

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In the Supreme Court

RECEIVED

MAY 23 2019

S.C. SUPREME COURT

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

DeAndrea Gist Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5618 (S.C. Ct. App. Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled April 24, 2019)

Jean P. Derrick

Respondent,

v.

Lisa C. Moore,

Petitioner.

APPENDIX

Robert D. Dodson
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, SC 29201
Telephone: (803) 252-2600
Attorney for Petitioner

Other Counsel of Record:

William S. Tetterton, Esquire
P. O. Box 530
Camden, South Carolina 29021

Katherine Carruth Goode, Esquire
229 South Congress Street
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180
Attorneys for Respondent

APPENDIX

Final Brief of Appellant.....	001-010
Final Brief of Respondent.....	011-028
Record on Appeal	029-142
Court of Appeals Opinion No. 5618 dated April 24, 2019.....	143-149
Order filed April 24, 2019 Granting Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing	150
Order filed April 24, 2019 Denying Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing	151
Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing dated February 5, 2019	152-154
Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing dated February 7, 2019	155-157
Respondent’s Return to Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing.....	158-162

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

DeAndrea Gist Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Jean P. Derrick,

v. Respondent,

Lisa C. Moore.

Appellant.

FINAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

November 10, 2016

Robert D. Dodson, Esquire
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, SC 29201
Telephone: 803-252-2600
Facsimile: 803-771-2259

Attorney for Appellant

RECEIVED

NOV 10 2016

SC Court of Appeals

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

<u>Hyload, Inc. v. Pre-Engineered Prods., Inc.</u> , 308 S.C. 277, 417 S.E.2d 622 (Ct. App. 1992).....	3, 5
<u>Rhodes v. Benson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.</u> , 374 S.C. 122, 647 S.E.2d 249 (Ct. App. 2007).....	3
<u>Wilson v. Willis</u> , March 2, Advance Sheets, opinion number 5387 (S.C. App. 2016)	3

STATUTES

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3)	1, 4, 6, 7
---------------------------------------	------------

OTHER AUTHORITIES

South Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 416.....	2, 4, 5, 6
--	------------

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO ARBITRATION WHEN IT WAS RESPONDENT WHO FILED THE LAWSUIT AND ONLY MOVED TO COMPEL ARBITRATION BEFORE THE FEE DISPUTE BOARD AFTER COUNTERCLAIMS WERE BROUGHT AGAINST HER?

II. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN COMPELLING ARBITRATION BEFORE THE RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES BOARD WHEN THE APPELLATE COURT RULES CREATING THE FEE DISPUTES BOARD DO NOT VEST ANY COURT WITH THE JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY TO COMPEL MANDATORY ARBITRATION BEFORE THE FEE DISPUTES BOARD?

III. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN COMPELLING ARBITRATION WHEN THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (S.C. CODE ANN § 15-48-10(b)(3)) EXPRESSLY EXEMPTS "A PRE-AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO WHEN THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES IS SUCH THAT OF LAWYER-CLIENT"?

STATEMENT OF CASE

This appeal arises from the lower court's Orders compelling Appellant to binding arbitration through the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar.

Respondent is a lawyer who sued her client, Lisa Moore, for additional money and fees she claimed she was owed related to her representation of Ms. Moore in a Family Court action.¹

¹ The Family Court awarded fees to Respondent and the fees she now seeks to collect from Appellant exceed those awarded by the Family Court.

R. pp. 27-39. Respondent has a long history of suing former clients for additional fees, getting those clients in default and then obtaining default judgments against them. R. pp. 40-47. In this case, Respondent's ploy and scheme did not work because Ms. Moore obtained other legal counsel, answered Respondent's Complaint and filed counterclaims of her own. R. pp. 40-47.

However, when the litigation process no longer suited Respondent, she sought to have the initial action that she filed dismissed and sent to binding arbitration through Fee Disputes Board. R. pp. 95-101. At no point prior to initiating the current lawsuit and, at no point since she has commenced the current lawsuit, has Respondent filed an application with the Fee Disputes Board. Instead, her legal argument to the court below was that a fee agreement which predated the fee dispute in this case and which does not comply with SCRAP, Rule 416, compelled Appellant to participate in forced arbitration before the Fee Disputes Board.

The court below erred in bifurcating the case by mandating that Respondent's initial complaint be referred to the Fee Disputes Board while the Circuit Court maintained jurisdiction over Ms. Moore's counterclaims. R. pp. 24-25. The lower court erred in failing to find that Plaintiff had waived any right she might have to forced arbitration through the Fee Disputes Board by initiating litigation and actively pursuing her case through the Courts. Furthermore, the Circuit Court misapplied the rules governing disputes before the Fee Disputes Board. More specifically, those rules require a client's voluntary consent to the jurisdiction of the Fee Disputes Board *after* a dispute over a fee arises. Finally, the court below erred in finding that the arbitration clause at issue was enforceable under the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act. This appeal followed two orders compelling Appellant to mandatory arbitration before the Fee Disputes Board.

ARGUMENT

I. **RESPONDENT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO ARBITRATION BY ELECTING TO FILE THIS LAWSUIT.**

“Although South Carolina favors arbitration, the right to enforce an arbitration clause may be waived.” Wilson v. Willis, (S.C. App. 2016) *citing* Rhodes v. Benson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 374 S.C. 122, 126, 647 S.E.2d 249, 251 (Ct. App. 2007). A party “bringing a suit based on the contract instead of relying on the arbitration provision constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate.” Hyload, Inc. v. Pre-Engineered Prods., Inc., 308 S.C. 277, 280, 417 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Ct. App. 1992). In the case now before this Court, that is what Respondent did – she brought “suit based on the contract instead of relying on the arbitration provision” and thereby waived her right to compel arbitration. Hyload *supra*.

To be clear, the issue of waiver was raised in the lower court. At the initial hearing Counsel stated:

The other point I would say is, she waived it because she filed this lawsuit hoping that she’s going to come over here and get my client into default and then when my client gets a lawyer and the lawyer stands up and says ‘Huh-uh, we dispute the fee. We think you’ve committed fraud in the way that you billed her. We think there are other improprieties in this and we want a jury trial, then she says, ‘No, no, no. I want a do-over. I want to go to the Fee Dispute Resolution Board even though I’m the one that initiated this lawsuit. There is simply no law for that...”

R. p. 58, *quoting* ll. 3-13. The issue was also raised with Circuit Court at the reconsideration hearing.

My fourth point that I would make is a fairly obvious point, but I’ll make it anyway. And it is this. Ms. Derrick initiated this lawsuit. She filed the original summons and complaint in this action. And she - - this not the first time she has done it. She has done this numerous times where she has sued clients for fees. And so she made her bed. She wanted the Court to decide the issues that she brought before the Court. And she can’t get a Mulligan or a do-over or a takeaway and file the initial action here and then say, Nope, I don’t want - - I take it back. I want to go the Fee Dispute Resolution Board.

R. p. 72-73, *quoting* p. 72, l. 24 – p.73, l. 12.

Despite raising the waiver issue at both hearings before the lower court, the Circuit Court simply did not address waiver in either of its orders. In the first order compelling arbitration before the Fee Disputes Resolutions Board, the lower court's Order provides in total:

This matter came before the Court on July 14, 2015 as a motion filed by the Plaintiff to compel the Defendant to resolve the fee dispute through the Resolution of Fee Dispute Board of the South Carolina Bar. In the fee agreement signed by Defendant, the agreement directly states that 'any dispute concerning the fee due pursuant to this agreement shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full, final resolution to the Resolution Fee Dispute Board of the South Carolina Bar, pursuant to Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.' Because the Defendant disputes the fee for numerous alleged reasons, this Court finds that it is proper to take these matters up with the Resolution Fee Disputes Board pursuant to the signed contract. The other counterclaims and potential legal malpractice claim may remain under the Circuit Court jurisdiction. The Plaintiff's motion to compel resolution through the Fee Dispute Board is granted.

R. p. 24.

The lower court also never addressed the waiver issue at the reconsideration hearing. In total, the lower court's Order provides:

This matter came before the Court on January 27, 2016 as a 59(e) motion to amend the December 4, 2015 Order. Defendant's counsel argues Rule 10 of SCRAP Rule 16 provides that 'consent may be withdrawn' after parties agree to take a fee matter to the Fee Disputes Resolution Board (the Board), however this is an erroneous interpretation of the phrase. The 'consent may be withdrawn' language refers specifically to the email correspondence among the Board, the client and the lawyer. It does not refer to the consent of taking the matter in front of the Board. Furthermore, the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act makes clear that the Act does not apply to 'a pre-agreement entered into when the relationship of the contracting parties is such that of lawyer-client...' §15-48-10(b)(3). Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

R. p. 26.

Despite raising the issue of waiver at both motions hearing, the court below never addressed Appellant's waiver issue despite case law holding that a party "bringing a suit based

on the contract instead of relying on the arbitration provision constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate.” Hyload, Inc. v. Pre-Engineered Prods., Inc., 308 S.C. 277, 280, 417 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Ct. App. 1992). This was reversible error that should be corrected by this Court.

II. THE CIRCUIT COURT LACKED THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO COMPEL BINDING ARBITRATION THROUGH THE FEE DISPUTES BOARD BECAUSE APPELLANT DID NOT CONSENT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEE DISPUTES BOARD AFTER THE DISPUTE AROSE.

Rule 416, SCRAP creates the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar and the Rule sets forth how parties may have disputes resolved before the Board. In relevant part, Rule 10 of Rule 416, SCRAP states:

All proceedings hereunder shall be commenced by filing an application in the Office of the Bar, on forms provided by the Bar.

That was simply not done in this case. At no point, did Respondent or Ms. Moore file an “application in the Office of the Bar, on forms provided by the Bar.” Nothing in Rule 10 or the other rules that are a part of the SCRAP vests the Circuit Court with the legal authority to compel parties to file such an application or submit fee disputes to the Board despite what might be contained in a written fee agreement that *predates* an actual fee dispute. Yet, that is precisely the effect of the lower court’s Orders. In effect, the lower court’s orders rewrite the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure by expanding the application process to include forced arbitration before the Board when ordered by the Circuit Court.

To date, Appellant and her counsel are not aware of any case law or other legal authority taking such an overly expansive reading of Rule 416, SCRAP. In fact, neither Respondent herself, her attorney or the Circuit Court cited a single case or other legal authority that

effectively allows a Circuit Court order to be substituted for “an application in the Office of the Bar, on forms provided by the Bar.” In reading other parts of Rule 416, SCRAP it is clear why such case law does not exist: Because Rule 416 contemplates voluntary participation by clients *after* a fee dispute arises. The rules simply do not contemplate that attorneys and lawyers will be able to force clients into mandatory arbitration before the Fee Disputes Board by inserting clauses into their fee agreements before an actual fee dispute arises.

In pertinent part Rule 9 of Rule 416, SCRAP provides:

RULE EXCLUSIVE UPON CONSENT

(b) No application will be accepted from an attorney unless accompanied by the client’s written consent to jurisdiction and consent to be bound by the final decision of the Board.

If the intent of this Rule were to allow written fee agreements that *predated* actual disputes to be substituted for consent *at the time* an application were filed with the Fee Disputes Board that intent would have been clearly articulated in the Rule itself. It was not but the lower court’s orders effectively read this intent into Rule when it was not originally contemplated by the drafters of the Rule. This is reversible error that should be corrected by this Court.

III. THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE AT ISSUE IS UNENFORCEABLE UNDER S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(3).

The court below erred in enforcing the arbitration clause because pre-agreed arbitration clauses between lawyers and clients are not enforceable under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3). While the Courts in South Carolina generally favor arbitration over litigation there are important exceptions to this general rule. One of those exceptions was crafted by the Legislature when they adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act. The Act provides that it “shall not apply to...

(3) A pre-agreement entered into when the relationship of the contracting parties is such that of lawyer-client...

In granting Respondent's Motion to Compel, the court below effectively ignored the legislative directive found in the Code at S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3). The lower court interpreted this provision as excluding the contract/fee agreement at issue from the ordinary requirements that "it be typed in underlined capital letters, or rubber stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract..." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(a). Such an interpretation misconstrues the purpose and intent of the Uniform Arbitration Act.

Like the Federal Arbitration Act, the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act was drafted as a legislative response to court rulings refusing to enforce arbitration clauses in general. The Legislature sought to correct what it saw as judicial overreach and passed the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act which legislatively mandated that arbitration clauses be enforced by the courts. In so doing, however, the Legislature also recognized that certain provisions needed to be in place to safe guard the Constitutional right to trial by jury. It is for this reason that the Legislature requires that "arbitration pursuant to this Chapter shall be typed in underlined capital letters, or rubber-stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract." The Legislature also recognized that certain contracts and disputes were not suited for sweeping and binding arbitration clauses. One of those types of contracts is attorney client fee agreements.


The court below erred when it enforced the arbitration clause at issue over the legislative protection and mandate found in S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3). According to the lower court's interpretation, attorney client fee agreements were afforded none of the protections contemplated by the Legislature. This was reversible error that should be corrected by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, this Court should issue an Order(s) reversing the lower court's orders compelling Appellant to arbitrate through the Fee Disputes Board.

Respectfully submitted,

November 10, 2016



Robert D. Dodson, Esquire
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, SC 29201
Telephone: 803-252-2600
Facsimile: 803-771-2259

Attorney for Appellant

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2014-CP-28-940
Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Jean P. Derrick,

Respondent,

v.

Appellant

Lisa C. Moore.

FINAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

William S. Tetterton
Tetterton Law Firm, LLC
608 Lafayette Avenue
Post Office Box 530
Camden, South Carolina 29021
Telephone: 803-432-1496
South Carolina Bar No. 5509

Katherine Carruth Goode
229 South Congress Street
Post Office Box 1175
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180
Telephone: 803-799-4440
South Carolina Bar No. 8951

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities	ii
Statement of Issues on Appeal	1
Statement of the Case	2
Argument	3
Conclusion	14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

<i>Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis</i> , 398 S.C. 323, 730 S.E.2d 282 (2012)	6
<i>Bailey v. Bailey</i> , 312 S.C. 454, 441 S.E.2d 325 (1994)	5
<i>Byrd v. City of Hartsville</i> , 365 S.C. 650, 620 S.E.2d 76 (2005)	6
<i>Easterling v. Burger King Corp.</i> , 416 S.C. 437, 786 S.E.2d 443 (Ct.App. 2016)	13
<i>Hyload, Inc. v. Pre-Engineered Products, Inc.</i> , 308 S.C. 277, 417 S.E.2d 622 (Ct. App. 1992)	10, 11
<i>I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant</i> , 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000)	7
<i>ML-Lee Acquisition Fund, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche</i> , 327 S.C. 238, 489 S.E.2d 470 (1997)	6
<i>Rhodes v. Benson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.</i> , 374 S.C. 122, 647 S.E.2d 249 (2007)	9, 10
<i>Snow v. Smith</i> , 416 S.C. 72, 784 S.E.2d 242 (Ct.App. 2016)	6
<i>Spreeuw v. Barker</i> , 385 S.C. 45, 682 S.E.2d 843 (Ct.App. 2009)	12
<i>Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia</i> , 409 S.C. 563, 762 S.E.2d 693 (2014)	12
<i>Walters v. Canal Ins. Co.</i> , 294 S.C. 150, 363 S.E.2d 120 (Ct.App. 1987)	6
<i>Wilder Corp. v. Wilke</i> , 330 S.C. 71, 497 S.E.2d 731 (1998)	12

Statutes:

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10 <i>et seq.</i>	1, 6
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3)	6, 7, 8, 13
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-90	9
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-120	9
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-150	9

Rules of Court:

Rule 208(b)(1)(C), South Carolina Appellant Court Rules	2
Rule 208(b)(2), South Carolina Appellant Court Rules.....	1
Rule 220(c), South Carolina Appellant Court Rules	7
Rule 416, South Carolina Appellant Court Rules	<i>passim</i>
Rule 416, South Carolina Appellant Court Rules, 1-22.....	3
Rule 416, South Carolina Appellant Court Rules, 2	8
Rule 416, South Carolina Appellant Court Rules, Rule 9(c)	3, 5
Rule 416, South Carolina Appellant Court Rules, Rule 10	12
Rule 59(e), South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.....	2, 6

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

Pursuant to Rule 208(b)(2) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, Respondent submits the following alternative statement of the issues on appeal:

1. Did the circuit court correctly compel resolution of the attorney-client fee dispute through the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board, where Appellant consented to pursue such resolution?
2. Did the circuit court correctly find the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act, S.C. Code 15-48-10 *et seq.*, is not applicable to an attorney-client fee agreement?
3. Did the circuit court correctly decline to find Respondent waived the right to have the fee dispute resolved through the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board? (Appellant's Issue 1)
4. Did the circuit court have the authority to compel resolution of the attorney-client fee dispute through the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous fee agreement? (Appellant's Issue 2)
5. Did the circuit court correctly find the fee dispute provision enforceable? (Appellant's Issue 3)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE¹

Respondent, Jean P. Derrick (hereafter, "Attorney"), filed this action on October 8, 2014, in the Kershaw County Court of Common Pleas, seeking judgment against the appellant, Lisa C. Moore (hereafter, "Client"), for outstanding attorney's fees and costs incurred in Attorney's representation of Client in family court litigation. R. pp. 27-39. Client filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting, among other allegations, that the fees charged were unreasonable and that the fees included charges for work that was not actually performed. R. pp. 40-46. Attorney filed a reply to the counterclaim. R. pp. 48-49. Because Client's pleadings raised the issue whether the attorney's fees were fair and proper, Attorney also filed a motion to compel Client to submit the fee dispute to the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board, in keeping with the terms of the fee agreement entered into by Attorney and Client at the outset of the representation. R. pp. 96-100.

Judge DeAndrea G. Benjamin held a hearing on the motion to compel on July 14, 2015. R. p. 51. On December 14, 2015, Judge Benjamin issued an order granting the motion to compel resolution of the fee dispute through the Board. R. p. 24. Client filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil

¹ The statement of the case in appellant's opening brief does not comply with Rule 208(b)(1)(C) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. It does not contain a history of the proceedings, as required by that rule. It contains contested matters – unfounded and unproven allegations – which the rule mandates shall not be included in the statement of the case. It contains the false assertion that the respondent (referred to in this brief as "Attorney") sought to have her initial action against the appellant (referred to as "Client") dismissed. That did not occur. It contains arguments, not supported by any authority, which are not appropriately included in the statement of the case. It contains false references to the fee dispute resolution process as "binding arbitration" and "mandatory arbitration." It also contains the conclusory and false assertion that the fee agreement entered into by the parties does not comply with Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, without citation to any provision of Rule 416 with which the appellant contends the fee agreement fails to comply. This Court should disregard the appellant's statement of the case in its entirety.

Procedure. R. pp. 103-05. Judge Benjamin held a hearing on the reconsideration motion on January 27, 2016. R. p. 68. On March 16, 2016, Judge Benjamin issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. R. p. 26.

ARGUMENT

I. THE CIRCUIT COURT CORRECTLY COMPELLED RESOLUTION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE DISPUTE THROUGH THE BAR'S RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES BOARD.

Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules created the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar (hereafter, "Board"), established the jurisdiction of the Board, and established procedures for the resolution of fee disputes between attorneys and clients. *See* Rule 416, SCACR, Rules 1-22. Rule 9 of Rule 416 vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Board where the client has consented to be bound by the final decision of the Board. *See* Rule 416, SCACR, Rule 9(c).

Attorney and Client entered into a written fee agreement in 2011 with respect to Attorney's representation of Client in a matter in the Family Court of Kershaw County. That agreement, signed by Client on April 19, 2011, contained two separate provisions setting forth that ~~any dispute as to fees would be submitted by the dissatisfied party to the Board for resolution.~~ R. pp. 99-100, ¶¶ 7, 8. Attorney's representation of Client in this case proceeded from April 2011 through April 2014, and the outcome of trial was favorable to Client.

In the family court's unappealed final order, the family court judge ordered the opposing party to pay a portion of Client's attorney's fees directly to Client. R. p. 20, ¶ P. The court found Attorney had "obtained beneficial results across the board" for Client. R. p. 14, ¶ 37. The family court further found the litigation was "relatively complex,"

involving full discovery, including depositions, and a two-day trial, even after the primary issue of custody was settled pre-trial. R. p. 15, ¶ 38. The court found Attorney's expenditure of ~~64 hours~~ working on the case to be reasonable and found Attorney's professional standing to be excellent. *Id.* The court found Attorney has been a member of the South Carolina Bar for over 36 years. *Id.* The court found the case was well prepared and well tried. *Id.* The court found the beneficial results obtained by Attorney for Client were good. *Id.* The court found Attorney's hourly rate of \$300 was "customary in this community for legal services, and even on the low side for an attorney of her stature and experience." R. pp. 15-16, ¶ 38.

By order dated March 6, 2014, the family court awarded \$12,000 in attorney's fees and ordered the opposing party to pay \$6,000 of the fee award directly to Client within 90 days from the date of the order (June 4, 2014); and another \$6,000 of the fee award directly to Client within 120 days from the date of the order (July 4, 2014). R. p. 20, ¶ P. Notwithstanding Client's receipt of this fee award, her last payment to Attorney was made in May 2014, leaving an outstanding balance for attorney's fees and costs of \$10,484.40. R. pp. 30-39. In October 2014, Attorney brought this action seeking a judgment for the unpaid amount. *Id.*

In footnote 1 of Client's opening brief, she asserts that the fees Attorney seeks to collect exceed the fees awarded by the family court. This assertion is incorrect. The family court awarded fees of \$12,000. Attorney seeks judgment for a lesser sum, the outstanding balance of her total fees and costs, in the amount of \$10,484.40.

When Client filed a responsive pleading challenging the reasonableness of the fees charged by Attorney, Attorney invoked the provision of the fee agreement by which

Client consented to resolution of any fee dispute through the Board. The motion to compel was based on the clear and unambiguous language of the fee agreement, which Client freely and voluntarily entered into in April 2011, the benefit of which Client accepted throughout the ensuing three years of this contentious litigation.

In its order, the circuit court relied upon the plain language of the fee agreement to order that the fee dispute be resolved through the Board. The court stated:

In the fee agreement signed by Defendant, the agreement directly states that "any dispute concerning the fee due pursuant to this agreement shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full, final resolution to the Resolution Fee Dispute Board of the South Carolina Bar, pursuant to Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules." Because the Defendant disputes the fee for numerous alleged reasons, this Court finds that it is proper to take these matters up with the Resolution Fee Dispute Board pursuant to the signed contract. The other counterclaims and potential legal malpractice claim may remain under the Circuit Court jurisdiction. The Plaintiff's motion to compel resolution through the Fee Dispute Board is granted.

R. p. 24, quoting R. p. 2, ¶ 7.

The court's conclusion was not in error. Client freely and voluntarily entered into the fee agreement and accepted its benefits. She consented in that agreement to submit any fee dispute to the Board. Because of that consent, the Board had exclusive jurisdiction of the dispute. See Rule 416, SCACR, Rule 9(c); cf. *Bailey v. Bailey*, 312 S.C. 454, 459, 441 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1994) (noting exclusive jurisdiction of Board under Rule 9). The court properly enforced the plain language of the unambiguous agreement and properly granted the motion to compel resolution through the mechanism provided by the contract, reserving all of Client's counterclaims for further proceedings in the trial court. None of the arguments of Client, addressed below, undermines the correctness of the court's ruling.

II. THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, S.C. CODE 15-48-10 *et seq.*, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE AGREEMENT.

At the hearing on the motion to compel submission of the fee dispute to the Board, Client for the first time asserted that the fee dispute resolution proceedings under Rule 416 constitute arbitration, and the thread running through all her arguments in the court below and in her appellate brief is the contention that Rule 416 proceedings are essentially arbitrations. In the court's order ruling on the Rule 59(e) motion, the court specifically found "the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act makes clear that the Act does not apply to a pre-agreement entered into when the relationship of the contracting parties is such that of a lawyer-client." See R. p. 26, quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3). Client has not appealed this ruling, and it is the law of the case.

An appellant is bound by any unappealed factual findings and conclusions of law, which are the law of the case. See *Byrd v. City of Hartsville*, 365 S.C. 650, 655, 620 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2005); *ML-Lee Acquisition Fund, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche*, 327 S.C. 238, 241, 489 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1997); *Walters v. Canal Ins. Co.*, 294 S.C. 150, 151, 363 S.E.2d 120, 121 (Ct.App. 1987). An unappealed ruling, whether right or wrong, is the law of the case. See *Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis*, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012); *Snow v. Smith*, 416 S.C. 72, 87 n.6, 784 S.E.2d 242, 249 n.6 (Ct.App. 2016). Here, Client did not appeal the court's finding that the Arbitration Act is not applicable to the fee agreement, and that ruling is binding as the law of the case.

In Client's answer and counterclaim, she did not plead any defense or counterclaim based on the attorney-client fee agreement being an arbitration agreement.

In fact, the answer's "second affirmative defense" quoted the agreement's fee dispute resolution provision and pled as a defense Attorney's failure "to satisfy this administrative remedy/condition precedent." See R. p. 41, ¶¶ 5, 6. No other allegation of Client's responsive pleading addressed the fee agreement or claimed that it was subject to the Uniform Arbitration Act or decisions in arbitration cases. Any un-pled defenses based on non-compliance with the Arbitration Act, asserted for the first time in the hearing of the motion to compel or later in these proceedings, were not properly before the court, and this Court should find those defenses waived. See Rule 220(c), SCACR (appellate court may affirm judgment of lower court on any ground appearing in the record on appeal); *I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant*, 338 S.C. 406, 419, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) (acknowledging appropriateness of affirming judgments on additional sustaining grounds).

However, regardless of any procedural default of this issue, the court's ruling that the Uniform Arbitration Act does not apply to the fee agreement entered into by Attorney and Client is correct on the merits. The section of the Arbitration Act quoted in the court's order expressly removes this attorney-client fee agreement from the purview of the Arbitration Act: "This Chapter however shall not apply to . . . any pre-agreement entered into when the relationship of the contracting parties is such that [sic] of lawyer-client" See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3). Rule 416 establishes a fee dispute resolution system that is separate and distinct from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, and attorney-client fee agreements are therefore expressly exempted from the Act. The court correctly ruled the Arbitration Act is inapplicable based on the plain language of

Section 15-48-10(b)(3), and all arguments of Client premised on provisions of the Arbitration Act or decisions addressing arbitration agreements are misplaced.

III. ATTORNEY DID NOT WAIVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK RESOLUTION OF THE FEE DISPUTE THROUGH THE RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES BOARD.

Client contends Attorney waived the right to have the fee dispute resolved through the Board by filing suit for the outstanding balance. To the contrary, no waiver occurred. ~~At the time Attorney filed the complaint, there was no fee dispute, and therefore there was nothing to be submitted to the Board for resolution.~~ The language of the agreement called for the "dissatisfied party" to submit the dispute to the Board; and ~~Attorney was not dissatisfied~~ with the fees charged, since they were the true and accurate fees incurred in Attorney's representation of Client. By definition, "[a] dispute exists when the parties to an employment agreement between lawyer and client have a genuine difference as to the fair and proper amount of a fee." See Rule 416, SCACR, Rule 2. ~~Believing her fee to be fair and proper, Attorney could not institute a fee dispute proceeding with the Board.~~ The provisions of Rule 416 are not a substitute for an action for a money judgment. By bringing such an action for the outstanding fees owed to her, Attorney did not waive her right, pursuant to the clear terms of the parties' agreement, to have the dispute resolved by the Board once that dispute arose. The court correctly enforced the plain language of the agreement, and this Court should affirm the court's order compelling Client to submit the dispute to the Board.

Client's reliance on case law addressing a party's waiver of the right to enforce an arbitration agreement is misplaced. As discussed in Argument II, *supra*, the attorney-client fee agreement is not subject to the Arbitration Act. The provisions of Rule 416

create a fee dispute resolution system that is separate and distinct from arbitration proceedings, and decisions pertaining to waiver of arbitration provisions are simply not applicable to proceedings under Rule 416.

Significantly, the procedures of Rule 416 are not consistent with those of the Uniform Arbitration Act. There is no provision in any sub-part of Rule 416 for an attorney to apply to the Board for a money judgment for unpaid fees, where no dispute exists with the client as to the fairness or propriety of the fee charged. See Rule 416, SCACR, Rules 1-22. Unlike the Arbitration Act, there is no provision for the grant of an award. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-90. ~~Unlike the Arbitration Act, there is no provision for confirmation of an award by the circuit court.~~ Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-120. ~~Unlike the Arbitration Act, there is no provision for entry of a money judgment on the basis of confirmation of an award.~~ Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-150. [REDACTED]

In this case, the only recourse Attorney had to collect outstanding fees that had not previously been disputed was to file a lawsuit. There was no avenue for her to pursue a judgment through the procedures of Rule 416. Upon Client's filing a response that disputed the amount of the fees, Attorney properly invoked the fee dispute resolution provision of the fee agreement. Her earlier action to collect the outstanding fees cannot be deemed a waiver of that provision.

Even if arbitration decisions were applicable in the context of Rule 416, which Attorney disputes, they do not support Client's claim that Attorney waived the right to compel resolution of the dispute through Rule 416. In one of the cases cited by Appellant, *Rhodes v. Benson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 374 S.C. 122, 126, 647 S.E.2d 249, 251 (2007), the Supreme Court outlined a multi-part test for determining if a party

waived its right to compel arbitration. Although Client cites *Rhodes* in her brief, she did not present any evidence or argue that any factor of the *Rhodes* test for waiver was met in this case.

Client principally relies on *Hyload, Inc. v. Pre-Engineered Products, Inc.*, 308 S.C. 277, 417 S.E.2d 622 (Ct.App. 1992), to argue that bringing a lawsuit constitutes a waiver. However, Client misquotes the sentence in *Hyload* to that effect, leaving out the qualifier "ordinarily." *Hyload*, 308 S.C. at 280, 417 S.E.2d at 624. The principle stated in *Hyload* was *not* an absolute. In fact, *Hyload* acknowledged there is no set rule as to what constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate, and the question depends on the facts of each case. *Id.*; see *Rhodes*, 374 S.C. at 126, 647 S.E.2d at 251. Moreover, "to establish waiver, a party must show prejudice through an undue burden caused by delay in demanding arbitration." *Rhodes*, 374 S.C. at 126, 647 S.E.2d at 251 (citation omitted). Here, there has been no allegation and certainly no showing that Client will be prejudiced or suffer any burden due to submission of the fee dispute to proceedings under Rule 416. In fact, the court's order assures no prejudice will result, reserving all of Client's counterclaims for decision in the court action. Under the authorities invoked by Client in her brief, she cannot establish that Attorney waived the dispute resolution provision of the fee agreement.

Moreover, *Hyload* is factually distinguishable from the situation presented here. In *Hyload*, the waiver of the right to enforce an arbitration provision was premised upon the party's having acted inconsistently with the continued assertion of the right. In that case, *Hyload* and Pre-Engineered, corporate entities in a dispute arising from multiple contracts, brought actions against each other. *Hyload*, 308 S.C. at 278, 417 S.E.2d at

623. Upon being sued by Pre-Engineered, Hyload demanded arbitration pursuant to one of the agreements, and Pre-Engineered agreed to arbitrate and prepared the arbitration documents for Hyload's signature. Hyload, however, never signed the documents, instead commencing an action against Pre-Engineered. *Id.*, 308 S.C. at 279, 417 S.E.2d at 624. When Hyload sought dismissal of Pre-Engineered's action because the agreement required arbitration, the court found Hyload had waived its right to compel arbitration by refusing to execute the papers necessary to commence arbitration and electing instead to sue on the contract. *Id.*, 308 S.C. at 280, 417 S.E.2d at 624.

In this case, unlike *Hyload*, Attorney never acted inconsistently with the right under the fee agreement to have disputes as to the reasonableness, fairness, and propriety of Attorney's fee resolved by the Board. Under the procedures of Rule 416, Attorney had no recourse to the Board for collection of fees or entry of a judgment at the time she filed suit, because no dispute as to the fees then existed. Her only avenue for obtaining a judgment for outstanding fees was through the courts. Upon Client's filing of a responsive pleading raising a dispute as to the fees charged, Attorney for the first time learned client disputed the amount of her fees, and Attorney was within her right under the agreement to seek resolution through the Board. Her actions cannot be construed to be a waiver of that right.

IV THE CIRCUIT COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO COMPEL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE THROUGH THE BOARD.

Client asserts the court lacked legal authority to compel resolution of the fee dispute through the Board because Client did not consent to the jurisdiction of the Board when the dispute arose.

In her brief, the only authority she cites in support of this argument is Rule 10 of Rule 416, providing for how proceedings under Rule 416 are commenced – by application in the Office of the Bar and on forms provided by the Bar – and she complains that was not done in this case. This argument was not made at the hearing on ~~the~~ motion to compel. Client did not cite Rule 10 of Rule 416 in her argument at that hearing, instead invoking Rule 10 for the first time in her Rule 59(e) motion. A party cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion to advance an issue or argument the party could have raised to the circuit court prior to judgment. *Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia*, 409 S.C. 563, 567, 762 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2014). Argument made for the first time in the Rule 59(e) motion is not preserved and may not be entertained by the appellate court. *Id.*; *Spreeuw v. Barker*, 385 S.C. 45, 69, 682 S.E.2d 843, 855 (Ct.App. 2009).

Moreover, the argument premised on Rule 10 in Client's Rule 59(e) motion was a different argument, a contention, based on certain language of Rule 10, that participation in Rule 416 proceedings must be voluntary and that consent could be withdrawn. R. p. 104. The court correctly found the "consent may be withdrawn" language of Rule 10 refers specifically to email correspondence among the Board, the client, and the lawyer, not to consent to taking the matter in front of the Board. R. p. 26. This ruling has not been challenged on appeal. The argument Client now asserts under Rule 10 is based on ~~the authority~~ for commencing a proceeding under Rule 416. That argument, never raised in the court below, either at the initial hearing or in the Rule 59(e) motion, and ~~not raised for the first time on appeal~~, is not preserved. See *Wilder Corp. v. Wilke*, 330 S.C.

71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998); *Easterling v. Burger King Corp.*, 416 S.C. 437, 453, 786 S.E.2d 443, 451 (Ct.App. 2016).

Client makes the sweeping assertion that nothing in the rules governing proceedings before the Board grants authority to the court to compel parties to file an application or submit a fee dispute to the Board based on an agreement that predates an actual fee dispute. But Client also can point to no authority that prohibits such action by the circuit court, because none exists. The circuit court may properly enforce a contract according to its plain meaning. Where Client freely and voluntarily agreed to be bound by the terms of the fee agreement, which included a provision for resolution of fee disputes before the Board, the circuit court had the authority under contract law to enforce that agreement by compelling Client's participation in the dispute resolution process to which she agreed.

V. THE CIRCUIT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE FEE DISPUTE PROVISION ENFORCEABLE.


In a disingenuous argument, Client asserts the court erred in compelling submission of the fee dispute to the Board "because pre-agreed arbitration clauses between lawyers and clients are not enforceable under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3)." This argument misconstrues Section 15-48-10(b)(3). Section 15-48-10(b)(3) provides that the Uniform Arbitration Act is not applicable to a pre-agreement entered into by a lawyer and a client. Argument III of Client's brief concedes the Arbitration Act is not applicable to this agreement, but nonetheless invokes the Act's provisions to challenge the agreement. Because the Act does not apply, it has no bearing on the enforceability of the agreement's dispute resolution provision.

The Supreme Court and Bar established a separate and distinct system for resolution of fee disputes arising between a lawyer and a client, where the client consents. See Rule 416, SCACR. That system is the one invoked by the clear and unambiguous language of the parties' agreement, voluntarily entered into by Client. Because the fee agreement was exempt from the applicability of the Arbitration Act, it is not subject to any provision of the Act, and it cannot be deemed unenforceable based on an alleged violation of a term of the Act. The court properly enforced the terms of the fee agreement and properly granted the motion to compel resolution of the dispute through the procedures of Rule 416.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the orders of the circuit court.

Respectfully submitted,



William S. Tetterton
Tetterton Law Firm, LLC
608 Lafayette Avenue
Post Office Box 530
Camden, South Carolina 29021
Telephone: 803-432-1496
South Carolina Bar No. 5509

Katherine Carruth Goode
229 South Congress Street
Post Office Box 1175
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180
Telephone: 803-799-4440
South Carolina Bar No. 8951

Attorneys for Respondent

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

RECEIVED

DeAndrea Gist Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

OCT 20 2016

SC Court of Appeals

Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Jean P. Derrick, ... Respondent,
v.
Lisa C. Moore, ... Appellant.

RECORD ON APPEAL

Robert D. Dodson, Esquire
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, SC 29201
(803)252-2600
Attorney for Appellant

William S. Tetterton
Tetterton Law Firm, LLC
P.O. Box 530
Camden, South Carolina 29021
(803) 432-1496
Attorney for Respondent

Katherine Carruth Goode
229 South Congress Street
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180
(803)799-4440
Attorney for Respondent

INDEX

I. ORDERS

1. Final Order from Family Court Docket No. 2011-DR-28-186, filed March 20, 2014 in Kershaw County 1-21
2. Form 4 Order dated July 14, 2015 22-23
3. Form 4 Order dated December 4, 2015 24-25
4. Form 4 Order dated March 16, 2016 26

II. PLEADINGS

1. Civil Action Summons and Complaint for Debt filed October 8, 2014 27-39
2. Answer and Counterclaim of Defendant filed December 4, 2014.....40-47
3. Reply to Counterclaim filed December 31, 2014 48-50

III. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING

1. Motions Hearing Before the Honorable DeAndrea G. Benjamin heard on July 14, 2015.....51 -67
2. Transcript of Record before the Honorable DeAndrea G. Benjamin January 27, 2016.....68-94

IV. MOTIONS

1. Plaintiff's Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel April 28, 2015 95-101
2. Defendant's Notice of Motion and Motion for Reconsideration filed on December 16, 2015.....102-106

V. OTHER MAERIALS OR DOCUMENTS

1. July 15, 2015 Correspondence from William S. Tetterton to The Honorable DeAndrea Benjamin.....107

2. July 20, 2015 Correspondence from Robert D. Dodson to The Honorable DeAndrea Benjamin.....	108
3. Notice of Deposition dated August 6, 2015.....	109

VI. CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

11-459

FILED FOR RECORD
MAR 20 AM 2:31

FILED
CLOCKED
IN
ERROR

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA IN THE FAMILY COURT FOR THE
COUNTY OF KERSHAW FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Docket No. 2011-DR-28-188

William T. Moore,
Plaintiff,

vs.

FINAL ORDER

Lisa C. Moore,
Defendant.

Dates of Hearing: November 13th & 14th, 2012
Presiding Judge: Hon. Deborah A. Malphrus
Attorney for Plaintiff: William T. Moore; Douglas J. Robinson
Attorney for Defendant: Lisa C. Moore; Jean P. Derrick
Guardian ad Litem: Carrie Hall Tanner

ATTEST: True, Correct & Certified
Copy of Original for File in the
Court
Clerk of Court
Kershaw County

In this post-divorce litigation Plaintiff William T. Moore has filed two Complaints: first, Mr. Moore sued in 2009 to reduce child support. Then, in 2011, he filed an action seeking a change of custody.

The parties were married December 6, 1986, and divorced April 12th, 2006. At the time of the divorce the two older sons of the parties were 17 and 15. Their twin daughters were 9 years old.

At the time of this trial, in November 2012, the two older sons were 23 and 21, and the twin girls were 15 years old, turning 16 the next month, after conclusion of the trial.

The parties were earlier divorced by a Decree filed March 8, 2006, issued by the Hon. Rolly W. Jacobs, and filed the records of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw County on April 12, 2006, under docket number 2004-DR-28-0045. Earlier, child support for

DAM

the four children born of the marriage was set pursuant to Order of Separate Support and Maintenance, entered under docket number 2003-DR-28-00063, and filed February 24, 2003 in the records of the Clerk of Court for Kershaw County.

In the initial litigation instituted by Plaintiff, to reduce his child support, the Hon. Donna Strom issued her *pendente lite* Order October 21, 2009, under docket number 2009-DR-28-449, recognizing that two of the four children of the parties were now emancipated, and reducing child support from \$1,273 a month to \$730 a month. Judge Strom found that Defendant, although having retired since issuance of the Decree of separate support and maintenance, nevertheless had the ability to work part time for 20 hours a week, earning \$8.00 an hour, so Judge Strom imputed additional income to him in setting this support.

When Plaintiff instituted the second case in 2011, the parties entered into a Consent Order filed May 4, 2011 under docket number 2011-DR-28-186, agreeing that Carrie Tanner, Esquire, of the Kershaw County Bar would be appointed Guardian ad Litem, and that each party would be evaluated by psychiatrist Dr. Marc Harari, who would provide his reports to the Guardian ad Litem, who should in turn share them with the attorneys. A separate and more complete order appointing a Guardian ad Litem was filed May 26, 2011, giving the Guardian plenary powers to investigate the custodial fitness of each party.

Pursuant to Status Conference Order filed May 15, 2012, under docket number 2011-DR-28-186 these two actions were merged under single docket number, that of 2011-DR-28-186.

At the call of the case, the parties appeared, accompanied by counsel. The

parties announced that they had reached a partial agreement, basically resolving the issues of custody and visitation, but leaving for litigation a number of financial issues. The terms of the parties' agreement were stated on record, in the presence of the parties. Each party was sworn, and questioned. Each party understood the agreement and had no questions concerning the meaning thereof. Neither was subject to any threats or coercion. Also, neither was under the influence of alcohol or mood altering substances, during negotiations or on the days of trial. Both parties testified they realized they could have had a trial on these issues, but wished to waive it, and agree to the terms to which they could agree. Both parties were satisfied with services of counsel. Each party testified he or she realized that, if the agreement was approved as an Order of the Court, it would be enforceable as an Order of the Court, including use of the Court's contempt power to incarcerate, fine, or compel community service. Both parties testified they believe their agreement was in the best interest of the remaining minor children, and further, each party knowingly, freely and voluntarily entered into the agreement and wished the Court to adopt, incorporate, and approve their agreement as a final Order.

The Guardian recommended the agreement of the parties to the Court, as being in her opinion in the best interest of the children.

The Court has considered the testimony of the parties and the guardian, as well as the parties' respective financial declarations, and finds the agreement of the parties, as set forth at the conclusion of this Decree, is fair and equitable, and is in the best interest of the two remaining minor children born of the marriage. The Court therefore will adopt and incorporate the parties' agreement as a Decree of this Court.


The issues remaining to be litigated by the parties and to be decided by the Court are the amount of child support, including an award of retroactive child support, to be paid by Plaintiff, together with his proportionate contribution to the uninsured healthcare expenses incurred by the remaining minor children, as well as the issues of attorney's fees and guardian ad litem fees.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff called the Guardian as his first witness. Defendant also called as a witness his sister Jane Warrenton, and Defendant himself testified. Plaintiff called as her first witness Lisa Gill, whose testimony was concluded at the end of the first day trial. Plaintiff herself testified on the following day of trial. Both parties introduced a number of documentary exhibits in evidence.

Based on the record before me, I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action and personal jurisdiction of the parties in this post decree litigation. Venue is proper.
2. Plaintiff's first witness was Carrie Hall Tanner, the duly appointed Guardian ad litem for the two remaining minor children of the parties, twins Molly Kathryn Moore and Hannah Elizabeth Moore, both born December 31st, 1995. Ms. Tanner testified that, from the beginning, this action was never truly a change of custody case. Instead, she testified that she believed that after Plaintiff had a heart attack in 2010, he experienced an awakening, and wanted to spend more time with the children. Likewise, his daughters wanted to spend more time with him, although, the Guardian testified, the girls always wanted to live primarily with their Mother, Defendant Lisa C. Moore.

3. The Guardian testified that both girls were very intelligent, and were enrolled in honors classes in high school and making excellent grades.
4. The Guardian further testified that she had no opinion as to whether or not the girls would choose to exercise their prerogative to have over night visitations with their Father on Sundays or Wednesdays, (this being a portion of expanded, elective visitation by agreement of the parties). The Guardian testified any opinion would be speculative. The Guardian testified that she had calculated the visitation schedule to be exercised by Defendant as comprising 103 over nights during the calendar year. Later in the trial, this testimony was corroborated by the introduction into evidence of Defendant's 8, a calendar showing the calculations of these over night visits.
5. The Guardian testified that she believed it was in the best interests of her wards that the strict Restraining Order against either party discussing the litigation with the girls should continue. The Guardian noted that Defendant had, prior to her awareness of this problem, engaged in extensive discussions with the girls about the litigation, and in fact had kept a file in his house for them to review, while he visited.
6. The next witness was Plaintiff himself. While Plaintiff had several lines of work during the marriage, primarily he was employed by the South Carolina Department of Public Safety for 23 years.

7. Earlier, Mr. Moore had worked in retail sales, as a production plant worker, and a trucker. However, his chief employment has been in law enforcement, with Camden Police Department, for several stints, as well as the South Carolina Department of Public Safety. In early 2006, he purchased an additional 2 years of service with the state, for \$59,000, and retired. Plaintiff chose to retire in June 2006, three months after the parties were earlier divorced, in April 2006. At the time he retired, Defendant was earning gross income in excess of \$75,000 a year. However, at the time of divorce when the child support was set, Defendant only declared gross monthly income of \$5,313 (or \$63,756 per year). See Defendant's exhibits 1 & 2. He was 51 years of age when he retired, and he was 57 years of age at the time of trial.
8. Plaintiff testified that his health was better now than before he had a heart attack in 2010. He testified that he retired because he wanted more time with the children. (However, on cross examination, Plaintiff could not explain why, even after he retired, he never exercised the entirety of the expanded visitation allocated to him under the Modification of Visitation Agreement dated March 8, 2006, which was incorporated in the Decree of Divorce).
9. Defendant agreed in his testimony that, after he retired, he still could have worked. Defendant testified that since 1978 he has been overseer of Long Leafed Plantation, owned by the Rose family. He bush hogs, plows, and deer hunts on the property. Defendant asserts that since his retirement he has not had any earned income. His only income claimed on his financial declaration form is gross of \$3,544.55 a month, as pension, retirement and annuity income.
- 

He pays a premium for health and dental insurance for the children of \$90 a month. Defendant asserts that he draws no income nor is he otherwise compensated from his duties as overseer at Long Leaf Plantation.

10. Since the divorce, the Defendant has worked for his sister Jan Warrenton (who was his next witness) in a warehouse business established by her husband. Again, Defendant testified that he was not compensated for this work in the warehouse. Plaintiff conceded that he had sold some items from the warehouse on ebay, and had received at least several thousand dollars from these sales.
11. Defendant has a high school education, plus a two year degree in criminal justice.
12. Since the separation of parties, the Defendant has lived with his mother, on Roberts Street in Camden, in a 1200 sq ft brick cottage in which his mother has a life estate. Defendant and his three sisters are the remaindermen. There are two bedrooms in the residence. When his two daughters visit, the Defendant sleeps on the couch, and allows his daughters use of his bedroom.
13. Plaintiff admitted filing a financial statement (in evidence as Defendant's exhibit 6) with BB & T dated May 3, 2011, in which he claimed total assets of \$711,317, total liabilities of \$425,352, with a net worth of \$585,964. He also asserted annual income of \$41,400 a year.
14. At trial, the Defendant owned four vehicles, and had access to and use of an additional four vehicles. Since the divorce the Defendant has made four trips to Maine to vacation, where he boated, and ate out. He estimated he had made some 20 trips to Disney World, costing \$2,000 a trip. He also purchased a

7
DAM

\$8,000 timeshare at Disney World, although he could not recall where he had gotten the money to buy the timeshare. He had taken four or five vacations to Gatlinburg, Tennessee; Williamsburg, Virginia; and to the beach. The Defendant had recently bought four four-wheelers, which cost approximately \$3,500, but he could not remember where he got the money.

15. Since the divorce he had become a one third owner of a 5.6 acre tract in Pickens, South Carolina, which contained a mountain house. He also had become a part owner in a family lake house.
16. Defendant testified he lived very cheaply, merely paying the utilities at his mother's residence. He estimated his total out of pocket living expense to be \$1,200 a month. Defendant eats all meals out. Defendant does not cook. Defendant admitted that he had never spent a penny on his children except as Court ordered.
17. Defendant described the custody action he instituted as a second complaint as "my children's lawsuit", and admitted he had been keeping the children up to date on the litigation until recently, when the guardian had cautioned him against this. Previously, Defendant showed them the court papers in the file that he kept at home.
18. Defendant admitted telling the girls that their mother lies. When the Defendant mother would call Plaintiff father with matters of concern of the children, Plaintiff would in turn tell the girls the conversation that he had with their mother, apparently attempting to recruit the children to his side, and failing to support their mother, their primary custodian, in her effort to involve him in co-parenting

DAM

the children.

19. Plaintiff asserted that he had done nothing wrong, and that the Defendant was totally at fault at the divorce of the parties. Defendant further explained "that's why we're here (in court)". He agreed that he had made such statements in the past Defendant as "I will not talk with you (Plaintiff) or do anything you ask"; "I'm not willing to put the children's interest first and work with Lisa"; "I enjoy my daughters being unhappy at their mother's house".
20. Defendant admitted that until he was ordered in 2009 by Judge Strom, he had never transported his children to any extracurricular activities. He admitted he had never taken the children to the doctor or dentist. He admitted he had never had any contact at any point in time with any school teachers. He admitted he did not have a residence suitable for his daughters, either at his mother's house or lake house. For example, there is no dedicated bedroom for these girls, anywhere, at present in any residence occupied by Defendant.
21. Most concerning, the Defendant admitted that he viewed pornography regularly and masturbated.
22. Defendant's sister Jan Warrenton testified about Defendant's work in the warehouse. He had helped unload trucks, and had free access to take what he wished of the inventory in the warehouse to sell on ebay. Defendant took clothing, radios and refrigerators, to Ms. Warrenton's knowledge to resell. Plaintiff rested his case after her testimony.
23. Defendant's first witness was Lisa Giff, a neighbor in Camden who had heard discussions between the parties concerning their children. She corroborated

Plaintiff's stated refusal to cooperate and work with Defendant mother in the best interest of the children.

24. Defendant testified on the second day of trial. Defendant has a four year degree from USC in marketing, and at present is employed as an appraiser and real estate agent. She also earns extra income from catering. Her total income from all sources year to date at trial was \$17,487, averaging \$1,457 a month. At the time child support was last set, in 2003 she declared gross monthly of \$1,625. See Defendant's exhibits 2 & 4.
25. Defendant in her testimony corroborated the nonproductive behavior of Plaintiff since the divorce, in failing to assist her in parenting the children. She also testified that she believed that he was under employed, and had the ability to earn substantial income.
26. Defendant has been unable to take any vacation since the divorce of the parties, although she has been able to continue to reside in the former marital residence, which was allocated to her in property division. Her consumer debt has significantly increased, from less than \$10,000 at the time of divorce (Defendant's exhibit 4) to approximately \$32,000 at present.
27. Defendant requested an award of retroactive child support, and an increase in present child support. Court finds and concludes that this request should be granted, retroactive to the date of filing litigation in this case, June 10, 2009.
28. It is well settled that a Family Court may impute income to an unemployed or underemployed party for purposes of calculating child support obligations. See SC Code Ann. Regs. 114-4720 (Supp. 2012).

Specifically, the South Carolina Child Support Guidelines Regulation requires:

"In order to impute income to a parent who is unemployed or underemployed, the court should determine the employment potential and probable earnings level of the parent based on that parent's recent work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing job opportunities and earning levels in the community", (27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 114-4720 (A) (5) (b) (Supp. 2012)). The South Carolina Supreme Court in *Amal v. Amal*, 311 S.C. 10, 636 S.E. 2d 864 (Cl. App. 2006) held that "a parent seeking to impute income to the other parent need not establish a bad faith motivation to lower a support obligation in order to prove voluntary underemployment." [371 S.C. at 13, 636 S.E.2nd at 866].

Nevertheless, "the motivation behind any purported reduction in income or earning capacity should be considered in determining whether a parent is voluntarily underemployed", *Spreuw v. Barker*, 385 S.C. 45, 62, 682 S.E. 2nd 843, 851 (Cl. App. 2009). Here, Plaintiff has a work history that shows he has a broad range of abilities -- operating heavy equipment, working outdoors in self-directed tasks, unloading trucks, organizing inventory, and successfully marketing goods for sale on the Internet are all wide ranging, useful occupational qualifications which are also part of Plaintiff's recent work history. There are continuing job opportunities in these areas of work in the semi-rural communities, such as Camden, where Plaintiff resides. The court finds that Plaintiff could easily be employed full time, earning a minimal income of \$12 an hour, which would allow him to gross at least an additional \$25,000 a year.

29. Further, the Court is convinced that Plaintiff has not been truthful with the Court.

11
DAM

concerning the amount of his true income since he's retired. Plaintiff has made substantial expenditures for example, on vacations to Disney World. He estimated each trip cost about \$2,000 and he admittedly has gone to Disney World 20 times over the last 6 years. He spent \$3,500 on four wheelers, and could not explain where the money came from. He also bought a \$6,000 time share at Disney World, and again could not identify the source of funds for the purchase price. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is earning money "under the table", and this money does not appear in Plaintiff's bank accounts, nor is it reported on his tax returns. However, Plaintiff is spending these funds, and again his expenditures since the divorce reaffirm the Court's assessment that he has a more substantial earning capacity, and in fact does earn more income than from his retirement accounts.

30. Plaintiff's true income is \$3,545 from his retirement, plus an additional ability to earn, and imputed earnings of, \$2,083 a month, for a total of \$5,628.
31. Defendant's income is, as reported, \$1,748 a month, which is a slight increase from her earnings at the time of the divorce, seven years ago. As above noted, Plaintiff pays a premium of \$90 a month for health insurance coverage for the children. The date of filing of the initial Complaint for reduction of child support in this case, is June 19th, 2009. I specifically find that Judge Strom in her *Pendente Lite* Order filed October 21, 2009 reserved "the issue of retroactivity of the child support changes..." as an issue for decision on the merits now.
32. Pursuant to the attached guidelines worksheet, Defendant should be paying \$881 a month child support, which support is awarded retroactive to the date of

filing of the initial pleadings in this case, June 19th, 2009.

33. It has been 51 months since filing, through September 2013, and there is an incremental difference between the monthly child support Plaintiff has been paying, (\$730), and the amount he should have been paying, (\$881), of \$151 a month, which for the last 51 months amounts to a lump sum arrearage of \$7,700.
34. I find and conclude that Plaintiff should pay by direct deposit to Defendant's designated checking account \$ 881 a month child support, commencing October 2, 2013, and continuing on the second day of each month thereafter, until further order of the Court.
35. I further find that Plaintiff may pay the accrued arrearage of retroactive child support in the amount of \$200 a month, for a period of 39 months with the final payment in the amount of \$100. Again these payments should be made by a direct deposit by Plaintiff into Defendant's checking account, on the 16th day of each month, commencing October 16th, 2013, and continuing each and every month for the next 38 months, with the final 39th payment being in the amount of \$100.

I find and conclude that Plaintiff plainly has the ability to make these child support payments, which total, \$1081 per month. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that his living expenses were \$1,200 a month. Plaintiff's financial declaration shows that his net monthly income is, after taxes, \$2,524. This is from his retirement only, but Plaintiff, even if he chooses not to work at present, he still should have \$1,443 to meet his own needs, during the period of time he is paying back the accrued child support arrearage.

13
DAM

36. I also find and conclude that Defendant is entitled an award of attorney's fees and costs. In deciding whether to award attorneys fees, this Court in it's discretion should consider:

1. Each party's ability to pay his or her own fees;
2. The beneficial results obtained by the attorney;
3. The parties' respective financial conditions;
4. The effect of the fees on each party's standard of living.

Bennett v. Rector, 388 S.C. 275, 697 S.E. 2nd 715 (Cl App. 2010)

37. Here, each of these four factors militate an award of fees to Defendant Mother. Mr. Moore's income is approximately three times that of Mother's. She does not have the ability to pay her own fees. Mother's attorney has obtained beneficial results across the board for Mother. The parties' respective financial conditions are that Plaintiff's assets have grown significantly since the divorce, and he has no debt. Defendant has not acquired any assets since the divorce, and her debt has significantly increased. Plaintiff has accrued substantial assets since the divorce. It would further diminish Defendant Mother's standard of living, and certainly negatively impact on the minor children, if Defendant had to pay the majority of her fees in the case.

38. Plaintiff has incurred, according to her exhibit 8, through date of trial attorney's fees and costs totaling of \$20,509.55. In determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award, this Court should consider six factors:

- (1) The nature, extent, and difficulty of the case;
- (2) The time necessary devoted to the case;

- (3) Professional standing of counsel;
- (4) Contingency of compensation;
- (5) Beneficial results obtained;
- (6) Customary legal fees for similar services.

Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 403 S.E.2d 313 (1991).

Here, the Court finds and concludes that the sum of \$12,000 is a just, fair and equitable amount for Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant for fees and costs. The Court notes that Plaintiff's unrealistic claim for primary custody, which he conceded only less than a week before trial, after he had instituted this litigation a year and a half before, necessitated the trial of this case. This was relatively complex litigation. There was a Guardian appointed who had complete psychological evaluations performed on each party. Full discovery was pursued by both sides, including Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Depositions of each party were taken. The trial of the case subsumed two days, even after the primary issue of custody was settled. According to Defendant's counsel's affidavit, 64 hours were spent by her attorney working on the file, which the Court finds reasonable. The professional standing of Plaintiff's counsel is excellent. She's been a member of the Bar of the state of South Carolina for over 36 years. This case was well prepared and well tried, by both counsel. The contingency of compensation is significant. As is evidence by Defendant's attorney's fee bill, while some payments have been made by Defendant, those payments were intermittent and partial. The beneficial results obtained are good. Defendant's attorney's hourly rate of \$300 an hour is

customary in this community for legal services, and even on the low side for an attorney of her stature and experience.

39. The Court therefore finds that \$12,000 is a just, true and fair amount of attorney's fees for Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant. This amount is approximately 60% of the attorney's fees and costs incurred by Defendant.
40. The Court will allow Plaintiff substantial time to pay these fees. Plaintiff shall pay the first installment of reimbursement of fees, in the amount \$6,000, directly to Defendant within 90 days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff shall pay the second installment of fees, again in the amount of \$6,000, directly to Defendant within 180 days from the date of this Order. The Court notes that Plaintiff, since the divorce of the parties has expended large lump sums of money for things like a time share at Disney World and four-wheelers. The Court is requiring of Defendant, in paying these attorney's fees, to do nothing less than he has already done in these earlier, elective expenditures.
41. Finally, the Guardian ad Litem appeared on the initial day of trial and was present while the parties placed on the record their partial settlement agreement, which did resolve all issues involving custody and visitation. At the Court's request, the Guardian recommended that the Court approve and adopt the parties' settlement agreement, as being in the best interest of her two minor wards. At that time, the Guardian also presented her bill to the Court and the parties. The Guardian's total fees are \$4,492.50. Each party has paid her an initial retainer of \$500, so that the total balance due is \$3,492.50. The Court finds and concludes that each party should be responsible for payment of one

half of the balance of the remaining balance of the Guardian's fees, \$1746.25 a piece.

Now, therefore, in the view of the above, it is ordered and as agreed upon by the parties:

- A. Plaintiff and Defendant shall share joint custody of their daughters, primary custody with Defendant and secondary custody with Plaintiff.
- B. Defendant shall claim both children as dependants for state and federal income tax returns;
- C. The Plaintiff shall continue to maintain the current health insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children, plus he shall add dental insurance coverage for them beginning in December 2012, and maintain this Dental Plus insurance coverage through June 2016. Defendant shall pay the first \$250 per year per child of any uninsured medical, dental, orthodontic, ophthalmological, or counseling expenses incurred by the minor children but not paid by insurance; thereafter, Plaintiff should pay 76% and Defendant should pay 24% of all such uninsured expenses; Defendant shall give Plaintiff written documentation of the incurrence of such expense, including the final bill from the medical provider as well as any documentation in her possession showing the amount insurance has paid on the bill, and the Plaintiff shall directly reimburse the Defendant within 30 days after receipt of this documentation his share of this expense.
- D. The parties will continue to use the internet program "My Family Wizard"

17

DAM

for purposes of communication, each paying their appropriate annual fees for the enrollment in and use of this program.

- E. Plaintiff shall visit with his daughters on alternate weekends, beginning after school on Thursday and continuing through Sunday at 6:00 pm. with the children having, at their own option and election the ability to spend Sunday night with Plaintiff. If the children exercise that option, then Plaintiff shall get the children to school on time on Monday morning, appropriately dressed and rested, with their homework done. In the Summer he shall return them to Defendant's home by 10:00am. Plaintiff will also insure that the children attend at least the Sunday evening activities at their church, these activities currently consisting of bells, and youth group; further, Plaintiff shall get the children to Sunday service if the children are playing bells or participating in youth group services Sunday morning.
- F. Plaintiff shall also visit with the children on Wednesdays, again with the children having the option to elect to spend Wednesday night with Plaintiff, in which case he shall be responsible for getting them to school on time, appropriately dressed, rested, and fed with their homework done. In the summers he shall return them to Defendant's home by 10:00 am on Thursday; further, in the future, according to the girls' directives, the day of the week of this weekday visitation may change, given the children's school schedule, and study schedule.
- G. Plaintiff shall be responsible for providing the transportation for visitation.

timely picking up and returning his daughters on the above schedule.

- H. Holiday visitation, Summer visitation, school in service days, etc. will remain as provided in the Final Decree of Divorce, which adopted and incorporated a Modification of Visitation Agreement dated March 8, 2008.
- I. The parties may mutually agree to any changes in this visitation schedule and any additions to this visitation schedule with appropriate input from the children.
- J. The Bank of Camden stock will be divided equally between the parties, and each party will receive a check for half the value of that stock.
- K. Each party is enjoined and restrained from discussing the litigation while the minor children are present, or disparaging the other party.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:

- L. Plaintiff will pay, by direct deposit to a checking account designated by Defendant, the sum of \$881 a month, commencing October 2nd, 2013, and continuing the 2nd day of each month thereafter.
- M. Plaintiff will also pay \$200 a month to reduce his total child support arrearage of \$7700, over a period of 39 months, these payments shall also be by direct deposit, the 39 months commencing October 16, 2013 and the 39th payment shall be in the amount of \$100.
- N. If Plaintiff is more than 5 days late on any of the above mentioned payments, then Defendant may file an affidavit to this effect with the Kershaw County Family Court, and shall obtain an immediate ex parte order requiring Plaintiff to make all future payments through the Support

19

DAM

Division of the Kershaw County Court, with 5% surcharge added.

- O. Plaintiff will stock his home all toiletry items needed by his children while they are visiting him, including but not limited to toiletries, make up, razor blades, feminine hygiene products, and other miscellaneous necessities.
- P. Plaintiff shall pay Defendant \$12,000 in attorney's fees and costs, payable in the amount of \$6,000 directly to Defendant within 90 days from the date of this Order, with the second installment of \$6,000 being paid directly to Defendant 120 days from the date of this Order.
- Q. Each party shall pay a one half share of the remaining balance owed the Guardian ad litem, each party's share being \$1,746.25; each party shall pay their half share of the total fee due to Guardian within 90 days from the date of this Order, or make other agreeable arrangements in writing, suitable with the Guardian, for payment.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.


Hon. Deborah Malphrus
Family Court

Ridgeland, South Carolina

September 3, 2013

3-6-14

South Carolina Department of Social Services
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET A

-PR-

	Father	Mother	
1. Monthly Gross Income:	5,627	1,749	
2. Monthly Alimony (This Action):			
a. To Be Received:		0	
b. To Be Paid:	0		
3. a. Other Monthly Alimony Or Child Support Paid: (If Being Paid By One Parent To The Other)	0	0	
b. Adjustment For # Child(ren) In The Home:	101	101	
4. Adjusted Monthly Gross Income:	5,627	1,749	7,375
Number Of Children To Be Supported In This Action: 1			
5. Basic Combined Child Support Obligation (Gross): (Gross Income, Using Combined Monthly Adjusted Gross Income)			1,181
6. Adjustment To Basic Child Support Obligation:			
a. Health Insurance Premium: (Portion Covering Children Only)	90	0	
b. Children's Extraordinary Medical Expenses:	0	0	
c. Work-Related Child Care Costs Adjusted: Actual Child Care For Child(ren) In Custody Father: Gross - 20% Credit = \$0 Mother: Gross - 20% Credit = \$0	0	0	
Total Adjustment To Basic Combined Child Support Obligation	90	0	90
7. Total Combined Monthly Child Support Obligation (Net):			1,272
8. Proportional Share Of Combined Monthly Adjusted Gross Income:	76.3 %	23.7 %	
9. Gross Child Support Obligation Of Individual Parent (Monthly):	971	301	
The Noncustodial Parent Is: The Father			
10. Credit For Adjustment To Basic Combined Child Support Obligation Adjusted Gross Income:	90		
11. Net Child Support To Be Paid To Custodial Parent:	981		
The Father Pays \$981 Each Month.			
	Without Costs	+ 5% Costs	
Monthly	881	935.65	
Twice A Month	440	467.80	
Every 2 Weeks	407	427.34	
Weekly	203	213.65	
Date: September 12, 2013			
Worksheet Prepared By: Jean Perrin Dazrick For			

FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF KERSHAW
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
CASE NUMBER 2014CP2800940

Jean Perrin Derrick

Lisa C Moore

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by:

Attorney for: ☐ Plaintiff ☐ Defendant
☐ Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- ☐ **JURY VERDICT:** This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- ☐ **DECISION BY THE COURT:** This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered. ☐ See Page 2 for additional information.
- ☐ **ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON):** ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRCP; ☐ Rule 41(b), SCRCP (Voluntary Dismissal);
☐ Rule 43(k), SCRCP (Settled); ☐ Other: _____
- ☐ **ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON):** ☐ Rule 40(j), SCRCP; ☐ Bankruptcy;
☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; ☐ Other: _____
- ☐ **DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):**
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded; ☐ Other: _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☐ See attached order; (formal order to follow) ☐ Statement of Judgment by the Court.

ORDER INFORMATION

Plaintiff's motion to compel resolution through Fee-Dispute Board is taken under advisement

This order ☐ ends ☐ does not end the case.
Additional Information for the Clerk: _____

INFORMATION FOR THE JUDGMENT INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled (List amount(s) below)

If applicable, describe the property, including tax map information and address, referenced in the order.

ATTEST True, Correct & Certified
Filed in this

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed
CPFORM4Cm
SCCA SCRCP Form 4C (Revised 3/2013)

Jean Perrin Derrick
Clerk of Court Kershaw County

023

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF RICHLAND
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

FORM 4

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

CASE NUMBER: 2014-CP-28-00940

Jean P. Derrick

Lisa C. Moore

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by:

Attorney for: ☐ Plaintiff ☐ Defendant or ☐ Self-Represented Litigant

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- ☐ JURY VERDICT. This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- ☒ DECISION BY THE COURT. This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been heard and a decision rendered.
- ☐ ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRCP; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRCP (Voluntary Dismissal); ☐ Rule 43(c), SCRCP (Settled); ☐ Other _____
- ☐ ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 40(f), SCRCP; ☐ Bankruptcy; ☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; ☐ Other _____
- ☐ DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): ☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded; ☐ Other _____

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RULING IN THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☐ See attached order (formal order to follow) ☒ Statement of Judgment by the Court:

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ☐ ends ☒ does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk:

This matter came before the Court on July 14, 2015 as a motion filed by the Plaintiff to compel the Defendant to resolve the fee dispute through the Resolution of Fee Dispute Board of the South Carolina Bar. In the fee agreement signed by Defendant, the agreement directly states that "any dispute concerning the fee due pursuant to this agreement shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full, final resolution to the Resolution Fee Dispute Board of the South Carolina Bar, pursuant to Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules." Because the Defendant disputes the fee for numerous alleged reasons, this Court finds that it is proper to take these matters up with the Resolution Fee Dispute Board pursuant to the signed contract. The other counterclaims and potential legal malpractice claim may remain under the Circuit Court jurisdiction. The Plaintiff's motion to compel resolution through the Fee Dispute Board is granted.

INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled
		\$
		\$
		\$

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

Circuit Court Judge

Judge Code

Date

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on the _____ day of _____, 20____ and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on this _____ day of _____, 20____ to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

Court Reporter _____

Clerk of Court _____

FORM 4

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF KERSHAW
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

CASE NUMBER: 2014-CP-28-90

Jean P. Derrick

Lisa C. Moore

2016 MAR 21 AM 11:32

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT(S)

Submitted by: JOYCE T. MOORE Attorney for: ☐ Plaintiff ☐ Defendant or ☐ Self-Represented Litigant

KERSHAW COUNTY, S.C.

DISPOSITION TYPE (CHECK ONE)

- ☐ JURY VERDICT: This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and a verdict rendered.
- ☒ DECISION BY THE COURT: This action came to trial or hearing before the court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision rendered.
- ☐ ACTION DISMISSED (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 12(b), SCRPC; ☐ Rule 41(a), SCRPC (Vol. Dismissal);
☐ Rule 43(b), SCRPC (Settled); ☐ Other
- ☐ ACTION STRICKEN (CHECK REASON): ☐ Rule 40(j), SCRPC; ☐ Bankruptcy;
☐ Binding arbitration, subject to right to restore to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration award; ☐ Other
- ☐ DISPOSITION OF APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT (CHECK APPLICABLE BOX):
☐ Affirmed; ☐ Reversed; ☐ Remanded; ☐ Other

NOTE: ATTORNEYS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING LOWER COURT, TRIBUNAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THIS CIRCUIT COURT RULING ON THIS APPEAL.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ☐ See attached order (formal order to follow) ☐ Statement of Judgment by the Court

ORDER INFORMATION

This order ☐ ends ☒ does not end the case.

Additional Information for the Clerk:

This matter came before the Court on January 27, 2016 as a 59(e) motion to amend the December 4, 2015 Order. Defendant's counsel argues Rule 10 of SCRAP Rule 16 provides that "consent may be withdrawn" after parties agree to take a fee matter to the Fee Disputes Resolution Board (the Board), however this is an erroneous interpretation of the phrase. The "consent may be withdrawn" language refers specifically to the email correspondence among the Board, the client, and the lawyer. It does not refer to the consent of taking the matter in front of the Board. Furthermore, the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act makes clear that the Act does not apply to "a pre-agreement entered into when the relationship of the contracting parties is such that of a lawyer-client." § 15-48-10(b)(3). Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC INDEX

Complete this section below when the judgment affects title to real or personal property or if any amount should be enrolled. If there is no judgment information, indicate "N/A" in one of the boxes below.

Judgment in Favor of (List name(s) below)	Judgment Against (List name(s) below)	Judgment Amount To be Enrolled
		\$
		\$
		\$

The judgment information above has been provided by the submitting party. Disputes concerning the amounts contained in this form may be addressed by way of motion pursuant to the SC Rules of Civil Procedure. Amounts to be computed such as interest or additional taxable costs not available at the time the form and final order are submitted to the judge may be provided to the clerk. Note: Title abstractors and researchers should refer to the official court order for judgment details.

Circuit Court Judge MBJudge Code 2161

Date

3/16/16

For Clerk of Court Office Use Only

This judgment was entered on the _____ day of _____, 20____ and a copy mailed first class or placed in the appropriate attorney's box on this _____ day of _____, 20____ to attorneys of record or to parties (when appearing pro se) as follows:

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

ATTORNEY(S) FOR THE DEFENDANT(S)

SCRPC Form 4C (10/2011)

ATTEST True, Correct & Certified

Clerk

Clerk of Court Cheryl S. Smith
Kershaw County

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

County of Kershaw

JERRIN DERRICK

Plaintiff(s)

vs.

LISA C. MOORE

Defendant(s)

Submitted By: Jean P. Derrick, Esquire
Address: PO Box 929
Lexington, SC 29071

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CIVIL ACTION COVERSHEET

2014-CP-28-

940

SC Bar #: 4417
Telephone #: 803-359-6189
Fax #: 803-808-1657
Other:
E-mail: jderrick@windstream.net

NOTE: The coversheet and information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law. This form is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of docketing. It must be filled out completely, signed, and dated. A copy of this coversheet must be served on the defendant(s) along with the Summons and Complaint.

DOCKETING INFORMATION (Check all that apply)

- ☐ JURY TRIAL demanded in complaint.
☐ This case is subject to ARBITRATION pursuant to the Court Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules.
☐ This case is subject to MEDIATION pursuant to the Court Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules.
☐ This case is exempt from ADR (Proof of ADR/Exemption Attached)

NATURE OF ACTION (Check One Box Below)

- | | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| <p>Contracts</p> <p>☐ Construction (100)
☒ Debt Collection (110)
☐ Employment (120)
☐ General (130)
☐ Breach of Contract (140)
☐ Other (199)</p> | <p>Torts - Professional Malpractice</p> <p>☐ Dental Malpractice (200)
☐ Legal Malpractice (210)
☐ Medical Malpractice (220)
Previous Notice of Intent Case #
20 - CP -
☐ Notice/File Med Mal (230)
☐ Other (299)</p> | <p>Torts - Personal Injury</p> <p>☐ Assault/Stalker/Abel (300)
☐ Conversion (310)
☐ Motor Vehicle Accident (320)
☐ Premises Liability (330)
☐ Products Liability (340)
☐ Personal Injury (350)
☐ Wrongful Death (360)
☐ Other (399)</p> | <p>Real Property</p> <p>☐ Claim & Delivery (400)
☐ Condemnation (410)
☐ Foreclosure (420)
☐ Mechanic's Lien (430)
☐ Partition (440)
☐ Possession (450)
☐ Building Code Violation (460)
☐ Other (499)</p> |
| <p>Inmate Petitions</p> <p>☐ PCR (500)
☐ Mandamus (520)
☐ Habeas Corpus (530)
☐ Other (599)</p> | <p>Administrative Law/Relief</p> <p>☐ Reinstatement License (600)
☐ Judicial Review (610)
☐ Relief (620)
☐ Permanent Injunction (630)
☐ Forfeiture-Petition (640)
☐ Forfeiture-Consent Order (650)
☐ Other (699)</p> | <p>Judgments/Settlements</p> <p>☐ Death Settlement (700)
☐ Foreign Judgment (710)
☐ Magistrate's Judgment (720)
☐ Minor Settlement (730)
☐ Transcript Judgment (740)
☐ Lis Pendens (750)
☐ Transfer of Structured Settlement Payment Rights Application (760)
☐ Confession of Judgment (770)
☐ Petition for Workers Compensation Settlement Approval (780)
☐ Other (799)</p> | <p>Appeals</p> <p>☐ Arbitration (800)
☐ Magistrate-Civil (910)
☐ Magistrate-Criminal (920)
☐ Municipal (930)
☐ Probate Court (940)
☐ SCDOT (950)
☐ Worker's Comp (960)
☐ Zoning Board (970)
☐ Public Service Comm. (980)
☐ Employment Security Comm. (991)
☐ Other (999)</p> |
| <p>Special/Complex/Other</p> <p>☐ Environmental (600)
☐ Automobile Arb. (610)
☐ Medical (620)
☐ Other (699)</p> | <p>☐ Pharmaceuticals (630)
☐ Unfair Trade Practices (640)
☐ Out-of-State Depositions (650)
☐ Motion to Quash Subpoena in an Out-of-County Action (660)
☐ Sexual Predator (670)</p> | | |

Submitting Party Signature:

Date: October 6, 2014

Note: Frivolous civil proceedings may be subject to sanctions pursuant to SCRCP, Rule 11, and the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act, S.C. Code Ann. §15-36-10 et seq.

FOR MANDATED ADR COUNTIES ONLY

Aiken, Allendale, Anderson, Bamberg, Barnwell, Beaufort, Berkeley, Calhoun, Charleston, Cherokee, Clarendon, Colleton, Darlington, Dorchester, Florence, Georgetown, Greenville, Hampton, Horry, Jasper, Kershaw, Lee, Lexington, Marion, Oconee, Orangeburg, Pickens, Richland, Spartanburg, Sumter, Union, Williamsburg, and York

SUPREME COURT RULES REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION OF ALL CIVIL CASES TO AN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE EXEMPT.

You are required to take the following action(s):

1. The parties shall select a neutral and file a "Proof of ADR" form on or by the 210th day of the filing of this action. If the parties have not selected a neutral within 210 days, the Clerk of Court shall then appoint a primary and secondary mediator from the current roster on a rotating basis from among those mediators agreeing to accept cases in the county in which the action has been filed.
2. The initial ADR conference must be held within 300 days after the filing of the action.
3. Pre-suit medical malpractice mediations required by S.C. Code §15-79-125 shall be held not later than 120 days after all defendants are served with the "Notice of Intent to File Suit" or as the court directs. (Medical malpractice mediation is mandatory statewide.)
4. Cases are exempt from ADR only upon the following grounds:
 - a. Special proceeding, or actions seeking extraordinary relief such as mandamus, habeas corpus, or prohibition;
 - b. Requests for temporary relief;
 - c. Appeals;
 - d. Post Conviction relief matters;
 - e. Contempt of Court proceedings;
 - f. Forfeiture proceedings brought by governmental entities;
 - g. Mortgage foreclosures; and
 - h. Cases that have been previously subjected to an ADR conference, unless otherwise required by Rule 3 or by statute.
5. In cases not subject to ADR, the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes, upon the motion of the court or of any party, may order a case to mediation.
6. Motion of a party to be exempt from payment of neutral fees due to indigency should be filed with the Court within ten (10) days after the ADR conference has been concluded.

Please Note: You must comply with the Supreme Court Rules regarding ADR. Failure to do so may affect your case or may result in sanctions.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

Jean P. Derrick,)

Plaintiff)

v.)

Lisa C. Moore,)

Defendant.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Case No. 2014-CP-28-

940

SUMMONS

TO: THE DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED:

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint to this action, of which a copy is herewith served upon you, and to serve a copy of your answer to the said Complaint on the subscriber at her office at P.O. Box 929, 205 West Main Street, Lexington, South Carolina 29071 within thirty (30) days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service, and if you fail to answer the Complaint within the time aforesaid, the Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for the relief demanded in the Complaint, and judgment by default entered against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint.

JEAN P. DERRICK

Attorney for Plaintiff

PO Box 929 (29071)

205 West Main Street

Lexington, SC 29072

Tel: (803) 359-6189

Fax: (803) 808-1657

Email: jderrick@windstream.net

October 6, 2014

Lexington, South Carolina

ATTEST: True, Correct & Certified
Copy of Original on File in this
Court

[Signature]
Clerk of Court Kershaw County

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

Jean P. Derrick,)

Case No. 2014-CP-28-940

Plaintiff)

v.)

COMPLAINT FOR DEBT

Lisa C. Moore,)

Defendant.)

Plaintiff above captioned appears and alleges as follows:

1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action and personal jurisdiction of the parties; Defendant is a citizen and resident of the State of South Carolina, County of Kershaw.

2. Plaintiff is a licensed attorney practicing in the State of South Carolina for the past 37 years.

3. On April 4, 2011 Defendant Lisa C. Moore retained Plaintiff to represent her in a Kershaw County Family Court action; a copy of the fee contract is attached hereto and incorporated herein.

4. In said contract Defendant Lisa C. Moore agreed to pay Plaintiff \$300 per hour for her time, and reimburse her for all expenses.

5. Plaintiff accepted representation of Defendant Lisa C. Moore and beginning in 2011 vigorously represented her, through the conclusion of the litigation in March 2014, when a Final Order was issued by The Honorable Deborah Malphrus and filed in the Court record on March 20, 2014.


6. During the course of representation Defendant Lisa C. Moore became delinquent in payment of Plaintiff's fees; Plaintiff repeatedly discussed this delinquency with Defendant Lisa C. Moore, and Defendant Lisa C. Moore repeatedly assured Plaintiff and repeatedly promised Plaintiff that she would pay these fees; Plaintiff continued her representation of Lisa C. Moore.

7. Since the case was concluded however Defendant has failed and refused to make any regular contributions toward payment of the balance of the fees owed, although demand has been made therefor.

8. At present, the total amount for fees and costs owed is \$10,484.40 per the attached itemized bill.

9. Plaintiff is informed and believes she is entitled to judgment against the Defendant for this amount, together with the cost of this action.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff would pray for judgment against Defendant Lisa C. Moore in the amount of \$10,484.40, plus the cost of this action, together with such other and further relief as this Court deems meet and proper.



JEAN P. DERRICK

Attorney for Plaintiff

PO Box 929 (29071)

205 West Main Street

Lexington, SC 29072

Tel: (803) 359-6189

Fax: (803) 808-1657

Email: jderrick@windstream.net

October 6, 2014

Lexington, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF LEXINGTON) FEE AGREEMENT

This Agreement entered into by and between Lisa C. Moore, hereinafter referred to as "Client", and JEAN P. DERRICK, Esquire, hereinafter referred to as "Attorney".

WITNESSETH:

1. Matter: The Client hereby employs and retains the Attorney to represent her with respect to proceedings in the Family Court for the County of Kershaw.
2. Authority: The Client hereby grants to Attorney full power and authority to do and perform all acts on the Client's part which are necessary and appropriate to such representation.
3. Costs: The Attorney is authorized to pay or incur liability for all costs and expenses which the Attorney may deem necessary and proper in the representation of the Client. The Client agrees to pay Attorney monthly upon receipt of billing for all costs and expenses so paid or incurred during the preceding month. Client agrees to pay costs and expenses in advance should the Attorney be able to anticipate incurring same and give Client adequate notice thereof. The Client agrees to pay all fees that may be assessed against him/her for a Guardian or Counsel ad litem appointed to represent minor(s) in this case.
4. Fees: The Client also agrees to pay the Attorney as compensation for professional services to be rendered a reasonable fee in the amount and under the terms herein set forth:
 - a. The Client is solely responsible for the payment of the fee. The Attorney has made no representation or warranties concerning either the agreement by the adverse party or a court award compelling the adverse party to pay Attorney's fees in this matter. Should payment be made by the adverse party, that money will be passed on to the Client or applied to the Client's bill as appropriate.
 - b. The Client will be charged for all time devoted exclusively to be Client's case, including the initial interview. Time records are maintained to substantiate all time billed to the Client's case.
 - c. The Client must pay a NON-REFUNDABLE retainer in an amount to be fixed by the Attorney taking into

consideration the estimated difficulty of the case. In this case, the retainer is \$5,000.

d. Time will be billed at the rate of \$300.00 an hour against this retainer. When and if this retainer is used in full, then monthly bills will be sent, as stated in sub-paragraph (e).

e. As the case progresses, bills based upon the time involved will be submitted periodically for interim payment. Any such bill must be paid promptly and in full within fifteen (15) days of the date of the bill. The periodic billing serves the convenience of the client from accruing large amounts of fees and serves to inform the Client of the service performed in this case. The interim billing shall be at the rate of \$300.00 per hour.

5. Best Efforts: The Attorney agrees to utilize her best efforts in the representation of the Client, to advise the Client in advance before taking any action that might seriously affect his/her interest, and to keep the Client fully informed as to all significant developments in the case. The Attorney has made no representation or warranty concerning the outcome of the case.


6. Course of Representation: It is understood that this Agreement covers legal representation of the Client by the Attorney only through trial or other pre-trial disposition of the case, and specifically does not include Appeal, Motion for New Trial, Motion for Rehearing, Modification of any Final Judgment or other post-trial proceedings and the like.

7. Security for Fees and Expenses and Collection Procedures: The Attorney is hereby granted a lien for his fees, costs, and expenses on any property awarded the client pursuant to a settlement or judgment or both, and such lien is to continue in the event the Attorney is discharged. The Attorney shall be entitled to the costs and expenses of any outstanding balance due in the event of default in payment by the Client, including a reasonable Attorney fee and court costs. In the event of such default, the outstanding balance of fees and costs shall accrue interest at the legal rate commencing forty-five (45) days after the date of the final billing. ANY DISPUTE CONCERNING THE FEE DUE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY THE DISSATISFIED PARTY FOR A FULL FINAL RESOLUTION TO THE RESOLUTION FEE DISPUTES BOARD OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA BAR, PURSUANT TO RULE 416 OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA APPELLATE COURT RULES.

8. Charging Lien: To secure payment by me to Jean P. Derrick of all expenses, Court costs and attorneys fees I am obligated to pay under this retainer agreement, I hereby grant to Jean P.

Derrick a charging lien applicable to any and all recoveries on my claims or causes of action, whether by settlement, collection of a judgment, or otherwise. I understand that I have a right to discharge my lawyer for cause or without cause. In the event I decide to discharge Jean P. Derrick without cause, I agree to pay reasonable compensation to her for the work done up to the time of discharge, and I agree that Jean P. Derrick's charging lien may be used to protect Jean P. Derrick's right to receive reasonable compensation in that event. Any dispute concerning the fee due pursuant to this contract shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full, final resolution to the Resolution Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar, pursuant to Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.

9. When Effective: This Agreement is effective when signed by the Client and returned and payment of the retainer fee are received at the office of the Attorney at 205 West Main Street, P.O. Box 929, Lexington, SC 29072.

 7-13-2011
LISA C. MOORE, Client Date


JEAN P. DERRICK, Signature Date

JEAN P. DERRICK, ATTORNEY
 205 WEST MAIN STREET
 P.O. BOX 929
 LEXINGTON, SOUTH CAROLINA 29072

Invoice submitted to:
 LISA C. MOORE
 1501 FAIR STREET
 CAMDEN SC 29020

Invoice Date: October 6, 2014

In Reference To: VS WILLIAM T. MOORE

Professional Services

	Hours	Amount
3/25/2011 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT	0.50	150.00
4/7/2011 - JPD CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT	1.50	450.00
4/19/2011 - JPD CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT	1.50	450.00
DRAFTING TWO ORDERS		
E-MAIL OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.20	60.00
4/25/2011 - JPD E-MAIL GUARDIAN AD LITEM ORDER TO CLIENT	0.40	120.00
4/26/2011 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL		
E-MAIL CLIENT	2.50	750.00
4/28/2011 - JPD CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT		
LETTER TO GUARDIAN AD LITEM	0.20	60.00
4/28/2011 - JPD TRANSMITTAL OF ORDER	0.20	60.00
- JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO DR. HARARI	0.20	60.00
5/3/2011 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT		
E-MAIL GUARDIAN AD LITEM	0.10	30.00
5/5/2011 - JPD E-MAIL OPPOSING COUNSEL WITH ORDER	2.50	750.00
5/24/2011 - JPD CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT		
E-MAIL OPPOSING COUNSEL		
LETTER TO GUARDIAN AD LITEM		
DRAFTING ANSWER		
6/20/2011 - JPD DRAFTING DISCOVERY REQUESTS	0.40	120.00
REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT		
TRANSMITTAL OF ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AD LITEM & REPORT TO CLIENT		
7/1/2011 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.10	30.00
7/13/2011 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT	0.30	90.00
E-MAIL CLIENT		
7/13/2011 - JPD E-MAIL OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.20	60.00
7/18/2011 - JPD ATTENDANCE AT PRE-TRIAL & PREPARATION	1.50	450.00
8/12/2011 - JPD E-MAIL OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.30	90.00
8/18/2011 - JPD REVIEW OF FILE	0.50	150.00
TELEPHONE CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL		
LETTER TO OPPOSING COUNSEL		

LISAC MOORE

Page 2

		Hours	Amount
8/25/2011 - JPD	REVIEW OF CORRESPONDENCE	0.40	120.00
	E-MAIL OPPOSING COUNSEL		
	TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT	0.40	120.00
8/30/2011 - JPD	SUBPOENAS RE: LIFE INSURANCE & IRA ISSUANCE & SERVICE	0.80	240.00
9/19/2011 - JPD	REVIEW OF FILE		
	TELEPHONE CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL		
	TELEPHONE CALL TO GUARDIAN AD LITEM		
	TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT	0.20	60.00
9/20/2011 - JPD	TELEPHONE CALL TO DR. HARARI		
	EDITING AFFIDAVIT	0.30	90.00
9/21/2011 - JPD	TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT		
	E-MAIL OPPOSING COUNSEL		
	PICKING UP AFFIDAVIT	0.20	60.00
9/30/2011 - JPD	E-MAIL CLIENT	0.10	30.00
10/4/2011 - JPD	E-MAIL RE: INSURANCE BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION	1.50	450.00
	DRAFTING DISCOVERY RESPONSES	0.50	150.00
10/31/2011 - JPD	TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT		
	EDITING DISCOVERY	0.10	30.00
11/28/2011 - JPD	E-MAIL CLIENT	0.10	30.00
2/1/2012 - JPD	E-MAIL CLIENT	1.10	330.00
3/12/2012 - JPD	CONFERENCE CALL RE: PRE-TRIAL & PREPARATION		
	TWO TELEPHONE CALLS TO CLIENT		
	DRAFTING & SERVICE OF MOTION TO PRODUCE	1.50	450.00
4/11/2012 - JPD	CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: DEPOSITION PREPARATION	2.50	750.00
4/15/2012 - JPD	DEPOSITION PREPARATION	0.10	30.00
4/16/2012 - JPD	PRINTING E-MAILS	2.00	2,400.00
	ATTENDANCE AT DEPOSITIONS		
	DRAFTING 3rd REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION		
	E-MAIL GUARDIAN AD LITEM & COUNSELOR	0.50	150.00
4/17/2012 - JPD	TELEPHONE CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL		
	TELEPHONE CALL TO GUARDIAN AD LITEM		
	TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT		
	E-MAIL CLIENT	0.30	90.00
4/20/2012 - JPD	TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT		
	E-MAIL OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.50	150.00
4/24/2012 - JPD	DRAFTING, FILING & SERVICE OF MOTION		
	TELEPHONE CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL		
4/25/2012 - JPD	KERSHAW CLERK OF COURT - FILING FEE - MOTION	0.20	60.00
	E-MAIL GUARDIAN AD LITEM	0.50	150.00
4/27/2012 - JPD	CONFERENCE CALL WITH COURT		
	E-MAIL CLIENT	0.30	90.00
5/1/2012 - JPD	E-MAIL OPPOSING COUNSEL		
	EDITING STATUS ORDER	0.30	90.00
5/10/2012 - JPD	CORRESPONDENCE TO COURT	0.10	30.00
5/22/2012 - JPD	E-MAIL CLIENT	0.20	60.00
5/30/2012 - JPD	E-MAIL CLIENT		
	SCHEDULING HEARING	1.50	450.00
6/7/2012 - JPD	CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT ANSWERING 3RD REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION		
	LETTER TO MEDIATOR	0.20	60.00
8/12/2012 - JPD	TELEPHONE CALL TO GUARDIAN AD LITEM	0.20	60.00
8/14/2012 - JPD	REVIEW OF COUNSELOR'S REPORT		

LISA C. MOORE

Page 3

	Hours	Amount
6/15/2012 - JPD ATTENDANCE AT MEDIATION & PREPARATION	5.50	1,650.00
6/17/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO & FROM CLIENT	0.30	90.00
6/18/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO DR. HARARI	0.30	90.00
6/19/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO RIP ROSE	0.30	90.00
6/20/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL FROM OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.20	60.00
6/25/2012 - JPD E-MAIL CLIENT	0.20	60.00
6/25/2012 - JPD REVIEW OF E-MAIL	0.20	60.00
10/17/2012 - JPD E-MAIL CLIENT	0.10	30.00
10/23/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO GUARDIAN AD LITEM	0.50	150.00
10/25/2012 - JPD CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: HEARING PREPARATION	2.00	600.00
10/25/2012 - JPD E-MAIL GUARDIAN AD LITEM	0.10	30.00
10/25/2012 - JPD JAN WARRINGTON - WITNESS FEE		30.00
10/25/2012 - JPD CHARLES CARRAWAY - WITNESS FEE		30.00
11/1/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO GUARDIAN AD LITEM	0.50	150.00
11/2/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.60	180.00
11/7/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT	0.60	180.00
11/8/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO GUARDIAN AD LITEM & OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.60	180.00
11/8/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT	0.60	180.00
11/8/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL	0.60	180.00
11/9/2012 - JPD REVIEW OF E-MAIL	0.10	30.00
11/9/2012 - JPD TRIAL PREPARATION	3.00	900.00
11/11/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO & FROM OPPOSING COUNSEL		
11/11/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO & FROM GUARDIAN AD LITEM		
11/11/2012 - JPD E-MAIL CLIENT		
11/11/2012 - JPD READING PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION	2.50	750.00
11/12/2012 - JPD TRIAL PREPARATION	3.00	900.00
11/13/2012 - JPD TRIAL TIME	8.00	2,400.00
11/14/2012 - JPD ATTENDANCE AT TRIAL	3.00	900.00
11/15/2012 - JPD E-MAIL CLIENT	0.20	60.00
11/15/2012 - JPD E-MAIL GUARDIAN AD LITEM	0.10	30.00
11/15/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO CLIENT	0.40	120.00
11/15/2012 - JPD TELEPHONE CALL TO COURT'S SECRETARY		
11/15/2012 - JPD E-MAIL TO COURT		
11/15/2012 - JPD REVIEW OF E-MAILS FROM CLIENT	0.20	60.00
11/15/2012 - JPD DRAFTING ORDER	1.00	300.00
11/15/2012 - JPD E-MAIL CLIENT	0.10	30.00
11/15/2012 - JPD DRAFTING ORDER	3.50	1,050.00
11/15/2012 - JPD WRITING FINAL ORDER	4.00	1,200.00
11/15/2012 - JPD DRAFTING DECREE	0.50	150.00
11/15/2012 - JPD EDITING ORDER	1.00	300.00
11/15/2012 - JPD EDITING ORDER	1.00	300.00
11/15/2012 - JPD TRANSMITTAL TO OPPOSING COUNSEL, COURT & GUARDIAN AD LITEM		
3/13/2014 - JPD FILING ORDER	0.20	60.00
3/14/2014 - JPD COMPLETION OF FORM 4	0.10	30.00
3/18/2014 - JPD E-MAIL COURT	0.10	30.00
3/20/2014 - JPD E-MAIL LISA COBB MOORE	0.10	30.00

LISA C. MOORE

Page 4

4/1/2014 - JPD SERVICE OF ORDER
 4/29/2014 - JPD E-MAIL CLIENT
 TELEPHONE CALL TO & FROM CLIENT
 TELEPHONE CALL TO CLERK

Hours	Amount
0.40	120.00
0.20	60.00
80.30	\$24,175.00

For professional services rendered

Additional Charges :

4/25/2011 - JPD COPIES FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL
 - JPD POSTAGE FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL
 7/14/2011 - JPD COPIES FOR THE MONTH OF JULY
 8/30/2011 - JPD COPIES FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST
 - JPD POSTAGE FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST
 11/1/2011 - JPD POSTAGE FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER
 11/5/2012 - JPD COPIES FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER
 11/12/2012 - JPD COPIES FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER

5.20
 1.83
 10.00
 2.40
 6.00
 7.00
 4.40
 10.00

Total costs

\$46.83

4/8/2011 Payment - thank you
 5/3/2011 Invoice No. 38860
 6/6/2011 Invoice No. 39049
 6/30/2011 Invoice No. 39244
 8/4/2011 Invoice No. 39435
 9/6/2011 Invoice No. 39635
 10/5/2011 Invoice No. 39835
 11/3/2011 Invoice No. 40033
 12/6/2011 Invoice No. 40240
 3/2/2012 Invoice No. 40840
 4/3/2012 Invoice No. 41001
 5/2/2012 Invoice No. 41166
 5/31/2012 Invoice No. 41336
 6/4/2012 Payment - thank you
 7/3/2012 Invoice No. 41510
 11/1/2012 Invoice No. 42186
 11/9/2012 Payment - thank you
 11/27/2012 Invoice No. 42263
 11/30/2012 Invoice No. 42360
 2/4/2013 Invoice No. 42712
 5/2/2013 Invoice No. 43272
 9/4/2013 Invoice No. 43946
 10/2/2013 Invoice No. 44120
 4/1/2014 Invoice No. 45078
 5/1/2014 Invoice No. 45234

38860
 39049
 39244
 39435
 39635
 39835
 40033
 40240
 40840
 41001
 41166
 41336
 41510
 42186
 42263
 42360
 42712
 43272
 43946
 44120
 45078
 45234

(\$5,000.00)
 \$2,107.03
 \$840.00
 \$120.00
 \$640.00
 \$488.40
 \$390.00
 \$540.00
 \$187.00
 \$30.00
 \$330.00
 \$4,255.00
 \$270.00
 (\$1,927.43)
 \$2,670.00
 \$870.00
 (\$3,810.00)
 \$5,544.40
 \$970.00
 \$50.00
 \$180.00
 \$300.00
 \$3,030.00
 \$150.00
 \$180.00

Total payments and adjustments

\$10,484.40

PLEASE MAKE YOUR CHECK PAYABLE TO JEAN P. DERRICK, ATTORNEY.
 ALSO, PLEASE PUT THE INVOICE NUMBER NEAR THE BOTTOM LEFT HAND
 SECTION ON YOUR CHECK.
 IF YOU HAVE ACCOUNT QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL (803) 359-6189.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

Jean P. Derrick,)

Plaintiff,)

vs)

Lisa C. Moore,)

Defendant.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Docket No.: 2014-CP-28-940

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM OF
DEFENDANT
(Jury Trial Demanded)

FILED FOR RECORD
2014 DEC -4 AM 9:39
JONATHAN W. AND
CLERK OF COURT
KERSHAW COUNTY, S.C.

The Defendant, Lisa C. Moore, by and through undersigned counsel answers
Plaintiff's Complaint and makes Counterclaims as follows:

GENERAL DENIAL

1. This Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not specifically admitted herein.

SPECIFIC DENIAL

2. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 1 and 2.
3. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 3 through 9.

FOR A FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

4. This Defendant incorporates by reference the above paragraphs and defenses as if repeated herein verbatim.

BY WAY OF A SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

FAILING TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
AND/OR CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO FILING SUIT

5. The alleged Contract at issue, which was attached to Plaintiff's Complaint specifically provides that any dispute concerning the fee due pursuant to the agreement shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full, final resolution to the Resolution Fee Disputes Board of the South Bar.

6. Plaintiff failed to satisfy this administrative remedy/condition precedent and Defendant pleads this as a complete defense and bar to Plaintiff's Complaint.

COUNTERCLAIMS

FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

BREACH OF CONTRACT ACCOMPANIED BY A FRAUDULENT

ACT

7. By reference, Defendant repeats the above allegations as if repeated here verbatim.

8. Plaintiff agreed to represent Defendant in connection with an action in the Family Court.

9. As such, Plaintiff implied and warranted that she would represent the Defendant competently, diligently and that her fees to the Defendant would be reasonable.

10. Plaintiff had a fraudulent intent in breaching the contract of representation with the Defendant. More specifically, Plaintiff's goal in representing the Defendant was to do as little as possible for Defendant while at the same time over inflating her bills and misrepresenting the number of billable hours she worked on the Defendant's file in an effort to churn or milk the file unlawfully for excessive and unreasonable fees.

11. In fact, Plaintiff accomplished her goals of file churning and file milking through numerous fraudulent acts including but not necessarily limited to:

- a. overstating the actual number of hours she worked on Defendant's file and then billing Defendant for time she did not actually work;
- b. Unlawfully and illegally attempting to bill Plaintiff for time that she initially represented to the Defendant was for free consultations and for time that was spent which pre-dated the fee agreement between the parties;
- c. Having paralegals or other support staff in her office perform work on the file but then billing the Plaintiff as if this work was actually performed by her so she could bill the file at higher hourly rates for time she did not actually work on the file;
- d. In billing the Plaintiff for administrative tasks such as "Printing emails" which should not be properly or reasonably billed as attorney work;
- e. In representing to the Family Court total hours worked that were significantly lower than what she represented she worked to the Defendant and then billing the Defendant for the higher amount;
- f. In such additional and further particulars as may be learned in discovery and/or proven at trial.

12. Defendant hereby demands judgment against Plaintiff for all actual, special and punitive damages in an appropriate amount.

FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

13. By reference, Defendant repeats the above allegations as if repeated here verbatim.

14. Plaintiff has engaged in a pattern and practice of acts which violate the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.C. Code §§ 39-5-10 *et. seq.*

15. More specifically, Plaintiff has a pattern and practice of overbilling clients and charging clients unreasonable high rates for poor, sloppy and incompetent legal representation that she provides.

16. Thereafter, when clients, such as the Defendant to this lawsuit and specifically including the Defendant to this lawsuit, are unwilling and/or unable to pay Plaintiff's overinflated and unreasonably high legal bills, Plaintiff sues them knowing that they will not be able to afford another attorney or adequately defend themselves against the unfair and unlawful attempts to gouge them.

17. In the last few months, Plaintiff has filed a dozen or so "collection actions" against her former and/or existing clients in the Lexington, Richland and Kershaw County Courts of Common Pleas.

18. In most situations, Plaintiff is able to unfairly and unlawfully take advantage of her former and/or existing clients by obtaining default judgments against them or otherwise manipulating the legal process against her clients to siphon off additional money that she did not in fact earn because she overbilled her clients and tried to collect unreasonably high fees by overbilling.

19. In addition, Plaintiff typically gets a sizeable retainer from her clients and she got a sizeable retainer from the Defendant to this action. Plaintiff then sets out to make up and overinflate "billable time" so she can burn through the retainer and demand additional payments from clients. In demanding additional payments, Plaintiff intimidates clients and she intimidated the Defendant to this action by telling clients

including the Defendant to this action that she will withdraw as their attorney; that the Court will rule against the clients their case if happens since the Court will see that Plaintiff is not being paid and the Court will protect a lawyer's fees; and that the clients will lose their case if they don't pay the Plaintiff additional money.

20. The Defendant to this action was the victim of Plaintiff's plan and scheme. More specifically, Plaintiff used the vary tactics outlined above to unfairly milk unreasonably high fees from the Defendant and when the Defendant could no longer pay or would no longer pay, Plaintiff fell back to her time tested practice of suing her client.

21. As outlined and pleaded above, Plaintiff's action is capable of repetition and in fact Plaintiff has repeated this practice several times in recent months.

22. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff's conduct, Defendant has suffered damages. More specifically, Plaintiff has already billed and collected unreasonably high fees from the Defendant; unreasonably high fees that Plaintiff should be forced to disgorge because of her unlawful behavior and tactics as outlined and pleaded more fully above.

23. Defendant hereby demands judgment against Plaintiff for all actual, special, punitive damages in an appropriate amount and treble damages where provided by statute.

FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

ABUSE OF PROCESS

24. By reference, Defendant repeats the above allegations as if repeated here verbatim.

25. Plaintiff has used the courts and specifically this lawsuit, as an unlawful attempt to extort additional legal fees from the Defendant, legal fees that are unreasonably high because Plaintiff has attempted to bill Defendant for work that she did not in fact perform and she attempted to bill Plaintiff for more time than she actually worked on Defendant's file.

26. In filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff has an ulterior motive – in essence to unlawfully blackmail the Defendant to extort more money from her for illegally high and unreasonable fees.

27. Defendant hereby demands judgment against Plaintiff for all actual, special and punitive damages in an appropriate amount.

FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

CONVERSION

28. By reference, Defendant repeats the above allegations as if repeated here verbatim.

29. In paying Plaintiff a retainer, Defendant had an interest in those funds and that money until earned as a lawful and reasonable legal fee.

30. Plaintiff unlawfully and illegally converted the retainer fees by disbursing those fees to herself and by utilizing fraudulent, unlawful and unreasonably high fees.

31. Defendant did not give Plaintiff authority or permission to draw fees from her retainer for unlawful and unreasonably high fees.

32. Defendant hereby demands judgment against Plaintiff for all actual, special and punitive damages in an appropriate amount.


RESERVATIONS OF FURTHER DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIMS

33. Defendant specifically reserves any further defenses and/or counterclaims she may have against the Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendant intends to file a legal malpractice claim against Plaintiff once she obtains an expert affidavit attesting to Plaintiff's malpractice.

WHEREFORE, having fully answered Plaintiff's Complaint and made counterclaims of her own, Defendant prays that the Court issue an Order(s) dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice; that judgment be rendered for the Defendant and against the Plaintiff on Defendant's counterclaims against Plaintiff; that Plaintiff be taxed with all costs and where provided by statute or rule reasonable attorney's fees; and that the Court award the Defendant such other relief in law or equity that the Court deems just and proper.

In accordance with the United States Constitution and Constitution for the State of South Carolina, Defendant demands a trial by jury.

Respectfully submitted,


Robert D. Dodson, Esquire
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, SC 29201
Phone: (803) 252-2600
Fax: (803) 771-2259
Attorney for Defendant

Columbia, South Carolina
December 3, 2014

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF KERSHAW

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Jean P. Derrick,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Lisa C. Moore,

Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 2014-CP-28-940

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Tasha L. Smith, paralegal to the Law Office of Robert Dodson, PA, do hereby certify that I have caused the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim of Defendant (Jury Trial Demanded) to be served upon the following parties at the following addresses via United States Postal Service, Postage Pre-Paid, and electronic mail:

Jean Perrin Derrick, Esquire
PO Box 929
Lexington, SC 29071


Tasha L. Smith, Paralegal

December 3, 2014
Columbia, South Carolina

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

Case No: 2014-CP-28-940

Jean P. Derrick,)

Plaintiff,)

v.)

REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM

Lisa C. Moore,)

Defendant.)

FILED FOR RECORD
2014 DEC 31 PM 3:20
JULIA A. WALSH
CLERK OF COURT
KERSHAW COUNTY, S.C.

The Plaintiff, replying to the Counterclaim of the Defendant, would respectfully show
unto the Court:

1. That the Plaintiff denies each and every allegation of the Defendant's Counterclaim except as hereafter admitted, qualified, or otherwise explained.
2. That as to the allegations of Paragraph Eight and Nine, she would admit that she entered into a contract with the Defendant to represent her in a Family Court matter and she did do so in this complex litigation, obtaining beneficial results for the Defendant.
3. That she would further show that she did in fact represent the Defendant competently and diligently, charging reasonable fees and would further show that the Family Court found that her professional standing was excellent; that her time spent on the Defendant's case was reasonable and that her hourly rate was customary and even on the low side considering her professional stature and experience.
4. That as to the remaining allegations of the Defendant's First Cause of Action, she would deny the same.

5. That as to the Defendant's allegations set out in her Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action, the Plaintiff would emphatically deny the same and demand strict proof thereof.

WHEREFORE, having replied to the Counterclaim of the Defendant, the Plaintiff prays that her Counterclaim be dismissed and that she be granted the relief sought in her Complaint.

Respectfully submitted,


WILLIAM S. TETTERTON, ESQUIRE
Tetterton Law Firm, LLC
Post Office Box 530
Camden, South Carolina 29021
(803) 432-1496

Camden, South Carolina
December 31, 2014

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

Jean P. Derrick,)

Plaintiff,)

v.)

Lisa C. Moore,)

Defendant.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT


Case No: 2014-CP-28-940

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

FILED FOR RECORD
2014 DEC 31 PM 3:00
JOHN A. BRIDGES
CLERK OF COURT
KERSHAW COUNTY, S.C.


I, Debra B. Branham, being first duly sworn, state that I am an employee of Attention Law Firm, LLC, attorney for Plaintiff in the above captioned matter. I state that on December 31, 2014, I mailed first class via U.S. Postal Service with proper postage affixed, a Reply to Counterclaim in the above captioned matter to the following, to wit:

Robert D. Dodson, Esquire
1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, South Carolina 29201


Debra B. Branham

SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS

31st day of December, 2014.


Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: 2-25-20

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF KERSHAW

LISA C. MOORE,

PLAINTIFF,

VERSUS

JEAN PERRIN DERRICK,

DEFENDANT.

) IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
) IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
) 2014-CP-28-00940

) DATE: JULY 14, 2015
) CAMDEN, SOUTH CAROLINA

MOTIONS HEARING

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE DEANDREA G. BENJAMIN

APPEARANCES:

ROBERT DANIEL DODSON, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF

WILLIAM S. TETTERTON, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT

PROVIDED FOR: ROBERT DANIEL DODSON, ESQUIRE

COURT REPORTER:

JO RICE
jrice@sccourts.org
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
SOUTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

1 THE COURT: This is a motion to compel. Well, it looks
2 like two motions to compel; one filed by the plaintiff, one
3 filed by the defendant. Is that correct?

4 MR. DODSON: That's correct, Your Honor.

5 MR. TETTERTON: One is the defendant's motion to compel
6 discovery, which was filed first. The other motion is the
7 plaintiff's motion to, I guess, compel arbitration, to compel
8 resolution and fee dispute resolution which was filed second.
9 I don't know the order in which Your Honor wants to hear
10 these motions this morning.

11 THE COURT: All right. Let me hear the motion on the fee
12 dispute, because I guess if that is resolved, then --
13 depending on which way it is resolved, then we can hear the
14 motion to compel. Yes, sir.

15 MR. TETTERTON: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, we
16 have filed that motion to have this matter sent to the
17 Resolution and Fee Dispute Board and the reason that we have
18 done that is because attached to the complaint is the fee
19 agreement entered into between Mr. Dodson's client and my
20 client. That fee agreement specifically spells out in capital
21 letters, any dispute concerning fees pursuant to this
22 agreement shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a
23 full and final resolution to the Resolution and Fee Dispute
24 Board of The South Carolina Bar pursuant to the Rule 416 of
25 the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. That's in paragraph

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 seven on page two of the fee agreement attached to the
2 complaint.

3 Also, in paragraph eight, page three, it again says that
4 any dissatisfied party would have the right and should file a
5 complaint or file a claim, for a full and final resolution to
6 the Resolution and Fee Dispute Board of The South Carolina
7 Bar.

8 Your Honor, we take the position that that is mandatory,
9 that they both agreed to it, and that this matter should be
10 sent to the Fee Dispute Committee.

11 Now, a dispute has arisen between the young lady she
12 represented and my client about the reasonableness of the
13 fees. That is entirely within the jurisdiction of the fee
14 dispute board under Rule 2 of Rule 416, when there is a
15 dispute arising and the parties have a continuing difference
16 about the fair and proper amount of fees. So, the Fee Dispute
17 Board would definitely have jurisdiction to hear this matter
18 and if they have raised, I believe that they have raised some
19 issues in their answer in their counterclaim about unfair
20 trade practices or reasonableness of the fees. If that comes
21 up in the Fee Dispute Committee, then the Committee, at that
22 time, has the right to refer the case on to the Lawyer
23 Misconduct Board. If that comes up in the fee dispute
24 hearings, they have the right at that time to send it on to
25 somewhere else.

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 We are saying she is bound by her own contract that she
2 made and she is the party that seems to be dissatisfied. She
3 is the party that has to bring this action in the fee dispute
4 case. We can't bring it or my client can't bring it because
5 we are not dissatisfied with our own fees, obviously.

6 If you look at the pleadings, Your Honor, the answer and
7 counterclaims, she admits that this matter should have been
8 sent to the Fee Dispute Committee. He is saying we have
9 failed to try to get all our administrative relief in this
10 answer and counterclaim and I would refer Your Honor to the
11 answer and counterclaim where he said that she had to -- in
12 his answer he says, alleged contract issues provide any
13 dispute concerning the fees due pursuant to the agreement
14 shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full and
15 final resolution to The Resolution and Fee Dispute Board of
16 the South Carolina Bar. It says that in his answer. By his
17 own admission, it's in there. A contractual arrangement
18 between two parties shall be sent to the Resolution and Fee
19 Dispute Board.

20 THE COURT: All right. Yes, sir.

21 MR. DODSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

22 MR. TETTERTON: If I may, Your Honor?

23 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry.

24 MR. TETTERTON: Again, Your Honor, I can hand up the
25 final court order of a family court judge. The final order of

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 the family court judge is a twenty page order. A couple of
2 things. The Family Court Order following the guidelines of
3 Ascot versus Ascot found after considering all six factors of
4 the fees that this was a relatively complex litigation that
5 took at least two days of trial after extensive discovery.
6 The hours spent by the attorney, my client, the Court found
7 were reasonable. She had professional standing of a counselor
8 with thirty-six years of experience. She was well prepared.
9 The case was well-tried. She obtained beneficial results and
10 her rate of \$300 an hour were customary but also on the low
11 side for this action and experience. And so, that was
12 unappealed from Horry, Your Honor, where the Court found that
13 everything that she charged this client for were reasonable
14 under the circumstances based on criteria set up in cases and
15 we think this has to be sent to The Resolution and Fee
16 Dispute Board.

17 THE COURT: All right. Yes, sir.

18 MR. DODSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Robert Dodson for the
19 Defendant, Lisa Moore. The reason Your Honor should not send
20 this to The Fee Dispute Resolution Board is because under
21 Rule 416 of the Appellate Court Rules and then specifically
22 Rule 9 under Rule 416. If I may approach, I have a copy of
23 that Rule, Your Honor. (Hands document to Mr. Tetterton and
24 to Judge Benjamin) You cannot prospectively through a
25 contract bind a client to resolve fee disputes at the fee

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 Dispute Resolution Board. That has to be done by consent of
2 the parties after there is a fee dispute, but you can't,
3 before there is a fee dispute, you can't prospectively bind a
4 client by popping that into a fee contract. There simply is
5 no authority for that. There is no authority and he has cited
6 absolutely no case law where a circuit court compelled
7 somebody to effectively arbitrate a case for The Fee Dispute
8 Resolution Board, because they put something in a fee
9 agreement with a client.

10 And the other point that I would make here is this: it
11 is effectively arbitration because it takes away her
12 constitutional right to a jury trial, but it does not comply
13 with the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act. That clause
14 in the fee agreement that he is referring to simply does not
15 comply with The Uniform Arbitration Act. So, you can't hobble
16 together between The Uniform Arbitration Act, the fee
17 agreement, and Rule 9 that I passed up to Your Honor some
18 sort of holding that when his client initiates a lawsuit in
19 this court and effectively tries to basically get her into
20 default because she, this client has done this a lot. She
21 goes and sues a lot of clients for fees. She has a long
22 history of this. She gets them in default, but this time, Ms.
23 Moore did not go into default. Ms. Derrick initiated this
24 lawsuit and my client is exercising her right to a trial by
25 jury and there is simply nothing under Rule 9 that I passed

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 up which is a part of Rule 416 of the Appellate Court Rules,
2 that vests Your Honor with the authority to compel this kind
3 of arbitration. There is nothing in The Uniform Arbitration
4 Act that was complied with and there is absolutely no
5 appellate law in this state where this has been done. And so,
6 for those reasons, we oppose the motion.

7 THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this. You are
8 saying that -- Rule 9 says exclusive upon consent, so it's
9 your position that her consenting to it in the contract is
10 not consent?

11 MR. DODSON: It is not, because you cannot, you have to,
12 the whole way that the Fee Dispute Resolution Board is set up
13 is that either the client can file a claim directly with the
14 Fee Dispute Resolution Board and the attorney is bound. The
15 attorney can file a claim with The Fee Dispute Resolution
16 Board and The Fee Dispute Resolution Board can ask the client
17 effectively, "Do you consent". But those procedures are
18 accurately disputed as already arisen. There is nothing in
19 Rule 416 or any other statutory authority that says that you
20 can prospectively do this. Absolutely nothing. No case law,
21 no statute. And you can go to the Uniform Arbitration Act and
22 it specifically sets forth what you have to do with an
23 arbitration clause in South Carolina to be enforceable and
24 among other things that has to be put in bold letters,
25 capital letters, on the front of the contract. That was not

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 done here. That is why I said earlier, you can't cobble all
2 these things together to create a new procedure.

3 The other point I would say is, she waived it because
4 she filed this lawsuit, not my client. She can't march into
5 court initiating this lawsuit hoping that she's going to come
6 over here and get my client into default and then when my
7 client gets a lawyer and the lawyer stands up and says,
8 "Huh-uh, we dispute the fee. We think you've committed fraud
9 in the way that you billed her. We think there are other
10 improprieties in this and we want a jury trial, then she
11 says, "No, no, no. I want a do-over. I want to go to the Fee
12 Dispute Resolution Board even though I'm the one that
13 initiated this lawsuit. There is just simply no law for that.
14 It is not provided for in Rule 9, it's not provided for in
15 any appellate law that I see.

16 THE COURT: Yes, sir.

17 MR. TETTERTON: Your Honor, if I may. I don't know how
18 Mr. Dodson plans on getting around a final order of a family
19 court judge when that judge found that these fees were
20 reasonable and he's talking about trying to get his client
21 into default when the family court found that his client,
22 even though there was a fee agreement, his client made some
23 payments, but those payments were intermittent and partial.
24 But I think he has a problem on appeal with a final order
25 from family court judge who has found the fees were

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 reasonable and at no time did she, she had an attorney at
2 those hearings, and at no time did she raise any issue about
3 the fees being unreasonable. I think the case is very simple,
4 she just doesn't want to pay her lawyer for getting
5 beneficial results and doing a good job for her.

6 And all during discovery, Your Honor, we've provided
7 this on a disk for Mr. Dodson. There are letters and letters
8 in here and emails back and forth where she says, "I intend
9 to pay," and there are letters and emails from my client to
10 her telling her you are behind on your payments, you've got
11 to pay some so that we can continue your case and so it shows
12 this matter started half-way back through this case that she
13 intended to not pay my client and as she is now, she's just
14 trying to get out of paying her. If you look at Rule 9, Your
15 Honor, and I agree with Your Honor that Rule 9 says she must
16 consent in writing and be bound by the final decision of the
17 board. She consented to that in the fee contract spelled out
18 in capital letters. And in number 2, it's spelled out again
19 in smaller capital letters, but she agreed to this
20 resolution. If she had problems at the beginning, she
21 shouldn't have signed the agreement. I think she's bound,
22 that's a contractual matter, and I think she's bound by the
23 contract. This does not come under the Arbitration Act. This
24 is a contractual matter between a client and her lawyer and
25 the Fee Dispute Resolution Board can settle this matter very

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 simply. I have the family court order if you'd like me to
2 pass it up.

3 THE COURT: That would be great. Thank you. And let me
4 hear from you all as to the motion to compel. I'm going to
5 take a look at the Uniform Arbitration Act. If this is as Mr.
6 Tetterton says, that it is not arbitration and therefore does
7 not apply. I'll give you an opportunity to respond to that.
8 All right. He says it does not fall under the Uniform
9 Arbitration Act, I'm assuming you are saying that it is not
10 an arbitration, it's a fee dispute.

11 MR. DODSON: You cannot do an end run around the Uniform
12 Arbitration Act, because that's what the Fee Dispute
13 Resolution Board is, it's essentially an arbitration panel of
14 a lawyer or a panel of lawyers that decide fee disputes
15 between clients and lawyers and if that's what she wanted,
16 then she, at a bare minimum, has to comply with the Uniform
17 Arbitration Act in her contract. She's a lawyer. She ought to
18 know how to do that. She didn't do it. I mean, that Act
19 specifically says if this is subject to arbitration, you've
20 got to put that on the front of the contract. It has to be in
21 bold type, capitalized, and when you look at the contract, it
22 simply wasn't done. He can say all he wants to that this
23 isn't subject to the Uniform Arbitration Act, but his motion
24 is to effectively take away my client's constitutional right
25 to a trial by jury and send it over to the Fee Dispute.

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 Resolution Board. That's the same thing as sending it to the
2 American Arbitration Association or some other Arbitration.
3 It may not be the AAA, but it's just another arbitration body
4 with rules and procedures that are for arbitration. He cannot
5 do an end run around like Ms. Derrick is attempting to do.

6 The other thing, as far as the merits of the case, I'm
7 happy to address those at a later time, but we are not to
8 that point.

9 THE COURT: The what in the case?

10 MR. DODSON: The merits. He wanted to get into the merits
11 of the case and I'd be happy to get into the merits of the
12 case, but I don't want to do it today, because I don't think
13 that's relevant to the issues before you.

14 THE COURT: What is the motion to compel?

15 MR. DODSON: The motion to compel, the first thing that I
16 have sought is Ms. Derrick's file, because it's not Ms.
17 Derrick's file, it's Ms. Moore's file. Our courts have been
18 very clear, and if I may approach, Your Honor, I have two
19 ethics advisory opinions from the bar. I've already provided,
20 prior to the hearing, copies to plaintiff's counsel, but the
21 bar has made very, very clear that a lawyer cannot hold a
22 client's file hostage pending resolution of some fee dispute
23 or pending payment of a fee. I've simply asked for the file
24 and they won't give it to me, so that's the first thing that
25 I'm seeking through my motion to compel and I can take the

LISA G. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 other issues later, but that's certainly the most important
2 thing.

3 THE COURT: All right. Has she not given her a copy of
4 the file?

5 MR. TETTERTON: No, Your Honor. What we have done is, he
6 did not ask for that in his motion to produce. He only asked
7 for certain things out of the file and Rule 34, I think,
8 specifically says that the request shall specify a reasonable
9 time and place to make a copy. He hasn't done that. So we
10 have no objection to him coming at a reasonable time and
11 place to copy the file.

12 MR. DODSON: Your Honor, it's not her file. Okay? It's my
13 client's file. If you read those ethics advisory opinions,
14 they makes clear that if a lawyer wants to obtain a copy of
15 the file, the lawyer may do that at the lawyer's cost, but
16 it's not my obligation to go and look at the file and copy it
17 at my expense. That's her lawyer's obligation.

18 MR. TETTERTON: It's not in the letter of production,
19 Your Honor. If he had requested ---

20 MR. DODSON: I ---

21 THE COURT: Hold on one second. I think you all are
22 asking for -- he's saying under the Rules, if there wasn't a
23 lawyer that you have to ask for it in your request to
24 produce, which the motion to compel is filed pursuant to.
25 Correct?

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 MR. DODSON: That's correct, Your Honor.

2 THE COURT: You are talking about something which she, I
3 think the ethics opinions are pretty clear and she has to
4 turn her file over to her. So, but for purposes of the motion
5 to compel, I think you have to ask for it first before I can
6 grant the motion to compel. I understand what you are saying,
7 Mr. Dodson, she owes it to her anyway, but you are saying she
8 owes it to her based on the Rules, which I'm in agreement
9 with is that she has to give her a copy of the file.

10 MR. DODSON: Judge, it's number 13. Here's what I asked
11 for. Please produce copies of all defendant's file material
12 including, but not necessarily limited to; notes, pleadings,
13 discovery, billings, correspondence, including emails text
14 messages or other electronic correspondence, research and/or
15 draft documents of any kind. I further followed up in a
16 letter to Mr. Tetterton and I specifically clarified, I want
17 the file. I don't know that I can make it any clearer than
18 that.

19 MR. TETTERTON: I may stand corrected. Just one second,
20 Your Honor.

21 MR. DODSON: I can pass up the discovery request if Your
22 Honor would like.

23 THE COURT: I don't have it.

24 MR. TETTERTON: We'll make it very simple, Your Honor. We
25 will give her the file.

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 THE COURT: I think even though for the purposes of the
2 Rules of Civil Procedure, I still think she has to give her a
3 copy of the file based on -- that's what I've always
4 practiced. She has to give her the file. It's her file and
5 she has to give her a copy of the complete file. I will go
6 ahead and grant the motion and he is saying he's going to
7 turn it over to you anyway and so we will grant the motion as
8 the motion to -- or they are going to consent to, I don't
9 want to say grant, they are going to consent to turn over the
10 documents. Is that correct, Mr. Tetterton?

11 MR. TETTERTON: Yes, Your Honor.

12 MR. DODSON: And I just want to make clear, I want the
13 whole file.

14 MR. TETTERTON: I don't have a problem with that.

15 MR. DODSON: It's been a problem to this point.

16 MR. TETTERTON: There's not been a problem. It's been a
17 definite misunderstanding.

18 THE COURT: All right.

19 MR. TETTERTON: He just needs to say when he wants to
20 show up and a particular time and place he wants to meet at.

21 MR. DODSON: Judge, again ---

22 THE COURT: Under the rules, I think you have to make a
23 copy, give her a copy and Ms. Derrick has to keep a copy.

24 MR. TETTERTON: Exactly. We just need to know when he
25 wants to pick it up or how he wants to pick it up.

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 THE COURT: How big is the file?

2 MR. TETTERTON: I don't know. I don't have it.

3 THE COURT: I think she has to go pick it up, now. I'm
4 not going to make them mail it. Is she in ---

5 MR. DODSON: I'll be more than happy to have my client
6 pick up the file.

7 THE COURT: All right.

8 MR. TETTERTON: I think it's probably two banker boxes,
9 Your Honor. This thing has been going on several years.

10 MR. DODSON: Okay.

11 THE COURT: Okay. She is going to pick the file up and
12 once she has it, because it's two banker boxes, how much time
13 do you think you need to have it copied to get it to her?

14 MR. TETTERTON: About three weeks, Your Honor, or thirty
15 days. If it's two banker boxes full, we'll have to find a
16 copier.

17 THE COURT: What I'll do is give her fifteen days to get
18 that ready and you can notify Mr. Dodson when it's ready to
19 be picked up. All right.

20 As to the -- I would like to look at the Uniform
21 Arbitration Act and also the fee dispute resolution and so I
22 will get something back to you all on that within the next
23 couple of weeks, also. On the fee dispute, I'm going to take
24 it under advisement and get something back to you. I'm
25 assuming there is no authority one way or the other on the

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1 fee dispute?

2 MR. TETTERTON: No.

3 MR. DODSON: I looked. I couldn't find anything.

4 MR. TETTERTON: The purpose of the board is to establish
5 proceedings to provide resolutions of dispute. Attorney's
6 fees, costs or disbursements between a client and an attorney
7 may be resolved expeditiously, fairly, and professionally and
8 so the Fee Dispute and Resolution Board has jurisdiction on
9 this.

10 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

11 MR. DODSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

12 Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
)
 COUNTY OF FLORENCE)

CERTIFICATE

BE IT KNOWN THAT I, THE UNDERSIGNED JO RICE, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER FOR THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT REPRESENTS A TRUE, ACCURATE AND COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD OF THE HEARING IN THE CAPTIONED CASE, RELATIVE TO APPEAL, BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR KERSHAW COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA, SO GIVEN ON JULY 14, 2015 TO THE BEST OF MY SKILL AND ABILITY;

THAT I AM NOT RELATED TO NOR AN EMPLOYEE OF ANY OF THE PARTIES HERETO, NOR A RELATIVE OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY ATTORNEY OR COUNSEL EMPLOYED BY THE PARTIES HERETO, NOR INTERESTED IN THE OUTCOME OF THIS ACTION.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I HAVE HERE UNTO SET MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 7TH DAY OF MAY, 2016.

s/Jo Rice

JO RICE
 OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

LISA C. MOORE VERSUS JEAN P. DERRICK

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF KERSHAW

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
2014-CP-28-940

Lisa C. Moore,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Jean P. Derrick,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

January 27, 2016
Columbia, South Carolina

B E F O R E:

THE HONORABLE DEANDREA G. BENJAMIN, JUDGE.

A P P E A R A N C E S:

ROBERT D. DODSON, ESQ.
Attorney for the Plaintiff

WILLIAM S. TETTERTON, ESQ.
Attorney for the Defendant

DEBORAH M. McCURDY, RPR
Official Court Reporter

INDEX OF WITNESSES

(WHEREUPON, no witnesses were called
during these proceedings.)

EXHIBITS

(WHEREUPON, no exhibits were introduced
during these proceedings.)

JANUARY 27, 2016

(WHEREUPON, the proceedings began at
2:17 p.m.)

THE COURT: I believe this is Mr. Dodson's
motion.

MR. DODSON: It is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Actually, this is a Kershaw County
case. It is 2014-CP-28-940.

Yes, sir?

MR. DODSON: Thank you, Your Honor. I
promised your law clerk I would take no more than
seven and a half minutes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DODSON: I intend to keep my promise to
her.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DODSON: As Your Honor will recall, this
was an action that was initiated by Jean Derrick,
who is a lawyer over in Lexington. She sued --
this is one of numerous cases where she has sued
her client for fees. We answered and served
counterclaims, and after the action was commenced
she filed a motion to send her part of the case,
the original claim, to the Fee Dispute Resolution
Board, and Your Honor granted that motion to send

1 just the initial complaint to the Fee Dispute
2 Resolution Board. And I filed, timely filed, a
3 motion for reconsideration.

4 My motion for reconsideration is based on four
5 grounds.

6 First of all, under Rule 416 of the Appellate
7 Rules of Civil Procedure which sets out the Fee
8 Dispute Resolution Board, Rule 10 of Rule 416 talks
9 about commencing an action in the Fee Dispute
10 Resolution Board.

11 And I want to kind of be careful about how I
12 word this, because I'm not trying to come across as
13 snotty when I say this, but nothing in that rule
14 416, specifically Rule 10, vests the Court with the
15 authority to compel a motion to send the case to
16 the Fee Dispute Resolution Board.

17 My second point that I would make is even if
18 the contract or the fee agreement by the parties is
19 viewed as some sort of consent to the Fee Dispute
20 Resolution Board, Rule 10 of Rule 416 specifically
21 says -- and I'm reading right from my rule book --
22 Such written consent may be withdrawn by written
23 notice served on all other parties or attorneys.

24 So certainly she can withdraw her consent even
25 if the Court were to view the initial fee agreement

1 as her consent to that.

2 My third point is that this is an arbitration.
3 The Fee Dispute Resolution Board is, in effect, an
4 arbitration body. It may not use that word
5 "arbitration," but arbitration is not a word that
6 is defined in the South Carolina Uniform
7 Arbitration Act, so we have to go to a common law
8 definition of it.

9 And the common law definition, which I quoted
10 in the motion, in my motion for reconsideration
11 itself, this is exactly what it describes: That
12 essentially there is a body or a panel that is
13 going to decide the issues for the parties to that
14 arbitration.

15 And you cannot compel arbitration in an
16 attorney-client fee dispute like this for a couple
17 of reasons.

18 First, the contract at issue doesn't contain,
19 you know, prominent bold letters typed on the front
20 or stamped on the first page of the contract, and,
21 second, even if it did, under our Uniform
22 Arbitration Act, attorneys can't compel arbitration
23 in their fee agreements.

24 My fourth point that I would make is a fairly
25 obvious point, but I'll make it anyway. And it is

1 this. Ms. Derrick initiated this lawsuit. She
2 filed the original summons and complaint in this
3 action. And she -- this is not the first time she
4 has done it. She has done this numerous times
5 where she has sued clients for fees. And so she
6 made her bed.

7 She wanted the Court to decide the issues that
8 she brought before the Court. And she can't get a
9 Mulligan or a do-over or a takeaway and file the
10 initial action here and then say, Nope, I don't
11 want -- I take it back. I want to go to the Fee
12 Dispute Resolution Board.

13 And so for those four reasons, we would ask
14 the Court to either alter or amend its prior ruling
15 and deny the motion, or at least further explain in
16 a written order. Number One, how the Court --
17 again, not trying to be disrespectful or snotty --
18 has the authority to compel the Fee Dispute
19 Resolution Board -- and that is not provided in the
20 rules itself -- why my client, Ms. Moore, couldn't
21 withdraw consent for that because that is provided
22 for in the rules. And then, further, how the
23 arbitration -- it would be proper under the Uniform
24 Arbitration Act. And then, finally, why
25 Ms. Derrick's action of initiating this lawsuit and

1 bringing this lawsuit doesn't constitute some sort
2 of a waiver.

3 Thank you, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: Let me just ask. I think in doing
5 the Form 4, I did not dismiss the counterclaim.

6 MR. DODSON: That's correct, Your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Nor did I dismiss the suit. If I
8 remember correctly, her suit was for breach of
9 contract; is that correct?

10 MR. DODSON: I believe that is right. I think
11 there was also a quantum meruit claim, but I think
12 that that was the initial action.

13 THE COURT: All right. And so the breach of
14 contract case would not be appropriate for the Fee
15 Dispute Board; is that correct?

16 MR. DODSON: My contention is none of it would
17 be appropriate before the Fee Dispute Resolution
18 Board.

19 THE COURT: All right. No, just as to your
20 fourth point as to why did she bring it in an
21 action at law and not -- and that she is trying to
22 change and now do it before the Fee Dispute Board.

23 I guess my next question is -- and I know you
24 are saying it is arbitration -- but the decision
25 before the Fee Dispute Board is subject to being

1 appealed to the circuit court; is that correct?

2 MR. DODSON: Honestly, I'm not sure of the
3 answer to that.

4 THE COURT: Because I have heard them before.
5 That is -- yes, where they have appealed the
6 decision of the Fee Dispute Board.

7 MR. DODSON: Well, in arbitration -- you know,
8 arbitration, you can appeal arbitration awards as
9 well. I mean, the grounds for those appeals are
10 very limited, but arbitration awards themselves can
11 be appealed to one body or another, it is just the
12 grounds for them are very limited.

13 So I don't know that -- sort of foreseeing
14 where Your Honor is going, I don't know that that
15 is really dispositive to the question about whether
16 or not this is in fact arbitration.

17 And I think when you look at the procedures
18 that are set forth in Rule 416 about how this Fee
19 Dispute Board operates, it is an arbitration body.
20 It is an arbitration body set up for -- by the
21 bar -- for a limited purpose of settling certain
22 fee disputes if the parties consent, but that is,
23 you know -- not to be cliché, but it is kind of
24 cliché. It if walks like a duck and quacks like a
25 duck, it is a duck. And if it looks like

1 arbitration and acts like arbitration, it is
2 arbitration. And that is what our position is.

3 THE COURT: But the -- and I'm looking at the
4 rules. I'm asking these questions. When I look at
5 the Uniform Arbitration Act and the rules
6 pertaining to it, this fits specifically in a
7 different section, Rule 416. I understand you
8 believe that it basically takes on the same effect
9 as arbitration, but is there any case law or
10 anything that says that this is actually considered
11 arbitration and would be subject to the rules of
12 arbitration?

13 MR. DODSON: I am not aware of case law on the
14 issue one way or another, nor am I aware of any
15 case law one way or another on whether the Court
16 can compel arbitration through the Fee Dispute
17 Resolution Board under a written contract.

18 THE COURT: Well, yes, and I don't believe the
19 order says arbitration, it is just that --

20 MR. DODSON: I understand.

21 THE COURT: In the contract. The only issues
22 that were being sent to the Fee Dispute Board are
23 just the issues she had regarding her. She said --
24 I believe her only complaint was that she did not
25 get the services that she was supposed to pay for.

1 and that is why she did not pay them. I think that
2 is -- something to that effect.

3 MR. DODSON: And she may -- yes, you are
4 right.

5 THE COURT: Something to that.

6 MR. DODSON: She told me --

7 THE COURT: She also claims legal malpractice.
8 And none of that stuff would go to the Fee Dispute
9 Board under the current order.

10 MR. DODSON: Under the current order, I
11 understand. It sort of, you know, gets into
12 another thing, sort of bifurcating it out, because
13 you know --

14 THE COURT: Well, I don't know if it
15 bifurcates it. I think what it does is basically
16 says she has to -- based under the contract, she
17 has to go to the Fee Dispute Board. But I'm not
18 sure how it disturbs the current suit. Maybe
19 that -- or your counterclaim.

20 MR. DODSON: Well, I mean, it doesn't disturb
21 them in the sense that -- as Your Honor just
22 pointed out, the current order doesn't dismiss her
23 counterclaims. Those are still preserved and she
24 is still entitled to her right to a trial by jury
25 on those issues. It is only the initial claims

1 that Ms. Derrick brought.

2 However, in bifurcating out the original
3 claims that the Plaintiff brought from the
4 counterclaims that the Defendant asserted, there
5 are issues in both of those. For example, the
6 reasonableness of the fee is in part based on the
7 quality of the legal services, the novelty of the
8 issues, and the hours worked, you know.

9 And so the quality of the legal services, the
10 hours that are worked is one of the things that
11 we're going to bring up. And we have already
12 talked to one of Ms. Derrick's former paralegals
13 that basically is going to testify that she is a
14 chronic over-biller, she represents that she has
15 worked hours that in fact she didn't work.

16 Well, those are going to be -- that is going
17 to be testimony that is going to be important in
18 the Fee Dispute Resolution Board as the current
19 order reads because if she didn't work the hours,
20 she is not entitled to the additional fee. But it
21 also goes in with the other claims about unfair
22 trade practices and this kind of issue of
23 chronically over-billing clients for work that she
24 didn't perform.

25 So those are -- just to give Your Honor -- I

1 mean, there is a lot of overlap between the two.

2 THE COURT: So you are just -- I guess your
3 issue is the fact that your client would have to
4 litigate both -- litigate the same issues, one to
5 the Fee Dispute Board and one to a jury?

6 MR. DODSON: That is one of the -- I mean,
7 that is certainly one of my concerns, yes.

8 THE COURT: Okay.

9 MR. DODSON: But I think --

10 THE COURT: I did not dismiss any of the
11 claims.

12 MR. DODSON: You didn't. And I agree. I
13 mean, I understand that, Your Honor. I just, with
14 all due respect to Your Honor and this Court in the
15 prior order, I just take issue with whether or not
16 the Court can properly compel the original action
17 before the Fee Dispute Resolution Board, even
18 recognizing that the counterclaim would remain with
19 this Court.

20 THE COURT: Well, the original action also
21 remains with the Court, because this is a breach of
22 contract; right? That would not -- I guess what
23 I'm saying is, it is almost -- I'm trying to think
24 of a good example -- of someone filing a complaint,
25 but then also going through some other grievance

1 process where they are running parallel?

2 MR. DODSON: Well, I don't know that they
3 are --

4 THE COURT: I don't know about parallel,
5 but --

6 MR. DODSON: Well, I don't know that they are
7 on parallel tracks. They may not be on
8 perpendicular tracks. But I think there is going
9 to be some overlap at some point in the future
10 because, you know, you have the problem of if the
11 Fee Dispute Resolution Board says she is entitled
12 to some money, but then, you know, you get a jury
13 that says she committed legal malpractice in the
14 very case or that she committed -- that she has
15 violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act in the
16 legal malpractice action, you know. I'm not sure I
17 can get into questions of offset, and it just
18 becomes I think a quagmire, a complicated mess.

19 THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this
20 also. Did she ever send something saying she
21 withdrew her consent?

22 MR. DODSON: I don't know that she has ever
23 given her consent, other than what is in the --

24 THE COURT: Agreement?

25 MR. DODSON: In the agreement itself. Because

1 the way that the rule reads, Rule 10 of Rule 416,
2 is that if Ms. Derrick had completed an application
3 and filed with the Fee Dispute Resolution Board,
4 then those papers that she would file would get
5 served on Ms. Moore, my client, and she could
6 either consent or not consent to it. So we never
7 even got to that process.

8 THE COURT: Let me ask. I guess I'm a little
9 confused. The Fee Dispute Board, Ms. Derrick --
10 you are saying Ms. Derrick could have filed her
11 initial action with the Fee Dispute Board to
12 enforce your client to pay her?

13 MR. DODSON: I think she could have. I
14 believe, if I read the rule right, Ms. Derrick --

15 THE COURT: I'll go back and look at it,
16 but --

17 MR. DODSON: -- initiated it, yes. I think
18 so. I may be wrong on that. I know a client can
19 initiate it.

20 THE COURT: I know your client could have
21 initially filed a fee dispute with her.

22 MR. DODSON: And she is not -- I mean, to be
23 clear, Your Honor, my client is not, at this point
24 I mean, she -- my client never filed with the Fee
25 Dispute Resolution Board at all. So she never

1 filed a claim saying, I want back the money that I
2 have already paid Ms. Derrick, because she already
3 paid Ms. Derrick a sizeable amount. She never
4 filed anything with the Fee Dispute Resolution
5 Board saying, I want that money back.

6 I think at some point -- and it was after the
7 commencement of this lawsuit -- Mr. Tetterton sent
8 me an e-mail or a letter or something along the
9 lines of, Ms. Derrick would go to the Fee Dispute
10 Resolution Board. And I e-mailed him back and
11 said, We don't agree to that.

12 So -- but there is nothing, I mean, as far as
13 the Fee Dispute Resolution Board is concerned as
14 the case sits right now, we don't exist, because
15 there has just been nothing filed over there that
16 I'm aware of.

17 THE COURT: Okay.

18 MR. DODSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: I'll see what he has to say.

20 All right. Yes, sir?

21 MR. TETTERTON: I will do the easy part first,
22 Your Honor. He is citing Rule 10 saying that she
23 had to withdraw by written consent, she had to
24 withdraw consent. That is not what the rule says
25 at all.

1 If you read the rule very carefully: After
2 the initial correspondence, all other
3 correspondence shall be sent by regular mail or
4 with the consent of the client or lawyer by e-mail.
5 That is the consent that he is misreading. Such
6 written consent may be withdrawn by written notice
7 served on all other parties or attorneys.

8 That section right there, plain black and
9 white, says that the written consent, if you agreed
10 to do it by e-mail, that written consent, doing it
11 by e-mail, can be withdrawn. So he is misreading
12 that. That is the easy part of that.

13 The other thing is, Your Honor, this is a
14 contract case. You have read the contract. And in
15 two separate paragraphs in the fee agreement, which
16 is dated April of 2000 -- some three years before
17 the final order of the Court, it was spelled out
18 explicitly in the contract in two different
19 locations that the parties would -- if anyone was
20 dissatisfied or there was any dispute, it would be
21 sent to the South Carolina Fee Dispute Resolution
22 Committee.

23 It is spelled out not only there in the
24 contract, in the agreement, but also in his answer.
25 In Paragraph 4 of his answer, he says that we

1 didn't send it to them or it hadn't been submitted
2 to them and that it is supposed to be sent there.
3 In Paragraph 4 of his answer he says that. So he's
4 admitting that it should be. I'm sorry, Paragraph
5 of his answer.

6 Now, he refers to the Arbitration Act saying
7 this is arbitration. First of all, he is trying to
8 get you to rewrite contract law. We all know that
9 the contract on the four corners of the contract is
10 not ambiguous. The contract speaks for itself. So
11 arguing the contract against the arbitration -- I
12 mean, excuse me, the Fee Dispute Committee
13 provision in the contract, he is trying to get this
14 Court to rewrite contract law. This Court already
15 has to look at the four corners of the contract,
16 and it very explicitly spells it out.

17 Then he is trying to say this is arbitration.
18 We have gone over this before, Your Honor, in the
19 other motion, (B)(3) of the Uniform Arbitration Act
20 specifically, in black and white: A fee agreement
21 entered into between the relationship of the
22 contracting parties is such that of lawyer-client
23 shall not apply to that agreement.

24 The legislature in its intent said: Any
25 agreement between a lawyer and a client is excluded

1 from the Uniform Arbitration Act.

2 What he is trying to do is come in through the
3 back door and say, Well, you are bound by the
4 Arbitration Act, but yet the act itself, the
5 legislative intent was for it to be excluded. So
6 not only is he trying to rewrite contract law, he
7 is trying to get this Court to rewrite legislation.

8 Your Honor, this case -- the legislative
9 intent was for it to be only arbitration cases, not
10 fee dispute cases. If you look at 416, that is the
11 exclusive remedy for fee disputes. There is no
12 dispute that this is not a dispute case. This is a
13 fee dispute case.

14 So fee dispute -- or the Resolution Fee
15 Dispute Committee, or the board, has exclusive
16 jurisdiction -- jurisdiction to hear those cases.

17 Now, that act -- I mean, that 416 does not put
18 the burden on the lawyer, it puts the burden on the
19 client. The client has to file. It says: The
20 client shall file if she is dissatisfied with the
21 fee. And the fee is included -- the definition of
22 the fee in that particular act covers everything
23 about the fee, any dispute about the fee:
24 Overpayment, underpayment, anything.

25 Now, Your Honor, this case went for three

1 solid years. There was a final order by the Family
2 Court judge, unappealed from, unappealed, which
3 made a finding that this -- and she asked for
4 attorney's fees, said that this was complex
5 litigation, full discovery, two full days of trial,
6 64 reasonable hours by the attorney, who had a
7 professional standard of excellence, 36 years of
8 practicing law, she was well prepared, the case was
9 well tried, she obtained beneficial results, and
10 her hourly rate of \$300 was customary, even though
11 on the low side.

12 His client waits three years, doesn't pay the
13 lawyer, and now all of sudden she is trying to get
14 out of paying the lawyer, doesn't want to go to the
15 Fee Dispute Committee.

16 The exclusive jurisdiction of this case is
17 with the Fee Dispute Board. And I can cite Your
18 Honor Bailey v. Bailey. That is 312 S.C. 454, 441
19 S.E.2d 525.

20 THE COURT: One more time.

21 MR. TETTERTON: 312 S.C. 454, 441 S.E.2d
22 525 -- 325, Bailey v. Bailey, which says that: Any
23 dispute about the fee remains in the jurisdiction
24 of the Resolution or the Fee Dispute Board.

25 I think this Court ruled correctly on my

1 motion to compel this case going to the Fee Dispute
2 Committee first. This Court has already in its
3 order said, We are going to leave all these other
4 causes of action open. So that does not prevent
5 him from, if he gets that far, of having a jury
6 trial on all his causes of action in the complaint,
7 nor does it prevent Ms. Derrick from having her day
8 in court on her breach of contract.

9 But I don't see how in the world he can get
10 around this case being excluded from the Uniform
11 Arbitration Act or included in the 416 Fee Dispute
12 Committee -- fee dispute. And she has not -- this
13 part of 410, I'm sorry, Rule 10 of 416, he just
14 misread that. That is not what it says.

15 THE COURT: One quick question. His position
16 is that he doesn't think that this Court has the
17 jurisdiction to compel his client to the Fee
18 Dispute Board.

19 MR. TETTERTON: Well, he wants this Court to
20 rewrite contract law, Your Honor. This is a
21 contract, unambiguous, plain on its face, which
22 says: They will submit any fee disputes to the
23 Resolution Fee Dispute Committee.

24 So he is asking this Court to disregard
25 contracts between two of the parties, both whom

1 relied on this contract. Ms. Derrick, for three
2 years, relied on the fact that she was under an
3 obligation to perform services for Ms. Moore, which
4 she did, as found by the Family Court judge. She
5 did a great job. Was underpaid for \$300 an hour.
6 That case was unappealed from. So Mr. Dodson is
7 asking this Court to rewrite contract law.

8 THE COURT: All right.

9 MR. TETTERTON: And the contract is plain on
10 its face. I think this case should go to the Fee
11 Dispute Board first, and then we'll figure it out
12 in the civil court on all these other -- I mean,
13 the other court, about all these other causes of
14 action.

15 THE COURT: All right.

16 MR. TETTERTON: Thank you.

17 THE COURT: All right. I'll take a look at
18 that. I'll look at Bailey v. Bailey. It has been
19 a while. I did some research on it, there is just
20 not anything really out there. I'll take a look at
21 Bailey v. Bailey and read over the Fee Dispute
22 Resolution rule again.

23 MR. TETTERTON: 416.

24 THE COURT: The appeals. And I'll get
25 something back to you.

1 MR. TETTERTON: And, Your Honor, again, I
2 invite your attention to (B)(3) of the Uniform
3 Arbitration Act.

4 THE COURT: I'll take a look.

5 MR. TETTERTON: Which specifically excludes
6 lawyer-client grievances.

7 Thank you, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

9 MR. DODSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

10 (WHEREUPON, the proceedings were
11 concluded at 2:44 p.m.)
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(END OF TRANSCRIPT)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF KERSHAW

I, Deborah M. McCurdy, Official Court Reporter for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of the State of South Carolina, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, accurate and complete Transcript of Record of the proceedings had and evidence introduced in the trial of the captioned case, relative to appeal, in the Court of Common Pleas for Kershaw County, South Carolina, on the 27th day of January, 2016.

I do further certify that I am neither of kin, counsel nor interest to any party hereto.

March 24, 2016

s/Deborah M. McCurdy, RPR

Deborah M. McCurdy, RPR
Fifth Circuit Court Reporter

\$	another [4] 8/11 9/14 9/15 10/13	bringing [1] 7/1
\$300 [2] 19/10 21/5	answer [5] 8/3 16/24 16/25 17/3 17/5	brought [3] 6/8 11/1 11/3
1	answered [1] 3/21	burden [2] 18/18 18/18
10 [6] 4/8 4/14 4/20 14/1 15/22 20/13	any [9] 9/9 9/14 12/10 16/20 17/24 18/25	C
2	19/22 20/22 23/17	called [1] 2/4
2000 [1] 16/16	anyone [1] 16/19	can [10] 4/24 8/8 8/10 9/16 12/16 13/17
2014-CP-28-940 [2] 1/2 3/8	anything [4] 9/10 15/4 18/24 21/20	14/18 16/11 19/17 20/9
2016 [4] 1/9 3/1 23/15 23/19	anyway [1] 5/25	can't [2] 5/22 6/8
24 [1] 23/19	appeal [2] 8/8 23/13	cannot [1] 5/15
27 [2] 1/9 3/1	appealed [3] 8/1 8/5 8/11	captioned [1] 23/13
276 [1] 23/15	appears [2] 8/9 21/24	careful [1] 4/11
2-17 [1] 3/3	Appellate [1] 4/6	carefully [1] 16/1
2-44 [1] 22/11	application [1] 14/2	CAROLINA [7] 1/1 1/9 5/6 16/21 23/4
3	apply [1] 17/23	23/10 23/14
312 [2] 19/18 19/21	appropriate [2] 7/14 7/17	case [21] 3/8 3/23 4/15 7/14 9/9 9/13 9/15
325 [1] 19/22	App-l [1] 16/16	13/14 15/14 16/14 18/8 18/12 18/13 18/25
36 [1] 19/7	arbitration [38]	19/8 19/16 20/1 20/10 21/6 21/10 23/13
4	are [18] 7/24 8/9 8/12 8/18 9/22 10/3 10/23	cases [4] 3/20 18/9 18/10 18/16
410 [1] 20/13	11/5 11/10 11/16 11/25 12/2 13/1 13/3 13/6	causes [3] 20/4 20/6 21/13
416 [12] 4/6 4/8 4/14 4/20 8/18 9/7 14/1	14/10 18/3 20/3	certain [1] 8/21
18/10 18/17 20/11 20/13 21/23	arguing [1] 17/11	certainly [2] 4/24 12/7
441 [2] 19/18 19/21	around [1] 20/10	CERTIFICATE [1] 23/1
454 [2] 19/18 19/21	as [14] 3/17 4/12 4/19 5/1 7/19 7/20 8/8 9/9	certify [2] 23/10 23/16
5	10/21 11/18 15/12 15/12 15/13 21/4	change [1] 7/22
525 [2] 19/19 19/22	ask [4] 6/13 7/4 13/19 14/8	chronic [1] 11/14
6	asked [1] 19/3	chronically [1] 11/23
64 [1] 19/6	asking [5] 9/4 20/24 21/7	circuit [3] 8/1 23/9 23/23
9	asserted [1] 11/4	cite [1] 19/17
940 [2] 1/2 3/8	attention [1] 22/2	citing [1] 15/22
A	attorney [4] 1/18 1/20 5/16 19/6	civil [2] 4/7 21/12
abound [10] 4/9 4/11 8/15 8/18 11/21 13/4	attorney's [1] 19/4	claim [3] 3/24 7/11 15/1
18/23 18/23 19/23 21/13	attorney-client [1] 5/16	claims [5] 10/7 10/25 11/3 11/21 12/11
accurate [1] 23/11	attorneys [3] 4/23 5/22 16/7	clear [1] 14/23
across [1] 4/13	authority [2] 4/15 6/18	clerk [1] 3/11
act [14] 5/7 5/22 6/24 9/5 13/15 17/6 17/19	awards [2] 8/8 8/10	cliche [2] 8/23 8/24
18/1 18/4 18/4 18/17 18/22 20/11 22/3	aware [3] 9/13 9/14 15/16	client [19] 3/21 5/16 6/20 12/3 14/5 14/12
action [15] 3/18 3/22 4/9 6/3 6/16 6/25 7/12	B	14/18 14/20 14/23 14/24 16/4 17/22 17/25
7/21 12/16 12/20 13/16 14/11 20/4 20/6	back [7] 6/11 14/15 15/1 15/5 15/10 18/3	18/19 18/19 18/20 19/13 20/13 22/6
21/14	21/25	clients [2] 6/5 11/23
acts [1] 9/1	Backley [8] 19/18 19/18 19/22 19/22 21/18	Columbia [1] 1/9
actually [2] 3/7 9/10	21/18 21/21 21/21	come [2] 4/12 18/2
additional [1] 11/20	bar [1] 8/21	commenced [1] 3/22
admitting [1] 17/4	based [3] 4/4 10/16 11/6	commencement [1] 15/7
after [3] 3/22 15/6 16/1	basically [3] 9/8 10/15 11/13	commencing [1] 4/9
again [3] 6/17 21/22 22/1	be [24]	committed [2] 13/13 13/14
against [1] 17/11	because [10] 4/12 6/21 8/4 10/12 11/19 12/21	Committee [7] 16/22 17/12 18/15 19/15 20/2
agree [2] 12/12 15/11	13/10 13/25 15/2 15/14	20/12 20/23
agreed [1] 16/9	becomes [1] 13/18	common [4] 1/1 5/7 5/9 23/14
agreement [9] 4/18 4/25 13/24 18/25 16/15	bed [1] 6/6	compel [8] 4/15 5/15 5/22 6/18 9/16 12/16
16/24 17/20 17/23 17/25	been [3] 15/15 17/1 21/18	20/1 20/17
agreements [1] 5/23	before [8] 6/8 7/17 7/22 7/25 8/4 12/17 16/16	complaint [5] 4/1 6/2 9/24 12/24 20/6
all [23] 3/16 4/6 4/23 7/13 7/19 12/14 13/19	17/18	complete [1] 23/11
14/25 15/20 15/25 16/2 16/7 17/7 17/8 19/13	began [1] 3/2	completed [1] 14/2
20/3 20/6 21/8 21/12 21/13 21/15 21/17 22/8	being [3] 7/25 9/22 20/10	complex [1] 19/4
almost [1] 12/23	believe [6] 3/4 7/10 9/8 9/18 9/24 14/14	complicated [1] 13/18
along [1] 15/8	beneficial [1] 19/9	concerned [1] 15/13
already [5] 11/11 15/2 15/2 17/14 20/3	BENJAMIN [1] 4/14	concerns [1] 12/7
also [7] 7/11 10/7 11/21 12/20 12/25 13/20	between [3] 12/1 17/21 17/25 20/25	concluded [1] 22/11
16/24	bifurcates [1] 10/15	confused [1] 14/9
alter [1] 6/14	bifurcating [2] 10/12 11/2	consent [17] 4/19 4/22 4/24 5/1 6/21 8/22
am [3] 9/13 9/14 23/16	bill [1] 11/14	13/21 13/23 14/6 14/6 15/23 15/24 16/4 16/5
ambiguous [1] 17/10	billing [1] 11/23	16/6 16/9 16/10
amend [1] 6/14	black [2] 16/8 17/20	considered [1] 9/10
amount [1] 15/3	board [35]	constitute [1] 7/1
	body [5] 5/4 5/12 8/11 8/19 8/20	contain [1] 5/18
	bold [1] 5/19	contention [1] 7/16
	book [1] 4/21	contract [28]
	both [3] 11/5 12/4 20/25	contracting [1] 17/22
	bound [1] 18/3	contracts [1] 20/25
	breach [4] 7/8 7/13 12/21 20/8	corners [2] 17/9 17/15
	bring [2] 7/20 11/11	correct [4] 7/6 7/9 7/15 8/1

C	correctly [3] 7/8 19/25 correspondence [2] 16/2 16/3 could [4] 14/5 14/10 14/13 14/20 couldn't [1] 6/20 counsel [1] 23/17 counterclaim [3] 7/5 10/19 12/18 counterclaims [3] 3/22 10/23 11/4 COUNTY [4] 1/2 3/7 23/5 23/14 couple [1] 5/16 court [32] covers [1] 18/22 CP [2] 1/2 3/8 current [5] 10/9 10/10 10/18 10/22 11/18 customary [1] 19/10	entitled [3] 10/24 11/20 13/11 ESQ [2] 1/18 1/19 essentially [1] 5/12 even [6] 4/17 4/24 5/21 12/17 14/7 19/10 ever [2] 13/20 13/22 everything [1] 18/22 evidence [1] 23/12 exactly [1] 5/11 example [2] 11/5 12/24 excellence [1] 19/7 excluded [3] 17/25 18/5 20/10 excludes [1] 22/5 exclusive [3] 18/11 18/15 19/16 excuse [1] 17/12 exhibits [1] 2/13 exist [1] 15/14 explain [1] 6/15 explicitly [2] 16/18 17/16	H had [6] 9/23 14/2 15/23 15/23 19/6 23/12 hadn't [1] 17/1 half [1] 3/12 has [19] 3/20 6/4 6/4 6/5 6/18 10/16 10/17 11/14 13/14 13/22 15/15 15/19 17/15 18/15 18/19 20/2 20/12 20/16 21/18 have [12] 5/7 8/4 8/5 11/11 12/3 13/10 14/10 14/13 14/20 15/2 16/14 17/18 having [2] 20/5 20/7 he [19] 15/19 15/22 16/5 16/11 16/25 17/3 17/6 17/7 17/13 17/17 18/2 18/6 18/6 20/5 20/9 20/13 20/16 20/19 20/24 he's [1] 17/3 hear [1] 18/16 heard [1] 8/4 her [19] 3/15 3/21 3/23 4/24 5/1 6/6 7/8 9/23 9/24 10/22 10/24 13/21 13/23 14/10 14/12 14/21 19/10 20/7 20/8 here [1] 6/10 hereby [1] 23/10 hero [1] 23/17 him [2] 15/10 20/5 his [8] 16/24 16/25 17/3 17/5 19/12 20/6 20/15 20/17 Honestly [1] 8/2 Honor [23] 3/6 3/10 3/17 3/25 7/3 7/6 8/14 10/21 11/25 12/13 12/14 14/23 15/16 15/22 16/13 17/18 18/6 18/25 19/18 20/20 22/1 22/7 22/9 HONORABLE [1] 1/14 hour [1] 21/5 hourly [1] 19/10 hours [5] 11/8 11/10 11/15 11/19 19/6 how [6] 4/11 6/16 6/22 8/18 10/18 20/9 However [1] 11/2
D	dated [1] 16/16 day [2] 20/7 23/15 days [1] 19/5 DEANDREA [1] 1/14 DEBORAH [4] 1/24 23/8 23/21 23/23 decide [2] 5/13 6/7 decision [2] 7/24 8/6 Defendant [3] 1/8 1/20 11/4 defined [1] 5/6 definition [3] 5/8 5/9 18/21 deny [1] 6/15 Derrick [13] 1/7 3/18 6/1 11/1 14/2 14/9 14/10 14/14 15/2 15/3 15/9 20/7 21/1 Derrick's [2] 6/25 11/12 describes [1] 5/11 did [11] 5/21 7/5 7/7 7/20 9/24 10/1 12/10 13/20 21/4 21/5 21/19 didn't [5] 11/15 11/19 11/24 12/12 17/1 different [2] 9/7 16/18 discovery [1] 19/5 disables [4] 7/5 7/7 10/22 12/10 dispositive [1] 8/15 dispute [53] disputes [3] 8/22 18/11 20/22 disregard [1] 20/24 disrespectful [1] 6/17 dissatisfied [2] 16/20 18/20 disturb [1] 10/20 disturbs [1] 10/18 do [7] 6/9 7/22 15/21 16/10 18/2 23/10 23/16 do over [1] 6/9 DODSON [2] 1/18 21/6 Dodson's [1] 3/4 does [4] 10/15 18/17 20/4 20/7 doesn't [7] 5/18 7/1 10/20 10/22 19/12 19/14 20/16 doing [2] 7/4 16/10 don't [12] 6/10 8/13 8/14 9/18 10/14 13/2 13/4 13/6 13/22 15/11 15/14 20/9 done [2] 6/4 6/4 door [1] 18/3 duck [3] 8/24 8/25 8/25 due [1] 12/14 during [2] 2/5 2/14	F face [2] 20/21 21/10 fact [4] 8/16 11/15 12/3 21/2 fairly [1] 5/24 Family [2] 19/1 21/4 far [2] 15/12 20/5 fee [64] fees [3] 3/21 6/5 19/4 Fifth [2] 23/9 23/23 figure [1] 21/11 file [4] 6/9 14/4 18/19 18/20 filed [11] 3/23 4/2 4/2 6/2 14/3 14/10 14/21 14/24 15/1 15/4 15/15 filing [1] 12/24 final [2] 16/17 19/1 finally [1] 6/24 finding [1] 19/3 first [8] 4/6 5/18 5/20 6/3 15/21 17/7 20/2 21/11 fits [1] 9/6 foregoing [1] 23/10 foreseeing [1] 8/13 Form [1] 7/5 former [1] 11/12 forth [1] 8/18 found [1] 21/4 four [4] 4/4 6/13 17/9 17/15 fourth [2] 5/24 7/20 front [1] 5/19 fall [2] 19/5 19/5 farther [3] 6/15 6/22 23/16 future [1] 13/9	I TH [8] 5/25 14/15 15/19 21/17 21/18 21/20 21/24 22/4 I'm [13] 4/12 4/21 8/2 9/3 9/4 10/17 12/23 12/23 13/16 14/8 15/16 17/4 20/13 important [1] 11/17 included [2] 18/21 20/11 initial [7] 4/1 4/25 6/10 7/12 10/25 14/11 16/2 initially [1] 14/21 initiate [1] 14/19 initiated [3] 3/18 6/1 14/17 initiating [1] 6/25 intend [1] 3/16 intent [3] 17/24 18/5 18/9 interest [1] 23/17 introduced [2] 2/13 23/12 invite [1] 22/2 is [114] issue [5] 5/18 9/14 11/22 12/3 12/15 issues [8] 5/13 6/7 9/21 9/23 10/25 19/5 11/8 12/4 it [62] its [5] 6/14 17/24 20/2 20/21 21/10 itself [5] 5/11 6/20 13/25 17/10 18/4
E	e-mail [4] 15/8 16/4 16/10 16/11 e-mailed [1] 15/10 easy [2] 15/21 16/12 effect [3] 5/3 9/8 10/2 either [2] 6/14 14/6 END [1] 22/25 enforce [1] 14/12 entered [1] 17/21	G get [11] 6/8 9/25 13/12 13/17 14/4 17/8 17/13 18/7 19/13 20/9 21/24 gets [2] 10/11 20/5 give [1] 11/25 given [1] 13/23 go [8] 5/7 6/11 10/8 10/17 14/15 15/9 19/14 21/10 goes [1] 11/21 going [11] 5/13 8/14 11/11 11/13 11/16 11/16 11/17 12/25 13/8 20/1 20/3 gone [1] 17/18 good [1] 12/24 got [1] 14/7 granted [1] 3/25 great [1] 21/5 grievance [1] 12/25 grievances [1] 22/6 grounds [3] 4/5 8/9 8/12 guess [4] 7/23 12/2 12/22 14/8	J January [3] 1/9 3/1 23/15 Jean [2] 1/7 3/18 job [1] 21/5 Judge [3] 1/14 19/2 21/4 Judicial [1] 23/9 jurisdiction [5] 18/16 18/16 19/16 19/23 20/17

J	Mr. Dodson [1] 21/6 Mr. Dodson's [1] 3/4 Mr. Tetterton [1] 15/7 Ms. [16] 6/1 6/20 6/25 11/1 11/12 14/2 14/5 14/9 14/10 14/14 15/2 15/3 15/9 20/7 21/1 21/3	paying [1] 19/14 perform [2] 11/24 21/3 perpendicular [1] 13/8 pertaining [1] 9/6 plain [3] 16/8 20/21 21/9 Plaintiff [3] 1/5 1/18 11/3 PLEAS [2] 1/1 23/14 point [8] 4/17 5/2 5/24 5/25 7/20 13/9 14/23 15/6 pointed [1] 10/22 position [2] 9/2 20/15 practices [2] 11/23 13/15 practicing [1] 19/8 prepared [1] 19/8 preserved [1] 10/23 prevent [2] 20/4 20/7 prior [2] 5/14 12/15 problem [1] 13/10 Procedure [1] 4/7 procedures [1] 8/17 proceedings [15] 2/5 2/14 3/2 22/10 23/12 process [2] 13/1 14/7 professional [1] 19/7 prominent [1] 5/19 promise [1] 3/14 promised [1] 3/11 proper [1] 6/23 properly [1] 12/16 provided [2] 6/19 6/21 provision [1] 17/13 purpose [1] 8/21 put [1] 18/17 puts [1] 18/18
K	Ms. Derrick [11] 6/1 11/1 14/2 14/9 14/10 14/14 15/2 15/3 15/9 20/7 21/1 Ms. Derrick's [2] 6/25 11/12 Ms. Moore [3] 6/20 14/5 21/3 Mulligan [1] 6/9 my [15] 3/14 4/4 4/17 4/21 5/2 5/10 5/24 6/20 7/16 7/23 12/7 14/5 14/23 14/24 19/25	
L	N	
law [13] 3/11 5/7 5/9 7/21 9/9 9/13 9/15 17/8 17/14 18/6 19/8 20/20 21/7 lawsuit [4] 6/1 6/25 7/1 15/7 lawyer [8] 3/19 16/4 17/22 17/25 18/18 19/13 19/14 22/6 lawyer-client [2] 17/22 22/6 least [1] 6/15 leave [1] 20/3 legal [5] 10/7 11/7 11/9 13/13 13/16 legislation [1] 18/7 legislative [2] 18/5 18/8 legislature [1] 17/24 let [3] 7/4 13/19 14/8 letter [1] 15/8 letters [1] 5/19 Lexington [1] 3/19 like [5] 5/16 8/24 8/24 8/25 9/1 limited [3] 8/10 8/12 8/21 lines [1] 15/9 Lisa [1] 1/4 litigate [2] 12/4 12/4 litigation [1] 19/5 little [1] 14/8 locations [1] 16/19 look [9] 8/17 9/4 14/15 17/15 18/10 21/17 21/18 21/20 22/4 looking [1] 9/3 looks [1] 8/25 lot [1] 12/1 low [1] 19/11	neither [1] 23/16 never [4] 14/6 14/24 14/25 15/3 next [1] 7/23 no [5] 2/4 2/13 3/11 7/19 18/11 none [2] 7/16 10/8 Nopa [1] 6/10 not [37] nothing [3] 4/13 15/12 15/15 notice [2] 4/23 16/6 novelty [1] 11/7 now [6] 7/22 15/14 17/6 18/17 18/25 19/13 Number [1] 6/16 numerous [2] 3/20 6/3	
	O	
	obligation [1] 21/3 obtained [1] 19/9 obvious [1] 5/25 Official [2] 1/25 23/8 offset [1] 13/17 Okay [3] 9/13 12/8 15/17 one [13] 3/20 6/16 8/11 9/14 9/15 11/10 11/12 12/4 12/5 12/6 12/7 19/20 20/15 only [6] 9/21 9/24 10/25 16/23 18/6 18/9 open [1] 20/4 operates [1] 8/19 order [10] 6/16 9/19 10/9 10/10 10/22 11/19 12/15 16/17 19/1 20/3 original [5] 3/24 6/2 11/2 12/16 12/20 other [12] 4/23 11/21 12/25 13/23 16/2 16/7 16/13 17/19 20/3 21/12 21/13 21/13 our [2] 5/21 9/2 out [10] 4/7 10/12 10/22 11/2 16/17 16/23 17/16 19/14 21/11 21/20 over [7] 3/19 6/9 11/14 11/23 15/15 17/18 21/21 over-biller [1] 11/14 over-billing [1] 11/23 overlap [2] 12/1 13/9 Overpayment [1] 18/24	
M	P	
made [2] 6/6 19/3 mail [5] 15/8 16/3 16/4 16/10 16/11 mailed [1] 15/10 make [3] 4/17 5/24 5/25 malpractice [3] 10/7 13/13 13/16 March [1] 23/19 may [6] 4/22 5/4 10/3 13/7 14/18 16/6 Maybe [1] 10/18 McCURDY [3] 1/24 23/8 23/21 23/23 me [6] 7/4 10/6 13/19 14/8 15/8 17/12 mean [11] 8/9 10/20 12/1 12/6 12/13 14/22 14/24 15/12 17/12 18/17 21/12 marital [1] 7/11 mess [1] 13/18 minutes [1] 3/12 misread [1] 20/14 misreading [2] 16/5 16/11 money [3] 13/12 15/1 15/5 Moore [4] 1/4 6/20 14/5 21/3 more [2] 3/11 19/20 motion [11] 3/5 3/23 3/25 4/3 4/4 4/15 8/10 5/10 6/15 8/19 20/1 Mr. [3] 3/4 15/7 20/6	p.m. [2] 3/3 22/11 page [1] 5/20 paid [2] 15/2 15/3 panel [1] 5/12 papers [1] 14/4 Paragraph [3] 16/25 17/3 17/4 paragraphs [1] 16/15 paralegals [1] 11/12 parallel [3] 13/1 13/4 13/7 part [5] 3/23 11/6 15/21 16/12 20/13 particular [1] 18/22 parties [8] 4/18 4/23 5/13 8/22 16/7 16/19 17/22 20/25 party [1] 23/17 pay [4] 9/25 10/1 14/13 19/12	quacks [1] 8/24 quagmire [1] 13/18 quality [2] 11/7 11/9 quantum [1] 7/11 question [3] 7/23 8/15 20/15 questions [2] 9/4 13/17 quick [1] 20/15 quoted [1] 5/9
		R
		rate [1] 19/10 read [4] 14/14 16/1 16/14 21/21 reading [1] 4/21 reads [2] 11/19 14/1 really [2] 8/15 21/20 reasonable [1] 19/6 reasonableness [1] 11/6 reasons [2] 5/17 6/13 recall [1] 3/17 recognizing [1] 12/18 reconsideration [3] 4/3 4/4 5/10 RECORD [2] 1/6 23/11 refers [1] 17/6 regarding [1] 9/23 regular [1] 16/3 relationship [1] 17/21 relative [1] 23/13 relied [2] 21/1 21/2 remain [1] 12/18 remains [2] 12/21 19/23 remedy [1] 18/11 remember [1] 7/8 Reporter [3] 1/25 13/1 23/8 23/23 represents [1] 11/14 research [1] 21/19 Resolution [24] respect [1] 12/14

R results [1] 19/9 rewrite [6] 17/8 17/14 18/6 18/7 20/20 21/7 right [17] 3/16 4/21 7/10 7/13 7/19 10/4 10/24 12/22 13/19 14/14 15/14 15/20 16/8 21/8 21/15 21/17 22/8 ROBERT [1] 1/18 RPR [3] 1/24 23/21 23/23 rule [19] 4/6 4/8 4/8 4/13 4/14 4/20 4/20 4/21 8/18 9/7 14/1 14/1 14/1 14/14 15/22 15/24 16/1 20/13 21/22 Rule 10 [2] 4/8 4/14 Rule 416 [5] 4/6 4/8 4/20 8/18 14/1 ruled [1] 19/25 rules [6] 4/7 6/20 6/22 9/4 9/5 9/11 ruining [1] 6/14 rumor [1] 13/1	stuff [1] 10/8 subject [2] 7/25 9/11 submit [1] 20/22 submitted [1] 17/1 such [3] 4/22 16/5 17/22 sudden [1] 19/13 sued [3] 3/19 3/20 6/5 suit [3] 7/7 7/8 10/18 summons [1] 6/2 supposed [2] 9/25 17/2 sure [3] 8/2 10/18 13/16	Uniform [8] 5/6 5/21 6/23 9/5 17/19 18/1 20/18 22/2 up [2] 8/20 11/11 use [1] 5/4
S S.C. [2] 19/18 19/21 S.E. [2] 19/19 19/21 s/Deborah [1] 23/21 said [5] 9/23 15/11 17/24 19/4 20/3 same [2] 9/8 12/4 say [5] 4/13 6/10 15/19 17/17 18/3 saying [18] 7/24 12/23 13/20 14/10 15/1 15/5 15/22 17/6 says [14] 4/21 9/10 9/19 10/16 13/11 13/13 15/24 16/9 16/25 17/3 18/19 19/22 20/14 20/22 second [2] 4/17 5/21 section [2] 9/7 16/8 see [2] 15/19 20/9 send [5] 3/23 3/25 4/15 13/20 17/1 sense [1] 10/21 sent [5] 9/22 15/7 16/3 16/21 17/2 separate [1] 16/15 served [14] 3/21 4/23 14/5 16/7 services [4] 9/25 11/7 11/9 21/3 set [2] 8/18 8/20 sets [1] 4/7 settling [1] 8/21 seven [1] 3/12 shall [3] 16/3 17/23 18/20 she [59] should [2] 17/4 21/10 side [1] 19/11 sir [2] 3/9 15/20 sits [1] 15/14 sizeable [1] 15/3 snooty [2] 4/13 6/17 so [23] 4/24 5/7 6/5 6/13 7/13 8/13 11/9 11/25 12/2 14/6 14/18 14/25 15/12 16/11 17/3 17/19 18/5 18/14 20/4 20/24 21/6 solid [1] 19/1 some [9] 4/19 7/1 12/25 13/9 13/9 13/12 15/6 16/16 21/19 someone [1] 12/24 something [5] 10/2 10/5 13/20 15/8 21/25 sorry [2] 17/4 20/13 sart [5] 4/19 7/1 8/13 10/11 10/12 SOUTH [7] 1/1 1/9 5/6 16/21 23/4 23/9 23/14 speaks [1] 17/10 specifically [5] 4/14 4/20 9/6 17/20 22/5 spelled [2] 16/17 16/23 spells [1] 17/16 stamped [1] 5/20 standard [1] 19/7 STATE [3] 1/1 23/4 23/9 still [2] 10/23 10/24	T take [6] 3/11 6/11 12/15 21/17 21/20 22/4 takenway [1] 6/9 takes [1] 9/8 talked [1] 11/12 talks [1] 4/8 testify [1] 11/13 testimony [1] 11/17 TEATERTON [2] 1/19 15/7 than [2] 3/11 13/23 Thank [7] 3/10 7/3 15/18 21/16 22/7 22/8 22/9 that [116] That's [1] 7/6 their [1] 5/23 there [6] 8/4 8/12 10/1 10/21 17/1 17/2 themselves [1] 8/10 then [8] 6/10 6/23 6/24 12/25 13/12 14/4 17/17 21/11 there [17] 5/12 7/11 9/9 11/4 12/1 13/8 15/12 15/15 15/15 16/8 16/20 16/23 17/2 18/11 19/1 21/19 21/20 these [6] 2/5 2/14 9/4 20/3 21/12 21/13 they [6] 8/5 13/1 13/2 13/6 13/7 20/22 thing [2] 10/12 16/13 things [1] 11/10 think [16] 7/4 7/10 7/11 8/17 10/1 10/15 12/9 12/23 13/8 13/18 14/13 14/17 15/6 19/25 20/16 21/10 third [1] 5/2 this [53] those [9] 6/13 8/9 10/23 10/25 11/5 11/16 11/25 14/4 18/16 though [1] 19/10 three [4] 16/16 18/25 19/12 21/1 through [3] 9/16 12/25 18/2 time [2] 6/3 19/20 timely [1] 4/2 times [1] 6/4 told [1] 10/6 tracks [2] 13/7 13/8 trade [2] 11/22 13/15 TRANSCRIPT [3] 1/6 22/25 23/11 trial [4] 10/24 19/5 20/6 23/12 tried [1] 19/9 true [1] 23/11 trying [11] 4/12 6/17 7/21 12/23 17/7 17/13 17/17 18/2 18/6 18/7 19/13 two [5] 12/1 16/15 16/18 19/5 20/25 typed [1] 5/19	W waits [1] 19/12 waiver [1] 7/2 walks [1] 8/24 want [6] 4/11 6/11 6/11 15/1 15/5 19/14 wanted [1] 6/7 wants [1] 20/19 was [22] 3/18 3/18 3/22 7/8 7/11 7/12 9/24 9/25 15/6 16/17 16/19 16/20 18/5 18/9 19/1 19/4 19/8 19/8 19/10 21/2 21/5 21/6 way [3] 9/14 9/15 14/1 we [11] 3/21 5/7 6/13 11/11 14/6 15/11 15/14 16/25 17/8 17/18 20/3 we'll [1] 21/11 we're [1] 11/11 well [13] 8/7 8/9 9/18 10/14 10/20 11/16 12/20 13/2 13/6 18/3 19/8 19/9 20/19 went [1] 18/25 were [5] 2/4 2/13 4/25 9/22 22/10 what [9] 5/11 9/2 10/15 12/22 13/23 15/19 15/24 18/2 20/14 when [3] 4/13 8/17 9/4 where [5] 3/20 6/5 8/5 8/14 13/1 WHEREUPON [4] 2/4 2/13 3/2 22/10 whether [3] 8/15 9/15 12/15 which [8] 4/7 5/9 16/15 19/2 19/22 20/21 21/3 22/5 while [1] 21/19 white [2] 16/9 17/20 who [2] 3/19 19/6 whom [1] 20/25 why [4] 6/20 6/24 7/20 10/1 will [3] 3/17 15/21 20/22 WILLIAM [1] 17/9 withdraw [4] 4/24 6/21 15/23 15/24 withdrawn [3] 4/22 16/6 16/11 withdrew [1] 13/21 witnesses [1] 2/4 word [3] 4/12 5/4 5/5 work [3] 11/15 11/19 11/23 worked [3] 11/8 11/10 11/15 world [1] 20/9 would [17] 3/11 4/17 5/24 6/13 6/23 7/14 7/16 9/11 10/8 12/3 12/18 12/22 14/4 14/4 15/9 16/19 16/20 written [9] 4/22 4/22 6/16 9/17 15/23 16/6 16/6 16/9 16/10 wrong [1] 14/18
	U unambiguous [1] 20/21 unappealed [3] 19/2 19/2 21/6 under [8] 4/6 5/21 6/23 9/17 10/9 10/10 10/16 21/2 underpaid [1] 21/5 underpayment [1] 18/24 understand [4] 9/7 9/20 10/11 12/13 unfair [2] 11/21 13/15	Y years [5] 16/16 19/1 19/7 19/13 21/2 yes [7] 3/9 8/5 9/18 10/3 12/7 14/17 15/20 yet [1] 18/4 you [35] your [31]

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF KERSHAW

Jean P. Derrick

Plaintiff

vs.

Lisa C. Moore

Defendant

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

CASE NO.: 2014-CP-28-00940

MOTION AND ORDER INFORMATION
FORM AND COVERSHEET

2015 APR 28 PM 4:10

CLERK OF COURT
KERSHAW COUNTY, S.C.

Plaintiff's Attorney:

William S. Tetterton, Bar No. 5509

Address:

P.O. Box 530, Camden, SC 29021

Phone: 803-432-1496 Fax 803-432-1498

E-mail: wstmail@bellsouth.net Other:

Defendant's Attorney:

Robert D. Dodson, Bar No. 16208

Address:

1722 Main St., Ste. 200, Columbia, SC 29201

Phone: 803-252-2600 Fax 803-771-2259

E-mail: rdodson@rdodsonlaw.com Other:

☒ MOTION HEARING REQUESTED (attach written motion and complete SECTIONS I and III)

☐ FORM MOTION, NO HEARING REQUESTED (complete SECTIONS II and III)

☐ PROPOSED ORDER/CONSENT ORDER (complete SECTIONS II and III)

SECTION I: Hearing Information

Nature of Motion: Motion to Compel

Estimated Time Needed: 30 Minutes

Court Reporter Needed: ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION II: Motion/Order Type

☒ Written motion attached

☐ Form Motion/Order

I hereby move for relief or action by the court as set forth in the attached proposed order.

Signature of Attorney for ☒ Plaintiff / ☐ Defendant

April 28, 2015

Date submitted

SECTION III: Motion Fee

☒ PAID - AMOUNT: \$

☐ EXEMPT

(check reason)

☐ Rule to Show Cause in Child or Spousal Support

☐ Domestic Abuse or Abuse and Neglect

☐ Indigent Status ☐ State Agency v. Indigent Party

☐ Sexually Violent Predator Act ☐ Post-Conviction Relief

☐ Motion for Stay in Bankruptcy

☐ Motion for Publication ☐ Motion for Execution (Rule 69, SCRPC)

☐ Proposed order submitted at request of the court, or,

reduced to writing from motion made in open court per judge's instructions

Name of Court Reporter:

☐ Other:

JUDGE'S SECTION

☐ Motion Fee to be paid upon filing of the attached order.

☐ Other:

JUDGE CODE

Date:

CLERK'S VERIFICATION

Collected by: Date Filed:

☐ MOTION FEE COLLECTED: \$

☐ CONTESTED - AMOUNT DUE: \$

SCCA 233 (11/2003)

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

Jean P. Derrick,)

Plaintiff,)

v.)

Lisa C. Moore,)

Defendant.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Civil Action No.: 2014-CP-28-940

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
TO COMPEL

FILED FOR RECORD
APR 28 PM 4:15
CLERK OF COURT
KERSHAW COUNTY, SC

TO: ROBERT D. DODSON AND THE DEFENDANT ABOVE NAMED

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Plaintiff by and through her undersigned counsel, will move before the Court ten (10) days after filing this Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel or as soon thereafter as may be scheduled by the Court, for an Order compelling the Defendant to submit this fee dispute to the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar.

The motion is based upon the following:

1. The Defendant retained the Plaintiff to represent her in a highly litigious domestic dispute with her ex-husband which ended in a Final Order of the Family Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit.
2. The Defendant signed a fee agreement with the Plaintiff providing inter alia, "ANY DISPUTE CONCERNING THE FEE DUE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY THE DISSATISFIED PARTY FOR A FULL FINAL RESOLUTION TO THE RESOLUTION FEE DISPUTES BOARD OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA BAR, PURSUANT TO RULE 416 OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA APPELLATE COURT RULES," paragraph 7 at page 2; "Any dispute concerning the fee

due pursuant to this contract shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full, final resolution to the Resolution Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar, pursuant to Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules," paragraph 8 at page 3 (Exhibit A).

3. The Defendant in her Answer to the Plaintiff's Complaint, has raised the issue as to whether the Plaintiff's fees were fair and proper, further alleging a genuine difference as to the fair and proper amount.
4. Further, the Defendant in her Answer alleges "The alleged contract at issue... any dispute concerning the fee due pursuant to the agreement shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full, final resolution to the Resolution Fee Disputes Board of the South Bar."
5. Plaintiff's Counsel certifies that prior to filing this motion, the Defendant's attorney had been given the opportunity in a good faith attempt to submit this matter to the Resolution Fee Dispute Board of the South Carolina Bar. To date, Defendant's counsel has not responded to this request.

Respectfully submitted,



William S. Tetterton
Tetterton Law Firm, LLC
Attorney for Plaintiff
608 Lafayette Ave (29020)
P.O. Box 530
Camden, SC 29021
803-432-1496 Phone
803-432-1498 Fax
wstmail@bellsouth.net

April 28th, 2015

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF LEXINGTON) FEE AGREEMENT

This Agreement entered into by and between Lisa C. Moore, hereinafter referred to as "Client", and JEAN P. DERRICK, Esquire, hereinafter referred to as "Attorney".

WITNESSETH:

1. Matter: The Client hereby employs and retains the Attorney to represent her with respect to proceedings in the Family Court for the County of Kershaw.
2. Authority: The Client hereby grants to Attorney full power and authority to do and perform all acts on the Client's part which are necessary and appropriate to such representation.
3. Costs: The Attorney is authorized to pay or incur liability for all costs and expenses which the Attorney may deem necessary and proper in the representation of the Client. The Client agrees to pay Attorney monthly upon receipt of billing for all costs and expenses so paid or incurred during the preceding month. Client agrees to pay costs and expenses in advance should the Attorney be able to anticipate incurring same and give Client adequate notice thereof. The Client agrees to pay all fees that may be assessed against him/her for a Guardian or Counsel ad litem appointed to represent minor(s) in this case.
4. Fees: The Client also agrees to pay the Attorney as compensation for professional services to be rendered a reasonable fee in the amount and under the terms herein set forth:
 - a. The Client is solely responsible for the payment of the fee. The Attorney has made no representation or warranties concerning either the agreement by the adverse party or a court award compelling the adverse party to pay Attorney's fees in this matter. Should payment be made by the adverse party, that money will be passed on to the Client or applied to the Client's bill as appropriate.
 - b. The Client will be charged for all time devoted exclusively to be Client's case, including the initial interview. Time records are maintained to substantiate all time billed to the Client's case.
 - c. The Client must pay a NON-REFUNDABLE retainer in an amount to be fixed by the Attorney taking into


- consideration the estimated difficulty of the case. In this case, the retainer is \$5,000.
- d. Time will be billed at the rate of \$300.00 an hour against this retainer. When and if this retainer is used in full, then monthly bills will be sent, as stated in sub-paragraph (e).
- e. As the case progresses, bills based upon the time involved will be submitted periodically for interim payment. Any such bill must be paid promptly and in full within fifteen (15) days of the date of the bill. The periodic billing serves the convenience of the client from accruing large amounts of fees and serves to inform the Client of the service performed in this case. The interim billing shall be at the rate of \$300.00 per hour.
5. Best Efforts: The Attorney agrees to utilize her best efforts in the representation of the Client, to advise the Client in advance before taking any action that might seriously affect his/her interest, and to keep the Client fully informed as to all significant developments in the case. The Attorney has made no representation or warranty concerning the outcome of the case.
6. Course of Representation: It is understood that this Agreement covers legal representation of the Client by the Attorney only through trial or other pre-trial disposition of the case, and specifically does not include Appeal, Motion for New Trial, Motion for Rehearing, Modification of any Final Judgment or other post-trial proceedings and the like.
7. Security for Fees and Expenses and Collection Procedures: The Attorney is hereby granted a lien for his fees, costs, and expenses on any property awarded the client pursuant to a settlement or judgment or both, and such lien is to continue in the event the Attorney is discharged. The Attorney shall be entitled to the costs and expenses of any outstanding balance due in the event of default in payment by the Client, including a reasonable Attorney fee and court costs. In the event of such default, the outstanding balance of fees and costs shall accrue interest at the legal rate commencing forty-five (45) days after the date of the final billing. ANY DISPUTE CONCERNING THE FEE DUE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY THE DISSATISFIED PARTY FOR A FULL, FINAL RESOLUTION TO THE RESOLUTION FEE DISPUTES BOARD OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA BAR, PURSUANT TO RULE 416 OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA APPELLATE COURT RULES.
8. Charging Lien: To secure payment by me to Jean P. Derrick of all expenses, court costs and attorneys fees I am obligated to pay under this retainer agreement, I hereby grant to Jean P.

Derrick a charging lien applicable to any and all recoveries on my claims or causes of action, whether by settlement, collection of a judgment, or otherwise. I understand that I have a right to discharge my lawyer for cause or without cause. In the event I decide to discharge Jean P. Derrick without cause, I agree to pay reasonable compensation to her for the work done up to the time of discharge, and I agree that Jean P. Derrick's charging lien may be used to protect Jean P. Derrick's right to receive reasonable compensation in that event. Any dispute concerning the fee due pursuant to this contract shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full, final resolution to the Resolution Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar, pursuant to Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.

9. When Effective: This Agreement is effective when signed by the Client and returned and payment of the retainer fee are received at the office of the Attorney at 205 West Main Street, P.O. Box 929, Lexington, SC 29072.

 4-19-2011

LISA C. MOORE, Client Date

 _____
JEAN P. DERRICK, Esquire Date

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

Jean P. Derrick,)

Plaintiff,)

v.)

Lisa C. Moore,)

Defendant.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Civil Action No.: 2014-CP-28-940

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Robin L. Wilson, being first duly sworn, state that I am an employee of Tetterton Law Firm, LLC, attorney for the Plaintiffs in the above captioned matter. I state that on

4/28/15, I mailed first class via U.S. Postal Service with proper postage affixed, a

Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel in the above captioned matter to the following, to wit:

Robert D. Dodson
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main St., Ste. 200
Columbia, S.C. 29201


Robin L. Wilson

SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS

28th day of April, 2015.



Notary Public for South Carolina

My Commission Expires: 9/30/23

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF KERSHAW

JEAN P. DERRICK,

Plaintiff,

VS.

LISA C. MOORE,

Defendant.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

CASE NO.: 2014-CP-28-00940

**MOTION AND ORDER INFORMATION
FORM AND COVERSHEET**

FILED FOR RECD
CLERK OF COURT
KERSHAW COUNTY, S.C.
2015 DEC 16 AM 11:55

Plaintiff's Attorney:
William Tetterton, Bar No. _____
Address:
608 Lafayette Avenue, Camden, SC 29021
Phone: (803) 432-1496 Fax _____
E-mail: _____ Other: _____

Defendant's Attorney:
Robert Dodson, Bar No. 16205
Address:
1722 Main Street, Suite 200, Columbia, SC 29201
Phone: 803.252.2600 Fax 803.771.2259
E-mail: rdodson@rdodsonlaw.com Other: _____

- ☒ MOTION HEARING REQUESTED (attach written motion and complete SECTIONS I and III)
☐ FORM MOTION, NO HEARING REQUESTED (complete SECTIONS II and III)
☐ PROPOSED ORDER/CONSENT ORDER (complete SECTIONS II and III)

SECTION I: Hearing Information

Nature of Motion: Motion for Reconsideration

Estimated Time Needed: 15

Court Reporter Needed: ☒ YES / ☐ NO

SECTION II: Motion/Order Type

- ☐ Written motion attached
☐ Form Motion/Order

I hereby move for relief or action by the court as set forth in the attached proposed order.

Signature of Attorney for ☐ Plaintiff / ☐ Defendant

Date submitted: 12/14/15

SECTION III: Motion Fee

☒ PAID - AMOUNT: \$

☐ EXEMPT:

(check reason)

- ☐ Rule to Show Cause in Child or Spousal Support
☐ Domestic Abuse or Abuse and Neglect
☐ Indigent Status ☐ State Agency v. Indigent Party
☐ Sexually Violent Predator Act ☐ Post-Conviction Relief
☐ Motion for Stay in Bankruptcy
☐ Motion for Publication ☐ Motion for Execution (Rule 69, SCRCP)
☐ Proposed order submitted at request of the court or, reduced to writing from motion made in open court per judge's instructions
Name of Court Reporter: _____
☐ Other: _____

JUDGE'S SECTION

☐ Motion Fee to be paid upon filing of the attached order.

☐ Other: _____

JUDGE CODE _____

Date: _____

CLERK'S VERIFICATION

Collected by: _____ Date Filed: _____

☐ MOTION FEE COLLECTED: \$ _____

☐ CONTESTED - AMOUNT DUE: \$ _____

SCCA 233 (11/2003)

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)

COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

Jean P. Derrick,)

Plaintiff,)

vs.)

Lisa C. Moore,)

Defendant.)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Docket No.: 2014-CP-28-940

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

FILED FOR RECORD
2015 DEC 16 AM 11:53
CLERK OF COURT
KERSHAW COUNTY, S.C.

TO: THE HONORABLE DEANDREA G. BENJAMIN, SOUTH CAROLINA
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEY, WILLIAM
TETTERTON, ESQUIRE.

Defendant respectfully moves the Court for an Order altering or amending the Court's prior Order dated December 4, 2015. This Order was received by Defense Counsel via U.S. Mail on December 8, 2015. This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 59(e), other applicable court rules, case law and such other authority as may be relevant. The legal and factual basis for the Motion is set forth below.

The Plaintiff to this lawsuit is a lawyer suing her client for additional attorney's fees she claims she is owed. The Plaintiff moved the Court for an order compelling Defendant to submit the claim to the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar (hereinafter Fee Disputes Board). This Court's Order dated December 4, 2015 granted Plaintiff's Motion on the grounds that: "Because the Defendant disputes the fee for numerous alleged reasons, this Court finds that it is proper to take these matters up with the Resolution Fee Dispute Board pursuant to the signed contract."


Plaintiff moves that the Court amend and/or clarify its Order because Rule 10 of SCRAP Rule 416 which creates the Fee Disputes Board mandates that the process be voluntary and each party must consent to having the dispute resolved by the Fee Disputes Board. Even if the fee agreement/contract may be viewed by this Court as the Defendant's consent, Rule 10 of the Fee Disputes Board's rules provides that "consent may be withdrawn..." Defendant seeks clarification and/or amendment from the Court's December 4, 2015 Order as to why she cannot withdraw any consent she may have previously given through the fee agreement/contract at issue. More specifically and with all due respect to this Honorable Court, Defendant should not be compelled to participate in the Fee Disputes Board's process, as this process was designed to be a voluntary process which should not be compelled by this Court.

Defendant also moves the Court for an order which clarifies and/or alters or amends the Court's December 4, 2015 Order because the Court's Order, in effect, would compel mandatory arbitration and the contract at issue does not comply with the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act (S.C. Code Ann § 15-48-et. seq.) such that arbitration can be compelled or mandated by the Court. The term "arbitration" is not defined under the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act (hereinafter SCUAA). Black's Law Dictionary defines arbitration as: "A process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders a decision after a hearing at which both parties have the opportunity to be heard." A careful review and analysis of SCRAP Rule 416 shows that it meets the common law definition of arbitration. However, the fee agreement/contract at issue here does not comply the SCUAA for at least two reasons. First, the fee agreement/contract does not state that it is subject arbitration "in underlined capital

letters, or rubber-stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract..." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(a). Just as importantly, arbitration cannot be compelled because the contract/fee agreement is "that of lawyer-client" and is excluded from mandatory arbitration pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(c). With all due respect to the Honorable Court, the Court's Order fails to explain or clarify why the process it is compelling the Defendant to participate in is anything but arbitration and the Order fails to explain why arbitration can be compelled given the wording of the SCUAA.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant seeks an Order from this Court altering or amending its previous Order dated December 4, 2015 such that Plaintiff's Motion which is the subject of Order is denied. In the alternative, Defendant seeks an Order from this Court altering or amending its previous Order as outlined more fully above.

Respectfully submitted,



Robert D. Dodson, Esquire
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, SC 29201
Phone: (803) 252-2600
Fax: (803) 771-2259
Attorney for Defendant

Columbia, South Carolina
December 14, 2015

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF KERSHAW

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Jean P. Derrick,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Lisa C. Moore,

Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 2014-CP-28-940


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Lindsay H. V. Protopapas, paralegal to the Law Office of Robert Dodson, P.A., do hereby certify that I have caused the foregoing **MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION** to be served upon the following parties at the following addresses via United States Postal Service, Postage Pre-Paid, and electronic mail:

The Honorable DeAndrea G. Benjamin
South Carolina Circuit Court Judge
PO Box 192
Columbia, SC 29202

William S. Tetterton, Esquire
Tetterton Law Firm, LLC
608 Lafayette Avenue (29020)
PO Box 530
Camden, SC 29021


Lindsay H.V. Protopapas


This 14th Day of December, 2015
Columbia, South Carolina

TETTERTON LAW FIRM, LLC

608 LAFAYETTE AVENUE (29020)
P.O. BOX 530
CAMDEN, SOUTH CAROLINA 29021

WILLIAM S. TETTERTON
wstmail@bellsouth.net

RECEIVED

JUL 20 2015

TELEPHONE: 803-432-1496
FACSIMILE: 803-432-1498

July 15, 2015

The Honorable DeAndrea Benjamin
Fifth Judicial Circuit
P.O. Box 192
Columbia, SC 29202

Re: Derrick v. Moore
Civil Action No.: 2014-CP-28-940

Dear Judge Benjamin:

In yesterday's argument before you on my motion to compel the parties to submit the dispute to the Resolution of Fee Dispute Board for the South Carolina Bar, Mr. Dodson argued that this matter was governed by §15-48-10, and I of course said that statute did not apply. You advised Mr. Dodson and me that you were going to review that particular statute. I would invite your attention to section (b)(3) of that statute which is an exception for "a pre-agreement entered into when the relationship of the contracting parties is such that of lawyer client."

By copy of this letter, I am advising Mr. Dodson of my communication with the Court.

I certainly appreciate your indulgence.

Sincerely,



William S. Tetterton

WST/rly

cc: Robert Dodson

Law Offices of
ROBERT DODSON, P.A.

1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Robert D. Dodson,
Esquire
Attorney at Law
Also Licensed in N.C.



Telephone: 803.252.2600
Facsimile: 803.771.2259

July 20, 2015

The Honorable DeAndrea Benjamin
Fifth Judicial Circuit
Post Office Box 192
Columbia, South Carolina 29202

RE: Jean P. Derrick v. Lisa C. Moore
Civil Action No.: 2014-CP-28-940

Dear Judge Benjamin:

Ordinarily I do not write the Court to make legal arguments following a motions hearing. However, since opposing counsel wrote you first, I felt compelled to respond especially since Mr. Tetterton made my point for me (apparently without even recognizing it). I will explain.

In his letter to you dated July 15, 2015 Mr. Tetterton writes that he "would invite your attention to section (b)(3) of that statute [the Uniform Arbitration Act] which is an exception for 'a pre-agreement entered into when the relationship of the contracting parties is such that of lawyer-client.'" That is exactly my point. A lawyer cannot preemptively compel a client to waive their constitutional right to a trial by jury by inserting some clause or provision into a fee agreement. That is what the Plaintiff in this case did when she inserted a clause in her fee agreement trying to compel her client to resolve disputes through the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board. As Your Honor is aware, the Fee Dispute Board is effectively an arbitration body established by the bar. However, a lawyer cannot force a client to participate in this venue and that is why the Court should deny the Motion to Compel filed by the Plaintiff.

Thank you. With kind regards, I am,

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature of Robert D. Dodson in dark ink, written over a horizontal line.

Robert D. Dodson

cc: William Tetterton, Esquire

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Civil Action No.: 2014-CP-28-940

Jean P. Derrick,

Plaintiff,

v.

Lisa C. Moore,

Defendant.


NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

TO: ROBERT D. DODSON, ATTORNEY AND THE DEFENDANT ABOVE NAMED

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and for purposes therein authorized, the Plaintiff, through her undersigned attorney, will take the deposition of Lisa C. Moore, for discovery purposes and/or use at trial on August 20, 2015, beginning at 10:00am before a duly authorized Notary Public or other authorized person at the offices of Tetterton Law Firm, LLC, 608 Lafayette Ave., Camden, South Carolina.

Attendance fees and mileage will be paid pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Said deposition shall continue from time to time until completed, including any adjournments thereof. You are invited to appear and to participate as you deem proper.


William S. Tetterton
Tetterton Law Firm, LLC
Attorney for Plaintiff
608 Lafayette Ave. (29020)
P.O. Box 530
Camden, SC 29021
803-432-1496 Phone
803-432-1498 Fax
wstmail@bellsouth.net

August 6 2015

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF KERSHAW)

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Civil Action No.: 2014-CP-28-940


Jean P. Derrick,
Plaintiff,


v.
Lisa C. Moore,
Defendant.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Robin L. Wilson, being first duly sworn, state that I am an employee of Teterton Law Firm, LLC, attorney for the Plaintiffs in the above captioned matter. I state that on 8/6/15, I mailed first class via U.S. Postal Service with proper postage affixed, a Notice of Deposition in the above captioned matter to the following, to wit:

Robert D. Dodson
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main St., Ste. 200
Columbia, S.C. 29201


Robin L. Wilson

SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS
6 day of August, 2015.

Notary Public for South Carolina
My Commission Expires: 2-25-20

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

DeAndrea Gist Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

RECEIVED

OCT 20 2016

SC Court of Appeals

Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Jean P. Derrick, ... Respondent,
v.
Lisa C. Moore, ... Appellant.

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

The undersigned hereby certifies that the Record on Appeal contains all materials proposed to be included by any of the parties and not any other material.

October 20, 2016



Robert D. Dodson
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
(803) 252-2600
Attorney for Appellant

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jean P. Derrick, Respondent,

v.

Lisa C. Moore, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Appeal From Kershaw County
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge,

Opinion No. 5618
Submitted September 19, 2018 – Filed January 23, 2019
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled April 24, 2019

AFFIRMED

Robert Daniel Dodson, of Law Offices of Robert
Dodson, PA, of Columbia, for Appellant.

William S. Tetterton, of Tetterton Law Firm, LLC, of
Camden, and Katherine Carruth Goode, of Winnsboro,
for Respondent.

LOCKEMY C.J.: This is an appeal from a circuit court order compelling Lisa Moore (Client) to resolve a fee dispute through the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar (the Board). Client argues (1) Jean Derrick (Attorney) waived the right to compel her appearance before the Board by first filing an action in the circuit court, (2) the circuit court lacked authority to compel

Client's appearance before the Board, and (3) Attorney's fee agreement is unenforceable under the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act.¹ We affirm.²

I. FACTS

Client retained Attorney in April 2011 to represent her in a family court matter in Kershaw County. At the onset of the representation, Client and Attorney signed a fee agreement, which provided: "ANY DISPUTE CONCERNING THE FEE DUE PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY THE DISSATISFIED PARTY FOR A FULL, FINAL RESOLUTION TO [THE BOARD], PURSUANT TO RULE 416 OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA APPELLATE COURT RULES."

Attorney's representation of Client continued from April 2011 through April 2014. On March 6, 2014, the family court entered a final order largely favoring Client and awarding her attorney's fees.³ The family court found the litigation was "relatively complex," Attorney had "obtained beneficial results across the board for [Client]," the number of hours expended on the case was reasonable, and Attorney's hourly fee was reasonable for a practitioner with thirty-six years' experience. Based on these findings, the family court ordered the opposing party to pay \$12,000 in attorney's fees—or roughly sixty percent of Client's \$20,509.55 legal bill—directly to Client by July 4, 2014. This order was not appealed.

Client's last payment to Attorney was in May 2014; however, there still remained an outstanding balance of \$10,484.40. Client did not object to the amount of the bill and repeatedly assured Attorney she would pay, although this evidently never happened. On October 6, 2014, Attorney commenced an action against Client in the circuit court to recover the unpaid fees.

Client answered, and by way of an affirmative defense, asserted Attorney had failed to comply with the provision of the fee agreement that required all fee disputes to be resolved by the Board. Client also submitted counterclaims for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, abuse of process, and conversion. Attorney answered and moved for an order compelling Client to submit the fee dispute to the Board pursuant to the fee agreement and Rule 416, SCACR.

¹ S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-48-10 through -240 (2005).

² We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

³ It is not disputed the outcome was favorable to Client.

At a hearing on Attorney's motion, Client contended the circuit court lacked the authority to send a fee dispute to the Board without her consent. Client also argued Attorney waived the right to have the fee dispute settled before the Board by electing instead to file a lawsuit in the circuit court.

On December 4, 2015, the circuit court granted Attorney's motion, concluding the fee agreement bound Client to adjudicate any fee disputes before the Board. Client filed a motion to reconsider, arguing (1) the circuit court lacked the authority to compel Client to arbitrate fee disputes through the Board, (2) Client did not consent to the Board's jurisdiction, (3) the fee agreement was unlawful under the Uniform Arbitration Act, and (4) Attorney waived the right to compel arbitration by filing a lawsuit in the circuit court. The court denied the motion by form order. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Rule 416, SCACR, vests the Board with jurisdiction to hear certain fee disputes. A fee dispute arises "when the parties to an employment agreement between lawyer and client have a genuine difference as to the fair and proper amount of a fee." Rule 416, SCACR, Rule 2. The "amount in dispute" is defined as the difference in the dollar amount between the attorney and client's determination of the appropriate fee. *Id.* But, "[a] dispute does not exist solely because of the failure of the client to pay a fee." *Id.*

Rule 2 of Rule 416, SCACR, further states that the Board may not undertake to resolve: "(1) a fee dispute involving an amount in dispute of \$50,000 or more; [or] (2) disputes over fees which by law must be determined or approved, as between lawyer and client, by a court, commission, judge, or other tribunal," Additionally, no fee disputes "may be filed more than three years after the dispute arose." *Id.*

Rule 9 of Rule 416, SCACR, provides:

(a) Any client-applicant for the services of the Board must consent in writing to be bound by a final decision of the Board. Thereafter, the attorney is also bound.

(b) No application will be accepted from an attorney unless accompanied by the client's written consent to jurisdiction and consent to be bound by the final decision of the Board. Thereafter, both parties are bound.

(c) Upon consent of the client-applicant to be bound by the final decision of the Board, exclusive jurisdiction over the fee dispute vests in the Board.

A. Waiver by Attorney

Client first argues Attorney waived the right to compel her appearance before the Board by electing instead to file a lawsuit in the circuit court. Client relies on the case of *Hyload, Inc. v. Pre-Engineered Prod., Inc.*, for the proposition that a party may waive a contractual right to arbitrate by bringing a suit on the underlying contract rather than the arbitration provision. 308 S.C. 277, 280, 417 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Ct. App. 1992). Attorney contends that under the fee agreement and Rule 416, SCACR, only a "dissatisfied party" could submit a fee dispute to the Board; because Attorney believed her fee to be fair and reasonable, she was not a dissatisfied party and therefore could not institute a fee dispute proceeding.

We find Attorney did not waive the right to resolve the fee dispute before the Board by filing a collection action in the circuit court. Neither the plain language of the fee agreement nor Rule 416, SCACR, mandates that a party must initiate a proceeding before the Board prior to filing an action to recover unpaid attorney's fees. The fee agreement provides that "any dispute concerning the fee due" shall be submitted by the "dissatisfied party" to the Board. There is no evidence suggesting Client was dissatisfied with Attorney's performance or that Client contested the amount or reasonableness of Attorney's bill prior to the present action. To the contrary, the family court's unappealed final order found Attorney's performance supported an award of attorney's fees. Only when Client disputed the amount of the bill and refused to pay, could Attorney become a "dissatisfied party" under the fee agreement.

Moreover, Rule 2 of Rule 416, SCACR, provides that a "fee dispute" does not exist until after the attorney and client "have a genuine difference as to the fair and proper amount of a fee." Nothing in Rule 416 precludes an attorney from filing a civil suit to collect a delinquent fee from a client who has not contested the validity of the fee; rather, Rule 2 of Rule 416 explicitly states "[a] dispute does not exist solely because of the failure of the client to pay a fee." Here, Client allegedly failed to pay her fee, but under Rule 416, that alone was insufficient to bring the matter before the Board. Importantly, Client did not actually dispute the fee until she filed an answer to Attorney's complaint and invoked the fee dispute provision as an affirmative defense.

Furthermore, we find *Hyload, Inc. v. Pre-Engineered Prod., Inc.* distinguishable from the present case.⁴ In that case, a distributor sued Hyload for breach of contract, but when Hyload sought to enforce an arbitration provision in the contract, the distributor complied by sending the arbitration documents to Hyload's office for its signature. 308 S.C. at 279, 417 S.E.2d at 623-24. After receiving the arbitration documents, however, Hyload refused to sign and instead commenced a claim and delivery action against the distributor under a different section of the agreement. *Id.* When the distributor reinstituted its original action for breach of contract, Hyload again asserted the breach of contract action was subject to the arbitration provision. *Id.* at 280, 417 S.E.2d at 624. This court held that under those facts, Hyload waived its contractual right to arbitrate by bringing a suit on the underlying contract rather than seeking to enforce the arbitration provision. *Id.*

Additionally, both *Hyload* and subsequent cases have required the party opposing arbitration to show actual prejudice before a waiver is found. *See Toler's Cove Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Trident Const. Co.*, 355 S.C. 605, 612, 586 S.E.2d 581, 585 (2003) ("In order to establish waiver, a party must show prejudice through an undue burden caused by delay in demanding arbitration."); *Rich v. Walsh*, 357 S.C. 64, 71, 590 S.E.2d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2003) ("South Carolina has primarily . . . followed the approach adopted by the federal courts of the Fourth Circuit and other jurisdictions which require a showing of actual prejudice before finding waiver."); *Evans v. Accent Manufactured Homes, Inc.*, 352 S.C. 544, 550, 575 S.E.2d 74, 76-77 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Mere inconvenience to an opposing party is not sufficient to establish prejudice, and thus invoke the waiver of right to arbitrate."). Here, Client has not alleged any prejudice she will suffer if required to resolve the fee dispute through the Board. *See Rich*, 357 S.C. at 72, 590 S.E.2d at 510 ("The party seeking to establish waiver has the burden of showing prejudice."). Client will still be able to litigate her counterclaims against Attorney, as they are still under the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Furthermore, if dissatisfied with the decision of the Board, Client will be able to seek review of the decision with the circuit court. *See* Rule 416, SCACR, Rule 20; *Wright v. Dickey*, 370 S.C. 517, 521, 636 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ct. App. 2006) "[Rule 416, SCACR] provides that a party may appeal a final decision of the Board to the circuit court on certain limited grounds.").

⁴ We also note the procedure under Rule 416, SCACR, for resolving a fee dispute before the Board is inconsistent with the arbitration procedures outlined in the Uniform Arbitration Act. For this reason, we believe Client's reliance on arbitration decisions is misplaced.

B. Withdrawal of Consent

Client next argues the circuit court lacked legal authority to compel Client to appear before the Board because Client did not consent to the Board's jurisdiction. Specifically, Client asserts Rule 416, SCACR, requires the client to give written consent to the Board's jurisdiction *after* the fee dispute arises.

We find Client consented to the jurisdiction of the Board as required under Rule 9 of Rule 416, SCACR, by signing the fee agreement. The rule does not draw a distinction between a client who consents to jurisdiction prior to the representation and one who gives consent after a fee dispute arises. *See* Rule 416, SCACR, Rule 9(b) ("No application will be accepted from an attorney unless accompanied by the client's written consent to jurisdiction and consent to be bound by the final decision of the Board."). Here, Client entered into a valid contract, the plain language of which contemplated that when a fee dispute arises it would be sent to the Board for a resolution. *See Jordan v. Sec. Grp., Inc.*, 311 S.C. 227, 230, 428 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1993) ("Where the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument's force and effect."). By signing the contract and agreeing to be bound by the terms of the fee agreement, the parties conferred exclusive jurisdiction to the Board over fee disputes. *See Bailey v. Bailey*, 312 S.C. 454, 459, 441 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1997) (noting exclusive jurisdiction over a fee dispute vests in the Board upon a client's consent to be bound). Accordingly, we find the circuit court was within its authority to enforce the contractual provision and send the fee dispute to the Board.

C. Applicability of the Uniform Arbitration Act

Finally, Client argues that because the Board is effectively an arbitral body, the fee dispute provision was required to comply with the portions of the Uniform Arbitration Act that require all arbitration clauses to appear conspicuously on the first page of a contract. Client argues the fee dispute provision here is unenforceable because it appears on the second page of the fee agreement.

Section 15-48-10(a) of the South Carolina Code (2005) requires certain arbitration agreements to be "typed in underlined capital letters, or rubber stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract." Otherwise, the provision is unenforceable. The Uniform Arbitration Act does not apply, however, to "pre-agreement[s] entered into when the relationship of the contracting parties is such that of lawyer-client." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3) (2005).

While we acknowledge the resolution of a fee dispute before the Board is similar to arbitration, section 15-48-10(b)(3) of the Uniform Arbitration Act explicitly states that pre-agreements between an attorney and a client are not subject to the requirements of the Uniform Arbitration Act. In the present case, the agreement between Attorney and Client cannot fairly be categorized as anything other than a "pre-agreement entered into when the relationship of the contracting parties is such that of lawyer-client." Furthermore, even if we were to accept Client's argument—that the fee agreement falls under the purview of the Uniform Arbitration Act—we note that orders compelling arbitration are not immediately appealable. *See* section 15-48-200(a) of the South Carolina Code (2005) (listing orders related to arbitration that are subject to immediate appeal); *Toler's Cove Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.*, 355 S.C. at 610, 586 S.E.2d at 584 (2003) (stating that all orders relating to arbitration not mentioned in section 15-48-200(a) are not immediately appealable). Accordingly, we find the circuit court correctly found the Uniform Arbitration Act was inapplicable to the current case.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the circuit court order compelling Client and Attorney to resolve their fee dispute before the Board. We further find the Uniform Arbitration Act is inapplicable to fee agreements entered into between an attorney and client. Therefore, the order of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED

THOMAS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

The South Carolina Court of Appeals

Jean P. Derrick, Respondent,



v.


Lisa C. Moore, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

ORDER

The Respondent's petition for rehearing is granted. We dispense with further briefing and argument. The attached opinion is substituted for the previous opinion, which is withdrawn.

 C.J.
 J.

 J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:

Robert Daniel Dodson, Esquire
William S. Tetterton, Esquire
Katherine Carruth Goode, Esquire

FILED

April 24, 2019

The South Carolina Court of Appeals

Jean P. Derrick, Respondent,


v.


Lisa C. Moore, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

ORDER

After careful consideration of the Appellant's petition for rehearing, the Court is unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or disregarded, and hence, there is no basis for granting a rehearing. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied.

 C.J.
 J.

 J.

Columbia, South Carolina

cc:

Robert Daniel Dodson, Esquire

William S. Tetterton, Esquire

Katherine Carruth Goode, Esquire

FILED

April 24, 2019

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

DeAndrea Gist Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Jean P. Derrick,

v. Respondent,

Lisa C. Moore.

Appellant.

RECEIVED
FEB 05 2019
SC Court of Appeals

PETITION FOR REHEARING

February 5, 2019

Robert D. Dodson, Esquire
Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, SC 29201
Telephone: 803-252-2600
Facsimile: 803-771-2259

Attorney for Appellant

With all due respect to this Court, the Court's opinion is in error because it effectively rewrites the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 416.

In its opinion, this Court writes: "We find Client consented to the jurisdiction of the Board as required under Rule 9 of Rule 416, SCACR, by signing the fee agreement." However, and with all due respect to this Court, signing a fee agreement does not satisfy Rule 9 of Rule 416, SCACR. Rule 9(b) states:

No application will be accepted from an attorney unless accompanied by the client's written consent to jurisdiction and consent to be bound by the final decision of the Board. Thereafter, both parties are bound. (Emphasis added).

Rule 9 requires an "application" not a "fee agreement." A fee agreement is not application as required by Rule 9, even if signed by the client.

Rule 9 is clear – it requires an "application...accompanied by the client's written consent." Emphasis added. The facts in this case are equally clear and are not disputed: Respondent never submitted an "application...accompanied by client's written consent." Emphasis added. Instead, Respondent sought to have the lower court and this court rewrite Rule 416 in at least two important respects. First, by effectively changing the wording of Rule 9 from "application" to "fee agreement." Second, by effectively adding and changing the language Rule 9 so that the rule now vests the courts with the legal authority to compel arbitration through the Board based on a court order instead of an "application...accompanied by client's written consent."

Respectfully, Appellant requests rehearing and oral arguments for this Court to reconsider that portion of its opinion outlined above.

Respectfully submitted,

February 5, 2019



Robert D. Dodson, Esquire

Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A.
1722 Main Street, Suite 200
Columbia, SC 29201
Telephone: 803-252-2600
Facsimile: 803-771-2259

Attorney for Appellant

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2014-CP-28-00940
Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Jean P. Derrick,

Respondent,

v.

Lisa C. Moore,

Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 221 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, Respondent, Jean P. Derrick, by and through her undersigned counsel, files this petition for rehearing, for the purpose of asking the Court of Appeals to correct one reference in its decision of this case, Published Opinion Number 5618, filed January 23, 2019.

In the last paragraph of page two of the opinion, the Court correctly recited the counterclaims asserted by Appellant, Lisa C. Moore, against Respondent in the answer and counterclaim filed in the lower court. In the last paragraph on page five of the

opinion, the Court stated, "Client will still be able to litigate her counterclaims for potential malpractice and unfair trade practices against Attorney, as they are still under the jurisdiction of the circuit court."

Respondent respectfully petitions the Court to delete from this sentence the reference to the counterclaims as claims "for potential malpractice." No claim for legal malpractice has been filed by Appellant against Respondent, and therefore no claim for legal malpractice is within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. See Answer and Counterclaim of Defendant, Record on Appeal, pages 40-46. Respondent respectfully suggests that the sentence quoted above be corrected to read as follows: "Client will still be able to litigate her counterclaims against Attorney, as they are still under the jurisdiction of the circuit court."

Respectfully submitted,



William S. Tetterton
Tetterton Law Firm, LLC
608 Lafayette Avenue
Post Office Box 530
Camden, South Carolina 29021
Telephone: (803) 432-1496
South Carolina Bar no. 5509

Katherine Carruth Goode
229 South Congress Street
Post Office Box 1175
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180
Telephone: (803) 799-4440
South Carolina Bar no. 8951

Attorneys for Respondent

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2014-CP-28-00940
Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Jean P. Derrick,

Respondent,

v.

Lisa C. Moore,

Appellant.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I served the Respondent's petition for rehearing, by mailing a copy, postage pre-paid, to Appellant's counsel of record, Robert D. Dodson, Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A., 1722 Main Street, Suite 200, Columbia, South Carolina 29201, on February 7, 2019.



Katherine Carruth Goode
229 South Congress Street
Post Office Box 1175
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180
Telephone: (803) 799-4440
South Carolina Bar no. 8951
Attorney for Respondent

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2014-CP-28-00940
Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Jean P. Derrick,

Respondent,

v.

Lisa C. Moore,

Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S RETURN TO
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

Respondent, Jean P. Derrick, by and through her undersigned counsel, files this return to the petition for rehearing filed by appellant, Lisa C. Moore. The Court should deny appellant's petition for rehearing.

Appellant incorrectly asserts that the decisions of the lower court and of the Court of Appeals in this case effectively rewrite Rule 9 of Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. No such effect occurs.

This action began with the service and filing of a complaint seeking payment of the attorney's fees owed by appellant ("Client") to respondent ("Attorney") under the fee agreement entered into by the parties at the outset of Attorney's representation of Client. That agreement provided: "Any dispute concerning the fee due pursuant to this agreement shall be submitted by the dissatisfied party for a full, final resolution to the Resolution Fee Disputes Board of the South Carolina Bar, pursuant to Rule 416 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules." R. p. 34. At the time the complaint was filed by Attorney, Client had never before disputed the amount of Attorney's fees, therefore no dispute existed for Attorney to seek to have resolved by the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board ("Board").

Client filed an answer and counterclaim in which, for the first time, she disputed the reasonableness and propriety of Attorney's fees. Thus, for the first time, a dispute existed as to which either party could seek resolution by the Board. Attorney moved to have Client compelled to resolve the dispute through the Board, on the basis of Client's prior agreement to do so. Based on the agreement in which Client consented to the Board's jurisdiction, the lower court held, "[b]ecause [Client] disputes the fee for numerous alleged reasons, this Court finds that it is proper to take these matters up with the [Board]." R. p. 24. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to compel. R. p. 24. The court's ruling was correct, and this Court properly affirmed that ruling.

Client now asserts that this result alters the mechanism for bringing a fee dispute before the Board, because no application has been filed with the Board for resolution of the dispute. No application has yet been filed because the issue first arose in this litigation. Until the court ruled on the motion to compel, and until that ruling becomes

final at the conclusion of the appeal process, no application could be filed. If at the conclusion of this appeal, the lower court's order is affirmed, Attorney will file the application, accompanied by Client's written consent, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the Board in accordance with Rule 9(b) of Rule 416. It is simply incorrect that the effect of this Court's decision affirming the lower court's grant of the motion to compel is to alter the procedure for bringing a fee dispute before the Board. This claim of the petition for rehearing is without merit.

This claim of the petition for rehearing is also not properly before the appellate court. In the lower court, Client never raised a contention that the granting of the motion to compel has the effect of rewriting Rule 9 of Rule 416 by eliminating the requirement of an application, as she now argues. In her appellate brief, Client made an argument premised on Rule 10 with respect to the method for commencing a Rule 416 proceeding, but that argument also had not been made in the court below. See Final Brief of Appellant, page 5. No argument was asserted in the court below with respect to the method for commencing a proceeding under Rule 416, a preservation deficiency pointed out in the Final Brief of Respondent, page 12-13, citing *Wilder Corp. v. Wilke*, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998); *Easterling v. Burger King Corp.*, 416 S.C. 437, 453, 786 S.E.2d 443, 451 (Ct.App. 2016). This new version of the argument premised on Rule 10, raised for the first time on appeal, should not be entertained because it is procedurally barred.

Finally, Client continues to maintain in her petition for rehearing that the effect of the court's ruling is to "compel arbitration." As this Court correctly held, attorney-client fee disputes are specifically excluded from the ambit of South Carolina's Uniform

Arbitration Act. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(b)(3). The dispute resolution methodology of Rule 416, while similar to arbitration, is not arbitration subject to the requirements of the arbitration act, and the lower court order and appellate decision in this case do not "compel arbitration."

Contrary to Client's assertions in her petition for rehearing, nothing in the Court's analysis of the issue before it alters the procedures for bringing a matter before the Board. That procedure will be initiated through application accompanied by the client's written consent to the jurisdiction of the Board, as required by Rule 9(b) of Rule 416, when the lower court's order becomes final upon the completion of this appeal.

For all these reasons, the appellant's petition for rehearing should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,



William S. Tetterton
Tetterton Law Firm, LLC
608 Lafayette Avenue
Post Office Box 530
Camden, South Carolina 29021
Telephone: (803) 432-1496
South Carolina Bar no. 5509

Katherine Carruth Goode
229 South Congress Street
Post Office Box 1175
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180
Telephone: (803) 799-4440
South Carolina Bar no. 8951

Attorneys for Respondent

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals

APPEAL FROM KERSHAW COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Case No. 2014-CP-28-00940
Appellate Case No. 2016-000804

Jean P. Derrick,

Respondent,

v.

Lisa C. Moore,

Appellant.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I certify that I served the Respondent's Return to Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, by mailing a copy, postage pre-paid, to Appellant's counsel of record, Robert D. Dodson, Law Offices of Robert Dodson, P.A., 1722 Main Street, Suite 200, Columbia, South Carolina 29201, on February 19, 2019.


Katherine Carruth Goode
229 South Congress Street
Post Office Box 1175
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180
Telephone: (803) 799-4440
South Carolina Bar no. 8951
Attorney for Respondent