

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

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APPEAL FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT

Administrative Law Judge Ralph King Anderson, III

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ALC Case No. 18-ALJ-04-0243-AP  
Appellate Case No. 2018-002046

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Quincy Allen, #006019.....Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections.....Respondent.

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**INITIAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT**

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**SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT  
OF CORRECTIONS**

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**STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL**

- I. DID THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT PROPERLY DISMISS APPELLANT'S APPEAL WHERE APPELLANT'S CLAIM DID NOT IMPLICATE A STATE CREATED LIBERTY OR PROPERTY INTEREST?**
  
- II. DID THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT PROPERLY DISMISS APPELLANT'S APPEAL WHERE RESPONDENT WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS IN MAKING ITS FINAL AGENCY DECISION?**

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “Court”) pursuant to the appeal of Quincy Allen (“Appellant”), an inmate incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC” or “Department”). On March 21, 2018, Appellant filed a Step One grievance regarding the disapproval of visitation applications on the basis that the applicant did not know Appellant prior to his incarceration. *See* Step One Grievance. On March 29, 2018, SCDC denied the Step One grievance. Thereafter, on March 30, 2018, Appellant filed a Step Two grievance appealing the disposition of his Step 1 grievance. *See* Step Two Grievance. On May 11, 2018, SCDC denied the Step Two grievance, and Appellant appealed to the Administrative Law Court. *See* Step Two Grievance. On November 1, 2018, Administrative Law Judge Ralph King Anderson, III dismissed Appellant’s appeal. *See* Judge Anderson’s November 1, 2018 Order. This appeal follows.

## STANDARD OF REVIEW

S.C. Code § 1-23-610(B) provides the applicable standard of review:

The review of the administrative law judge's order must be confined to the record. The reviewing tribunal may affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantive rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision is:

- (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
- (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
- (c) made upon unlawful procedure;
- (d) affected by other error of law;
- (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
- (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code § 1-23-380(5).

In an appeal of a final decision of an administrative agency, the standard of appellate review is whether the ALC's findings are supported by substantial evidence. S.C. Code § 1-23-610(B). "Substantial evidence" is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow a reasonable mind to reach the same conclusion that the administrative agency reached. *Hendley v. S.C. State Budget & Control Bd.*, 325 S.C. 413, 481 S.E.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1996). A reviewing court shall not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALC as to findings of fact, but it may reverse or modify decisions that are controlled by errors of law or that are clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the record as a whole. *Id.*

## ARGUMENTS

### **I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S APPEAL WHERE APPELLANT'S CLAIM DID NOT IMPLICATE A STATE CREATED LIBERTY OR PROPERTY INTEREST.**

The ALC's jurisdiction to hear inmate appeals of final decisions by the South Carolina Department of Corrections is derived entirely from the decision of the South Carolina supreme court in *Al-Shabazz v. State*, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). When reviewing SCDC's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALC sits in an appellate capacity. *Id.* at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. The South Carolina supreme court clarified the ALC's appellate jurisdiction over inmate appeals in *Sullivan v. South Carolina Department of Corrections* holding that the ALC's jurisdiction was limited to (1) cases in which an inmate contends prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; (2) cases in which SCDC has taken an inmate's state-created liberty interest in major disciplinary hearings; and (3) cases in which an inmate's confinement implicates a state-created liberty interest. 355 S.C. 437, 443, 586 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2003).

Moreover, regarding categories (2) and (3), *supra*, the South Carolina supreme court has consistently emphasized that the liberty or property interest implicated must be one that is state created. *See Wicker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.*, 360 S.C. 421, 602 S.E.2d 56 (2004) (emphasizing that the ALC's jurisdiction extends only to those cases involving the denial of "state created liberty interests" and that the Court's holding [*i.e.*, in *Wicker*] "is not to be viewed as expanding the jurisdiction of the [ALC] in any other circumstance."); *Slezak v.*

*S.C. Dep't of Corr.*, 361 S.C. 327, 605 S.E.2d 506 (2004) (holding that the ALC “may summarily dismiss those appeals that do not implicate an inmate’s state created liberty or property interest”). The South Carolina Court of Appeals has interpreted *Slezak* to mean that where a state-created liberty interest is not implicated in a prisoner appeal, a judge of the ALC “should” dismiss the appeal. *Skipper v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.*, 370 S.C. 267, 633 S.E.2d 910 (Ct. App. 2006).

The United States Supreme Court, in *Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson*, articulated the test by which a court can determine if a state has created a liberty interest. 490 U.S. 454, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 104 L. Ed. 506 (1989). The Court stated that a state creates a liberty interest by (1) “establishing ‘substantive predicates’ to govern official decision-making” and (2) mandating a certain outcome “be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met.” *Id.* at 462, 109 S. Ct. at 1909 (internal citation omitted). In *Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales*, the Supreme Court further clarified the second prong of the *Thompson* test stating that a person is not entitled to, and thus has no property interest in, a benefit “if officials have discretion to grant or deny it.” 545 U.S. 748, 748, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2798-99, 162 L. Ed. 2d 658 (2005).

Aside from prohibiting conjugal visits, South Carolina law does not address inmate visitation. S.C. Code § 24-3-81. However, under the authority granted him by S.C. Code § 24-1-90, the Director of the Department of Corrections has promulgated a policy regarding inmate visitation: SCDC Policy OP-22.09, “Inmate Visitation.” This policy clearly states that visitation can be “suspend[ed], restrict[ed], den[ied], or terminate[d].” *See* SCDC Policy OP-22.09, section 1.4. Additionally, permissive language such as “may” is used throughout in

describing the granting or revoking of visitation. This makes it clear that decisions regarding visitation are subject to wide discretion. SCDC Policy OP-22.09 also consistently refers to visitation as a privilege, not a right. This policy does not mandate any particular outcome upon the satisfaction of certain criteria. Thus, it does not create a liberty interest in visitation.

Appellant argues that he does have a state created liberty interest in visitation and that such a right is established by Article XII, section 2, of the South Carolina Constitution, which states, “[t]he General Assembly shall establish institutions for the confinement of all persons convicted of such crimes as may be designated by law, and shall provide for the custody, maintenance, health, welfare, education, and rehabilitation of the inmates.” *See* Appellant’s Initial Brief, p. 8. This language does not mention visitation and certainly does not create criteria for awarding visitation privileges, mandate any particular outcome upon the completion of those criteria, or limit the discretion of decision makers in any way. Thus it does not create a liberty interest in visitation. *Thompson* at 462, 109 S. Ct. at 1909. Additionally, the South Carolina supreme court has already ruled that this language does not create a liberty interest. In *Sullivan v. South Carolina Department of Corrections*, the Court rejected Sullivan’s argument that this exact same language regarding rehabilitation created an interest in sex offender treatment and ruled that the Administrative Law Court did not have jurisdiction over the claim. 355 S.C. at 445, 586 S.E.2d at 128.

Appellant also argues that ALC Judge Anderson’s reliance on *Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson* was improper. *See* Appellant’s Initial Brief, p. 8. Appellant asserts that the facts in this case are so different from the facts in *Thompson* that the *Thompson* Court’s conclusion that “[t]he denial of prison access to a particular visitor is well

within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence” is not applicable here. *Thompson* at 462, 109 S. Ct. at 1909 (internal quotations omitted); *See* Appellant’s Brief, p. 7. While Judge Anderson did make note of this language from *Thompson* in his Order, he did so only after noting that neither prong of the *Thompson* test had been established. *See* Judge Anderson’s November 1, 2018 Order, p. 2. The *Thompson* test on which Judge Anderson relied is applicable to any situation in which the court must determine whether or not a state has created a liberty or property interest. In fact, in *Slezak v. Evatt*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied on this test in determining that South Carolina law does not create a liberty interest in a particular custody or security classification. 21 F.3d at 594. Judge Anderson’ reliance on *Thompson* was proper.

SCDC Policy OP-22.09 makes it clear that visitation is a privilege – a privilege SCDC officials can grant, deny, or limit in their discretion. Therefore, applying the Supreme Court precedents *Thompson* and *Gonzales*, Appellant has no state created liberty interest in having any visitors, let alone the specific group of visitors of which he complains. Because no state created liberty or property interest is implicated in this case, Judge Anderson’s November 1, 2018 dismissal of this appeal was proper under *Slezak* and *Skipper*.

**II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT’S APPEAL BECAUSE RESPONDENT WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS IN MAKING ITS FINAL AGENCY DECISION.**


Appellant argues that SCDC’s final agency decision was arbitrary and capricious because disapproval of potential visitors who did not know the inmate prior to their

incarceration is not in SCDC's visitation policy. *See* Appellant's Brief, p. 3. However, Alice Mascio explained her reasoning for denying these visitors in her response to Appellant's Request to Staff Member stating, "not knowing an inmate but wanting to visit [is] a security concern." *See* Appellant's Request to Staff Member. This was again explained to Appellant in the responses to his Step one and Two Grievances. *See* Step One and Two Grievances. This decision was within the discretion allowed by SCDC Policy OP-22.09, "Inmate Visitation" which states, "SCDC reserves the right to suspend, restrict, deny, or terminate an inmate's or visitor's visitation privileges and/or telephone privileges due to legitimate concerns regarding the security and safety of the institution." *See* SCDC Policy OP-22.09, section 1.4. SCDC's final agency decision was based on concerns regarding institutional security and was within the limitations set by policy. It was not arbitrary or capricious.

### **CONCLUSION**

The Administrative Law Court's decision below is supported by substantial evidence and is neither effected by legal error nor clearly erroneous in view of the whole record. Thus it should be upheld.

Respectfully submitted,  
**SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT  
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March 1, 2019

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT

Administrative Law Judge Ralph King Anderson, III

ALC Case No. 18-ALJ-04-0243-AP  
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
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
**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Undersigned counsel hereby certifies that I have served the **Initial Brief of Respondent and Designation of Matter to be Included in the Record on Appeal** on Appellant via Appellant's attorney, Charles Grose, by placing a copy in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: E. Charles Grose, Jr., The Grose Law Firm, LLC, 404 Main Street, Greenwood, South Carolina, 29646.



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
The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings  
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Reference: App. Case No.: 2018-002046 (*Quincy Allen, #6019 v. South Carolina Department of Corrections*)

Dear Madam Clerk:

Enclosed, please the Initial Brief of Respondent and Designation of Matter to be Included in the Record on Appeal. Thank you.

Sincerely,



Annie Laurie Rumler, Esquire

Enclosure

cc: Mr. E. Charles Grose, Jr., *Attorney for Appellant*