M. Connell, Jr., of Kelaher, Connell & Connor,
P.C., of Surfside Beach, for Appellants.

Beacham O. Brooker, Jr., of the South Carolina
Department of Transportation, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

LOCKEMY, J.: In this appeal from a condemnation action, Janell P. Revels and R.J. Poston, Jr. (the Appellants) argue the circuit court erred in finding they were entitled to attorney's fees based on an hourly rate rather than a contingency fee agreement. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2007, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) served the Appellants with a notice of condemnation.¹ SCDOT subsequently offered the Appellants \$40,300 for their property. In June 2009, the case proceeded to a jury trial where the Appellants prevailed and were awarded \$125,000.

On June 23, 2009, the Appellants filed an application for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 28-2-510(B)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2007). The Appellants sought \$28,233.33 in attorney's fees and \$6,643.91 in costs pursuant to a contingency fee agreement with their attorney. The agreement provided that the Appellants' attorney agreed to represent them on a contingency fee basis of one-third of the gross amount collected over SCDOT's offer of \$40,300. During a hearing before the circuit court, the Appellants argued the court should determine whether the requested contingent attorney's fees were reasonable based on the factors set forth in *Jackson v. Speed*, 326 S.C. 289, 486 S.E.2d 750 (1997). SCDOT argued the contingency fee agreement should not be considered, but rather fees should be calculated based upon the lodestar analysis set forth in *Layman v. State*, 376 S.C. 434, 658 S.E.2d 320 (2008).

In a March 1, 2010 order, the circuit court determined attorney's fees should be based on an hourly rate rather than on the contingency fee agreement between the Appellants and their attorney. Citing the six *Jackson* factors, the circuit court determined Appellants' attorney was entitled to compensation at the rate of \$300 per hour for a total of \$16,290.² The circuit court subsequently denied the Appellants' motion for reconsideration. In its order denying the Appellants'

¹ According to the Appellants' brief, the condemnation notice provided that SCDOT was acquiring .314 acres of the Appellants' property for the construction of the U.S. Highway 378 relocation.

² The circuit court also awarded the Appellants \$6,643.91 in costs. The costs awarded are not at issue in this appeal.

motion, the court found the *Jackson* factors were not applicable. The court also found the Appellants' request for a determination that its contingency fee agreement was reasonable was not applicable in light of *Layman*. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The decision to award or deny attorneys' fees under a state statute will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." *Kiriakides v. School Dist. of Greenville Cnty.*, 382 S.C. 8, 20, 675 S.E.2d 439, 445 (2009) (citing *Layman v. State*, 376 S.C. 434, 444, 658 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2008)). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the [circuit] court are either controlled by an error of law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions." *Id.* "Similarly, the specific amount of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to a statute authorizing reasonable attorneys' fees is left to the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." *Id.*

LAW/ANALYSIS

Layman v. State

The Appellants argue the circuit court erred in relying on *Layman v. State*, 376 S.C. 434, 658 S.E.2d 320 (2008). We disagree.³

"Under the 'American Rule,' the parties to a lawsuit generally bear the responsibility of paying their own attorneys' fees." *Layman*, 376 S.C. at 451, 658 S.E.2d at 329. South Carolina and other jurisdictions "recognize numerous exceptions to this rule, including the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to a statute." *Id.* at 451-52, 658 S.E.2d at 329. "A statutory award of attorneys' fees is typically authorized under what is known as a fee-shifting statute, which permits a prevailing party to recover attorneys' fees from the losing party." *Id.* at 452, 658 S.E.2d at 329.

³ The Appellants also argue they are entitled to attorney's fees based upon their contingency fee agreement in order to satisfy the "just compensation" to which they are entitled under the South Carolina Constitution. Because the Appellants failed to raise this argument to the circuit court, it is not preserved for our review. See *Pye v. Estate of Fox*, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 633 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2006) (holding issues must be raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court to be preserved for appellate review).

In *Layman*, participants in the Teachers and Employee Retention Incentive (TERI) brought a class action suit against the State and the South Carolina Retirement System alleging breach of contract as a result of the State collecting retirement contributions from their paychecks. 376 S.C. at 441, 658 S.E.2d at 323-24. The plaintiffs argued the court's instructions to consider the "benefit to all old TERI participants" in awarding attorney's fees made the determination of a reasonable award analogous to cases in which attorney's fees were awarded from a common fund. *Layman*, 376 S.C. at 453, 658 S.E.2d at 330. The plaintiffs argued that even though the applicable state action statute, section 15-77-300 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011), shifts the source of attorney's fees to the State, the court should find that the circuit judge properly awarded attorney's fees based on the percentage-of-the-recovery approach typically utilized when the source of attorney's fees is spread among the beneficiaries of a common fund. *Id.*

Our supreme court disagreed with the plaintiffs, holding "that because the state action statute shifts the source of the prevailing party's attorneys' fees to the losing party, an award of fees based on a percentage of the prevailing party's recovery is improper." *Id.* at 455, 658 S.E.2d at 331. The court noted:

[U]tilizing common fund methodology when awarding attorneys' fees pursuant to a fee-shifting statute is wholly inappropriate in light of the underlying theoretical distinction between a common fund source of attorneys' fees and a statutory source of attorneys' fees. Although both sources are exceptions to the general rule that each party is responsible for the party's own attorneys' fees, the common fund doctrine is based on the equitable allocation of attorneys' fees among a benefited group, and not the shifting of the attorneys' fee burden to the losing party. This Court certainly acknowledges that a percentage-of-the-recovery approach may be appropriate under circumstances in which a court is given jurisdiction over a common fund from which it must allocate attorneys' fees among a benefited group of litigants. However, where, as here, a fee-shifting statute shifts the source of reasonable attorneys' fees entirely to the losing party, we find it both illogical and erroneous to calculate fees using the methodology justified under a fee-spreading theory.

Id. at 453-454, 658 S.E.2d at 330. The court found a lodestar analysis was the proper method for determining an award of reasonable attorneys' fees under the state action statute. *Id.* at 457, 658 S.E.2d at 332. "A lodestar figure is designed to reflect the reasonable time and effort involved in litigating a case, and is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable time expended." *Id.*

Here, the Appellants argue *Layman* is not applicable because the state action statute at issue in *Layman*, section 15-77-300, is not at issue in the present case. They contend the Eminent Domain Procedure Act⁴ (the Act) provides the proper procedure for determining reasonable litigation expenses. SCDOT argues the analysis in *Layman* is not limited to section 15-77-300, but also applies to the Act.

The Act provides the procedural guidelines for determining just compensation with regards to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Pursuant to the Act, a landowner who prevails in the trial of a condemnation action, in addition to his compensation for the property, may recover his "reasonable litigation expenses." S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510(B)(1) (2007). "Litigation expenses" are defined in the Act as

the reasonable fees, charges, disbursements, and expenses necessarily incurred from and after service of the Condemnation Notice, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees, appraisal fees, engineering fees, deposition costs, and other expert witness fees necessary for preparation or participation in condemnation actions and the actual cost of transporting the court and jury to view the premises.

S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-30(14) (2007). In any application for attorney's fees under the Act, the landowner

shall show that [he] has prevailed, state the amount sought, and include an itemized statement from an attorney or expert witness representing or appearing at trial in behalf of the landowner stating the fee charged, the basis therefor, the actual time expended, and all actual expenses for which recovery is sought.

⁴ S.C. Code Ann. §§ 28-2-10 to -510 (2007).

S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510(B)(1) (2007). The court can, in its discretion, reduce or deny the amount to be awarded if it determines the landowner "engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or to the extent the court finds that the position of the condemnor was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." *Id.*

We find *Layman* is controlling in this case. Here, section 28-2-510, like section 15-77-300, shifts the source of the prevailing party's attorney's fees to the losing party, the State. According to *Layman*, it is improper to award a percentage-of-the-recovery as fees under a statute that shifts the source of attorney's fees to the losing party. Furthermore, as the court explained in *Layman*, it is improper to award a percentage-of-the-recovery under a statute that explicitly requires an attorney to state his hours. The *Layman* court found:

[A]n award based on a percentage of the TERI plaintiffs' recovery is inconsistent with the express terms of the statutory scheme. Although the state action statute neither requires that attorneys' fees be awarded based on an hourly rate, nor places a numerical cap on attorneys' fees, we find it significant that the statute provides that attorneys' fees assessed to the state agency may only be paid 'upon presentation of an itemized accounting of the attorney's fees.' S.C. Code Ann. § 15-77-330 (2005). In our opinion, the requirement of an 'itemized accounting' squarely contradicts the utilization of the percentage-of-the-recovery method in awarding attorneys' fees under the statute.

376 S.C. at 454, 658 S.E.2d at 330-31. Like section 15-77-300, section 28-2-510(B)(1) requires the presentation of an itemized statement from an attorney detailing his fee, hours, and expenses. As the *Layman* court found, this requirement "squarely contradicts" the percentage-of-the-recovery approach.

We also note the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina recently discussed *Layman* in *Sauders v. South Carolina Public Service Authority*, 2011 WL 1236163 (D.S.C. 2011). In *Sauders*, the District Court found the plaintiffs' contingency fee agreement was merely one of many factors to be taken into consideration in determining the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees due to the plaintiffs arising out of their inverse condemnation claims pursuant to section

28-11-30 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011).⁵ Citing *Layman*, the *Sauders* court gave "enhanced consideration" to the actual amount of work performed, the customary legal fees for similar services, and the benefit obtained for all plaintiffs. *Sauders*, 2011 WL 1236163 at 7. The District Court noted that "[e]mphasizing these criteria remains consistent with awarding fees pursuant to a fee-shifting statute." *Id.*

Accordingly, we find the circuit court did not err in relying on *Layman*.

Jackson v. Speed

The Appellants argue the circuit court erred in failing to determine whether the requested attorney's fees were reasonable pursuant to *Jackson v. Speed*, 326 S.C. 289, 486 S.E.2d 750 (1997). We disagree.

In *Jackson*, our supreme court held that "[w]hen determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees under a statute mandating the award of attorney fees, the contract between the client and his counsel does not control the determination of a reasonable hourly rate." 326 S.C. at 308, 486 S.E.2d at 759. The court held the following six factors should be considered when determining a reasonable attorney's fee: "(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees for similar services." *Id.* at 308, 486 S.E.2d at 760.

Here, the circuit court, in its order, stated

I have taken into consideration the following items in reaching a decision in this matter:

- a) Major extent and difficulty of the case;
- b) Time necessarily devoted to the case;
- c) Professional standing of counsel;
- d) Contingency of compensation; and
- e) Beneficial results obtained.

⁵ Section 28-11-30 deals with reimbursement for property owners for certain expenses under the relocation assistance chapter. S.C. Code Ann. § 28-11-30 (Supp. 2011).

Based on the factors set forth above, I do find that [the Appellants are] entitled to an award of attorney's fees but that the attorney's fees should be based on an hourly rate rather than on a contingency fee agreement between [the Appellants'] attorney and his client[s].

In their motion for reconsideration, the Appellants argued the circuit court's ruling did not address any of the *Jackson* factors the court must consider in awarding attorney's fees. Subsequently, in its order denying the Appellants' motion for reconsideration, the circuit court found the *Jackson* factors were not applicable. The court further stated that the Appellants' "request for attorney's fees and whether or not a contingent attorney fee under S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510(B) are reasonable are not applicable in light of the *Layman* decision."

On appeal, the Appellants contend that although the circuit court cited the six *Jackson* factors in its order, it relied on the factors "only in determining the lodestar multiplier" and did not rule whether the Appellants' agreed upon contingency fee was reasonable under the Act. Relying on *Vick v. South Carolina Department of Transportation*, 347 S.C. 470, 556 S.E.2d 693 (Ct. App. 2001), the Appellants argue the circuit court should have first determined whether the requested attorney's fees were reasonable in accordance with the *Jackson* factors.

In *Vick*, a property owner brought an inverse condemnation action against SCDOT, alleging damage to a private road. 347 S.C. at 475, 556 S.E.2d at 696. After a finding by the master-in-equity that the road was privately owned and had not been dedicated to the public, the circuit court entered judgment on the jury verdict and awarded *Vick*, the property owner, attorney's fees pursuant to section 28-2-510(A). *Id.* at 476, 556 S.E.2d at 696. After the trial, *Vick*'s attorney submitted an affidavit stating that he had worked for *Vick* in the past at an hourly rate of \$130, but in this case the fee agreement called for a one-third contingency fee. *Id.* at 483, n.6, 556 S.E.2d at 700, n.6. *Vick*'s attorney stated that he spent 137.2 hours on this matter, plus 59.1 hours by an associate, and 7.7 hours of paralegal time. *Id.* The circuit court awarded *Vick* \$41,425.00 in attorney's fees. *Id.* SCDOT appealed and this court found that "[t]o the extent SCDOT asserts the attorney fees are excessive because they exceed the amount that would be due on an hourly basis, this issue also was not preserved In any event, the award was not error." *Id.* at 483, 556 S.E.2d at 700. Based upon the *Jackson* factors, this court found that the "circuit judge's order in this case shows that he considered these factors in determining a figure he believed constituted reasonable compensation." *Id.* at 484, 556 S.E.2d at 701.

Here, the circuit court was not required to first make a determination regarding the reasonableness of the contingency fee agreement. The South Carolina District Court recently analyzed *Vick* in *Sauders*. The *Sauders* court held that although this court's language in *Vick* concerning the amount of reasonable attorney's fees was dicta because the issue was not preserved for appeal, the discussion in *Vick* was relevant to determining the method of attorney's fees. 2011 WL 1236163 at 5. The District Court found *Vick* "demonstrates that after analyzing the six factors a court should consider in determining a reasonable attorney's fee, a court could conclude that a reasonable attorney's fee under the circumstances of the particular case is an amount close to or equal to the contingency fee contract." *Id.* However, the District Court noted "*Vick* does not hold that the contingency fee contract controls the determination of what is a reasonable attorney's fee in an inverse condemnation action." *Id.* The District Court noted that "South Carolina law specifically rejects the notion that a contingency fee contract controls a court's determination of reasonable attorneys' fees due to a plaintiff pursuant to a statute mandating the award of attorney's fees." *Id.*

Accordingly, in light of *Layman* and *Sauders*, we find the circuit court was not required to first determine the reasonableness of the Appellants' contingency fee agreement.

Consideration of Fee Agreement

Relying on *Kiriakides v. School District of Greenville County*, 382 S.C. 8, 675 S.E.2d 439 (2009), the Appellants argue a contingency fee agreement between a landowner and his attorney must be considered by the court when determining reasonable attorney's fees. The Appellants contend it is contradictory for SCDOT to argue the circuit court should not consider the Appellants' contingency fee agreement when, in *Kiriakides*, the condemnor argued the contingency fee agreement between the condemnee and his attorney controlled. Because the Appellants failed to raise this argument to the circuit court, it is not preserved for our review. *See Pye*, 369 S.C. at 564, 633 S.E.2d at 510 (holding issues must be raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court to be preserved for appellate review).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court.

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

EXHIBIT 2

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF BERKELEY

Road/Route U.S. Route 71A
File 8.165B
Item
Project STP-UR08(007)
PCN 32502

South Carolina Department of Transportation,

Condemnor,

vs.

RI CS5, LLC,

Landowner(s).

and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North
Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
County Treasurer's Office, Lien Holder,

Other Condemnee(s).

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

**AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD D. BYBEE**

PERSONALLY APPEARED before me, Richard D. Bybee, who being first duly sworn does state as follows:

1. My name is Richard Bybee. I am over twenty-one years of age and competent in all respects to testify about the matters herein.
2. I am a partner in the firm of Smith, Bundy, Bybee & Barnett, located in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. The firm focuses on many real estate related areas of practice, including eminent domain. I have been with the firm since 1989.
3. I have practiced law for over 30 years. I served as Assistant Attorney General for the South Carolina Attorney General from 1977 to 1982.
4. From 1983 to 1989, I served as Deputy Chief Counsel for the South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation. In that capacity, I was involved in eminent domain matters throughout the State of South Carolina.
5. Since 1989, my private practice has involved representation of landowners, including landowners in Berkeley County, and condemning authorities in eminent domain matters. I have been involved in all aspects of such matters, including trial and appeals.



6. I am a member of the South Carolina Bar, and admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina.

7. Mr. Dominick and Mr. Tibbals have earned and enjoy excellent reputations among the legal community in South Carolina. The law firm of Nexsen Pruet, LLC also enjoys a reputation of providing excellent legal representation.

8. I have reviewed the Landowner's Application for Award of Reasonable Litigation Expenses, the Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of Jeffrey S. Tibbals, with Exhibits (including billing records of Nexsen Pruet, LLC), Condemnor's Return to Landowner's Application for Award of Reasonable Litigation Expenses, and the Final Order and Judgment in this matter.

9. Based upon my experience, a reasonable and customary rate for handling a matter of this complexity in Charleston tri-county area, including Berkeley County, would be \$350 per hour. Although Mr. Dominick's combined hourly rate was \$382 an hour, this is offset by Mr. Tibbals' combined rate of \$310 per hour, for an average rate of \$346 per hour. Thus, it is my opinion that rates charged by Nexsen Pruet, LLC are reasonable.

10. The division of labor between Mr. Dominick and Mr. Tibbals was reasonable for a case such as this one. It appears most of Mr. Dominick's involvement was up to and through mediation, while Mr. Tibbals handled discovery and most of the trial preparation. Considering the evidence being presented and the substantial amount at stake in the case, having two experienced attorneys, a senior partner and a junior partner, at trial was reasonable.

11. This was a complex case that was aggressively litigated by Condemnor. Condemnor presented two experts and three appraisals to support the offer to Landowner. Additionally, Condemnor asserted that the market value of the lease on the property could not be considered in determining just compensation. This unjustified legal position, in combination with Condemnor's multiple appraisals increased the work required of Landowner's counsel to successfully prosecute Landowner's claim for just compensation. Landowner's counsel was successful in achieving an excellent result.

12. Considering the complexity and substantial nature of the matter, discovery, mediation, trial, and the result achieved, the amount of time devoted to asserting the Landowner's claim for compensation was reasonable and appropriate.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.


RICHARD D. BYBEE

SWORN TO and subscribed before me
this 1st day of August, 2012.



NOTARY PUBLIC FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
My Commission Expires: 3.9.19

EXHIBIT 3

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF BERKELEY

Road/Route U.S. Route 71A
File 8.165B
Item
Project STP-UR08(007)
PCN 32502

South Carolina Department of Transportation,

Condemnor,

vs.

RI CS5, LLC,

Landowner(s).

and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North
Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
County Treasurer's Office, Lien Holder,

Other Condemnee(s).

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

**SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
JEFFREY S. TIBBALS**

PERSONALLY APPEARED before me, Jeffrey S. Tibbals, who being first duly sworn does state as follows:

1. I am one of the attorneys for the Landowner, RI CS5, LLC and its sole member Realty Income Corporation ("Landowner"), in the above-captioned action practicing with the firm of Nexsen Pruet, LLC ("Nexsen Pruet").

2. This Supplemental Affidavit supplements and updates my previous Affidavit dated June 1, 2012 filed in support of Landowner's Application for Award of Reasonable Litigation Expenses of even date.

3. The table attached as Exhibit A hereto shows the time spent, amount charged, and average billable rate of each of the timekeepers who worked on this matter. Because Nexsen Pruet, LLC's involvement in this matter began on or around April 28, 2009, certain timekeeper rates were adjusted over the years in accordance with the firm's normal business practices.


4. Since May 18, 2012, additional attorneys' fees and costs in this matter have accrued in an amount totaling \$13,401.78, as shown on the attached Exhibit B.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.



Jeffrey S. Tibbals

SWORN TO and subscribed before me
this 2nd day of August, 2012.



NOTARY PUBLIC FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
My Commission Expires: 02-24-13

EXHIBIT "A"

Matter Timekeeper Summary - Amount Worked

<u>Number</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Worked Amount</u>	<u>Hours Worked</u>	<u>Combined Rate *</u>
149	Dominick, Paul	Partner	44,000.00	115.30	\$ 382.00
127	Groves, Stephen	Partner	608.00	1.60	\$ 380.00
450	James, Eric	Paralegal	204.00	1.20	\$ 170.00
483	Jervey, Neyle	Paralegal	60.00	0.40	\$ 150.00
486	Joyner, Sara	Paralegal	68.00	0.40	\$ 170.00
413	Leclerc, Denise	Paralegal	7,625.00	44.60	\$ 170.00
451	Taylor, Kimberly	Paralegal	883.50	5.70	\$ 155.00
306	Tibbals, Jeffrey	Partner	61,233.00	198.00	\$ 310.00
	Total		114,681.50	367.20	

* Dominick and Tibbals Combined Rates are rounded up.

EXHIBIT "B"

Cost Summary - Unbilled



Matter Description WF INTERMEDIATE REAL ESTATE, LLC VS. SCDOT AND Matter Number 038854-00002
 Client Name REALTY INCOME CORPORATION Client Number 038854

	01	08	2012	New Period	0812	01/12-08/12	LTD
Description	Currency	Amount	Billable Amount	Amount	Billable Amount	Amount	Billable Amount
<u>FILING FEES</u>	USD	0.00	0.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00
<u>COMMUNICATION CHARGES</u>	USD	0.00	0.00	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02
<u>POSTAGE</u>	USD	0.00	0.00	6.30	6.30	6.30	6.30
<u>COPIES</u>	USD	0.20	0.20	60.60	60.60	60.60	60.60
<u>COURIER SERVICES</u>	USD	0.00	0.00	40.50	40.50	40.50	40.50
<u>WESTLAW RESEARCH</u>	USD	0.00	0.00	14.36	14.36	14.36	14.36
Total		0.20	0.20	147.78	147.78	147.78	147.78

Matter Timekeeper Summary - Unbilled Fees



Matter Description WF INTERMEDIATE REAL ESTATE, LLC VS. SCDOT AND
Currency USD
Matter Number 038854-00002

Number	Name	Title	Worked Hours	Worked Amount	Billable Hours	Billable Amount
<u>0149</u>	DOMINICK, PAUL	PARTNER	15.40	6,468.00	15.40	6,468.00
<u>0306</u>	TIBBALS, JEFFREY	PARTNER	23.00	7,245.00	20.00	6,300.00
<u>0413</u>	LECLERC, DENISE	PARALEGAL	2.70	486.00	2.70	486.00
			41.10	14,199.00	38.10	13,254.00

Date	Initials	Name / Invoice Number	Description	Hours	Amount
5/21/2012		306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT SIGNED BY JUDGE WATSON.	0.3	94.50
5/21/2012		306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER, LAURA KING, SUSIE ONATE AND PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING ORDER.	0.1	31.50
5/21/2012		306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER DEADLINE FOR ATTORNEY FEES APPLICATION.	0.1	31.50
5/28/2012		306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTE REGARDING APPLICATION FOR AWARD OF LITIGATION EXPENSES.	0.3	94.50
5/30/2012		306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER SIX FACTOR TEST FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES UNDER SOUTH CAROLINA LAW.	0.4	126.00
5/30/2012		413 DENISE LECLERC	DRAFT PETITION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COST, AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY TIBBALS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, LETTER TO BERKELEY COUNTY REGARDING PETITION FOR AWARE OF COSTS; RESEARCH AND PREPARE EXHIBITS FOR FEES AND COSTS; COMMUNICATIONS WITH COUNSEL REGARDING SAME.	2.7	486.00
5/31/2012 billed amt.		306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	WORK ON ATTORNEY FEES ISSUE; REVISE AND AMEND APPLICATION FOR REASONABLE LITIGATION EXPENSES, REVISE AND AMEND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS FEES; REVIEW ALL BILLING ENTRIES; WORK ON COMPILATION OF EXPENSES AND FOLLOW UP WITH TOMMY HARTNETT'S OFFICE REGARDING CHARGES/PAYMENTS.	2.3	724.50

6/1/2012 billed amt	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	FURTHER REVISE AND AMEND APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES; REVISE AND AMEND AFFIDAVITS; REVIEW AND CONSIDER TIMEKEEPING AND COST RECORDS; REVIEW HARTNETT INVOICES AND CONSIDER SAME; FURTHER REVISE AND AMEND AFFIDAVIT; REVISE AND AMEND COST SPREADSHEET; DRAFT LETTER TO CLERK OF COURT REGARDING LANDOWNER'S APPLICATION FOR AWARD OF REASONABLE LITIGATION EXPENSES AND THE AFFIDAVIT.	3.9 1.9	1,228.50
6/1/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW AND REVISE MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEYS FEES; CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING THE SAME.	0.4	168.00
6/5/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT LETTER TO JUDGE WATSON REGARDING CONSENT ORDER PERMITTING TRIAL EXHIBITS TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL.	0.2	63.00
6/5/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND LETTER TO JUDGE WATSON.	0.1	31.50
6/6/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON LEGAL FEE ISSUES.	0.4	168.00
6/6/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING RETURN TO APPLICATION FOR REASONABLE LITIGATION EXPENSES.	0.1	31.50
6/6/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING TRIAL, FEE APPLICATION.	0.3	94.50
6/6/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT E-MAIL MEMO TO CLIENT REGARDING SCDOT POSITION ON FEE APPLICATION.	0.2	63.00
6/6/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST	0.1	31.50

REGARDING TIMING OF RETURNS.				
6/6/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER STRATEGY, POTENTIAL APPEALS ISSUES.	0.2	63.00
6/7/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH DARCEA MONTGOMERY OF JUDGE WATSON'S OFFICE REGARDING ORDER PERMITTING EXHIBITS TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL.	0.1	31.50
6/7/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH DARCEA MONTGOMERY REGARDING SEAL ORDER.	0.1	31.50
6/11/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE DISCUSSION WITH MR. BYBEE CONCERNING AFFIDAVIT RELATING TO REASONABLENESS OF LEGAL FEES; CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING SAME.	0.6	252.00
6/12/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW SIGNED ORDER REGARDING EXHIBITS UNDER SEAL, CONSIDER PROCEDURES.	0.2	63.00
6/15/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER STATUS OF FILING DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL; REVIEW COURT PROCEDURES REGARDING SAME.	0.5	157.50
6/26/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING CONDEMNOR'S RETURN TO FEE APPLICATION.	0.2	63.00
6/26/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING STRATEGY FOR RESPONSE ON SCDOT'S OBJECTION TO FEES.	0.1	31.50
6/26/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER SCDOT RETURN TO APPLICATION FOR FEES AND E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH CLIENT REPRESENTATIVES REGARDING SAME.	0.6	189.00

6/27/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JUDGE WATSON, JOHN WEST REGARDING SCDOT'S RETURN TO APPLICATION FOR FEES, POTENTIAL RESOLUTION AND PLANNED SCHEDULE.	0.4	126.00
6/27/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER STRATEGY FOR RATIONAL RESPONSE TO STATED OBJECTIONS TO FEES BY SCDOT AND E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING SAME.	0.5	157.50
7/2/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING ADJUSTMENTS TO FEES, CALCULATIONS, STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH SCDOT.	0.1	31.50
7/2/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER STRATEGY AND CALCULATIONS.	0.2	63.00
7/2/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT, REVIEW AND AMEND E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING OFFER TO SETTLE ON FEE APPLICATION.	0.5	157.50
7/6/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING SCDOT POSITION ON APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY FEES.	0.1	31.50
7/6/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY FEES.	0.2	63.00
7/6/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER, PAUL DOMINICK REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES, REPLY AFFIDAVIT.	0.2	63.00
7/9/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM JOHN WEST REGARDING COUNTEROFFER FOR ATTORNEYS FEES.	0.1	31.50

7/9/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER STRATEGY ON FEE RECOVERY.	0.2	63.00
7/9/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT E-MAIL MEMO TO MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING FEES.	0.2	63.00
7/9/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT.	0.1	31.50
7/9/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON ATTORNEYS' FEE ISSUES.	0.5	210.00
7/10/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING SCDOT OFFER ON ATTORNEYS FEES.	0.1	31.50
7/10/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER STRATEGY REGARDING FEE RECOVERY.	0.2	63.00
7/16/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MIKE PFEIFFER REGARDING COUNTEROFFER TO SCDOT AND CONSIDER SAME.	0.3	94.50
7/16/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW CALCULATIONS AND DRAFT E-MAIL MEMO TO JOHN WEST REGARDING COUNTEROFFER.	0.3	94.50
7/18/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	WORK ON LEGAL FEE ISSUES.	0.3	126.00
7/18/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONSIDER STRATEGY FOR FEE SETTLEMENT.	0.2	63.00
7/23/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	CONDUCT LEGAL RESEARCH REGARDING SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED STANDARD UNDER FEDERAL EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT AND SOUTH CAROLINA CODE § 15-77-300.	1.8	567.00
7/23/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT, REVISE AND AMEND REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR REASONABLE LITIGATION EXPENSES.	4.1	1,291.50

7/23/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	CALL TO MR. BYBEE CONCERNING AFFIDAVIT; CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS.	0.3	126.00
7/24/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	RESEARCH RELATED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES.	1	420.00
7/24/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVISE AND AMEND REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS FEES.	1.2	378.00
7/24/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JOHN WEST REGARDING FEE ISSUE.	0.1	31.50
7/24/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH JOHN WEST, JUDGE WATSON REGARDING AGREED UPON EXTENSION FOR REPLY ON FEE APPLICATION.	0.1	31.50
7/25/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE FROM JUDGE WATSON REGARDING FEE APPLICATION.	0.1	31.50
7/26/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	EMAIL EXPERT; TELEPHONE DISCUSSION WITH MR. BYBEE CONCERNING AFFIDAVIT; WORK ON AFFIDAVIT.	1.2	504.00
7/30/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	DRAFT AFFIDAVIT OF MR. BYBEE; REVIEW MOTION AND BRIEF.	2.5	1,050.00
7/31/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	REVIEW NEW CASE; FORWARD TO CLIENT; WORK ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF AND AFFIDAVIT OF MR. BYBEE; TELEPHONE DISCUSSION WITH MR. BYBEE.	3.2	1,344.00
8/1/2012	149 PAUL DOMINICK	TELEPHONE DISCUSSION WITH MR. BYBEE CONCERNING HIS CHANGES TO THE AFFIDAVIT; CONFERENCE WITH MR. TIBBALS CONCERNING SUPPLEMENT AFFIDAVIT; REVISE AND FINALIZE REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF LANDOWNER'S	5	2,100.00


APPLICATION FOR REASONABLE LITIGATION
EXPENSES.

8/1/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW BILLING RECORDS SINCE MAY 18, 2012.	0.4	126.00
8/1/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	REVIEW AND CONSIDER BYBEE AFFIDAVIT.	0.2	63.00
8/1/2012	306 JEFFREY TIBBALS	DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT REGARDING RATES AND RECENT ACCRUED COSTS.	0.7	220.50
	UNBILLED TOTALS: WORK:	59 records	41.1	14,199.00
	UNBILLED TOTALS: BILL:		38.1	13,254.00
	GRAND TOTALS: WORK:	59 records	41.1	14,199.00
	GRAND TOTALS: BILL:		38.1	13,254.00

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Tina B. Sessions, an employee with the law firm of Nexsen Pruet, LLC, do hereby certify that I have mailed a copy of the **REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF LANDOWNER'S APPLICATION FOR REASONABLE LITIGATION EXPENSES** and our Certificate of Mailing in the foregoing action upon the recipient below this 3rd day of August, 2012, by placing a copy of same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid and return address clearly indicated, addressed as follows:

John S. West, LLC
Attorneys at Law
207 Carolina Avenue
Post Office Box 1869
Moncks Corner, SC 29461



Tina B. Sessions

Charleston, South Carolina

August 3, 2012

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

County of Berkeley

Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

Road/Route	U.S. Route 71A
File	8.165B
Item	
Project	STP-UR08(007)
PCN	32502

South Carolina Department of Transportation,
Condemnor,

v.

ORDER DENYING LITIGATION
EXPENSES

RI CS5, LLC,

Landowner(s)

and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North
 Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley
 County Treasurer's Office, Lien Holder,

Other Condemnee(s).

This matter is before me on the Landowner's Application for Award of Reasonable Litigation Expenses. The court heard counsel in this matter in Moncks Corner on October 2, 2012.

The Landowner, as a prevailing party in a condemnation case, has requested that the Court award it fees for two attorneys in the amount of \$114,068.82 plus other costs and expert witness fees in the amount of \$12,049.32 for a total award of \$126,730.82. The condemnor, the Department of Transportation, submitted a return requesting that the Court deny the same on the grounds that the litigating position of the Department in the condemnation case was substantially justified under the meaning of that term in the governing statute. I find that the condemnor's litigating position was substantially justified, being reasonably grounded in the facts and law,

and that under the circumstances of the case an award of costs against the State would not be just or equitable. I therefore deny landowner's application.

Initially, I will briefly discuss the landowner's argument that an award of fees and costs are part of the just compensation due under the law of eminent domain, therefore, denial of that recovery would unconstitutionally reduce the amount of that compensation. The constitutions of South Carolina and that of the United States require that just compensation be made and paid to a landowner before taking private property for public use. S.C. Code Ann. Constitution, art. 1, §13; U.S. Constitution, Amend. V. The constitutions do not define just compensation but leave that to the legislature. The South Carolina General Assembly has defined the term in the Eminent Domain Procedure Act, S.C. Code Ann. §28-2-10, *et. seq.*, as the value of the property taken plus any diminution in the remaining property less any benefits provided by the project. S.C. Code Ann. §28-2-370 (Rev. 2007). In a separate section of the Act, discussed more fully below, the legislature provided that the trial judge may award costs and fees to a prevailing party if it finds the government's litigating position was not "substantially justified" and no other circumstances make an award unjust. Clearly, if the General Assembly had intended that just compensation include fees against the State, it would have included that in the general definition instead of a separate section. With the exception of the specific section of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act, I find nothing in the law that would differentiate a condemnation case from any other class of cases that are governed by the "American Rule" that each party to litigation bear its own costs.

The law governing fee awards in condemnations is contained in S.C. Code Ann. §28-2-510 (B)(1)(Rev. 2007). That Code section is part of the S.C. Eminent Domain Procedure Act enacted in 1987. The section provides that the court on application from a prevailing party may

award fees and costs as part of the condemnation judgment. “Prevails” is defined as compensation awarded that is at least as close to the highest valuation testified to on behalf of the landowner as the highest amount testified to on behalf of the condemnor. The section goes on to say that,

The court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this section, or deny the award, to the extent that the landowner, during the course of the action, engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or to the extent the court finds that the position of the condemnor was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

The “substantially justified” language above mirrors that in the main federal fee-shifting statute involving the government, the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412.¹ That statute, enacted in 1980, provides in part,

(d)(1) ...a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and expenses...unless the court finds the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

South Carolina appellate courts have relied on federal jurisprudence for the definition of “substantially justified.” There is an abundance of legislative history and case law interpretations of the federal statute. See, generally, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 130 (“What constitutes substantial justification of government’s position so as to prohibit awards of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, (28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A).”) With regard to the legislative history, that annotation refers to the House Judiciary Committee Report which states that the substantial justification test is essentially one of reasonableness. Thus, no award is intended where the government can show that its case had a reasonable basis in both law and in

¹ Both the federal and the South Carolina statutes negate the “American Rule” that each party to a lawsuit bear its own costs. Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., Inc., 340 S.C. 626, 532 S.E.2d 856 (2000). Further, statutes waiving the state’s immunity from suit being in derogation of sovereignty must be strictly construed and the State can be sued only in the manner and upon the terms and conditions prescribed by the statute.

fact. The Report explains that the substantial justification standard should not be read to raise the presumption that the government was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case, and indicates that the standard does not require the government to establish that its decision to litigate was based on a substantial probability of prevailing. 69 A.L.R. Fed 130.

Regarding the federal case law, Am. Jur. Fed. has a good summary:

To be substantially justified means, of course, more than merely undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness. However, a position can be justified even though it is not correct and can be substantially (that is, for the most part) justified if a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact. It must have enough foundation in law and fact that a reasonable person could think it correct; in other words, such position must be sufficiently colorable to engender "genuine dispute."

32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts, §260.

Our appellate courts have used similar language in interpreting the term substantially justified contained in another fee-shifting statute, S.C. Code Ann. §15-77-300 (Supp. 2011) (the "State action" statute.) In Heath v. County of Aiken, 302 S.C. 178, 394 S.E.2d 709 (1990), after remand to the circuit court to consider the factors in Code section 15-77-300, on re-appeal the Supreme Court stated that,

Secondly, we must examine whether the Council acted without substantial justification in pressing its claim. In *Pierce*, the Supreme Court discussed the definition of "substantial justification" in the context of attorney's fees a determined that this term does not mean "'justified to a high degree', but rather 'justified in substance or in the main'-that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person." 108 S.Ct. at 2250. To say that there was no substantial justification is not the same as a determination that a claim was frivolous. Therefore, a court need not go so far as to brand a claim "frivolous" in order for it to be found to be without substantial justification. *Pierce v. Underwood*, 108 S.Ct. at 2551.

Heath, supra, 302 S.C. at 183, 394 S.E.2d at 712.

In Video Gaming Consultants, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't. of Revenue, 358 S.C. 647, 652, 595 S.E.2d 890, 892 (Ct. App. 2004), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's award of fees against the State in a case concerning a South Carolina statute that arguably had been made unconstitutional by a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court stated that the U.S. Supreme Court decision was subject to interpretation and that, in any event, the SCDOR attorneys were obligated to follow the statute since all statutes are presumed to be constitutional until stricken by a competent court. The State's position was substantially justified and fees should not have been awarded.

Trial of this case, as most condemnation cases, involved the testimony of expert appraisal witnesses as to their opinions of the value of the property condemned. Mr. Thomas F. Hartnett testified for the landowner. Messrs. Charles F. Crider and David Ray Graydon, Jr. testified for the condemnor. Each was qualified as an expert to testify as to their opinion on the real estate valuation. The law and rules governing such testimony are contained in case law and in certain published appraisal standards of the appraisal industry, primarily the publication Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and Advisory Opinions, the Appraisal Foundation (2005) ("USPAP"). With regard to the case law,

It must be remembered that in condemnation cases valuation is not a matter of mere mathematical calculation, but involves the exercise of judgment.

4 Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, §12.01, p, 12-31; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Southern Pac. Co., 268 U.S. 146, 156, 45 S.Ct. 465, 467, 69 L.Ed. 890 (1925).

Nichols states,

All elements of value inherent in the property merit consideration in the valuation process. Every element which affects value and which would influence a prudent purchaser should be considered. No single element, standing alone, is decisive

and, of course, illegal considerations should be ignored. No general rule can be inflexibly adhered to. Each case necessarily differs from all others insofar as its factual situation is concerned, and exceptional circumstances render imperative a fair degree of elasticity in application of the fundamental rule.

Irrespective of the method adopted for the ascertainment of such value, it is incumbent on the condemnor to endeavor to reach a result that is truly "just compensation," that is, fair to the public as well as to the owner of the property taken.

4 Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, §12.01, pp. 12-1 – 12-7.

USPAP recognizes a number of valid approaches to determining value. The most relevant with regard to commercial real property are the cost approach, the sales comparables approach, and the income approach. After analyzing each, the appraiser then applies his judgment as to which approach to accord the greater weight and which approaches to discount or disregard. See, generally, USPAP, Standard 1.

Mr. Hartnett testified that his analysis indicated a value for the property under the sales comparable approach as \$444,500. However, in his reconciliation of the values, he gave greater weight to the capitalization of income approach using the existing lease and discounting the capitalized rent for certain reasons. His opinion was that the property was worth \$900,000.

On the other hand, Messrs. Crider and Graydon, in their testimony for the condemnor, discounted the income approach relying more heavily instead the sales comparable approach. Their stated reasons for doing so were that the actual rent was not arrived at in a true arms-length transaction and was much higher than the comparable rents for convenience stores locally. All three appraisers agreed that the rent was above market. The opinions of the condemnor's appraisers have ample support in the record.

Michael Robert Pfeiffer, executive vice president of the landowner's parent company, Realty Income Corporation, testified at trial as to the background of his company's acquisition of

the real estate and the process followed for valuing it and determining rental rates. At some point in 2008, a company, Sun Capital, approached Realty Income concerning its desire to purchase 75 convenience stores owned and operated the Worsley Companies. Not desiring to own the real estate but only the operating business, Sun asked Realty Income to purchase the land and improvements and lease it back to them. Realty Income then closed on a purchase of all the properties of Worsley for \$65,350,000. Then Realty Income allocated the total purchase price among the properties with the result that it valued the Moncks Corner store at \$1.15 million. Realty Income then determined that it required a rate of return of 8.9% and applied that percentage to the allocated values of each of the stores. The result was that the rent set for the store at issue was \$8,517.67 per month to be increased periodically per the CPI.

According to the Department, the conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that, although the global purchase price of all the Worsley properties was reached between the buyer and seller in an arms-length transaction, and Worsley/Sun assented to the overall rental rate of return on all of the properties, the actual rental for the Moncks corner store was set unilaterally and arbitrarily by the owner, landowner, Realty Income for their subsidiary RICS 5. Moreover, Worsley or Sun had no incentive or reason to protest the rental rate on the Moncks Corner store because a high rental there would necessarily result in a lower rental for another property. The individual store rents were not a concern of the lessee companies because their focus was on the overall rent on all of the properties based upon the global purchase price.

Although this court agreed with the landowner's witness that the actual contract rent should be given the greatest weight in determining the compensation due, that is not to say that the condemnor's appraisers' opinions were not substantially justified in discounting or even disregarding the actual rent for the Moncks Corner store. Clearly a reasonable person could

think that this view is correct. The landowner should not be awarded its attorneys' fees and costs solely because the court agreed with its theory of the case and not with the State's.

Finding substantial justification for the State's position, I must next determine under section 28-2-510 whether the application should be reduced in amount or denied altogether. In my view, this case presents circumstances where an award taxing the landowner's litigation costs against the State would be unjust and thus should be denied.

As the United States Supreme Court said in a lead case on this issue:

These statutes were not designed as a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys, nor were they intended to replicate exactly the fee an attorney could earn through a private fee arrangement with his client. Instead, the aim of such statutes was to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific federal laws. Hence, if plaintiffs, such as Delaware Valley, find it possible to engage a lawyer based on the statutory assurance that he will be paid a "reasonable fee," the purpose behind the fee-shifting statute has been satisfied.

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) (Delaware Valley I). As reflected in the record as well as in this court's order in this case, Realty Income, Inc., is large and profitable national corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange. It deemed it prudent and had the wherewithal to retain two experienced attorneys and agreed to pay \$310-370 per hour to each to challenge the Department's offer of compensation. Clearly such an arrangement is not necessary for the typical condemnee in Berkeley County to obtain counsel. Due to the amounts at stake, it is reasonable to conclude that Realty Income would have taken the same course without the inducement provided by the fee shifting statute. Thus, in my view, justice would not be served by causing the State to bear its litigation costs in addition to its own where the landowner could and would have contracted services at those costs in any event.

Finally, and contrary to petitioner's assertions, the issues in this suit were not novel or complex. Rather, the case was a routine condemnation case involving well settled valuation approaches. All appraisals of retail properties, whether for condemnations, bank loans, or other purposes analyze the income approach to value. The purported difficulty and complexity do not outweigh the considerations outlined above so that a cost award would be justified.

I deny the petition for fees and costs.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

Robert E. Watson, Judge

Moncks Corner, S.C.

_____, 2012

In The Matter Of:
SC Department of Transportation vs
RI CS5, LLC, et al

Hearing
October 2, 2012

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1 STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

2 COUNTY OF BERKELEY

3 SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

4 Condemnor,

5 vs.

CASE NO. 2009-CP-08-3890

6 RI CS5, LLC,

7 Landowner(s)

8 and

WORSLEY OPERATING CORPORATION, a North Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and BERKELEY COUNTY

9 TREASURER'S OFFICE, Lien Holder,

10 Other Condemnee(s).

11 HEARING BEFORE
12 THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. WATSON

13 DATE: October 2, 2012

14 TIME: 1:45 p.m.

15 LOCATION: Berkeley County Courthouse
16 300-B California Avenue
Moncks Corner, SC

17 REPORTED BY: Patricia L. Thompson,
18 Registered Professional Reporter

19
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21 Fast, Accurate & Friendly

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Also Present:

Beacham O. Brooker, Jr.
SC Department of Transportation
Assistant Chief Counsel

1 THE COURT: I'm assuming we're here
2 today on the issue regarding reasonable litigation
3 expenses; is that correct?

4 MR. DOMINICK: That's correct, your
5 Honor.

6 THE COURT: Who wants to be heard
7 first?

8 MR. DOMINICK: It's my application,
9 I believe, your Honor.

10 THE COURT: I'll let you go.

11 MR. DOMINICK: Paul Dominick, your
12 Honor, on behalf of the landowner.

13 Your Honor, as the Court noted, this is
14 for the court on the landowner's application for
15 the award of reasonable litigation expenses under
16 the eminent domain statute in South Carolina and
17 particularly the section SC Code S28-2-510.

18 It's my understanding that the
19 Department of Transportation, the condemning
20 authority here, has not contested that we are the
21 prevailing party in the litigation but contends its
22 position was substantially justified, and thus
23 under the statute the landowner is not entitled to
24 fees.

25 Your Honor, I'm not aware of any case

1 law in South Carolina denying legal fees to a
2 prevailing party in a condemnation action and
3 certainly am not aware of any case law in South
4 Carolina that denies the fees on the basis that
5 there was no substantial justification,
6 particularly where you've got the prevailing party
7 formula. And in this particular case the landowner
8 clearly surpassed that hurdle to be the prevailing
9 party.

10 Unlike cases cited by the DOT, those
11 were cases under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
12 the Federal Act, and then basically South
13 Carolina's version of that act, 15-77-800.
14 Here you've got a condemnation case where the state
15 is taking by force of condemnation a landowner's
16 property. And you can't have just compensation,
17 your Honor, if the condemnor in this case is denied
18 -- or the landowner is denied attorneys' fees that
19 were required to achieve the just compensation.
20 Essentially the Court's order of award would be
21 reduced by the legal fees that our client had to
22 pay to obtain the just compensation.

23 So I think in this particular case
24 certainly legal fees are certainly reasonable, and
25 we would be entitled to those.

1 A couple other points I would point
2 out. All of this was pretty detailed in the
3 briefs, so I'll try not to repeat all of this. But
4 in this case there was a substantial gap here
5 between what the Department of Transportation was
6 offering, their highest valuation at trial of
7 351,000, and then my client the highest valuation
8 of 1,150,000.

9 This is not just a case where you've
10 got a \$50,000 difference between the parties and
11 not a case where the legal fees would exceed the
12 difference between the parties. Here you've got a
13 substantial gap. So my client had no choice but to
14 come to this hearing and fight this case on the
15 merits, and in fact prevail. This is not a case
16 where you've got a runaway jury. This is a nonjury
17 case where the Court considered the evidence and
18 issued an order.

19 I think some of the substantial
20 justification language and equitable fairness and
21 whatever else is in the condemnation statute --
22 I can understand if you've got a runaway jury
23 situation, the jury ignored the testimony, but here
24 the Court adopted the testimony of one of the
25 appraisers as the valuation. So we really don't

1 have that situation.

2 Had the landowner in this case accepted
3 the highest valuation of the Department of
4 Transportation my client would have received 39% of
5 what they actually ended up receiving from the
6 Court. So certainly the client was justified in
7 pursuing the full compensation.

8 Additionally, a couple of things about
9 the DOT's argument. The cases cited, again, are
10 not cases under the eminent domain statute but
11 under -- one of the South Carolina statutes that
12 was cited by the South Carolina DOT 15-77-300 where
13 the terminology "substantial justification" was
14 talked about and defined as being taking a
15 reasonable position. But even our Supreme Court,
16 South Carolina Supreme Court, in the case of layman
17 versus state of South Carolina 658 S.E. 2d 320 the
18 Court held that although it is not a presumption of
19 substantial justification when an agency loses on
20 the merits, the substance and outcome of the matter
21 litigated is nevertheless relevant to the
22 determination as to whether there was substantial
23 justification in pressing the claim.

24 So even though that's not a case under
25 the condemnation, the eminent domain statutes still

1 think that that language works toward our favor.

2 The Court's order and findings, which
3 I've gone through in the reply brief -- the
4 findings themselves establish that there were no
5 substantial justification in this case and their
6 position.

7 First, as the Court will recall, the
8 key issue here was whether the lease could be
9 considered in the valuation of the property. If
10 the DOT was taking the legal position contrary to
11 South Carolina law and contrary to statute and case
12 law, the lease could not be considered in
13 establishing just compensation.

14 Our position was that it could be
15 considered, and the Court in its order rejected the
16 SCDOT legal position, so there was no substantial
17 justification for them taking that position if it
18 was contrary to both case and statutory law in
19 South Carolina.

20 Furthermore, the Court went on to find
21 in the order and pointed out that the lease was
22 properly considered under the statute and case law;
23 found that the South Carolina Department of
24 Transportation's appraisers' opinions were found to
25 be not supported by the evidence, ill-founded and

1 not justified. And I won't go through all the
2 different quotes, but they've set out in the reply
3 brief and basically cited back to the Court's order
4 where those findings were made by the Court.

5 I also point out there has been no
6 appeal to the Court's final order in this case. So
7 that order of \$900,000 is final. In the face of
8 these rulings I just don't see how the South
9 Carolina Department of Transportation can
10 legitimately claim to be substantially justified to
11 the point of denying my client the right to legal
12 fees as the prevailing party in a condemnation
13 action.

14 THE COURT: I'm not going to deny you
15 the right to legal fees. That's not -- I'm not
16 going to deny them. So the issue is going to be,
17 from my perspective at least, unless you gentlemen
18 convince me otherwise, that I need to use the low
19 star method -- what I call the low star method
20 where you take kind of a reasonable rate and
21 determine what should be paid. That's kind of
22 where I am right now.

23 MR. DOMINICK: And I think that's the
24 law. I know the Court has rejected the continued
25 fee methodology, and basically that would be our

1 position.

2 I just point out that we -- this is a
3 case where we ask -- where both parties went to an
4 early mediation to try to resolve the case, and it
5 wasn't resolved at this early mediation. So I
6 don't think there is any question that we had to go
7 through the trial in order to obtain the
8 compensation.

9 Now, of course you've got that. We've
10 submitted our hours. We've submitted our rates.
11 We've submitted an affidavit of Richard Bybee, who
12 -- as far as I know in this scenario he's kind of
13 the dean of the condemnation lawyers. He does
14 condemnation work all over the state, and he does
15 it in this county. And he gave an affidavit that
16 our fees were reasonable. There is no independent
17 affidavit on the part of the South Carolina
18 Department of Transportation. Mr. West did give an
19 affidavit, but I think the Court -- and he's an
20 advocate.

21 I think the Court should weigh the fact
22 that there is not an independent affidavit
23 provided, and we would ask that the Court file and
24 award us legal fees according to the affidavits
25 that we presented and our amended application.

10

1 THE COURT: All right.

2 MR. BROOKER: Thank you, your Honor.
3 I'm Beacham Brooker of the DOT out of Columbia, and
4 I appreciate the Court's decision that you will
5 award some fees. But for the record, if you don't
6 mind, I would like to go through our --

7 THE COURT: That would be fine.

8 MR. BROOKER: First addressing the
9 statement Mr. Dominick made that somehow just
10 compensation is reduced by the failure to award
11 fees -- that is not correct. The just compensation
12 is a precondition to using the power of eminent
13 domain that you must make fair compensation to the
14 landowner before taking his property, but the
15 constitution does not define what just compensation
16 is.

17 The legislature and General Assembly in
18 1987 enacted the eminent domain procedure and the
19 Eminent Domain Procedures Act which has a separate
20 section in 28-3-70 which defines just compensation
21 as the value of the land taken, damages to any
22 remaining land, and then that is reduced -- that
23 compensation is reduced by benefits from the
24 project which increase the value of the land.

25 The attorneys' fees are allowed in a

1 separate section of that Section 5-10, but the
2 point is that the General Assembly did not have to
3 do that because of the American rule that each
4 party bears its own litigation fees, and they do
5 not say that attorneys' fees will always be awarded
6 -- you have to be a prevailing party and get above
7 this split threshold in order to do it.

8 So it gives the trial court discretion
9 to award fees or reduce the fees. So when you
10 receive an application and you find that the
11 litigating position of the state was substantially
12 justified, then you have the discretion to reduce
13 the fees or refuse them altogether, and we would
14 suggest that they be refused in this case for the
15 following reasons: What is substantially justified
16 is the Court of Appeals in South Carolina and the
17 Supreme Court referred to and adopted the federal
18 juris prudence, which is very extensive on the
19 definition of that term, "substantially justified,"
20 being just something that can defeat an argument
21 that is frivolous and avoid sanctions for being
22 frivolous. But a position based on the facts and
23 the law that are reasonable has a reasonable basis
24 and the facts of the law that a reasonable person
25 can find correct.

12

1 Of course, the Court, as you know, did
2 not find that our position was correct, but that is
3 not the standard, your Honor. It's whether our
4 litigating position is substantially justified in
5 being reasonable. We think it was.

6 Turning to the actual case and the
7 parties' litigating position, condemnation cases
8 generally, especially with income producing
9 properties are -- the trials are basically expert
10 testimony of appraiser witnesses, and there were
11 three in this case, two on the Department's side
12 and one testified for the landowner.

13 What appraisers do under their
14 professional standards, which is USPAP, plus the
15 case law defines it as well -- when you have an
16 income producing property you have to analyze in
17 your report three approaches to value and cover
18 each of them on an income approach where you take
19 the income stream from the property and then
20 basically capitalize that to come up with a value
21 of the property.

22 The second is the sales comparison
23 approach where you go out in the local area in
24 Moncks Corner, in this case, and find comparable
25 sales of convenience stores. Our appraisers did

1 that. And then the third approach would be the
2 replacement approach, the construction cost
3 approach; how much would it cost to rebuild this
4 convenience store. Replace it.

5 Then after the appraiser goes through
6 these three methods then they have to use their
7 professional judgment to either discount one,
8 emphasize the other, depending on the actual facts
9 of the case. And that's what went on the trial of
10 the case, your Honor. The Department's appraiser
11 discounted the actual rent that was being paid by
12 the Sun companies to the landowner here, Realty
13 Income or RI CS5, because of the actual situation
14 in the transaction by which the rent was set.

15 As you recall, Realty Income had
16 purchased all of the land under about 60 or 65
17 convenience stores in the area, and I don't know
18 what the area is. It must be coastal South
19 Carolina.

20 THE COURT: I think they bought around
21 75 stores.

22 MR. BROOKER: And they agreed with the
23 Worsley company, who is the seller, on a price of
24 \$65,350,000. And then you had this Michael Robert
25 Pfeiffer, who is the vice-president and general

14

1 counsel of Realty Income, testify before you as to
2 how he arrived at the value on the Moncks Corner
3 store. And he testified that what he did is he sat
4 down by himself and allocated values to each of
5 these 65 stores and he placed -- we think just
6 arbitrarily -- a value on the Moncks Corner stores
7 of 1.15 million.

8 Then they had decided that they wanted
9 -- of this entire \$65 million purchase transaction
10 they wanted an 8.9% return for the investors, the
11 shareholders. So he allocated 1.15 million as the
12 value to the Moncks Corner store, applied 8.9%
13 percent to that, and came up with an annual rent or
14 a monthly rent of \$8,517.

15 The point is, your Honor, that that is
16 not an arm's length transaction, although the Sun
17 Company, the tenant, the operator of these stores
18 who is paying the rent to Realty Income, would care
19 what they paid overall per year on all 65 stores as
20 rent. It doesn't matter a bit to them how it's
21 allocated, because if you have a high value placed
22 on the Moncks Corner store they're going to get
23 lower rent somewhere else to come up with 8.9% on
24 the 65 million, and that's what we think is a
25 substantial justification for our appraisers.

1 discounting that actual rent and actual value to be
2 put on there, because it's essentially -- you make
3 up a value for the store. You apply the rent to it
4 and then hire an appraiser who capitalizes the rent
5 back up to what you started with in the first
6 place.

7 We have not -- as Mr. Dominick said, we
8 have an appeal in this case. We're satisfied with
9 the judgment, but our point is -- and I want to
10 emphasize that our litigating position was not
11 unreasonable. A reasonable person could have found
12 us correct even though the Court did not, and just
13 simply winning does not entitle you to attorneys'
14 fees.

15 As far as between the decision -- and
16 the Court does have the discretion to either reduce
17 the fee request or refuse it altogether. As I've
18 said and another court said it disagrees, I think
19 that this is an excellent case for not shifting the
20 fees to the government. This is a very, very
21 large, well capitalized company, a company listed
22 on the New York Stock Exchange, and the point and
23 the purpose of fee shifting statutes in general is
24 to allow someone who has a claim against the state
25 or is being treated wrong by the state and who does

1 not have the wherewithal and may not be able to
2 afford to hire local counsel to be able to do so by
3 taking the assurance that if it is a meritorious
4 case, if he's successful the state will pick up
5 those fees; and therefore, it is to give the
6 attorney some assurance to take on the case and
7 reduce the chance that he will not be paid anything
8 at all.

9 Here we had a very large national
10 company on the New York Stock Exchange hiring one
11 of the biggest law firms in the state. They put
12 two lawyers on it at very high fees, \$410 an hour.

13 The point is that Realty Income would
14 have done that anyway. There is no reason to cause
15 the taxpayer to pay these fees in order to induce
16 an attorney to take -- or allow Realty Income to
17 find an attorney to take its case. They would have
18 done it anyway.

19 Just to summarize that point, your
20 Honor; if this is not a case where you would deny
21 instead of reducing fees -- I can't think of one
22 where you would. McDonald's case is pretty
23 frequent, but we think this is one where it should
24 be denied or substantially reduced to the
25 prevailing rates in the Moncks Corner area.

1 I thank you, your Honor.

2 THE COURT: Do you have any cite on the
3 case where our appellate court said denied?

4 MR. BROOKER: I think the video gaming
5 case -- I think they found that DRS position was
6 substantially justified.

7 THE COURT: I couldn't recall seeing
8 one.

9 MR. DOMINICK: That's not a
10 condemnation case. That was under that other
11 statute, your Honor. I don't think there is
12 anything in the statute about how much money your
13 client has got. The state has more money than my
14 client. I don't really it really matters. But
15 they wanted the property for their project, and I
16 think my client needs to be fairly compensated, and
17 I think that would include their right to legal
18 fees under the statute. That's why the statute is
19 there.

20 Thank you, your Honor.

21 THE COURT: Thank you.

22 MR. WEST: If I may, just by way of
23 clarification, you had asked the question about any
24 case law. We corresponded with the Court after the
25 filing of our return and supplemented our

1 submission to the Court by delivering two cases,
2 one of which was the video gaming case that
3 Mr. Brooker was referring to. So your file should
4 contain the actual case.

5 THE COURT: That is right.

6 MR. WEST: Thank you, your Honor.

7 THE COURT: I think you would have the
8 opportunity to question about the lawyer fees,
9 question the lawyers who submitted their fee
10 requests. Is there any desire to do that?

11 MR. BROOKER: Well, your Honor, I think
12 Mr. West's affidavit that he submitted, 250 an hour
13 -- I think that is sufficient to allow someone to
14 hire an attorney in this area.

15 THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

16 Thank you again for coming, and I'll
17 give you folks an answer very quickly. I have read
18 all the briefs. I don't know how you missed that
19 case, Mr. West, but I just had to clarify.

20 MR. WEST: Judge, if for whatever
21 reason you don't have any material I can email it.

22 MR. DOMINICK: If you want a copy of
23 the case, the Layman case, I can provide you
24 with --

25 THE COURT: I've got the Layman case.

1 I pulled several cases myself. I probably have
2 that case somewhere.

3 MR. WEST: Judge, I've got it right
4 here.


5 (Hearing concluded at 2:25 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Patricia L. Thompson, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public for the State of South Carolina at Large, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate and complete record.

I further certify that I am neither related to nor counsel for any party to the cause pending or interested in the events thereof.

Witness my hand, I have hereunto affixed by official seal this 26th day of February 2013 at Charleston, Charleston County, South Carolina.



Patricia Morrison

Patricia L. Thompson
Registered Professional Reporter
My Commission Expires
October 19, 2015

1 portfolio. Between 1969 and 1985, we acquired
2 around 600-plus properties. And in 1995 October,
3 we consolidated all of our partnerships and went
4 public on the New York Stock Exchange.

5 So what we do is we acquire properties
6 and own them for the long-term and lease them to
7 national or regional tenants and pay a monthly
8 dividend to our shareholders. We have -- we're
9 public. We have around 90,000 investors. We're
10 known as "The Monthly Dividend Company." We are
11 one of the few public companies that pays their
12 dividends monthly. Since 1969, we have paid every
13 single monthly dividend, and we increase our
14 dividend on a quarterly basis.

15 Q. What is the source of income,
16 generally, for those dividend payments?

17 A. All of the income comes solely and
18 completely from lease revenue or rental revenue.
19 Being a REIT, or real estate investment trust,
20 there is very specific rules that we have to comply
21 with in order to not pay corporate tax. And that's
22 owning property for long-term income production.
23 We receive our rents, generally, on the 1st; and we
24 pay our dividends to our shareholders on the 15th
25 of every month.

1 this case?

2 A. I am.

3 Q. How did Realty Income learn that the
4 subject property was for sale?

5 A. Our acquisition department had been in
6 contact with Sun Capital. Sun Capital is a private
7 equity company located in Boca Raton, Florida.
8 They had acquired Marsh Supermarkets in 1995. And
9 Marsh Supermarkets had a subsidiary, which was
10 Village Pantry. They spun off Village Pantry --
11 they were one of the largest gas/convenience stores
12 in the Midwest -- and had contacted us as to
13 whether or not we would be interested in acquiring
14 some of those properties.

15 And then their desire, as a private
16 equity company, was to expand the base of their
17 gas/convenience stores. So they did further
18 acquisitions after that transaction with companies
19 called Imperial, Ameristop, and then finally
20 Worsley. So we had a relationship with them
21 because we did the initial Village Pantry
22 transaction. Then we did properties with Imperial,
23 properties with Ameristop. And then this specific
24 transaction was with Worsley.

25 Q. And by the time that Worsley -- by the

1 time that Realty Income became involved at Sun
2 Capital or one of its affiliate entities, had it
3 already purchased the stores? Or was that
4 something in process?

5 A. That was something in process. And
6 what they were actually looking for was to have --
7 Worsley owned a lot of -- or owned almost all or
8 most of their properties. So what they wanted to
9 do was come in Sun Capital -- come in and buy the
10 business operations, consolidate those business
11 operations into the Village Pantry parent, and sell
12 the properties.

13 We would step in and, at the closing of
14 the business sale, provide some of the capital
15 through acquiring this properties and then enter
16 into long-term leases with the tenant, which would
17 be guaranteed by Village Pantry.

18 Q. Okay. So the subject property here in
19 Moncks Corner was part of a much larger ^ dict ^
20 transaction. Is that correct?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. What due diligence did Realty Income
23 conduct, generally, with respect to the overall
24 transaction?

25 A. Well, we did a due diligence, of which

1 I was a part, with Village Pantry. They were the
2 parent who was going to be the operator of the
3 entire portfolio of gas/convenience stores. We
4 went in and met with the management team. We
5 looked at their financial statements. We wanted to
6 understand how they were going to operate, what
7 their expansion programs were.

8 And because it was gas/convenience, I
9 generally go and meet with the companies. Because
10 I want to understand any environmental risks or
11 liabilities. And the tenant undertakes all
12 responsibility related to that with complying with
13 the state underground storage tanks rules.

14 So from a financial perspective, we got
15 comfortable with Village Pantry. We then for this
16 specific transaction wanted to understand how
17 Worsley's operations were, but knowing that Worsley
18 was going to be selling and the Village Pantry
19 operators would be continuing, in essence.

20 Q. So by the time that this was all over
21 and the transaction was complete, Worsley, the
22 original owners of Worsley, were out of the
23 picture. Is that right?

24 A. That's correct. There were some people
25 through the Worsley company that stayed on working

1 for the new parent, Sun Capital or Village Pantry.
2 But we have absolutely no connection with those
3 people. All we want to make sure is that the rent
4 is paid and that the tenant complies with all of
5 the terms of the lease.

6 Q. And there's no common ownership between
7 Realty Income and Sun Capital or Worsley or any of
8 the other entities involved in this transaction, is
9 there?

10 A. Absolutely none.

11 Q. Tell me about the due diligence that
12 Realty Income conducted, not with respect to the
13 transaction in its entirety, but with respect to
14 the specific property here in Moncks Corner.

15 A. Sure. We had an individual go out and
16 look at the property. For this specific property,
17 that person was Janet Windman. She was an employee
18 of the company. And she went out and did a
19 drive-by of the property, did the video that I
20 described earlier in my testimony, looked at any
21 information she could find relating to the specific
22 property, relating to competition, relating to
23 demographics, relating to traffic, and put together
24 a report and presented that report to the
25 investment committee.

1 Q. I would like to hand you an exhibit
2 that has been premarked as Landowner's Exhibit
3 Number 2. And I'd ask you if you are familiar with
4 this document, Mr. Pfeiffer.

5 A. I am.

6 Q. Is this the report that you referred to
7 regarding the due diligence on the specific
8 property prepared by Janet Windman?

9 A. It is. Would you like me to describe
10 that at all?

11 Q. Sure. That would be fine.

12 A. All right. The report includes
13 information that shows the location of the property
14 with different maps. It includes what we call a
15 handdrawn map, which shows the property and who the
16 neighboring properties are, and information
17 relating to the market, the county. Often the
18 person who goes out in our research department will
19 talk to people within the local area, the trade
20 area. It includes demographics, traffic
21 generators. And then the last several pages are
22 the demographics that we used from a company called
23 AnySite.

24 Q. And this report is something that's
25 prepared in order to assist Realty Income in

1 determining a purchase price for the specific
2 property?

3 A. Yes. It's one of the things that we do
4 look at, and also to determine whether or not we
5 want to purchase the property. Because after going
6 out and looking at each of our properties, there
7 are some properties we choose not to buy because
8 they may not meet our criteria.

9 Q. In this particular case, the subject
10 property was a property that you desired to
11 purchase and that did meet your criteria. Is that
12 right?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Did Realty Income determine an offer
15 price for the entire portfolio of properties?

16 A. We did.

17 Q. Do you happen to recall the total
18 purchase price?

19 A. It was initially, with the LOI, over
20 \$65 million, I believe.

21 Q. I'm going to hand you an exhibit that
22 is marked as Landowner's Exhibit Number 10. I
23 would like for you to take a look at that document
24 and let me know if you are familiar with Exhibit
25 Number 10, please.

1 A. I am.

2 Q. Can you tell me what Exhibit Number 10
3 is?

4 A. It is our final settlement statement
5 that we used when we acquired the portfolio of
6 Worsley properties in North Carolina and South
7 Carolina. First American Title Insurance Company
8 was the escrow agent. And also, they provided a
9 title report on each and every one of the
10 properties that we acquired.

11 Q. And this is actual cash money that
12 Realty Income paid in the amount of \$6,535,000
13 (sic) for the portfolio properties. Is that right?

14 A. \$65 million, that is correct. We had
15 to wire-transfer those funds to First American.
16 And they distributed those money -- that money to
17 the seller.

18 Q. And that was paid on March 27, 2008.
19 Is that right?

20 A. That's correct.

21 MR. WEST: If your Honor please, just
22 for clarification purposes, are you offering these
23 in evidence or --

24 MR. TIBBALS: Yes. Yes. I would like
25 to offer both of these first two in evidence. And

1 MR. TIBBALS: I would like to offer
2 Exhibit Number 1 into evidence.

3 MR. WEST: No objection.

4 THE COURT: It's admitted.

5 (LANDOWNER'S EXH. 1, admitted into
6 evidence.)

7 BY MR. TIBBALS:

8 Q. And if you follow with me, the total
9 column on Page 2 of Exhibit Number 1, where you see
10 portfolio total, it's the second-to-last entry
11 there --

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. -- and you see that it reflects a total
14 purchase price of 65,535,000?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And that is consistent, is it not, with
17 the Exhibit Number 10?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. How did Realty Income determine an
20 appropriate allocated purchase price for the
21 subject property?

22 A. It starts with the purchase price for
23 the entire portfolio. Sun Capital was -- we were
24 only one of the many people that Sun Capital
25 approached to buy this portfolio of properties. It

1 was a highly marketed transaction, where they
2 wanted to get the highest purchase price they
3 could.

4 So we looked up at the portfolio. We
5 analyzed the properties, and we went back with a
6 suggested purchase price. That was negotiated back
7 and forth. I think that they could have gotten a
8 higher purchase price, but they wanted to use us
9 because we had done prior transactions with them.
10 They knew that we would be able to close when they
11 needed to for the acquisition of the business.
12 They also knew that we jumped through hoops to
13 accommodate getting a transaction closed.

14 We had relationships with companies
15 like First American Title, with the surveyor, with
16 an environmental consultant so that we can do it
17 expeditiously. So once that was completed,
18 we -- and in addition, along with that, we looked
19 at each of the property valuations and analyzed the
20 property-specific information I talked about
21 earlier and what we looked at when we're doing a
22 property transaction; looked at the profitability
23 of each of the locations to make sure that that met
24 with our criteria; and came up with a allocation
25 for each and every one of the properties.

1 And once we do that, the specific price
2 for the property then is determinative of what the
3 rent will be for that location.

4 Q. Was this transaction an arm's-length
5 transaction between a willing buyer and a willing
6 seller?

7 A. Absolutely.

8 Q. Did the purchase price of \$1.15 million
9 constitute fair market value at the time with
10 Realty Income purchased --

11 MR. WEST: Objection, your Honor.

12 BY MR. TIBBALS:

13 Q. -- the subject property?

14 THE COURT: What's the objection?

15 MR. WEST: My objection is that he is
16 apparently being asked an opinion as to fair market
17 value on the property.

18 MR. TIBBALS: Well, he's the owner of
19 the property, your Honor.

20 THE COURT: I think he can testify
21 being the owner of the property -- representing the
22 owner of the property.

23 MR. WEST: Thank you, your Honor.

24 THE COURT: I'll allow it. Go ahead.

25 THE WITNESS: Yes. Absolutely, I think

1 Q. I'm going to hand you a document
2 premarked as Exhibit Number 7, Landowner Exhibit
3 Number 7. Are you familiar with Exhibit Number 7?

4 A. I am.

5 Q. Can you tell me what Exhibit Number 7
6 is?

7 A. This is the specific lease for the
8 property that we acquired on South Live Oak Drive.

9 MR. TIBBALS: I'm going to offer this
10 Exhibit Number 7 into evidence.

11 MR. WEST: No objection.

12 THE COURT: Thank you. It's admitted.

13 (LANDOWNER'S EXH. 7, admitted into
14 evidence.)

15 BY MR. TIBBALS:

16 Q. Can you tell me what the amount of the
17 base monthly rent is, pursuant to Section 4.2 of
18 the lease?

19 A. I can. It is \$8,517.67.

20 Q. Was that ever subject to increase?

21 A. It was. The lease provides that there
22 were annual increases. And those increases were
23 determined upon the CPI, or Consumer Price Index.
24 And how it was calculated is I believe it was 2
25 times the CPI, not to exceed 2 percent per year.

1 that was the business. We would acquire portfolios
2 of property, have leases in place, and then
3 immediately start marketing those properties for
4 sale.

5 .And there was a very high demand for
6 people to buy these types of properties. And we
7 would get the spread between the difference on the
8 price that we paid and the price that we were able
9 to sell the properties. And in every single
10 instance, we made more and, in most instances, much
11 more than what we paid.

12 Q. If the lease were assigned to another
13 property owner, the tenant would remain obligated
14 to pay monthly rent to the owner, to the new owner.
15 Right?

16 A. That is correct. There was not a
17 release of that tenant provided for in the lease.

18 Q. Did Realty Income conduct an analysis
19 of the creditworthiness of the tenant, Worsley
20 Operating Corporation, prior to entering into the
21 lease?

22 A. We did.

23 Q. What did Realty Income conclude
24 regarding the tenant's long-term ability to pay the
25 rent.

1 A. We felt comfortable with the tenant's
2 operations, but we also made sure that we would get
3 a guarantee on this lease. We felt comfortable
4 that the parent, Village Pantry, would have the
5 financial wherewithal to insure the payment of the
6 lease for the 20-year duration.

7 Q. Whether the store continued in
8 operation or not, correct?

9 A. There was nothing provided for in the
10 lease that the tenant had the ability to not pay
11 rent. So despite what happened at that specific
12 location, we were relying upon the rent to be
13 received.

14 Q. And if the rent wasn't paid by the
15 tenant, then you would look for the guarantor to
16 make the rental payments. Is that right?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. What is the term of the lease? And
19 I'll direct your attention to Section 3.1.

20 A. It was a 20-year term.

21 Q. Does the lease contain renewal options
22 beyond the initial term?

23 A. It does, two 10-year options to renew.
24 And these -- all of these items were negotiated, as
25 well, at arm's-length.

1 Q. All right. I'm going to hand you a
2 document that's been marked as Landowner's Exhibit
3 Number 9. You testified earlier about a guarantee
4 of the lease.

5 A. That is correct. This exhibit you just
6 handled me is the actual form of guarantee.

7 MR. TIBBALS: I would like to offer
8 Exhibit Number 9 into evidence.

9 MR. WEST: No objection.

10 THE COURT: It's admitted.

11 (LANDOWNER'S EXH. 9, admitted into
12 evidence.)

13 BY MR. TIBBALS:

14 Q. And did Realty Income conduct a
15 creditworthiness analysis of Village Pantry's
16 holding corp?

17 A. Yes, we did.

18 Q. What did Realty Income concluded about
19 the creditworthiness of the guarantor.

20 A. We were comfortable with the
21 creditworthiness of the tenant. We believed that
22 they had the financial wherewithal to pay rent for
23 the duration of the lease and the other leases that
24 we acquired, so we were very comfortable with it.
25 And since we have done the transaction with Village

1 Pantry, including the Worsley, the Imperial, and
2 the Ameristop transactions, they have paid rent on
3 every property every single month.

4 Q. There's never been a default by the
5 tenant on any of those other leases in the
6 portfolio?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Did RI CS5 or Realty Income have any
9 affiliation or relationship with Worsley Operating
10 Corporation other than that of landlord tenant
11 after the lease was executed?

12 A. We never did, no.

13 Q. Was there ever any common ownership of
14 RI CS5 and Worsley?

15 A. Never.

16 Q. Any common ownership between Realty
17 Income and Worsley?

18 A. No. We knew -- I -- we never knew
19 anyone with Worsley until this transaction.

20 Q. Would Realty Income have any reason
21 whatsoever to inflate the purchase price for the
22 subject property?

23 A. No. Actually what we try to do is
24 negotiate a lower purchase price and -- which would
25 equate to lower rent, if we can. We don't want to

1 pay more for a property. We really are
2 conservative in nature. And we believe that this
3 valuation, or the price that we paid, was the fair
4 market value at that time. It was a very, as I
5 indicated, competitive nature and there were other
6 people wanting to pay more for this specific
7 property.

8 Q. At the time of the taking, did Realty
9 Income own any going-concern business interest in
10 the convenience store?

11 A. No. As I indicated, REITs are
12 prohibited from doing that. So the only thing we
13 actually own is the property with the lease in
14 place with Worsley to pay us rent.

15 Q. Would Realty Income have been
16 interested in purchasing the subject property as
17 raw land or land with the improvement?

18 A. No. We would never do that. All of
19 the transactions that we do, have a lease in place.
20 So we don't buy raw land. We don't speculate. We
21 rely upon the income of our leases to come in with
22 rent being received, generally on the 1st, and our
23 dividends being paid out to our shareholders on the
24 15th.

25 Q. So the lease here is the essence of the

1 transaction for Realty Income. Right?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And without a lease on the property,
4 Realty Income would not have been interested in
5 purchasing the subject property.

6 A. That's exactly correct. We rely upon
7 the lease and the lease income for the 20-year
8 during in evaluating the property.

9 Q. Realty Income is not in the business of
10 operating convenience stores, is it?

11 A. No, sir. We do not do that.

12 Q. Does Realty Income operate any
13 convenience stores or any of the other commercial
14 businesses that are operated on its properties?

15 A. No. We never do that.

16 Q. Just for completeness, I'm going to
17 offer a couple of other exhibits. And then we'll
18 be finished, Mr. Pfeiffer, for the time being.

19 Do you know whether or not there were
20 any addendums or amendments to the lease?

21 A. Yes, I do. And there were.

22 Q. Okay. I'm going to hand you two
23 documents so that we're sure that we have a
24 complete copy of the lease, including all
25 amendments. I'm handing you what has been marked

1 as Landowner's Exhibit 8 and Exhibit 11.

2 MR. TIBBALS: Your Honor, I do not have
3 an extra copy of Exhibit Number 11. I had not
4 intended to introduce it. But I just want to be
5 sure that on the record, we have a complete copy of
6 the lease. It's not that I don't want to give you
7 a copy, I just didn't bring one.

8 There is 8, which is the addendum.

9 BY MR. TIBBALS:

10 Q. And I'd just like to ask you,
11 Mr. Pfeiffer, do you recognize Exhibit Number 8 and
12 Exhibit Number 11?

13 A. I do.

14 Q. Okay. Can you tell me what those
15 respective documents are?

16 A. Yes. The addendum to the lease related
17 to some requirements that we have an environmental
18 insurance policy in place, and we wanted to comply
19 with the insurance program and got a endorsement to
20 our policy relating to having underground storage
21 tanks for South Carolina.

22 Q. And what about the amendment?

23 A. The amendment to the lease related to a
24 dispute that we had because of this condemnation,
25 as well as the underground storage tank system.

1 The definition in the lease for the underground
2 storage tanks included language that was going to
3 be detrimental for Worsley to be able to finance
4 some of their equipment, so we changed the
5 definition to be more beneficial for them.

6 MR. TIBBALS: I'm going to offer
7 Exhibit Number 8 and Exhibit Number 11 into
8 evidence.

9 MR. WEST: May I look at that?

10 MR. TIBBALS: 11, he's got the only
11 copy I brought of it.

12 MR. WEST: Excuse me. Your Honor, may
13 I approach the witness?

14 THE COURT: You may.

15 MR. WEST: No objection, Judge.

16 (LANDOWNER'S EXH. 8 and 11, admitted
17 into evidence.)

18 BY MR. TIBBALS:

19 Q. Mr. Pfeiffer, do you now have before
20 you a full and complete copy of the lease,
21 including all amendments, addendums, and other
22 modifications?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 MR. TIBBALS: That's all the questions
25 I have for, Mr. Pfeiffer. Thank you.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

2 MR. WEST: Your Honor, I hate to ask
3 the Court this, but can we take about a
4 three-minute break before we start cross?

5 THE COURT: That will be fine.

6 (A recess transpired.)

7 THE COURT: You may be seated.

8 Mr. West, are you ready for
9 cross-examination?

10 MR. WEST: If it please the Court, your
11 Honor.

12 CROSS-EXAMINATION

13 BY MR. WEST:

14 Q. Mr. Pfeiffer, welcome to Berkeley
15 County, South Carolina. It's a long ways from
16 California. We're glad to have you here.
17 Appreciate your testimony.

18 When I hear your testimony, at least in
19 part, it's very obvious I think to all of us that
20 this was a very large and sophisticated business
21 transaction that resulted in RI CS5 becoming the
22 owner of a number of convenience store sites,
23 including the Scotchman site here in Moncks Corner.
24 A pretty large and sophisticated transaction, you
25 would agree with that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And you have described in great detail
3 the financing arrangement. You have described the
4 due diligence that was conducted by your
5 organization, including the investment committee.
6 You have described in great detail the criteria,
7 the three-legged stool.

8 So it appears, I think to me and to all
9 of us and I'm sure to the Court, that this was not
10 a transaction that was casually entered into but
11 the result of a very sophisticated and detailed
12 analysis of the merits of the project. Is that a
13 fair statement?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. All right. Now, one of the things that
16 you talked about is, is that there were folks who
17 came down. And I believe her name was Ms. Wideman,
18 is that -- do I remember her name correctly?

19 A. Windman.

20 Q. Windman. And she did some due
21 diligence on this site in particular, as I recall
22 your testimony. Is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And she produced a report that you
25 testified to earlier. And I want to talk about

1 that report just a little bit. And of course,
2 we're referring to Landowner's Exhibit Number 2.
3 And I'm going to ask you, if you will, please, sir,
4 to take a look at that document again and refresh
5 your memory.

6 By the way, did you see that document
7 itself during the course of your examination of the
8 project?

9 A. I have seen this. Yes.

10 Q. You saw that contemporaneously with the
11 due diligence that was going on?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. All right. Do you see anything in that
14 document that speaks to the fact that there was a
15 very strong likelihood at the time that document
16 was produced, if not certainty, that U.S. Highway
17 17A would be widened in the vicinity of the
18 Scotchman store on Live Oak Drive? Do you see
19 anything in that document that speaks to that
20 issue?

21 A. I do not.

22 Q. All right. Do you believe that that
23 would have been a material piece of information
24 that the decision makers, including yourself and
25 the investment committee, would have taken into

1 account in whether to include Store Number 82?

2 By the way, that's the store number
3 that I think you testified to as it relates to this
4 particular site.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Is that correct?

7 If it had been known by the investment
8 committee and yourself and other decision makers at
9 Realty Income that U.S. Highway 17A would be
10 widened and that the Store Number 82 site, or
11 Tract 244 site, would be impacted by that widening,
12 would that have been material?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And if it were known that the entire
15 site was going to be acquired, or at least the
16 potential of the entire site being acquired, you
17 would likely have excluded Store Number 82 from the
18 portfolio acquisition, would you not?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. All right. I'm going to hand you a
21 document that is part of the material that your
22 lawyers provided to me and ask you if you have ever
23 seen what has been premarked for identification
24 purposes as Condemnor's Exhibit Number 3.

25 A. I saw this today.

1 Q. I'm asking an open-ended question, and
2 you can -- we might zero in on that in a minute.

3 Does each property have an anticipated
4 and expected rate of return?

5 A. We expect to receive rent for the
6 duration of the lease. So if you are referring to
7 that, then yes.

8 Q. That was not my question. My question
9 is: Do you expect a particular percentage rate of
10 return on your investment in each individual site?

11 A. If you multiple the rent, then the
12 answer is yes.

13 Q. And what would that rate of return be?

14 A. The way that it's reflected is
15 somewhere around an 8.9 percent rate of return.

16 Q. All right. And that's in the documents
17 that you have in front of you, which have been
18 marked as Condemnor's Exhibit -- bear with
19 me -- Number 4?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 MR. WEST: All right. Your Honor, I
22 omitted offering Number 3, Condemnor's Number 3 and
23 Number 4 now in evidence, subject to counsel's
24 request to be able to substitute that last page of
25 Condemnor's Number 3.

1 THE COURT: No objections?

2 MR. WEST: No objections.

3 (LANDOWNER'S EXH. 6 admitted into
4 evidence.)

5 BY MR. DOMINICK:

6 Q. Looking at your appraisal -- and we'll
7 go through the -- some of the details in process in
8 a minute. But if you would, just tell the Court,
9 what was your final determination in this appraisal
10 of the value of the property at issue?

11 A. In the appraisal report which is dated
12 May the 19th, 2009, which has been identified as
13 Landowner's Exhibit Number 6, my appraisal of the
14 before value of the property, before the
15 acquisition by the Department of Transportation,
16 was \$900,000.

17 And I arrived at that number through a
18 coalition, a coalition of approaches to value which
19 I had used. I used a sales comparison approach,
20 wherein I attempted to locate sales of convenience
21 stores that were considered relatively comparable
22 to the subject property. And that value -- that
23 approach indicated a value of the real estate of
24 \$444,500.

25 I then did a direct capitalization

1 comparison approach of the real estate using the
2 sales of convenience stores throughout South
3 Carolina, which indicated a value of \$444,500.

4 The direct capitalization approach, of
5 course, took into consideration the existing lease.
6 It is a 20-year lease, I think, with one or two
7 10-year options. The monthly rent is \$8,517.67.
8 When you multiple that times 12 months, it comes
9 out to about \$102,101 and some change, which would
10 have been the value indicated by the direct
11 capitalization approach.

12 I then took off 5 percent for
13 management and 3 percent for vacancy and credit
14 loss, although it is a triple net lease. There are
15 appraisers who don't do that. I just consistently
16 allow for management and vacancy and credit loss,
17 which that then gave a net income to the property
18 of \$94,188 as opposed to the gross income of
19 \$102,212.

20 I used an overall capitalization rate
21 of 8 -- 0.883 percent, close to 9 percent but
22 between 8.5 and 9 percent. And when I capitalized
23 the net operating income of \$94,188, that indicated
24 a value of 1,067,000.

25 The third approach was as an ongoing

1 MR. DOMINICK: Just one second, your
2 Honor. I think I'm just about through.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 BY MR. DOMINICK:

5 Q. Assuming that you are appraising
6 income-producing or investment properties, wouldn't
7 it be appropriate to use the income capitalization
8 approach?

9 A. Tell me what property you are talking
10 about.

11 Q. Well, I mean, anytime you have an
12 income-producing or investment property, shouldn't
13 you use an income capitalization approach to value?

14 A. I don't know that that's always true.
15 I can tell you specifically in convenience stores,
16 you look at both sales and the income approach. As
17 I mentioned, that is a consideration. But the
18 income is a function of a factor or multiplier.

19 Q. You're familiar with the South Carolina
20 DOT appraisal manual, aren't you?

21 A. Absolutely.

22 Q. And are you also aware that the manual
23 provides that the income capitalization approach to
24 value must be demonstrated when appraising
25 investment-type properties?

1 A. And I agree with that, first of all.
2 And the use of a multiplier or a factor is a part
3 of the income approach and direct capitalization.
4 It's just done with multiplication instead of
5 division. It's the same thing.

6 Q. And you would agree there is a
7 difference between an investment property and a
8 property that you're buying to operate a business
9 on?

10 A. Market value is market value. It
11 doesn't matter the situation. It's only worth one
12 number.

13 MR. DOMINICK: I don't have any further
14 questions. Thank you.

15 MR. WEST: Nothing on redirect, your
16 Honor.

17 THE COURT: All right. Before we leave
18 this witness, that paper that you handed to him, I
19 want to look at it and maybe make it an exhibit.

20 MR. DOMINICK: It is an exhibit.

21 THE COURT: No. The one --

22 MR. DOMINICK: Oh, the one we had?

23 THE COURT: Yeah, the one that was
24 talked about. I would like to see what it --

25 MR. TIBBALS: And we'll want to explain

1 A. No, not necessarily.

2 Q. Okay. Taking it back to 10 doesn't do
3 anything to the capitalization --

4 A. No. What happens is the
5 reversion -- that's the sale of the property at the
6 end of a holding period. The reversion is realized
7 a lot sooner in 10 years. In other words, it has
8 greater value because you receive that reversion
9 10 years from now. If that reversion is not
10 received till 20 years, it maybe even be a higher
11 figure.

12 Q. Okay. So it's a wash probably between
13 the --

14 A. It's basically a wash whether it's done
15 over 10 years or 20 years.

16 Q. I see. Okay.

17 You didn't find any rental comps in
18 Berkeley County, did you?

19 A. I did not.

20 Q. Did you find any in the Tricounty area?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. All of your rental comps were from the
23 Greenville area. Is that right?

24 A. Yes. They were from upstate South
25 Carolina. Like I said, most convenience stores are

1 owner occupied. There are some that are leased,
2 but it is a minority. I'm appraising one right now
3 in North Carolina that is leased for \$35 per square
4 foot, and it's just a three-year-old facility with
5 state-of-the-art equipment.

6 Q. Who is the -- is the landlord wanting
7 to sell that one?

8 A. The landlord no longer wants to own
9 it -- I mean, wants to manage the business. And
10 it's sold to somebody who is operating it.

11 Q. So the owner is simply selling the
12 business, but retaining the realty?

13 A. In a typical lease, the tenant gets the
14 real property and the personal property, the -- and
15 the business.

16 Q. Okay. I'm just trying to explain what
17 is going on in this one that you're valuing right
18 now.

19 A. Right.

20 Q. And that is, is it currently owner
21 occupied?

22 A. It was, till they had a tenant in
23 place.

24 Q. Okay. So now he has a tenant in place
25 and he no longer runs the business. Is that right?

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM BERKELEY COUNTY

Robert E. Watson, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2013-000394
Case No. 2009-CP-08-3890

RECEIVED
AUG 07
AUG 06 2013
SC Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Transportation Appellant,

vs.

RI CS5, LLC Respondent,


and

Worsley Operating Corporation, a North Carolina Corporation, Lessee, and Berkeley County
Treasurer's Office, Lienholder Other Condemnees.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served the RECORD ON APPEAL on the Respondent by depositing a copy of it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid on August 5, 2013, addressed to its attorneys of record, Paul A. Dominick and Jeffrey S. Tibbals, as follows:

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