THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT
Shirley C. Robinson, Administrative Law Judge

Case No. 18-ALJ-22-0211-AP

Appellate Case No. 2018-001685

Cynthia G. Aldaqqaq

Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce and IQOR Holdings US, LLC,

Respondents.

INITIAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the Administrative Law Court err by finding it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissing Appellant's appeal when Appellant failed to file and serve her notice of appeal within thirty days of the mailing date of the Department's final decision as required by section 41-35-750 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018) and SCALC Rule 33?

II. Are Appellant's arguments regarding an incorrect mailing address and the date she received the Panel decision preserved for this Court's review, and if this Court finds these issues preserved, do her allegations, even if true, have any impact on whether the ALC had appellate jurisdiction over Appellant's appeal?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Cynthia G. Aldaqqaq worked for Respondent IQOR Holdings US, LLC (IQOR) until November 18, 2017, when she separated from her employment. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). On January 24, 2018, Appellant filed for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits with Respondent South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (the Department). (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). The Department's claims adjudicator issued a determination on February 7, 2018, finding Appellant voluntarily quit her employment without good cause. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18).

Appellant appealed the adjudicator's decision to the Department's Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal), which held an evidentiary hearing and affirmed the adjudicator's decision. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). On April 16, 2018, Appellant appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Department's Appellate Panel (the Panel). (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). On May 8, 2018, the Panel affirmed the Tribunal's decision and mailed its decision to Appellant. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18).

Subsequently, Appellant filed an appeal with the Administrative Law Court (ALC) on June 18, 2018. (ALC Notice of Assignment, 6/21/18). On July 6, 2018, the Department filed a motion to dismiss with the ALC, notifying the court Appellant's notice of appeal was untimely filed and served and the ALC lacked appellate jurisdiction. (Motion to Dismiss, 7/6/18). The ALC granted the Department's motion on July 24, 2018. (ALC Order, 7/24/18). Appellant filed a petition for rehearing with the ALC, and the court denied the motion on August 16, 2018. (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18; ALC Order, 8/16/18). This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Appellant worked for IQOR from November 2012 until November 2017, and she most recently worked as a collections agent. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). Following the end of her employment, Appellant filed a claim for UI benefits on January 24, 2018. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). The Department's claims adjudicator disqualified Appellant from receiving benefits after finding she voluntarily quit her employment without good cause. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). The Tribunal and the Panel affirmed the finding that Appellant voluntarily quit her employment without good cause. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). The Panel's decision shows the Department mailed the Panel's decision to Appellant at 5933 Natures Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada, which is the correct address for Appellant. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18; App. Initial Br. p.4).

Also, the Panel's decision notified Appellant of the statutory requirements for appealing and, specifically, the thirty-day deadline:

> To obtain judicial review of this decision, you must comply with the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. § 41-35-750 and the Rules of Procedure of the Administrative Law Court. The Court may require a filing fee.
>
> The law requires that a Petition for Judicial Review must be filed with the Court and served on all parties and SCDEW within thirty (30) days from the mailing date of SCDEW's final decision **(see the mailing date above)**.
>
> . . .
>
> Service of the Petition on SCDEW must be addressed and mailed to:
>
> **Office of General Counsel**
> **S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce**
> **Post Office Box 8597**
> **Columbia SC 29202**

(Panel Decision, 5/8/18).

On June 18, 2018, Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the ALC, seeking review of the Panel's May 8, 2018 decision. (ALC Notice of Assignment, 6/21/18). Appellant served the Department with her notice of appeal on June 14, 2018, as noted by the postmark on Appellant's letter to the Department. (Letter from Appellant with June 14, 2018 postmark).

Appellant's notice of appeal vaguely claimed the Panel's decision was "in [e]rror." (Appellant ALC Notice of Appeal, 6/7/18). Subsequently, the Department filed a motion to dismiss with the ALC for lack of appellate jurisdiction. (Motion to Dismiss, 7/6/18). The Department argued the ALC lacked jurisdiction because Appellant failed to timely file and serve her notice of appeal by doing so within thirty days after mailing of the Panel decision. (Motion to Dismiss, 7/6/18). Appellant failed to file a return to the Department's motion. (ALC Order, 7/24/18). The ALC noted the timely filing and service of the notice of appeal are jurisdictional requirements, and it did not have the authority to extend the thirty-day deadline. (ALC Order, 7/24/18). The ALC found "Appellant's appeal must be dismissed." (ALC Order, 7/24/18).

In response, Appellant filed a "petition for rehearing" with the ALC. [1] (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18). In her petition, Appellant did not make any arguments regarding her failure to timely file and serve her notice of appeal to the ALC. (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18). Instead, Appellant focused on the circumstances surrounding her evidentiary hearing before the Tribunal. (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18). Appellant claimed her sister was admitted to the hospital in March 2018 and this, along with a surprise telephone call on the day of her Tribunal hearing, rendered her "disoriented" and "torn." (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18). Appellant claimed this disorientation caused her to omit "much vital information" during the Tribunal hearing. (Appellant Petition for Rehearing,

[1] SCALC Rule 40 allows motions for rehearing under these circumstances, and they are analogous to a Rule 59(e), SCRCP motion to reconsider.

7/31/18). Appellant concluded by asking to submit the allegedly vital information. (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18). In the motion, Appellant did not dispute the ALC's finding that she failed to timely file and serve her notice of appeal.[2]

The ALC denied Appellant's petition for rehearing, reiterating timely filing and service are jurisdictional requirements and the court lacked authority to extend the deadline. (ALC Order, 8/16/18). This appeal followed.

[2] Appellant has made multiple different assertions as to why she omitted information during the Tribunal hearing. In her appeal to the Panel, Appellant asserted she omitted information during the Tribunal hearing because she was "frustrated" and "agitated" when her Tribunal hearing started late due to IQOR's failure to answer the first telephone call. (Appellant Appeal to Panel, 4/16/18). She made no mention of any family medical issues in her appeal to the Panel. In her petition for rehearing filed with the ALC, Appellant for the first time claimed she omitted evidence during the Tribunal hearing due to receiving bad news about her sister's medical condition. (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Department is an agency governed by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). *See Gibson v. Florence Country Club*, 282 S.C. 384, 386, 318 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1984) (finding the Department's predecessor, the Employment Security Commission, subject to the APA). Under the APA,

> The review of the administrative law [court]'s order must be confined to the record. The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the administrative law [court] as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court of appeals may affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings; or, it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantive rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision is:
>
> (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
> (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
> (c) made upon unlawful procedure;
> (d) affected by other error of law;
> (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
> (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2018).

With regard to factual issues, this Court's review is limited to determining whether the Panel's decision was "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." *Id.*

> "Substantial evidence" is something less than the weight of the evidence; it is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached in order to justify its action. The substantial evidence rule does not allow judicial fact-finding, or the substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment.

Todd's Ice Cream, Inc. v. S.C. Emp't. Sec. Comm'n, 281 S.C. 254, 258, 315 S.E.2d 373, 375 (Ct. App. 1984); *see also Friends of Earth v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C.*, 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692

S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010) ("Substantial evidence is . . . evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency."). Further, "[t]he findings of the agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence." *Kearse v. State Health & Human Serv. Fin. Comm'n*, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not mean the agency's conclusion is unsupported by substantial evidence. *Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm'n*, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996). Finally, the Appellant bears the burden "to prove convincingly that the agency's decision is unsupported by the evidence." *Id.*

ARGUMENT

I. THE ALC DID NOT ERR BY FINDING IT LACKED APPELLATE JURISDICTION BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO FILE AND SERVE HER NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE MAILING DATE OF THE PANEL DECISION AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 41-35-750 AND SCALC RULE 33.

The ALC did not err by finding it lacked appellate jurisdiction because Appellant failed to file and serve her notice of appeal within thirty days of the mailing date of the Panel decision as required by section 41-35-750 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018) and SCALC Rule 33. A party filing a notice of appeal requesting judicial review of the Panel's decision must file the notice of appeal with the ALC within thirty (30) days of the mailing date of the Panel's decision. § 41-35-750; SCALC Rule 33. "Within thirty days from the date of mailing the [D]epartment's decision, a party to the proceeding whose benefit rights or whose employer account may be affected by the [D]epartment's decision may initiate an action in the [ALC] against the [D]epartment for the review of its decision . . . ." § 41-35-750; *see* SCALC Rule 33 (explaining a party appealing the Department's decision "must" file the notice of appeal within thirty days "of the date of mailing of the decision").

Also, a party appealing the Panel's decision must serve the Department with the notice of appeal within the same thirty days. The appealing party "must" serve the notice of appeal "on the executive director or on a person designated by the Department within the time specified by this section." § 41-35-750; *see* SCALC Rule 33 (explaining in an appeal from the Panel's decision the appealing party "must" serve the Department with the notice of appeal "within thirty (30) days of the date of mailing of the decision" of the Panel). Additionally, SCALC Rule 5 states that "[a]ny document filed with the [ALC] shall be served upon all parties to the proceeding."

"The question of compliance with rules, regulations, and statutes governing an appeal is one of appellate jurisdiction." *Allison v. W.L. Gore & Assocs.*, 394 S.C. 185, 188, 714 S.E.2d 547, 549 (2011). Consequently, the timely filing and service of the notice of appeal under section 41-35-750 are jurisdictional requirements, and neither the ALC nor this Court has the authority to extend the time in which the notice of intent to appeal must be filed and served. *See Mears v. Mears*, 287 S.C. 168, 169, 337 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1985); *Allison*, 394 S.C. at 189, 714 S.E.2d at 550 (noting "an appellate body may not extend the time to appeal").

In this case, the Panel mailed its decision on May 8, 2018, and Appellant's statutory deadline for filing her notice of appeal with the ALC and serving the Department with the notice of appeal was thirty days later on June 7, 2018. However, Appellant waited until June 18, 2018, to file her notice of appeal with the ALC, which exceeded the statutory deadline for filing by eleven days. (ALC Notice of Assignment, 6/21/18). Also, Appellant failed to serve the Department with the notice of appeal until June 14, 2018, which exceeded the statutory deadline for service by seven days. (Letter from Appellant with June 14, 2018 postmark). Thus, because Appellant failed to file and serve the notice of appeal within the statutory deadline, the ALC lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The ALC properly dismissed the appeal pursuant to SCALC Rule 38 based on a lack of appellate jurisdiction. *See generally Elam v. Dep't of Trans.*, 361 S.C. 9, 15, 602 S.E.2d 772, 775 (2004) ("The requirement of service of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, i.e., if a party misses the deadline, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal and has no authority or discretion to 'rescue' the delinquent party by extending or ignoring the deadline for service of the notice.")

Although the Department recognizes Appellant was proceeding pro se, a pro se litigant is responsible "for complying with substantive and procedural requirements of the law." *State v.*

Burton, 356 S.C. 259, 265, 589 S.E.2d 6, 9 (2003). Indeed, Appellant's pro se status does not excuse her failure to comply with rudimentary procedures, such as timely filing and serving the notice of appeal within statutory prescribed deadlines. Also, Appellant was aware of the deadline. The Panel's decision informed Appellant "[t]he law requires that a Petition for Judicial Review must be filed with the Court and served on all parties and [the Department] within thirty (30) days from the mailing date of [the Panel]'s final decision." (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). As a result, Appellant had knowledge of the thirty-day deadline but, nonetheless, failed to comply.

Because Appellant failed to file and serve her notice of appeal within thirty days of the mailing date of the Panel's decision as required by section 41-35-750 and SCALC Rule 33, the ALC lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear Appellant's appeal. Thus, the ALC did not err by dismissing Appellant's appeal, and this Court should affirm.

II. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING HER MAILING ADDRESS AND THE DATE SHE RECEIVED THE PANEL DECISION ARE UNPRESERVED BECAUSE SHE NEITHER RAISED THEM TO THE ALC NOR OBTAINED A RULING ON THEM, AND EVEN IF PRESERVED, HER ALLEGATIONS, IF TRUE, HAVE NO IMPACT ON WHETHER THE ALC HAD APPELLATE JURISDICTION.

A. Appellant's arguments regarding her mailing address and the date she received the Panel decision are unpreserved because she neither raised them to the ALC nor obtained a ruling on them.

Appellant failed to preserve her argument that the Department used an incorrect mailing address when mailing the Panel decision because she failed to raise it to the ALC, and the ALC did not rule on it. For the same reason, Appellant failed to preserve her argument regarding the date she actually received the Panel decision. When reviewing final decisions from the Department, the ALC sits as an appellate court. *See Brown v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control*, 348 S.C. 507, 519, 560 S.E.2d 410, 417 (2002). "It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court]

to be preserved for appellate review." *Wilder Corp. v. Wilke*, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998). "Issue preservation rules are designed to give the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on the issues, and thus provide [the appellate court] with a platform for meaningful appellate review." *Herron v. Century BMW*, 395 S.C. 461, 465, 719 S.E.2d 640, 642 (2011).

The preservation rules requiring a party to raise its arguments and obtain a ruling on them apply to administrative proceedings. *See Brown*, 348 S.C. at 519, 560 S.E.2d at 417; *see Home Med. Sys., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue*, 382 S.C. 556, 562, 677 S.E.2d 582, 586 (2009) ("As in other appellate matters, we require issue preservation in administrative appeals."). "An issue that is not raised to an administrative agency is not preserved for appellate review by the ALC." *Gatewood v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.*, 416 S.C. 304, 324, 785 S.E.2d 600, 611 (Ct. App. 2016).

Furthermore, an "argument that is not raised to an intermediate appellate court is not preserved for review" by a subsequent appellate court. *State v. Oxner*, 391 S.C. 132, 134, 705 S.E.2d 51, 52 (2011); *see Linda Mc Co. v. Shore*, 390 S.C. 543, 558, 703 S.E.2d 499, 506–07 (2010) (finding an issue not presented to the court of appeals was unpreserved for review by our supreme court), overruled on other grounds by *Gordon v. Lancaster*, Op. No. 27847 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 21, 2018) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 46 at 8).

In this case, the Department filed a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction with the ALC, and Appellant did not file anything in response. (ALC Order, 7/24/18). Following the ALC's dismissal of the appeal, Appellant filed a "petition for rehearing" asking the ALC to reconsider its order dismissing the appeal. (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18). In her petition for rehearing, Appellant made no arguments regarding her mailing address or the date she received the Panel decision, and she failed to make any assertions that the Department mailed any document to an incorrect address. (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18).

Appellant had every opportunity to raise both of these issues with the ALC in her petition for rehearing, and she failed to do so. Indeed, she failed to even argue the issue of appellate jurisdiction, which was the basis for the ALC's dismissal. Instead, she focused exclusively on the circumstances surrounding her evidentiary hearing before the Tribunal and her claim as to why she omitted evidence during that hearing. (Appellant Petition for Rehearing, 7/31/18). Moreover, the ALC did not issue any ruling regarding an incorrect mailing address or the date Appellant received the Panel decision. (ALC Order, 7/24/18; ALC Order, 8/16/18).

Because Appellant failed to raise either of these issues to the ALC and the ALC did not rule on them, these issues are unpreserved for review by this Court. Appellant is attempting to raise an issue for the first time on appeal to this Court, and respectfully, this Court should reject that attempt. *See Pye v. Estate of Fox*, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 633 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2006) ("It is well settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved.").

Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to support Appellant's claim of receiving the Panel decision on May 25, 2018. Appellant simply makes the assertion in her brief to this Court. Even if the Court found this issue preserved, because there is nothing in the record to support Appellant's claim regarding the date she received the Panel decision, the Court should reject this argument and affirm. *See* Rule 210(h), SCACR (explaining our appellate courts "will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal" except in specific limited circumstances unrelated to this appeal).

B. Even if the Court finds Appellant's issues regarding her mailing address and the date she received the Panel decision preserved, her allegations, if true, have no impact on whether the ALC had appellate jurisdiction because the Department mailed the Panel decision to Appellant's correct address and that act started Appellant's thirty-day period to file and serve her notice of appeal.

Even if the Court finds Appellant's issues regarding her mailing address and the date she received the Panel decision preserved, her allegations, if true, have no impact on whether the ALC had appellate jurisdiction because the Department mailed the Panel decision to Appellant's correct address and that act started Appellant's thirty-day period to file and serve her notice of appeal. With regard to the mailing address issue, the Panel decision lists the mailing address in two locations, and both show the Department mailed the Panel decision to 5933 Natures Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89122. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). On appeal to this Court, Appellant maintains 5933 Natures Drive is her correct mailing address. (App. Initial Br. 4, 9). The mailing of the Panel decision is the event that started the thirty-day period during which Appellant could have appealed the Department's final decision to the ALC. *See* § 41-35-750 (explaining the time period for filing and serving a notice of appeal from the Department's final decision begins when the Department mails the Panel decision). Because the Department mailed the Panel decision to Appellant's correct address, the clock started on Appellant's thirty-day window to appeal on the day it was mailed, and the ALC correctly concluded Appellant's time to file and serve her notice of appeal expired on June 7, 2018.

Appellant's claims about an incorrect mailing address are a smoke screen and are irrelevant to whether the ALC had appellate jurisdiction. Appellant claims the Department mailed two documents to an incorrect address, including the Department's motion to dismiss to

the ALC and the Department's return to Appellant's petition for rehearing to the ALC.[3] (App. Initial Br. 4, 9). However, even if the Department mailed these two documents to an incorrect address, it is irrelevant to whether the ALC had appellate jurisdiction. As noted above, pursuant to section 41-35-750, the mailing date of the Panel decision was the event that started Appellant's thirty-day period for appealing to the ALC, and the Panel decision reflects Appellant's correct address. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18). Thus, by the time the Department mailed its motion to dismiss and its return to Appellant's petition for rehearing to an incorrect address, Appellant's thirty-day period for appealing had already expired, and the ALC lacked appellate jurisdiction. The ALC already lacked appellate jurisdiction when the Department mailed those two documents, regardless of whether the address on them was correct, and therefore, Appellant's claims about an incorrect mailing address are irrelevant when deciding if the ALC had appellate jurisdiction.

Furthermore, Appellant's brief assertion that, because the Department mailed its motion to dismiss and its return to Appellant's petition for rehearing to the wrong address, the Department must have mailed the Panel decision to the wrong address too is speculation. More importantly, it is directly refuted by the address stamped on the Panel decision. As noted above, the Panel decision reflects Appellant's correct mailing address in two locations. (Panel Decision, 5/8/18).

Additionally, Appellant's claim regarding the date she received the Panel decision is irrelevant. Because, as noted above, the time for filing and serving the notice of appeal begins when the Department mails the Panel decision, rather than when Appellant received the decision, Appellant's claim that she did not receive the decision until May 25, 2018, is irrelevant.

[3] In her brief, Appellant states the Department mailed three documents to an incorrect address; however, she actually lists only two.

Moreover, even if her allegation is true, she received the Panel decision almost two weeks before the period for filing and serving the notice of appeal expired. Thus, she had ample time to comply with section 41-35-750 and SCALC Rule 33 and failed to do so.

Accordingly, even if the Court finds Appellant's issues regarding her mailing address and the date she received the Panel decision preserved, the Department mailed the Panel decision to Appellant's correct address, which started Appellant's thirty-day period for appealing to the ALC. Because Appellant failed to file and serve her notice of appeal within thirty days of the mailing date of the Panel decision, the ALC lacked appellate jurisdiction. Appellant's claim regarding an incorrect mailing address on the Department's motion to dismiss and its return to Appellant's petition for rehearing is irrelevant because those documents had no impact on whether Appellant timely filed and served the notice of appeal. Also, Appellant's claim regarding the date she received the Panel decision is irrelevant because the time period to file and serve the notice of appeal begins when the Department mails the Panel decision, not when Appellant receives it in the mail. As a result, this Court should affirm the ALC's order dismissing Appellant's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the ALC's finding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because Appellant failed to file and serve her notice of appeal within thirty days of the mailing date of the Panel decision as required by section 41-35-750 and SCALC Rule 33. Furthermore, this Court should find Appellant's issues regarding her mailing address and the date she received the Panel decision unpreserved because she failed to raise them to the ALC and the ALC did not rule on them. However, even if this Court finds these issues preserved, her allegations, if true, have no impact on whether the ALC had appellate jurisdiction over Appellant's appeal.

Respectfully Submitted,

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March 13, 2019

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM THE
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Appellate Case Number: 2018-001685

Cynthia G. Aldaqqaq,

Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce and IQOR Holdings US LLC,

Respondent (s).

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served the Initial Brief and Designation of Matter of the Respondent DEW on the parties in this case by depositing a copy of it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, on March 13, 2019, addressed to the parties at their addresses of record:

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March 13, 2018

The Honorable Jenny Abbott Kitchings
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RE: Cynthia G. Aldaqqaq v. South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce and IQOR Holdings US, LLC
Appellate Case No: 18-001685

Dear Ms. Kitchings:

Enclosed are the original and one copy of the Initial Brief and Designation of Matter of Respondent South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce. A Proof of Service is also included in this packet.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Kristi Chesley

Kristi Chesley
Administrative Legal Assistant for
Steven A. Jordan
Attorney for Respondent South Carolina
Department of Employment and Workforce

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