

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In the Supreme Court

RECEIVED

MAY 29 2019

S.C. SUPREME COURT

APPEAL FROM GEORGETOWN COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5327 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed February 9, 2017)

Georgetown County, Appellate/Petitioner,

v.

Davis & Floyd, Inc., Republic Contracting Corporation,
S&ME, Inc., The South Carolina Department of Transportation
and The City of Georgetown, Defendants,

Of Whom

The South Carolina Department of Transportation and
The City of Georgetown, Respondents.

**JOINT RETURN OF CITY OF GEORGETOWN AND SOUTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TO
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

David L. Morrison, Esquire
SC Bar No.: 4101
MORRISON LAW FIRM, LLC
7453 Irmo Drive, Suite B
Columbia, South Carolina 29212
Telephone: (803) 661-6285
Facsimile: (803) 661-6289
Email: david@dmorrison-law.com
*Attorney for Respondent
The City of Georgetown*

and

Lisa A. Reynolds, Esquire
SC Bar No.: 15527
ANDERSON & REYNOLDS, LLC
37 ½ Broad Street
P.O. Box 87
Charleston, SC 29402
Telephone: (843) 723-0185
Facsimile: (843) 405-0313
Email: lreynolds@arlawsc.com
Attorney for Respondent
The South Carolina Department of
Transportation

INDEX

Statement of Issue on Appeal	1
Statement of the Case	1
Facts of the Case	3
Arguments	3
I. The Circuit Court did not err in ordering that the Article I, Section 13 of the South Carolina Constitution applies to private property	4
A. The Circuit Court did not err in not adding language To the South Carolina Constitution that is not Contained therein	4
B. Home rule does not change the nature of public property .	8
C. The Trial Judge’s Order does not work an absurdity	10
D. The Trial Judge’s Order does not work an absurdity	14
II. Inverse condemnation is not the same as eminent domain	17
III. The Court did not err in ordering that public policy does not require the Circuit Court to add language to the South Carolina Constitution that is not contained there	21
Conclusion	23

STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL

Respondents would respectfully restate the issue on appeal as follows:

DOES THE TERM "PRIVATE PROPERTY" AS CONTAINED IN THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAUSE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION, INCLUDE PUBLIC PROPERTY OWNED BY A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY SUCH THAT ONE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY MAY SUE ANOTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY IN INVERSE CONDEMNATION PURSUANT TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION FOR ALLEGED UNINTENTIONAL DAMAGE TO NON-ABUTTING PROPERTY AS THE RESULT OF A PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT?

INTRODUCTION

The issue on appeal involves an alleged inverse condemnation. The South Carolina Constitution states in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation being first made for the property. (Emphasis added). The only issue decided by the lower court in striking the inverse condemnation claim is that Georgetown County cannot assert an inverse condemnation since the takings clause is limited to "private" not public property. The Georgetown County property at issue here is public property. The term "private property" is clear and unambiguous. The inclusion of the word "private" is a limiting term which specifically excludes "public" property. As such, the takings clause of the constitution can only be interpreted to prohibit the taking of private, not public, property.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant filed its Complaint on October 25, 2013 (R. p. 11) and its Amended Complaint on July 10, 2014 (R. p. 34) against Respondents, the engineers and contractors who performed work on the public project. Respondents filed their Answers on November 21, 2013, (R. p. 52) and January 22, 2014, (R. p. 68). Appellant asserted various claims against the Respondents including an inverse condemnation cause of action. (ROA p. 34). On May 2, 2014, Appellant

moved for Summary Judgment on their inverse cause of action against Respondents. (R. p. 76). Respondent SCDOT filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's motion and moved to dismiss the inverse condemnation cause of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCPP. (R. p. 118). A hearing on Appellant's motion was held on August 7, 2014. (R. p. 287).

Respondents argued in defense to Appellant's motion at the hearing August 7, 2014 hearing. (R. p. 287). Following arguments, the trial court requested further briefing on the legal issue regarding private property versus public property (R. pp. 309-310). Appellant filed their Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. p. 158). Respondent SCDOT filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's Motion (R. p. 167) and Respondent City filed a Brief on the Legal Issue of Whether Georgetown County Can Assert an Inverse Condemnation Claim Under the Law. (R. p. 178). Appellant filed a Reply Brief in response to Respondents' filings. (R. p. 193). Thereafter Respondents filed responses thereto, Respondent SCDOT Response Brief (R. p. 206) and Respondent City's Reply Brief (R. p. 213). Thereafter another hearing was held on this matter on April 30, 2015. (R. p. 314). The Court denied Appellant's motion and granted Respondent's Motion orally on April 30, 2015. (R. p. 349). The written Order, from which this appeal stems, was entered on November 12, 2015 ("Order"). (R. p. 1). The Court specifically limited its ruling to the legal issue of whether Appellant could bring an inverse condemnation claim against Respondents for alleged unintentional damage to public, not private, property as the result of a public works project.

(R. p. 1). Appellant filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCPP Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend on November 13, 2015. (R. p. 221). Arguments on Appellant's Motion to Reconsider were held on August 5, 2016 (R. p. 353) and the court entered an order denying same on January 17, 2017. (R. p. 7). Again, the Court specifically limited its ruling to the constitutional issue. (R. p. 7).

Appellant filed their Notice of Intent to Appeal. The sole issue on appeal is the constitutional issue of whether the term “private property” as contained in the inverse condemnation clause of the South Carolina Constitution, include public property owned by a governmental entity such that one governmental entity may sue another governmental entity in inverse condemnation pursuant to the South Carolina Constitution for alleged unintentional damage to non-abutting property as the result of a public works project.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Georgetown County (Appellant) brought this action seeking recovery for property damage allegedly caused by a public works project allegedly constructed by the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) and/or the City of Georgetown (City) (collectively Respondents). (R. p 34). Appellant alleges there was a joint project between the Respondents to relieve flooding that occurs in Georgetown, South Carolina during heavy rains. (R. pp. 81-82).¹ The alleged joint project included work performed on public rights of way and property. (R. p. 82). Appellant alleges that during this construction subsurface water was pumped from the ground that caused changes in the subsurface of Georgetown, South Carolina and caused damage to non-abutting public properties some distances away. (R. p. 83; p. 14, ¶ 23; p. 15, ¶ 24-25).

ARGUMENTS

The City of Georgetown and the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) jointly respond to Appellant, Georgetown County’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals, like the lower court, correctly found that

¹ The City of Georgetown disputes that this was a joint project. The issues surrounding the City’s participation in the project and the existence of any affirmative act for purposes of inverse condemnation were raised but not reached by the lower court. The only issue reached by the lower court and the only issue for this appeal is whether the County can bring an inverse condemnation claim when its property is clearly public, not private, property.

Georgetown County cannot bring an inverse condemnation claim against the South Carolina Department of Transportation and the City of Georgetown as there has been no alleged taking of “private” property since Georgetown County does not own private property.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND THAT ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION APPLIES TO PRIVATE, NOT PUBLIC, PROPERTY.

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN NOT ADDING LANGUAGE TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION THAT IS NOT CONTAINED THEREIN.

The word “private” is unambiguous and the court did not err in giving it its plain ordinary meaning. “When this Court is called upon to interpret our Constitution, we are guided by the ‘ordinary and popular meaning of the words used....’” *Richardson v. Town of Mt. Pleasant*, 350 S.C. 291, 566 S.E.2d 523 (2002). “A word used in the Constitution should be given its ‘plain and ordinary’ meaning.” *Id.* “Under the plain and ordinary meaning rule, it is not the court’s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.” *In re Vincent J.*, 333 S.C. 233, 509 S.E.2d 261 (1998). Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.” *Id.*, at 233, 509 S.E.2d at 262 (citing *Paschal v. State Election Comm’n*, 317 S.C. 434, 454 S.E.2d 890 (1995)). “What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature.” *Hodges v. Rainey*, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000). Article I, § 13 of the South Carolina Constitution is contained in the Bill of Rights to the SC Constitution. The Bill of Rights is a charter of negative powers, that is, it prevents the government from depriving the citizens of their basic rights. The Bill of Rights was never designed or intended to protect the government. The term “private property” is clear and unambiguous.

The Appellant has supplied no caselaw wherein the term “private property” has been found to be ambiguous. Appellant cites no South Carolina case that has interpreted the word “private” to include “public” in its meaning, nor any instance in which a South Carolina court has ruled that article I, section 13 applies to public as well as private entities. This Court must interpret article I, section 13’s use of the term “private property” according to its plain meaning. This constitutional language is unambiguous and therefore the Court is confined to reviewing the words of the provision itself. Black’s Law Dictionary 2nd Edition defines property private as “the term that describes property belonging to a person or person's and not to a community.” The Court of Appeals correctly found that “private” is the antonym of “public” and therefore the term private property as used in the Takings Clause of the South Carolina Constitution applies only to privately owned property, not publicly owned property.

The Supreme Court of Missouri recently considered this issue in a strikingly similar case. In *Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors*, 476 S.W.3d 913, (Mo. 2016) the sewer district (MSD) sued the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors in inverse condemnation for the alleged unintentional damage to the sewers underground pipes as the result of a city public project. “Article I, section 26 of the Missouri Constitution provides ‘[t]hat private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.’” *Id.* MSD, as Appellant did here, did not contest that it is a public entity, that the property allegedly taken was the property of a public entity or that the constitutional article expressly provides that “private property” shall not be taken without compensation. MSD, like Appellant, argued that the court should interpret the words “private property” as used in the constitutional article to include public property that is damaged by other public entities “either by ignoring the word ‘private’, by defining ‘private’ to include ‘public’, or by adding by implication the word ‘public’ because there is no good policy

reason why just compensation should not be provided to public entities whose property has been taken by another public entity when private entities are so entitled.” *Id.* Missouri rejected MSD’s arguments finding that MSD, like Appellant, cited no Missouri case that interpreted the word “private” to include “public” in its meaning, nor any instance in which a Missouri court had ruled that article I, section 26 applied to public as well as private entities. The Court held that, like Appellant in this case, MSD asked ‘the [c]ourt to act as a legislature or to add a provision to the constitution that is not there.’ *Id.* The Missouri Supreme Court held that “is not a role this Court can undertake.” *Id.* “The Court must interpret article I, section 26’s use of the term ‘private property’ according to its plain meaning.” *Id.*

“Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines ‘private as ‘belonging to or concerning an individual person, company or interest (~property). *WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY AT 1804, (3RD ED. 1993)*. ‘Public’ means authorized or administered by or on acting for the people as a political entity: government. *Id.* at 1836. These definitions unequivocally do not support reading the word ‘private’ to include within its meaning the word ‘public.’ To the contrary, the words are understood as antonyms.”

Id.

The court went on to hold that “article I, section 26 affirmatively limits its reach to private property. The meaning of this language is plain. It does not give a public entity a constitutional right to just compensation for the taking of its property.”

As in the *Metro, St. Louis Sewer District* case above, the constitutional language in Article I, § 13 of the SC Constitution is unambiguous and therefore the Court is confined to reviewing the words of the provision itself. Article I, § 13 affirmatively limits its reach to private property and as such the court did not err in not ignoring the word “private”, in not defining “private” to include “public”, or in not adding by implication the word “public.”

The issue of whether a governmental entity can bring an inverse condemnation action against another governmental entity for unintentional damage to public property as the result of a public works project has not been directly decided in this state. However, the issue has been addressed by the Supreme Court. The issue is addressed by *Edgefield County v. Georgia – Carolina Power Co.*, 104 S.C. 311, 88 S.E. 801 (1916). Appellant is correct in that the case was ultimately not decided on constitutional grounds but statutory grounds, however the Court addresses the issue of whether public property falls under the protection of the Constitution and states, “[a]nd it is true that, if the company should thereby flood the private property of the citizen, then under the constitutional protection it would need to make compensation to those persons who suffered a particular injury from the nuisance. But public property, we think, does not fall within the protection of the Constitution.” *Edgefield County v. Georgia – Carolina Power Co.*, 104 S.C. 311, 88 S.E. 801 (1916).

Appellant has cited eight cases which it contends support a constitutional taking analysis under these circumstances. However, none of those eight cases involves a constitutional analysis of private versus public property under a takings clause. In fact, most of those cases were decided on statutory grounds under statutory schemes unlike anything in South Carolina. Those cases have no application to the issue before the Court in this case.

Appellant’s position would make the word “private” meaningless and of no effect. As used, “private” is an adjective modifying property to describe the type of property affected. The inclusion of the word surely was for a purpose. Appellant’s view would read “private” out of the Constitution altogether – an illogical interpretation.

B. HOME RULE DOES NOT CHANGE THE NATURE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY NOR THE RESULT OF *EDGEFIELD COUNTY V. GEORGIA-CAROLINA POWER CO.*

South Carolina's movement to "Home Rule" in 1975 does not change the public nature of the property at issue in this case. In *Chesterfield County v. State Highway Dep't*, 191 S.C. 19, 3 S.E.2d 686 (1939), the Court reviewed the relationship between counties and the State and, citing Corpus Jurisprudence stated:

“[C]omprehensively considered, a county is an involuntary political or civil division of the state, created by statute to aid in the administration of government...[T]he authorities unite in holding that a county is a local, legal, political subdivision of the state, created out of the territory of the state, and that it is but an agency or arm of the state, created, organized, and existing for civil and political purposes, particularly for the purpose of administering locally the general powers and policies of the state.”

Home Rule did not abrogate State control of counties. The General Assembly implemented home rule and they decide/decided what powers local governments should have. As such, the State has the authority to give, modify or remove grants of power to local governments. *Hospitality Ass'n of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Charleston*, 320 S.C. 219, 464 S.E.2d 113 (1995). In a footnote to Attorney General Opinion No. 87-76, the Attorney General states, “[c]ounties or municipalities are arms or subdivisions of the State, subject to legislative control, created and existing with a view to the policy of the State and serving as its agencies...Accordingly, as a general rule, counties (or municipalities) may not sue the State or its agencies.” “The county is but another manifestation of the state; it is an arm of the state.” *Edgefield County v. Georgia – Carolina Power Co.*, 104 S.C. 311, 88 S.E. 801 (1916). “Counties are subdivisions of the State, subordinate and subject to legislative control, created and existing with a view to the policy of the State and serving as its agencies.” *Parker v. Bates*, 216 S.C. 52, 56 S.E.2d 723 (1949). “The power to ‘sue and be sued’ given to almost all political subdivisions does not extend to a challenge of the

acts of the creator of those subdivisions.” *Richland County Recreation Dist. v. Columbia*, 290 S.C. 93, 348 S.E.2d 363 (1986):

The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that there is a difference between transactions involving the State and private individuals and those between the State and a municipal corporation, such as a county. “[B]etween the State and municipal corporations, such as cities, counties, and towns, the relation is different from that between the State and the individual. Municipal corporations are mere instrumentalities of the State, for the convenient administration of government; and their powers may be qualified, enlarged, or withdrawn, at the pleasure of the legislature.” *Tippecanoe County v. Lucas*, 93 U.S. 108, 114, 23 L.Ed. 822 (U.S. 1876). The Supreme Court further discussed the relationship between a State and a county in *Trenton v. New Jersey*, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S. Ct. 534, 536, 67 L. Ed. 937 (U.S. 1923):

“The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state.” *Id.* “The state, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.”

In *Edgefield*, the Georgia-Carolina Power Co. built a dam which obstructed the Savannah River and a creek causing the water to back up and flood and destroy the public highway of Edgefield County. The Court decided it was within the power of the Legislature to subject the highway in Edgefield to be overflowed, and the county did not have a right to complain about it. *Id.* “The constitutional prohibition to take private property without making compensation therefore has no application to the taking of public property.” *Id.* Appellant argues that *Edgefield* has no implications here as it was decided before South Carolina adopted Home Rule. In making

that assertion Appellant ignores the facts of Edgefield in that the County was operating under a grant of power from the state over the highways in the county and were seeking compensation for damages thereto.

Additionally, Appellant's argument that *Edgefield* does not apply as the adoption of Home Rule allowed it to own property separate for the first time ignores that counties could hold property separately from the State under the South Carolina Constitution of 1865, as well as, under statutory law in 1800's, more specifically, S.C. Code Section 41-1-10. Home Rule did not change the ability of Georgetown County to hold private property since it always had that right, therefore does not affect the constitutional analysis here.

C. FEDERAL TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE DICTATES THAT A LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL BODY HOLDING PUBLIC PROPERTY HAS NO CLAIM FOR INVERSE CONDEMNATION.

Federal Takings Clause jurisprudence does not support Appellant's contention that local governments are included in the definition of "private property" pursuant to the South Carolina Constitution Article 1, Section 13. Rights under the South Carolina Constitutional Takings Clause follow the breath of those same rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. South Carolina recognizes that its legal analysis of any takings claims or inverse condemnation claim is the same as that used by the federal courts in interpreting the Fifth Amendment takings clause.

In *Byrd v. City of Hartsville*, 365 S.C. 650, 620 S.E.2d 76 (2005), our Supreme Court said:

"The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 'nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' U.S. Const. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; *Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago*, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897)."

“In addition, the South Carolina Constitution states, “Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation being first made therefor.” S.C. Const. art. I, § 13. Takings analysis under South Carolina law is the same as the analysis under federal law. *Westside Quik Shop, Inc. v. Stewart*, 341 S.C. 297, 306, 534 S.E.2d 270, 275 (2000).”

Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 365 S.C. 650, 656, 620 S.E.2d 76, 79 (2005) @ footnote 6.

Therefore, reliance on federal takings law is appropriate. However, the cases cited by Appellant do not stand for the proposition espoused by Appellant. The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution applies to the state and local governments for the taking of their properties by the United States. *Ark. Game and Fish Com’n v. U.S.*, 568 U.S. 23, 133 S. Ct. 511, 184 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2012). Federal jurisprudence has not held that the takings clause of the US Constitution is applicable to an agency or arm of the federal government as against another agency or arm of the federal government. The states and local governments are not arms of the United States government. Here, Appellant and Respondents are arms of the same sovereign. The relationship between arms of the same sovereign are different from the relationship between two separate sovereigns. The question raised in the instant matter involves the application of the Takings Clause of the Constitution as between departmental arms of the same state or sovereign. This issue was addressed by the Missouri Supreme Court in the *Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. Bellefontaine Neighbors* cited above. Missouri stated that *United States v. 50 Acres of Land*, 469 U.S. 24, 105 S. Ct. 451, 83 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1984) is not applicable as *50 Acres* dealt with whether local governments should receive greater compensation than private landowners. Additionally, *50 Acres* cited *United States v Carmack*, 329 U.S. 230, 242, 67 S. Ct. 252, 91 L. Ed. 209 (1946) “[b]ut Carmack specifically said its rationale does not apply when the taking is of public property within one state or for when ‘a sovereign state transfers its own public property from one governmental use to another.’”

“Other states accordingly have recognized that the rationale of *50 Acres of Land* does not require a state or local public entity to compensate another state or local public entity for the taking of its property (absent a constitutional or statutory provision expressly so providing). For instance, *Evanston v. Regional Transp. Authority*, 202 Ill. App. 3d 265, 559 N.E.2d 998, 905-06, 147 Ill. Dec. 559 (Ill. App. 1990), held that ‘there is no authority that private property within the meaning of the 5th Amendment includes the public property of one political subdivision taken by another political subdivision of the same state.’ The Supreme Court of Georgia similarly rejected the relevance of *50 Acres of Land* to state proceedings, holding that a state constitutional requirement of just compensation for the taking of ‘private property’ did not require just compensation for the taking of ‘public’ lands in a state condemnation action because ‘[t]he relationship between the federal government and a state or a city is certainly different from the relationship between a state and a city.’” *Department of Transp. v. Atlanta*, 255 Ga. 124, 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985).

Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., Id. @ 920.

In *Evanston v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., Id.* the court stated:

“[i]t has been held that the reference to private property in the fifth amendment encompassed the property of State and local governments when condemned by the United States but there is no authority that private property within the meaning of the fifth amendment includes the property of a political subdivision taken by another political subdivision of the same State. RTA’s and PACE’s property was public property that was not protected by the United States Constitution’s just compensation clause.”

The court went on to hold that though “RTA’s and PACE’s property was not subject to Evanston’s control, but we hold that it was nevertheless public property that was not protected by the Illinois Constitution’s just compensation clause.” *Id.* Section 15 of article I of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided by law.” “[E]arly United States Supreme Court cases, is that a political subdivision of the State has no rights under the United States Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to its creator, the State.” *Evanston citing City of Newark v. New Jersey*, 262 U.S. 192, 43 S. Ct. 539, 67 L. Ed. 943 (1923) (the regulation of municipalities is within the domain of the State so that the city could not invoke the protection of the fourteenth amendment against the

State); *Trenton v. New Jersey*, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S. Ct. 534, 536, 67 L. Ed. 937 (U.S. 1923) (municipal corporation is merely a department of the State which may withhold, grant, or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit so that city could not attack State act as violative of due process and fifth amendment). *South Macomb Disposal Authority v. Township of Washington*, 790 F.2d 500, (6th Cir. 1986) (fourteenth amendment does not impose restrictions upon one political subdivision *vis-à-vis* another political subdivision); *Town of Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury*, 746 F.2d 1049, (5th Cir. 1984) (a municipal corporation cannot invoke the fourteenth amendment against another subdivision of the State). “Counties are subdivisions of the State, subordinate and subject to legislative control, created and existing with a view to the policy of the State and serving as its agencies.” *Parker v. Bates*, 216 S.C. 52, 56 S.E.2d 723 (1949); 1987 S.C. Op. Atty. Gen., 196 (S.C.A.G.), 1987 S.C. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 87-76, 1987 WL 245484. “A municipality or county has no vested rights which it may assert against the state and these entities have no vested rights in public property where the exercise of governmental powers is involved... Accordingly, as a general rule, counties (or municipalities) may not sue the State or its agencies.” 1987 S.C. Op. Atty. Gen., 196 (S.C.A.G.), 1987 S.C. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 87-76, 1987 WL 245484 (citing *Richland County Recreation Dist. v. Columbia*, 290 S.C. 93, 348 S.E.2d 363 (1986); *Hibernian Soc. v. Thomas*, 282 S.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 339 (Ct. App.1984).

Further, the Court in *Hibernian Society v. Thomas*, addressed the City maintaining a claim against the State to challenge a statute enacted by the State on equal protection grounds. The Court found that a “municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities ... which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.” *Hibernian Society v. Thomas*, 282 S.C. 465, 472 (1984) “Likewise, a governmental agency created and controlled by a state is not a “person” entitled, as against that state, to equal protection of the

laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” Federal law does not require compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause here, instead, federal law results in just the opposite result - that is, that the Takings Clause has no application.

D. THE TRIAL JUDGE’S ORDER DOES NOT WORK AN ABSURDITY.

Appellant cites *City of Chester v. Com., Dept. of Transp.*, 495 Pa. 382, 434 A.2d 695 (1981) for the proposition that the Pennsylvania Court has decided that to hold a public entity is not entitled to just compensation would lead to a highly absurd result. However, *City of Chester* involved the affirmative act of a physical taking of property for another entities permanent use under eminent domain and for reasons discussed below is not applicable to issue here. The Pennsylvania found that the constitution prohibition on taking only applied to private property and that the analysis of these two provisions are separate and distinct. *Sch. Dist. of Borough of Speers v. Com.*, 383 Pa. 206, 117 A.2d 702 (1955) also dealt with compensation under eminent domain act however the Court went further holding that:

“[c]onstitutional prohibitions against the taking of property without compensation apply only to privately owned property: Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.

Sch. Dist. of Borough of Speers, Id. @ 703

Appellant’s absurdity argument is misguided. Regarding at least some of the properties Appellant refers to, such burden is expressly the burden of Appellant per statute.

“The governing body of each county shall furnish the probate judge, auditor, superintendent of education, clerk of court, sheriff, treasurer and master in equity of their respective counties office room, together with necessary furniture and stationery for the same, which shall be kept at the courthouse of their respective counties, and it shall supply the offices of such officials with fuel, lights, postage and other incidentals necessary to the proper transaction of the legitimate business of such offices.”

S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-80.

“The governing bodies of the several counties shall make any alternations and additions deemed advisable, or which may become necessary, to any courthouse or jail built in the several counties.” S.C. Code Ann. § 4-17-60. “If at any time the courthouse of any county in this State shall be in course of reconstruction or repair or from any other cause shall not be in the condition to be occupied, the governing body of the county must furnish suitable rooms for the accommodation of the courts and public officers. S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-90. “Each county council shall ... establish within the county a county public library system” S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-35. “The governing authorities of each county shall provide office space and facility service, including janitorial, utility and telephone services, and related supplies, for its county Department of Social Services.” S.C. Code Ann. § 43-3-65. Appellant is provided funds from the State of SC for the funding of its offices, including the courthouse. “From funds distributed to the county pursuant to Section 6-27-40, a county council shall provide a reasonable amount of funds for all county offices of state agencies for which the council is require to provide funding by state law.” S.C. Code Ann. § 6-27-55. “No later than thirty days after the end of the calendar quarter, the State Treasurer shall distribute the monies appropriated to the Local Government Funds as follows: Eighty-three and two hundred seventy-eight thousandths percent must be distributed to counties.” S.C. Code Ann. § 6-27-40.

The construction of public projects would be severely impeded if one governmental entity incurred liability for inverse condemnation to another governmental entity when so much of the governmental entities properties in South Carolina lie within the physical boundaries of each other. Appellant alleges that Respondent DOT “can spread this burden over the taxpayers of the entire State.” *Appellant’s Initial Brief*, p. 17. Appellant is incorrect, Respondent DOT does not set or collect taxes from the citizens of the State of South Carolina. Respondent DOT is allocated monies

yearly by the Legislature and cannot spend that money for purposes or activities for which it was not allocated. “It shall be unlawful for any monies to be expended for any purpose or activity except that for which it is specifically appropriated, and no transfer from one appropriation account to another shall be made unless such transfer be provided for in the annual appropriation act.” S.C. Code Ann. § 11-9-10. Additionally, Appellant disputes the argument of spreading the cost across a larger tax base when this argument was made on behalf of the City. See *Appellant’s Brief* p. 22.

The State would constantly be shifting monies from one pocket to the other.

Allowing the County, as an alter ego of the state, to maintain an action against other state entities would be in effect allowing the state to sue itself.

“Comprehensively considered, a county is an involuntary political or civil division of the state, created by statute to aid in the administration of government. Separating this definition into the elements that compose it, and considering a county from the standpoint of its distinguishing characteristics, the authorities unite in holding that a county is a local, legal, political subdivision of the state, created out of the territory of the state, and that it is but an agency or arm of the state, created, organized, and existing for civil and political purposes, particularly for the purpose of administering locally the general powers and policies of the state.”

Chesterfield County v. State Highway Dep’t, 191 S.C. 19, 3 S.E.2d 686 (1939).

There is no absurd result here. The Court of Appeals order correctly reflects that the County’s remedy is not an action in inverse condemnation since that constitutional prohibition in the bill of rights is explicitly available to private property owners as a protection against governmental property grabs. That result does not leave the County without a potential remedy, as they have pled thirteen causes of action against the parties below, four of which are pled against SCDOT and the City of Georgetown.

II. INVERSE CONDEMNATION IS NOT THE SAME AS EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURES ACT DOES NOT APPLY.

“The term ‘inverse condemnation’ describes an action grounded, not on statutory condemnation power, but on the constitutional proscription.” *Vick v. South Carolina Dep’t of Transp.*, 347 S.C. 470, 556 S.E.2d 693 (Ct. App. 2001). The power to take private property for public use without an owner’s consent is one of the powers inherent in the concept of sovereignty. This clause, like the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which provides for just compensation for private property taken, is merely a limitation on the use of the power. It is not part of the power itself, but a condition upon which the power may be exercised. *United States v. Jones*, 109 U.S. 513, 3 S. Ct. 346, 27 L. Ed 1015 (1883). “It is a generally recognized principle that the state, as sovereign, has the power, by virtue of its very nature and without the benefit of any express grant thereof, to condemn for public purposes property located within its boundaries.” 35 ALR 1293. “The power of eminent domain does not originate in Article I, § 23. Instead, it is a power inherent in every sovereign state.” *Gober v. Stubbs*, 682 So. 2d 430, (Ala. 1996). “The right of eminent domain antedates constitutions, and is an incident of sovereignty, inherent in, and belonging to every sovereign State. *Steele v. County Commissioners*, 83 Ala. 304, 3 So. 761, 762 (Ala. 1887). Inverse condemnation is not simply the reverse of Eminent Domain. In South Carolina, a governmental entity that does not have the power of Eminent Domain can be held liable in inverse condemnation. “[A]s long as state acts through one of its arms in such a way as to deprive an **individual** of his property for public use, it is irrelevant whether the state arm doing the actual taking has eminent domain power.” *Mower v. Charleston County Parks and Recreation*, 361 S.C. 476, 605 S.E.2d 563 (emphasis added). “Liability for inverse condemnation is grounded in the Constitution, not in a statutory power of eminent domain or tort.” *Id.* at 481 n. 8, 605 S.E.2d @ 565 n. 8. Appellant has agreed in their memorandums that

a claim for inverse condemnation is based on the constitutional prohibition and not a tort or statutory condemnation powers.

The South Carolina Eminent Domain Procedures Act is just that, a procedural act, it is not and does not alter substantive law. S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-20 The General Assembly states its intent as:

This act amends the law of this State relating to procedures for acquisitions of property and to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. It is the intention of the General Assembly that this act is designed to create a uniform procedure for all exercise of eminent domain power in this State. It is not intended by the creation of this act to alter the substantive law of condemnation, and any uncertainty as to construction which might arise must be resolved in a manner consistent with this declaration. In the event of conflict between this act and any other law with respect to any subject governed by this act, this act shall prevail.

The South Carolina Eminent Procedures Act states “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall constitute the exclusive procedure whereby condemnation may be undertaken in this State.” S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-60. The Act defines condemnation as the “means to take property under the power of eminent domain.” S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-30. The Act speaks of the intentional acquisition of an interest in any real property necessary for any public purpose. S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-60. As such, an action under the Eminent Domain Act can only occur when a government entity, endowed with the power to condemn, affirmatively takes legal action to acquire interest in any real property for any public purpose.

Conversely, “An inverse condemnation can result from two instances: ‘An inverse condemnation can result from the governments physical appropriation of private property, or it may result from governmental-imposed limitations on the use of private property.’” *Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist.*, 382 S.C. 8, 675 S.E.2d 439 (2009) *citing* *Byrd v. City of Hartsville*, 365 S.C. 650, 620 S.E.2d 76 (2005). If it is a regulatory taking then there must be a balancing of all relevant

circumstances to determine whether the government has taken property. *Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City*, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S. Ct. at 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d at 631 (1978). Inverse condemnation actions are grounded in the self-executing takings clause of the Constitution. *First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles*, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1987).

This is a cause of action brought pursuant to inverse condemnation and not eminent domain and as such the law of eminent domain is not applicable. However, a review of the case law on this issue shows that the country is split on whether a public entity is entitled to compensation from another public entity pursuant to eminent domain. Other jurisdictions have addressed this issue of states taking county property without compensation, finding that no compensation was payable. *See State Highway Commission of New Mexico v. Board of County Commissioners of Dona Ana County*, 72 N.M. 86, 380 P.2d 830 (N.M. 1963) (“the property in question being public property and used for governmental purposes, the County cannot claim it is guaranteed compensation under this constitutional provision.”); *City of Cambridge v. Commissioner of Public Welfare*, 357 Mass. 183, 257 N.E.2d 782 (1970) (holding that property owned by municipality for public use may be taken by the state without payment of compensation.); *City of Worcester v. Commonwealth*, 185 N.E.2d 633, 345 Mass. 99 (1962) (no compensation was payable for the taking of municipal property which was used as a school and park for highway purposes); *New Castle County School Dist. v. State*, 424 A.2d 15, (Del. 1980) (“Property which is held in governmental capacity may be taken by the State for public use without payment of compensation therefor; property which is held in a proprietary capacity cannot be taken by the State unless just compensation is paid. This is the majority rule.”); *State ex rel. Department of Highways v. New Orleans*, 360 So. 2d 624, (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that taking of city property to construct highway intersection did not deprive city

of private property without due process of law and payment of compensation); *Board of Sup'rs v. State Highway Com.*, 188 Miss. 274, 194 So. 743 (Miss. 1940) (legislature may take or devote public land to an additional public use without paying any compensation).

Appellant appends to their Brief what they allege are the takings clauses of the constitutions of eight (8) states and assert that all of “these states of held that their respective takings clauses require payment of just compensation where one public entity has taken the property of another public entity.” Appellant is incorrect in this statement.² The cases which Appellant references therewith involve cases of proper eminent domain or do not address the issue of constitutional taking prohibition. Additionally, Pennsylvania has held that Art. I, Section 10 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution does not apply to public property. “Constitutional prohibitions against the taking of property without compensation apply only to privately owned property: Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. Therefore it has always been held that the Commonwealth may take property of a political subdivision or agency without payment therefor.” *Chester County Institution Dist. v. Commonwealth*, 341 Pa. 49, 17 A.2d 212 (1941), the right to compensation in such cases being only a matter of grace or allowance by the Legislature. *School Dist. v. Commonwealth*, 117 A.2d 702, 383 Pa. 206, (Pa. 1955). Pennsylvania distinguishes between cases pursuant to their eminent domain statute and the constitutional prohibition against taking private property. Appellant asserts that South Carolina’s taking clause should not be interpreted any differently yet they seek to enforce a cause of action for inverse condemnation against the City. In Alabama, inverse condemnation can only stand against a governmental entity that has the power of eminent domain. See *Sima Props., L.L.C. v. Cooper*, 236 So.3d 857 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).

² Appellant cites the wrong takings clause for Alabama. Appellant cites to Art. I, section 23. However, the takings clause for inverse condemnation purposes is found in Art. XII, section 235. See *Sima Props., L.L.C. v. Cooper*, 236 So.3d 857 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).

This is in contrast to South Carolina case law holding that “[a]s long as state acts through one of its arms in such a way as to deprive an individual of his property for public use, it is irrelevant whether the state arm doing the actual taking has eminent domain power.” *Mower v. Charleston County Parks and Recreation*, 361 S.C. 476, 605 S.E.2d 563.

The issue is not the exercise of the power of eminent domain but whether one public entity may bring a cause of action for inverse condemnation against another public entity for the unintentional damage to non-abutting property pursuant to the constitutional prohibition of taking private property. No power of eminent domain was exercised and the Court of Appeals correctly found that the Eminent Domain Procedures Act does not apply.

III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING THAT PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT REQUIRE THE CIRCUIT COURT TO ADD LANGUAGE TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION THAT IS NOT CONTAINED THEREIN.

“But for purposes of judicial application it may be regarded as well settled that a state has no public policy properly cognizable, by the Court, which is not derived from the established law of the state, as found in its Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions.” *Grant v. Butt*, 198 S.C. 298, 17 S.E.2d 689 (1941). As discussed in the sections above, South Carolina’s Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions do not support Appellant’s position in this matter. Appellant states that the “circuit court erred in ruling that public policy does not require SCDOT and City to pay just compensation to Georgetown County” (Appellant’s Initial Brief p. 21). Appellant states that “[P]ublic policy is derived from the established law of the state, as found in its Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions[.]” (Appellant’s Initial Brief, p. 21) yet they cite no South Carolina judicial decisions in support of their position that private property includes public property.

There is no authority under South Carolina law that private property includes public property of a political subdivision. Instead, the best reference to that under South Carolina law is

the Court in *Edgefield County v. Georgia–Carolina Power Co.*, 104 S.C. 311, 88 S.E. 801 (1916). In *Edgefield*, the Georgia-Carolina Power Co. built a dam which obstructed the Savannah River and a creek causing the water to back up and flood and destroy the public highway of Edgefield County. The Court decided it was within the power of the Legislature to subject the highway in Edgefield to be overflowed, and the county did not have a right to complain about it. “The constitutional prohibition to take private property without making compensation therefore has no application to the taking of public property.” *Id.* Appellant is correct in that the case was ultimately not decided on constitutional grounds but statutory grounds, however in reaching the issue of whether the legislature provided a mechanism for the County to be compensated the Court addresses the issue of whether public property falls under the protection of the Constitution and states, “[a]nd it is true that, if the company should thereby flood the private property of the citizen, then under the constitutional protection it would need to make compensation to those persons who suffered a particular injury from the nuisance. But public property, we think, does not fall within the protection of the Constitution.” *Id.*


Again, this result does not leave the County without a potential remedy. The County has twelve other causes of action pled with three additional causes of action against the City and SCDOT. Public policy does not require torturing the definition of “private” property to include admittedly public property as well.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law and reached the correct result. This court deny the writ of certiorari.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court deny the writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted:



David L. Morrison, Esquire
SC Bar No.: 004101
MORRISON LAW FIRM, LLC
7453 Irmo Drive, Suite B
Columbia, South Carolina 29212
Telephone: (803) 661-6285
Facsimile: (803) 661-6289
Email: david@dmorrison-law.com
Attorney for Respondent
City of Georgetown

and

Lisa A. Reynolds, Esquire
SC Bar No.: 15527
ANDERSON REYNOLDS & STEPHENS,
LLC
37 ½ Broad Street
P.O. Box 87
Charleston, SC 29402
Telephone: (843) 723-0185
Facsimile: (843) 405-0313
Email: lreynolds@arslawsc.com
Attorneys for Respondent
South Carolina Department of
Transportation

Columbia, South Carolina

May 29, 2019

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

RECEIVED

MAY 29 2017

APPEAL FROM GEORGETOWN COUNTY
Court of Common Pleas

S.C. SUPREME COURT

Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5327 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed February 9, 2017)

Georgetown County, Appellate/Petitioner,

v.

Davis & Floyd, Inc., Republic Contracting Corporation,
S&ME, Inc., The South Carolina Department of Transportation
and The City of Georgetown, Defendants,

Of Whom


The South Carolina Department of Transportation and
The City of Georgetown, Respondents.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned employee of Morrison Law Firm, LLC, attorney for the Defendant, City of Georgetown, does hereby certify that service of the **Joint Return of City of Georgetown and South Carolina Department of Transportation to Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari** in the above-captioned action was made upon the Appellate/Petitioner by placing same in the United States Mail, first class postage prepaid, at the below listed address

clearly indicated on said envelope this the 29th day of May, 2019, addressed as follows:

Louis H. Lang, Esquire
George A. Taylor, Esquire
Callison, Tighe & Robinson, LLC
Post Office Box 1390
Columbia, South Carolina 29202



Callie M. Morrison

Columbia, South Carolina